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Contents The Cult of the Offensive:

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Cult of the Offensive: The Islamic The Islamic State on Defense State on Defense By Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello By Michael Knights and Alexandre Mello

REPORTS 7 Chad: A Precarious Counterterrorism Partner By Margot Shorey and Benjamin P. Nickels

11 Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria By Adrian Shtuni

14 Canadian Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria By Christopher Anzalone

20 A View From the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Tom Wheelock By LTC Bryan Price

23 Jamaat-ud Daawa: Into the Mainstream By Animesh Roul

26 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts An image from an Islamic State video, showing improvised rockets during an attack in April at Al-bu-Ayyuda in Anbar Province, Iraq

he islamic state has been on to argue that the Islamic State has a the defensive in Iraq for more distinctive defensive operational style than eight months and it has and that this style has many exploitable lost practically every battle weaknesses as the coalition considers Tit has fought. After peaking in August new offensives in Anbar province 2014, its area of control has shrunk, and Mosul. In many ways, the Islamic slowly but steadily. The group’s ability State’s defensive style is reminiscent About the CTC Sentinel to control terrain has been dictated of the German military between 1944 The Combating Terrorism Center is an largely by the weakness of its opponents. and 1945:2 At the tactical level they independent educational and research When the Iraqi security forces (ISF) and institution based in the Department of Social the Kurdish Peshmerga have committed Sciences at the United States Military Academy, resources to an attack they have dislodged due to the availability of good quality imagery and news West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the Islamic State’s defenses, particularly reporting, particularly from behind Kurdish lines. This the Center’s global network of scholars and when Western airpower, intelligence, part of Iraq has witnessed the bulk of offensive actions practitioners to understand and confront and planning have been a large part of against IS, both launched by the Kurds and by federal contemporary threats posed by terrorism and the mix. ISF and Hashd forces. Northern battles have also been other forms of political violence. well-supported by Western airpower and intelligence This paper will use case studies from support, a factor that is increasingly relevant to the next recent battles in north-central Iraq1 stages of the conflict in Iraq and perhaps in Syria also. The views expressed in this report are those of Detailed focus on southern battles like Jurf as-Sakr, the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 This research draws on case studies from Iraq’s north- Samarra and Dhuliyah might provide subtly different the Department of the Army, or any other agency lessons. of the U.S. Government. ern provinces for a number of reasons. The authors have focused their six-month research program in this area 2 One tactical treatise notes of the German army in the

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are highly dangerous and can still win soldiers are a mix of location-specific many skilled and charismatic small unit engagements, but at the operational part-time fighters and Iraqi auxiliaries leaders,8 but they are not a professional level they lack strategic coherence who have signed on with the Islamic military institution by any measure. and they display a chronic inability to State for an unknown period, uprooted Their base of experienced fighters may defend terrain. Iraqis who may be willing to fight be weakened by attrition rates even if anywhere that the Islamic State raises its foot soldiers may still be flooding to the The Islamic State’s Operational Style flag, and fully nomadic foreign fighters jihad because leaders and specialists Like all organizations the operational with varying levels of commitment take time to develop and the war in Iraq behavior of the Islamic State in Iraq is to the Iraqi theater and specific Iraqi is both intensifying and accelerating.9 driven by its composition, structure, locations.5 Well over half of the Islamic ideology, and leadership. As a number of State’s fighters appear to be under 30 Armaments are a problem too. The studies argue,3 the Islamic State seems years of age, though some are clearly Islamic State has access to many to be effectively led at the strategic level considerably older.6 different types of captured weapons,10 by some genuinely capable planners, but their arsenal is slowly degrading but at the operational level there is The different sources of fighters have thanks to ongoing airstrikes and other seemingly much less opportunity for created disparate outlooks for each engagements.11 They are ultimately centralized control. Instead, the Islamic operational Islamic State unit active capped at being a confederation of State’s military operations have become in the Iraqi theater. Some may be fierce motorized war bands, most often gradually more disjointed and localized highly committed to fighting in just in their scope and scale since the fall of one location, particularly when their Mosul. involvement with the Islamic State is tied Jazeera English, September 12, 2014, and “How Many “Some have conflated the to local tribal and sectarian conflicts. Fighters Does the Islamic State Really Have,” Daveed A number of dissimilar ideologies and For some locally focused affiliates, if the Gartenstein-Ross, War on the Rocks, February 9, 2015. idea of verbal expressions objectives seem to be pulling the Islamic fight is lost in that specific area, the war The Islamic State has attempted to fast-forward its of support to mean State military operations in different is over. Many fighters will be fixated on expansion from its insurgent core into a hybrid army by directions. Within the leadership there their own experience of the jihad, their boosting recruitment and imposing conscription mea- the same as a pledge are Salafi ideologues, former Baathist personal odyssey, and exploits in search sures in areas such as its stronghold of Hawijah district of allegiance (bay`a). military officers of considerable skill, of a reputation and military glory. in Kirkuk province. and hybrids of the two.4 Front line Others will be much more seriously 8 For example one of the Islamic State’s most high- These two concepts are committed to the goals of the Islamic profile mid-tier commanders, Abu Umar ash-Shishani not equivalent and have State’s leadership: the defense of (Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili), a 29-year old Second World War: “Defensive operations were origi- Caliphate territories and the imposition former Georgian Army sergeant from Georgia’s Pankisi different implications.” nally envisaged as holding situations pending resump- of religious structure in those territories Gorge, who initially fought in Syria as leader of Jaysh tion of the offensive and laying great stress on immedi- for as long as is possible. In many cases al-Mujahirin wal-Ansar, a group of hardened foreign ate and violent counter-attacks.” W.J.K Davies, German there will be differences between the fighters from Chechnya and the Caucasus region before Army Handbook 1939-1945 (London: Purnell, 1973). p. 57. needs of the group and the preferences pledging allegiance to the Islamic State in May 2013 and This method achieved many tactical successes but was of individuals. went on to command the ‘northern sector’ in Syria, the also costly, especially when enemy troops became used provinces of Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia. See “Treasury to predictable counter-attacks and prepared for them. Then there are the practical issues that Designates Twelve Foreign Terrorist Fighter Facilita- German tactics in the First World War also showed this, underlay military strength: experience, tors,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 24, with Paddy Griffith describing them as “an over-rigid numbers, and equipment. The core 2014. and excessively expensive system.” Commonwealth Islamic State is still a very small military 9 The Islamic State forces in Iraq initially drew on forces learned the “bite and hold” tactic—to seize ground movement in Iraq. It is far too small leaders whose military experience went back 30 years cheaply in surprise attacks and then inflict heavy to perpetually defend the territories or more (in terms of Baathist officers and some jihadists casualties on the German counter-attackers, a situation it currently dominates.7 They boast with Afghan experience), whilst even some younger not unlike today’s Kurdish/Western tactics on their commanders have extensive experience in combat frontlines in northern Iraq. Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics within Iraq or Syria over the last half decade. At the time of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of the Attack been high-ranking officers in the Saddam-era Iraqi of writing it has only been ten months since the fall of 1916-1918 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. Army, the Republican Guard, Directorate General of Mosul but casualties have been steady. It is uncertain 32, 194. Military Intelligence, and air force intelligence. that combat skills can be learned fast enough to make up 3 See Richard Barret “The Islamic State,” The Soufan 5 The Islamic State draws from a range of sources for for operational attrition in leaders and specialists. Group, October 28, 2014; Hisham al-Hashimi and the its manpower: foreign fighters, released prisoners who 10 These include over a hundred T-55, T-69, and T-72 Telegraph interactive team, “Revealed: the Islamic may it have resettled in their home areas, and existing main battle tanks, dozens of M113 APCs, M117 armored State ‘cabinet’”, The Telegraph, July 9, 2014; Hisham al- insurgent group members who merged with Islamic security vehicles, hundreds of Humvees, trucks, 4WD Hashimi “Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the State, some of whom have a very localized outlook and pickup trucks, and several towed artillery pieces. For new ‘caliphate’ is run,” The Telegraph, July 9, 2014. joined purely to gain advantages over local rivals. Mi- a comprehensive list see “Vehicles and equipment 4 See Richard Barret “The Islamic State,” The Soufan chael Knights, personal interview, Islamic State expert captured and operated by the Islamic State inside Syria,” Group, pp. 18-21, 24-34, “The hidden hand behind the Aymenn al-Tamimi, November 19, 2014. Oryx Blog, November 10, 2014, and “Vehicles and equip- Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s.” Liz Sly, 6 The authors’ assessment of the age distribution among ment captured, operated and destroyed by the Islamic Washington Post, April 4, 2015; “Iraqi Officer Takes Dark Islamic State fighters is based on a year-long survey of State inside Iraq,” Oryx Blog, November 22, 2014. Turn to al Qaeda,” Matt Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, imagery and video footage derived from Islamic State’s 11 For an comprehensive, regularly updated list see March 17, 2014. At least six of the Islamic State’s upper- social media output. “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targets Damaged/De- tier leadership cadres in early 2014 are known to have 7 See “CIA says IS numbers underestimated,” Al- stroyed,” CENTCOM, April 8, 2015.

2 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 undertaking tactical engagements at lack of military strength the Islamic Islamic State seems more focused on reinforced platoon strength.12 The above State cannot mount an exclusionary actively defending the rural zones factors—organizational, ideological, perimeter defense if sufficient attackers in which urban areas are located. In and logistical—have a strong influence come forward. The limiting factor on many cases, the urban center may be on the Islamic State’s defensive style of the speed of advance against the Islamic the part of the defended zone allocated war. State in Iraq is gathering sufficient the smallest proportion of available quantities of capable Iraqi forces to fill Islamic State forces. The Islamic State Can the Islamic State Defend Terrain? up the spaces. has not shown a tendency to fight “last Since June 2014, the Islamic State stand” defensive actions. Snipers, has fought major defensive actions An early example of preemptive mobile shooter teams, and improvised in at least 14 Iraqi locations: Ramadi, withdrawal behind a screen of IEDs, minefields made of crude canister IEDs Mosul Dam, the Amerli district, Jalula- booby-trapped buildings, and snipers and explosive-filled houses are more Saadiyah, Muqdadiyah, Rabiya, Jurf as- was Jurf as-Sakr, the Sunni town than sufficient to slow, but not stop, an Sakr and northern Babil, the Samarra- overlooking the pilgrim route between advancing force: populated areas are Jallam-Udaim desert, Sinjar, Beyji, Baghdad and Karbala, which was denied rather than actually defended.18 Makhmour, Aski Mosul, Kirkuk, and decisively cleared and occupied by Tikrit.13 The Islamic State has lost every Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) The rural belts surrounding the city time they faced a determined and well- from the Shia Hashd forces in late are often more actively contested by resourced ISF or Peshmerga attack. In October 2014.15 The Islamic State’s main the Islamic State and for longer. This fact, when outnumbered the Islamic forces likewise melted away when long- strategy first appeared in the battle State frequently relinquishes terrain awaited Peshmerga and ISF offensives for Baghdad in 2006 and 2007, when to suit its own operational needs and began in mid-November 2014 to liberate the phrases “Baghdad belts”19 and often signals an awareness that they Jalula-Saadiyah,16 the Islamic State- “commuter insurgency” summed up the will be forced from attacked areas in occupied twin towns by the Hamrin pivotal role of the rural periphery in short order. Though the Islamic State Dam. In a wide range of areas—from the urban battle. This strategy is still in frequently holds out until the last small towns like Suleiman Beg to play. In Ramadi, the Islamic State has possible moment before withdrawing, Mosul city—the Islamic State seems to been pursuing a commuter insurgency they have a track record of draining accelerate its destruction of religious, strategy20 for more than a year, because their main forces from areas that are cultural, and administrative sites (and the difficult task of securing the city’s about to be attacked—for instance in its withdrawal of the Islamic State rural belts has not been adequately Jalula and Jurf as-Sakr.14 Due to a basic families and economic equipment) when resourced.21 it feels that an attack is imminent.17 In 12 The authors’ review of Islamic State attacks since essence, the Islamic State seems to have The same problem of nearby June 2014 suggest that a typical attack force comprises a clear-headed assessment of its own ungoverned sanctuaries afflicts all the around 20–40 foot soldiers—historically the size of limited defensive capabilities. areas the Islamic State group is still the average insurgent cell, including indirect-fire, IED- effectively defending. In some Anbar laying/triggering teams, RPG/ambush teams, etc.—plus The Islamic State’s Defensive Playbook three to five armored cars and unarmored utility ve- Though towns and cities are of both 18 See “Operation to retake Tikrit from Islamic State hicles, with a couple of heavy support weapons. When symbolic and strategic value, the stalled by heavy casualties, discord,” Mitchell Prothero, larger attacks are undertaken, it is usually coordinated, McClatchy, March 20, 2015, for an example of Islamic simultaneous but only loosely connected activity by 15 “Iraqi security forces and Kurds gain ground against State’ defensive preparations encountered by the ISF these small war bands, not a larger unit action per se. Islamic State,” Ahmed Rasheed and Isabel Coles, Re- during the operation to clear Tikrit. Islamic State made 13 See the Institute for the Study of War (ISW)’s daily uters, October 25, 2014. use of huge numbers of IEDs, booby-trapped buildings updated Iraq Situation Report blog for a daily coverage 16 See ISW Iraq Situation Reports for November 22-23 and small sniper and suicide attacker cells to slow the of events in Iraqi since summer 2014. and November 24, “Jalawla heavily mined, most homes ISF advance and cause maximum casualties, but its 14 The ISF carried out 13 clearing sweeps of Jurf booby trapped,” Rudaw, November 25, 2014. stay-behind presence in the city (likely well under 750 as-Sakhr between January 2014 and a final conclusive 17. In only one week period at the end of March, Islamic fighters by the authors’ calculations of simultaneous dai- operation in October 2014. The Islamic State consis- State demolished the 2nd Iraqi Army division head- ly engagements) was not intended to fight a prolonged, tently chose to withdraw and re-infiltrate, with the area quarters at Camp Kindi, the Mosul Police Academy, intensive urban battle. permanently cleared only when it was entirely depopu- Mosul Traffic Directorate, police stations, plus dozens 19 For a great account of the battle of the Baghdad belts lated and turned into a closed military zone. See “The of houses of ISF and Peshmerga members. See “The see Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The End- Clearing Of Iraq’s Jurf Al-Sakhr, Babil And Its Impact,” terrorist organization blew up the Traffic of Nineveh Di- game (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), pp. 336-401. Joel Wing, Musings on Iraq, January 15, 2015; and“Iraqi rectorate building in northern Mosul,” NINA, March 30, 20 The “commuter insurgency” refers to an urban fight security forces and Kurds gain ground against Islamic 2015; “ISIL terrorists steal contents of Police Academy, in which insurgents travel in each day, like suburban State,” Ahmed Rasheed and Isabel Coles, Reuters, Octo- detonate it in Mosul” All Iraq News, March 24, 2015; commuters, from support zones in the outskirts. Coined ber 25, 2014. The Islamic State held Jalula and Saadiyah “Daash blow up the headquarters of army Second north by U.S. forces in Iraq, the concept is explained further in for months, but then collapsed its defense in a few days of Mosul” NINA, March 21, 2015; “IS blew up three David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small during November 2014 with under a hundred casualties police stations north of Mosul” NINA, March 28, 2015. Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University by most estimates. See ISW Iraq Situation Reports for Islamic State demolitions are remarkably widespread Press, 2009), p. 142. November 22-23 and November 24, “Jalawla heavily and must consume a significant proportion of the time of 21 For an account of the Ramadi battle’s first three mined, most homes booby trapped,” Rudaw, November members who might otherwise be undertaking military months see Michael Knights, “The ISIL’s Stand in the 25, 2014. operations. Ramadi-Falluja Corridor,” CTC Sentinel 7:5 (2014).

