AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

ISSN: 1324 1540 Volume 28 I No. 1 I January 2013

IN THIS ISSUE

Vale Major-General Alan Sydney Harbour Tunnel Environmental health disaster Stretton evacuation exercise: a timely management study Contents Volume 28 No. 1 January 2013

Please note that some contributions to the Australian Journal of Emergency Management are reviewed. Academic papers (denoted by ) are peer reviewed to appropriate academic standards by independent, qualified experts.

Foreword 2 By Kelvin Anderson, Director-General Department of Community Safety, Queensland. BRAND GUIDELINES MAY 2011

COMMUNIQUÉ Standing Council on Police and Emergency Management 4 Creswick, Victoria, 23 November 2012.

An introduction to the Victorian Fire Services Commissioner and the 2021 Research Program 6

BRAND GUIDELINES By Dr Holly Foster, Senior Researcher, Fire Services Commissioner Victoria. MAY 2011

Interactive hazard preparation strategy efficacy: considerations for future community engagement programs 8 Dr Holly Foster provides findings from two primary research case studies into interactive community engagement strategies.

In Search of the 'Prepared Community’: the way ahead for Australia? 15 Roger Jones OAM provides a perspective on the ‘prepared communities’ concept and methodologies.

Human behaviour during an evacuation scenario in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel 20 Penelope Burns, Garry Stevens, Kate Sandy, Arnold Dix, and Professor Beverley Raphael (University of Western Sydney) and Bob Allen (Sydney Harbour Tunnel Company) evaluate an evacuation exercise at the Sydney Harbour Tunnel.

Australian Journal of Emergency management. The Journal emphasises empirical reports but may EXECUTIVE EDITOR include specialised theoretical, methodological, case study and The Editor-in-Chief of the Journal with responsibility for the Management review papers and opinion pieces. The views in this journal are not Journal’s operations and policies is Warwick Finn, First Assistant necessarily the views of the Attorney-General's Department. Secretary, National Security Capability Development Division of Vol. 28 No. 1, January 2013 ISSN: 1324 1540 the Australian Government’s Attorney-General’s Department. PUBLISHER ABOUT THE JOURNAL The Australian Journal of Emergency Management is published by EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE The Australian Journal of Emergency Management is Australia’s the Australian Government’s Attorney- General’s Department. • Andrew Coghlan, Australian Red Cross, Melbourne premier Journal in emergency management. Its format The Journal is published on the Australian Emergency • Chris Collett, Attorney-General’s Department Resilience Policy and content is developed with reference to peak emergency Management website at www.em.gov.au. Division management organisations and the emergency management • Michael Eburn, Australian National University College of Law sectors—nationally and internationally. The Journal focuses COVER • Chas Keys, formerly of NSW State Emergency Service on both the academic and practitioner reader and its aim is to A bushfire smoke plume visible from Park Beach in Forcett, • Prof Jennifer McKay, University of South Australia strengthen capabilities in the sector by documenting, growing and south-east of Hobart, Tasmania, Friday, Jan 4, 2013. (AAP image/ • David Parsons, Sydney Water Corporation disseminating an emergency management body of knowledge. The Jo Giuliani) Journal strongly supports the role of the Australian Emergency • Raelene Thompson, AEMI, Attorney-General’s Department Management Institute (AEMI) as a national centre of excellence for knowledge and skills development in the emergency management sector. Papers are published in all areas of emergency © Commonwealth of Australia 2012. Impact of landslides in Australia to December 2011 28 Dr Marion Leiba, Geoscience Australia, provides an update of the landslide data over the last decade.

Environmental health disaster management: a new approach 35 Ben Ryan, Brad Milligan and Dr Annie Preston-Thomas (Cairns Public Health Unit) and Geoff Wilson (Cassowary Coast Regional Council) detail the development of a response guide and supplementary planning tools to assist in the information-gathering stage of health emergencies in Queensland.

Perceptions of institutional and social response to frequent flooding in an Australian rural town 42 Ian Manock, Dr Rabiul Islam, Prof. John Hicks, Dr Richard B. Sappey and Dr Valerie Ingham (Charles Sturt University) consider aspects of community emergency management.

Flood risk information portal launched 49

Fire development in focus 50 Nathan Maddock, Communications Officer, Bushfire CRC explains how a team of Bushfire CRC researchers is investigating how bushfires develop.

2012 Resilient Australia Awards 52

Letters to the editor 57

Notes from the field 58

EM Online 60

EDITORIAL TEAM Relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative For new subscriptions please visit us online at Contract Manager: Mark Hilgert, AEMI. Commons website, www.creativecommons.org/licenses ajem.infoservices.com.au/member/new. Changes to current Managing Editor: Christine Belcher, Grey Canberra. subscription details can also be made by visiting us online at Design, typesetting, print management and distribution: Chris SUBMISSIONS ajem.infoservices.com.au/authentication/login Robey, Grey Canberra. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management welcomes Accessible PDF and HTML conversion: Biotext, Canberra. submissions. The Contributors’ Guidelines are available at CONTACT US www.em.gov.au/ajem. In brief, contributions should be no longer Mail: Australian Journal of Emergency Management PUBLICATION DEADLINE than 3 000 words, be submitted as a Word file and contain Australian Emergency Management Institute The Journal is published on the last day of January, April, July and photographs, graphs and tables in their original software Main Road, MT. MACEDON VIC 3441 October, each year. Copies of the Journal are distributed quarterly applications as separate files. All articles must contain an Email: [email protected] without charge to subscribers throughout Australia and overseas. abstract and a small biographical paragraph about each author. Phone: 02 6282 3344 (editorial enquiries only) A Copyright Release form and the Editorial Policy are available CIRCULATION on the website. Authors should familiarise themselves with Approximate circulation: 3 000. the Journal before making a submission. Contributions should be forwarded electronically to [email protected]. All academic papers are peer reviewed. Please note that the Australian Journal COPYRIGHT of Emergency Management is indexed by several indexing Material in the Australian Journal of Emergency Management organisations throughout the world, please visit our website is protected under the Commonwealth Copyright Act 1968. for details. No material may be reproduced in part or in whole without written consent from the copyright holders. SUBSCRIPTIONS Foreword By Kelvin Anderson, Director-General, Department of Community Safety, Queensland.

Thirty-eight years ago, on Christmas Eve 1974, Major General Stretton died on Friday 26 October 2012, Cyclone Tracy devastated Darwin. Tracy killed 71 aged 90. It is appropriate that this edition of the AJEM people, caused over A$800 million of damage, pays tribute to his leadership and achievement. Having and destroyed more than 80 per cent of all homes. only been appointed to the NDO just five months prior to the disaster, he was named Australian of the Year in Some 36,000 of Darwin’s 47,000 inhabitants were 1975. He went on to lead the NDO until 1978 and served evacuated in an unprecedented disaster response subsequently as a Member of the National Intelligence operation. That operation was led by Major General Committee. To help reflect his legacy and to connect Alan Stretton AO, CBE, the founding Director- it regularly to the emergency management sector of General of Emergency Management Australia (then Australia, a meeting room at the Australian Emergency the National Disaster Organisation, (NDO). Management Institute is named the “Stretton Room”.

Major General Alan Stretton AO, CBE at the naming of the Emergency Management Australia ‘Stretton Room’.

4 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

The impact of Cyclone Tracy is an extreme example of November 2012 through the ability to deliver messages what we now call a catastrophic disaster: devastating based on the location of the mobile handset and not, tens of thousands of people and stretching the nation’s as formerly, the service address of the mobile account. resources to the limit. Few natural disaster events of I acknowledge the tireless efforts of colleagues in that scale have occurred in Australia since 1974. But we Victoria and the Commonwealth to bring this important are not complacent and, as the storm and bushfire enhancement into service. season reaches its peak, remain vigilant in planning for a range of contingencies. However, the essential doctrine of disaster management has not changed. Prevention, preparation, Disaster management has progressed significantly response and recovery are still best executed at the since 1974. Today, through the National Strategy for local level where we remain critically dependent on the Disaster Resilience (NSDR), the Commonwealth and the commitment and skill of volunteers. The role of district, States and Territories are jointly leading a broad range state and national tiers is to provide increasing levels of initiatives to build community and organisational of support to a threatened or impacted community. resilience. This is a shared responsibility for individuals, The front-line will always remain at the local level of households, businesses and communities, as well as communities and, ultimately, individuals. Thirty-eight years ago, on Christmas Eve 1974, for governments at the local, state and national levels. Cyclone Tracy devastated Darwin. Tracy killed 71 Our understanding of and ability to counter the wide The strategy has a number of key actions—to lead spectrum of natural disaster risks have come a long people, caused over A$800 million of damage, change and co-ordinate effort, to understand risks, way since 1974. The business of disaster management and destroyed more than 80 per cent of all homes. to communicate and educate people about risks, to is one of continuous improvement. Our resources Some 36,000 of Darwin’s 47,000 inhabitants were partner with those who effect change, to empower are finite. Our ability to effect change is incremental. individuals and communities to exercise choice and take Meanwhile the risks to our growing communities are evacuated in an unprecedented disaster response responsibility, to reduce risks in the built environment, increasing. operation. That operation was led by Major General and to support capabilities for disaster resilience. Alan Stretton AO, CBE, the founding Director- The Resilient Australia Awards announced on 6 Some if not all of these concepts will have been in the December 2012 and listed on page 52 of this edition General of Emergency Management Australia (then minds of disaster managers for decades. In December show the quality, breadth and depth of the work the National Disaster Organisation, (NDO). 2009, COAG agreed to adopt a whole-of-nation underway to deliver better disaster management across Major General Alan Stretton AO, CBE at the naming of the Emergency Management Australia ‘Stretton Room’. resilience-based approach to disaster management Australia. that led to the single, coherent strategy of NSDR. The challenge now is to successfully implement the strategy But we cannot be complacent; there is much still to do. through all tiers of government down to communities Kelvin Anderson and individuals. Director-General, Department of Community Safety, Today we also have crucial capabilities not available Queensland and Chair of the Capability Development in 1974. One such is the ability to issue warnings in Sub-Committee of the Australia – New Zealand the form of sms text messages to mobile phones. Emergency Management Committee Emergency Alert was given an important uplift in

Dunalley Primary School outside Hobart after the January 2013 fires.

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 5 Standing Council on Police and Emergency Management COMMUNIQUÉ

Creswick, Victoria, 23 November 2012

The Standing Council on Police and Emergency Ministers noted recent achievements and work Management (SCPEM) met in Creswick on underway in a range of areas including enhancing emergency warning capabilities, flood mapping, 23 November and was chaired by the Hon Peter disaster risk communication, and community Ryan MLA, Deputy Premier of Victoria and Minister engagement. for Police and Emergency Services. The Council promotes a co-ordinated national response to law enforcement and emergency management Understanding and issues, and comprises Australian and New Zealand communicating disaster risk ministers for police and emergency management Ministers discussed a range of projects that have been completed to help raise community awareness and and a representative of the Australian Local understanding of disaster related issues. This included Government Association. The following is the the practical aspects of effectively communicating emergency management extract. hazard and risk information and the role that risk registers play in this context, as well as ways to promote disaster resilience.

Emergency Management Ministers noted that guidance to assist practitioners Ministers discussed the considerable progress that communicate risk to the broader community will has been made in implementing Australia’s resilience- be incorporated into a new section of the National based approach to emergency management, in line with Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines. the objectives of the COAG endorsed National Strategy for Disaster Resilience.

Left to right NSW The Hon Michael Gallacher MLC, Minister for Police and Emergency Services, NZ The Hon Chris Tremain MP, Minister for Civil Defence, VIC The Hon Peter Ryan MLA, Minister for Police and Emergency Services (Chair), CTH The Hon Nicola Roxon MP, Attorney-General, Minister for Emergency Management, QLD The Hon Jack Dempsey MP, Minister for Police and Community Safety, CTH The Hon Jason Clare MP, Minister for Home Affairs and Justice. Absent from photo ACT Mr Simon Corbell MLA, Minister for Police and Emergency Services, NT The Hon Terry Mills MLA, Minister for Police, Fire and Emergency Services, NZ The Hon Anne Tolley MP, Minister for Police, SA The Hon Jennifer Rankine MP, Minister for Police and Emergency Management, TAS The Hon David O’Byrne MP, Minister for Police and Emergency Management, WA The Hon Troy Buswell MLA, Minister for Transport, Emergency Services, ALGA Ms Felicity-Ann Lewis, President, Australian Local Government Association.

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Ministers also agreed to a new national slogan to Ministers agreed in principle to commit to a nationally promote disaster resilience in Australia – Get Ready. interoperable mobile broadband capability for This slogan is underpinned by the National Strategy for public safety agencies and endorsed a national Disaster Resilience Communication Plan six key messages implementation plan. Ministers also agreed to align jurisdictional-specific public safety mobile broadband • disasters will happen network planning with national interoperability • disaster resilience is your business principles. The successful delivery of this initiative • connected communities are resilient communities will provide Australia’s police and emergency service • know your risk agencies with a robust capability that can be critically relied upon during natural disasters and other • get ready, then act emergencies. This important body of work remains a • learn from experience. significant priority for SCPEM. Ministers considered that the use of a national slogan will contribute to more consistent disaster Ministers noted progress made to strengthen the preparedness communication across Australia and will capacity of the Triple Zero emergency call service to assist the public to recognise and retain key messages. handle surges in demand during extreme events. This includes the progressive roll out of a single, uniform telephone number across Australia for the State Research Emergency Service (132 500). Ministers acknowledged the importance of a whole- of-government approach to natural hazards and Disaster preparations for emergency management research. Research informs the understanding of risks posed by natural hazards the 2012-13 summer and contributes to effective decision-making to respond Ministers stressed the need for everyone within the to them. Ministers agreed to the development of a community being prepared for the coming summer Disaster Resilience Cooperative Research Centre (CRC) period. Ministers discussed the significant actions application, incorporating the continuation of bushfire and investments that jurisdictions have undertaken to research. A multi-jurisdictional committee will be prepare for the 2012-13 summer, particularly in public established to support the development of the CRC education and awareness and in updating technical and proposal to be chaired by New South Wales. hardware capabilities.

Ministers were advised that the Commonwealth will Knowledge management issue a new National Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements [NDRRA] Determination 2012 including Building disaster resilience through enabling matters arising from the Review of the Insurance jurisdictions, agencies and the community to access Arrangements of States and Territories under the information and evidence is essential. To this end, NDRRA Determination 2011 (Insurance Review). the Commonwealth Attorney-General launched the Ministers were also updated on the development of a Australian Emergency Management Knowledge Hub, a national impact assessment framework to better target key online facility providing a research clearing house, disaster relief and recovery assistance. cross-sectoral discussion forums and new media collaboration tools for the emergency management sector and the general community. The Knowledge Hub Learning from previous disasters can be found at www.emknowledge.gov.au. Previous disasters provide valuable lessons to governments, businesses and the community to Enhancing disaster ensure better preparation in the future. The Council is committed to ensuring that findings from significant resilience capability reviews into previous disasters will be taken into Recognising the importance of providing warnings consideration when enhancing Australia’s disaster during disasters, the Commonwealth Attorney- management framework. General and the Victorian Minister for Police and Emergency Services launched the deployment of Ministers noted issues of national significance arising major enhancements to the national telephone-based from the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry Final warning system, Emergency Alert. The enhancements Report. These issues are being addressed through the will enable emergency services to send text messages ongoing implementation of the National Strategy for to mobile phones based on the last known physical Disaster Resilience. location at the time of an emergency. It is currently Ministers were also given a presentation on the operational for Telstra customers and will be available findings from the Review of the Civil Defence Emergency for Optus and Vodafone customers by November Management response to the 22 February Christchurch 2013. This builds on the system’s existing capability Earthquake which was released on 5 October 2012. to send voice messages to landline telephones and The Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management text messages to mobile phones based on the user’s Committee is currently reviewing the recommendations registered address. further to determine whether they apply to the Australian context. Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 7 An introduction to the Victorian Fire Services Commissioner and the 2021 Research Program By Dr Holly Foster, Senior Researcher, Fire Services Commissioner Victoria.

well as Victorian SES, to better prepare for major fires and ensure the services can work as a unified and integrated team. The Commissioner has responsibility to promote and direct reform to increase operational capability, interoperability and resilience of the fire and emergency services, and how they can work with others.

