Ex Machina: Analytical Platforms, Law and the Challenges of Computational Legal Science
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AI4J – Artificial Intelligence for Justice
AI4J { Artificial Intelligence for Justice August 30, 2016 The Hague, The Netherlands Workshop at the 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2016) Workshop chairs Floris Bex Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University Tom van Engers Leibniz Center for Law, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam Henry Prakken Faculty of Law, University of Groningen; Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University Bart Verheij Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Engineering, University of Groningen Artificial intelligence is currently in the centre of attention of legal professionals. An abundance of startup companies explore the application of AI techniques in the domain of law, and there is even talk of artificially intelligent legal assistants disrupting the legal market space. Factors driving the increased attention for legal AI include: Technological breakthroughs in machine learning, natural language process- ing, ubiquitous computing, data science, and argumentation technology; The changing attitude towards technology in the legal domain; The much increased availability of legal data on the internet; The recent success of AI applications in the private and public domain; The success of technology supporting access to law, legal empowerment, and transparency; The increased need for norms embedded in technology (autonomous driving and warfare, big data analysis for crime fighting and counterterrorism). The aim of this workshop is to investigate opportunities and challenges -
Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity
A5_RUHL&KATZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2015 8:55 AM Measuring, Monitoring, and Managing Legal Complexity J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Martin Katz ABSTRACT: The American legal system is often accused of being “too complex.” For example, most Americans believe the Tax Code is too complex. But what does that mean, and how would one prove the Tax Code is too complex? Both the descriptive claim that an element of law is complex and the normative claim that it is too complex should be empirically testable hypotheses. Yet, in fact, very little is known about how to measure legal complexity, much less how to monitor and manage it. Legal scholars have begun to employ the science of complex adaptive systems, also known as complexity science, to probe these kinds of descriptive and normative questions about the legal system. This body of work has focused primarily on developing theories of legal complexity and positing reasons for, and ways of, managing it. Legal scholars thus have skipped the hard part— developing quantitative metrics and methods for measuring and monitoring law’s complexity. But the theory of legal complexity will remain stuck in theory until it moves to the empirical phase of study. Thinking about ways of managing legal complexity is pointless if there is no yardstick for deciding how complex the law should be. In short, the theory of legal complexity cannot be put to work without more robust empirical tools for identifying and tracking complexity in legal systems. This Article explores legal complexity at a depth not previously undertaken in legal scholarship. -
Evaluation of the Shreveport Predictive Policing Experiment
Safety and Justice Program CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Safety and Justice Program View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that ad- dress the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for re- search quality and objectivity. Evaluation of the Shreveport Predictive Policing Experiment Priscillia Hunt, Jessica Saunders, John S. -
A Philosophy of Technology for Computational Law
© Mireille Hildebrandt, draft chapter for OUP’s The Philosophical Foundations of Information Technology Law, eds. David Mangan, Catherine Easton, Daithí Mac Síthigh A philosophy of technology for computational law Abstract: This chapter confronts the foundational challenges posed to legal theory and legal philosophy by the surge of computational law. Two types of computational law are at stake. On the one hand we have artificial intelligence in the legal realm that will be addressed as data-driven law, and on the other hand we have the coding of self-executing contracts and regulation in the blockchain, as well as other types of automated decision making (ADM), addressed as code-driven law. Data-driven law raises problems due to its autonomic operations and the ensuing opacity of its reasoning. Code-driven law presents us with a conflation of regulation, execution and adjudication. Though such implications are very different, both types of computational law share assumptions based on the calculability and computability of legal practice and legal research. Facing the assumptions and implications of data- and code-driven law the chapter will first investigate the affordances of current, text-driven law, and relate some of the core tenets of the Rule of Law to those affordances. This will lead to an enquiry into what computational law affords in terms of legal protection, assuming that one of the core functions of the law and the Rule of Law is to protect what is not computable. Keywords: positive law, rule of law, legal certainty, justice, -
Predictive POLICING the Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations
Safety and Justice Program CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Safety and Justice Program View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that ad- dress the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for re- search quality and objectivity. Safety and Justice Program PREDICTIVE POLICING The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement Operations Walter L. -
Legal Technology & Informatics: Syllabus
Legal Technology & Informatics: Syllabus Think Outside The Bar Notre Dame Law School Spring Semester, 2015 Ron Dolin, JD, PhD, CoInstructor Jason Boehmig, JD, CoInstructor Synopsis: Legal technology is rapidly transforming both the practice and nature of law. This class seeks to explore both the current trends and the future possibilities of this transformation, as we begin to train the future generation of technology savvy lawyers, and technologists who understand the intricacies and potential of what the law could be. Legal informatics could be defined as a computational perspective of law: where does legal information reside, and how is it manipulated and transmitted? Note that there are no prerequisites for this class beyond an interest in the subject. There are numerous examples of technologically driven legal transformation. Case law search has moved from hard copy to closed digital systems such as Westlaw and LexisNexis, and into free cloudbased systems such as Google Scholar and Ravel Law. More and more statutes are available online. Changes can be seen in ediscovery, privacy, the delivery of (online) legal services, and the budding legal technology startup community. As a result, questions arise as to the proper statutory and ethical framework for the legal profession and the boundaries between humans and machines in implementing legal functions. Beyond the current and nearterm technologies, however, are core academic and philosophical questions that will have increasing import as machines gain in sophistication and capability. -
How Will AI Shape the Future of Law?