3 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 battlefields, uncontrolled deserts and city before. Will they drive out the between forces, and the Islamic State riverside groves leave the Islamic population or let them leave when the had great mobility. ISF and Peshmerga State with clear reinforcement routes military operation begins? Will they forces had not yet learned to consolidate and fallback options.22 In Sinjar, the adopt the same approach in other their hold on newly-won positions and Syrian border offers the Islamic State a places or will that decision be locally they lacked anti-armored weapons and degree of sanctuary. The Islamic State controlled? The ISIL view regarding the air support.33 remains able to defend in areas where presence of civilians in the defended the Kurds are disunited and do not zone should be a priority area of near- The optimal conditions for counter- provide sufficient resources. 23 And in term research. attacking warfare do not currently exist areas such as Bayji,24 which backs onto yet the Islamic State keeps trying. Both the remote Jallam Desert and Hamrin Active Defense the ISF and the Peshmerga are now Mountains, the Islamic State is also able When the Islamic State does commit to undertaking more methodical clearing confound attempts to dislodge it. The the defense of a zone it often chooses the operations with large numbers of units Islamic State exacerbates the challenge most aggressive offensive approach to operating in close proximity and often by extensively shaping terrain. It often the mission. This probably reflects the with Western or Iraqi air support.34 The impedes force movement by clogging mindset of many junior Islamic State Kurdish frontline between Mosul and mobility corridors with improvised commanders, who appear to have very Makhmour offers a good case study. In minefields and destroying key bridges.25 considerable latitude in the planning one week-long period (February 17–23, and execution of operations.28 Many 2015) the Islamic State attempted to One unknown in the Islamic State Islamic State units appear to be afflicted launch ten major raids along the 170- defensive playbook is their true attitude with chronic “tactical restlessness,”29 mile front: eight were repelled with toward civilians. They were unable to an almost pathological need to take the the aid of Western airpower, and the prevent the outflow of civilians from initiative and attack the enemy. This remaining two were disrupted before Tikrit, Jurf as-Sakr, and many other approach can and does help sustain they had even commenced when aircraft areas, but they have actively prevented morale and extend the operational destroyed the attack forces in their the inhabitants of Mosul from leaving experience of surviving troops, but it assembly areas.35 Though body counts thanks to a variety of security also tires troops and continually erodes should always be treated with caution, measures.26 It is unclear whether this overall force strength.30 the Coalition’s claims to have inflicted is because they want to prevent the over 150 casualties are probably not too depopulation of the Caliphate’s biggest A prime example of this restlessness is wide of the mark.36 city or whether they are planning to use the tendency to mount tactical counter Mosul’s residents as human shields or as attacks soon after suffering a setback. For many months the Islamic State’s a way to blunt airstrikes.27 The Islamic This trend almost approaches doctrinal leaders appear to have been stubbornly State has never defended a populated instinct and is one of the ways in which unwilling to accept that the military the Islamic State units resemble German forces during the final phase of the 22 See “ISIS Offensives in Ramadi City and Al-Asad Second World War.31 The Wehrmacht’s 33 This impression was gained during months of open- Airbase in Al-Anbar, Iraq,” Jessica Lewis, Ahmed Ali, experience also shows how predictable source reporting and imagery analysis plus interviews. and Sinan Adnan, December 24, 2014. counter-attacks can prove very costly Michael Knights, multiple personal interviews, Iraqi and 23 See “Kurdish Forces Show The Strain Of The in the face of growing enemy power and Peshmerga leadership, June to March 2015. ISIS Fight,” Mike Giglio, February 19, 2015. air superiority.32 34 Examples include the recent Kurdish offensives at 24 “Islamic State recapture parts of northern refinery Aski Mosul (January 21, 2015) and Kirkuk (March 9, city Baiji,” Reuters, December 17, 2015. An ISF column Such immediate counter-attacks are also 2015) which both involved Kurdish brigades fighting in punched through Bayji in November 2014 to relieve the achieving fewer and fewer successes. line abreast, with no unguarded flanks or gaps between besieged Bayji refinery clearing the neighborhoods along After Mosul fell the battlefields in Iraq units. the main urban area. The Islamic State withdrew to the were rather empty, with porous gaps 35 The ISIL attacks struck at Sinjar, Aski Mosul, peripheries and in December reinfiltrated the city, over- Baqufa/Tall Asqof, Fasiliyah/Mt Bashiqa, Quban/Mt running several isolated ISF positions. At the time of Bashiqa, Hassan Shami, Makhmour peninsula (Tall writing IS in control of some 80% of Bayji, with ISF con- 28 For an excellent overview of ISIL’s operational art, Shair, Sultan Abdullah, Jarallah, Tall al-Reem). Attacks fined to holding a corridor along the central road axis. command and control and mission-type tactics see in the Badush area and Mt. Zartak east of Mosul were 25 For a detailed overview of ISIL’s extensive use of IED “How to defeat Islamic State’s war machine,” Metin disrupted by airstrikes before they commenced. See minefields see “The Hidden Enemy In Iraq,” Mike Giglio, Gurcan, al-Monitor, October 14, 2014. Horizon Client Access, Northern KRG Security Threat March 19, 2015. 29 The authors’ phrase to sum-up the Islamic State’s Triggers, November 17-23, 2014 (subscriber service 26 In Mosul residents are kept in by a security trench restless patrolling and attacking actions along the available via www.hcaccess.com ). that channels movement to vehicle check points, where frontline. 36 Ibid. See “(22) Elements of the IS killed by Coali- persons leaving are forced to give the names of friends or 30 “U.S. officials say 6,000 ISIS fighters killed in tion planes bombing to the outskirts of Sinjar,” NINA, relatives as hostages who may be harmed if they do not battles,” Barbara Starr, CNN, January 22, 2015. We February 16, 2015; “Coalition shells ISIS-held bridge return. Residents also fear that may permanently lose discuss this casualty metric later in this piece. on eastern Tigris River” Rudaw February 21, 2015; their property if they leave the city. See “How to Retake 31 See W.J.K Davies, German Army Handbook 1939- “Peshmerga forces repulse the IS attacks north of Mo- Mosul From the Islamic State,” Michael Knights and 1945 (London: Purnell, 1973). sul” NINA February 21, 2015; “Warplanes pound ISIS Michael Pregent, February 27, 2015. 32 See Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western group near Mount Zartak” Rudaw February 20, 2015; 27 See “Mosul residents prepare for battle,” Saleh Elias, Front: The British Army’s Art of the Attack 1916-1918 “Warplanes blast ISIS positions in Kirkuk, Mekhmour” March 13, 2015. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 32, 194 Rudaw February 17, 2015.

4 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 tide has turned against it in Iraq. Makhmour.40 The centerpiece of the motivations that make up the Islamic Their commitment to a version of the operation was a double envelopment State in Iraq. Decentralized operational “cult of the offensive”37 led them to of Kurdish forces that had pressed control gives significant leeway to local experiment with two even more costly southwest of Erbil to the Tigris River, commanders, often at platoon level, versions of counter-attacking warfare. deep in territory held by the Islamic to plan and undertake operations. The first was the creation of tactical State since June 2014. The northern Individual volunteers are clearly reserves made up of Suicide Vehicle- flank of the Kurdish salient suffered a driven by their personal commitment Borne Improvised Explosive Devices series of platoon-sized river assaults to the armed jihad, by their desire to (SVBIEDs), often a quick reaction across the Tigris and Zab rivers,41 fight, and by a personal and small-unit force made up of armored suicide truck while the southern flank buckled under quest for glory.45 The defense of specific bombs. This kind of shock force has the weight of motorized blitzes up the terrain, or even of Mosul itself, may not been used on a range of battlefields— Tigris, which overran Kurdish advance be important to the significant elements Udaim Dam, Hamrin oilfield, Tikrit38— guard outposts that had reached the of the Islamic State who are not tied to but the largest such counter-attack river.42 The operation was impressive, particular Iraqi locales. came at Aski Mosul, south of Mosul achieving tactical surprise with dawn Dam. On January 21, 2015, Peshmerga attacks under cover of river mist, and The willingness of Islamic State fighters forces achieved a breakthrough across Kurdish forces remain stalled in the to undertake offensive action can be an a 30-mile front that seemed to threaten area at the time of writing. But the front asset. The group creates a constant flow the city of Mosul. In response, the opened up by the counter-offensive has of well-publicized actions that bolster Islamic State committed its operational sucked the Islamic State forces into its propaganda efforts.46 These images reserve. In a scene that could have been a grueling battle in open areas where create the sense among sympathizers lifted straight from the dystopian vision Kurdish forces and Western airpower that the Islamic State is still on the of the Mad Max movies, 14 armored fuel continue to inflict heavy casualties.43 offensive, whereas the reverse is tanker SVBIEDs were directed against This operational-level counter- true. Images of offensive warfare and the Peshmerga breakthrough, all of offensive by the Islamic State in Iraq particularly of suicide operations may which were destroyed by Western could well be their “Battle of the Bulge,” be powerful recruitment tools, aiding airpower and guided anti-tank missiles the doomed and costly German effort the “refresh rate,” the rate at which it is before they reached their targets.39 in late 1944 to regain the initiative in able to bring in fresh troops. Western Europe.44 Another costly experiment was a At the tactical level, the active theater-wide counter-offensive from Operational Impact of Tactical Restlessness patrolling undertaken by Islamic the Islamic State on January 9-11, The “cult of the offensive,” manifested in State units has often slowed down 2015. This was the largest of the tactical restlessness, is probably driven their opponents. Like other proficient Islamic State group’s coordinated by the fusion of individual and group infantry forces, the Islamic State operations, drawing together more uses fighting patrols to dominate no- than a dozen platoon-sized attack cells man’s-land, fix the enemy, and prevent to mount assaults on the area held by 40 “Peshmerga Respond to Islamic State Attacks in enemy intelligence-gathering, and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Zumar” Basnews January 11, 2015;”ISIL launches fierce reconnoiter attack routes. The Islamic forces between the Syrian border and attacks across Iraq” al-Jazeera, January 15, 2015; “Kurd- State desensitized enemy units with ish official: Daash suffered 125 killed in Qwayer battles,” constant patrolling, with a sub-set of NINA January 11, 2015, “Kidnapped Civilians Freed by Peshmerga in Gwer,” BasNews, January 12, 2015;“ISIS 37 This concept, adapted slightly here, describes the Assault on “Gwer: Shaikh Serwan Barzani and His 45 IS video releases show motivated, predominately belief that the power of offensive action is so decisive Team Ran a Way, 70 Reported Killed or Missing,” Millet young, 20–40 man groups—the size of an old Iraqi that static defence is almost never adopted, regardless January 10, 2015. IS video footage of the Gwer attacks army platoon—making their military reputations of local circumstances. For a good review of the issue 41 “In heaviest fighting since August, Kurds turn back with daring attacks. Foreign fighters and suicide and see Jack. L Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Islamic State assault near Irbil,” Mitchell Prother, Mc- SVBIED operatives are also prominently featured. For Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell Clatchy, January 11, 2015; IS footage of the Gwer attacks two recent examples see footage of the complex assault University Press, 1984). 42 Ibid. on Peshmerga positions near Kirkuk in “Raiding the 38 Between March 29 and April 6, 2015, the Islamic 43 Since January 2015 Coalition airstrikes have Barracks of the Peshmerga #2 – Wilayat Kirkuk,” Jihad- State launched at least six SVBIEDs at ISF positions pounded exposed Islamic State forces holding the ology, April 11, 2015, and the raid on a Zerevani outpost in the Hamrin oil field (footage of Hamrin SVBIED Makhmour front including pinpoint close air support in Kisik area, “Storming the Barracks of the Peshmerga utilizing a captured ISF M113 APC). IS threw numerous on frontline Islamic State vehicles and positions, Islamic in the Area of Shandukhah – Wilayat al-Jazirah,” Jihad- SVBIEDs at the ISF in Tikrit and the surrounding areas State concentrations massing for attacks, and rear-area ology, April 5, 2015. during recent operations to clear the city, see “Casualties support infrastructure sustaining the front. See “The 46 The Gwer raid video footage makes good propa- Increase In Iraq Due To Tikrit Operation,” Joel Wing, International Coalition bombed a gathering to the IS “in ganda use of captured ISF Humvees and advanced Musings on Iraq, April 2, 2015. Tal al-Sha’ir village in al-Qayyarah district in Nineveh” weapons systems, such as a captured 155mm M198 39 See Isabel Coles, “Kurdish forces squeeze Islamic NINA March 11, 2015; and “Coalition aircraft bomb ISIL howitzer, to create the image of formidable, well-armed State supply line in northern Iraq,” Reuters, January 21, hideouts in Gwer sun-district” PUK Media February 20, military force. IS deliberately emphasizes operations 2015, “Peshmerga Kills Over 200 IS Militants in East 2015. with high propaganda value versus statistically far Mosul Operation,” BasNews, January 21, 2015. Video 44 For a thorough account of this operation see Charles more numerous, run-of the mill IED attacks, indirect- footage of the destruction of several SVBIEDs by Pesh- B. MacDonald, The Battle of the Bulge (London: George fire harassment and small-unit ambushes, which in fact merga anti-tank guided missiles . Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1984). inflict the majority of ISF and Peshmerga casualties.

5 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 attacks being well-planned trench raids active patrolling.51 Such raids and other intelligence support is employed.55 intended to overrun and massacre or fruitless probing actions are wearing Mosul is far bigger than Tikrit—around capture small garrisons.47 down the Islamic State, a factor that may 144 square miles versus eight square contribute to a less effective defense of miles respectively56—but as Tikrit The Islamic State got particularly key ISF objectives like Mosul, Fallujah, showed, ISF forces do not need to attack effective at dominating the night and and Tall Afar. the whole city at once. Additionally, attacking under cover of morning Mosul is probably too big for the Islamic mist or fog, greatly undermining the Attrition to Islamic State forces is State to mount an exclusionary defense confidence of ISF and Peshmerga undoubtedly mounting. On January 22, with their relatively small numbers. units.48 This enabled the Islamic State to 2015, U.S. ambassador to Iraq Stuart Coalition forces will be able to penetrate move through encirclements, allowing Jones told Al Arabiya television that the city. Getting into the Islamic State- surrounded groups to be reinforced or to an estimated 6,000 fighters had been dominated areas is rarely the problem. slip away, and letting the Islamic State killed up to so far in the campaign. reposition forces with great freedom.49 Breakdowns of the target types in the An under-acknowledged aspect of the This advantage has increasingly ebbed air campaign to that date52 suggest Islamic State’s military campaign in on more static battlefields where that the figure may be quite likely.53 Iraq is that it has been a theater-wide Western airpower and intelligence Counting in the Islamic State losses to “economy of force” effort. The Islamic assets support the Kurds or, less Kurdish forces, ISF and other causes, State forces have engaged in a blur frequently, the ISF. On a visit to the the Islamic State might have credibly of active defense to conceal the basic frontlines at Kirkuk in March 2015 one lost many more than the U.S. estimate of thinness of their troops on the ground. of the authors was told by Peshmerga 6,000 in the first 24 weeks since Mosul If sufficient forces are available to take infantrymen that the Islamic State’s fell, and at the time of writing there has over and consolidate recaptured areas, technicals could only break cover for been another 12 weeks of increasingly then a step-by-step approach can be used a few moments to undertake heavy effective strikes and battles against to reduce the lethality and effectiveness machine-gun attacks on Peshmerga the Islamic State in Iraq. Though the of the Islamic State delaying tactics.57 fighters before they would be inevitably Islamic State refresh rate is unknown, The key limiting factor on the speed destroyed by airpower in over-watch the Islamic State group may struggle of advance against the Islamic State mode.50 to replace weekly losses of more than is the mustering of sufficient clearing 250 fatalities54 (plus commensurate forces, the development of effective In general, however, the costs of numbers of other casualties and plans to clear areas, and the use of offensive actions are rising steeply for desertions), particularly leaders and sufficient numbers of effective units to the Islamic State while the benefits skilled specialist manpower. fill up contested spaces and consolidate are declining. The Peshmerga and ISF ownership.58 are planning and conducting offensive The Islamic State after Mosul operations with little apparent The battle of Tikrit shows that the This finding suggests that the Islamic disruption from the Islamic State’s coming battles of Mosul and Fallujah State might also be defeated in other will be tough but winnable, if the Iraqi cities and even in Raqqa, Syria, right formula of planning, adequate which is close to potential military resources, Western airpower, and jump-off points in Turkey, if motivated, 47 See the same video footage cited above, for an excel- well-supported forces can be developed lent example of this: footage of the complex assault on to liberate and consolidate those areas. Pesh positions near Kirkuk “Raiding the Barracks of There is nothing mystical about the the Peshmerga #2 – Wilayat Kirkuk,” Jihadology, April 51 For instance Peshmerga advances at Khazr, Aski Islamic State as a defensive force: it 11, 2015, and video of the raid on a Zerevani outpost in Mosul, and Kirkuk have taken place despite frequent Kisik area, “Storming the Barracks of the Peshmerga in ISIL raids on the frontline. Where the Kurds are not at- the Area of Shandukhah – Wilayat al-Jazirah,” Jihadol- tacking—Makhmour, Sinjar, Bashiqa—it is because they 55 ISIL’s defensive system of IEDs, snipers, and exten- ogy, April 5, 2015. have chosen not to attack further. sively booby-trapped buildings successfully absorbed 48 On January 11 ,2015 Islamic State took advantage of 52 See Chris Woods, US & allied airstrikes Iraq 2014-15: and repulsed an assault on Tikrit in mid-March by Pop- poor weather conditions to stage a boat-borne infiltra- Dataset maintained by freelance reporter Chris Woods ular Mobilization Units (PMUs), but rapidly collapsed in tion attack across the Zab river at Gwer southeast of 53 Targeting data showed that of the strikes, around a early April under a multi-pronged push into the city by Mosul. They were able to control the town and its vital quarter were programmed strikes aimed at low-lethality Iraqi Special Forces (ISOF) and battle-hardened federal Mosul-Erbil highway bridge for several hours, killing 25 fixed targets (buildings, often empty). The remain- police backed by Coalition air support. See “Divisions rear-area Asayesh security force personnel in one of the der (1,300–1,500 strikes by late January 2015) were Over Iraq War Exposed In Victory In Tikrit,” Joel Wing, deadliest single attacks on Peshmerga forces since the dynamic targets where very careful real-time positive Musings on Iraq, April 6, 2015. fall of Mosul. identification was possible because enemy units were 56 See “How to Retake Mosul From the Islamic State,” 49 Ibid. The January 11 boat-borne raid on Gwer is undertaking military activity, creating high potential for Foreign Policy. Michael Knights and Michael Pregent, a prime example. Islamic State undertook a night at- multiple enemy casualties. An average of around four February 27, 2015. tack, also taking advantage of fog and bad weather to fatalities per strike (1,500 times four) would give 6,000 57 “Iraqi prime minister claims victory against Islamic infiltrate across the river and achieve complete tactical fatalities from airstrikes alone, hardly unimaginable State in Tikrit,” Loveday Morris, Washington Post, surprise. considering the fact that Western controllers had eyes- March 31, 2015. 50 Michael Knights, personal group interview, on most IS targets until the moment of weapon impact. 58 “CENTCOM Outlines Battle for Mosul, Doubles Peshmerga lieutenant and Peshmerga private soldiers, 54 Six thousand divided by 24 weeks, as of January 22, Estimate for IS Dead,” Paul McLeary, Defense News, Maktab Khalid, Kirkuk, March 8, 2015. 2015, gives an average of 250 fatalities a week. February 19, 2015.