The work of the Fire Services Commissioner provides leadership, support and expertise and works consultatively with the Victorian fire services to develop an ongoing program of improvement and reform. It has Following the handing down of the Victorian responsibility to ensure the longer-term needs of the Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report in 2010, Victorian community are understood, represented, and the Victorian Government announced it would acted on. It also provides the foundation for improving the integration and performance of the fire services. establish the new role of a Fire Services Commissioner. The FireB ServicesRAN CommissionerD GU IisD ELINES an independent statutory officer responsible to the The Victorian Emergency BRAND GUIDELINES Minister for Police andM EmergencyAY 2 Services011 and Management Reform White Paper – the senior operational firefighter in Victoria. December 2012 MAY 2011 The Victorian Government released the Victorian Emergency Management Reform White Paper. The Why a Fire Services Commissioner? White Paper outlines a strategic reform pathway for the emergency management sector in which the new The Fire Services Commissioner oversees and works Emergency Management Commissioner (EMC) will play with the three Victorian fire services (Metropolitan a prominent role. The Commissioner’s work is towards Fire Brigade, Country Fire Authority and the Victorian a genuine all-hazards, all-agencies approach continues Department of Sustainability and Environment) as Image: Keith Pakenham Image: Keith

The devastating events of Black Saturday led to a Royal Commission which recommended the establishment of a Fire Services Commissioner. Princes Way, Longwarry, Victoria, 7 February 2009.

8 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

Program philosophy The 2021 program aims to build the evidence of change in Victorian communities by highlighting the drivers of change, describing the likely impacts on emergency management, emergency service organisations and promoting pathways for adaptation.

In doing so, the program considers research questions such as:

• What factors are driving change in communities? • How will these changes impact −− the provision of emergency management, and −− emergency service organisations and their stakeholders? • How might these changes be addressed? • What barriers/facilitators of adaptation exist?

Program design The program consists of a series of major projects that explore the social, economic and environmental changes in key community segments. It attempts to build a macro-level, integrated perspective of change

Image: courtesy CFA Image: courtesy across Victoria and make meaning of the identified changes for the emergency services sector. CFA Image: courtesy The Victorian Emergency Management Reform White Paper The Victorian Emergency Management Reform White Paper recognised the need to continue placing the community at the This research is not intended to answer all questions recognised the need to continue placing the community at the centre of emergency management design and delivery. or all issues for organisations that deliver emergency management programs, products and services. It will, centre of emergency management design and delivery. however, highlight issues and changes that may require with a stronger focus and mandate across emergency further analysis and understanding from the emergency management and emergency management organisations. services sector. The EMC replaces the Fire Services Commissioner.

The 2021 Research Program (2021) In pursuing the task of identifying and analysing changes across the Victorian community, the Fire Fire Services Commissioner’s Services Commissioner recently welcomed a transfer ‘Strategic Issue Series’ of the Climate Change Research Project and has The Fire Services Commissioner will publish a shaped the project to reflect current sector needs and series of papers over the 2013 editions of the interoperability objectives. Australian Journal of Emergency Management. Now known as the 2021 Research Program (2021), the This series is designed to provoke thought, evoke project identifies and analyses the likely challenges new ideas and encourage adaptation within the across the Victorian landscape. The research program emergency management sector. capitalises on its predecessor’s strong adaptation focus These papers form a Strategic Issues Series of identifying the key impacts of climate change on the and report key findings and themes identified in Victorian emergency services sector. However, 2021 the 2021 research program. While the project embodies a broader research agenda, examining other concentrates on trends within Victoria the strategic anticipated changes occurring alongside increasing impacts of change are relevant to the wider climate variability. The research scope adds value to emergency management community. The papers the sector; providing a holistic and robust method to are designed to stimulate discussion and promote explore the impacts of climate change alongside other joined-up thinking across emergency services anticipated changes in the environment, economy and agencies throughout Australia. community. This edition of the Australian Journal of Emergency The program works with a variety of stakeholders Management features the first publication from within the sector and research fraternity, minimising this research program (carried out under the Office research duplication and concentrating outputs on of the Emergency Services Commissioner) in the the implications for emergency management and following article. emergency management organisations.

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 9 2021 RESEARCH PROGRAM STRATEGIC ISSUES SERIES Interactive hazard preparation strategy efficacy: considerations for future community engagement programs Dr Holly Foster provides findings from two primary research case studies on interactive community engagement strategies.

ABSTRACT

The emergency services have assumed In assuming these roles, many communities have become dependent on ESOs for advice, warnings, a significant role in building resilience in instruction and physical assistance during severe Victoria. The extent of instruction, advice events. The level of detail of these messages has and information provided by emergency increased, with some communities expecting address- service organisations is critical to engage specific warnings and preparation information communities to prepare for hazards. To (Comrie 2011). better engage communities, some agencies have adopted face-to-face, interactive Community resilience community engagement strategies. These strategies can be effective as they overcome Community resilience is a multi-disciplinary phenomenon: a function of different elements within a many barriers of passive information social system. A resilient system is one that functions transfer. This paper forms part of a larger well under stress, can successfully adapt, is self-reliant research project exploring the efficacy and displays social capacity (COAG 2011). The extent of of community engagement programs in disruption to any of these elements can influence the the emergency management sector. This impact of an extreme event within a community. paper explores the benefits and limitations Developing and empowering communities to of interpersonal community engagement recognise and manage disruption can reduce the time, strategies, highlighting implications for involvement and resources of ESOs post-disaster future engagement undertakings. (Dufty 2011, Cutter et al., 2010). The extent to which individuals prepare themselves for climate hazards can be encouraged through community engagement at the individual and household level (COAG 2011, Paton et al., Introduction 2010, Tompkins and Adger 2004). Extreme weather events such as bushfire, heatwaves, storms and floods have occurred more frequently, with Community engagement 2021 RESEARCH PROGRAM STRATEGIC ISSUES SERIES greater ferocity and, in some cases, longer duration (Hennessey 2011, Jones 2011). In addition to response Community resilience can, in part, be bolstered by and recovery responsibilities, the Victorian emergency engaging with communities about their roles and services sector has assumed communication roles responsibilities in preparing for extreme weather within their communities. The community engagement events. However, numerous contextual factors mediate functions of emergency service organisations (ESOs) the impacts of these strategies (Hartel and Pearman include: 2010, Stern 2002). This is because sustained hazard preparation is a function of how people interpret • education on different climate hazards information, social and community contexts (Frandsen • providing timely and accurate warnings et al., 2011). Figure 1 depicts some of the broad factors • preparation advice, and influencing the impacts of engagement strategies. • response and recovery advice.

10 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

FIGURE 1. Factors influencing community engagement.

Figure 1 demonstrates that many forces influence • support, through supplementary information (written information retention and preparation uptake of material), rather than dependent on it (Spittal et al., households. The process is also influenced by the 2011, Paton 2007, Dann and Dann 2005, Tompkins degree to which message transfer is passive (Paton and Adger 2004, Nielsen and Lidstone 1998). 2008, McIvor and Paton 2007). The availability and/or Engagement strategies that consider these factors transmission of generic disaster mitigation information are more likely to result in campaigns that promote does not ensure its understanding or acceptance as it information retention, including uptake of disaster fails to: mitigation activities (CFA 2011, Paton and Wright 2008, • meet the diverse needs of communities Paton 2007). This study explores the impacts of these strategies by exploring the extent of behaviour uptake, • explain the significance of risks and how they will the information retention and the contextual factors impact individual households, or influencing these actions. • offer personalised, specialised solutions for households to mitigate their risk (Frandsen et al., 2012, Paton 2008, Paton and Johnston 2001). To overcome known barriers to information transfer and Research design instigate preparation activities in the community, some The literature recognises that hazard awareness, emergency service agencies are developing understanding and preparation are important aspects personalised, face-to-face community engagement of community resilience. The aim of this paper is strategies. These strategies enable agencies to tailor to explore the efficacy of interactive engagement engagement activities to the unique characteristics of strategies in instigating hazard preparation and the communities in which they work and the context of information retention. their environment. Purpose-built, tailored engagement activities are being developed that: This paper examines how households have responded to the engagement strategies of two different ESOs. • deliver complex messages and hazard information The first strategy explored is the Victorian State • justify to individuals and households the need to act Emergency Services (VIC SES) ‘Community Education • provide personalised advice and recommendations of Doorknocks’. The second strategy explored is the how to act Country Fire Authority’s (CFA) ‘Home Bushfire Advice • provide real-time, two-way communication Service’ (HBAS). These strategies focus on preparing • allow for perceptions of ‘credible’ message sources for different hazards – bushfire and floods – and were (via experts), and carried out in different geographic locations.

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 11 Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

FIGURE 2. Retention of written information. FIGURE 3. Acted on preparation advice.

The VIC SES doorknock campaign was developed in The engagement activities outlined employ some collaboration with several working partners. It involved commonalities, including: pairs of volunteers visiting households at risk of over- floor flooding. Volunteers discussed with householders • face-to-face interaction the possible impacts of flood and ways to minimise • visit to the homes of community members those impacts by preparing effectively. An information • provision of specific information relevant to their kit was used to guide discussion and a copy was left household, and at the household at its conclusion. The doorknocks • provision of supplementary, written information to were carried out without prior notification and, in cases prepare for the hazard. where no one was home at the time of the doorknock, The engagement activities also have some noteworthy an information kit was left on the doorstep with an differences, including: invitation for the householder to contact the VIC SES for further information, or arrange a time to call back (VIC • the CFA engagement strategy is instigated by the SES 2011). householder and a suitable time is determined • the VIC SES engagement strategy is instigated by the The HBAS is a free service offered by the CFA and agency and is carried out without a time being pre- involves a Fire Safety Officer visiting the property to arranged with the household provide specialised information on reducing the risk • the CFA engagement strategy has been running for of bushfire. A follow-up written report summarising three years, and key points made during the assessment is posted to householders one to two weeks after the HBAS has • at the time of the study, the VIC SES engagement strategy was in pilot phase. been completed (CFA 2011). Householders are able to book a HBAS by contacting their local CFA.

12 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready FIGURE 2. Retention of written information.

Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

Sample What prevented households making changes? A targeted sampling method was used to ensure respondents surveyed had participated in the Respondents were asked to explain what, if anything, engagement strategies being studied. The scope was had prevented them from adopting recommendations to narrowed to two suburbs where either engagement prepare for climate hazards. campaign had been carried out—the CFA HBAS in a peri-urban suburb and the VIC SES doorknock in an Table 1: Barriers to preparing for hazards urban suburb. Both suburbs had recent experience with the hazard under study (that is, fire in the HBAS study Doorknock (VIC SES) HBAS (CFA) area and flood in the doorknock study area). Contact details of participants were provided by each agency Too busy/No time Cost/Expense and the survey carried out within three months of the engagement activities being performed. Not at risk - does not Nothing stopping us flood much making changes The study surveyed 90 participants of the HBAS and Not at risk - home is 106 households doorknocked by the VIC SES. Of Too busy/No time elevated those contacted, 50 householders did not recall being doorknocked by the VIC SES or that they had received Cannot be bothered Amenity/Landscape an information kit. Of the 56 respondents that were Nothing stopping us familiar with the doorknock, 27 were present and Council regulations interacted with volunteers, while 29 respondents were making changes absent, but received an information kit. Table 1 shows the top five barriers participants believed prevented them from taking on suggestions to prepare Results for climate hazards. The most frequent barrier for preparing for flood was time. However, the data The following extracts from the larger research report indicate collectively that the perception of flood risk detail some of the findings. was low and this prevented many householders from preparing. Many respondents expressed they were not Retention of written information at risk due to the infrequent occurrence of floods or, alternatively, the elevated location of their home. Some Both the CFA and the VIC SES engagement programs respondents admitted that ‘they could not be bothered’ provided supplementary, written information to and admitted nothing was preventing them from acting FIGURE 3. Acted on preparation advice. households about preparing for climate hazards. on the information provided. In addition, the cost of Figure 2 shows that 98 per cent of respondents (89 some suggestions made during the HBAS deterred people) who participated in the HBAS kept their written participants from taking on the changes. It was noted report, while 77 per cent of respondents (43 people) that many changes adopted by HBAS recipients doorknocked by the VIC SES kept their information kit. were ‘low hanging fruit’—non labour intensive and inexpensive property modifications. However, other amenity and landscape preferences overrode the Changes made as a result of urgency to make changes. Some respondents indicated information provided that while they could afford to make changes (such as Participants in this study were asked if they had acted fit metal shutters, remove sky lights, change roofing on the advice by adopting changes or suggestions made material), they refused to compromise the aesthetics of to prepare for climate hazards. The results are their home. displayed in Figure 3. What motivated or facilitated Figure 3 demonstrates that nine per cent of households making changes? respondents (five people) adopted recommendations made during the VIC SES doorknock. Respondents Respondents were asked to explain what, if anything, who were doorknocked by the VIC SES had developed had motivated them or facilitated them in adopting the emergency plans, repaired gutters and made other advice to prepare for climate hazards. structural changes to prepare for flood. Table 2 shows that those who had adopted advice from In contrast, 69 per cent of respondents (62 people) the VIC SES (five people) were primarily motivated by adopted recommendations made from the HBAS. their previous experience with flood. This data suggests These participants had cleared gardens, purchased the engagement instigated few people making tangible fire fighting equipment or generators, and relocated changes to prepare for flood. However, the study also combustible materials. found householders who were present and interacted with volunteers during the doorknock were more likely to have read the information kit, kept it (not thrown it out), and be able to recall key flood messages from the written information.

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 13 Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

Table 2 illustrates that respondents who participated in per cent, 29 people) said they would leave on high fire the HBAS were motivated by the specialised information danger days, 20.4 per cent (18 people) said they would provided by the Fire Safety Officer during the HBAS. prepare their homes more rigorously while others (17.7 Many respondents stated the personalised information per cent, 16 people) said they would leave early and not encouraged their hazard preparation actions. attempt to defend their home.

Table 2: What motivated or facilitated households to prepare for hazards Summary This study highlights the intuitive, practical efforts of Doorknock (VIC SES) HBAS (CFA) two Victorian ESOs and their working partners to Previous experience Getting an assessment promote tailored, hazard-preparedness messages to with flood from CFA their communities. While only a small sample, this data demonstrates that interactive engagement activities can Advice given from the Fire be effective in instigating hazard preparation and Safety Officer information retention. However, subsequent desired Being told explicitly what action by householders depends on a number of to do variables. Table 4 summarises the most salient of the contextual contrasts identified in the larger research Better understanding of study that may have moderated householders preparing what changes are required for climate hazards.

Being better informed While the study was limited by its small sample size, the data shows that interactive community engagement Action taken to prepare for more strategies are useful to adapt to the heterogeneous frequent and severe events needs of communities. However, the willingness, capacity and readiness of communities to prepare Table 4: Contextual differences between the VIC SES doorknocks and CFA HBAS In closing the survey, participants were asked to comment on their likely response if, as expected, for hazards depends greatly on the community context, perceptions of the risk and varying levels Context VIC SES CFA climate events become more frequent and severe. The five most frequent responses from either sample of engagement within the community. Identification Extent of interaction with agency staff - extent Participants present during All households surveyed are shown in Table 3. and analysis of these issues is important to ensure of engagement and ability to discuss the the doorknock (27 people) had actively participated in continuous improvement of engagement strategies, to householder’s property, answer questions high information retention. the HBAS. They had high better target information to the nuances of communities and provide verbal advice (Spittal et al., 2011, Those absent during the information retention and Table 3: Likely actions for more frequent and severe and, ultimately, strengthen community resilience. Wiseman et al., 2010, Stern 2002). doorknock retained less many acted on preparation events hazard information and made advice. no tangible changes. Doorknock (VIC SES) HBAS (CFA) Strategic issues Leave on high fire Credibility of the threat of the hazard to the Many respondents did not Many respondents in the Move out of area Interactive community engagement strategies are a danger days household - does the householder believe the perceive flooding was likely to survey recognised they lived useful tool in educating communities about hazard hazard is likely to occur and/or be disruptive occur and, if it did, would not in high fire danger areas and More rigorous property More rigorous property preparation. In many places, community expectations (Dann and Dann 2005, Mileti and Peek 2002)? affect them, impacting their perceived the risk of bushfire maintenance maintenance have evolved to anticipate increased levels of detail and behaviour. to their home as credible. personalisation of emergency messages. The following Would not change/just Will leave and not list outlines opportunities and challenges to adapt to Extent of marketing and other information The agency worked with The agency advertised live with it defend home community engagement functions. sources - has the campaign been promoted key partners to develop through numerous channels More thorough home through other communication channels or the doorknocks. Moderate and worked with key partners Modify home or property have working partners which bolster message advertising was used to to promote the service. bushfire plan Supporting legislation for agencies to perform their functions credibility (Johnston et al., 2012, Chia 2010)? promote the doorknocks. More thorough Move out of area emergency plan To advance the community engagement function of Previous experience - has the household or any The five participants in the Most respondents had not ESOs, a review of supporting legislation is necessary to of its members had experience with the hazard study who prepared for the experienced (first hand) Table 3 demonstrates that householders who remove ambiguities and make explicit ‘implied’ roles. under investigation (Johnston et al., 2012, Paton hazard were motivated by bushfire in their area, participated in the VIC SES doorknock were less likely Community engagement functions require specification 2007)? previous flood experience. although the memory to adopt practical, tangible actions (or behaviours) to to avoid task duplication, foster task ownership and of recent bushfires was encourage an ethos for evaluation and continuous prevalent in the sample. prepare for increased occurrences of flood. A third of respondents (18 people) stated they would move, improvement of strategies. Engaged community - how engaged is the Many respondents did not Many respondents believed 14.5 per cent (eight people) indicated they would make community with local hazards and their perceive the need or personal they were responsible for their structural changes to their property, while 13 per cent Importance of partnerships and networks personal responsibilities in preparing for them responsibility to prepare. own safety and took action (seven people) said they would not make any changes Partnerships and strategic networks are essential in (Frandsen et al., 2012, Hartel and Pearman accordingly. and ‘deal with’ higher instances of disruption. 2009, McIvor and Paton 2007)? building message credibility and targeting audiences. In contrast, householders who participated in the The development and sustainability of strategic Further discussion on social and contextual factors moderating household preparation activities can be found in the full report. CFA HBAS were more likely to adopt new, or increase relationships is integral to delivering robust, effective existing prevention strategies. Most respondents (32.7 community engagement now and into the future.

