Jeremy M. Weinstein is a Ph.D. candidate in political economy and government at Harvard University and a graduate student fell(JW ofthe Center for International Development.

Africa's "Scramble for Africa" Lessons ofa Continental War Jeremy M. Weinstein

• The war in the Democratic Republic of the invaded in 1978, and only the Congo (DRC), which began in August 1998, third since 1960. Although Africa is seen as is unprecedented-at times involving ar­ a hotbed ofviolence and warfare, most con­ mies from eight African states. Soldiers from flicts have been intrastate in nature. Norms Chad are fighting alongside regiments from ofsovereignty reinforced by clauses in the Namibia, Angola, and Zimbabwe in defense charter of the Organization ofAfrican Unity of President Laurent Kabila. And on offense, (OAU) and the constitutions of the various the two main rebel groups, the Congolese subregional organizations have effectively Assembly for Democracy (which is known prevented cross-border conflict from the by the acronym RCD) and the Movement for time ofindependence until now. The Ugan­ the Liberation ofCongo (Mlc), are backed dan and Rwandan-led invasion ofCongo, as by troops from and . As well as the presence there of the Southern Susan E. Rice, assistant secretary ofstate for African Development Community (SADC) African affairs, warned the House Interna­ intervention force, therefore represents a wa­ tional Relations Committee in September tershed in the recent history ofAfrican con­ 1998, "The fighting threatens regional sta­ flict. It appears that the forces preventing bility, hampers economic progress, endan­ cross-border conflict since 1960 have be­ gers the lives of millions ofpeople, per­ come seriously weakened. petuates human rights abuses, and impedes What are the implications of the rise of the democratic transformation ofAfrica's interstate war in Africa for peace and secu­ third-largest country." This war, Rice said, rity on the continent? Why have Western is potentially "among the most dangerous powers been so reluctant to take an active conflicts on the globe." role in resolving Africa's first "world war"? Yet, the war in Congo goes on almost And what impact will the changing nature unnoticed outside ofAfrica. While African ofwarfare in Africa have on U.S. policy and heads ofstate spent much of the last year the role of the United Nations there? shuttling across the continent, wrestling with the crisis and searching for a peaceful A BriefHistory ofthe Conflict solution, Congo has been largely missing President Mobutu Sese Seku ruled over from the agendas of the Western powers (as Congo was called from 1971 to 1997) and multilateral organizations. Only in Jan­ with an iron fist for over 30 years. Mobutu uary, when the U.S. representative to the exploited Zaire's enormous mineral wealth United Nations, Richard Holbrooke, taking (diamonds, metals, rubber) for personal advantage of his tenure as Security Council gain, squandering the opportunity for eco­ president to draw attention to Africa, did nomic growth. He invested resources in the the war enter Western consciousness. strengthening of his presidential guard at The conflict in the DRC is the first inter­ the expense of the military at large, creating state war in sub-Saharan Africa since Uganda an impenetrable shield around his ruling

Afflca's "Scramble for Africa" 11 elite that would take nearly three decades that year, the new leadership in be­ to break down. During the , the gan to secretly train and equip the Banya­ United States encouraged Mobutu's suppres­ malengue in order to prevent cross-border sion ofdissent and autocratic rule in order attacks from the 1.5 million to combat the spread (or perceived threat) of who had fled Rwanda and were now living communism in the region. In retrospect, in camps in the Kivu region. Many of these Mobutu's reign was very nearly an extension refugees were former members of the Rwan­ of the Belgian occupation of the Congo; like dan Armed Forces who were using the refu­ King Leopold II in the late nineteenth cen­ gee camps as bases for rearming themselves. tury, Mobutu bled Zaire-robbing the citi­ zenry of the country's natural wealth, using The Roots ofthe Crisis force to sustain his autocratic rule, and re­ The roots of the current crisis in Congo fusing to invest even the most limited re­ lie in the period immediately following sources in development. Kabila's takeover. The new Congolese With the Cold War receding into mem­ leader soon antagonized his Rwandan and ory, more than ten neighboring countries Ugandan backers by ignoring their security (and foreign powers across the globe), wel­ concerns and allowing Hutu refugees to comed Laurent Kabila and his Alliance of launch destabilizing attacks on Rwanda Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the from Congo. This fed Ugandan fears that Congo (ADFL) as they marched across Zaire's Kabila would-through inaction and inat­ vast expanse in an effort to topple Mobutu. tention-enable Ugandan rebel groups to When Kabila arrived in the capital city of mount similar attacks on Uganda from Kinshasa in May 1997, he was greeted by northwestern Congo. cheering crowds. Although many were anx­ The Rwandans had hoped that by in­ ious about the direction this new leader stalling Kabila as the leader of the DRC, they would take, most were relieved that Mobu­ would have the help of the Congolese army tu's brutal reign had come to an end. (backed by their own forces) to clear the The ADFL was essentially a Rwandan jungles in eastern Congo of the Interhamwe creation, although it gained credibility with (Hutu) rebels. However, as he took hold of the local population as it advanced on Kin­ the reins ofpower, Kabila shifted his atten­ shasa in 1997. At its inception, it was domi­ tion away from Rwandan and Ugandan in­ nated by the Banyamalengue, an ethnic terests toward issues related to the develop­ Tursi group that had lived in Congo since ment ofCongo. During his first year in the nineteenth century. Contentious politics power, he restructured the government, have always surrounded the Banyamalengue, promoting ethnic countrymen at the ex­ who were concentrated in the Kivu region pense ofTutsis. He consolidated his hold in the eastern part of the country and were on power by cracking down on domestic often seen as interlopers. Mobutu painted opposition. And he sought to reduce the them as "Rwandans" and denied them citi­ influence of those Rwandans who had re­ zenship in an effort to strengthen his do­ mained in Congo after the takeover of Kin­ mestic support in the region. Following shasa to help restructure the army. By the the in Rwanda in April 1994, in summer of 1998, Kabila, tired of having which ethnic Hutu militias had systemati­ policy dictated from Kigali, kicked the cally exterminated much of the popu­ Rwandans out of the country, thereby set­ lation, with an estimated 800,000 killed, ting the stage for the events ofAugust. the Banyamalengue also came under attack. Rwanda responded by mobilizing the After the Tutsi-Ied Banyamalengue and various other disen­ (RPF) defeated the Hum forces in July of chanted parts of the new Congolese army