6 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 has succeeded almost entirely due to repeated sorties from insurgent- Chad: A Precarious the absence of effective opposition, not controlled redoubts in Iraq and Syria. because of its inherent strength. The Islamic State has failed to hold Counterterrorism Partner terrain, but they may prove adept at By Margot Shorey and Benjamin P. Nickels What will follow the liberation of cities preventing post-conflict resettlement such as Mosul, Fallujah, and Tall Afar? and stabilization of affected areas.62 the Republic of Chad is building a One option is the Ramadi model—that This is where the Islamic State’ real reputation as a leading African state Islamic State elements will remain in strength lies and this is the real military in the fight against terrorism. Chad place to mount commuter insurgencies challenge faced by Iraqis and their will provide more than a third of the in areas where population centers and coalition partners. 8,700 soldiers—3,000 men, nearly as economic hubs can be attacked from many as Nigeria’s 3,250—currently rural redoubts. This kind of operational Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow at The assigned to the African Union (AU) model could work along some stretches Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He approved Multi-National Joint Task 1 along the Syrian border, in parts of the has worked in all of Iraq’s provinces, including Force (MNJTF), and Chadian forces Western Desert and Jazira, in Beyji, in periods embedded with the Iraqi security forces. have already claimed successes against the areas between Ramadi and Fallujah, Dr. Knights has been briefing U.S. officials on the Boko Haram in its strongholds along and in areas adjacent to the Hamrin resurgence of Al-Qa`ida in Iraq since 2012 and Nigeria’s borders. From the capital Mountains. It could even work in Mosul provided congressional testimony on the issue in N’Djamena, President Idriss Déby Itno if the ISF and Kurds repeat the error of December 2013. He has written on militancy in is busy working to project an image of failing to adequately garrison the city, Iraq for the CTC Sentinel since 2008. his country as a regional powerbroker its desert belts, and satellite towns (most and valuable counterterrorism player. significantly Tall Afar).59 A key lesson Alexandre Mello is the lead Iraq security analyst at A closer look, however, reveals of the last six months is that retaking Horizon Client Access, an advisory service working worrying vulnerabilities and triggers of town centers is not a real measure of with the world’s leading energy companies. instability that raise concerns about the success: stabilizing the whole defensive risks of overreliance on this precarious zone, including the rural belts, is the partner to contain and counter terrorist real victory. threats in Central and West Africa.

Rebuilding large, reliable, locally This article provides an analysis of accepted occupation forces will not Chad’s role in regional counterterrorism be easy given today’s sectarian and efforts, examining its track record in economic climate in Iraq. Counter- such efforts and a number of its political, insurgency efforts will benefit from the economic, and structural vulnerabilities. resettlement of displaced persons but The article concludes by examining the restoring governance and services for implications of these concerns through returnees will also be very difficult. some possible scenarios for instability The formula of leaving Sunni areas in Chad, with serious consequences as depopulated garrisoned zones has if Western partners were to rely too been used in some places—Amerli, heavily on Chad’s help in regional Jurf as-Sakr, and Jalula-Saadiyah60— counterterrorism ventures. but it is not a mid-term solution and will only create ghost towns that are A New Prominence favorable haunts for the Islamic State. In the past few years, Chad has earned Resettling populations will be a major international recognition as a regional challenge because the Islamic State has security leader, thanks to its provision destroyed hundreds of police stations, of a tough peacekeeping force and its administrative offices, bridges, and successes as a strong counterterrorism official dwellings.61 This is part of a partner in a troubled part of Africa. deliberate counter-stabilization effort A large country located in the heart that may hint at a slow-burn strategy of Africa, Chad is strategically well to wear down the Iraqi nation with placed to partner with regional and international actors seeking to counter various insurgent and extremist threats 59 For a great account of the neglect of Mosul see Joel throughout West and Central Africa. Rayburn, Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Re- 62 The current situation in Diyala province, which the In President Déby, Chad has a leader sistance The Great Unraveling: the Remaking of the Middle Iraqi government declared cleared in January 2015, is who has demonstrated the political East, Hoover Institution Press Publication; No. 643, a cautionary example. ISF cleared IS from its urban will to lead in security cooperation August 1, 2014, pp. 137-162. stronghold in Jalula/Saadiyah in November 2014, but and a willingness to enforce collective 60 Human Rights Watch, “After Liberation Came De- the insurgents merely dispersed and regrouped in rural decisions. struction: Iraqi Militias and the Aftermath of Amerli,” sanctuaries along the middle Diyala river valley and March 18, 2015 . their historic support zones south of Balad Ruz, with the 61 See footnote 17 for examples of the Mosul demoli- result that overall insurgent activity in Diyala has not 1 Thomas Fessy, “Boko Haram: Can regional force beat tions. measurably declined since November 2014. Nigeria’s militant Islamists?” BBC News, March 3, 2015.

7 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4

Chad has raised its regional security Chad’s ability to act in Mali is in part Enduring Vulnerabilities profile since 2013 through leadership thanks to long-term counterterrorism Yet on closer inspection, Chad’s in several multilateral bodies. Chad investments by international partners, counterterrorism successes obscure currently represents Central Africa such as France and the United States. some troubling traits in its politics, in the AU Peace and Security Council, France has provided financial and military, economy, and diplomatic and it recently successfully campaigned military support to President Déby relations that, if considered for a seat as a non-permanent member for decades, and it has maintained a pragmatically, cast doubt on its of the United Nations Security Council military base in N’Djamena since 1986.7 leadership and hint at the possibility of with its two-year term concluding at In August 2014, when the French future crisis. the end of 2015. A founding member government restructured its Sahel of the Economic Community of Central strategy following its intervention in The most salient political reality is that African States (ECCAS), Chad provided Mali, it showed its ongoing commitment President Déby heads an authoritarian the organization’s current and previous to, and reliance on, Chad by basing regime that relies on patronage and secretaries-general.2 Chad’s government troops for Opération Barkhane in repression for its longevity. Like has also made new connections to N’Djamena, even though actual other African strongmen, his tenure the Economic Community of West operations will likely have a West as president has long outlasted the African States (ECOWAS) through African focus.8 typical span of democratic rule. on-the-ground operations, displaying President Déby took power in 1990 by its military prowess in responding For Washington, Chad is a successful overthrowing the country’s previous to terrorism and instability in the example of the light-footprint approach leader, Hissène Habré, whose harsh neighboring sub-region. to security in Africa. Chad served eight-year term seems brief compared as a base for recent U.S. support to to President Déby’s current quarter- With its strong experience fighting in Nigeria in combating Boko Haram century tenure.12 President Déby the Saharan terrain, Chad’s military and the search for the approximately claimed victory in elections in 1996 and has been very active in countering 230 young women kidnapped from 2001, before rewriting the constitution al-Qa’ida–linked Islamist extremists Chibok in mid-April 2014.9 Chad also to do away with term limits to run and in northern Mali. Chadians fought has been a core partner for over a win again in 2006 and 2011. On each alongside the French to halt the decade in initiatives such as the Trans- occasion ballots were cast, but massive extremists’ southern offensive toward Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership restrictions, intimidation of opponents, Bamako in early 2013, and the Chadian (TSCTP), through which the United and widespread fraud meant President government contributed approximately States seeks to build African capability Déby’s electoral successes were far 2,000 troops to the African-led and capacity to combat terrorism in the from democratic.13 Chad’s politics have International Support Mission in region. Between 2009 and 2013, the prompted concerns from many quarters, Mali (AFISMA).3 When AFISMA was United States obligated approximately including, for example, Freedom House, replaced by the UN Multidimensional $13 million in TSCTP funds to Chad.10 which has categorized Chad as “Not Integrated Stabilization Mission in Through the Partnership, the United Free” in its Freedom in the World report Mali (MINUSMA) in July 2013, Chad States trained the Chadian Army’s for more than a decade.14 again contributed to the mission, elite Special Anti-Terrorism Group, sending approximately 1,100 troops.4 the only African force to participate Politicization and patronage in the Although described in peacekeeping in the French-led offensive in Mali in Chadian Armed Forces also creates terms, these missions saw soldiers in early 2013.11 In February and March points of concern. President Déby has direct combat with extremists, and 2015, Chad hosted the annual U.S.- cultivated a military elite that is drawn Chad’s contingent has suffered the sponsored Exercise Flintlock, a regional predominantly from his own ethnic most casualties in MINUSMA.5 Chad is counterterrorism exercise for countries group, the Zaghawa,15 and Chad’s senior again taking casualties in the regional in the Sahel. officers are loyal to the president rather counterterrorism fight against Boko than the republic. President Déby has Haram, with 71 dead and 416 wounded deployed his armed forces against in less than three months of fighting in killed fighting Boko Haram,” April 10, 2015. Chadian rebel groups. Chad’s military the Lake Chad Basin.6 7 French Defense Ministry, “Les éléments français au Tchad (EFT),” February 24, 2014 . 8 French Defense Ministry,“Opération Barkhane,” 12 Celeste Hicks, “Clay Feet: Chad’s Surprising Rise 2 “UNOCA présent à la cérémonie d’installation du August 11, 2014 . and Enduring Weaknesses,” World Politics Review, nouveau SG,” UNOCA, Bureau régional des Nations 9 Ernesto Londoño, “U.S. deploys 80 troops to Chad to November 13, 2014. Unies pour l’Afrique centrale, help find kidnapped Nigerian schoolgirls,” The Washing- 13 Freedom House, “Chad: Freedom in the World 3 African Union Peace and Security Council, 358th Meet- ton Post, May 21, 2014. 2014;” Freedom House “Freedom in the World : Chad ing, Progress Report of the Chairperson of the Commission 10 United States Government Accountability Office, 2013;” Amy McKenna, “Idriss Déby, President of Chad,” on the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts in Northwest Africa Encyclopedia Britannica. March 7, 2013. Would Be Strengthened by Enhanced Program Management, 14 See the annual reports available at Freedom House 4 United Nations, Troop and Police Contributers, June 2014. “Chad: Freedom in the World 2014.” August 31, 2014. 11 Lesley Anne Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter 15 Gaël Grilhot, “Les forces tchadiennes au Mali : mythe 5 Unted Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping,” Fa- Terrorism Partnership Building Partner Capacity to et réalités,” RFI, January 21, 2013 , and “L’armée tchadi- talities by Nationality and Mission, (As of March 31, 2015) Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” Center for enne aux avant-postes de la guerre au Mali,” Le Monde, 6 Agence France-Presse, “Chad army says 71 soldiers Naval Analyses, March 2014. March 4, 2013.

8 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 has been lauded for its efficiency in some 350,000 Sudanese refugees, could become a danger in and of itself, Mali, but the hallmark of its success, its largely from Darfur,23 who could become rather than the source of stability in the expertise in desert warfare, stems from a greater humanitarian or security risk Sahel it is currently perceived to be. campaigns against insurgents in the if conflict between Chad and Sudan country’s desert north and east.16 were to reignite. In addition, President Implications and Scenarios Déby’s long-time links with Libya’s Chad’s combination of under- There are also socio-economic concerns former leader Mu’ammar Qadhafi has appreciated vulnerabilities and driven by Chad’s failure to meet its complicated Chad’s relations with its importance to regional counterterrorism development potential. Despite the northern neighbor.24 efforts could lead to unwelcome discovery of oil, which Chad began developments. exporting in 2003, the inequitable These long-term drivers of instability distribution of Chad’s new wealth means make Chad fragile, and any number President Déby’s personalized that life for most Chadians remains of near-term triggers might tip the diplomacy and penchant for interfering extremely difficult.17 Poor governance country into crisis. Protests, especially in neighbors’ affairs raises concerns, and corruption—Chad sits at 154 out by young people, have become an given N’Djamena’s central role in of 174 on Transparency International’s increasingly common disturbance the MNJTF and Chad’s enthusiastic Corruption Perception Index18—have in N’Djamena and smaller cities cross-border operations against Boko ensured that unemployment remains across the country. In March 2015, Haram in Cameroon and Nigeria. Such very high and development remains enforcement of a new law requiring entanglements have limited Chad’s limited. Chad, for example, ranks 184 motorcyclists to wear helmets, like the effectiveness in other regional forces out of 187 countries on the 2014 UN one that sparked Boko Haram violence over the years. Once peace support Human Development Index.19 President in Nigeria in July 2009,25 spurred an operations began in the Central African Déby has used Chad’s oil wealth to intense round of demonstrations that Republic (CAR) in 2013, for example, fund national security at the expense of led to three deaths and closed high Chad’s long history of interference in other development projects, breaking schools and universities.26 Meanwhile, the CAR’s internal affairs,28 coupled a deal with the World Bank in 2006 new technologies are empowering and with reports of financial and military to do so.20 To this day, despite its accelerating unrest. A recent video support to the Seleka rebels, undermined military partnerships, Chad receives of Chadian police beating unarmed N’Djamena’s role in the International less international non-humanitarian students went viral, causing outrage Support Mission to the Central African development aid than its neighbors in among civil society and invigorating Republic. Subsequent accusations that the Sahel, such as Niger and Mali.21 the opposition.27 These incidents could Chadian forces conducted politically be just a taste of future events. For motivated killings of unarmed civilians Diplomatically, Chad’s international example, following the popularity of the in March 2014 eventually forced relations are potentially volatile because #lwili hashtag in Burkina Faso’s rallies President Déby to withdraw from the they rely on President Déby’s tenuous that eventually helped push the former mission altogether.29 personal dealings with neighboring president Blaise Compaoré from power, autocrats, a risky approach with great Chadians adopted the hashtag #Goum_ External reliance on Chad as a force for potential for sudden and complete Mou during November 2014 protests, regional security might also exacerbate reversals. Chad, for example, has a demanding a leadership transition in internal drivers of instability. The working relationship with Sudan at the Chad’s upcoming 2016 elections. perception among Western partners moment, but President Déby had hostile that N’Djamena’s support is needed for relations with Sudan’s President Omar If a crisis in Chad were to develop, success in regional counterterrorism al-Bashir in the early 2000s, when both multiple vectors and sustainers of efforts may encourage them to men supported rebel groups operating in instability could easily aggravate and compromise on their values in order each other’s country.22 Chad still houses prolong instability across the country. to protect their interests, just as Once in the grip of a major crisis, Chad it lets President Déby trade on his government’s perceived international 16 Peter Tinti, “In Mali fight, Chad proves a powerful utility as a way to compensate for a partner for France,” Christian Science Monitor, March 7, and Enduring Weaknesses,” World Politics Review, lack of domestic legitimacy. The more 2013. November 13, 2014. the international community depends 17 Celeste Hicks, “Chad’s oil project 10 years on: has 23 “2014 UNHCR country operations profile – Chad,” on Chad as a security partner, the more anything changed?” African Arguments, July 31, 2013 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees important its stability becomes, even if 18 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014,” Transparency 24 International Crisis Group, “Africa without Qaddafi: it comes at the expense of democracy, International. The Case of Chad.” Africa Report No. 180, October 21, respect for human rights, and economic 19 “Human Development Index and its components,” 2011. development. Of course this dynamic 2014 Human Development Report, United Nations Devel- 25 “Boko Haram Recent Attacks,” National Consortium is not unique to Chad: the tradeoff is opment Programme. for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, May 20 Celeste Hicks, “Is Chad managing to beat the ‘oil 2014. curse’?” The Guardian, April 14, 2014 26 Siobhán O’Grady, “Why Are Chadian Youth Rioting 28 Celeste Hicks, “Clay Feet: Chad’s Surprising Rise 21 See and compare Organisation for Economic Co- Over a Motorcycle Helmet Law?” Foreign Policy, March and Enduring Weaknesses,” World Politics Review, operation and Development data from Chad and its 11, 2015. November 13, 2014. neighbors. 27 “Violences policières: l’opposition tchadienne appelle 29 “UN Investigators: Chadian Soldiers Fired on Civil- 22 Celeste Hicks, “Clay Feet: Chad’s Surprising Rise à des sanctions,” RFI, March 15, 2015. ians in CAR,” Voice of America, April 4, 2014.

9 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 apparent in several countries in Africa Haram activity, is only some 250 and operations across both Central and and beyond. kilometers from N’Djamena, compared West Africa. to the more than 800 kilometers Yet that focus may be short-sighted separating this remote town from the Margot Shorey works in academic affairs at the even in relation to counterterrorism Nigerian capital Abuja. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where she issues. There are no guarantees that focuses primarily on West Africa and the Sahel. Chad will remain stable long enough The threat of further retaliatory attacks She holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher to mitigate or overcome terror threats is real and concerning for the citizens School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. in West and Central Africa. Chad’s of N’Djamena, as are the economic many vulnerabilities mean that implications of the loss of important Dr. Benjamin P. Nickels is Academic Chair for scenarios in which the country becomes trade routes through northeastern Transnational Threats and Counterterrorism more unstable are easy to envisage. Nigeria. Finally, Chad’s stability at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where Elite infighting, along with possible could suffer not only from this type he focuses primarily on the Sahel, North Africa, military discontent from repeated of terrorist spillover, but also from and the Horn of Africa. He holds a doctorate and deployment, significant casualties, or a sub-regional conflagration, with a master’s degree from the University of Chicago. unfair distribution of pay from regional combination of refugees, proxy forces, missions against terrorists could and state aggression coming from precipitate a coup d’état. Factionalism bordering nations, if the country’s could also increase tensions if rivalries delicate personalized relations with based on religious, ethnic, or regional neighboring heads of state were to sour. divisions harden and turn violent, something that could emerge in the These scenarios are not farfetched. The event of disputes over the country’s oil recent fall of Burkina Faso’s president revenues, for example. Blaise Compaoré, one of the Sahel’s other enduring strongmen, is a vivid example Any of these developments could be of an authoritarian ruler toppled by a the spark for significant destabilization mobilized population. President Déby given the underlying reality of has also come close to losing power. In Chadian life. There is little economic 2008, rebel forces reached the capital opportunity, few ways to express and nearly overthrew the regime, but political dissent, and no near-term end retreated from the city after a three-day in sight to the regime led by the 62-year- battle. Ultimately, France continued old president who has already ruled its role as President Déby’s protector, for nearly 25 years. In this context, the helping thwart the rebels in N’Djamena citizens of Chad—especially residents before they could oust the president.32 of the capital city, where a tenth of the President Déby survived the attack and population lives—could take inspiration made some reforms, but they did not go from recent revolutions on the continent far enough to avoid another such crisis. and foment a broader popular uprising. Conclusion Alternatively, these factors might Chad may seem to be a strong provide fertile ground for the attempted counterterrorism partner with radicalization of disaffected young a capable military in a troubled Chadians by terror groups. Boko Haram region, but the country’s internal could conceivably target Chadians for vulnerabilities warrant more attention recruitment or expand operations in from a wide variety of stakeholders. Chad, as it has in northern Cameroon. Regional states and international According to news reports, Boko partners who invest in and depend Haram is already operating in Chad heavily on Chad’s security and and has already moved some of the girls counterterrorism capabilities should kidnapped in Chibok, Nigeria, across remain alert. Another crisis might yet the border into Chad.30 Boko Haram’s push this regional powerbroker into first attack on Chadian soil occurred turmoil, with grave consequences for shortly after Chadian troops joined the regional counterterrorism strategies MNJTF.31 Also, Boko Haram’s activities in Nigeria are close to the border with 32 See “Chadian Army, Rebels Battle in Capital; Chad. Maiduguri, a hotbed of Boko The views expressed are those of the authors Hundreds Killed; Civilians Flee; France, U.N. Back Gov- and do not neccesarily represent the views ernment,” Facts on File World News Digest, February 7, of the Department of Defense, USMA, or the 30 “Chibok abductions: Nigeria girls ‘taken abroad’,” 2008; Ketil Fred Hansen, “Chad’s Relations with Libya, ACSS. BBC News, April 29, 2014. Sudan, France and the US,” Norwegian Peacebuilding 31 “Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants attack Chad for first Resource Centre, April 15, 2011. time,” BBC News, February 13, 2015.