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Table 4: Contextual differences between the VIC SES doorknocks and CFA HBAS

Context VIC SES CFA

Extent of interaction with agency staff - extent Participants present during All households surveyed of engagement and ability to discuss the the doorknock (27 people) had actively participated in householder’s property, answer questions high information retention. the HBAS. They had high and provide verbal advice (Spittal et al., 2011, Those absent during the information retention and Wiseman et al., 2010, Stern 2002). doorknock retained less many acted on preparation hazard information and made advice. no tangible changes.

Credibility of the threat of the hazard to the Many respondents did not Many respondents in the household - does the householder believe the perceive flooding was likely to survey recognised they lived hazard is likely to occur and/or be disruptive occur and, if it did, would not in high fire danger areas and (Dann and Dann 2005, Mileti and Peek 2002)? affect them, impacting their perceived the risk of bushfire behaviour. to their home as credible.

Extent of marketing and other information The agency worked with The agency advertised sources - has the campaign been promoted key partners to develop through numerous channels through other communication channels or the doorknocks. Moderate and worked with key partners have working partners which bolster message advertising was used to to promote the service. credibility (Johnston et al., 2012, Chia 2010)? promote the doorknocks.

Previous experience - has the household or any The five participants in the Most respondents had not of its members had experience with the hazard study who prepared for the experienced (first hand) under investigation (Johnston et al., 2012, Paton hazard were motivated by bushfire in their area, 2007)? previous flood experience. although the memory of recent bushfires was prevalent in the sample.

Engaged community - how engaged is the Many respondents did not Many respondents believed community with local hazards and their perceive the need or personal they were responsible for their personal responsibilities in preparing for them responsibility to prepare. own safety and took action (Frandsen et al., 2012, Hartel and Pearman accordingly. 2009, McIvor and Paton 2007)?

Further discussion on social and contextual factors moderating household preparation activities can be found in the full report.

Viability of face-to-face they live and (among other factors) home ownership. engagement strategies Building knowledge of hazards that will move with While effective, interpersonal, interactive engagement people will create greater resilience across Victoria. strategies are time and labour intensive. Agencies will have to determine the viability of these intensive Outsourcing or collaborating in future campaigns in the long-term, particularly when carried community engagement strategies out by volunteers. ESOs carry out concurrent community engagement More people living in new and more campaigns across Victoria, targeted at different climate challenging environments hazards. These campaigns are often challenged by Population projections across Victoria suggest budget and staffing constraints. Collaborating future population growth in fringe areas and greater engagement campaigns to create synergies and population transfer. This means there will be more efficient use of resources may offer opportunity for people without existing knowledge of hazards living in a greater message penetration, credibility and potentially range of hazard-prone areas. There will be an ongoing bolster preparedness for all hazards. need to educate, inform and find new ways of sharing local hazard information to these communities. Furthermore, some agencies may be more equipped than others to carry out community engagement Increased frequency and ferocity of events functions. There may be opportunities to outsource While only a small sample, this study has indicated that these capabilities to other organisations as the task of people have vastly different responses to the notion of community engagement becomes increasingly critical increased climate hazards. This is dependent on where to establish and sustain community resilience.

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References Paton D. and Johnson D., 2001 Disasters and communities: vulnerability, resilience and preparedness. Disaster Prevention Country Fire Authority, 2011 Evaluation Report: Evaluation and Management, 10(4): 270-277. and effectiveness project. CFA, Victoria. Paton D. and Wright L., 2008 ‘Preparing for bushfires: The Chia J., 2010 Engaging communities before an emergency: public education challenges facing fire agencies’. In Community developing community capacity through social capital Bushfire Safety. Eds. Handmer J. and Haynes K. Bushfire CRC, investment. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Australia. 25(1): 18 – 22. Paton D., 2007 Preparing for natural hazards: The role of Council of Australian Governments (COAG), 2011 National community trust. Disaster Prevention and Management, 16(3): Strategy for Disaster Resilience: building the resilience of our 370-379. nation to disasters. COAG: Australia. Paton D., 2008 Community resilience: Integrating individual, Comrie N., 2011 Review of the 2010–11 Flood Warnings and community and societal perspectives’. In The Phoenix of natural Response. Victorian Government, Melbourne. disasters: Community Resilience. Eds. Gow K. and Paton D. Nova Science Publishers Inc: New York. Cutter S. L., Burton C. G., and Emrich C. T., 2010 Disaster resilience indicators for benchmarking baseline conditions. Paton D., Frandsen M. and Johnston D., 2010 Confronting Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency management, an unfamiliar hazard: Tsunami preparedness in Tasmania. The 7(1): 20 pages. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 25(4): 31-37.

Dann S. and Dann S., 2005 Social Marketing and Behavioural Spittal M. J., McLure J., Siegert R. J. and Walkey F. H., Change Strategies. Queensland Department of Premier and 2011 Predictors of two types of earthquake preparation: Cabinet: Australia. Survival activities and mitigation activities. Environment and Behaviour, 40(6): 798-817. Dufty N., 2011 Engagement or education? The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, 26(3): 35-39. Stern P. C., 2002 ‘Changing behaviour in households and communities: What have we learned?’ In New Tools for Frandsen M., Paton D. and Sakariassen, 2011 Fostering Environmental Protection: Education, Information, and community bushfire preparedness through engagement Voluntary Measures. Washington, DC: The National Academies and empowerment. The Australian Journal of Emergency Press. Management, 26(2): 23-30. Tompkins E. L. and Adger W. N., 2004 Does adaptive Hartel, C. E. J., and Pearman, G. I., 2010 Understanding management of natural resources enhance resilience to and responding to the climate change issue: Towards a climate change? Ecology and Society, 9(2): 10 whole-of-science research agenda. Journal of Management & Organization, 16(1): 16-47. Victorian State Emergency Service (SES), 2011 Community Education Plan: Local Municipal strategy and activity plan. Hennessey K., 2011 ‘Climate Change Impacts’, in Climate October 2011 – Draft. SES: Melbourne. Change: Science and solutions for Australia. Eds. Cleugh H., Smith M. S., Battaglia M. and Graham P. CSIRO: Australia. Wiseman J., Williamson L. and Fritze J., 2010 Community engagement and climate change: learning from recent Johnston D., Becker J. and Paton D., 2012 Multi-agency Australian Experience. International Journal of Climate Change community engagement during disaster recovery: Lessons Strategies and Management, 2(2): 134-147. from two New Zealand earthquake events. Disaster Prevention and Management, 21(2): 252-268.

Jones D., 2011 Extreme weather events: The new norm? ‘The Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials About the author Australasia’, conference proceedings. Dr Holly Foster is the Senior Researcher at the Fire Services Commissioner in Victoria and the McIvor D. and Paton D., 2007 Preparing for natural hazards: primary researcher on the 2021 research program. normative and attitudinal influences. Disaster Prevention and Holly is a social researcher with extensive research Management, 16(1): 79-88. background in climate change, water pricing and regional economics. Meliti D. S. and Peek L. A., 2002 ‘Understanding individual and social characteristics in the promotion of household This paper forms part of a larger research report carried out under the Office of the Emergency disaster preparedness’. In New Tools for Environmental Services Commissioner, supported by the then Protection: Education, Information and Voluntary Measures. current Project Manager, Julie Hoy. Washington DC: The National Academies Press The complete report is available at http://www. Nielson S. and Lidstone J., 1998 Public education and firecommissioner.vic.gov.au/our-work/research/ disaster management: is there any guiding theory? The climate-change/. Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Spring: 14-19.

16 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready In search of the ‘Prepared Community’: the way ahead for Australia? Roger Jones OAM provides a perspective on the ‘prepared communities’ concept and methodologies.

Introduction An early Australian approach Since the late 1980s, a key concept in Australia’s to community emergency approach to emergency and disaster management has risk management been the need to develop ‘the prepared community’, In 1996 Emergency Management Australia (EMA) whose basic requirements are summarised as: convened a workshop at its research and teaching • ‘an alert, informed and active community which establishment, the Australian Emergency Management supports its voluntary organisations Institute, to consider the application of the risk • an active and involved local government, and management standard and concepts to emergency management. This followed new international studies • agreed and co-ordinated arrangements for into the management of risk factors in disasters prevention, preparedness, response and recovery’ (Blaikie et al. 1994) and the publication of a new (Natural Disasters Organisation 1989). Australian/New Zealand Standard, AS/NZS 4360:1995 – The most recent statement of national emergency Risk Management1. management concepts and principles still refers to the ‘prepared community’ as an element in Australia’s The three-day workshop concluded that effective risk ‘integrated approach’ to emergency management, with management at community level is fundamentally that approach requiring co-ordination between the about managing the vulnerability of communities to ‘prepared community’ and the ‘efforts of governments, risks, recognising that ‘vulnerability’ is a function of all relevant organisations and agencies’ (EMA 2004). community susceptibility and resilience to hazards. It was agreed that a variety of indicators were required This paper argues that: when assessing vulnerability (e.g. demographic, health, • While considerable early effort between 1994-2004 economic, societal/cultural and physical factors). The was devoted to the development of an effective workshop’s principal recommendations were that: emergency risk management tool which had • Australian emergency management embody a risk application in Australian communities, that earlier management approach, and work has been effectively abandoned. • guidelines (based on the Standard) be developed • While there have been significant international appropriate to the Australian ‘emergency developments promoting the concept of the management industry’ (EMA 1996). ‘prepared community’ as central to effective national emergency management policy, more The workshop outcomes were accepted in 1997 by the recent developments have focussed largely on the then National Emergency Management Committee community’s ‘shared responsibility’ for responding to (NEMC) and in 2000 EMA published the Emergency Risk events. Management – Applications Guide (revised and reissued • There is a clear and urgent need, both in Australia as EMA 2004), as part of its Australian emergency and overseas, for the development of a new and management series of publications and resulting effective ‘prepared community’ concept and from studies by a national working party. A guide to methodology. emergency risk management for facilitators working with committees and communities was produced by EMA in 2001.

Severe flooding in central Queensland in 1997 led to the Queensland Department of Emergency Services (QDES) commissioning a flood risk study in the rural Murweh Shire, a particular requirement being that it should be undertaken in the context of the risk management

1. It needs to be recognised here that AS/NZS 4360:1995 (and its current version, AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009) is essentially a process for managing risks within an organisation, and thus needs interpretation and modification in order to be applied to the management of community safety risk.

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standard, AS/NZS 4360:1995. For the purposes of the One of the outcomes of HFA was the formation of the study EMA authorised the use of material developed Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction forum in the ‘Applications Guide’ working party process. The which meets every second year. The forum brings study’s final report (Geo-Eng Australia Pty Ltd 1998), together national governments, relevant UN and published in May 1998, included the outcomes of regional agencies, and the non-government sector community consultation processes and vulnerability to maintain ‘the world-wide momentum of disaster profiles based on the EMA workshop material. risk reduction’.

The Queensland Government later commissioned By late 2012, under Global Platform arrangements, a further study in three largely-urban coastal 78 countries had nominated National Platforms and environments, using the process and methodology Focal Points for disaster risk reduction. A National developed for Murweh Shire but in a multi-hazard Platform was defined as ‘a nationally owned and application. The outcomes of both sets of studies nationally led forum or committee for advocacy, were reported in the Winter 2001 issue of this journal coordination, analysis and advice on disaster risk (Durham et al. 2001). On the basis of these studies reduction’, while National Focal Points are the a refined community emergency risk management designated national government agencies responsible methodology and process was made available to for national DRR policies and programs3. Some all local governments in Queensland (Zamecka and regions have also established Regional Platforms and Buchanan 1999). Focal Points.

It appeared that Australia was entering the first decade At its 2009 meeting, the Global Platform group of the 21st Century well placed to develop a new considered a detailed report, the Global Assessment approach to the concept of ‘the prepared community’ Report (GAR). Based on evidence from reviews with the EMA and QDES community emergency risk conducted in some 62 countries and on additional management publications, both based on verifiable field commissioned research, GAR highlighted what it practice, freely available. identified as ‘the need to strengthen capacities to address three disaster risk drivers: poor urban governance, vulnerable rural livelihoods, and Meanwhile, a new paradigm was ecosystem decline’. developing internationally The 2009 meeting concluded that ‘most countries During the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant paradigm still lack a determined and focussed high-level policy in international emergency management theory framework that addresses these drivers’ and that had developed from a 1979 US National Governors ‘the institutional and administrative responsibility Association workshop which identified the key for risk reduction has to be vested at the highest emergency management elements as mitigation, possible level of government, in order to have the preparedness for response, response and recovery necessary political authority and resources to influence (National Governors Association 1979). development policy’.

In 1994, the mid-point of the International Decade of The Global Platform report of its meeting in Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), an international 20114 identified that there has been only marginal conference in Yokohama, Japan agreed the Yokohama improvement in disaster risk reduction on a global Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World. The scale, in spite of the hard work and good intentions of subsequent World Conference on Disaster Reduction UN agencies and the 168 nations which endorsed the was held in early 2005 at Kobe in Japan’s Hyogo Hyogo Framework in 2005 and a number of significant Prefecture. The conference produced the Hyogo initiatives which had been undertaken by some regional Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience and national entities. The main aim of the 4th Session of Nations and Communities to Disasters (HFA)2 which, of the Global Platform to be held in Geneva in May 2013 having identified specific gaps and challenges in seeks to ‘…continue the effort from all sectors … to take existing programs, adopted three strategic goals and shared responsibility in reducing risks and reinforcing five related priorities for the 2005-15 period. resilience in our communities’5. It is anticipated that it will also provide an opportunity to consult on and The HFA follows in the footsteps of IDNDR in focussing progress the development of the successor to the on disaster risk reduction within the context of Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015. ‘building resilience to hazards’. It clearly incorporates risk reduction processes into the full range of There is growing acceptance within the international emergency management program areas—prevention, community over the relationship between disaster preparedness, response and recovery. risk reduction (DRR) and disaster management (DM)6. Disaster management (or emergency management in US, Australia and some other jurisdictions) is defined as

2. UN A/CONF.206/L.2/Rev.1 (22 January 2005) 3. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/national/list/ 4. http://www.iisd.ca/ymb/gpdrr/2011/html/ymbvol141num6e.html 5. http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2013/ 6. Definitions of these terms are in http://unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish.pdf

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‘concerned with organising and managing the impacts The 2009 COAG National Disaster Resilience Statement on and consequences of disasters and emergencies if and which NSDR is based, acknowledges that ‘a national, when they occur’. There has also been some support for coordinated and cooperative effort is required to the use of the term disaster risk management (DRM)7 enhance Australia’s capacity to withstand and recover as the higher-order term embracing both the disaster from emergencies and disasters’ (ibid., p. iv), but neither risk reduction (DRR) and disaster management (DM) suggest specific and agreed arrangements to enable functions. that effort effectively.

Thus, following the declaration of IDNDR in 1989, there has been an almost unbroken 20-year period of development of a new approach to disaster risk management, an approach which sees a direct linkage between disaster risk reduction (what we currently term as ‘prevention’ or ‘mitigation’, the first P in PPRR) and preparedness for and management of emergency and disaster events (the central PR). Clearly, however, some issues of policy and methodology in the current international approach need to be resolved.

