7 January 2000 Vol 41 No 1 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL NORTH AFRICA 3 AFRICA IN 2000 New brooms Algerian President Bouteflika’s Brave new century honeymoon won’t see the end of Dealing with the conflicts from the Atlantic to the Red Sea will Ramadan. In Sudan, the tensions dominate this year’s policy agenda between President Omer’s group and Hassan el Turabi did not The tempo of political and economic change in Africa will speed up in 2000. In six elections, amount to a coup and do not credible opposition parties will vie for power. Heavy pressure is building up on the continent’s indicate a policy change. gerontocracies, especially in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Africa has the world’s youngest voters but its rulers are still among the oldest and demands for a generational shift are growing. Few people CENTRAL AFRICA 5 harbour illusions about the merits of what Malawian political scientist Thandika Mkandawire calls ‘choiceless democracies’. Like Mkandawire, many Africans lament the lack of real policy More rumblings choices between ruling parties and their opponents but fully support the democratisation impetus and Violations of the Lusaka peace its halting progress of the last decade. However much they wriggle, governments are becoming more accord in Congo-Kinshasa are accountable and the kleptocrats’ room for manoeuvre is diminishing. Foreign aid is falling rapidly likely to continue. Major battles on and mainstream private capital is increasingly reluctant to deal with grossly corrupt regimes. the north-east front could trigger a A statistical tally makes the point. In 1999, 32 of the 54 heads of state had been chosen in elections general breakdown of the accord against rivals backed by opposition parties: in 1975, only three had been chosen in that way. In 1999, and might finally drive an already weak President Kabila from power. 40 African states had legislatures chosen in multi-party elections; in 1975, 25 states lacked any form of legislature at all. Sadly, only a minority of governments elected in 1999, such as those of Botswana, Namibia, Niger and South Africa, got there freely and more or less fairly. Yet rigging SOUTHERN AFRICA 6 elections is getting harder. Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali’s 99.4 per cent victory last October looks like a Cold War relic; most regimes south of the Sahara would have trouble selling Decision time such a result to their voters or to foreigners. President Mbeki will drive South Africa's foreign policy harder, Born-again soldiers pushing for reform in the SADC. President Mugabe's ZANU is likely Democracy activists are less pleased to find that born-again soldiers can be another brake on civilian to win the parliamentary elections autocracy and misrule. Nigeria’s General Abdulsalami Abubakar came to power after a ‘cardiac but will face much more opposition. coup’ against Gen. Sani Abacha in June 1998 and oversaw a year-long transition to civilian rule. After Niger’s military ruler, Gen. Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, was ‘accidentally killed’ in an airport WEST AFRICA 7 shoot-out in April, Major Daouda Mallam Wanké telescoped an election timetable which ended in the credible election in October of President Mamadou Tandja. In Côte d’Ivoire, Gen. Robert Reverse roles Gueï’s coup against President Henri Konan Bédié proved popular, at least among Ivorians suffering from the regime’s xenophobia and economic mismanagement. If Gueï holds open in Nigeria President Obasanjo will elections and hands over before the end of 2000, as he’s being urged to do, he will help redeem the be helped by an oil-fired economy but constrained by the military's image of Africa’s armies. legacy. Gen. Gueï will be pressed However, if he is stopped from handing over or is pushed out, other Francophone soldiers in the to return Côte d'Ivoire to civil rule. region (perhaps Senegal’s and Gabon’s) might be emboldened. A failure by Gueï would expose his own country to further coups and ratchet up the ethnic tensions heightened by Bédié’s policy of EAST AFRICA 9 Ivoirité. The ethnicisation of politics under Bédié has had parallels in many other countries since the multi-party wave began in the early 1990s. Ethnicity is likely to be at the centre of African Cooperation again politics for much of this decade but in a form different from that of the 1960s. Encouraged by Eastern Europe’s ethnic breakdowns and the United States’ new recognition of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda start cultural diversity, ethnicity has broken out everywhere. Like their Serb, Croat, Chechen and East the year having just revived the East African Community. Its Timorese counterparts, African political groups openly use ethnicity as an organising principle. Few ambitious goals are a customs incumbent regimes (save the super-federalists in Ethiopia) will encourage this. Most states, such union, together with common as Nigeria and Zimbabwe, try to quieten ethnic sentiment at the centre under large umbrella political citizenship and currency. parties, while exploiting ethnicity at the grassroots, to garner votes. In extreme cases such as Kenya, the ethnic numbers game overwhelms ideology. There is almost POINTERS 12 no difference between the economic and social aims stated by the ruling Kenya African National Union and by opposition groups such as the Democratic Party, National Development Party and Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire Forum for Democracy-Kenya. The only ideologically distinct party, the Islamic Party of Kenya, is banned. President Daniel arap Moi keeps his minority Kalenjin clique in power by cunningly and Zimbabwe dividing other bigger ethnic groups - successfully for him but disastrously for the economy, 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1 Less debt, more growth

World Bank President Jim Wolfensohn, together with internationalist 70 per cent are in Africa, where 3.5 million adults are newly infected anti-debt campaigners, will get joint credit if the Bank and the each year. Only Uganda, with its open and effective AIDS education International Monetary Fund’s Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative campaign, has substantially pushed down the infection rate. makes real progress this year. Most creditor countries have shifted Alongside the human suffering, AIDS cuts agricultural production from outright rejection of debt cancellation (especially Bank and Fund and further limits the narrow supply of technically trained staff. debts) to grudging acceptance. Now both Britain and United States Huge investments in education and health are needed, to catch up President Bill Clinton say they want to write off all their loans to the with recent falls in social spending in most African states, and to deal 41 countries eligible for HIPC status - only six of which have qualified with the far heavier burden of AIDS. Yet most Western countries so far. (apart from Britain, which made huge aid cuts in the past decade) are But Africa’s biggest bilateral creditors, France and Japan, will reducing foreign aid. Promises to support education and health are take a disproportionate hit if the new HIPC plans go through, and are holding up in some areas, but total disbursements are falling sharply. against debt relief; the US Congress also dislikes Clinton’s The Bank will try to fill the gap left by bilateral donors and the reining expansiveness on debt. Western squabbling over ‘burden sharing’ in of the African Development Bank. The World Bank will probably could still scupper the first comprehensive attempt to tackle Africa’s resume major lending to Africa’s giants - Nigeria and South Africa debt burden. This year, only Uganda is likely to benefit from write- - this year, and overshadowing the IMF, following the departure of its offs, both of HIPC’s multilateral debts and Britain’s bilateral debts. Africa-savvy Managing Director, Michel Camdessus, in March. Public support for debt relief has pushed the issue onto the agendas For this year, the IMF projects 5 per cent growth for sub-Saharan of most creditor governments; but the activists’ first achievement was Africa, while the World Bank and the Economist Intelligence Unit the World Trade Organisation’s failure to agree on the agenda for a reckon on 4 per cent growth (which the EIU points out would make new round of negotiations, which could have opened rich countries’ Africa the world’s fastest-growing region). The best hopes of growth markets to more African exports. Africa hardly featured in the Uruguay are for Cameroon, Egypt, Mozambique, Tanzania, Tunisia and round of trade negotiations, which ended in 1998. The WTO’s Uganda. Much less likely is an early economic revival in the big Director General, Mike Moore, wants the next round to break down three, Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa. Algeria and Nigeria are the barriers that rich countries put up against poor countries’ exports, still stuck in the political mire, and South Africa’s economic and the rich countries’ attempts to protect their own industries by restructuring is painfully slow. bringing labour and investment laws into the negotiations. Europe, still Africa’s biggest trading partner, is banking on an Expect more fall-out from South Africa’s row with the USA about economic upturn, and Asia’s recovery may continue. But a major the licensing of drugs for treating AIDS. President Thabo Mbeki’s slump in the US stock market could provoke a world economic panic government insists that poor countries which can’t afford proprietary and make its presidential election campaign even more inward- brands should be allowed to manufacture generic versions of the drugs. looking. Private investment flows would decline, as the economic The Clinton administration backed the pharmaceutical companies’ slow-down cuts the prices of raw materials (including oil), bringing opposition to unlicensed copies of their intellectual property. African delay or cancellation to some of the huge oil and gas projects planned and Western governments gravely under-estimated the impact of in the Gulf of Guinea. However, bad economic news usually pushes AIDS a decade ago. The 21 countries with the highest prevalence of up the gold price, which would help South Africa, Ghana, Mali and infection by HIV (the virus that causes AIDS) are all in Africa which, Tanzania after last year’s panics. But no one expects higher prices for with just over 10 per cent of the world’s population, contains two- farm commodities - cocoa, coffee, tea, wheat, and soya beans - the thirds of those living with HIV/AIDS. Of new infections world-wide, mainstay of vulnerable economies such as Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya.