10 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 Ethnic Albanian Foreign during the communist era. Albania’s In contrast, ethnic Albanians who long-time dictator Enver Hoxha went lived in the territories of the former Fighters in Iraq and Syria so far as to declare his country to be Yugoslavia as an ethnic and religious By Adrian Shtuni the first atheist state in the world, and minority struggling for civil rights all religion was banned between 1967 embraced Islam. It was not simply a extensive research suggests that about and 1990.2 The fall of communism dogma for them, but it was also part of 500 ethnic Albanians from the Western in the early 1990s, however, created a pragmatic strategy intended to secure Balkans have traveled to Syria and significant volatility, both political and ethnic and territorial preservation. Iraq since 2012, predominantly joining ideological. Yugoslavia’s decade-long violent the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah dissolution intensified ethno-religious (JN).1 For the most part these fighters The vacuum attracted pan-nationalist cleavages, creating a more welcoming are the product of a well-integrated movements and Islamist revivalists environment for a militant strain of regional network of extremist entities across the Balkans, including some Islam. As the 1998–1999 Kosovo war painstakingly expanded across the 20 Arab Islamic foundations, which came to an end, and almost a decade region over the past two decades. Recent established a strong presence in after infiltrating Albania, dozens counterterrorism operations in Albania Albania.3 These foundations financed of foreign faith-based charities— and Kosovo have shed some light on the building of hundreds of mosques particularly Saudi-funded groups—set the structure and inner workings of and awarded educational scholarships up shop in Kosovo. Besides providing this network. These efforts by local law to thousands of malleable young humanitarian aid and building schools enforcement agencies have revealed that Muslim Albanians. Many of these young and community centers, they also the web of extremist actors primarily men who took up these opportunities erected significant numbers of Wahhabi comprises a new generation of local returned home from their studies in Arab mosques and madrassas,8 the financing fundamentalist clerics trained in the and Asian religious institutions with a of which was opaque. Middle East and closely affiliated with strong sense of spiritual identity and an a number of foreign-funded Islamic eagerness to promote a puritanical form The Saudi Joint Relief Committee for charities and cultural associations. of Islam.4 The impoverished Albanian Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), whose government, thanks to combination activities have been linked to al- This article examines the presence of of lax law enforcement oversight and Qa’ida operatives,9 reportedly built ethnic Albanian foreign fighters in a desperate need for foreign aid and 98 primary and secondary schools in Syria and Iraq and provides an analysis investment, paid scant attention to some rural Kosovo after the war. The most of their backgrounds, affiliations, of the more dubious dealings by some promising students were enrolled in and activities. The data reveal that of the charities until in June 1998. In 30 Koranic schools sponsored by the the age groups most vulnerable to that month, law enforcement agencies Islamic Endowment Foundation, an recruitment are different among the raided the offices of the Revival of SJRC entity.10 In a massive construction countries examined—Albania, Kosovo, Islamic Heritage Society and four sites boom, more than 100 unlicensed and Macedonia—despite broad ethno- linked to other charities, arresting four mosques sprouted across Europe’s linguistic and cultural similarities. foreign terrorist operatives in their poorest country within ten years. 11 The study concludes that if they are employ.5 The raids broke up a cell of Kosovo covers just 4,212 square miles. to be effective, counter-narrative the Egyptian Islamic Jihad6 terrorist campaigns and government responses organization and reportedly foiled a The development of an extensive must take into account evolving trends bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in religious infrastructure required a of radicalization, and that they should Tirana.7 Nevertheless, almost a quarter significant increase in the number be fine-tuned to target the age groups century of forced atheism had made of qualified clerics. Agencies and most vulnerable to being swept up into Albanian society comparatively less groups such as The World Assembly of violent extremism. susceptible to radical Islam. Muslim Youth made available hundreds of scholarships to Middle Eastern Historical Conditions Islamic education institutions.12 The The Western Balkans are home to the returning graduates, often sporting largest indigenous Muslim population 2 Finngeir Hiorth, “Albania: An Atheistic State?,” in Europe and a long standing tradition Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe (10:5), 8 David Gardner, “Saudis Have Lost the Right to Take of moderate Islam that dates back to the Article 3, 1990. Sunni Leadership,” Financial Times, January 1, 2014. Ottoman conquest of the peninsula in 3 Miranda Vickers, “Islam in Albania,” Defense Acad- 9 “Written Testimony Of Jean-Charles Brisard, Interna- the 15th century. There are important emy of the United Kingdom, March 1, 2008. tional Expert On Terrorism Financing Lead Investigator distinctions, however, among the 4 Ibid. 911 Lawsuit, CEO JCB Consulting International–Before different countries of the region. Islam 5 Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Probes Blasts’ Possible Mideast The Committee On Banking, Housing And Urban Af- lost significant ground in Albania Ties.” The Washington Post, August 12, 1998. fairs United States Senate.” October 22, 2003. 6 The Egyptian Islamic Jihad is an al-Qa’ida affiliate 10 “Political Islam Among the Albanians: Are the Tali- established in the 1970s responsible for the assassina- ban Coming to the Balkans?” KIPRED, June 1, 2005. 1 This estimate is based on data provided by multiple tion of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 and 11 “Kosova Mbyll Sytë Para Xhamive Ilegale,” (Kosovo specialized reports tracking the flow of foreign fighters for targeting U.S. and Israeli facilities in a number of turns a blind eye towards illegal mosques), Balkan to Syria, hundreds of articles from regional media out- countries. Insight, January 12, 2012. lets reporting on this issue, and social media inquiries 7 John Kifner, “Police Seek Suspects Tied To Terrorism 12 William Finnegan, “The Countdown,” The New between November 2012 and early March 2015. In Albania.” The New York Times. August 21, 1998. Yorker, October 15, 2007. 11 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 the Salafis’ trademark long beard with for Albanian citizens range from 90 confluence of particular sociopolitical, the clean-shaven upper lip, created a to 148.18 By comparison, published economic, and demographic factors steady supply of hard-line clerics for estimates of Macedonian fighters—just may help explain Kosovo Albanians’ the growing network of mosques and 12—are very low, and other evidence disproportionate rate of radicalization. madrassas across Kosovo. Tellingly, seems to suggest a higher number may With 44 percent of the population aged eight of the 11 Kosovo imams arrested be more accurate. The similar number below 25, Kosovo has the youngest between August and September 2014 of reported casualties among jihadists population in Europe.25 There is also a on charges of preaching extremism from Albania (12) and ethnic Albanian surplus of young men, with a ratio of and helping to recruit jihadists were jihadists from Macedonia (14) would 1.1 male(s) per female. This youth bulge relatively young and educated in the indicate that the total number of ethnic makes the country more susceptible Middle East.13 Albanian fighters from Macedonia is to radicalization and social unrest, about 100. This estimate is further especially when combined with rapid Genci (Abdurrahim) Balla, a 35-year- supported by the reported death rate urbanization and poor economic old imam educated in Saudi Arabia, of around 10 percent among German,19 conditions.26 In fact Kosovo has the is typical of those caught up in the Belgian,20 Dutch,21 and Bosnian22 lowest Human Development Index operation. He was arrested in April jihadists. Only one ethnic Albanian in Europe and the lowest per capita 2014 in Albania on suspicion of leading jihadist from Serbia has been reported income in the Balkans.27 Also, as of a recruitment ring authorities believe to dead so far. 2013, Kosovo’s unemployment rate for have sent dozens of fighters to Syria.14 the 15–24 age group was 56 percent.28 These imams were closely affiliated The data also reveals that relative to A number of studies demonstrate a with a chain of 14 Islamic charities and its population of 1.8 million, Kosovo is significant association between high cultural associations whose leaders arguably the largest source of European youth unemployment and the incidence were also educated in the Middle East jihadists in Syria and Iraq. With a rate of of terrorism in Europe.29 Furthermore, and which the authorities in Kosovo over 16 fighters per 100,000 nationals, according to United National shut down recently because of their Kosovo’s recruitment rate is more than Development Programme (UNDP), 62 alleged ties to Islamist organizations eight times that of France, Europe’s percent of Kosovo’s adult population such as the Muslim Brotherhood.15 largest overall source of jihadists in has low levels of education.30 Ignorance Syria and Iraq.23 Kosovo’s per capita and lack of proper educational The Scale of the Problem rate of recruitment exceeds by about 60 opportunities often make people more There were only a small number of percent even that of a failed state like vulnerable to ideological indoctrination ethnic Albanian individuals involved Libya.24 and radicalization.31 In Kosovo, in jihadist activity prior to the Syrian this vulnerability is exacerbated by conflict.16 The evidence now suggest There are several likely factors for this significant ethnic polarization and that the number of ethnic Albanians development. Geographic proximity, the recent traumatic ethno-sectarian who have gone to fight in Syria and Iraq lack of visa restrictions, and low conflict that had sharp religious as of early March 2015 is about 500. transportation costs make the trip undertones. Among the data points that are publicly to Syria logistically easy. Yet the available, Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Who are the Ethnic Albanian Foreign Fighters? Affairs in a late February 2015 interview The author researched, examined, and stated that the number of foreign Kosovo’s Minister of Internal Affairs). VOA. February categorized publicly available data fighters from Kosovo stands at “about 20, 2015. related to ethnic Albanian foreign 300.”17 The latest available estimates 18 Peter R Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/ fighters and their known associates Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan published between November 2012 and Conflict in the 1980s,” ICSR, 26 January, 2015 and 13 Fatos Bytyci, “Imam Arrested in Kosovo on Suspi- “Foreign Fighters Flow to Syria,” The Washington Post, cion of Recruiting Islamist Fighters,” Reuters, August, January 27, 2015. 25 “The World Factbook: Kosovo,” Central Intelligence 2014 14, and Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in 19 Daniel H. Heinke, and Jan Raudszus, “German For- Agency and “Kosovo Population and Housing Census Push to Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, eign Fighters in Syria and Iraq, Combating Terrorism 2011,” UNSTATS. November 1, 2012 . September 17, 2014. 2015 . Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center at 26 Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth 14 Nikoleta Kovaci, “Lufta Në Siri, Zbulohet Celula Ter- West Point, NY. January 20, 2015. Bulges and Political Violence,” UN Department of Eco- roriste Në Tiranë” (War in Syria: Terrorist Cell Identi- 20 Christian Levaux, “Belgian Police Kill Two in Raid nomics and Social Affairs. January 1, 2012 . fied in Tirana, Shekulli Mobile, February 1, 2014 . on Suspected Islamists,” Reuters. January 15, 2015. 27 “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private 15 Fatos Bytyci, “Indebted to America, Kosovo Strug- 21 Samar Batrawi and Ilona Chmoun, “Dutch Foreign Sector and Employment,” UNDP November 2012 . gles to Curb Islamist Recruits,” Reuters, October 14, Fighters Continue to Travel to Syria, Combating Terror- 28 “Workforce Survey Results,” Kosovo Statistics 2014 and “Mbyllet OJQ-ja e imamit qe eshte e lidhur me ism Center at West Point.” Combating Terrorism Center Agency 2014 . ‘Vellazerine Myslimane’” (Shut down the imam’s NGO at West Point, NY, July, 20 2014. 29 “Global Terrorism Index 2012: Capturing the Impact with links to ‘Muslim Brotherhood’), Portali Telegrafi, 22 Rusmir Smajilhodzic, “Bosnia Arrests 16 Would-be of Terrorism for the Last Decade” Institute for Econom- September 22, 2014. Fighters, Balkans Move Against Jihadists,” Agence ics and Peace, 2012. 16 Timothy Holman, “Foreign Fighters from the West- France Presse, September 3, 2014. 30 “Kosovo Human Development Report 2012: Private ern Balkans in Syria,” Combating Terrorism Center at 23 “France to Get Better Weapons, Hire More Intel- Sector and Employment,” UNDP. 2012 . West Point, NY, June 30, 2014 . ligence Agents to Fight Homegrown Terror,” CBS News, 31 Omer Taspınar, “Fighting Radicalism, Not ‘Terror- 17 “Intervistë me Skender Hysenin, Ministrër i January 21, 2015. ism’: Root Causes Of An International Actor Redefined,” Brendshëm i Kosovës” (Interview with Skender Hyseni, 24 Ibid., Neumann. SAIS Review XXIX, no. 2 (2009), pp. 75–86.

12 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 early March 2015 by media outlets, Kosovo.35 The presence of at least two former Albanian Army Commandos in released by regional governments, or groups of ethnic Albanians fighting in the data set.38 Media reports suggest posted on social media. The resulting Syria was also recorded in November they traveled to the conflict zone in dataset compiled for the purposes of 2012.36 groups and that the number of KLA this study contains information on 211 veterans who have already fought in ethnic Albanian men who have either The deadliest year was 2014 with at Syria may be even higher. One press fought in Syria and/or Iraq at some point least 29 reported deaths. The deadliest article from mid-2013 quotes a KLA between 2012 and 2015 or have been month was September 2014 with ten veteran as stating that he was planning arrested and are being investigated for reported deaths mostly the result of to join the war in Syria “with about a recruiting fighters or attempting to join U.S.-led airstrikes targeting Islamic dozen war comrades.”39 terrorist groups. This number does not State strongholds. January 2014 was include the dozens of women, children, the second deadliest with five reported Meanwhile, the pool of imams and and other family members who have deaths, mainly linked to intensified madrassa students involved either accompanied them. clashes between the Islamic State and directly or indirectly in this armed JN. Media reports on at least three, conflict increases from ten to 23 when According to official sources, at least and possibly as many as six, Kosovo including the 13 imams arrested in 13 Albanian nationals have traveled to Albanian youths traveling to Syria Kosovo and Albania for inspiring Syria with their wives and 31 children.32 in early January 2015 attest to the or recruiting jihadists.40 Albanian Another report claims that about 20 continued flow of fighters despite authorities reportedly possess strong Kosovo Albanian families have “made the punitive measures taken by local evidence that a ring operated by two hijrah”33 to live and fight in the region and governments to curb the phenomenon.37 imams in the suburbs of Tirana is that one of these families—composed responsible for recruiting 70 fighters.41 of three brothers, two wives, and five At least ten of the fighters identified children— traveled to Syria as late as in the dataset belong to the ethnic Not surprisingly, due to a tradition September 2014.34 Bearing in mind the Albanian diaspora in Western Europe of close-knit families among ethnic patriarchal family structure common and possibly had dual nationality, Albanians, a third cluster of fighters is among ethnic Albanians, particularly specifically five originating from connected to each other mainly through in Kosovo, it would be reasonable to Macedonia, and five originating from kinship ties. There are at least eight assume that more than 100 ethnic Kosovo. Their last reported residences cases in which a small group of fighters Albanian relatives of jihadists have were in Germany, Sweden, Norway, related to each other (e.g., brother or made the trip, some of whom may Austria, and Switzerland. Other cousins) traveled to the Middle East, for have received military training and fighters or would-be fighters arrested a total of 20 known fighters. In five of eventually participated in armed before they could travel to Syria or Iraq these cases, the fighters originate from operations. are known to have resided at some point Kosovo. This is in line with a similar in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, trend observed among fighters from Of the 211 men in the data set, at least Greece, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, other countries such as France and the 152 of these men from Albania (70), and Egypt. United Kingdom.42 Kosovo (64), Macedonia (17), and Serbia (1) have fought in Syria and/ Two main clusters of fighters that stand What Age Groups are Most Susceptible to or Iraq in the past three to four years. out are those with previous military Recruitment for Violent Jihad? Of those 152 men, 49 were reportedly experience (14) and those with previous Of the 152 ethnic Albanian foreign killed in action: 12 from Albania, 22 formal religious training (ten). At least from Kosovo, 14 from Macedonia, and 14 of the fighters from the dataset have 38 “Katër Komando Të Zall Herrit Shkuan Për Të Luf- one from Serbia. The first local media previous guerilla warfare experience or tuar Në Siri. Dy U Vranë” (Four Commandos from Zall report of an ethnic Albanian casualty formal military training. There were ten Herr Went to Fight in Syria: Two Now Dead), Gazeta came in early November 2012 regarding KLA and/or National Liberation Army Tema, March 21, 2014. Naman Demolli, a 35-year-old Kosovo veterans from the armed conflicts in 39 Ismet Hajdari, “Unknown to Their Families, Balkan Liberation Army (KLA) veteran and a Kosovo and Macedonia in late 1990s Former Guerrillas Join Rebels,” The Daily Star Newspa- staunch activist for a radical Islamic and the beginning of 2000s and four per, August 8, 2013. movement turned political party in 40 Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo Imams Arrested in Push to 35 “Vritet Ish-ushtari I UCK-se Ne Siri Gjate Sulmeve Stop Fighters Going to Syria, Iraq,” Reuters, September Kunder Asadit (Former KLA Soldier Killed in Syria dur- 17, 2014. 32 Aleksandra Bogdani, and Flamur Bezaj, “Dhjetra ing Raids against Assad).” Shqiptarja.com, November 41 “Tetë Në Pranga, Rekrutonin Luftëtarë Besimtarë Fëmijë Shqiptarë, “pengje” Te Xhihadisteve Ne Siri 14, 2012. Shqiptarë Për Të Luftuar Në Siri” (Eight Arrested for (Tens of Albanian kids, “hostages” of Jihadis in Syria),” 36 “Grupe Shqiptarësh Në Luftë Kundër Assadit (Al- Recruiting Albanians to Fight in Syria), Gazeta SHQIP, Reporter.al, December 16, 2014 . banian Groups in War against Assad),” Portali Telegrafi, March 12, 2014. 33 Hijrah refers to Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to November 14, 2012 . 42 “French Brothers Seek Jihad in Syria,” BBC News, Medina to escape persecution, but in this context is used 37 “Dy Nga Tre Gjilanasit Qe Shkuan Ne Siri Nuk August 20, 2013, and Chris Pleasance, “Last Surviving simply as migrate. Kishin Pasaporta; E Paraqarte Si Dolen” (Two of the Brother of Trio of British Extremists Who Left Britain to 34 Besiana Xharra and Anita Kadriu, “Familja Dhjeta- Three People from Gjilan That Travelled to Syria Did Fight in Syria Says He Will Not Return to UK until All nëtarëshe Në ISIS. (Ten-member (Albanian) Family Not Have Passports; Unclear How They Managed to Muslim Lands Are ‘liberated’,” Mail Online, November with ISIS.).” Zeri, January 25, 2015 . Travel), KOHA. January 20, 2015 . 15, 2014.