In Australia, not much has changed Australia had been an active participant in the 1990s IDNDR program, one of its primary roles being to facilitate DRR in the Pacific8, and has been a participant in both the 1994 Yokohama and 2005 Hyogo The Victorian Emergency Management Reform White disaster world conferences on disaster reduction. Paper is an extensive overhaul of Victoria’s emergency It has also participated in the three sessions of management system. the Global Platform. In general terms, the focus of most academic interest and research in the field of Again, neither the NSDR nor the COAG statements emergency management in Australia has parallelled address the issues which need to be dealt with in the international recognition of the inter-relatedness of developing that effort and the resultant resilient disaster risk reduction and disaster management. capacity. They are both silent on the processes by which that capacity might be attained. The NSDR suggested Since 2004, however, in terms of policy and program priority outcomes (ibid., pp. 10-11) compare poorly development, there has been little evidence that the both in scope and quality with the goals, priorities, EMA’s ‘emergency risk management’ process has key activities and implementation recommendations been taken up either theoretically or in substance in detailed eight years ago in the HFA. It is also clear that application to the management of community safety both are still significantly influenced by the response- risk in any jurisdiction (in spite of the earlier cited focussed ‘crisis and contingency management’ programs in Queensland in the late 1990s) or in any of approach which has dominated much of emergency the currently-advocated ‘emergency risk management management policy both in Australia and overseas models’, such as NERAG and CERM9. While those since 9/11. models themselves, and many of the published local government emergency risk management reviews Australia and the US now appear to be among a and plans drawn from them, generally recognise number of countries diverging from the disaster risk communities and individuals as ‘stakeholders’ in the management paradigm which has been developing process and as necessary elements in the standard internationally since the middle of the 1990s. ‘communication and consult’ step, the treatment of communities and individuals is cursory and often limited to a listing of ‘at risk’ facilities and lifeline elements without much detail. Where are we headed? There is little doubt that today, as in the 1980s and It is also noteworthy that other than in a brief 1990s, the international community remains concerned discussion of ‘improving community resilience’ there is with the rising cost of disasters in terms of lives, no direct reference in the Victorian Government’s Green property and national development, and that this Paper to current comprehensive risk-based disaster concern has now been exacerbated by increasing management concepts, while in the current Australian anxiety about the likely effects of climate change. National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (NSDR) they Some of the more recent international conferences warrant only an indirect reference (COAG 2011). seeking to renew political commitment to sustainable

7. ‘Disaster risk management (DRM)’ is defined as ‘the systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster’. 8. See EMA 1999, Final Report of Australia’s Coordination Committee for IDNDR, Canberra (ISBN 0642704724) 9. NERAG (http://www.em.gov.au/Publications), the ‘National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines’, is the current Commonwealth publication and CERM (http://www.ses.vic.gov.au/prepare/em-planning) is Victoria’s ‘Community Emergency Risk Management’ guideline (drawn primarily from NERAG) – both publications are currently still in draft form. Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 19 Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

development, such as the June 2012 Rio+20 Summit to the provision of effective guidance in the practical held in Rio de Janeiro, have managed to obtain minor development of such a role. advances but have not significantly contributed to the reduction of community safety risk10. At issue is the extent to which, since 9/11, national governments in western countries in particular, have One reason for the lack of progress in global disaster been pursuing top-down disaster management policies risk reduction is undoubtedly that the three major and methodologies. This is perceived as in ‘the national drivers of disaster risk worldwide, identified in interest’, while individual communities live with risks GAR as ‘poor urban governance, vulnerable rural which are peculiar to, and only capable of management livelihoods and ecosystem decline’, still remain the within those communities. These issues can only most intransigent problems faced by all countries, but properly be addressed within those communities especially by under-developed and developing nations. themselves.

A key factor contributing to this lack of progress has Is this what ‘the prepared community’ should be about? been the almost universal focus in the post 9/11 world on preparedness for and response to specific natural and man-made disaster events (which, of course, the The way ahead for Australia? UN itself now defines as disaster management). Much of this new focus has clearly arisen, particularly in many In a recent opinion piece in this journal, headlined western nations, in the tendency to see terrorism as Prevention is no longer a useful term in emergency a primary threat to national stability and security, and management, its author, Stuart Ellis AM, stated that in consequence to devote a disproportionate degree of current Australian doctrine ‘ignores the reality that attention to that threat. In Australia’s case the 2002 Bali PPRR is out-dated’ (AJEM 2012). Our PPRR concept, bombings could be seen as an additional factor in this, now over 30 years old, is hardly relevant to current helping to promote a disproportionately heavy focus international and Australian understandings of the 13 on anti-terrorism legislation and resource allocation purpose and scope of ‘emergency management’ . (Roach 2011). Indeed, not only does ‘prevention’, as disaster risk An additional issue arises out of varying uses of terms reduction, lie outside the remit of today’s emergency such as prevention, protection, mitigation, resilience and managers, but that can also be argued in relation to vulnerability, which is causing confusion in the current ‘recovery’, the long-haul process of restoration and international DRR/DM dialogue. reconstruction which can extend up to 10 years after disaster impact — although a proper linkage between As noted in the earlier section on international the relief phase of response and recovery is vital developments, however, while there has been growing (Burton et al., 1978). There is clearly a need for revision acceptance of the necessary connection between to the existing Commonwealth Government publications DRR and DM, there are continuing difficulties in and dealing with emergency management concepts and disagreements about how that connection can be principles (Australian Emergency Management Series made effective at both policy and program levels. One of the countries recognised as having been the first to enshrine that connection in legislation is South Africa11. That country is reviewing its disaster management arrangements as its implementation has posed significant challenges, particularly at the level of local municipalities. Pacific countries, such as Samoa, have recently included disaster risk reduction in legislation12, and have also experienced difficulty in its implementation at community level.

In countries such as Australia and the US, the theme of ‘shared responsibility’ in developing the capacity for ‘resilience’ has featured strongly in recent years, and consistently advocates a direct role for the individual and the community in disaster risk management. But other than in development of numerous ‘self-help’ or small-scale community resilience planning guides (e.g., Australian Emergency Management Handbook Series Queensland’s Harden up and Chapter 4 in UK’s National provides principles, strategies and actions for a range of Risk Register) there appears to be little real attention disaster events for emergency management professionals.

10. See for example statements by a number of international leaders on www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-18546583 and from the Australian Prime Minister on www.abc.net.au/news/2012-06-23 11. In its Disaster Management Act 2002 12. In its Disaster and Emergency Management Act 2007 13. Yet PPRR terminology is still used in the recent Victorian Government’s 2011 Green Paper and 2012 White Paper – and in the US has recently been expanded into ‘PPMRR’ – prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery (National Planning Frameworks developed following ‘Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System’)

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No. 1) and emergency risk management (Australian Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I. and Wisner, B. 1994, At Emergency Management Series No. 5) to ensure that Risk: Natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters, they address the purpose and scope of emergency Routledge, London. management as is now defined. Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 2011, National Ultimately the goal must be, as recognised in both Strategy for Disaster Resilience, 22 July 2011 (PDF version), the 2009 COAG Statement and the 2011 NSDR, the p. 10. development of Safer, Sustainable Communities (a motto until recently used by EMA). Promoting ‘resilience’ of Durham, K., Cawood, M. and Jones, R. 2001 ‘The Application itself neither addresses the issues which need to be of risk management principles to municipal emergency dealt with nor puts in place the processes necessary to management practice’, Australian Journal of Emergency the development of that greater capability and capacity Management, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 8-13. at community level. EMA 1996, Record of the Emergency Risk Management Given constitutional arrangements for the division of Workshop, 19 – 21 March 1996 (Mt Macedon Paper No 5/1996), powers between the Commonwealth and the States Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (ISBN 0 and Territories, these are tasks which fall to the latter, 644 47540 4), p. (v). but certainly it is clear that COAG and the Attorney- EMA 2004, Emergency Risk Management – Applications General’s Department could take a more active role Guide (Australian Emergency Manuals Series, Manual 5), in providing guidance and assistance in defining Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra. (Still available on the Footnotes national aims and objectives. A useful start would be website www.em.gov.au/publications.) the development of a practical and community-based 1. It needs to be recognised here that AS/NZS 4360:1995 (and its current version, AS/ NZS ISO 31000:2009) is essentially a process for managing risks within an organisation, and successor to the present emergency risk management Geo-Eng Australia Pty Ltd 1998, Flood Risk Study for thus needs interpretation and modification in order to be applied to the management of concept and documentation. Murweh Shire: Final Report (Report No. 1939/50052/182 of 7 community safety risk. May 1998). 2. UN A/CONF.206/L.2/Rev.1 (22 January 2005) At a recent Monash University Disaster Resilience 3. http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/national/list/ Initiative Forum on ‘Strengthening Community-Based Natural Disasters Organisation (NDO – now Emergency 4. http://www.iisd.ca/ymb/gpdrr/2011/html/ymbvol141num6e.html Resilience’, a noted Australian authority on emergency Management Australia, EMA) 1989, ‘Commonwealth 5. http://www.preventionweb.net/globalplatform/2013/ management issues suggested that we can only achieve Counter Disaster Concepts and Principles (Australian Counter community resilience by ensuring that communities 6. Definitions of these terms are in http://unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDRTerminologyEnglish. Disaster Handbook Vol. 1)’ (1st ed.), Commonwealth of pdf ‘are cognisant of the risks they face and the limitations Australia, p. 7. of emergency service organisations’, and concluded that 7. ‘Disaster risk management (DRM)’ is defined as ‘the systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement ’communities that have involvement in and ownership National Governors Association (US) 1979, Emergency strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of of plans for their safety have a greater capability and Preparedness program: Final Report, DCPA, Washington DC. hazards and the possibility of disaster’. 14 capacity to look after themselves’ . We also need to Initially Australian usage translated mitigation as prevention, 8. See EMA 1999, Final Report of Australia’s Coordination Committee for IDNDR, Canberra note the Global Platform’s 2009 statement of the need resulting in the handy mnemonic of ‘PPRR’, but later referred (ISBN 0642704724) for ‘constitutional and administrative responsibility to this first element as prevention/mitigation. 9. NERAG (http://www.em.gov.au/Publications), the ‘National Emergency Risk Assessment for risk reduction … to be vested at the highest Guidelines’, is the current Commonwealth publication and CERM (http://www.ses.vic.gov. possible level of government, in order to have the Roach, K. 2011, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter- au/prepare/em-planning) is Victoria’s ‘Community Emergency Risk Management’ guideline (drawn primarily from NERAG) – both publications are currently still in draft form. necessary political authority and resources to influence Terrorism, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne. development policy’. 10. See for example statements by a number of international leaders on www.bbc.co.uk/ Zamecka, A. and Buchanan, G. 1999 ‘Disaster Risk news/science-environment-18546583 and from the Australian Prime Minister on www.abc. net.au/news/2012-06-23 As noted earlier, Australia entered the first decade of Management’, Goprint, Brisbane (this was supported in a 11. In its Disaster Management Act 2002 the 21st Century well-placed to develop a new approach subsequent insert handbook, Queensland Department of to emergency management. It is now time for us to Emergency Services 2000 ’Disaster Risk Management Guide: 12. In its Disaster and Emergency Management Act 2007 review the stage we had reached in the development a how-to manual for local government’ John Garnsworthy and 13. Yet PPRR terminology is still used in the recent Victorian Government’s 2011 Green Associates, Brisbane. Paper and 2012 White Paper – and in the US has recently been expanded into ‘PPMRR’ – of that approach and to recognise that real ‘resilience’ prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery (National Planning Frameworks needs to be based on ‘the prepared community’. developed following ‘Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System’) 14. Monash University Disaster Resilience Forum, Melbourne, 15 August 2012 transcript, Neil Comrie presentation References About the author Roger Jones has practised in the field of emergency Australian Journal of Emergency Management October management for more than 35 years, joining the 2012, Vol. 27 No. 4 p. 3. Australian Natural Disasters Organisation (later Emergency Management Australia) in 1974 as its Burton, I., Kates, R.W. and White, G.F. 1978, inaugural Director, Operations and Plans. Roger The Environment as Hazard, OUP, New York. was the Director of the Australian Emergency Management Institute from 1987 to 1994 and is Emergency Management Australia (EMA) 2004, ‘Emergency currently a director and deputy chair of the Board Management in Australia: Concepts and principles (Australian of the Victoria State Emergency Service Authority. Emergency Manual Series, Manual No 1)’, Commonwealth of He has worked in the field internationally, regionally, Australia. Available on www.em.gov.au/Publications. nationally and at State/Territory and community level in Australia.

14. Monash University Disaster Resilience Forum, Melbourne, 15 August 2012 transcript, Neil Comrie presentation

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 21 Human behaviour during an evacuation scenario in the Sydney Harbour Tunnel Penelope Burns, Garry Stevens, Kate Sandy, Arnold Dix, and Professor Beverley Raphael (University of Western Sydney) and Bob Allen (Sydney Harbour Tunnel Company) evaluate an evacuation exercise at the Sydney Harbour Tunnel.

ABSTRACT

Tunnels evoke unique emotions and perceptions processes. Participants demonstrated much that may affect human behaviour in the event indecision and did not commence evacuation until of an emergency. Limited empirical data on audio instructions were issued. Three quarters human factors affecting response during tunnel of participants made the decision to evacuate emergencies have constrained our ability to based on audio instructions, although 34 per cent plan for these aspects of incident management. reported some difficulty hearing the audio and The Sydney Harbour Tunnel is Australia’s only were more likely to make decisions based on the immersed (subsea) road tunnel. It was the site behaviours of others. After an initial period of of a recent observational study conducted to evacuation ‘inertia’, evacuation was initiated by further develop tunnel evacuation procedures those able to hear the audio instructions within and systems. The event involved the evacuation seconds of the announcement and the evacuation of 32 volunteers from a controlled ‘burning car’ was completed in just over two minutes. European scenario. Response data was obtained from and Australian studies suggest that rapid film footage and a post-exercise questionnaire. evacuation during such events may save lives. Pre-recorded audio messages were found to be Findings from this field exercise indicate that the predominant source of information used in expediting early decision-making to evacuate forming the decision to evacuate, augmented by through improved communication (early loud social information exchange or social ‘checking’ clear audio messaging) is key.

Background Sime (1995) argued that behaviour in fire situations can be predicted. People tend to use familiar escape Research exploring human behaviour in tunnel disaster routes, take guidance from staff, and move as part of evacuation is limited for obvious logistical reasons, and family or known social groups. They felt pre-evacuation the studies that do exist are generally retrospective in time or the ‘period of ambiguity’ is critical, as the social nature. Much of our understanding comes from analysis exchange of information, in addition to other sources, of building fire evacuation, or the use of computer can expedite or inhibit decision-making and response. modelling, which only partially accounts for human behaviour. Kobes et al. (2010) conducted a literature review on human behaviour in building fires and delineated how Human factors affecting recent studies have shown several human behaviours in fire evacuation. Walking pace was slower in smoke building evacuation or in an abnormal environment. Even normally- Prior to Wood (1972), human behaviour was not mobile people, in a fire situation, exhibited a degree considered in evacuation research or planning. Tong of limitation, making them less self reliant. There was and Canter (1985) undertook a literature review of a high lack of awareness of ceiling signage, with 92 motivational factors affecting evacuation during building per cent of survivors in 400 cases of fire escape, being fires to discredit the prevalent presumption of a ‘panic’ unaware of escape route signage. Luminescent low- response in such situations. This was important as it level exit markings were found to be more effective. had prevented a more detailed examination of people’s The preference for people to evacuate through familiar motivation in fire situations. rather than closer, unfamiliar exits, especially if closed

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or alarmed, was reiterated in this review. The chosen including the decision to vacate vehicles and the choice route was also affected by affiliate behaviour. Desire of exit (Nilsson, et al., 2009). to conform to the family or friend group strongly influenced occupants’ inertia to danger signals when Users of rapid transit train systems in Singapore failing to initiate evacuation. showed low response to fire alarm warnings which they reported to be ambiguous; however they did prompt more than half to observe the reactions of Tunnel evacuation others or approach staff. A live announcement was Human behaviour in the first moments of an incident in found to clarify the initial cue and resulted in 85 per a tunnel is crucial in an evacuation. An analysis of three cent of people believing they should leave immediately. fatal tunnel fires in Europe by Voeltzel and Dix (2004) This highlights the need for ‘live’ information from an reported an average 15 minute fire brigade response authority (Yeo and He, 2009). time. The study detailed that drivers, ignoring a red signal and siren, proceeded to ‘queue’ within danger zones resulting in fire spreading between cars. This failure to evacuate resulted in mortality. The Sydney Harbour Tunnel The Sydney Harbour Tunnel (SHT) is a crucial infrastructure linking the northern and central Sydney business districts across Sydney Harbour. There are two northbound lanes and two southbound lanes for cars, each bordered by 0.85 metre high concrete jersey barriers and connected by pedestrian cross tunnels (ranging from 22 metres in the northern land tunnels to just a fireproof door in the immersed, undersea, tunnels) for use in evacuations. The concrete jersey barriers must be climbed to access the cross tunnels to exit.