burdened by the huge patronage payments that oil the system. Across Africa, NGOs and grassroot activists are set for a good Moi and others like him, such as Cameroon’s President Paul year. Last year, they swayed the policies of several multinationals. Biya, inherited a one-party system which more or less successfully Cameroonian and Chadian activists, along with the US-based managed ethnic rivalries. Their adaption of these tactics to multi- Rainforest Action group, helped scare off Anglo-Dutch Shell and party politics has increased violence and poverty, imposing a France’s TotalFina-Elf from building a $3.5 billion pipeline from serious risk that ethnic resentments and economic deprivation will Chad to the Atlantic - to the frustration of the World Bank, a co- combine to cause social breakdown. The oppositions respond by financier which had spent much time promoting the project. Also demanding constitutional reform mechanisms to make government gathering steam is the US-based campaign against Canada’s accountable, giving the executive fewer powers, devolving more to Talisman Energy and Sweden’s Adolph Lundin’s Tenke state and local governments, and making elections more honest. Fungurume Mining Corporation (AC Vol 37 No 25) over their Battles over these issues will be critical in Kenya, Nigeria and stakes in Sudan’s oil production and pipeline, whose revenues Zimbabwe this year. help pay for the National Islamic Front government’s war against The phenomenon once called ‘political meddling by imperialists’ the northern and southern opposition. While Western protesters is now commonly known as ‘donor concerns about governance’. embarrass Talisman and Lundin, the armed opposition may attack Expect the wiliest African rulers to outwit the ‘concerned donors’ oil installations. for another year. Again, the test cases will be Kenya and Zimbabwe, To beef up United Nations sanctions, diamond purchases from whose opposition leaders campaign stridently against foreign aid Angola ended after British-based Global Witness showed how for the incumbent regimes. In Kenya, oppositionists and local non- diamond smuggling financed the União Nacional para a governmental organisations demand that the International Monetary Independência Total de Angola’s war effort. De Beers and its Fund and World Bank should not resume its lending to Moi’s Central Selling Organisation feared, it seems, that diamonds could government until the senior officials involved in the Goldenberg become as morally tainted as fur among rich liberal Westerners. scandal (which cost the Treasury over US$350 million) are brought That pleased President José Eduardo dos Santos. He’s furious, to account. though, about Global Witness’ latest report, which argues that the 2 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1 rapid expansion of multinational oil companies’ operations fuels zones now stretch from Angola on the Atlantic sea-board to the Red the government’s war effort and enriches a corrupt elite. The huge Sea in the east. Yet for most African diplomats, classic considerations prize of Angola’s deepwater oil fields means it’s unlikely that of national security and high diplomacy have given way to almost Global Witness’ activism will prompt multinationals to withdraw continuous negotiations of debt relief packages and structural but it may persuade them to be more careful about their deals. adjustment programmes with the international financial institutions Less activist but better connected politically, the Berlin-based which have eroded so much of African state sovereignty. anti-corruption lobby Transparency International will also heighten its profile in Africa this year. Close to Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, TI has helped his ministers draft anti-corruption laws at NORTH AFRICA federal and state level. Its Director, former World Bank official Peter Eigen, has pushed anti-corruption strategies far higher up the agenda of the Bank and IMF. By listing the biggest bribe- New brooms paying countries (mostly European and Asian) beside the corrupt government index, it has highlighted foreign connivance in Africa’s In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s honeymoon period corruption industry. won’t survive the end of Ramadan this weekend. Expect a tough Financial fraudsters and mafia banks military-led Islamist campaign early in the year, then subsequent Africa’s new foreign policy-makers must deal with campaigns of reprisals against civilians. The key indicator for Algerians is the this kind. Several governments, including Nigeria’s and the new level of political violence. The dramatic fall in terror attacks last Ivorian military regime, argue that Western demands for debt year explains why so many Algerians changed their minds about repayment should be set against the hundreds of millions of stolen ‘Boutef’. Unexpectedly, he appeared to be breaking free of the dollars earning interest in Western banks. Fraud and criminalisation generals’ grip and capable of taking real political initiatives. Algiers, will become major dossiers on foreign ministry desks in both at least, almost returned to the pre-terror days; business confidence Africa and the West. Nigerian sophisticated financial fraud now mounted. ranks with Albanian gangsterism and Colombian drug trafficking The latest terror attacks, just outside Algiers, have negated all as an international crime threat. The proliferation of Italian and that. The real motives and identities of the gangs and their backers Russian mafia banking and mining operations in Southern Africa (a mix of military factions and Islamist formations) are as foggy as is also sounding alarms among Western securocrats. before - not to mention the growth of mainly criminal gangsterism These worries will increase the role of private Western security and of smuggling and protection rackets. and intelligence companies in Africa, hired by both private As security worsens, the rump Front Islamique du Salut ratchets corporations and governments to bolster surveillance and protection. up the pressure on Boutef though its Armée Islamique du Salut has Western governments are more than ever reluctant to commit their promised to demobilise. FIS officials echo the complaint of their troops, even as peacekeepers, to African wars and will step up leader, Abdelkader Hachani, murdered in November, that the training of African militaries. Much of this will be done by peace process was solely focused on military rather than political Western private military companies, such as the Virginia, USA- issues. There’s little sign of new political thinking while the based Military Professional Resources Incorporated, which is generals and intelligence chiefs maintain their hold. Certainly, the working on the reform of the Nigerian army and tipped for a similar almost ten-year terror campaign has meant the FIS, or any other contract in Angola. Islamist organisation, would not be able to repeat that election France, the only Western country with a major troop presence in victory it was about to win in 1991, before the army moved in. Africa, will follow suit. The Christmas coup in Côte d’Ivoire With an eye on new oil and gas developments, markets are still indicates that French military intervention to prop up Francophone broadly impressed by Bouteflika. They like his new Premier, African friends is decidedly passée. Wobbly Presidents, such as Ahmed Benbitour, a former Finance Minister well versed in techno- Biya, Senegal’s Abdou Diouf or Gabon’s Omar Bongo, should speak. Yet Benbitour is also steeped in old-style Front de Libération take note. France’s Opération Épervier in Chad, now under Nationale politics and rarely forgets grudges. His weakness for review, may also end as might its presence in Djibouti. The cronyism and elite faction-fighting will quickly dent his government’s modernisers of French Africa policy are slowly winning points fragile credibility. against the neo-Gaullistes and Foccartistes in the Elysée Palace Bouteflika’s greatest success will be diplomatic: relations with such as Michel Dupuch (ex-Ambassador to Abidjan) and Jean- France have improved sharply but questions hang over relations Marc Rochereau de la Sablière (ex-Ambassador to Cairo). with Rabat. Two issues will dominate: Islamist activity on the Washington’s interest in Africa will dip in this election year, Moroccan-Algerian border and Algiers’ support for the Polisario despite the best efforts of Assistant Secretary of State for African Front’s struggle for an independent Western Sahara. There have Affairs Susan Rice and new US Envoy to the UN Richard been bizarre reports of Saudi Arabia trying to buy off both Algiers Holbrooke. It was wise of Holbrooke, who chairs the UN Security and Polisario, presumably to shore up a fellow Arab monarchy (of Council for the first six months of 2000, to declare January the Mohammed VI). Backing Polisario seems too important a nationalist month for Africa as Washington’s diplomats are unlikely to have card for Bouteflika’s government to give up just now. much time for the continent later in the year. The energy and Western Sahara scares Western diplomats. They see the possibility political pedigree of Britain’s Minister for Africa, Peter Hain, will of a conflagration along East Timorese lines on the southern help Whitehall punch above its weight this year; Hain will be trying Mediterranean - with mass migration northwards. Their favoured to galvanise support from Washington and Paris to back solution is to put off the United Nations’ referendum until something peacemaking efforts in Angola and Sierra Leone. turns up. One plan Rabat is hatching is for a devolved regional He will also get some backing from Presidents Thabo Mbeki government structure for Western Sahara, followed by an ‘internal’ and Obasanjo in efforts to end the chaos that means Africa’s war referendum. Rabat will claim this provides a modern version of the 3 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1