13 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 fighters identified by name or by with extremist links well after Albania pseudonym in the media, the data did—post-1999 in Kosovo compared to Canadian Foreign Fighters set contains demographic data for 88 post-1990 in Albania. in Iraq and Syria fighters. Based on this information the By Christopher Anzalone ethnic Albanian fighters range in age Conclusion from 17–70 and they are on average The unprecedented proportion of ethnic The outbreak of mass popular protests 30-years-old. The data suggests that Albanians being drawn to violent against the Syrian government of the age group most susceptible to extremist organizations testifies that President Bashar al-Assad in the recruitment for violent jihad among militant Islamist narratives have struck spring of 2011 and the country’s rapid ethnic Albanians is 21–25 years old. a chord. This preliminary study based descent into an increasingly brutal on a detailed, yet partial footprint of civil war following violent repression While the individuals in this data set the ethnic Albanian foreign fighters, by state security forces and militias share similar ethnic and linguistic identified two distinct age groups have produced a chaotic environment backgrounds and are clustered particularly susceptible to recruitment in which armed groups such as the together on the battlefields of Syria into violent extremism. While the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra have and Iraq, they originate from three typical foreign fighter from Albania is flourished. different socio-economic and political a male between 31 and 35 years old, the environments. Ethnic Albanians from typical ethnic Albanian foreign fighter The Syrian government’s brutality Kosovo and Macedonia have more from Kosovo and Macedonia is a male and use of mass violence, including points of commonality due to their between 21 and 25 years old. The data the bombing of civilians, the common Yugoslav past than they share indicate that country-specific dynamics, widespread use of torture and rape, with Albanian nationals. In order to despite all the many ethno-linguistic and campaigns of starvation, has been detect potential variances between and cultural similarities among ethnic well documented. The emotive images, fighters, the data was segmented by Albanians in the Balkans, may have had coupled with ease of travel and a host country of origin: Albania (23), Kosovo a more determining role in their path to of highly personalized factors ranging (49), Macedonia (15), and Serbia (1). radicalization. from a search for a greater purpose Though the sample sizes of fighters and identity to troubled backgrounds originating from each country are not A more granular understanding of the involving crime and mental illness, equal, they represent comparable ratios complex radicalization environment have helped fuel the mobilizations of relative to the number of estimated and recruitment patterns identified foreign fighters, first to Syria and later fighters per country, 16, 16, and 15 in this study would allow for a more to Iraq.1 percent respectively. informed counter-radicalization strategy and effective counter- This article examines the flow of The data segmentation reveals distinctly narrative campaigns targeting the most Canadian foreign fighters to the Syrian different patterns of recruitment among susceptible age groups. Moreover, these and Iraqi theaters, placing it in the this pool of foreign fighters. While counter-radicalization efforts would context of earlier Canadian involvement the age group most susceptible to benefit from frequent monitoring and in jihadi groups, and in particular other recruitment is the same among ethnic assessment of evolving radicalization recent cases, such as Somalia. Canadian Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia patterns in the region. Ultimately, the foreign fighters, like those from (21–25) that changes by a decade in the long-term success of these efforts will other countries, are a diverse set of case of Albania (31–35). This variance be determined by the ability to adjust to individuals with different backgrounds is largely reflected in the fighters’ and anticipate radicalization trends. who have traveled to the battlefield at average age by country of origin as different times.2 This article describes follows: Albania 35.6, Kosovo 28, and Adrian Shtuni is a Washington, D.C.-based Macedonia 25.8. These differences, foreign policy and security analyst with a regional which are somewhat explained by focus on the Western Balkans and the Eastern 1 On the ease of access to the battlefront in Syria, and by Kosovo’s younger median population Mediterranean. He holds a M.Sc. in Foreign Service extension Iraq, as a possible factor for high mobilization age and other drivers of radicalization with a concentration in International Relations numbers of Europeans, see the Project on Middle East listed above, could also be influenced by and Security from Georgetown University, and Political Science interview with Thomas Hegghammer, the demographics of the most radical, consults for think tanks and academic institutions “POMEPS Conversations 32,” January 20, 2014. charismatic, and successful recruiters on issues of radicalization and violent extremism. 2 The timing of travel is often significant. In previous in each country. In Kosovo this includes cases, such as Somalia, individuals who traveled earlier a 25-year-old Islamic State commander were seemingly driven by different factors than those in- named Lavdrim Muhaxheri, who dividuals who went later, particularly in regard to their until recently ran an Islamic cultural ideological affinity with al-Shabab. From 2007 to Janu- association. His counterpart in Albania ary 2009, when the Ethiopian military still occupied was, until his arrest, the 35-year-old parts of Somalia, nationalism seems to have played an Imam Genci Balla. Another potential important role in the decisions of foreign fighters. Later causal factor worth exploring may be foreign fighters appear to have had more specifically the fact that Kosovo society experienced ideological motives, rather than wanting to simply join the growth of Middle Eastern charities an effective organization.

14 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 the different types of individuals who Canadians who joined al-Shabab were information. There is often a dearth have joined jihadi groups in Syria and of Somali descent, but those joining of open source information, which is Iraq and examines Canada’s mentions the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, or limited to jihadi primary sources and in the Islamic State’s official media other Syria -and Iraq-based militant whatever insights are available from discourse, particularly related to claims groups are more diverse in terms of the friends and family of fighters. It that it inspired recent lone wolf attacks their ethnic, religious, and family is difficult to interview most of these in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, backgrounds.6 Canadian recruits are individuals once they leave Canada. near Montreal. also featured prominently in the Islamic Some fighters have produced material State’s media operations, more so than once on the ground in Syria or Iraq, The Canadian Contingent in the media operations of other jihadi but their motivations generally have Despite some uncertainty around the groups. evolved by that point, limiting analysis. margins, it is clear that the number of foreign fighters traveling to the ongoing Like the foreign fighters from other Personal reasons are also factors, though conflicts in Syria and Iraq far outstrips countries, many of the Canadians they are often overlooked in much of earlier episodes of jihadi mobilization. who joined in 2011 and 2012 were the analysis of Muslim foreign fighters. The national, ethnic, and linguistic motivated in part by a desire to engage These motivations include the desire to diversity of the foreign fighters is in what they see as a kind of “armed atone for self-perceived sins (such as also much broader. A record number humanitarianism”7 on behalf of Syrian previously living in an un-Islamic way), of Canadians or those with Canadian civilians who are being violently feelings of disillusionment, and a desire connections, around 30 according to suppressed by the al-Assad government. to belong to a group and participate the federal department, Public Safety Others were motivated by the search for in a “noble” cause.8 Such motivations Canada, have joined jihadi groups active identity and purpose, which, for them, are difficult to classify concretely for in Syria and Iraq, primarily Jabhat al- was fulfilled by the fight against the analytical purposes because they often Nusra and the Islamic State. This is Syrian government and the idealized vary significantly among individuals. somewhat more than the estimated 20 rhetoric of groups such as Jabhat al- As a result, it is difficult, if not to 25 Canadians who joined al-Shabab Nusra and, to an even greater degree, impossible, to develop a fully applicable in Somalia between 2007 and 2013.3 the Islamic State and its claim to have and explanatory typology. Other high-end estimates put the reformulated a caliphate. possible number between 35 and 100 The decision to travel to Syria and Iraq individuals.4 There are a total estimated As with other foreign fighters, there rather than other battlefields is also 130 Canadians who are believed to are multiple factors influencing the likely influenced by logistical factors. have joined militant groups overseas, decision to join armed groups abroad. Travel to Syria is easier than traveling with Syria and Iraq being the most It is often difficult to construct a to jihadi battlefronts in Afghanistan, popular theater of choice.”5 Most of the full picture about the underlying Pakistan, or Somalia, for example. motivations because of the limits of the The international news media and the images of suffering civilians also put 3 Colin Freeze and Joe Friesen, “Why the Canadian the spotlight on the Syrian conflict, Pipeline to al-Shabab has Dried Up,” The Globe and Mail, 4, 2013. See also the article’s accompanying video report, likely influencing the decisions of September 30, 2013. “Canadians Fighting in Syria.” American photogra- prospective foreign fighters. Finally, 4 Public Safety Canada, “2014 Public Report on the Ter- pher Matthew Schrier, who was imprisoned for seven there is also the powerful allure of rorist Threat to Canada,” p. 30, Aaron Zelin; “ICSR In- months in 2013 by Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo, also the media narratives put forward by sight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise reported being interrogated in fluent English by three jihadi groups, especially for those among Western Europeans,” International Centre for masked individuals whom he believed to be Canadians. fighters who are not well educated in the Study of Radicalisation, December 17, 2013; Michelle See “US Photojournalist Recounts Horror of Captivity the nuance of Islamic theology, history, Shephard, “Canadians Hurrying to Syria in Record after Escaping al-Qaeda in Syria,” Agence France-Pres- or jurisprudence. This is particularly Numbers to Join Rebels,” Toronto Star, August 23, 2013; se, August 23, 2013; “American Photographer Escapes true of certain concepts such as that of Amarnath Amarasingam, “Canadian Foreign Fighters Syrian Islamist Torturers: Paper,” Reuters, August 23 the ghuraba, the strangers who will once in Syria: An Overview,” Jihadology, March 4, 2015. 2013; C.J. Chivers, “American Tells Odyssey as Prisoner again emerge as the “true Muslims,” The high-end estimate of up to 100 Canadian foreign of Syrian Rebels,” The New York Times, August 22 2013, and the important placement of Syria fighters was repeated on January 15, 2014 by Abu Turab and Michelle Shephard, “Canadians Hurrying in Record in eschatological narratives and certain al-Muhajir (the Emigrant), a Twitter user claiming to be Numbers to Join Rebels,” Toronto Star, August 23, 2013 hadith.9 These are concepts that jihadi one of them. See “Canadian ‘Martyred’ while Fighting in 6 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Somalia and Syria, Jihadist Says,” QMI Agency, January 17, 2014. Al Shabaab.” 5 Public Safety Canada, “2014 Public Report,” p. 11, p. 7 This description was coined by Thomas Heggham- 8 Libération, “Je suis allé en Syrie pour racheter mes 17. Estimates of the number of Canadians fighting in mer. See: Stefan Binder, “Interview: Syrien: Humanitäre péchés,” February 12, 2014, and Charlotte Boitiaux, Syria and, later, Iraq, also come from non-governmental Helfer mit Kalaschnikow,” Der Standard, February 13, “Confessions of a French Jihadist in Syria,” France24, sources, such as documentary filmmaker Bilal Abdul 2014. Jihadi rebel groups operating in northern Syria February 13, 2014 Kareem, who interviewed fighters from various Islamist have set up, according to British government officials, 9 The framing of the current conflicts in Syria and Iraq rebel groups in Syria in 2013. He noted in a Septem- fronts whose members pose as aid workers in order to in eschatological/apocalyptic terms can be seen most ber 2013 interview with the Canadian Broadcasting facilitate the travel of foreign fighters into Syria, see An- clearly in the naming of the Islamic State’s English lan- Company (CBC) that he met 20–30 Canadian fighters thony Lloyd, Alex Christie-Miller, and Michael Evans, guage e-magazine, Dabiq, and the name of an affiliated during his time in Syria. See CBC News, “Syria Conflict “Jihadists Using Aid Agencies as Cover to Join Syria media organization, the Al-Amaq News Agency. Both Attracts Canadians to Fight on Front Line,” September Fight,” The Times, February 10, 2014. names are those of places mentioned in Sunni hadith

15 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 media operatives and ideologues derive expecting a child at the time of his countries and coming to the blessed from selective readings of historical death.13 A convert of only six years, land of Syria to live a life of purity.18 In treatises, the hadiths, the Qur’an, and Poulin had a troubled youth, including his recruitment pitch, he emphasizes exegetical works. some criminal activity, before he left for his identity as an “average” Canadian Syria.14 Early on, he reportedly adhered who “loved” hockey and other sports as Individual Case Studies to a particularly rigid, black-and-white well as summers in the countryside, and Although open-source data on the interpretation of Islam.15 In a series of who was employed in a well-paying job Canadian foreign fighters in Syria and Internet postings, he claimed that he as a street cleaner, saying, “You know, Iraq are limited, there are significant had been accused of terrorism, had been mujahidin are regular people too.”19 data on some individuals that provide imprisoned, and was feared by people useful, if tentative, comparisons with in his hometown of Timmins. He also He is at pains, though, to also note other groups of Canadian foreign claimed that his activities were being the support network that he says fighters. monitored constantly by the police.16 is in place for foreign fighters.20 Poulin posted about his legal troubles Ultimately, though, the reward for André Poulin online, describing some of the acts he those who emigrate, he says, will be Poulin, a 24-year-old from Timmins, was accused of, including threatening the recompense (ajr) from God.21 He Ontario, who left for Syria in late 2012 to blow up a Timmins gas station. He calls for those with any skill, from road from Calgary, was killed in August also described arrest for making death construction to technology, to come 2013 during an assault on the Syrian threats after he was caught having an rebuild Syria. In Flames of War, Poulin’s government-held military airbase of affair with the common-law wife of a frontline participation in the battle Menagh in the governorate of Aleppo.10 man whose house he was then living in for Menagh is prominently featured in Reports of his death emerged in January as well as arrests for harassment, theft, the film’s narrative, though he is not 2014.11 Poulin was featured in a June and carrying a weapon illegally.17 identified by name. 2013 report about Western foreign fighters in Syria broadcast by Channel The Islamic State has posthumously The Calgary Group: Damian Clairmont, Salman 4 in the United Kingdom, in which he featured Poulin in two major films, Al- Ashrafi, and the Gordon Brothers noted that he was “helping people” Ghuraba: The Chosen Few from Different Lands, Clairmont, 22, a resident of Calgary from in Syria, something that he said his released in July 2014, and Flames of War, an Acadian family, was killed in Syria in parents supported but did not fully released in September 2014. In the January 2014 during fighting between understand.12 In the Channel 4 report, first, Poulin speaks candidly about his Jabhat al-Nusra and Free Syrian Army Poulin was shown fighting alongside previous life as a “normal Canadian” (FSA) militias.22 He had left Canada in a number of Europeans in Katibat al- before urging Muslim viewers to fulfill November 2012 after telling his mother Muhajirin (Brigade of the Emigrants), a what he says is their religious obligation that he was going to study Islam and rebel group founded and commanded by of emigrating from non-Muslim Arabic in Egypt. He instead traveled to Russians and foreign fighters from the Turkey before crossing the border into Caucasus. Syria and joining Jabhat-al-Nusra.23 13 CBC News, “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, Poulin, who had married in Syria, was Ont., Confirmed Dead in Syria,” January 16, 2014, and ICI Radio-Canada, “André Poulin, un autre Canadien 18 Islamic State film, Al-Ghuraba: The Chosen Few from about locations of a final great battle with “Rome,” djihadiste tué en Syrie selon CBC,” January 16, 2014. Different Lands, July 2014. Poulin, when speaking about which is today often interpreted by jihadis as referring These rumors were confirmed in a film released by the the rewards from God that await emigrants, notes that to “Christendom” generally. Islamic State in July 2014, Al-Ghuraba: The Chosen Few it is Ramadan at the time of recording, suggesting that 10 CBC News, “Syria Conflict Attracts Canadians to from Different Lands. it was recorded during Ramadan in 2013, which fell in Fight on Front Line,” September 4, 2013, CBC News, 14 He converted sometime between late 2008 and early July and early August. “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, Ont., Confirmed 2009, just after turning 20. See CTV News, “Another 19 Ibid. Dead in Syria,” January 16, 2014; ICI Radio-Canada, Canadian Man Dies Fighting in Syria,” January 17, 2014. 20 Ibid. “André Poulin, un autre Canadien djihadiste tué en Poulin confirmed that he had converted six years before 21 Ibid. Syrie selon CBC, January 16, 2014; The Canadian Press, in the Islamic State film Al-Ghuraba: The Chosen Few from 22 Jean-Marie Yambayamba, “Un jeune Calgarien tué “Canadian Man Killed Last August in Syrian Conflict: Different Lands. en Syrie après s’être rallié à un groupe djihadiste,” ICI Report,” January 17, 2014; and The Canadian Press, 15 Ibid., “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, Ont., Radio-Canada, 15 January, 2014, and Fadi al-Haruni, “Another Canadian Reported to Have Been Killed while Confirmed Dead in Syria.” “Death of a Canadian Jihadi in Syria,” Radio Canada Fighting in Syria,” January 17, 2014. 16 Ibid. Poulin posted about his legal troubles online, International, January 15, 2014 . 11 CBC News, “Andre Poulin, Jihadi from Timmins, describing some of the things he was accused of. These 23 The Huffington Post Alberta, “Damian Clairmont Ont., Confirmed Dead in Syria,” January 16, 2014, and included threatening to blow up a Timmins gas station. Dead: Calgary Islam Convert Killed Fighting in Syria,” ICI Radio-Canada, “André Poulin, un autre Canadien He also had been arrested for making death threats after 15 January, 2014 and CBC News, “Damian Clairmont djihadiste tué en Syrie selon CBC,” January 16, 2014. he was caught having an affair with the common-law Killed Fighting with al-Qaeda-linked Rebels in Syria,” Photographs of Poulin’s body following the battle were wife of a man in whose house he was then living in, and Postmedia News, “Canadian Man Fighting against tweeted on March 20 and March 21, 2014 by Twitter harassment, theft, and carrying a weapon illegally. Regime ‘Executed’ by Other Rebels: Report,” January user “Abu Bakr al-Muhajir,” who claimed to be a Cana- 17 Ibid., “Canadian ‘Martyred’ while Fighting in Syria, 16, 2014; Nick Logan, “Calgary Man Damian Clairmont dian foreign fighter in Syria. Al-Muhajir confirmed that Jihadist Says”, QMI Agency, and Michael S. Schmidt, Reportedly Killed Fighting in Syria,” Global News, Janu- Poulin had died during the battle for the airbase. “Canadian Killed in Syria Lives On as Pitchman for ary 15, 2014; Stewart Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: 12 Channel 4, “Britons Fighting with Syria’s Jihadi Jihadis: ISIS Uses Andre Poulin, a Convert to Islam, in How a Calgary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil ‘Band of Brothers’,” June 14, 2013. Recruitment Video,” The New York Times July 15, 2014 War,” National Post, July 12, 2014 .