Although the comprehensive emergency warning and evacuation systems within the SHT receive regular functional testing, there has never been a requirement

to use these procedures during a ‘live’ event with Sandy Image: Kate trapped vehicles. This study aimed to determine key

aspects of response during a simulated emergency Stop sign at entrance to the Sydney Harbour Tunnel

Image: Kate Sandy Image: Kate evacuation, specifically: southbound carriageway. It was developed to stop motorists entering the tunnel after other warning signs had failed to • responses to different tunnel warning systems achieve this. It consists of a cascading wall of water on which Stop sign at entrance to the Sydney Harbour Tunnel a stop sign is projected. southbound carriageway. It was developed to stop motorists • barriers and facilitators to initiating evacuation entering the tunnel after other warning signs had failed to • social information exchange achieve this. It consists of a cascading wall of water on which a stop sign is projected. • group affiliation, and • response times of specific phases of the evacuation.

Findings from a series of field studies by Boer (2002) Method suggest tunnel users may frequently over-estimate Thirty two volunteers aged between 16 and 81 years their response capacities in an emergency. The author reported substantial differences between what people participated in the evacuation scenario. They were thought they would do in a tunnel evacuation situation not told what to expect, only that they should behave and the observed behaviours in exercises. Participants in the way they thought they would in any real event were generally unprepared, with group affiliation to keep themselves safe. Participants travelled in (‘clustering’) appearing to inhibit individual decision- existing social/family groups of one to four people per making and response. car. Several individuals were allocated to vehicles with fewer occupants. Recent studies have also focused on how people perceive warning information and its relationship to The set-up of the test was, for safety reasons, evacuation decision-making, showing substantial variability in the capacity to register particular warning inherently a ’low threat‘ scenario with occupants cues. Multiple sources are typically used with social remote from the fire and smoke. This may have information exchange (observing others, ‘checking’) impacted on human behaviour during the event but was being a common mediator of response decisions not avoidable.

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 23 Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013 Image: Kate Sandy Image: Kate

Car fire being extinguished by emergency crew.

Evaluation of the behavioural response within the warning information, decision-making and factors exercise consisted of: in the social/physical environment that affected individual responses. 1. film footage and on-scene observer reports to The burn was monitored by over 20 fire brigade determine evacuation response times and related personnel including an incident commander and individual/group processes, and several fire trucks. The ’burning car‘ was located in the northbound carriageway 240 metres from the north 2. a post-exercise questionnaire which addressed the exit. The participants’ vehicles made a 40km per hour registration and understanding of different types of approach from the south behind a lead car and stopped

Image: Kate Sandy Image: Kate about 100 metres before the burning car. FIGURE 1. The three evacuation recording transcripts Car fire being extinguished by emergency crew. for the Sydney Harbour Tunnel. Within 55 seconds after all the cars had initially stopped, an announcement was relayed in two forms— over the radio, which was only heard by those with their car radios switched on, and over the public announcement system (PA) of the tunnel, which was heard most clearly by those with car windows down. FIGURE 1. The three evacuation recording transcripts for the Sydney Harbour Tunnel. Findings - evacuation response times and factors There was an initial period of inertia of less than a minute during which no participants left their cars before the first audio announcement asked people to remain in their cars and await instructions. It is impossible to know how much longer participants would have delayed before initiating evacuation without any audio instructions. In that first minute much indecision was shown by participants with some starting to exit cars, then retreating and closing doors, heads protruding from windows and photos being taken out of windows. Once the audio messaging commenced, those who could hear it followed instructions. Those who couldn’t hear it tended to follow others. The

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Table 1: Evacuation timeline. Time zero taken from the moment all vehicles had come to an initial stop.

Response phase Mins: secs Events Initial inertia phase 0:00 All cars come to an initial stop behind the lead vehicle ~100 metres from the burning cars. Ceiling signs are visible: “turn off engine” and “turn on radio.” 0:16 First movement from participants outside car: several heads protruding from open car window. 0:53 - 0:57 First car door opens, then closes when tones of first PA message start. Audio instructions to 0:55 – 1:15 PA speaker starts first announcement asking people to stay in their cars wait in car followed and await further instruction (Figure 1 paragraph 1). 1:25 The last car finally stops manoeuvring. Evacuation phase 2:12 Announcement says ”you are now required to evacuate the tunnel.” 2:12 First person, young male, exits car and is followed steadily by all other participants. There is no sense of urgency. 4:04 All participants have left the incident tunnel. Safety reached 2 mins 4:19 Last person exits the cross tunnel into the non incident southbound tunnel. 5 secs Evacuation continues In southbound tunnel evacuees follow audio instructions. in non-incident tunnel

subsequent evacuation to the cross tunnel was During an incident in the SHT, the same announcement completed in less than two minutes. The audio is played simultaneously on the car radio and the tunnel instructions clearly influenced people to evacuate. PA. If a CD is playing in the car, or if the radio is tuned Participants then walked to the non-incident to a station not broadcasting the message, then the southbound carriageway where they were guided north radio announcement may not be heard. Participants the final 540 metres to the SHT offices. commented that it was hard to hear the tunnel PA announcement through closed windows.

Information gathering – responses to different tunnel warning systems The main warning systems in the tunnel are: FIGURE 2. Participant responses to “What was the • audio - transmitted to the majority of local radio very first thing you noticed to indicate stations (but not all) and heard through the car radio there was a problem?” when it is turned on and the PA system in the tunnel, and • visual - electronic ceiling signage and painted wall signage. When asked “What was the very first thing you noticed to indicate there was a problem?”, various indicators were mentioned (see Figure 2). Most smelt or saw smoke or noticed the cars in front were slowing or stopping. The authors found no data on how the distance from a tunnel fire impacted on human response but felt these responses would be affected by a participant’s proximity to the event and this would reflect what would occur in a real event.

The first visual alert for all participants was smoke or fire. The majority of these saw smoke (84 per cent). When asked what the first audio cues were, 85 per cent nominated the emergency announcement via the radio (41 per cent), the PA (38 per cent), or simultaneously (6 per cent). Several heard human voices or a rumble first.

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Affiliate behaviour and FIGURE 3. Participant responses to “If you decided to evacuate when did you make this informational social influence decision and why?” Observations from film taken at the time clearly showed the role of social influence with 94 per cent of participants reporting their decision-making was influenced by the action of others. The first to exit their car was a group of young males. Others then followed. Participants appeared reluctant to initiate leaving their car. One person commented “[I] opened the door when I saw the sign above then saw others still in cars so got back in and shut the door”. Another mentioned “when other people hesitated to leave their vehicles, it made us unsure”. Others wound down windows to see what others were doing and reported “as soon as one person opened the car door so did we”.

Reasons given for following others included: • reassurance • being situated in the middle of the crowd • a belief that others were more knowledgeable • uncertainty about what to do • following others taking priority over following signs, and • a lack of certainty in ability to take the lead. Comments included “lemming for sure”, “I assumed Evacuation decision-making everyone knew what to do”, “I believed they had seen When asked “How did you know what to do?”, three something I didn’t”, “it was reassuring that others were quarters of participants said they made decisions based doing the same so I kept going”. on audio messaging, 13 per cent based decisions on FIGURE 3. Participant responses to “If you decided overhead signs, and others did not know what to do, to evacuate when did you make this they “just followed”. decision and why?” In knowing when to initiate evacuation the vast majority of respondents (75 per cent) relied on audio messages and it was clear from video observations that the first evacuees began evacuating within seconds of hearing the instructions to “evacuate the tunnel”. Only 13 per cent decided to evacuate based on signage, while 12 per cent of the participants did not use audio or visual signage cues to initiate evacuation.

Greater than one third commented on the difficulty in hearing the audio cues. Responses included, “I tended to follow the pack when I could no longer hear the PA”, “there was no radio announcement in our vehicle”, “the PA is not clear if windows are up and the radio is on”. Some participants were unable to distinguish the audio cues at all and had to rely on following others.

The authors feel that ‘inertia to evacuate’ is a barrier to safe behaviour in tunnel incidents and understanding what factors help people to make the decision to leave the dangerous area is important for planning. In this exercise audio messaging was crucial in initiating the evacuation of the group. Of concern were the participants who couldn’t hear the audio message. Image: Kate Sandy Image: Kate In some cases they had a CD playing or were tuned to a radio station which did not relay the message. Impediments to evacuation. The jersey barriers had two Others relied on the PA but had problems hearing and/ small cut away steps (visible in bottom right of this photo) or understanding the message, for instance due to which the elderly participants were unable to use without external noise. assistance. They took around five seconds to climb the barriers with assistance.

26 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013 Image: Kate Sandy Image: Kate

Image: Kate Sandy Image: Kate Exit cross tunnel, part of the evacuation route.

Exit cross tunnel, part of the evacuation route.

Impediments to evacuation subjects, on a six-monthly basis. It is likely that this level of preparedness and the existing infrastructure to The participants considered the major impediment to support evacuation contributed to the rapid response evacuation was physical; in particular, the Jersey during this exercise. barriers which had to be climbed to access the cross tunnel. One fifth noted the convergence of evacuees at The difficulty in running a ’realistic’ scenario was the entrance to the cross tunnel which was confirmed demonstrated by comments from some participants. by video footage. This was compounded as participants Several volunteered that in a real situation they mounted the barriers at the same point as the cross would have approached the burning car to check for tunnel exit door. Other impediments included curiosity occupants, or out of curiosity. Participant response (9 per cent), physical limitations - self or other (19 per times may also have been affected. Nevertheless cent), others’ inaction, a delay before the PA message to important data can still be gathered from these more evacuate, the poor clarity of the PA messaging, and restricted evacuation exercises. reluctance to follow instructions to leave the keys in the car. Only 16 per cent felt totally unimpeded during Human behaviour in building evacuation is conceptually the evacuation. similar to that of tunnel evacuation once the tunnel users have chosen to leave their vehicles. There are external factors which are somewhat different in Discussion tunnels, as in this case, where there was a delayed evacuation response until clear direction was received. Fire incidents in tunnel environments are high-risk Prior to the audio announcement there was a lot of events compared to fires in more open environments. indecision by participants shown on film footage and This is due to greater smoke volumes at an early stage expressed by participants in the questionnaire. Cars of the fire (due to containment of smoke at the beginning were still manoeuvring one and a quarter minutes after of the fire before ventilation commences), greater they had originally come to a stop and people were distance of fire spread between vehicles (due to radiation starting to exit vehicles, then changing their minds, containment and reflection), hotter fire temperatures getting back in and closing doors. of greater than 1000oC, and the unknown behaviour of road tunnel users in these situations (Dix, 2010). There Current international data highlights audio messaging has only been one recent tunnel fire in Australia which as one of the most effective sources of warning occurred in the Burnley Tunnel, Melbourne, Victoria, (Kobes, et al., 2010). This was confirmed in the present in 2007. Three people died and several hundred were study where visual signs were poorly registered by evacuated. However the number of road tunnels and the the majority of participants and audio signals clearly volume of traffic using major road tunnels in Australia prompted the first participants to evacuate. is increasing. There are now five tunnels in NSW, three in Victoria, and two in both Queensland and Western As shown in international evidence ‘live’ messages may Impediments to evacuation. The jersey barriers had two Australia with high vehicle numbers over 1km long. also be attended and responded to more quickly and, if possible, these could augment or replace the current small cut away steps (visible in bottom right of this photo) which the elderly participants were unable to use without recorded message. Audio warnings that are early, clear In this exercise the SHT controllers activated and ran assistance. They took around five seconds to climb the the emergency procedures efficiently and smoothly. and loud, provide simple instructions and, as such, may barriers with assistance. These procedures are exercised, albeit without live reduce the duration of ‘evacuation inertia’. A recent

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 27 Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

study in the SHT showed high background noise and 1997). In some emergencies remaining in the car is long reverberation degrade of the transmission of required. In others, it is safer to evacuate the vehicle. warning systems. This is an issue for clear transmission of PA systems (Ridley and Spearitt, 2011). In-car This study also demonstrated the need for better design messages will not be received by some, highlighting the consideration for the less physically able as they slowed need for a clear, loud PA as a secondary (and out-of- the evacuation of the rest of the group and were unable car) source. to evacuate themselves without assistance.

On several occasions informational social influence over-rode audio messaging. There were a number of Conclusion reported examples of people assuming the actions of others to be the correct behaviour based on This exercise was an opportunity to observe the main perceived greater knowledge of the situation. This constraints and facilitators to rapid evacuation of social phenomenon is known as ‘informational social people in a potentially dangerous situation. The current influence’, and may be exaggerated in hazard situations under-emphasis on user psychological and behaviour (Dynes, 2006, Nilsson, et al., 2009). Film footage clearly patterns in tunnel evacuations is changing. The lack of showed a delay in the initiation of evacuation in this familiarity of the environment, the negative perception exercise with several people opening car doors to exit, of tunnels, and the greater risk from fire constrained then closing them on realising no one else was doing by tunnels may increase the complexity of planning the same thing. tunnel evacuations. When there is increased duress, decision-making can be constrained and clear audible Unlike two of the previous tunnel exercises in the instructions are important. Netherlands and Sweden (Nilsson, et al., 2009, Boer, 2002) participants in the SHT exercise chose their exit Evidence-informed guidelines for evacuation best- point based on which cross tunnel others were using, practice and subsequent follow-up of persons involved in rather than by proximity or distance from danger. tunnel evacuations, including road users and response Initiation of evacuation, and choice of exit route, was personnel, would help ensure lessons are learned and highly influenced by what other people were doing incorporated into future response practice. during this exercise. There was orderly follow-the- leader behaviour of one large group with occasional individual behaviour which quickly conformed back About the authors to the group. There was a general lack of urgency Penelope Burns is a GP Fellow of Disaster Medicine shown by the group although several individuals with the Disaster Response and Resilience Research later expressed feeling anxious in the questionnaire Group in the School of Medicine at the University of (highlighting the importance of obtaining data through Western Sydney and a general practitioner in Rozelle, different methods). Sydney. Email: [email protected] Garry Stevens is a Clinical Psychologist and Such a response may be influenced by the relative Research Fellow at the Disaster Response & safety of being in an exercise situation. However it Resilience Research Group, School of Medicine, raises the important point that individuals in actual University of Western Sydney. hazard situations often opt for the ‘safety’ of being with Kate Sandy is a medical student at the University of others, displaying affiliate behaviour, even if this is at Western Sydney. She has a Diploma in Film and a the cost of being closer to the threat (Sime, 1995). Certificate in Screenwriting from the Australian Film Television and Radio School. The group seemed to move as a single herd, rather than as a collection of smaller groups but no participant Bob Allen is the General Manager of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel Company with which he has been took leadership of, or responsibility for, the group as involved for 20 years. He has a background in a whole. This is consistent with stories of evacuation operations management gained predominantly in through the stairwells after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 submarines through the Royal Navy and the Royal of a slow orderly procession without panic (Hingson and Australian Navy. Flory, 2011). Arnold Dix is a scientist and a lawyer who is an international expert on tunnel risk matters. He is In such situations vehicles are a familiar entity in an an Associate Professor at the University of Western unfamiliar environment containing valuable personal Sydney. He has audited tunnels for safety and property. It was demonstrated by several participant has investigated many recent international tunnel drivers in this exercise whose concerns included: incidents. • leaving the vehicle unattended Professor Beverley Raphael is Professor of • leaving the keys in the car, and Population Mental Health and Disasters and Director of the Disaster Response and Resilience Research • how to retrieve the car. Group at the University of Western Sydney. She is also Importantly, such vehicle affiliation has also been Professor of Psychological and Addiction Medicine at observed in tunnel emergencies where the presumed the Australian National University. greater safety of being in, or near, one’s vehicle has contributed to fatalities through people failing to evacuate dangerous environments (Masellis, et al.,

28 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

References Nilsson, D., Johansson, M. and Rantzich, H., 2009. Evacuation experiment in a road tunnel: A study of human Anon., 2010. Mob Mentality. Science Illustrated, Jan-Feb, Issue behaviour and technical installations. Fire Safety Journal, 3, pp. 52-59. pp. 458-468.