support from President Hosni Mubarak. Obeid said his premiership TUNISIA would shift away from his predecessor’s centralised decision- making, with more powers for ministers to design and implement MOROCCO policies. His record is unimpressive. Privatisation has failed to ALGERIA LIBYA accelerate. Changes in two state insurance companies will promote WESTERN EGYPT liberalisation and moves towards the long-expected privatisation SAHARA of the Bank of Alexandria should follow. The Islamist militants who formally laid down their weapons in 1997 have tried but failed to play a legal political role. After SUDAN apparently winning the war with the Gama’a el Islamiyya (the main armed Islamists), the government and its army and police generals don’t want Islamism coming through the back door. The authorities’ control over politics stifles debate. There will be more resistance to moves by terrorists-turned-politicians to operate in Egypt’s Population GNP Debt deliberately moribund political system. (million) ($million) ($million) The presidential succession won’t be raised in 2000. Last year, Algeria 29.3 43,927 30,921 the nomination of a vice-president was widely discussed because Egypt 60.3 72,164 29,849 Libya 5.2 40,000 3,750 of Mubarak’s renomination to a fourth six-year term as President Morocco 27.3 34,380 19,321 in September. He still benefits from the Arab world’s near immunity Sudan 27.7 7,917 16,326 to the political reforms that have swept Africa since 1990. Tunisia 9.2 19,433 11,323 In Sudan, internal tensions in the National Islamic Front (alias Western Sahara 0.3 n/a n/a National Congress) government will weaken it further but will be fatal only if opposition parties are more politically and militarily Beya (oath of allegiance). With Washington concerned about assertive or if there is an intifada (popular uprising). The tensions Algerian terrorists, it will ask other governments to help insulate between President Omer Hassan el Beshir’s group and NIF- the kingdom. founder Hassan el Turabi which surfaced last month did not Mohammed will further consolidate power, helped by a amount to a coup: Lieutenant General Omer is backed by core NIF rejuvenated set of royal advisors. His push for social liberalisation hawks, led by Vice-President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha. and more imaginative policies will become clearer. Along with his friend, Jordan’s new King, Abdullah, Mohammed will be held up New century, new packaging as a model of the 21st century Arab monarch. This doesn’t mean The NIF will pursue its campaign to persuade Arab (especially Mohammed is any more interested than his father in stripping the Egyptian) and Western (especially French, also German, Italian Alawite monarchy of its absolute powers. The awkward political and perhaps British) governments, business and media that it’s alternance which makes socialist leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi strong enough to be a permanent force but weak enough to accede Prime Minister will not make rapid strides. Youssoufi is ill and not to pressure to democratise and to end the war. This will not give dynamic enough to take the initiative, however much he wants to it the deep domestic political roots it lacks. prove his government can promote reform. Pressure from the poor Western and Arab governments will play down the NIF’s will grow as they sense change at the centre. After a drought-hit international Islamist role, unless it becomes too visible. The USA year, the economy should recover this year and the Casablanca will still oppose the NIF and give more but not decisive military bourse will move up a few points. help to the opposition National Democratic Alliance. The NDA The region’s most spectacular changes will be in Libya. Tripoli’s (including key Umma Party leaders) is challenged by El Sadig opening to the West will continue and its hotels will be full of oil Sadeeg el Mahdi’s ‘Call of the Homeland’ pact with the NIF in traders and sales people trying to tap into a market that resembles November (AC Vol 40 No 24) and faces change. The Umma’s ‘Cuba with oil’, as one American analyst put it. We predict that traditional rival, the Democratic Unionist Party, must decide whether a British minister will visit Libya in the first half of 2000, amid a to sign up with the NIF or stay loyal to the NDA policy of a secular stream of other European politicians and diplomats. Some local constitution and the option of self-determination for the south. political voices may make their presence felt above the foreign The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and northern secularist clamour. Islamist groups in the east may protest at Colonel parties (‘Modern Forces’ or ‘New Sudan Forces’) should gain Moammar el Gaddaffi’s rapprochement with the West; and strength from the ‘sectarian’ parties’ crisis. The flirtation with the Gaddaffi’s sons are thought to want to stake a claim to his throne NIF of the Umma and DUP fuels domestic discontent and southern as the country enters a time of rapid change. demands for self-determination, pushing southern groups coopted US oil companies, such as the Exxon-Mobil alliance, will put by the NIF, such as that of Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, back pressure on President Bill Clinton’s government to ease its hard towards the SPLA. line. Much of Libya’s ageing oil machinery was US-bought in the The key issues remain the relationships between the state and 1960s-70s. The critical point will be the trial of the Libyans religion - and between north and south. The NIF made these accused of the Lockerbie bombing. The most likely outcome is a sharper, seizing power in 1989 to abort substantive peace Scottish ‘not-proven’ verdict, which would favour a UK-Libyan negotiations and install its version of an Islamic state. Since rapprochement but outrage many of the victims’ families. ‘Homeland’, Omer el Beshir has repeatedly insisted on greater In Egypt, new Premier Atef Obeid (AC Vol 40 No 24) will come ‘Islamisation’. Without this Islamist insistence, the NIF would not under more fire for the slow pace of economic reform, despite exist. With it, the war will continue.

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CENTRAL AFRICA

More rumblings CHAD In Congo-Kinshasa, there is a buzz about the plans of United States’ diplomat Richard Holbrooke to hold a Congo summit in New York in late January. Holbrooke is US envoy to the United Nations and chairs the Security Council for the next six months. The idea, CENTRAL CAMEROON AFRICAN REPUBLIC Congolese sources say but US sources won’t confirm, is to bring several senior Congolese politicians, including President Laurent- EQUATORIAL GUINEA Désiré Kabila, to agree on an implementation programme and CONGO GABON supporting mechanisms for the Lusaka peace accord. The Congo DEMOCRATIC mediator, Botswana’s former President Ketumile Masire, would be REPUBLIC expected to attend, to prepare the ground for Congo’s internal dialogue. OF CONGO These plans, even if they win formal US backing, face two main snags: Kabila is unlikely to leave Congo, for fear of being toppled in a palace coup - an increasingly likely scenario. The combatants have still not accepted Masire as mediator because Botswana is seen as aligned with South Africa and because he doesn’t speak French or any local Population GNP Debt language. (million) ($million) ($million) US diplomats’ main efforts have been to calm anti-Western feeling in Cameroon 14.0 8,610 9,293 Central African Rep. 3.4 1,104 885 the Kinshasa government. Both President Bill Clinton’s envoy to Congo, Chad 7.2 1,629 1,027 Howard Wolpe, and UN envoy Kamel Morjane have tried to persuade Congo 2.7 1,827 5,071 Kabila to go to New York but he hasn’t yielded on that or his onerous Dem. Rep. of Congo 46.7 5,201 12,330 conditions for accepting the deployment of UN observers. Equatorial Guinea 0.4 444 283 Gabon 1.2 4,752 4,285 Threats to the Lusaka Peace Accord The series of clashes between Kabila’s forces and those of Jean- to portray himself as the victim of a new Western plot. Yet many Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo in early Lumumbists in the opposition argue that Kabila is far closer to Mobutu 2000 indicate that Kinshasa hopes to gain significant military advantage than to Lumumba. before the start of serious peace talks. A UN report to the Security Kinshasa is on the edge of a social explosion. The Kinois face food Council in late December blamed Kabila for most ceasefire violations. and fuel shortages because of the war economy and the precipitate Kabila believes arms supplies from China and better training for his depreciation of the Congolese franc. The gap between the official rate kidogo (small boy) soldiers will give the government side military (4.5 Congo francs = US$1 over the Christmas holiday) and the parallel advantage. In fact, Bemba is well positioned to repulse a government rate (FC30 = $1) will widen further. Combined with the foreign counter-offensive and will have Ugandan support in doing so. Kabila’s currency ban imposed last January, this has triggered a dramatic allies - Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe - are warning him not to increase in diamond smuggling (AC Vol 40 No 23). Official diamond open up the war again and openly break the Lusaka accord. They fear exports have shrunk by 80 per cent. he will provide Bemba’s forces and Emile Ilunga’s branch of the The war in Equateur Province makes many basic foodstuffs scarce Rassemblement Congolais Démocratique (backed by Rwanda) a and prices are soaring. Only Kabila’s gendarmes keep popular pretext to open up new fronts. The key target in any generalised discontent in check. At the end of 1999, they were occupying the breakdown of Lusaka would be Kasaï-Orientale’s diamond capital, Kinshasa University campus to stop a student revolt. The currency Mbuji Mayi. Kigali has bought attack helicopters and de-mining regulations and the franc’s slide make aid and development agency equipment, all useful for an assault on the town. operations even harder. If he holds on, Kabila will reshuffle his Kinshasa’s relations will improve with Belgium, whose Foreign cabinet. Likely to go are Finance Minister Mawapanga Mwana Minister, Louis Michel, plans an African tour, including Belgium’s Nanga and Badima Mulumba at Planning. They are resented for three former colonies and possibly Angola, South Africa and Uganda, announcing bad news about the economy and their long stints in early in 2000. Brussels says this is the start of a more active diplomatic America have rendered them vulnerable to charges of ‘collaboration strategy in Africa. It has good contacts on both sides of the Congo with the imperialists’. divide and is better trusted in Kinshasa than its Anglophone In Cameroon, President Paul Biya’s coalition government, which counterparts. Belgium is trying to re-establish its Africa policy after includes the ruling Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple being pushed into the background by Britain, France and the USA. Camerounais, the northern-based Union Nationale pour la Démocratie The Belgian parliament’s decision to open an investigation into the et le Progrès and the Union des Populations Camerounaises is assassination of Patrice Lumumba will go down well in Kinshasa. working relatively smoothly for now. A major reshuffle is expected early The compensation game (Congolese demanding reparations for Belgian in 2000. Biya will headline this as part of the anti-corruption war he colonialism and Belgian businesses demanding compensation for announced in his New Year message. The Transparency International companies nationalised under Mobutu Sese Seko) seems likely to be reports which have for two years running named Cameroon as the world’s stalemated. Kabila wants to use the focus on Lumumba’s assassination most corrupt country have done much diplomatic damage.