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Helsingin yliopiston digitaalinen arkisto How Will AI Shape the Future of Law? EDITED BY RIIKKA KOULU & LAURA KONTIAINEN 2019 Acknowledgements The editors and the University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab would like to thank the authors and interviewees for the time and effort they put into their papers. We would also like to thank the Faculty of Law at University of Helsinki and particularly the continuous kind support of Professor Kimmo Nuotio, the former dean of the faculty and the Lab’s unofficial godfather, for facilitating the Lab’s development and for helping us make the second Legal Tech Conference happen. In addition, we would like to express our gratitude to the conference sponsors, Finnish Bar Association, the Association of Finnish Lawyers, Edita Publishing, Attorneys at Law Fondia and Attorneys at Law Roschier as well as the Legal Design Summit community for their support. It takes a village to raise a conference. Therefore, we would like to thank everyone whose time and commitment has turned the conference and this publication from an idea into reality. Thank you to the attendees, speakers, volunteers and Legal Tech Lab crew members. RIIKKA KOULU & LAURA KONTIAINEN Legal Tech Lab, University of Helsinki 2019 University of Helsinki Legal Tech Lab publications © Authors and Legal Tech Lab ISBN 978-951-51-5476-7 (print) ISBN 978-951-51-5477-4 (PDF) Print Veiters Helsinki 2019 Contents Foreword 009 KIMMO NUOTIO I Digital Transformation of -
Establishing Discriminatory Purpose in Algorithmic Risk Assessment
NOTES BEYOND INTENT: ESTABLISHING DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE IN ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT Equal protection doctrine is bound up in conceptions of intent. Unintended harms from well-meaning persons are, quite simply, nonac- tionable.1 This basic predicate has erected a high bar for plaintiffs ad- vancing equal protection challenges in the criminal justice system. Notably, race-based challenges on equal protection grounds, which sub- ject the state to strict scrutiny review, are nonetheless stymied by the complexities of establishing discriminatory purpose. What’s more, the inability of courts and scholars to coalesce on a specific notion of the term has resulted in gravely inconsistent applications of the doctrine.2 States’ increasing use of algorithmic systems raises longstanding con- cerns regarding prediction in our criminal justice system — how to cat- egorize the dangerousness of an individual, the extent to which past behavior is relevant to future conduct, and the effects of racial dispari- ties.3 Integration of algorithmic systems has been defined by ambiva- lence: while they are touted for their removal of human discretion,4 they also readily promote and amplify inequalities — for example, through their consideration of protected characteristics and their interaction with existing systems tainted by legacies of inequality.5 Furthermore, algo- rithms, especially those incorporating artificial intelligence (AI), may operate in ways that are opaque, unpredictable, or not well understood. ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). 2 See Aziz Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1240–63 (2018) (presenting five definitions from the literature). 3 See Sonia K. -
Dan Katz on Legal Informatics, Corporate Law Firm Ownership and 21St Century Legal Education September 20, 2011 Dan Katz
Dan Katz on Legal Informatics, Corporate Law Firm Ownership and 21st Century Legal Education September 20, 2011 Dan Katz A recent article argues “65 percent of today’s elementary aged kids may end up doing work that hasn’t even yet been invented.” This is a thought provoking number and it points to the disruptive nature of innovation and its impact on a variety of labor markets. There is a portion of the downturn in legal hiring that is associated with the business cycle. When economic conditions improve – there should be a rebound. However, starting even before the recession, it is reasonably clear that a serious structural change was underway. Expect this broader trend to continue. As Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein have argued, we are at the very beginning of Law’s Information Revolution. Whether we like it or not, informatics, computing and technology are going to change both what it means to practice law and to “think like a lawyer.” Yesterday’s Fast is Today’s Slow: For better or for worse, when it comes to building software, there is nothing deeply exceptional about a subset of tasks undertaken by lawyers. In this vein, law is like other industries. The bundle of skills associated with the practice of law falls on a continuum – where a number of basic tasks have already been displaced by computation / automation / “soft” artificial intelligence. Faced with cost pressures, legal information technology is being leveraged to either automate or semi-automate tasks previously performed by teams of lawyers. Namely, a series of first generation innovations such as e-discovery and automated document generation have already imposed significant consequences on the legal services market. -
Communication Models in Law1
T. Bekrycht: Communication Models in Law 157 COMMUNICATION MODELS IN LAW1 by TOMASZ BEKRYCHT* Communication processes can be generally described with the use of two models. The first one adopts cybernetic perspective, while the second one adopts social per- spective. Cybernetic perspective leads to transmission conception of communication whereas the social one to convergent concept of it. Both communication models are deeply present in the legal discourses, i.e. in lawmaking discourse and discourse of application. The issue related to the analysis of communication models in law is a part of a comprehensive area, which in the literature on the subject is related to the problem of ideology of lawmaking and law application. Dynamic nature of our social and legal reality can be described, on the one hand, by means of the conceptual network of communication models and, on the other hand, by means of many models of law- making and law application created by Jerzy Wróblewski and socio-historical model of lawmaking developed by Ewa Kustra based on the models of law set out in the conception of Phillipe Nonet and Phillip Selznick. The paper describes the position of the above-mentioned models in these discourses. KEYWORDS Modelling, discourse of lawmaking, discourse of law application, communication models 1. INTRODUCTION The issue related to the analysis of communication models in law is a part of a comprehensive area, which in the literature on the subject is related to 1 The following text was prepared as a part of a research grant financed by National Science Center (Poland), No. DEC-2012/05/B/HS5/01111. -
A Comparison of Four Ontologies for the Design of Legal Knowledge Systems ?