Arias, A.V., Mayordomo Lopez, S., Fernandez, I., Martinez- Norris, F., 2005. Range, Magnitude, and Duration of the Rubio, J. L., Magallares A., 2008. Psychosocial factors, Effects of Disasters on Mental Health: Review Update 2005. perceived risk and driving in a hostile environment: driving Review Update 2005. through tunnels. International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 8(1 & 2), pp. 165-181. Norris, F., Friedman, M. and Watson, P., 2002. 60,000 Disaster VIctims Speak: Part II. Summary and Implications of Beard, A., 2009. Fire safety in tunnels. Fire Safety Journal, Disaster Mental Health Research. Psychiatry, 65(3). Volume 44, pp. 276-278. Norris, F., Friedman, M., Watson, P., Byrne, C., Diax, E., Boer, L., 2002. Behaviour by motorists on evacuation of a and Kaniasty, K., 2002. 60,000 Disaster Victims Speak: Part tunnel, Soesterberg: The Ministry of Transport, Public Works I. An Empirical review of the Empirical Literature, 1981-2001. and Water Management, Centre for Tunnel Safety. Pyschiatry, 65(3).

Brennan, P., 1997. Selected Literature Reviews on Human Peleg, T. and Shalev, A., 2006. Longitudinal Studies of Behaviour in Fire, Sydney: Fire Code Reform Centre Limited. PTSD: Overview of Findings and Methods. CNS Spectrums The International Journal of Neuropsychiatric Medicine, 11(8), Callaghan, P., 2010. Tunnel Exercise furthers safety research. pp. 589-602. Emergency, December, p. 24. Ridley, P. and Spearitt, D., 2011. Evaluation of speech Colombo, A., 2001. NEDIES PROJECT Lessons Learnt from transmission in a road tunnel. Acoustics, pp. 1-8. Tunnel Accidents, s.l.: Institute for Systems, Informatics and Safety . Sime, J., 1991. Accidents and disasters: vulnerability in the built environment. Safety Science, pp. 109-124. Dix, A., 2010. Tunnel Fire Safety in Australasia. Frankfurt am Main, Germany, s.n., pp. 69-79. Sime, J., 1995. Crowd psychology and engineering. Safety Science, Volume 21, pp. 1-14. Dynes, R., 2006. Social Capital: Dealing with Community Emergencies. Homeland Security Affairs 2, July. Issue 2. SWOV Institute for Road Safety Research, 2009. SWOV Fact sheet: The road safety of motorway tunnels, Leidschendam: Fahy, R. and Proulx, G., 2001. Towards creating a database SWOV. on delay times to start evacuation and walking speeds for use in evacuation modeling. Human behavior in fire-understanding Tong, D. and Canter, D., 1985. The Decision to Evacuate: a human behavior for better fire safety design. London, s.n., Study of the Motivations which Contribute to Evacuation in the pp. 175-183. Event of Fire. Fire safety Journal, Volume 9, pp. 257-265.

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Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 29 Impact of landslides in Australia to December 2011 Dr Marion Leiba, Geoscience Australia, provides an update of the landslide data over the last decade.

ABSTRACT

This paper is an update to Michael-Leiba by trench and beach sand or excavation cave-ins, while most injuries were caused by edge-of-road collapses (1999) Impact of landslides in Australia due to vehicle weight. to June 1999 published in the Australian Journal of Emergency Management in 1999. Around 370 buildings were damaged or destroyed Most of the information comes from the by 83 landslides and mine subsidence events including superficial damage from debris flows Geoscience Australia Australian landslide and the subsequent runout entering buildings. The database, which contains references to the estimated cost of landslide, debris flow runout and source literature, and is available online mine subsidence damage to buildings, residential at www.ga.gov.au. Because landslide land, fences, retaining walls, swimming pools and information is gleaned from written the like during the period 1842-2011 is approximately $82 million in 2010 dollars. Landslides also caused reports (often in the media) or personal considerable damage and disruption when they observations, and landslides are not impacted or destroyed roads (around 300 landslides recorded instrumentally like earthquakes, during the period 2000-2011), railways and bridges. the landslide database is incomplete. Unfortunately the readily available data are too few to Information from the public to improve estimate a monetary cost. the database is welcome, contact email Of the 114 landslide events causing injury or death to [email protected]. December 2011, 36 were rock falls or topples, including rocks displaced by climbers—some involving a single rock. Nineteen landslides involved material falling from cliffs.

Introduction The two most lethal landslides were both debris flows. For the purposes of this article, the term ‘landslide’ is used in a very broad sense to include slope failures The Briseis Dam Disaster, Derby, northeast Tasmania and cave-ins involving human activity, mine subsidence happened on 4 April 1929 and killed 14 people. Rainfall and cave-ins in paved roads. It also includes the flash of 450mm during the previous two days, followed by flood runout in the distal part of debris flows (distal 125mm in the catchment in 1.5 hours, caused the rock- meaning remote from the point of attachment or filled concrete Briseis Dam on the Cascade River to burst, origin), slow movements of a few centimetres a year, as releasing a wall of water six metres high. The water raced well as the well-recognised rock falls, debris slides and down the river gully, sweeping away a house and killing other gravity-driven downward movements of material the family of five, as well as a five-year-old girl. It then cut commonly thought of as landslides. a channel 30 metres deep and 64 metres wide through a low hill in its path. It demolished stables in its path, killing three people and 12 horses. The torrent was 180 metres wide and tree logs were deposited over 21 metres Landslides causing injury or death above normal river level. The width was evident from the In Australia, 114 landslides are known to have caused gouged-out channel left behind, and the main road was injury or death during the period 1842 to December obliterated. By cutting through the low hill, the river’s 2011. At least 138 people have been killed and 174 course was permanently changed to follow the channel injured. The naturally-occurring events causing death gouged out by the torrent. The wave of water at Derby varied from the fall of a single rock to spectacular was four metres high, however a rocky outcrop on its debris flows and their flash flood runouts. Many outskirts saved the town. The flood was diverted, striking landslides that killed or injured people were the result a mining tailings hill about 60 metres high and carrying of human activity. During the period 2000-2011, over away half the hill, leaving a sand cliff. Three people half the landslides causing injury or death were directly lost their lives and several houses were swept away, or indirectly human-caused. Most deaths were caused including the Briseis Company’s powerhouse and offices.

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Two bridges on the Ringarooma River, one on each side The largest number of injuries in a single event was of Derby, were destroyed and the Briseis tin mine was due to a landslide on the Cairns-Kuranda scenic railway flooded. It did not resume operations for five years after on 26 March 2010. Heavy rain triggered a debris slide the event. Many people were homeless, two cars were from the slope above the railway line just before the lost, the furniture in flooded houses was damaged, and first tunnel. The landslide blocked the line and the first the recreation ground outbuildings demolished. A total of the two locomotives pulling the train ran into it and of six houses were destroyed at Derby, and fences were was derailed. Luckily, the second locomotive was able destroyed and houses flooded at nearby Branxholm. to push the train back to Redlynch where five injured Fourteen people were killed in the 4.8km between passengers were taken to hospital by ambulance. The the Briseis Dam and Derby. The torrent had carried remaining passengers disembarked at Freshwater and thousands of tonnes of trees, rocks, gravel and boulders. one passenger requiring a wheelchair was taken to A 10-tonne granite boulder was moved 3km. hospital. In addition to the injuries, the closure of the railway line adversely affected tourism and business in The Thredbo, NSW landslide of 30 July 1997 injured Kuranda. one person and killed 18, as well as destroying two ski lodges and several vehicles. According to the Coroner’s During the period 2000-2011, 14 rock falls or topples, report (Hand, 2000), the landslide happened on the some from natural causes and others from human slope below the Alpine Way—the highway linking activity, killed or injured people. Jindabyne, NSW on the eastern side of the Snowy Mountains with the Murray Valley Highway on the In the Wollangambe Canyon, Wollangambe National west in Victoria. Perched above the ski resort village Park in the Blue Mountains of NSW, six people were of Thredbo, the road was originally built as a short- reported missing when they failed to return from a term construction road and was not intended to be a day canyoning trip on 12 January 2010. They were highway. It rested on uncompacted fill and creep (very well-equipped except they did not have an emergency slow land movement) in the fill had been occurring for beacon. About 50 people searched for two days and years before the catastrophic slope failure. The creep located them on January 14. One of them, a boy aged caused joints in a water main to leak for at least two 15, had been killed only a few hours earlier, apparently months, and possibly as long as 12 months, before the in a rock fall when a sandstone ledge had collapsed. landslide. As the separation at the joints worsened, the The five survivors were airlifted to Richmond Royal leakage increased. A portion of the uncompacted fill Australian Air Force base by police helicopter and taken embankment became saturated with water, triggering to hospital to be treated for dehydration, hypothermia the landslide at 11.30pm. The first stage of the failure and minor injuries. They were discharged the following was between the top ski lodge, Carinya, and the Alpine day. The boy’s body had been trapped under the fallen Way. Carinya Lodge was hit by collapsing soil, toppling it rocks and rain had hindered the search and rescue forward. The ski lodge was then impacted by a mudflow operation. His body was recovered on 15 January. that carried it downslope and onto Bimbadeen Lodge. At about 4.00am on 20 June 2005, rocks with a total The only occupant of Carinya Lodge was killed and 17 volume of about one cubic metre, rolled from the Lake others perished in the wreck of Bimbadeen. The sole George escarpment, NSW, onto the northbound lanes of surviver was rescued after almost three days in the the Federal Highway, causing a multi-vehicle accident. rubble of Bimbadeen Lodge. Two people were injured. A car collided with a boulder and was undriveable. A semi-trailer jack-knifed after hitting a boulder and ended up in a southbound lane, Landslides causing injury or death, partly jutting out over Lake George, and a station wagon January 2000 – December 2011 overturned, caught fire, and was destroyed. The truck driver, though injured, and another person, rescued the During the period January 2000 to December 2011, 24 injured driver from the car before it was engulfed in the people died and 100 were injured in Australia as a result flames. of 46 landslides—an average of two deaths per year. Image: Dr Marion Leiba On 4 November 2001 at Jan Juc in south west Victoria, The most lethal incident happened on the Old Pacific an 18-year-old man was walking with friends along A semi-trailer jack-knifed after being hit by rocks falling Highway, Somersby, NSW, on 8 June 2007. A low the beach at the time of a large rock fall from an 80 from the Lake George escarpment. pressure weather system swept across the east coast metre cliff. He was buried up to his shoulders in the of NSW dumping more than 200mm of rain over four landslide. His two companions managed to jump clear. days, causing flood conditions. A section of the Old It took three hours to rescue him because of dangerous Pacific Highway collapsed due to undermining by a conditions caused by continuing rock falls. He was flown flooded creek because of corrosion of the steel pipes to hospital with crush injuries to both legs. of a culvert. A car on the road at the time of the cave-in drove into the hole, killing its five occupants; two adults On 30 January 2000 a man fell while climbing at and three children. Investigations showed that the pipes Ginninderra Falls, NSW, 18km northwest of Canberra. had been corroding for almost 25 years and sinking of His rope broke and he dislodged some rocks during the the road was noticed some seven years before the cave- fall causing a human-induced rock fall. The rocks fell in. The resultant dip in the road had been asphalted on him causing a suspected broken leg, ankle and wrist. over in 2002 and again in 2004. After being winched to safety, he was transported to hospital by rescue helicopter.

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were digging holes in the beach when the sand caved in. Two of the boys were kneeling in the hole and were buried up to their chests. The 11-year-old managed to scramble free. The 13-year-old was trapped for more than an hour and was given oxygen while being rescued. He was subsequently treated by paramedics at the Surf Club. The 15-year-old died at the scene. Police, Fire, Ambulance and SES officers were all involved in the rescue.

Around one fifth of the deaths and over one third of the injuries caused by landslides during the period 2000- 2011 happened in just three edge-of-road collapses under the weight of vehicles. The worst happened on Dove Lake Road, just past the Visitors Centre in Cradle Mountain National Park, Tasmania, on 18 February 2001. A bus had edged to the side of the road to make

Image: Dr Marion Leiba way for an oncoming vehicle. The soft shoulder of the road gave way under the weight of the stationary bus A semi-trailer jack-knifed after being hit by rocks falling causing it to plunge down a ravine. Four people were from the Lake George escarpment. killed and 14 were injured.

For over half the landslides, deaths and injuries were either directly or indirectly caused by human activity. A Damage to buildings, their total of 30 landslides killed 13 people and injured 60 as summarised on Table 1. surrounds and residential land Over the same timeframe, 83 landslides, mine Of the 30 landslides, nine were trench cave-ins. On 14 May 2009, three men were working at Furber Street, subsidence and tunnel collapse events damaged or East Maitland, NSW, in a 3-4 metre deep, 25 metre destroyed about 370 buildings or their interiors. The most long soil trench at a horse trainer’s property while expensive case of building damage from non-debris flow making a plunge pool for the horses. The men were landslides was at Lawrence Vale, Launceston, Tasmania setting formwork for plastering the sides of the trench in the 1960s. Two adjacent, relatively slow-moving when the side(s) caved in and loose dirt heaped on landslides in Tertiary sediments destroyed 35 houses and the surface fell into the trench. One man was able the land was also written off. The cost in 2010 dollars is to escape and go for help. The second, aged 43, was estimated to be $13.4 million. buried from the waist down and suffered a cut on his head and crush injuries. He was flown to Newcastle The Briseis Dam disaster in northeast Tasmania, hospital by rescue helicopter. The third, aged 28, was destroyed at least 10 buildings and it is estimated that it completely buried and died at the scene. His body was recovered over nine hours later. The street was may have damaged about 45 buildings or their contents. blocked off for several hours to assist the rescue and The estimated cost in 2010 dollars is about $1.5 million. investigations. The estimated cost of landslide, debris flow runout Another nine landslides were cave-ins caused by young and mine subsidence damage to buildings, residential people digging deep holes in sand at the beach. At 1770 land, fences, retaining walls, swimming pools, etc. beach, near Agnes Water, Queensland, on 15 August during the period 1842-2011 is approximately $82 2006, three boys, Dutch tourists, aged 11, 13 and 15, million in 2010 dollars.

Table 1. Landslide deaths and injuries caused by human activity during the period January 2000 – December 2011.

Landslide type No. of landslides No. of deaths No. of injured people

Trench cave-ins 9 2 8

Beach sand cave-ins 9 3 7

Other excavation landslides 4 1 3

Edge of road collapse from vehicle weight 3 5 38

Other human involvement landslides 5 2 4

Total for human involvement landslides 30 landslides 13 people killed 60 people injured

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Table 2. Slope instability events affecting buildings during the period January 2000 – December 2011. These statistics exclude buildings damaged or destroyed during the flash floods and debris flows in the Lockyer Valley, Queensland on 10 January 2011.

Estimated number of buildings Type of slope instability event Number of events affecting buildings affected

Debris flows 11 24

Debris slides 4 4

Excavation related 4 5

Tunnel/mine subsidence 3 30

Slow moving landslides 2 4

Earth slump 1 1

Rock fall 1 1

Landslides affecting buildings considerable volume of debris in their lower storey while others suffered water and mud spoilage. During the period January 2000 to December 2011, approximately 70 buildings were affected by 26 Around 30 June 2005, at Lansell Avenue, Currumbin, landslides, including mine subsidence. The results Queensland, a landslide (probably a debris flow) varied from damage to contents to the total destruction severely damaged and put at risk at least six properties. of the building. Decks of at least two houses, and a spa, were washed down the hillside during a deluge and at least one The estimated cost of landslide and debris flow runout retaining wall was damaged. Residents were advised to damage to buildings, residential land, fences, retaining evacuate. walls, swimming pools, etc. during 2000-2011 is approximately $2.7 million. On 22 March 2010, intense rain brought by a severe storm triggered a debris flow from the escarpment The types of slope instability events causing building at Kings Park, Perth, Western Australia, behind the damage are shown in Table 2. Adelphi, Waldorf, Acacia and Park Lane apartments, Debris flows were a common cause of building impact. causing more than 100 residents to be evacuated. Mud surrounded two vehicles and entered apartments Almost half (11 out of 27) of the landslides affecting Image: Dr Marion Leiba buildings were debris flows. For example, on 3 April 2000 through the windows, filling two with mud deeper than at Castle Hill, Townsville, Queensland, four debris flows, 1.2 metres. A section of the eastbound lane of Mounts Large debris flows at Castle Hill were triggered by three east facing and one northeast facing each with a Road was also closed. Cyclone Tessi. volume of about 500 cubic metres weathered granite, On 19 March 2004, in Cairns, Queensland, heavy rain were triggered by torrential rain from Cyclone Tessi. associated with a tropical low (later Tropical Cyclone Almost 140 houses were initially evacuated and several Grace) triggered a fill failure in a disused road uphill were damaged by the runout. Several houses had a from Hillview Street, Whitfield. This pushed trees and topsoil into the downstairs rooms and garage of a house. Luckily the owners were overseas. Two cars in the garage were pushed forward, one into a column which dented the rear of the vehicle. Branches punched holes through the rear wall of the house in two places and through windows. The landslide volume was approximately 1500 cubic metres. Slope instability related to nearby excavations affected five buildings.