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The powerful Economy and Finance Minister, Akame Mfoumou, a kinsman of Biya’s, will be moved to a minor portfolio. The ruling coalition, which controls fourth-fifths of the 180 seats in the National Assembly and nearly three-quarters of local councils, will remain largely ANGOLA MALAWI unchanged. With the backing of UNDP leader Bello Bouba Maïgari and ZAMBIA RDPC northern barons, such as Hamidou Marafa Yaya (presidency MADAGASCAR Secretary General and the government’s de facto number two), Amadou MOZAMBIQUE Ali (Defence Minister) and Cavaye Yegue Djibril (Assembly President), NAMIBIA ZIMBABWE the coalition gets support in at least seven of the ten provinces, including BOTSWANA MAURITIUS the English-speaking South-West Province, home of Prime Minister Peter Mafany Musonge. Even in Western Province and the English- SWAZILAND speaking North-West Province, which are bastions of the radical opposition SOUTH (the Social Democratic Front and the Union Démocratique du Cameroun) AFRICA LESOTHO some officials are considering joining Biya’s coalition. Factional tensions in the SDF, which has 43 seats, have been growing since its April congress. The body of Cameroon’s first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo (who was Population GNP Debt implicated in an attempted coup in 1984) is to be flown home and given (million) ($million) ($million) Angola 12.0 43,927 30,921 a state burial in Garoua, the north’s political capital. His son, Mohammadou Botswana 1.5 5,070 562 Ahidjo, is Mayor of Garoua and a senior UNDP official. The state burial Lesotho 2.0 1,386 660 will reinforce Biya’s North-South alliance. Madagascar 14.1 3,575 4,105 As the Gulf of Guinea becomes an increasingly important oil and gas Malawi 10.3 2,129 2,206 investment zone (AC Vol 40 No 20), pressure will grow on Biya to reach Mauritius 1.1 4,444 2,472 Mozambique 16.6 2,405 5,991 a negotiated settlement with Nigeria over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula, Namibia 1.6 3,428 n/a where troops have clashed repeatedly since 1994. The latest scares in South Africa 40.6 130,151 25,222 Nigeria about a new French-built military base in Cameroon are overdone Swaziland 1.0 1,458 368 but Biya and President Olusegun Obasanjo don’t get on well. Zambia 9.4 3,536 6,758 Cameroonian opposition leader John Fru Ndi was a welcome and Zimbabwe 11.5 8,208 4,961 flamboyant guest at Obasanjo’s inauguration last May. Also problematic are Cameroon’s relations with Equatorial Guinea. They’re strained by Angola and Zambia persist over Lusaka’s failure to stop (at least) UNITA a dispute over oil in an area that includes Equatorial Guinea’s Zafiro field, getting supplies through its territory; in Lesotho, Pretoria’s military from which Mobil produces some 100,000 barrels of a day. Biya is under intervention in late 1998 still rankles and Basotho nationalist sentiment pressure to grant licences for deep offshore oil exploration to local and will be strong in the run-up to this year’s elections; Nujoma is watching foreign consortia. He’s likely to go ahead, despite Malabo’s complaints. closely Mishake Muyongo’s ‘liberation’ movement in the Caprivi Strip; Abuja may well side with Malabo on this. in Mozambique, the refusal of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana Cameroon’s adherence to its IMF programme looks shaky and a review to accept the victory of the governing Frente Nacional de Libertação de comes up in March. If it passes, it could become eligible for debt relief Moçambique in December’s elections detracts from the country’s rapid under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative. Yaoundé also plans economic growth and new investment. to sell off the state-owned water, electricity and telecommunications Aside from the tragic situation in Angola, these mini-crises pale into utilities. Helped by stronger oil prices, gross domestic product growth this insignificance beside the war in Congo-Kinshasa, where SADC states year is likely to increase to 4.8 per cent from 4.4 per cent. are deeply polarised: Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe back President Laurent-Désiré Kabila; South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique are SOUTHERN AFRICA ostensible neutrals but accused of helping the Congolese rebel alliance with Rwanda and Uganda. Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe has another six months as chairman of SADC’s security organ (through which he negotiated the endorsement of Zimbabwe’s, Angola’s and Namibia’s Decision time intervention in Congo-K). Nujoma, Mbeki, Mozambique’s President South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki will press for the adoption of a Joaquim Chissano and Mugabe will then have to negotiate the reform of defence pact by the 14-strong Southern African Development Community. the security body. It will be presented as a ‘reform package’: ministers will be asked to sign Jobs will be this year’s critical policy issue. SA unemployment rates a ‘political, defence and security agreement’ that will bolster stability and range from about 30 per cent, if only ‘work-seekers’ are counted, to some attract investment. Investors will know, according to South African 40 per cent for all unemployed. Trades unionists argue that these figures Defence Minister Patrick Lekota, that they’re protected by ‘the collective show the shortcomings of the government’s Growth, Employment and might of SADC’. This pact will follow regional trade and economic Redistribution Programme (Gear): it was meant to create 126,000 jobs in protocols due to be ratified soon. It will also provide a framework for a 1996 and a further 252,000 in 1997 but in fact, formal sector jobs shrunk multinational peacekeeping force in the region and even outside it. It may by 80,000 in that period. Mbeki will continue the tough line with the help to forestall conflicts between SADC states. unions that he showed immediately after last year’s elections. Pretoria There are disputes in the region in which SADC’s role ranges from policy-makers are planning more ‘supply side’ measures to boost negligible to highly ambivalent: Angolan troops and aircraft have moved employment but the upturn in gross domestic product growth to 3.4 per into northern Namibia with President Sam Nujoma’s permission to cent which they project this year would need to rise by another percentage launch attacks against the União Nacional para a Independência Total de point really to boost job creation. Angola (which threatens reprisals against Windhoek); tensions between Unemployment is fostering xenophobia and Pretoria’s treatment of the 6 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1 estimated 2-4 million illegal immigrants (mainly from neighbouring With popular discontent at the lacklustre economy still running high and countries) has become a sensitive regional issue. Almost all these a strong opposition voice in parliament, the last dangerous ingredient will countries backed the African National Congress in the anti-apartheid be the return of some 10,000 disgruntled soldiers from Congo. They are struggle. The harsh treatment of ‘illegals’ by the Home Affairs Ministry already frustrated at being denied their special emoluments because of the under Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi will be softened. Mbeki has his own local foreign exchange squeeze. The danger for Mugabe and Mnangagwa man, Billy Masethla (former head of the SA Secret Service), as Home is that this could create a crunch point for the military. Affairs Director General. The government also has to rethink recent and pending labour laws on Investors v. activists in Luanda affirmative action and equity which, businesses say, discourage investment In Angola, the government of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de and expansion. By August, Labour minister Membathisi Mdladlana is Angola has had a string of military victories: this will rein in UNITA but to complete a review of any laws that create ‘barriers to job creation’. not destroy it. Jonas Savimbi will continue to head its military but South Africa will get tougher with its criminals this year. That means exercise less and less control over its political offshoots. President José some illiberal laws (including amending the constitution) and some Eduardo dos Santos’s government will benefit from the unambiguously illiberal policing; both have broad popular support. The SA Police Service pro-MPLA stance of the three big Western investors in the booming oil is still hampered by corruption and incompetence; 25 per cent of police sector: the United States, France and Britain. Yet oil majors operating officers are illiterate. That lay behind Mbeki’s decision to form the elite in Angola will have to deal with an increasingly activist lobby abroad, ‘Scorpions’ unit of detectives, prosecutors, surveillance and forensic highly critical of the corruption and social collapse in Angola. Western experts. Led by Frank Dutton, a security officer hardened in the killing diplomats will find dealings with the nationalist regime increasingly fields of kwaZulu-Natal, the Scorpions are set to grow from 200 officers difficult as they try to negotiate political conditions in their aid packages. this year to over 2,000. Similarly, in Luanda, civil society activists will become bolder. Intellectuals and religious leaders will criticise the MPLA but escape the Controversial constitution tag of ‘UNITA sympathiser’. Increasingly detailed critiques of In Zimbabwe the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic mismanagement and corruption are being produced by local activists. Front wants to hold a referendum on its proposed constitutional reforms Smaller political parties may use the laws allowing political rallies to before parliamentary elections