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Once in Syria, he was attracted to the The news of Clairmont’s killing was Gordon brothers left for Syria sometime “al-Qa’ida types,” such as those in first reported on Twitter by Abu Turab in late 2012, around the same time as Jabhat al-Nusra, because they “do not al-Muhajir, who claimed to be a foreign Clairmont and Ashrafi.37 steal, rape, or sell drugs or murder or fighter in Syria.32 On January 14, he kidnap for ransom.”24 tweeted a photograph of Clairmont, Farah Mohamed Shirdon whom he called Abu Talha al-Canadi Shirdon, another former Calgary Clairmont, who suffered from bipolar (the Canadian), and, in subsequent resident, first emerged publicly as an disorder and, between 15 and 17, conversations with other Twitter users, Islamic State foreign fighter in a film agoraphobia, had a troubled childhood. reporting that his “bro” had been killed released by the group in mid-April His family moved to Calgary in October fighting FSA militias in Aleppo.33 2014 in which he is shown tearing up 1997 when he was seven.25 At 17, he and burning his Canadian passport attempted suicide.26 After turning 20, His execution was confirmed by FSA- and threatening both Canada and he became “very angry, very political,” affiliated sources.34 Like many foreign President Barack Obama.38 From a according to his mother, and began to fighters in Syria and elsewhere, prominent Canadian-Somali family, he speak forcefully about the worldwide Clairmont reasons for engaging in had previously studied at the Southern suffering of Muslims.27 Despite holding militant activism were guided not Alberta Institute of Technology before some basic jobs for short periods, he only by a personalized and peculiar leaving for Syria after stating that he lived largely off a disability pension that interpretation of Islam, but also by no longer felt comfortable living in his psychiatrist had recommended he graphic scenes of conflict and the Canada.39 He was active on Twitter, apply for after he was released from the suffering of civilians as well as highly urging readers to join the Islamic State hospital following his suicide attempt.28 individualized characteristics, life and posting ideological messages about experiences, and personal motivations. martyrdom and the religious duty of Though he initially lied about his becoming mujahidin.40 Shirdon was destination, Clairmont later admitted to Group dynamics and interpersonal reported to have been killed fighting his mother and in correspondence with relations, however, are also important in Iraq in August 2014, but subsequent a Canadian newspaper that he wanted aspects of the recruitment process for reports suggested that he was still to fight in Syria because women and militant groups and, more broadly, alive.41 children were being tortured and killed social movements in general.35 While there by the al-Assad government and he living in Calgary, Clairmont was part John Maguire believed that, by fighting, he was doing of a study group that also included Maguire, 24, left for Syria sometime something productive by contributing fellow converts and brothers Gregory in 2013 after expressing views that to a cause greater than himself.29 He and Collin Gordon and Salman Ashrafi. Islamic law should be enforced through also stated that the afterlife was a better The four men also shared an apartment violence and criticizing a local Calgary- place than this world, hinting at his together in downtown Calgary during based imam for condemning the Islamic desire for martyrdom.30 Although he 2011 and 2012. Ashrafi left Canada in State.42 According to the Royal Canadian initially kept in contact with his mother, October 2012 and in November 2013 Mounted Police (RCMP), Maguire was it tapered off.31 carried out a suicide bombing against 36 Iraqi forces for the Islamic State. The ‘Wake Up Call’ Urges Muslims to Follow Example of 24 Stewart Bell, “Canadian Killed in Syria: Calgary Calgary Suicide Bomber,” National Post, June 16, 2014. Man, 22, Joined Fight after Converting to Islam,” Na- Clairmont Killed Fighting with al-Qaeda-linked Rebels 37 CBC News, “Gregory and Collin Gordon, Calgary tional Post, January 15, 2014. in Syria” and Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Brothers, Join Ranks of Canadians Fighting for ISIS,” 25 Stewart Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Calgary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War.” August 29, 2014. Calgary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War,” 32 His Twitter account, which has since been sus- 38 Islamic State film, They Hear You, O’ Muslims, April National Post, July 12, 2014; Stewart Bell, “‘He was a pended, was: https://twitter.com/abu_muhajir1. 2014. He was not identified by name or nationality, sitting target’: Mother of Canadian Muslim Convert 33 http://twitter.com/abu_muhajir1/sta- though he spoke in English. says Sons Recruited into Syrian Conflict from Calgary tus/423121184180281344/photo/1 and https://twitter. 39 CBC News, “Farah Mohamed Shirdon of Calgary Mosque,” National Post, June 20, 2013. com/abu_muhajir1/status/423127061188706305 Fighting for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” June 18, 26 Ibid. 34 Murray Brewster and Ben Makuch, “Calgary Man 2014. 27 Stewart Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Cal- Killed in Syria Prompts Warning on Homegrown Radi- 40 Shirdon tweeted on everything from his desire for gary High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War.” cals,” The Canadian Press, January 15, 2014. martyrdom and the inability of his parents to prevent 28 Ibid. 35 For example: Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “Interests, him from engaging in military action to calls for other 29 Postmedia News, “Canadian Man Fighting against Ideas, and Islamist Outreach in Egypt,” Islamic Activism: Canadians to join the Islamic State. His account has Regime ‘Executed’ by Other Rebels: Report,” January 16, A Social Movement Theory Approach, (ed) Quintan Wik- since been suspended, but the author has recorded 2014, and Stewart Bell, “Alberta High School Dropout torowicz, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, and saved many of his tweets. His former account was: Explains Why He, and Many Others, Have Gone to pp. 231–249 and Donatella della Porta, “Recruitment http://www.twitter.com/MuhajirSumalee. Fight in Syria,” National Post, September 26, 2013. Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: Italian 41 CBC News, “Farah Mohamed Shirdon of Calgary, 30 Bell, “‘It’s between Me and God’: How a Calgary Left-Wing Terrorism,” International Social Movement Re- Fighting for ISIS, Dead in Iraq, Reports Say,” August High School Dropout Joined Syria’s Civil War.” search, Vol. 1: From Structure to Action: Comparing Social 15, 2014. and Bryan Passifume, “Calgary Jihadi May Not 31 He last called her on June 22, 2013 and had become, Movement Research Across Cultures, (ed) Bert Klander- Have Been Killed in Iraq,” QMI Agency, September 12, according to his mother, even angrier. He also, she said, mans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, London, 2014. “became increasingly angry about Canada, increasingly JAI Press, 1988. 42 Jessica Hume, “Canadian ISIS Fighter: Headed determined to be in Syria fighting.” CBC News, “Damian 36 Stewart Bell, “Canadian ISIS Member’s Online Down Dark Path,” QMI Agency, August 26, 2014.

17 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 part of a group of six young men in 18” group who had been previously fighting in Azaz in February 2013.52 Ottawa sympathetic to jihadi activity. imprisoned for his role in a domestic One other member, Khadar Khalid, 23, terrorism plot to attack the Toronto Zouaidia, Senouci, Rifaat, Rafai, Kadem, is also believed to have traveled to Syria Stock Exchange, the Canadian Security and Ismaili, who were all students at and Iraq. Suliman Mohamed, 21, twin Intelligence Service, and a military the College de Maisonneuve, a public brothers and recent converts, Ashton base, left Canada in 2012 using someone pre-university college in Montreal, and Carlos Larmond, 24, and Awso else’s passport since he was forbidden reportedly left for Syria and Iraq in mid- Peshdary, 25, were later arrested by to have one of his own as part of his January 2015 to join the Islamic State.53 the RCMP and charged with terrorism- parole.47 He traveled to Syria via Dubai Rafai, Kadem, and Zouaidia come from related offenses, including funding and is believed to have joined Jabhat al- Algerian-Canadian families and Ismaili Maguire’s travel.43 Nusra.48 Reports of his death surfaced is originally from Morocco.54 At least in late September 2013 from sources one of the six is believed to have briefly In early December 2014, Maguire was close to his family and friends.49 Born attended classes run by Quebec-based featured in a video series produced in Somalia, he had come to Canada as a teacher Adil Charkaoui, though he by the Islamic State, titled Message refugee when he was seven. denies that there is any connection to of a Mujahid.44 Standing amid rubble his classes and the choice to travel to and presenting himself as a “typical Quebec Foreign Fighters Syria and Iraq.55 Canadian,” educated and with no Montreal residents Jamal Mohamed criminal history, he calls for Muslim Abd al-Qadir, 24, Bilel Zouaidia, 18, The Islamic State and Lone Wolf Attacks viewers, particularly those in Canada, Shayma Senouci, 18, Mohamed Rifaat, In addition to seeking recruits for the to join the Islamic State. He also links 18 or 19, Imad Eddine Rafai, 18 or 19, Syria and Iraq battlefields, the Islamic the two lone wolf attacks in Canada Ouardia Kadem, 18 or 19, and Yahia State is also seeking to project its power to that government’s participation in Alaoui Ismaili, 29, are suspected of and influence abroad by claiming to attacks on the militant group. Maguire having left to fight in Syria. Abd al- have influenced the decision-making clearly displayed his heavy ideological Qadir was from a Kurdish Syrian- of a number of lone wolf militants in debt to the late al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Canadian family and is believed to have Western countries, including Canada, Peninsula (AQAP) preacher Anwar al- left Canada in the summer of 2012. He the United States, Australia, and Awlaki, closely paraphrasing him and grew up in Montreal and was a college France.56 The Islamic State claims even basing his own nom de guerre, student at the time of his departure.50 the two lone wolf attacks in Canada “Abu Anwar al-Kanadi,” on al-Awlaki’s He said that he was driven to become a during October 2014 were inspired by name.45 Maguire and another Canadian, foreign fighter because of the suffering calls from its official spokesman and a Mohamud Mohamed Mohamud, 20, of his fellow Syrians and the inaction of prolific ideologue Abu Muhammad al- formerly a student at York University, the world powers in stopping the Syrian Adnani al-Shami. The assertion came were reportedly killed during the government’s atrocities.51 Abd al-Qadir in a story in Dabiq, the Islamic State’s months-long battle for Kobane in first joined the Free Syrian Army but e-magazine in an article attributed northern Syria along the Turkish later transferred his allegiance first to John Cantlie, a captive British border.46 to Harakat Ahrar al-Sham and then to journalist. The Islamic State, however, Jabhat al-Nusra before he was killed does not state that either the shooting Ali Mohamed Dirie attack in Ottawa by Michael Zehaf- Dirie, a member of the “Toronto 47 CBC News, “‘Toronto 18’ Member Ali Mohamed Di- Bibeau or the vehicle attack in St. Jean- rie was under Strict Court Order,” September 26, 2013 . sur-Richelieu on two Canadian soldiers 43 Andrew Duffy and Meghan Hurley, “From JMag to 48 Ibid., CTV News, “Toronto 18 Member Killed Fight- by Martin “Ahmad” Couture-Rouleau 57 Jihad John: The Radicalization of John Maguire,” Ottawa ing in Syria,” September 25, 2013; CBC News, “‘Toronto received any operational support. Citizen, February 7, 2015 . 18’ Member Ali Mohamed Dirie Reportedly Died in 44 Islamic State film, Message of a Mujahid 5: Abu Anwar Syria,” September 25, 2013; and The Canadian Press, 52 Ibid. al-Kanadi, December, 2014. “Toronto 18 Plotter says He’s Changed,” September 13, 53 CTV News, “Six Young Montrealers Believed to Be 45 Maguire specifically mimicked or copied a message 2010. For his role in procuring and smuggling weapons Fighting for ISIS in Syria,” February 27, 2015, and Hugo from al-Awlaki featured in AQAP’s eulogy video for the for the plotters, Dirie received a seven-year prison Joncas, “Deux derniers djihadistes allégués identifies,” preacher, The Martyr of Da‘wa, December 2011. Simi- sentence in 2009, but was given credit for five years March 1, 2015. larities or outright paraphrasing or citation includes of pre-trial custody and paroled in October 2011. He 54 Joncas, “Deux derniers djihadistes allégués identi- Maguire’s urging of non-Muslim viewers to read the served his two years imprisonment in Canada’s highest fies.” Qur’an themselves in order to determine its validity, maximum security prison, the Special Handling Unit, 55 Alan Woods, “Tough Terror Laws Won’t Stop warning Muslims against trusting promises of Western in the province of Quebec. At a parole hearing in 2010, Canadians from Fleeing to Islamic State, says Adil governments that the war is not one against Muslims, Dirie claimed that while he still opposed Canada’s then- Charkaoui,” The Toronto Star, February 27, 2015, and and even his closing, “peace be upon those who follow involvement in Afghanistan, he no longer subscribed to Steve Rukavina, “Collège de Rosemont severs ties with the guidance.” violence and wanted to find peaceful and political ways Adil Charkaoui group,” CBC News, April 16, 2015 . 46 Stewart Bell and Meghan Hurley, “Mother Mourns to express his opposition. 56 Islamic State e-magazine, Dabiq, issue 5, November Ottawa Jihadi Maguire, Believed Killed in Syria,” Ot- 49 CBC News, “‘Toronto 18’ Member Ali Mohamed 2014, p. 37, and issue December 6, 2014, pp. 3-5. tawa Citizen, January 14, 2015; Bill Dunphy and Nicole Dirie Reportedly Died in Syria.” 57 Islamic State, Dabiq, issue 5, pp. 36-37. The Islamic O’Reilly, “Hamilton Family Fears Son Killed Fight- 50 Kurt Pelda, “Fodder for the Front: German Jihadists State issued even stronger claims on having influenced ing for Islamic State in Syria,” The Hamilton Spectator, on Syria’s Battlefields,” Der Spiegel, April 30, 2013. Man Haron Monis’ hostage-taking in a Sydney café, September 25, 2014 . 51 Ibid. connecting him to the militant group due to his bay‘a to