An expensive example was the destruction of the Indian Chilli Restaurant in Crown Street, Surrey Hills, Sydney, on 27 November 2007. Excavation for construction over six months before may have been partly responsible. The restaurant’s foundations were exposed to the weather for the first time in the life of the old, fragile building. The evening before the 27 November there

Image: Dr Marion Leiba was heavy rain. Noises were first heard during the evening of the 27, and by the next day there was Large debris flows at Castle Hill were triggered by cracking, partial disintegration, and the building was Cyclone Tessi. leaning towards the excavation. The old building was

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 33 Image: Dr Marion Leiba

Fill failure in a disused road inundates a house in Cairns. Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

Two slow-moving landslides that damaged or destroyed buildings were both in Buderim, Queensland in 2010. The most destructive was in Durham Crescent on 19 December. Prolonged high rainfall triggered a slow- moving landslide that caused one house and the garage of an adjacent house to move downhill. One house moved two metres in a week and was deemed unlivable. The adjacent house was unaffected as at 4 January 2011 but the garage was warped from the movement. The downhill part of the road suffered large cracks in the tarmac and was cordoned off. The occupant of the house below Durham Crescent voluntarily self- evacuated as a precaution.

Mine subsidence and tunnel failure Mine subsidence and tunnel failure have damaged or destroyed an estimated 30 buildings during the period 2000-2011. The estimated cost in 2010 dollars is about $6.5 million.

The worst case was at Collingwood Park, Ipswich, on Image: Dr Marion Leiba 26 April 2008. Part of the suburb is 130 metres above the disused Westfalen coal mine. Subsidence had Fill failure in a disused road inundates a house in Cairns. previously occurred in 1988 and 1992. The 2008 episode happened in the early morning of 26 April and had stabilised over the whole affected area by the end of 2 subsequently demolished and neighbouring buildings May. It damaged around 20 houses in Duncan, Fowler, evacuated as well as the road temporarily closed. Moloney, McInnerney and McLaughlin Streets and The contents of the restaurant, valued at more than Warren Court. Seven of the most seriously damaged $200,000, were lost. houses were evacuated. Structural engineers were engaged to assess houses in the subsidence area. The A spectacular, though less costly landslide happened on State Government budgeted $10 million to fund present 27 November 2001 on the east side of Northbourne and future repairs caused by the subsidence and to buy Avenue, Canberra, ACT, in the block north of Cooyong houses at pre-subsidence market value if the damage Street. Almost half of the western wall of an eight- was too great. metre-deep excavation failed, causing two prefabricated site buildings to tilt at angles of about 15-30 degrees. In the Sapphire and Rubyvale area gemfields, The headscarp consisted of two steps, each one metre Queensland, some time during the period 17-19 high, coinciding with the inner edge of a concrete January 2008, severe flooding caused shallow sapphire footpath. One lane of Northbourne Avenue was closed mines to cave in, swallowing caravans and sheds, and until 3 December. destroying some homes and livelihoods.

On 2 November 2005, a tunnel failure occurred at the entrance to the Pacific Highway, Lane Cove, NSW. All residents of a three-storey brick block of flats on Longueville Road were evacuated at about 2.30am when a 10-metre-deep hole appeared in front of and under a corner of the building. A water main broke and sections of the building fell into the hole, which was caused by failure of shale in a section of the Lane Cove Tunnel, then under construction. The failed section was the site of an exit ramp that intersected with a ventilation shaft. Over 1000 cubic metres of concrete was pumped into the hole to try to stabilise the area. The city-bound lanes of Epping Road were closed to traffic for two days.

Landslide damage to infrastructure

Image: Dr Marion Leiba Hundreds of landslides have damaged or disrupted roads, railways, bridges, culverts, paths and drains. A landslide at a building site in Canberra causes two There are inadequate data to estimate the financial prefabricated site buildings to come off their foundations. cost, but it would total many millions of dollars.

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The record in the Geoscience Australia Australian A landslide on Springbrook Road, Springbrook, landslide database for landslides impacting or Queensland, on 5 April 2009 had a luckier outcome. damaging roads during the period 2000-2011 is Heavy weekend rainfall had triggered a debris slide in almost certainly incomplete. In a number of entries, the cut in the uphill side of the road. As a station wagon particularly those relating to the Cairns area, a series drove past, the slope moved and the vehicle ended of landslides on a single road are recorded as a single up being sandwiched between two large boulders. entry. A cursory examination of database entries The larger, with a volume of about 0.5 cubic metres, suggests that well over 300 landslides adversely crushed the bonnet of the car. The smaller, with a affected roads during the period. This excludes holes volume of about 0.3 cubic metres, came to rest at the appearing in roads usually due to water beneath the rear corner of the vehicle. Rocks also hit and broke tarmac, or because of mine subsidence. through the metal of a back door. Fortunately none of the four occupants was hurt. The road was closed for The effect of landslides can vary from one lane being several weeks. closed for a few hours because of a failure in the cut on the uphill side of the road, with debris falling on the road, to structural damage to the road necessitating Holes in roads during the period repairs and sometimes closing some or all of the road for days or even longer. January 2000 – December 2011 There have been 15 instances of holes, excluding On 4 February 2011, intense, short-period rainfall ordinary potholes or mine subsidence, appearing in and an overflowing drain beside the Princes Freeway paved roads in populated areas. Six of these were (Morwell Bypass) in Victoria caused a landslide in the identified as being cave-ins caused by broken or leaking adjacent, un-used north wall of an open cut coal mine. water mains under the road. All bar one or two were Cracks 2-3cm wide and 2cm deep appeared in both attributed to water under the road tarmac from flooding sides of the freeway and the section was closed for or other causes. The amount of disruption caused by three months. Traffic was redirected through Morwell. these holes depended on their size and location, but Landslides that block an entire road can affect business one had very expensive consequences. and tourism. For example, landslides continue to occur On 25 March 2009, a five-metre-deep hole appeared in near ‘Pooh Bear Corner’ on the Kings Highway, which the bitumen at the intersection of Brisbane and East is the shortest route between Canberra and the South Streets, Ipswich, Queensland at about 9.15am. A leaking Coast of NSW. This is a popular route for Canberra water main had eroded soil under Ipswich’s busiest holiday makers who support coastal communities with traffic intersection. The hole subsequently grew to be tourist dollars. five metres long with an estimated volume of about Another example is the closure of the Cunningham 50 cubic metres. Traffic was thrown into chaos and, at Highway at Cunningham’s Gap in south Queensland. about 6.30pm, police drew an exclusion zone around On 5 December 2010, a landslide from the steep surrounding streets and a 300 metre air exclusion mountainside occurred above the road. The Council and zone. The intersection re-opened at 5.00pm the next the Warwick Chamber of Commerce were concerned day. It took 30 hours to repair the hole by pumping in about the economic impact of the closure on tourism, a special concrete mix, at a cost of $750,000. Business including motels, service stations, and fast food outlets. losses were expected to take the total cost to more than $1 million. An expensive case of isolation was the result of landslides triggered by 370mm of rain in a 24-hour period during 22-23 March 2011 at Wilsons Promontory, Toowoomba and Lockyer Victoria. The Wilsons Promontory Road to Tidal River Valley, 10 January 2011 was closed by at least one landslide and a bridge collapse involving a debris fall due to flash flooding. The tragic events of 10 January 2011 are described A massive landslide also closed the Mount Oberon separately because it is difficult to differentiate how access road. At least 200 campers were evacuated much of the damage and fatalities were caused by by helicopter and 400 were stranded in the National debris flows and their runout and how much was due Park. The closure of the park also adversely affected to the fast-moving floodwaters that did not originate as tourist operators. debris flows. A debris flow near its source is laden with debris and flows as a torrent because of its high water A very small landslide with serious consequences content (up to 50 per cent), but it becomes a flash flood happened on Greenhill Road, near Greenhill, South at its farthest end after much of its solid material has Australia, on 22 June 2000. A man was seriously been deposited. injured when his car was hit by a large boulder. It hit the rear driver’s side of the sedan then bounced onto The events in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley were the other side of the road. Rescue crews cut the roof caused by prolonged high rainfall followed by a super off the car to free the man who was taken to hospital. storm which dumped 80mm of rain in just 30 minutes. Two members of the rescue crew were sprayed with A rain gauge at Withcott recorded 150mm in 50 hydraulic fluid while using cutting tools and were also minutes. This deluge falling on the Toowoomba Range taken to hospital. triggered severe flash flooding in Toowoomba, and debris flows and flash floods in the Lockyer Valley area,

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which killed 23 people with an unstated number injured, The worst culprits were excavation failures, including and destroyed numerous houses and other buildings, trench collapses and children digging in sand. Six people vehicles, and farm machinery. There was considerable died in landslides caused by excavation during the infrastructure damage, including roads, footpaths, period 2000-2011. Education about the risk of working bridges, and railway lines. in trenches and other excavations and of digging in sand may save lives. A two metre wall of water, described as a “torrent, out of nowhere”, hit the Toowoomba CBD at about 1.00pm Landslides and mine or tunnel subsidence also after the West and East creeks broke their banks. continue to damage buildings or their contents with The flash flood piled up cars, flooded houses and around 70 being affected during the period 2000- businesses and resulted in two deaths. It is unlikely that 2011. Of these, an estimated 30 were affected by mine this originated as a debris flow. However, the railway subsidence and 24 by debris flows. station at Spring Bluff was destroyed by what appears Landslides also continue to damage roads, railways, to have been a debris flow from the steep hill slope culverts and bridges. For example, during the period above the railway. 2000-2011, well over 300 landslides adversely affected A “mud torrent came hurtling down the mountain” roads. There are insufficient data to estimate the cost to (a debris flow) on to Murphys Creek where it destroyed infrastructure, but it could be in the millions of dollars. houses, killed people and deposited two metres of mud. As in other parts of the world, debris flows in Australia The flash flood arrived in Grantham at about 3.30pm. have been lethal and destructive. The two most lethal It appeared as a wave of water across the paddocks, landslides in Australia’s recorded history are the 1997 washing away people in their houses and cars. Some of Thredbo landslide, killing 18 people, and the 1929 this water would have originated as debris flows from Briseis Dam disaster, killing 14 people. Both were the hill slopes. debris flows. Debris flows grade into flash floods as the water content increases. The destructive nature of flash The following information is quoted from Risk Frontiers floods was highlighted by the Toowoomba and Lockyer (2011). Valley disaster in 2011 in which 23 people were killed and an estimated 200 houses damaged or destroyed in “23 people died in the flash flood events in Toowoomba flash floods and debris flows. and the Lockyer Valley: 14 in Grantham, 2 in Murphy’s Creek, 2 in Spring Bluff, 2 in Postman’s Ridge, 1 in Helidon and 2 in Toowoomba. Acknowledgements

Houses built adjacent to waterways were washed Geoscience Australia for supporting this research. away in the Murphy’s Creek township, Postman’s Adele Bear-Crozier, Libby Metz and Jane Sexton for Ridge, Grantham and other locations due to high critically reviewing the manuscript and suggesting water velocities (up to 3 to 4 m/s) and high water improvements. depths. 29 houses were completely destroyed in Grantham, with 130 severely damaged. Nearly every house in the ‘southern development’ area References of Grantham sustained structural damage caused Geoscience Australia, 2012, Australian Landslide Database, by the velocity of the floodwaters. Some were www.ga.gov.au. washed off their stumps and completely destroyed, whilst others were rendered uninhabitable.” Hand, D., 2000, Report of the inquest into the deaths arising from the Thredbo landslide. NSW State Coroner’s report. It is highly likely that the four people killed in the Murphys Creek-Spring Bluff area died as a result of Michael-Leiba, M., 1999, Impact of landslides in Australia to debris flows and their runout. No figures were given for June 1999, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. the number of houses damaged or destroyed there but, 14, No. 3, pp. 30-31. based on the figures given for Grantham, an estimated Risk Frontiers, 2011, State-wide natural hazard risk 45 houses may have been affected by debris flows. It is assessment. Report 8: Major historical flash flooding in possible that debris flows may have caused damage and Queensland, Report for Queensland Department of Community fatalities in other parts of the Lockyer Valley and that Safety, July 2011. their runout contributed to the tragedy at Grantham.

About the author Conclusion Dr Marion Leiba worked as a volcanologist, Although landslides are not well-recognised by the earthquake seismologist and landslide scientist. She general public as being a problem in Australia, they worked with Geoscience Australia for 20 years until have killed at least 138 people which is more than nine her retirement in November 2001. She consults as times the number killed by earthquakes. Deaths from a Disaster Risk Scientist and updates the Australian landslides have not decreased in recent times. During Landslide Database for Geoscience Australia. Marion was born in Australia and has a PhD from University the period 2000-2011, 24 people died in landslides and of Hawaii. 13 of those were killed by human-caused landslides.

36 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Environmental health disaster management: a new approach Ben Ryan, Brad Milligan and Dr Annie Preston-Thomas (Cairns Public Health Unit) and Geoff Wilson (Cassowary Coast Regional Council) detail the development of a response guide and supplementary planning tools to assist in the information-gathering stage of health emergencies in Queensland.

ABSTRACT

The need for an integrated approach to Environmental health and disasters assessing environmental health issues The environmental health response to a disaster aims and priorities after a disaster has been to manage public health effects caused by the event highlighted by recent disasters in northern and improve disaster preparedness to respond to future Queensland. In response, the Cairns Public events (UCLA, 2006). The main elements considered in the response include, but are not limited to: Health Unit (CPHU), Queensland Health, initiated a project to work with local and • drinking water state governments from across northern • hazardous waste (e.g. asbestos) Queensland to address these issues. • general waste This approach has proved successful and • sanitation resulted in the development of a response • food safety guide, an environmental health rapid • communicable diseases assessment tool, and an evacuation centre • vector issues, and checklist. These achievements demonstrate • mass gatherings (e.g. evacuation centres). that an objective forum for local and state Public health professionals, particularly Environmental Health Officers (EHO), are in the best position to assess governments can be effective in solving the impact of disasters on populations and conduct issues requiring multi-agency solutions. evaluations on responses due to their population-based The project has provided a framework that focus (Degutis, 2008). Also, the core skills of EHOs can be applied to a range of issues other allow the profession to effectively respond, monitor and than environmental health and disaster assess public health issues in a disaster situation. management, and may be adapted to other The most effective way to protect the health of people settings beyond northern Queensland. impacted by disasters is to ensure adequate shelter, water, food and sanitation. A systematic approach to the assessment and control of communicable diseases and other public health issues is a key component of a Overview response, and is crucial to protect the health of affected Recent natural disasters in northern Queensland populations (TFQCDM/WADEM, 2002). highlight the need for an integrated approach to assessing environmental health issues and priorities that arise following a disaster. During recent responses Regional approach there were concerns raised that field officers did The range of environmental health issues (such as not have access to tools that allowed for timely and asbestos, sewage and contaminated drinking water) systematic assessments. This culminated in limited arising from recent natural disasters in northern information being collected for decision-makers to Queensland led the CPHU to work with local and state determine priority areas in a timely manner and allow governments to form the working group in mid 2011. The public health interventions to be based on evidence. working group facilitated environmental health teams In response, the Cairns Public Health Unit (CPHU), and disaster co-ordinators to work together in identifying Queensland Health, initiated a project to work with and managing public health risks within existing disaster local and state governments from across northern management arrangements. Further, it was anticipated Queensland to address these issues. This work centred this approach would allow local governments in the on the formation of the Far North Queensland Public region to enhance their public health resilience and allow Health Disaster Management Working Group (working core business activities to continue during a disaster group), which provided an objective forum for state response (e.g. water treatment). and local government disaster management and environmental health experts.