this year. That means a referendum organise demonstrations. sometime in the first quarter and polls in June or July. Delaying the Speculation about Dos Santos’s health and possible succession will parliamentaries will be a sop to donors, who are highly critical of the surface as a key political issue. MPLA General Secretary João Lourenço, review process: it will give extra time for voter re-registration and de- now being tipped for the succession, will come under greater scrutiny. limitation of constituencies. Amid this jockeying for power, more information about clandestine As so few people were involved in the constitutional amendments, the business and political deals is leaking out. However, the party machine referendum will see a low turnout. Mugabe will hold the elections after will still be able to buy off all but the most deep-rooted internal opposition. amending the constitution to give the government powers to expropriate Savimbi’s personal hold on UNITA soldiers will weaken. He is farmland. It will offer to pay for land improvements but not for the land desperate to prevent any more defections to the MPLA and will slow his itself. ZANU-PF will win with a comfortable majority, at least 120 of the normal cycle of military reshuffles. Those strengthening their position in 200 seats. But Zimbabwe will have its strongest parliamentary opposition UNITA include: Secretary General Paulo Lukamba ‘Gato’, Marcial since Independence, led by Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Dachala (Information), Helder Boris Mundombe (Special Operations), Democratic Change, which will win about 70 seats. Karisa Dachala (Savimbi aide). Talks between the government and the International Monetary Fund General Kalias Malungo will increase his military role along with Gen. and World Bank will make no headway in the first half of 2000. Yet after Neto and will link up with veteran figures such as Abilio Kamalata the elections, the new Premier (and ZANU National Chairman), John ‘Numa’ and António Dembo, who have been based in the north, from Nkomo, will tell Mugabe the economy can’t survive without donor where UNITA’s leadership now operates. The charismatic Abel assistance. Accordingly, a new standby facility will be negotiated with the Chivukuvuku, leader of the UNITA members of parliament who have IMF in the final quarter and talks start for a Bank structural adjustment not joined the government-sponsored UNITA-Renovada, will start a new credit to help repay an escalating domestic debt burden. A tough new party to win support from urban Ovimbundu disaffected from Savimbi. budget will be due in October from the new Finance Minister. We hear SADC’s former Executive Secretary, Simba Makoni, is a strong runner for that job. WEST AFRICA One of the confidential conditions of the loan agreement with the Fund and Bank is likely to be the withdrawal of all Zimbabwean troops from Congo by the end of 2000. Harare may also be required to amend its new constitution with a clause guaranteeing the property rights of citizens and Reverse roles stipulating that full and fair compensation be paid for any assets acquired West African politics wins again. Formerly coup-proof Côte by the state. As pressure mounts on the cash-strapped state, privatisation d’Ivoire succumbs to a putsch de Noël and coup-prone Nigeria will speed up, with the sale of a minority stake in national carrier Air survives a military-orchestrated transition to civil rule. Business Zimbabwe and the telecoms wing of the Posts and Telecommunications people are much more optimistic than political analysts about Corporation. Nigeria this year. Much is at stake. Diplomats say gravely that We predict that in December, over two years before the end of his term Africa can’t afford for Nigeria to fail this time. The upturn in oil as President, Mugabe will announce that he won’t contest the presidential and gas prices, Nigeria’s huge reserves and President Olusegun poll in 2002. He will nominate Emmerson Mnangagwa as his successor, Obasanjo’s reformist policies are stirring new interest among provoking deep divisions in ZANU between John Nkomo’s faction and traders and investors who have kept away from Africa’s biggest Mnangagwa’s. This could be the riskiest point for Mugabe and his party. market for the past two decades. 7 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1

off-limits for all onshore oil production this year. Almost all major new oil finds are offshore. Former President Ibrahim Babangida will continue to fascinate Nigerians and be blamed for sponsoring unrest if it seems that his own interests are threatened. Certainly, CAPE MAURITANIA government anti-corruption investigations will start to address the VERDE Babangida era this year. Will such matters be dealt with by open NIGER MALI confrontation or a backroom deal? The latter looks more probable, SENEGAL given current social fragilities. GAMBIA BURKINA GUINEA- FASO BISSAU GUINEA BENIN Military interregnum TOGO NIGERIA CÔTE As Nigeria tries to consolidate civil rule, Côte d’Ivoire has to come SIERRA LEONE D’IVOIRE LIBERIA GHANA to terms with a military interregnum and the biggest political swing since Independence. The former single party, the Parti SÃO TOMÉ & PRÍNCIPE Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire , looks in a political void. Its pre- eminent position has been seized by the military and will be Population GNP Debt bargained for by opposition parties such as the Front Populaire (million) ($million) ($million) Ivoirien and the Rassemblement des Républicains. It will have to Benin 5.8 2,227 1,624 Burkina Faso 10.5 2,579 1,297 compete with these on more equal terms or else, atrophy. Cape Verde 0.4 436 220 Confidence in politicians and state institutions is at an all-time Côte d’Ivoire 14.2 10,152 15,609 low after six years of President Henri Konan Bédié’s rule. The Gambia 1.2 407 430 country has lacked leadership since founding President Félix Ghana 18.0 6,982 5,982 Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993. France will lose some influence Guinea 7.0 3,830 3,520 Guinea-Bissau 1.1 264 921 in Abidjan in the short term, yet such is the scale of French financial Liberia 2.9 n/a 2,012 commitments that no Ivorian government can sideline Paris. Mali 10.3 2,656 2,945 Establishment Ivorians are bemused by the quarrelling between the Mauritania 2.5 1,093 2,453 Elysée (which wanted to prop up Bédié using the French soldiers Niger 9.8 1,962 1,579 based near the airport) and the Parti Socialiste ministers and Nigeria 118.0 33,393 28,455 São Tomé & Príncipe 0.1 40 261 modernisers who categorically rejected such interference. Senegal 8.8 4,777 3,671 The influence of the Dioula-speaking, mainly Muslim, north Sierra Leone 4.7 762 1,149 will increase with the end of Bédié and his ‘Ivoirité’ doctrine, Togo 4.3 1,485 1,339 which discriminated against the north and his rival, former Premier Alassane Ouattara. Burkinabé and Malian influence may grow, Obasanjo has been politically brave. Sensibly, he has done the with a more northern-friendly government in Abidjan. toughest things first: purge the army, investigate past contracts, The economy is in sharp decline. The 15-year lows in the world clean up the oil sector, end the subsidies on foreign exchange cocoa price have halved the value of the main export in the past purchases and local fuel, and tackle the issue of revenue distribution. year. The freezing of nearly all aid by the International Monetary However, these beginnings of reform aren’t enough for Nigeria’s Fund, World Bank and European Union in 1999, along with gross 120 million people. Many dissidents regard the transition from corruption, have left the Treasury empty and government struggling military to civilian rule as a weakening of central authority: the to borrow from offshore banks. This will make President Robert legacy of nearly 20 years of military rule is undermining political Gueï’s task of winning friends at home even harder. reforms and attempts to consolidate the elaborate 36-state civilian West Africa’s Franc Zone has been badly hit by the Ivorian coup federal system of government. and the Zone’s leadership is in limbo. Senegal’s President Abdou For all the chaos and clashes of his first six months, Obasanjo is Diouf has a near-impossible task in getting himself legitimately re- set to ride the storm in 2000. His status as a nationalist and his elected in February. Eternal opponent Abdoulaye Wade (74) alliance with key Middle Belt and northern military and business knows this is his last chance: his partisans say they’ll stop at interests offer him some protection. He is also much helped by nothing if ruling Parti Socialiste fraud skews the poll. higher oil prices, which have transformed Nigeria’s fortunes over Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré has survived a tricky year but the past quarter. The financial position has moved from chronic to could yet lose out thanks to France’s modernisers. If he fails to very serious and bought the government some room for manoeuvre. dampen growing civil unrest, he may go down in history as the last The naira is holding up better than expected and the government is unhappy instrument of the politique des réseaux of the Jacques selling stakes in major state assets such as telecommunications, Foccart-era. Compaoré will be carefully watching his southern power and water. neighbour, Ghana’s President Jerry Rawlings, who is scheduled Managing the economic reform programme will prove far less to make way for his successor after December’s presidential onerous than the core political issues: the internecine war in the elections. The betting is that Rawlings will leave on schedule, even Niger Delta; the worsening polarisation between north and south, if he keeps a stake in the political system. But it is less likely that symbolised by the introduction of Sharia (Islamic) law in some his baton will be smoothly passed to the current Vice-President, tax northern states; insurrectionary campaigns by Yoruba nationalist lawyer and technocrat John Atta-Mills. In the meantime the real groups, such as the Oduduwa People’s Congress; demands for a alarms are sounding in Sierra Leone where President Ahmad sovereign national conference and a thorough-going constitutional Tejan Kabbah looks likely to lose his tenuous grip on power once review; and the would-be putschists lurking in the shadows. Without more, giving way to a Foday Sankoh presidency underwritten by credible efforts to address the crisis there, the Delta could become neighbouring President Charles Taylor in Liberia. 8 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1