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By claiming responsibility, even if the average age decreasing over time.59 group for prospective foreign fighters. only “spiritual” and not operational, This average age range is similar to for lone wolf attacks in the West, the the ranges (twenties to early thirties) Christopher Anzalone is a Ph.D. candidate in the Islamic State is trying to further inflate seen in other samples of Islamist Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University. its image of power and influence and militants from the United Kingdom, His research focuses on political Islam, including it has already benefited from non- continental Europe, the United States, contemporary jihadi movements, Shi’ite Islam and stop coverage by the international and elsewhere.60 The sample sizes are contemporary Shi’ite social movements, as well news media and attention from world small, making it difficult to identify a as political violence in comparative perspective, leaders. This, in turn, allows it to firm trend, but there also appears to an the social and ideological construction of jihadi nudge the news narrative away from increasing number of Canadian converts narratives of martyrdom, and Muslim visual the increasing on-the-ground pressures who participate in jihadi militancy— cultures. it faces, particularly in Iraq, toward from just one before the September 11, an image of the group as an inexorable 2001 attacks to four after that date.61 regional and global force. A similar media strategy was quite successful Assessing the religiosity of these for al-Shabab, which has called for individuals is difficult due to lack lone wolf attacks in Europe and North of information, but some tentative America as well, garnering significant conclusions are possible.62 Poulin, amounts of news media coverage and Clairmont, and the Gordon brothers masking its battlefield setbacks inside were all converts, while others, Somalia.58 including Shirdon and possibly Abd al-Qadir, were newly religious. Conclusion The available information indicates The current group of Canadian foreign that Poulin, Clairmont, the Gordon fighters in Syria and Iraq has evolved brothers, and many other Canadian in comparison with previous Canadian foreign fighters had limited knowledge jihadists, particularly those who about Islam, particularly its diverse joined al-Shabab. The fighters who historical, literary, theological, and have traveled to Syria and Iraq have legal heritages. This evidence suggests no familial, ethnic, or national ties to further avenues for research, perhaps either Syria or Iraq. This stands in on the commonality of such patterns stark contrast to those who joined al- among other groups of foreign fighters Shabab, the second largest grouping of or the impact of educational campaigns foreign fighters. The majority of those on the flow of foreign fighters. jihadists had Somali roots, which was a significant factor for many in their In the meantime, it is possible that the decision to travel to Somalia. number of Canadians attempting to join the Islamic State or other jihadi groups There are also some significant in Iraq or Syria may decline. These commonalities between the grouping in Canadians face tighter surveillance by Syria and Iraq and previous Canadian the authorities and the confiscation of foreign fighters, however. These include their passports, making it difficult to similar demographic characteristics travel. The Islamic State also continues among most individuals, present or past, to lose territory in Iraq, which will including age. The fighters are usually likely further impede it from living up in their late teens to mid-twenties, with to the grandiose claims of its media campaign and make it a less attractive

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and describing him as a mujahid engaged in jihad in the path of God. Islamic State, Dabiq, 59 Sam Mullins, ““Global Jihad”: The Canadian Experi- issue 6, p. 4. ence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 25, no. 5 (2013): pp. 58 Al-Shabab films, Woolwich: It’s an Eye for an Eye, Oc- 734–776, p. 744. tober 2013 and The Westgate Siege: Retributive Justice, 60 Ibid. February 2015, and Christopher Anzalone, “The Rapid 61 Mullins, “’Global Jihad’: The Canadian Experience,” Evolution of Al-Shabab’s Media and Insurgent ‘Journal- p. 746. This was out of a sample of 35 cases in the pre- ism’”, openDemocracy, 16 November, 2011. Al-Shabab is September 11 period and 29 cases in the post-September keenly aware of the power of the news media and the 24- 11 period. hour news cycle and has frequently designed its media 62 It is also difficult to define religiosity or piety, though operations to take advantage of the need for sources by both are often presented in accounts of Muslim foreign journalists, such as during the Westgate Mall attack in fighters, particularly in the news media, as being suf- Nairobi in September 2013. See Christopher Anzalone, ficient explanations of individuals’ decisions to engage “The Nairobi Attack and Al-Shabab’s Media Strategy,” in militant activism. CTC Sentinel 6, no. 10 (October, 2013), pp. 1-6.

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A View From the CT CVE-relevant programming tries to individuals under the influence of favorably shape the environment for radical ideologies. The question Foxhole: An Interview with a particular community in terms of becomes: How can we reach them and Tom Wheelock political, social, and economic issues. convey a message that they will respond By LTC Bryan C. Price Basically, what you’re trying to do is to to in a positive manner? ameliorate the grievances that people Tom Wheelock is a Senior Vice President of have and make them less vulnerable CTC: What role can the U.S. Creative Associates International and the to extremist recruiters. You’re making government play in regards to Director of its Communities in Transition communities more resilient to the lure conducting CVE activities in other Division. He oversees implementation of a of violent extremism. countries? wide range of development, stabilization, and political transitions programs funded by the State There is also more targeted CVE-specific Wheelock: Many of our foreign Department and the U.S. Agency for International programming. It consists of four stages: assistance programs are CVE-relevant Development (USAID). Over the past few years, prevention, intervention, interdiction, programs. These include improving these programs have increasingly focused on and rehabilitation. These match closely educational systems, fostering countering violent extremism (CVE). His portfolio with the stages of crime and violence economic growth, and facilitating good of countries includes Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, prevention (CVP) programming, so governance. These programs attempt to Iraq, Nigeria, Colombia, and numerous other at- there may be a lot of crossover in best reduce the window of opportunity for risk countries. He is a 1969 graduate of the U.S. practices that we can apply in a CVE extremists to take advantage of political, Military Academy, and was awarded the Bronze context. Here you get down to the nuts economic, and social grievances. Star Medal for Valor and a Purple Heart for and bolts inside a specific community, action during combat operations in Vietnam. He trying to identify youth at risk by In terms of U.S. CVE-specific later received an M.P.A. from the Kennedy School analyzing a range of appropriate risk programming overseas, there isn’t of Government at Harvard. factors. Then, having identified those that much right now. There are U.S.- youth at risk, it is about intervention: sponsored CVE communication CTC: Countering Violent Extremism working with families, local leaders, and campaigns in various countries (CVE) programs have received a lot institutions to guide those individuals and pilot programs—some of which of attention since the White House away from these negative activities we at Creative implement—to test hosted an international summit on the and toward more positives ones. The how a program can gain entry into topic in late February. The concept is United Kingdom and some U.S. cities communities, create the space needed not new, but it has gained momentum such as Los Angeles and Boston have to operate, and build the confidence of with the rising numbers of foreign community-level programs focused on local partners, communities, and local fighters flocking to Iraq and Syria, prevention and intervention. governments to emphasize messages of many of whom are from the West. peace and tolerance and introduce CVE- How would you best articulate the Next is the interdiction phase, where specific type of programming. A U.S. concept of CVE to our readers? law enforcement and the military implementing partner such as Creative respond to those that have already would not directly conduct prevention Wheelock: CVE is the use of non- radicalized. or intervention activities. That is best coercive means to dissuade individuals done by local organizations. Our role or groups from mobilizing toward The final phase is the reintegration would be to train local organizations violence and to mitigate recruitment, phase. This entails de-programming in best practices for conducting support, facilitation, and engagement those who have radicalized and bringing prevention and intervention activities, in ideologically motivated terrorism them back into mainstream society. making technical assistance available, by non-state actors in furtherance of Saudi Arabia CVE programming is an and providing funding to support the political objectives. It complements example of this. The U.S. government CVE programs of our local partners and but should not be confused with does not engage in reintegration. broadcast media. counterterrorism operations. It recognizes a wide range of motives— A strategic communications campaign Having said that, we don’t call it CVE. such as political or economic grievances, should be overlaid on all of these That kind of language is offensive feelings of marginalization, money, phases. Broadcast and print media can to a foreign government and local kinship, coercion, and radicalization. emphasize the broader values of peace, communities. So it might be called unity, resilience, and tolerance of other a “peace and unity campaign,” or a CTC: This is such a broad and all- views. It can also highlight instances “resilience campaign.” This sets it into a encompassing topic. What is the best where acts of violent extremism go positive light and mitigates the political way to frame CVE? How do we go against established religious or cultural difficulties that these types of activities about conducting CVE practically? norms. A more focused communications may cause a partner government. There campaign would concentrate on social is a USG program designed to interact Wheelock: The best framework I have for media and interact with specific with potential extremists through social thinking about CVE has two parts: CVE- media, but it does not have sufficient relevant and CVE-specific programming.1 capacity to counter the overwhelming Humera Khan, “Why Countering Extremism Fails: number of social messages generated by Washington’s Top-Down Approach to Prevention Is extremist groups. 1 Editor’s note: For a more in-depth discussion see Flawed.” Foreign Affairs, February 18, 2015.

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CTC: Is it best to conduct CVE at conducting CVE, is there support at including programs in Los Angeles the grassroots level or is it better the community level? and Central America. When an area is coordinated by the host country identified as a hotbed of extremism, government? Wheelock: There is support for the a best practice that can be adapted to most part—especially when we are CVE is to implement an integrated Wheelock: My view is the more local implementing in communities where program of prevention, intervention, the better. Community leaders, civil we’re already working with a trusted policing, and rehabilitation—along with society organizations, and parents and respected interlocutor or partner an overlay of strategic communications. know their communities, the context, organization. The level of community This has been successful in Los Angeles. and relevant grievances. They are best support is generally high once someone The U.S. State Department and USAID placed to identify and work with youth has made the introduction and we’re are starting an integrated CVP strategy at risk. The central government should allowed to execute one or two activities, in Honduras and El Salvador. [Editor’s provide grants to fund these programs which may not be directly relevant to note: These two countries have among and then determine and disseminate CVE but which gain trust and allow a the highest murder rates in the world best practices. When it comes to the partnership to develop. You’re not going due to gang and drug-trafficking law enforcement aspect of it, of course to get anywhere without community activities.] you need the capabilities of the central support. government, but on the prevention CTC: You’ve had experience with and intervention side, those activities CTC: How do we measure the CVE programs in some of the planet’s should be very much locally driven. effectiveness of CVE programs? How most conflict-ridden countries. What do we know which ones work and country or countries do you feel are CTC: When you talk about gaining which ones do not? leading the pack in implementing CVE entry into these kinds of communities, strategies? is it through the central government or Wheelock: It is a difficult issue because going directly into these communities it is hard to empirically prove a negative. Wheelock: The emphasis changes yourself? If recruitment of youth to extremist in different countries. For example, organizations declines in a community, in Saudi Arabia the focus is on Wheelock: All U.S. development what caused the drop? CVE-specific rehabilitation and less on prevention. assistance programs are implemented programming, strong police action or The British are focused more on with concurrence from the host country changes in public policy that remove prevention and intervention. government, which may ask us to work grievances? Anecdotally, you can cite in certain communities. We deliberately examples of success, but how do you CTC: What about the differences seek to work with relevant government quantify and ascribe causation for that between crime and violence prevention ministries (education, sports, and success? Right now I don’t have the programs in Latin America where youth) to gain their buy-in and support. answer for it, and I don’t think the CVE religion is not a motivating factor Civil society organizations, local community yet has an answer either. in the violence like it is in countries government officials, or other trusted such as Nigeria and Pakistan? interlocutors generally facilitate It is somewhat easier to evaluate metrics entry into communities. In order for a when you look at crime and violence Wheelock: The religious component is program to be sustainable over a long prevention (CVP) programs. You can a major distinction between CVP and period of time, the government must see if the number of crimes has gone CVE programs. To be clear, gangs do buy-in to the program with its approval down and if the number of murders has have an ideological component, but I and, we hope, financial support. gone down, even if it takes a long time would argue it is not as enduring, nor to gather the data. There was a recent as strong as it is in the case of Islamic CTC: What about CVE in failed states Vanderbilt University study on our extremism. such as Somalia or Yemen, where the primary crime and prevention programs government is non-existent, unable or in Central America, and there was a CTC: Can you provide examples of unwilling? strong correlation between these kinds some successful counter-narratives? of programs and the drop in homicide Specifically, what counter-narrative Wheelock: You’re not going to be rates. can we provide to discourage able to do much, if any, CVE-specific disenfranchised Sunnis from prevention and intervention programs CTC: So would you recommend that radicalizing? What could dissuade in those kinds of places. Those types U.S.-sponsored CVE programs borrow those who are considering joining of situations can only be dealt with liberally from the crime and violence jihadist groups such as Islamic State through a counterterrorism type of prevention programs? in situations where the predominant approach. grievances can be legitimately focused Wheelock: Certainly there are on the corrupt central government? CTC: That seems like a major problem techniques and best practices of CVP that does not bode well for our that are applicable and can be adapted Wheelock: Counter-narratives long-term prospects in minimizing to CVE programming. We can learn ultimately have to be locally driven. radicalization in these countries. from successful CV programs that have They have to come from the people who In the countries where we are an integrated, place-based strategy, know the context and what is going to

21 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 appeal to the populace. For the Middle CTC: How would you invest the This is not just in the broad sense— East, the people you have to convince lion’s share of resources among the the broadcast media where we can are the senior sheiks and tribal leaders four buckets in your CVE-specific overlay messages of peace, resilience, as well as the religious authorities. framework (prevention, intervention, unity, tolerance—but also in regard interdiction, and rehabilitation)? to how we can shape some of the more It is vital for religious authorities individualized communications on to articulate messages of peace and Wheelock: The key word there is social media and work with companies tolerance and to provide convincing resources. Policymakers are more likely like Twitter that are involved at that arguments bolstered with religious to invest resources into the interdiction level. underpinnings explaining why part because these activities go after nonviolent methods are better able individuals who have already been The question we need to answer is how to accomplish change in political radicalized and are easier to identify. can we get locally driven messaging to and economic systems. Beyond You get short-term results. the forefront. The U.S. government can the contributions from trusted provide funding in the background for interlocutors, there are several The prevention/intervention part is the technology and provide funding for instances of locally produced television going to be much more difficult to do. the programming element as well. But and radio programming and print You have to mobilize a lot of community local leaders and institutions have to media that promote values of peace and groups, get them on board, train them, frame and articulate the message. The tolerance. and it may be more costly—especially U.S. government cannot and should not when you are attempting to identify do it all. You don’t want to “hug your CTC: What are some things that youth at risk and work with them. It is partners” too hard because that will decision-makers should know very manpower intensive. In the long- expose them to criticism and undercut about CVE? What are some of the run, however, investing resources in any media campaign’s effectiveness. misconceptions? this area is probably more effective than interdiction. How we strike that Wheelock: A lot of U.S. foreign balance between the policing effort and assistance can be viewed as being the prevention/intervention effort is relevant to CVE in building resilient going to be the essential issue. communities, removing economic grievances, and reducing political CTC: I imagine that some practitioners grievances. The increasing emphasis would recommend concentrating on CVE, I think, will result in more of resources into interdiction because the typical foreign assistance programs evaluating its effectiveness is being couched in these kinds of terms. relatively easy. In comparison, it will be difficult to gather metrics on But that just sets the context. I think prevention/intervention, even though that much debate will center on how it may be the most effective over the the United States can contribute to long-run. CVE-specific types of programming— prevention, intervention, interdiction, Wheelock: Exactly. It is tough to prove and reintegration. Where in the a negative. spectrum will the U.S. focus? Maybe the U.S. role is only supporting prevention CTC: Given your knowledge of violent or intervention programs or assisting extremism around the globe, which police work on the interdiction side. It region or group do you think poses will be different in each country, but at the greatest risk to the security of the least there is a framework for how to United States? think about and discuss CVE programs. Wheelock: Syria and the Islamic State The second point I’d like to make is along with Yemen and AQAP have to be about the prevention/intervention side. high up on the list of threats, but CVE I think you can take a good hard look programs need to focus on countries at the lessons from crime and violence such as Tunisia and Jordan that are prevention programs in Los Angeles major sources of jihadi foreign fighters. and in Central America. These programs excel at identifying youth at risk and CTC: Final question. What question working with them to bring them back or issue do you think is important for from the brink. If we can apply that our readers to know about? framework and appropriate lessons to the countries where want to do CVE, I Wheelock: I think communications think that’s a great place to start. campaigns are an area that needs improvement and should be a priority.

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Khalaq (IKK).2 3 Despite these efforts, jihadists to form the Markaz Ad- Jamaat-ud Daawa: JuD has flourished. Da’awa Wal Irshad (MDI) or the Center Into the Mainstream for Proselytization and Preaching. One By Animesh Roul This article explores JuD’s shifting of MDI’s early online releases clearly narrative and its efforts to secure socio- mentions Saeed’s original role and how Pakistan’s Jamaat-ud Dawa (JuD) political legitimacy both by supporting the organization raised funds for jihad is often compared with Lebanon’s the government and the military and in the name of Mujahidin-e- Lashkar- Hezbollah thanks to its efforts at by conducting humanitarian works i-Tayyiba.4 The group’s ostensible blending charitable works and Islamic intended to improve its reputation in role was to implement humanitarian proselytization with overt political civil society. The article also examines missions and preaching according to activism. The JuD is consciously JuD’s efforts to strike a balance between the Islamic tenets. Below the surface attempting to improve its image, taking its roles as a jihadi proxy for Pakistan, though, the group’s links to jihadi advantage of Pakistan’s religiously a political pressure group, a social philosophies and aims were readily charged socio-political environment. welfare group, and its efforts to remain apparent. One MDI document details It appears that it is being aided by domestically relevant under direct state how “the brothers [Lakhvi, Saeed, government policy, notwithstanding patronage. and others] gathered and in 1989, international sanctions imposed on Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad was the group. The JuD’s influence has The Historical Context established. This caravan of Da’wah now extended to even the most remote Pakistan arguably provides a unique and Jihad, started its journey towards corner of the country through its environment for terror groups. its destination under the guidance exploitation of the media, the expansion Internationally designated terrorist of Professor Mohammad Saeed.”5 of its social services that range from leaders and operatives, sometimes Another document states: “We declare health care to education, and its ability claiming a cover as religious scholars that Lashkar-e-Taiba is not a terrorist to assist affected populations during or social workers, appear to travel and organization […] but is fighting for natural calamities outside its epicenter work with little legal restraint. This freedom and liberty of Kashmiris.”6 of power in the province of Punjab. situation has its roots dating back more than 20 years to the early days After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the The JuD has been banned by many of the mujahidin revival in the 1980s. MDI and LeT shifted their attention to countries and international groupings, Pakistan’s then-government served Kashmir as part of Pakistan’s Operation including the United States, India, and as a willing partner in efforts to fund Tupac. The LeT established a number of the European Union, for its association and supply Afghan rebels in their fight training camps in Pakistan’s Kashmir with terrorist violence. As a sister against Soviet troops. As part of that and engaged in terror attacks across the organization to Lashkar-i-Tayyiba process, it allowed the creation and border in India’s Jammu and Kashmir, (LeT), JuD, along with all its associated operation of many activist groups. After along with other Islamist terror groups entities, has been designated as a the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, nurtured by Pakistani agencies.7 There terror organization under UN Security elements within Pakistan’s government is evidence suggesting that MDI and LeT Council Resolution 1267. Many of its top moved to use the mujahidin groups in were jointly operated by the same group commanders have been designated as their efforts to secure gains against of leaders, even after the Pakistani terrorists, including Hafiz Muhammed long-time rival India. Some of the government banned MDI’s operations Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the individuals and organizations that in 2002 and despite some frictions two founding fathers of JuD and LeT, flourished, or their descendants, between the two groups in 2004, which who were listed in December 2008.1 continue to operate today. 4 “Introduction: Da’awah and Jihad Movement,” More recently, in June 2014 the U.S. JuD, its sister group LeT, and Hafiz https://web.archive.org/web/20020109200440/ Department of the Treasury named Muhammed Saeed are examples of this http://www.markazdawa.org/english/organization/in- Nazir Ahmad Chaudhry and Muhammad dynamic. JuD was originally created troduction.htm, October 30, 2001. For the fund raising Hussein Gill of LeT as Specially in 1985 in Muridke, Lahore, as a small activities in the name of LeT, See, https://web.archive. Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), preaching group. A year later it merged org/web/20010128024900/http://markazdawa.org/ taking the number of designated with Lakhvi’s group of anti-Soviet English/organization/contribution.htm. terrorists associated with LeT and JuD 5 “Introduction: Da’awah and Jihad Movement,” to more than 20. Treasury also listed six 2 United States Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Two Se- https://web.archive.org/web/20011217234502/http:// entities associated with LeT, including nior Lashkar-E-Taiba Network Leaders,” June 25, 2014 www.markazdawa.org/English/organization/introduc- Jamaat-ud-Daawa, Al-Anfal Trust, 3 United States Department of State added Jamaat- tion.htm. Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, Tehrik-e- Ud-Dawa and Idara Khidmat-E-Khalq to the Specially 6 Official Site for Markaz Ad-Da’awa Wal Irshad and Tahafuz Qibla Awwal, Falah-i Insaniat Designated Global Terrorist Designation of LeT on April Mujahidin- e- Lashkar- e Taiba, URL, https://web. Foundation (FIF), and Idara Khidmat- e 27, 2006 and added Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF) archive.org/web/20001017212716/http://www.marka- as an alias of LeT on November 24, 2010, along with FIF zdawa.org/English/radio/news. cheif Hafiz Abdur Rauf as Specially Designated Global 7 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Terrorist. See, United States Department of State, “Ad- Militant Islam, Columbia University Press, 2008, pp. dition of Aliases Jamaat-Ud-Dawa and Idara Khidmat- 55-59, Also See, K Santhanam (ed.) Jihadis in Jammu and 1 For UN listing of JuD, See, http://www.un.org/sc/ E-Khalq to the Specially Designated Global Terrorist Kashmir: A Portrait Gallery, Sage (New Delhi), 2003, pp. committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf. Designation of Lashkhar-E-Taiba,” April 28, 2006. 22–24.