Artificial Intelligence and Law 6: 27–57, 1998. 27 © 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. A Comparison of Four Ontologies for the Design of Legal Knowledge Systems ? PEPIJN R. S. VISSER and TREVOR J. M. BENCH-CAPON LIAL – Legal Informatics at Liverpool, Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, P.O. Box 147, Liverpool, L69 7ZF, United Kingdom, (+44) 151 - 794 3792, E-mail: {pepijn, tbc}@csc.liv.ac.uk Abstract. There is a growing interest in how people conceptualise the legal domain for the purpose of legal knowledge systems. In this paper we discuss four such conceptualisations (referred to as on- tologies): McCarty’s language for legal discourse, Stamper’s norma formalism, Valente’s functional ontology of law, and the ontology of Van Kralingen and Visser. We present criteria for a comparison of the ontologies and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the ontologies in relation to these criteria. Moreover, we critically review the criteria. 1. Introduction In the Oxford dictionary the word ontology is defined as the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being (Allen, 1990). The word ontology is used in AI research as well, although its meaning in the latter field is only remotely related to the original metaphysical meaning of the word†. In the latter field, ontologies are loosely defined as ‘explicit conceptualisations of a domain’ (Gruber, 1992). Recently the results of gathering explicit conceptualisations of knowledge-system domains has been recognised as a valuable effort in its own right, deserving of widespread attention (e.g., Wiederhold, 1994, p. 7). This trend can also be seen in the legal domain, for instance, Moles and Dayal argue that researchers in the field of AI and Law should study the (implicit) ‘assumptions being made about the nature of law’ (Moles & Dayal, 1992, p. -
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN Vanderbilt University Law School, 131 21St Ave., Nashville, Tenn
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN Vanderbilt University Law School, 131 21st Ave., Nashville, Tenn. 37203-1181 Phone: (615) 343 2059; Fax: 322 6631; E-mail: [email protected] LEGAL AND PRE-LEGAL EDUCATION LL.M., University of Virginia Law School, 1979. J.D., University of Virginia Law School, 1977. A.B., Princeton University, 1973. LEGAL TEACHING EXPERIENCE Appointments: Vanderbilt University: Professor of Law, 7/08-present; Milton Underwood Professor of Law, 10/09 - present; Professor, Department of Psychiatry (secondary appointment), 2/09 - present. University of Florida: Stephen C. O’Connell Chair, 8/98-7/08; Alumni Research Scholar, 6/94-8/98; Prof., 3/87; Associate Prof., 3/85-3/87; Assistant Prof., 9/82-3/85; Affiliate Prof., Dep’t Psychiatry, 3/95-7/08. University of South Florida: Adjunct Professor, Department of Mental Health, 6/86 - present. Visitorships: Oxford University, Centre for Criminology (Fellowship), 5/17-7/17. Stanford Law School, Edwin A. Heafey Visiting Scholar, 9/06-5/07. University of California, Hastings Law School, 1/05-5/05; 1/03-5/03. University of Frankfurt Law School, Frankfurt, Germany, 4/01-7/01. University of Southern California Law School, 1/00-5/00. Monash University, Melbourne, Australia, 2/91-6/91. University of Virginia Law School, 8/88-6/89. University of Nebraska Law School, 6/88-8/88. Kiev University Law School, Kiev, Ukraine, Fulbright Scholar, 10/87-12/87. Courses Taught Criminal Procedure I & II Mental Health Law Professional Responsibility Comparative Criminal Procedure Health Law Evidence Criminal Law Law & Social Science Civil Procedure White Collar Crime Forensic Practicum Introduction to Law Teaching Awards/Evaluations: Average overall evaluation score, fall, 2003 through fall, 2020 at UF and Vanderbilt: 4.6 (out of 5) Hall-Hartman Outstanding Professor Award, Hartman Division, Vanderbilt University, 2018-2019 Chosen to create Vanderbilt-Coursera Course on “Hot Topics in Criminal Justice” (six 90-minute lectures, 5/19).