The factionalising of KANU will continue as the succession EAST AFRICA battle heats up. One would-be candidate, ex-Finance Minister Simeon Nyachae, openly consorts with the opposition and has invited Moi to resign. Vice-President George Saitoti will stay slightly ahead of the field but has no assurances of the job, signs Cooperation again that neither Biwott nor Moi wholly trusts him with all the KANU inner circles’ financial and political secrets. Saitoti has shown Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda start the year having just revived signs of too much independence from Moi-Biwott and has been the East African Community. It is one of Africa’s most viable testing the waters among Kikuyu electors. Equally, Moi has been economic groupings. Its ambitious goals are a customs union, sounding out Kikuyu views of the succession through KANU together with common citizenship and currency. Leaving aside the Secretary General Joseph Kamotho and Uhuru Kenyatta. issue of the much postponed final agreement, there is a real One of Africa’s wiliest leaders, Moi will play to all the galleries prospect of greater economic and political cooperation between and keep everyone guessing about the succession until the last member states. All three Presidents - Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, minute. He’ll outfox the opposition again this year, mixing Benjamin Mkapa in Tanzania, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda - patronage for pliable opponents with an iron fist for the resolute. believe that economic convergence will boost investment and He will find the divisions in his own party more intractable. expand regional markets. In neighbouring Kampala, Museveni is proving no less resilient Moi hopes the wealthy but opposition-supporting Kikuyu than Moi. This year, 14 years after seizing power, Museveni’s commercial class will get more interested in regional investment, National Resistance Movement is organising a referendum to so reducing its interest in the state assets due to come on the market canvass views on multi-party politics. Such is the NRM’s dominance in Kenya’s speeded-up privatisation process. Museveni sees the of the political scene that the two main opposition parties, the EAC as a part of a larger regional confederation, including Burundi, Democratic Party and Uganda People’s Congress, are boycotting Eastern Congo and Rwanda. As President of a land-locked the referendum to protest against foul play by the NRM. They want country, he wants a stake in different routes to the sea. Mkapa is to be free to organise and campaign as a political party; under NRM convinced that Tanzania will be a net beneficiary of the EAC, rules, only individuals, not parties, can campaign in the referendum. although his colleagues are less keen about liberalising the country’s capital market regime. Regional stockbrokers are also bullish Still no party for Kampala about the EAC. The three countries’ stock exchanges have This embarrasses Washington and London, which have financially harmonised their listing and trading rules; the Chairman of the supported the referendum and have tried to persuade the opposition Nairobi Stock Exchange, Jimnah Mbaru, speaks convincingly of to contest. Some NRM groups have set up pro-multi-party alliances plans for an East African exchange, and cross listings between the to make the referendum look more credible. The vote will almost Nairobi and Johannesburg exchanges. certainly support the present no-party ‘movement’ system, partly Tanzania has the brightest growth prospects for now. Uganda is because many rural electors will see the referendum as an burdened by the costs of its Congo-Kinshasa intervention but is due endorsement of Museveni, whose personal popularity remains to get substantial debt relief from the World Bank, International immense. He will also easily win the presidential poll, multi-party Monetary Fund and several bilateral creditors over the next three or not, two years hence. His agreement with Sudan’s National years. Kenya’s economy, hobbled by corruption, mismanagement Islamic Front government is a deal of convenience. It has hardly and now falling commodity prices, will be in intensive care for affected Sudanese-sponsored rebel operations, such as those of the much of this year, despite the reform efforts of new Civil Service Allied Democratic Forces and West Nile Bank Front: both launched head Richard Leakey. For much of the first half of the year, attacks in the wake of the ‘peace agreement’. Leakey will be negotiating with the IMF around unblocking about Tanzania’s President Mkapa had stepped back from regional US$175 million of credits. He’s likely to be successful, which affairs, leaving most high-level diplomacy to the founding President, should prompt further credits for health and education from the Julius Nyerere. Mwalimu’s death last year initially looked if it World Bank. Yet his clean-up will have mixed success: some areas might threaten Mkapa’s chances of securing the ticket of the ruling which touch on the business interests of the most senior Kenya party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, for the presidential candidacy. Now African National Union officials will be strictly off-limits. Some it’s probably the reverse, as Mkapa can use some of Mwalimu’s KANU loyalists will be sacrificed to Leakey’s broom, though, in reflected glory to build a stronger support base. CCM will win on the name of making the anti-corruption campaign look convincing. the mainland, helped by another expected upturn in economic Elsewhere, the anti-corruption force will come up against a Criminal growth. Investigation Department often sympathetic to the KANU hierarchy The elections may not go so smoothly on the islands, Zanzibar The close scrutiny of the IMF will not constrain the political and Pemba. It all depends on whether Zanzibar President Salmin supremacy of Industry Minister Nicholas Biwott. He will stay Amour goes quietly as the constitution dictates. He has spent central to the plans for the Moi succession. Moi, Biwott and much of the past five years refusing to compromise with political presidential son Gideon want to engineer another term for Moi by opponents outraged by the rigging tactics CCM used in Zanzibar in pushing a ‘change the constitution’ vote in parliament but have the 1995 polls. Amour is ambivalent towards a Commonwealth received a sharp rebuff from KANU notables. Several KANU agreement which negotiated his political exit: the best guess is that backbenchers are in open revolt against the Moi-Biwott alliance. this year, he will run out of steam. They showed that much in November when they voted in parliament Both Rwanda and Burundi have been knocking at the EAC’s for constitutional reforms to reduce the President’s powers. Some door. Rwanda would have had a chance of early accession to the KANU members of parliament also recently opposed Moi’s community if its relations with Uganda had not deteriorated so directives to his face at a KANU parliamentary group meeting. precipitously. Kampala wanted to broaden the EAC but Kenya and 9 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1

says. Yet probably she would have consulted the then Secretary of ERITREA State, Warren Christopher, or President Bill Clinton. Some Rwandan diplomats want to use these enquiries as a DJIBOUTI bargaining chip. Ambassador to Brussels Jacques Bihozagara argues for a ‘Marshall Plan’ to help Kigali address the consequences ETHIOPIA of the genocide. He adds that the UN must be given the forces and logistics to implement the Lusaka peace agreement in Congo to SOMALIA enable it to disarm those groups involved in the 1994 genocide, namely the Interahamwé militias and ex-Forces Armées UGANDA KENYA Rwandaises. RWANDA SEYCHELLES BURUNDI Complicated equation Nelson Mandela, the new mediator in Burundi’s conflict, faces his TANZANIA first round of negotiations next month. Appointed in Arusha in December, South Africa’s former President wants broad-based negotiations, to include the Hutu-led guerrilla groups kept out by COMOROS his predecessor, Julius Nyerere. Like the Botswana ex-President, Ketumile Masire, appointed mediator in the Congo-K peace Population GNP Debt (million) ($million) ($million) process, Mandela faces the handicap of his lack of a common Burundi 6.4 924 1,066 language with the protagonists, to allow direct conversation with Comoros 0.5 209 197 them - Nyerere used Kiswahili. Reports that a delegation from Djibouti 0.6 n/a 284 Léonard Nyangoma’s wing of the CNDD met officials from the Eritrea 3.8 852 76 Zimbabwean Defence Ministry and the ruling Zimbabwe African Ethiopia 60.0 6,507 10,079 Kenya 28.6 9,654 6,486 National Union-Patriotic Front in December to ask for weapons Rwanda 7.9 1,680 1,111 and food will further complicate the equation. Seychelles 0.8 537 149 Major Buyoya’s government will be increasingly pressured by Somalia 8.8 n/a 2,561 human rights groups and aid agencies to close its regroupment Tanzania 31.3 6,632 7,177 camps, known as ‘concentration camps’ by Hutu opponents. Uganda 20.3 6,608 3,708 Médecins sans Frontières suspended work in November Tanzania are far more sceptical. Instead this year, Kigali and complaining of insecurity in the remote camps. Thousands of Hutu Kampala will have to rehabilitate their bilateral relations, which hit refusniks crossed into Tanzania in December to escape the camps. rock bottom after fighting between their troops in Kisangani in In Eritrea and Ethiopia, heavy but brief fighting between the August. The closeness between Museveni and the Rwandan Vice- two antagonists is probable next month around Zalembessa, unless President and Defence Minister, General Paul Kagame, seems to the Asmara government withdraws its forces from all territory have gone for good but the two countries will remain strategic administered by Ethiopia prior to May 1998 (AC Vol 40 No 22). allies in Congo-K, if only because they still face the same opponents Whatever the outcome, both governments will then accept the there. Organisation of African Unity peace plan and international Kigali also has to do some repairs on relations with Washington. arbitration over the disputed border. The war should dribble to a It has been embarrassed by the campaigning of human rights halt later this year with no outright victor, each side claiming activists and relatives of victims of the 1994 genocide for a victory and blaming the other. The aftermath will remain for years, commission of enquiry into the United States’ role during the affecting international aid and attitudes, and rendering both states tragedy. Belgian Senator Alain Destexhe (ex-head the International far more vulnerable than before to natural disaster. Crisis Group) who led the creation of commissions to look at the The two countries will be unable to feed their peoples and, on top role of Belgium, France and the United Nations, is calling now for of the financial costs, President Issayas Aferworki and Premier a similar investigation in the USA. He says the main weakness of Meles Zenawi will face heavy criticism if casualty figures are the commission led by Swedish ex-Premier Ingvar Carlsson was released. Ethiopian-Eritrean coolness will last and the war ends the failure to analyse US policy during the genocide. Destexhe Issayas’s dream of regional political and economic influence. The argues that Washington’s refusal to describe the 1994 massacres as wilder dreams of Ethiopian nationalists of Addis Ababa reviving ‘genocide’ worsened the tragedy: had the USA immediately done its imperial reach will prove ill-founded: campaigns for Emperor so, the UN would have had to intervene. Shortly before the Meles for the third millennium can be discounted. The war also tragedy, the USA had ratified the international convention on ends Ethiopia’s dream of restoring Assab as its port and threatens genocide. the port’s viability; Djibouti port copes surprisingly well and US Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney works with Destexhe Ethiopia is now eyeing Berbera in Somaliland, too. This underlines but many fellow Democrats are unenthusiastic. Some UN officials Assab’s isolation from the rest of Eritrea, raising the spectre of fear the Republicans might use the issue to further worsen US-UN Afar claims to southern Eritrea and eastern Ethiopia. relations. Such a commission of enquiry would also have to find Since it became independent in 1993, Eritrea has gone to war out who objected to attempts by the then UN Secretary General, three times and quarrelled with all its neighbours, even Yemen, but Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to classify the Rwandan massacres as not Saudi Arabia. The war-time rapprochement with Sudan will genocide. Current US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, not end either country’s support for the other’s opposition. Issayas’s then the US Ambassador at the UN, defended this policy, Destexhe position remains unchallenged, though his handling of the war and

10 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1 the still unacknowledged death toll raise doubts about his once public endorsement and the ‘building blocks’ for peace are fragile unquestioned political skills. The time might be ripe to allow (AC Vol 40 No 19). The Somaliland and Puntland governments in others a more visible role but his record suggests he is unlikely to the north and north-east, quarrelling over Sol and Sanaag areas, reduce his power and position. Instead the war will postpone won’t go to war but their militias and police may clash. The moves towards democracy or devolution of authority from the Rahenweyne in Bay and Bakool regions announced an ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, which shows no administration late in 1999; it’s already beset by inter-clan conflicts; sign of reconciling with its critics. The regime will remain the Rahenweyne are in dispute with the Hawiye. Continued clan centralised, personalised and fiercely independent. Its self-reliance divisions in the Juba Valley make a consensus unlikely there soon. ideology will be further tested in the face of rising social and In Mogadishu, Hussein Mohamed Farah ‘Aydeed’, like Ali economic needs, and popular demands for some reward from Mahdi Mohamed last year, may leave the political spotlight. Independence. There are several aspiring successors and no sign of serious The PFDJ government uses its aggressive foreign policy as a progress towards unity among the Hawiye. Other leaders from distraction from domestic problems. Eritreans are fiercely protective Somalia’s old guard politicians and warlords could leave this year. of their hard-won Independence. And a mixture of patriotism and Elders will prevent Somaliland’s President Mohamed Ibrahim chauvinism means Issayas will face no serious challenge, despite Egal from attending any Somali reconciliation conference and the catastrophic war. claiming the Somali presidency, which he covets; he’s likely to In Ethiopia, Meles also uses the war to boost loyalty to his retire before his term ends in February 2002. The health of regime. The symbols of what it once labelled ‘an outworn past’ Puntland’s Abdullahi Yussuf causes concern; he has regular (flag, unitary Ethiopia, territorial integrity) are popular and will dialysis in Britain. The human rights record of the forces of Gen. last. The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Mohamed Siad Hirsi ‘Morgan’, ousted from Kismayo in June, Front will win the May elections overwhelmingly. Independent draws much criticism. Even his Ethiopian allies may have lost foreign election observers will be unwelcome. Most opposition patience. There is growing business and popular support for parties will fragment even before coming under government pressure Islamic courts in the south, due to their success in re-establishing and opposition in the new parliament will be confined to a few some security. independents, though disagreements will continue in the EPRDF. In Djibouti, President Ismail Omar will consolidate his authority, Like Issayas, Meles is under no real threat. Most of his colleagues exploiting the alliance with Ethiopia. He’ll have French support. will oppose attempts to revive friendship with Eritrea. Renewed The Eritrean threat to Djibouti, real or imagined, worries Paris as Ethiopian nationalism has won him popularity; the expulsion of well as Djibouti. Longer term, Djibouti’s survival depends on Eritreans, much criticised abroad, is popular at home. The war has closer relations with Ethiopia. Addis Ababa favours closer ties also shown that the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, which with Djibouti’s Ethiopian-born President. A confederation along dominates the EPRDF, cannot rule alone and must rebuild the the lines of the ill-fated Senegambia might have French support traditional Tigrayan-Amhara alliance. This time, the TPLF will and allow a larger Ethiopian military presence to secure Djibouti’s insist on greater equality, despite the Amharas’ previous dominance; main asset, the railway to Addis Ababa, against possible Eritrean- and it will want to balance them with some Oromos (there are some inspired attack. three million Tigrayans but about 18 mn. Amharas). Without any Even some French officers question the value of their military central government commitment to real democracy, the alliance presence in Djibouti. Paris will reduce or even end it. Keen to will be fragile. spend its money elsewhere, France is unlikely to bail out Djibouti Addis Ababa’s failure to devolve real power to locally elected from its imminent crisis with the IMF. Cash problems also threaten regional governments boosts opposition movements among the Djibouti’s cooperation with Ethiopia, which has not paid taxes for Oromo, Afar and Somali. Just as Eritrea supports these movements, using Djibouti port, a bone of contention that will grow as port hoping to weaken Ethiopia’s central government, Addis Ababa has improvements become urgent. Ismail is playing his own cards on backed the Eritrean government’s opponents, such as local Islamists the Somali table and Ethiopia may pressure him by giving a longer and rebel groups of nationalities including the Kunama, Beni Amer leash to opposition from within his own Issa people, opponents and Afar. Regional neighbours will continue to interfere in the mostly based in Ethiopia. collapsed state of Somalia. Like Djibouti and Kenya, Ethiopia ●All chart figures fromWorld Bank Atlas 1999 does not want a strong, unified Somali state and will intervene to ensure that no government or regional administration falls under Published fortnightly (25 issues per year) by Africa Confidential, at 73 Islamist politicians or threatens Ethiopian interests. Yet Egypt Farringdon Road, London EC1M 3JQ, England. Tel: +44 171-831 3511. Fax: +44 171-831 6778. and Eritrea do want a strong, centralised Somali government to Copyright reserved. Edited by Patrick Smith. Deputy: Gillian Lusk. counter-balance Ethiopia. Seeking to safeguard access to Nile Administration: Clare Tauben. waters, Cairo will become Ethiopia’s main regional competitor. Annual subscriptions, cheques payable to Africa Confidential in advance: Sudanese-Ethiopian relations may improve in the short term UK: £250 Europe: £250 because of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. In the longer term, though, Africa: £233 US:$628 (including Airmail) Ethiopia sees Sudan as threatening, including if it gets closer to Rest of the World: £325 Egypt. As with Uganda, ostensible rapprochements with Khartoum Students (with proof): £75 or US$124 All prices may be paid in equivalent convertible currency. We accept will not change Ethiopia’s or Eritrea’s profound hostility to the American Express, Diner’s Club, Mastercard and Visa credit cards. NIF regime. Subscription enquiries to: Africa Confidential, PO Box 805, Oxford OX4 In Somalia, both the UN and European Union will support yet 1FH England. Tel: 44 1865 244083 and Fax: 44 1865 381381 another reconciliation conference, as proposed by Djibouti’s new Visit our web site at: http://www.Africa-Confidential.com Printed in England by Duncan Print and Packaging Ltd, Herts,UK. President, Ismail Omar Guelleh. Its effects could be short-lived. ISSN 0044-6483 A centralised Somali government is unlikely as the warlords lack