12 WORLD POUCYJOURNAL. SUMMER 2000 who decided to back the Rwandans and terhamwe in the Kivu region are essentially prepared for a military invasion ofCongo. a continuation of the Rwandan , Rwandan vice president , who with the Tutsi leadership in Kigali anxious was largely in control of the government, to consolidate power over the at home and Rwanda's military leadership planned and across the border. to depose Kabila and replace him with a Moreover, the Rwandan Tutsi feel a new leader more attuned to the region's se­ powerful kinship with the Banyamalengue, curity concerns. Anxious to present this new their ethnic brethren in eastern Zaire. The intervention as an internal rebellion, Kigali Banyamalengue have consistently come un­ orchestrated the formation of the Congolese der attack by the local and national leader­ Assembly for Democracy, which included ship in Congo. The local indigenous popu­ many of the same individuals who had in­ lation - villagers with little or no educa­ stalled Kabila only 15 months earlier. How­ tion--express resentment toward the Ban­ ever, since the ReD was officially established yamalengue, characterizing them as "land­ only after the rebellion began, Kigali's med­ grabbing, greedy foreigners." Such resent­ dling was transparent. ments, taking root at the local level and Kagame and his allies failed to antici­ mobilized at the national level, have con­ pate the regional response to their effort. As tributed to the current anti-Tutsi hysteria their soldiers approached Kinshasa, Kabila in Congo. appealed to African leaders to lend their sup­ But the ethnic equation is even more port to his fledgling regime. Troops from complicated than this briefanalysis suggests. Zimbabwe rushed to Kabila's , working Ethnic allegiances are constantly shifting, with forces from Namibia and Angola to and fractures have emerged within the rescue Kinshasa and repel the invasion. Soon Banyamalengue leadership as the war has after, Chad and Sudan joined the fray as evolved. Some have turned against their for­ well. mer masters in Kigali, who have used ethnic kinship to exert political control outside Why Conflict Arises Rwanda's borders. The coalition supporting There are a number ofstandard explana­ the insurgent groups has also developed tions for why conflict arises in Africa, expla­ fault lines. In late 1999, and again this nations that can provide a starting point for spring, Ugandan and Rwandan troops re­ understanding the current conflict in Congo. portedly clashed in Congo. Tribal hatred and ethnic conflict drive con­ Security dilemmas lead to war. Border se­ flict. Many analysts have pointed to the un­ curity and regional power politics are at derlying ethnic cleavages in Africa as the the heart of security dilemmas in Central source ofdomestic instability, civil war, and Africa. So long as states care about their sur­ cross-border conflict. Politicians and would­ vival as independent entities, they will seek be leaders play upon ethnic differences to di­ to strengthen themselves relative to their vide and conquer, and distribute resources neighbors. This competition between states to one group or another in order to build for relative power often leads to attempts to coalitions. amass more power and resources than is Ethnicity is clearly an important part needed to maintain security. The introduc­ ofthe equation in the Congo conflict. As tion of ethnic considerations only intensi­ the history of the conflict suggests, Tutsi­ fies the security dilemma since ethnic ha­ Hutu divisions in the Great Lakes region tred (or a history ofconflict between groups) are at the bottom of Rwanda's interest in strengthens the rationale for mobilization eastern Congo. The efforts of the Tutsi-Ied or preemptive strikes against a neighbor­ Rwandan Patriotic Front to mop up the In- ing group.

Afnca's "Scramble for Afnca" 13