23 APRIL 2015 . VOL 8. ISSUE 4 was reportedly resolved with help from Kashmir (PAK), the Northern Areas mujahidin would create three Pakistans Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (Gilgit and Baltistan), or the Federally- in India.”14 More recently in mid-April (ISI).8 Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 2015, he stated in an interview with Channel-4 Pakistan that JuD would There is significant evidence linking In an attempt to ensure continuity, the support action by the Pakistani army LeT to attacks on Indian targets and MDI’s senior leaders decided to split in Jammu and Kashmir. “We support installations throughout the 1990s and the organization into two distinct units the Pakistani government and Pakistan beyond as the tensions in Jammu and as laid out in an internal MDI document army in their efforts to help the people Kashmir escalated. LeT was involved from October 2002. The document of Kashmir…we call it jihad.” 15 He also in skirmishes during 1999, fighting describes the planned division in admitted that Lakhvi has been a senior alongside Pakistan army regulars.9 LeT light of the fast-changing security member of JuD, negating earlier claims organized numerous terrorist attacks scenario in the region and how JuD was by the JuD’s leadership, who in the in India, including the December reconstituted. “A general council of months after the 2008 Mumbai attack 2000 Red Fort (Delhi) attack, the May Lashkar-i-Tayyiba has been established had denied Lakhvi and Zarar Shah’s role 2002 Kaluchak (J&K) massacre, and which will work under the chairmanship within the organization.16 Six months the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, of Maulana Abdul Wahid Kashmiri earlier, the newspaper Dawn quoted among other deadly strikes. Even who belongs to Poonch [Jammu and Saeed saying that “if India can send Pakistan’s government has admitted Kashmir]. The Lashkar-i-Tayyiba will its troops to Afghanistan, it can’t stop LeT’s role in the late November 2008 continue its jihadi activities in occupied mujahidin from entering Kashmir to Mumbai attacks in its July 2009 report, Kashmir…rather it will further intensify win freedom for the oppressed Muslim and underscored the roles of Zaki- them. On the other hand, to continue the brothers.”17 ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Zarar Shah, mission of Markaz al-Dawa Wal Irshad another LeT operative, in the tragic in the country [Pakistan], JuD has been Hafiz Saeed and other senior JuD event.10 established. All the organizational, leaders have pursued several strategies political, and reformatory work will be to maintain JuD’s continued relevance Charity Camouflage accomplished under the Jamaat.”12 This in the face of growing international The September 11, 2001, terror attacks shift also marked the beginning of JuD’s scrutiny and sanctions. JuD carried in the United States and the December move to the mainstream. out humanitarian relief activities in 13 attack on the Indian Parliament in the aftermath of the 2005 Kashmir the same year changed the security As part of the reorganization, Hafiz earthquake and the 2010 floods dynamics in the region and forced Saeed took control of JuD while Lakhvi in Pakistan via the IKK and FiF a response from Pakistan. Under became the supreme commander of respectively. JuD had several motives. significant U.S. and Indian pressure, LeT. Notwithstanding the internal Not only was it able to heighten its the Pakistani government, led at the arrangements, JuD maintained its public support, but by assisting in this time by President Pervez Musharraf, financial and logistic support, especially way it was also able to gain favor with on January 12, 2002, ordered a crack- for LeT operations in Jammu and senior government officials. The JuD down on militant groups active in Kashmir, via various existing charity was careful to work in tandem with the Kashmir region and in Pakistan, fronts and other channels such as Idara the Pakistani Army and other agencies including LeT and Jaish-e Muhammad, Khidmat-e Khalaq (IKK) and Falah-i- during rescue and relief operations another terror group active in Jammu Insaniyat Foundation (FiF).13 and use these opportunities to win the and Kashmir.11 The order, however, hearts and minds of the refugees.18 did not affect Pakistan-Administered There is, however, much evidence The JuD’s ability to reach inhospitable to indicate that Saeed’s aggressive regions such as North Waziristan or language directed at India going Balochistan before government help 8 Evidently, in 2004 Saeed and Lakhvi increasingly back nearly 20 years more accurately arrives during natural calamities and disagreed over financial irregularities and nepotism, describes his ideological leanings and other humanitarian relief operations which eventually led to the creation of a breakaway intent. On February 18, 1996, while has not surprisingly made the JuD quite faction of JuD/LeT, Khair-un Naas (KuN or People’s addressing the Lahore Press Club, he popular. Welfare). It was able to forcibly control JuD’s headquar- stated that “jihad in Kashmir would ters in Muridke and other assets before ISI intervened soon spread to all of India and the to find a truce between two factions. See, for example, 14 For example Navnita Chadha Behera, “Demystifying Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadis, Mashal books, 2004, Kashmir,” Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p, 162. pp. 95–113. 12 “Strategy to Foil Nefarious Designs of India”, Voice of 15 See, Hafiz Saeed’s Interview with Mujahid Barelvi on 9 In June 1999, Hafiz Saeed reportedly claimed that his Islam, January 2002. Channel 24, April 16, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ organization led the war against Indian troops in Kargil. 13 For instance, See, “Extremists given ‘free hand’ to watch?v=H_Hyl4_cFCE. See, Praveen Swami, “The Other Wars,” Frontline, June collect funds for flood victims,” Daily Times, August 27, “JuD supports Pak Army’s jihad in Kashmir,” Kashmir 19—2 July 2, 1999. 2010; Also, “Secretary of State’s Terrorist Designation of Monitor, April 19, 2015, 10 “After admission, Pak files 26/11 charge sheet”, Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation.” 16 Amir Mir, “LeT commander furious at JuD chief,” Times Now TV, 18 July, 2009; Also See, “Part of 26/11 U.S. Department of State Press Release, Novem- The News, January 15, 2009. plot hatched on our soil, admits Pak,” Mid Day, Febru- ber 24, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 17 “JuD call to arms to help Kashmiris,” Dawn, Decem- ary 13, 2009. ps/2010/11/151931.htm; Khalid Khattak, ber 6, 2014, 11 “Musharraf bans Lashkar, Jaish; says no terrorism on “Government takes over 10 JD schools,” December 27, 18 “Footprints: Extremist bodies run IDP relief efforts”, name of Kashmir,” Daily Excelsior, January 12, 2002. 2008. Dawn, July 4, 2014,

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Such activities also helps generate charities. Following the June 2009 This analysis is supported by the fact further charitable contributions, some verdict from the Lahore High Court that that most of the Kashmir-focused of which it can funnel to LeT, and also quashed all terrorism charges against terror groups, including LeT, Jaish-e- refreshes the flow of recruits to the Hafiz Saeed, JuD was able to continue Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahidin have cause of Kashmiri reunification. JuD its move into the mainstream. never targeted Pakistan or its interests also used its humanitarian efforts, such abroad. In contrast, the government as during relief operations, to spread In many regards, the government has occasionally used these groups to Islamic teachings, along with a dose of intervention in the wake of Mumbai counter other anti-Pakistan militant Kashmiri or Afghan jihad.19 attacks can be best seen as an effort extremist groups such as the Pakistani to avoid international criticism.22 Taliban. The government has even The central government has been Additionally, it is no secret that the deployed ideologues such as Saeed in hesitant to take action against the provincial government of Punjab has government-run militant rehabilitation JuD. On at least three occasions the provided and continues to provide or reform programs.26 government has cracked down on the significant financial and physical JuD, and all three occasions were the security for JuD’s properties and Most recently, JuD has heightened its result of India raising its concerns establishments.23 In fact, the government profile by supporting Saudi Arabia. with Pakistan about the involvement of approach could be interpreted as It spearheaded a campaign along with Lashkar-i-Tayyiba militants in attacks protecting the JuD in an effort to use it other religious groupings such as Ahle against India. to further policy goals with an apparent Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), pressing degree of deniability. On January 24, the government to send troops to Saudi In January 2002, as a result of the 2015, for example, Pakistan’s High Arabia to protect Muslim holy sites September 11 terror events in the Commissioner to India, Abdul Basit, against possible aggression by the United States and the December 2001 clarified that there is no ban on JuD’s rebels in Yemen.27 Issues like these are Indian Parliament attacks, the Pakistan activities, only that its accounts have another way that JuD can garner public government did take action against been frozen and a travel ban has been and government support while pleasing militant groups including LeT. The implemented restricting foreign travel multiple stakeholders, including the government intervened in JuD facilities by its leaders, in accordance with the people. and placed its top leaders under house UN Security Council resolution.24 arrest following the July 2006 Mumbai The Mainstreaming of JuD commuter train bombings. Saeed was Pakistani agencies, such as the ISI, have Over the years, JuD has grown into detained until mid-October that year systematically used Islamist ideologues a socio-religious behemoth with its and subsequently released by the such as Saeed to raise issues like Islamic education and health service Lahore High Court for lack of concrete Jammu and Kashmir, but at a distance.25 units spread across Punjab and other evidence against the JuD leader.20 parts of Pakistan. Free education and 22 Khalid Khattak, “Government takes over 10 JD free medical treatments comprising five Then, in early December 2008, in the schools,” The News, December 27, 2008. hospitals, 200 dispensaries, ambulance wake of the LeT’s Mumbai attacks and 23 For example, in the fiscal 2009-2010 the Punjab services, and 250 schools fuels growing under pressure from the United States government allocated Pakistan Rupees 79.7 million support for JuD’s presence and facilitate and India, Pakistan launched a brief (US$936,240) to JuD’s Al-Dawa School System, a its legitimacy substantially within the 28 police operation against LeT hideouts mosque, hospital, and other health facilities built on the Pakistan. and training camps. Top leaders JuD Markaz-e-Taiba campus at Muridke. An additional including Hafiz Saeed, Lakhvi, and Rs. 3 million (US$35,207) was given to schools run by Despite international pressure, it Zarar Shah were arrested and security Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Again in the budget for fiscal 2013-14 appears that at least some elements forces again took control of JuD the Punjab provincial government allocated more than of the Pakistani government consider 21 establishments across the country. Rs. 6.1 crore for Markaz-e-Taiba and allocated a further Rs. 35 crore for setting up a Knowledge Park at the him, Brig. Riaz handled Zaki ur Rahman Lakhvi (Chief Despite these actions, there are centre along with other developmental activities. See, military commander of LeT). Headley also revealed how many signals that the JuD enjoys a “Punjab Govt. funded outfits on UN terror blacklist: Maj. Iqbal gave him US$25,000 in cash for his India privileged status with various levels report, Express Tribune/ AFP, June 17, 2010; Also, trip prior to Mumbai attacks. See, “Interrogation Report of government. This kind of protection “Pakistan’s Punjab Government allocates funds for JuD of David Coleman Headley,” National Investigation has helped the group fuel its move into centre,” Hindu/Press Trust of India, June 18, 2013. Agency, India. the mainstream of Pakistani society and 24 “JuD not banned, only accounts frozen: envoy,” Daily 26 “Hafiz Saeed helping de-radicalize militants, says politics. Despite the UN ban, the central Times, January 24, 2015. official,” Dawn/Reuters, April 6 2012. government has not shut down JuD’s 25 Pakistan’s ISI has nurtured LeT and other Kashmir 27 “JuD, ASWJ activists ask govt. to send troops to or FIF’s establishments completely, centric Islamic extremist groups (e.g. Jaish-e-Moham- Saudi Arabia,” The News, April 4, 2015. claiming that the groups were primarily med) financially and with other logistics since their 28 According to JuD’s own website, there are 146 Ad inception. The latest piece of evidence comes from 26/11 Dawa model schools with an estimated 2,050 teachers 19 JuD includes religious lessons with flood relief,” accused David Coleman Headley during interroga- and nearly 35,000 students enrolled throughout the Express Tribune, October 26, 2011. tion by India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA). country. See, http://jamatdawa.org/en/education/. Also 20 “Hafiz Saeed set free,” Dawn, August 29, 2006 According to Headley, every important member of LeT for a rough estimation of overall strength, See, “Banned’ 21 “Pakistan cracks down on Lashkar, JuD,” Reuters, is handled by one of more ISI officials. For example he Jamaat-ud-Dawa group thrives in Pakistan,” Dawn/ December 13, 2008. named Maj. Sameer Ali and Maj. Iqbal who took care of AFP, February 10 2015

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CTC Sentinel Staff actors such as Saeed to be assets. trained, and committed cadres, JuD There are clear signals that this could find success in national politics John Watling is so, to include, for example, his or as a significant lobby. These many Managing Editor participation in the de-radicalization developments underscore JuD’s and rehabilitation of former militants, apparent move into the mainstream, but as mentioned above.29 Other evidence is also raise concerns about the direction seen in the group’s own conclaves and of politics in Pakistan. Editorial Board rallies, such as “Revival of Pakistan COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Ideology” and the Takbeer Conventions Animesh Roul is the executive director (research) Department Head that focus attention on its pro-Pakistan of the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, 30 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) agenda. These conventions are usually a think tank based in New Delhi that focuses on well attended by political and religious security issues. He studies militant Islamist groups COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. leaders and the general populace. active in South Asia and has published widely on Deputy Department Head the subject. He has been awarded a M. Phil from the Department of Social Sciences (West Point) JuD is also engaged in transforming School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal its self-image. It aggressively uses Nehru University in New Delhi, India. LTC Bryan Price, Ph.D. social media outlets such as Twitter Director, CTC and Facebook, as well as the Internet, and a variety of Urdu- and English- language publications to showcase its socio-religious works, including health and education programs. There are also reports about JuD’s political ambitions and possible participation in Assembly elections in Punjab province, its traditional stronghold.31 The JuD itself, however, claimed that the group or leadership do not believe in power CONTACT politics, but are engaged in educating Combating Terrorism Center people on various political and security U.S. Military Academy issues and in constructive criticism of 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall political actions. This could be loosely West Point, NY 10996 termed as political activism, and may Phone: (845) 938-8495 be prelude to large-scale political action Email: [email protected] in the future, something that would Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ complete the JuD’s move from the shadows into the light and cement its * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 legitimacy.

Conclusions The shift from an entity that supported violence in Kashmir and India in general into a ubiquitous pro-State entity hints at JuD’s likely new trajectory of Islamic SUPPORT nationalism, fueled by the legitimacy of The Combating Terrorism Center would its jihadi roots. With highly motivated, like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the 29 ‘Hafiz Saeed helping de-radicalise militants,’ The CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you Nation, April 7, 2012. are interested in learning more about how 30 “JuD calls for reviving Pakistan ideology,” The to support the Combating Terrorism Center, News, March 24, 2014. For Takbeer Convention, See for please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call example, “Takbeer Convention” held in solidarity with Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association Pak Army attracts Karachi public,” June 18, 2014. of Graduates at 845-446-1561. 31 Hafiz Saeed once reiterated that it was a miscon- ception to consider JuD as apolitical. As a political platform, JuD brings together different religious and political entities and raising awareness on issues, like the Difa-e-Pakistan Council. For details on this, See, “Difa-e-Pakistan Council: Ahead of 40-party rally, JuD chief parries questions on electoral ambitions,” Express Tribune, February 1, 2012.

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