11 7 January 2000 Africa Confidential Vol 41 No 1

Pointers CÔTE D’IVOIRE ZIMBABWE SUDAN Putsch de Noël They’re off - or not Manipulation General Robert Gueï is still far from consolidating Confusion mounts over Zimbabwe’s parliamentary his position as head of state following the 24 elections. Last month Justice Minister Emmerson In their first joint mission, Egypt’s and Libya’s December Christmas coup that brought him to Mnangagwa, 53, announced their postponement foreign ministers, Amr Moussa and Omer el power. Too many civilians and soldiers think the from March to June so that the poll could be held Muntasser, were in Sudan on 4 January to boost coup has been hijacked for the benefit of Alassane under the rules of the revised constitution. Among President Omer el Beshir against Hassan el Dramane Ouattara, leader of the Rassemblement the proposed constitutional reforms is the Turabi. They followed their Qatari counterpart, des Républicains and former Prime Minister. reintroduction of a premiership to take on many of Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem bin Jabr al Thani, Ouattara was at the centre of a political row last the executive powers of the presidency. who tried to reconcile Lieutenant General Omer year when President Henri Konan Bédié tried to Then on 4 January President Robert Mugabe, and Turabi. After visiting Cairo too, Hamad gave stop him running for president in elections loath to give power to a prime minister, announced up, complaining Turabi had rejected proposals scheduled for this year. the elections would be held in March - whatever that he’d previously accepted. Ouattara returned to Abidjan in triumph a week the state of the reforms. Mugabe’s view is This circus reflects the National Islamic Front after the coup. Although he has declined a job in popular with his ruling Zimbabwe African National government’s skill in turning weakness to Gueï’s transitional government, Ouattara’s Union-Patriotic Front which wants early elections advantage. When Omer declared a state of military and RDR allies are well represented in the to wrongfoot the opposition. But there are emergency on 12 December, this was seen abroad new line-up. Those objecting most strongly include obstacles. The United Nations team invited by the as a military coup against Turabi. Yet little Minister of Youth and Sports Colonel Mathias government to inspect the voters’ roll called it a actually happened: this is a power struggle not a Doui, who initiated the coup, and other young shambles and said the state bureaucracy wasn’t change of policy and even less of principle. The officiers. ready to update it. NIF (aka National Congress) still rules, as Omer The biggest opposition party, Laurent However ZANU-PF’s National Congress on keeps repeating. Gbagbo’s Front Populaire Ivoirien, has refused 16-18 December bore no sign of dynamic electoral Few seemed to be listening, even when he to join. We hear Paris intends to make the formation preparation. Unsurprisingly, President Mugabe stressed he’d been in ‘the Islamic movement’ of a broad-based government, including all (75) was retained as leader for another five years since his schooldays (first admission), had made political parties, a condition of French financial and Simon Muzenda (78) was reelected as deputy. the June 1989 coup on ‘the orders of the Islamic support. Some debt payments not met after the Joseph Msika (77) moved up from National movement’ (always denied), that the party still coup were service payments to French creditors. Chairman to Co-Vice-President, replacing the late ruled, that there was ‘too much secularism’ and On 5 January Gueï announced a ‘temporary Joshua Nkomo. The real contest was for the ‘more Islamisation’ was needed. Yet Egypt still suspension’ of foreign debt servicing. Ouattara’s National Chairmanship. If ZANU-PF win the welcomed his 1999 ‘coup’ as swiftly as it had manoeuvering has disappointed some of his parliamentaries under the new constitution, the welcomed his first, depicting Turabi as zealot supporters in the French establishment. National Chairperson would probably become versus Omer the pragmatist. Although Ouattara says his party has only three Prime Minister. The Prime Minister in 2000 Alarm bells rang even before Ghazi Salah el ministers in the new regime, he has seven if one would be in pole position for the presidential Din el Atabani stepped forward as Omer’s counts those military officers who are also RDR elections in 2002 when Mugabe stands down. spokesperson. Other core NIF-ers soon spoke out supporters. Mnangagwa, a frontrunner for the presidency, for him, too, notably Turabi’s old rival Vice- Security problems continued in the week ending stood for the chairmanship but lost badly to Local President Ali Osman, Bakri Hassan Salih 8 January. A meeting between Gbagbo and Gueï Government Minister John Nkomo (66). Long (security) and Ibrahim Ahmed Omer. These last was cancelled because of gunfire in the city centre. overshadowed by fellow Ndebele Dumiso two were in the ‘Group of Ten’ who criticised The absence of Col. Doui in his ministerial office Dabengwa, the Home Affairs Minister, Nkomo Turabi in December 1998, as were veteran NIF triggered rumours that he had been arrested by has stronger grassroots support in Matebeleland. businessman and financier Osman Khalid Gueï’s security on 5 January: Gueï energetically Dabengwa has denied that he agreed to be Modawi, key security buff Nafi’e Ali Nafi’e and refuted this. It was Doui’s supporters who began Mnangagwa’s running mate for the ZANU-PF People’s Defence Force Coordinator Ali Ahmed the initial army mutiny over salaries on 23 presidential ticket. But don’t discount Mnangagwa Korti, all now seen as in the group which Omer December. yet: he has discreet Western diplomatic backing fronts. The disagreements are not ideological: Gen. Gueï professes no party affiliation. But and strong support in Zimbabwe’s security most dissidents were Turabi’s bright young men his two key officers are RDR: Gen. Lassana establishment. Much will depend on future battles but are now middle-aged and tired of waiting for Palenfo, with ministerial experience, is now with Defence Minister Moven Mahachi (51) - him to relax the leash. They also know he’s a Minister of State for Security, in charge of the and Mnangagwa’s links to the Congo barrier to the NIF charm campaign. police and security services; airforce chief Gen. intervervention and to some local white Egypt, though, seems to think it’s backing a Abdoulaye Coulibaly is Minister of State for businessmen are a liability. band of ideology-free soldiers fighting Turabi, Infrastructure and Transport. Col. Issa Diakité is The opposition remains disorganised:14 whom it publicly condemned for 1995’s attempt not in the government but is said to be close to parties with little common purpose. The on President Hosni Mubarak (when it also showed Ouattara. strongest challenger, the Movement for its dislike of Nafi’e). Yet Egypt’s prime concern The RDR holds the key finance portfolio with Democratic Change, has not yet elected a now is the Nile. Omer has repeatedly rejected N’golo Coulibaly, and with Ouattara behind the substantive leadership; its leaders, Morgan southern independence - music to Egypt’s ears. scenes, wielding influence with United States’ Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda from the trade He has also repeatedly and formally offered the and French business and the Washington union movement, have not explained how they south a referendum on independence, yet Cairo is institutions. The now released RDR’s popular propose to pull the country out of its current rallying Arab governments against ‘a United Secretary General, Henriette Diabaté, is in the crisis. Some are desperate for an alternative to States’ plot’ to dismember an ‘Arab’ state (AC government to remind Ivorians that the RDR is ZANU-PF; others just want a viable opposition Vol 40 No 23). This suits the NIF but is hardening not exclusively northern or Dioula. But the absence that can deny the ruling party its usual two- southern attitudes: previously silent southern of people from other parties in the administration thirds majority. Few expect the opposition to leaders are now calling for independence. is a critical, perhaps fatal, weakness. do better than that in any case.

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