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Local governments, indigenous and non-indigenous, large disaster such as Cyclone Yasi, the RRC position and state agencies were invited to be part of the working would be filled by a state government representative group. Acceptance required nomination of a contact who functions as the Operations Officer or a similar person from an environmental health or disaster- position in an Incident Management Team within related field. CPHU facilitated the working group, which Queensland Health. If this was the case, the role of the included discussions, communication and organisation of RRC would be transferred to local government when meetings. The group consisted of representatives from a capacity permits. Alternatively, the RRC could be a local range of local governments including Cairns, Cassowary government representative or any other appropriate Coast, Cook, Pormpuraaw, Tablelands, Yarrabah, person. The key is to ensure this type of position is and Weipa. There was also active participation from agreed, identified and filled. Emergency Management Queensland and the Australian Red Cross. The RRC would deploy teams of two EHOs to undertake assessments of public health risks in selected communities and evacuation centres. The Integrated framework term ‘community’ refers to a selected suburb, area or town. The application of this term is at the discretion Based on lessons from recent natural disasters and of the RRC. A community-wide assessment may take working group discussions, an integrated framework approximately two hours and an evacuation centre up to was identified as the preferred approach for preparing an hour. A decision on the communities and evacuation for and responding to environmental health risks centres assessed would be made by the RRC. Before associated with disasters. The framework includes a team is deployed, the RRC would provide a detailed a response guide, an environmental health rapid briefing of the situation and areas to be assessed. assessment tool, and an evacuation centre checklist. These were developed as part of this project. The information gathered by EHOs in the field is provided to the RRC. The RRC is responsible for assessing information gathered and disseminating it to Response Guide the Local Disaster Management Group (LDMG) public health representative and other agencies deemed An Environmental Health Disaster Response Guide necessary. The LDMG and other agencies use the (Figure 1) provides an overview of the processes information to develop an evidence-based response involved in ensuring an effective response to a disaster. strategy. The RRC periodically deploys teams of EHOs to The objective is to provide a systematic approach for monitor the response. gathering public health information after a disaster and providing this to decision-makers in a timely manner. For successful implementation of this guide it is The primary role of local and state government EHOs recommended that triggers in disaster management is to determine the environmental health risks and plans be agreed and identified for appointing an RRC. priorities from a community perspective. For example, when a severe cyclone, such as Larry or Yasi (categories 4 and 5, respectively, at landfall) Environmental health assessments would be is imminent an RRC is appointed and a pool of EHOs Asbestos containing material littered private, public and state land undertaken within 72 hours of a disaster to identify placed on stand-by. community-wide risks and priorities. The environmental health rapid assessment form and evacuation centre This guide should be consistent whether the work is checklist would be used to ensure consistency in completed by local, state or federal governments. The the information gathered. Ongoing assessments are question of who conducts this work requires further conducted using these forms or modified versions to aid discussion, however, it should be dependent on the size the community’s recovery and re-building efforts. This of the disaster and the capacity for the local is particularly important to ensure the effectiveness of government to respond. Where disaster, such as interventions is monitored and guide transition from cyclones Larry or Yasi, overwhelms local government response and recovery phases of disaster management. resources, assistance will be required from other This type of process has been used successfully in agencies and all levels of government to address public the United States when responding to hurricanes, health risks. floods and ice storms (Rubin, 2005). Information gathered from such assessments allows responders to understand the public health issues, actual numbers Environmental health of resources needed, and the messages required for rapid assessment tool affected residents (Rubin, 2005). Tidal surge destroyed some houses Raw sewage in swimming pool One of the key lessons learned following the response The environmental health rapid response teams are led to cyclones Larry and Yasi was the lack of evidence- by a Rapid Response Coordinator (RRC). Depending on based and objective tools that allowed community- local arrangements, the teams would be made up of level environmental health rapid assessments. This EHOs from local and state governments to increase the resulted in insufficient information being collected and pool of resources available and ensure all public health collated to determine priority public health risks and jurisdictional responsibilities are covered. Ideally, in a interventions based on evidence. The public health

38 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Images: Queensland Health Damaged beachfront rock wall Mixed debris

Damage at Tully Heads (impacted by tidal surge) from Cyclone Yasi. Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

FIGURE 1. Environmental Health Disaster Response Guide.

risks and priorities identified in this situation should complete the rapid assessment tool as soon as access be accurate and timely. These can include inadequate permits (as outlined in Figure 1, ideally within water supply, waste, food and sanitation systems, which 72 hours). This enables a systematic approach to can have a direct, and potentially devastating, impact on identifying and reporting on environment health issues the health and livelihood of disaster-affected persons and priorities from a community perspective. As part (World Health Organization, 2004). To address this, the of the development process, Exercise Recon was held working group developed an environmental health rapid at Tully Heads, Queensland on 9 November 2011 to assessment tool. test the rapid assessment tool. Both assessment tools were designed for use in hard-copy or in an electronic The rapid assessment tool is a three-page form format to ensure adaptability for unique divided into the key environmental health themes. disaster situations. These include drinking water, sewerage, waste, asbestos, food safety, personal hygiene, vectors and The form concludes with a section for EHOs to prioritise chemical hazards. EHOs use their expertise to environmental health issues and priorities in-line with

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the key themes. The RRC uses the priority ratings as a Evacuation Centre Checklist guide on what actions may be required. Ultimately, any decision made on the response strategy will be made by Mass gatherings, such as those at evacuation centres, the LDMG with advice from the RRC and other experts. present some of the most complex management challenges faced by governments. The influx of large EHOs are not expected to conduct detailed assessments numbers of people and the infrastructure needed can of specific issues (e.g. determining methods for waste place a severe strain on public health systems and disposal and food business inspections) and implement services. This may compromise the ability to detect solutions. The information gathered is provided to the developing problems and make effective responses RRC. It provides a platform for a LDMG and other experts (World Health Organization, 2009). to develop a response strategy.

Asbestos containing material littered private, public and state land

Tidal surge destroyed some houses Raw sewage in swimming pool Images: Queensland Health Damaged beachfront rock wall Mixed debris

Damage at Tully Heads (impacted by tidal surge) from Cyclone Yasi.

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Pre-exercise briefing to participants

Field tests allowed participants to test the tools and make assessments Images: Queensland Health Post-exercise briefing

Field exercise, Exercise Recon, was useful to test the rapid assessment tools and get feedback from participants.

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To address this risk, the evacuation centre checklist working group and the establishment of a specialised was developed for EHOs to use before and after an team of EHOs from local and state governments evacuation centre is opened. The checklist provides in northern Queensland who can undertake rapid guidance for managers on the minimum environmental assessments of communities to determine the health standards. The development of the checklist environmental health risks and priorities. A key element Pre-exercise briefing to participants involved a review of literature and adapting relevant of forming such a team is identifying co-ordinators and items from national and international documents. ensuring access to a suitable training course. This included the: Due to resource constraints it is going to be a challenge • Environmental Health Assessment Form for Shelters to build on the achievements of this project. The risk - developed by the Centers for Disaster Control and is that momentum is lost, and attention is only paid Prevention (United States of America) to this area in the context of the next disaster. This • Sphere project – humanitarian charter and minimum does not allow for the other preparations described standards in humanitarian response before an event occurs that would permit informed • Emergency Management Australia Manual 12 – Safe decision-making and response. Funding has now and Healthy Mass Gatherings A Health, Medical and ceased, however, there are tangible benefits that can be Safety Planning Manual for Public Events, and used to enhance disaster preparedness and response • consultation with the working group and the activities. One solution may be for local governments to Australian Red Cross. formally adopt the response guide and tools developed The checklist is a two-page form and is segmented by including these in their public health disaster into various sections including general overview, power management plans. Such an approach would ensure supply, sanitation, food and water, waste, vectors, EHOs across northern Queensland use similar systems health (surveillance) and pets. EHOs use their expertise and tools which would streamline disaster response to complete the form and some information is pre- activities and ultimately mitigate public health risks. populated from the evacuation centre managers (e.g. number of occupants). The checklist provides a process for identifying environment health issues and priorities Conclusion at evacuation centres. The project has enhanced the ability of local and As with the rapid assessment tool, the information state government departments to address key gathered is provided to the RRC. It then informs the environmental health risks after a disaster. This LDMG and other experts when developing a response has been achieved through the development of an strategy to environmental health issues at environmental health response guide, environmental evacuation centres. health rapid assessment tool and an evacuation centre Field tests allowed participants to test the tools and make assessments checklist. These achievements provide a framework for allowing the environmental health risks after a disaster to be systematically identified and collated Discussion for decision-makers. However, due to resource This project demonstrated that providing an objective constraints there is a risk of the achievements being forum for local and state governments can be an lost and the collection of baseline data and creation effective way to solve issues requiring multi-agency of a specialised team of EHOs remaining incomplete. solutions. Communication between EHOs across To address this concern, it is recommended that local northern Queensland has strengthened, a response governments formally adopt the response guide and guide was developed, a rapid assessment tool and tools developed. This will allow priority areas to be evacuation centre checklists have been adopted. To identified in a timely manner and ensure appropriate complement these achievements, the development of a interventions based on evidence, all of which is vital database indicating baseline public health information for protecting livelihoods and mitigating public health is required. risks after a disaster.

A current understanding of the public health status of Images: Queensland Health Post-exercise briefing populations and infrastructure from an environmental Acknowledgements health perspective is incomplete in northern Queensland. This would include gathering information Far North Queensland Public Health Disaster Field exercise, Exercise Recon, was useful to test the rapid about areas likely to have buildings with asbestos Management Working Group. Mr Alex Skubij, Principal assessment tools and get feedback from participants. containing materials, the type of sewerage systems Environmental Health Officer, Cairns Regional Council. in various suburbs, sewage overflow points, water Mr Daryl Hanger, Australian Red Cross. Emergency infrastructure including access to chemical suppliers, Management Queensland. The residents of Tully Heads waste disposal sites, emergency food and water who participated in Exercise Recon. suppliers, etc. The development of such a baseline database allows decision-makers to immediately understand the public health impacts of a disaster Further information (Wilson, 2005). Please contact Ben at [email protected]. Ongoing activities are required to sustain momentum of the project. This would include regular meetings of the

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References About the authors Degutis, L., 2008, Public health systems and public health preparedness, Yale Centre for Public Health Preparedness, Ben Ryan is an Environmental Health Officer (EHO) with Queensland Health and doctoral candidate at New Haven, Connecticut. James Cook University. He has worked as an EHO during responses to cyclone’s Larry and Yasi, 2006 Hazard Risk Assessment Instrument, Centre for UCLA, , facilitated delivery of health services to asylum Public Health and Disasters, viewed 20 June 2011, http://www. seekers and worked in public health at all levels of cphd.ucla.edu/resources.html government in Australia.

Rubin, C., 2005, National Centre for Environmental Health, Brad Milligan is Manager of Environmental Health Center for Disease Control and Prevention, USA in: Hooke, Services for the Cairns Public Health Unit. In this W. & Rogers, P., 2005, Public Health Risks of Disasters – role he oversaw and co-ordinated environmental health and public health aspects of the response Communication, Infrastructure and Preparedness – Workshop to Cyclone Yasi and represented Queensland Health Summary, National Academies Press, Washington DC, p. 40. on the Innisfail District Disaster Management Group. Based on this experience and 17 years of work in TFQCDM/WADEM, 2002, Health Disaster Management: environmental health at local and state government Guidelines for Evaluation and Research in the “Utstein Style”, in North Queensland he initiated and sponsored Chapter 3: Overview and concepts, Prehospital Disaster this project. Medicine, vol. 17, no. 3, pp:31–55, viewed 18 June 2011, http:// www.wadem.org/guidelines/intro.pdf Geoff Wilson is Manager of Environmental Services for Cassowary Coast Regional Council. During Wilson, S., 2005, National Institute of Environmental Health the response to Cyclone Yasi he co-ordinated the environmental health and waste management Sciences, USA, in: Hooke, W. & Rogers, P., 2005, Public Health aspects from a local government perspective. He is Risks of Disasters – Communication, Infrastructure and a member of the Local Disaster Management Group Preparedness – Workshop Summary, National Academies and has seven years local government management Press, Washington DC, p. 41. experience in North Queensland. This has included overseeing the environmental health response by World Health Organization, 2004, Water and Disasters - Cardwell Shire Council to Cyclone Larry. Geoff used Leading Off, Health in Emergencies, No. 19. these experiences to play a vital role in steering a partnership between local and state government World Health Organization, 2009, WHO Global Forum on agencies during this project. Mass Gatherings: Rome, Italy - October 26 - 29, 2009, World Dr Annie Preston-Thomas is a Public Health Health Organization, Geneva. Registrar in the Cairns Public Health Unit and a Fellow of the Royal Australian College of General Practice, with over ten years experience working in community-controlled health services. Annie used this experience and her research skills to assist in developing the evacuation centre checklist, a major component of this project.

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 43 Perceptions of institutional and social response to frequent flooding in an Australian rural town Ian Manock, Dr Rabiul Islam, Prof John Hicks, Dr Richard B. Sappey and Dr Valerie Ingham (Charles Sturt University) consider aspects of community emergency management.

ABSTRACT

This study of a small rural flood-prone Background Australian community, explores the For some time, the disaster management literature perceptions of established approaches to has explored the relative strengths and weaknesses emergency management by the community, of two divergent approaches. The first is what may generally be referred to as the ‘technocratic approach’ particularly the roles ascribed to institutions (Hewitt 1983), or more readily the ‘government-led’ and social capital. The tentative findings approach. This encapsulates elements of bureaucracy and interpretation suggest a combination and technology which signify assumptions of rationality of institutional and social capital factors and functionality in the foundations of the approach. at work through the established stages This relates to their application in terms of structures, processes, systems, techniques and practices. These (prevention, preparation, response are generally housed within the institutions of the state, and recovery) and overall process of particularly government, military, police and, crucially, flood management. A key finding is a the state-based emergency service organisations which predominating attitude of dependency on depend on volunteers drawn from the community. This institutions. remains the dominant approach despite the evidence that disasters in all their forms frequently overwhelm the institutions established to control them (Alexander 2002; Lindell, et al. 2007; Phillips, et al. 2010). Introduction The second approach may be referred to as the The town of Molong has a population of 2,515 (ABS, ‘socially-constructed approach’. This concept seems to 2012) and is located 300 kilometres west of Sydney, have emerged in large part to serve as an alternative NSW and 30 kilometres from the city of Orange, to the ‘technocratic approach’. The basis is that risk the principal centre for employment and services is partially socially constructed rather than taken as for the region. Historically, Molong has experienced given (Miller 2009, p.169) which opens the way for non- flooding from the Molong Creek which runs near some institutional approaches, particularly those involving residential areas and the central business district the development of social capital within communities (CBD). Floods or threats of flooding (particularly leading (Portes 1998). In general, social capital refers to the to sandbagging preparations) have occurred most structures, processes and cultures that generate recently in 1995, 2005, 2010 and 2012 (Central Western and maintain trust, co-operation and cohesion. This Daily, 2010a; Central Western Daily, 2010b; Central social capital can, in turn, be used by institutions Western Daily, 2012). In 2005, flooding caused damage and the community to improve risk management—a to houses on the floodplain and to business premises in socially constructed, rather than a technocratic based, the CBD (ABC Rural, 2005). According to the NSW State improvement (Hewitt 1983; Tierney 2007; Norris, et Emergency Service (2007), the flood caused extensive al. 2008). Some of the literature has developed these damage to 30 buildings, eight people were rescued, 28 contested approaches (Quarantelli 1998) and applied businesses were sandbagged, and the occupants of 12 them using different characteristics. For example houses were evacuated. The persistence of flooding ‘vulnerability’ versus ‘resilience’ (Phillips, et al. 2010, and the ensuing damage in a relatively old and settled p.13) and a different way of thinking, for example, ‘…that part of Australia is interesting because it suggests resilience is a process that leads to adaptation, not an a failure to adequately prevent damage to people’s outcome, not stability’ (Norris et al. 2008, p.144). homes, assets and livelihoods despite improvement in floodplain risk management (Keys, 2006). Importantly for research purposes, Alexander (2002, pp.212-3) notes that the gap between the approaches means there is a question of the distribution and forms

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of control, particularly between state institutions and involvement at one or more phases of flooding as a communities. In short, much of the literature has process (e.g. Cottrell, 2005; Gissing, et al. 2010), and understandably relied on a spectrum of theoretical in relation to bushfire preparedness (Frandsen, et al. approaches that have ‘a technological approach’ at one 2012). Moving in this direction makes assumptions end and ‘a socially-constructed approach’ at the other. about the blending of social capital and institutions The task is to examine and draw useful conclusions in depending on the precision of the concept of resilience terms of how these are blended. The case study data as an explanatory tool and as a basis for practical revealed that the reality for Molong was somewhere methods of dealing with emergencies. Gissing, et al. between the extremities of the technological approach (2010, p.44) provide a guide to this direction, crucially and the socially-constructed approach. Social capital identifying the need for ‘cultural change within the encompasses relationships and wider networks at one emergency management agencies’ and ‘further extreme, and institutions, which are primarily state- engagement … to ensure stronger partnerships … funded and/or controlled in whole or with permanent between agencies and the community’. managerial functions overlaying a volunteer base, at the other. Thus it is possible to view the institutional The relationship between the two approaches to and social approaches to disaster management as two disaster management is explored. In particular, extremes of a continuum. Any given disaster situation the relationship between established political and will exhibit a mixture of both institutional and social disaster management institutions and institutional responses and can be represented by a point on this arrangements, and the espoused attitudes of the continuum. community and the social capital which underpins and/or arises out of these attitudes. The purpose is to This broad spectrum of approaches has become identify differences and similarities in terms of the two integrated into emergency management in Australia. approaches and to identify the elements of each which There has been a growth in attempts to analyse and leads to enhanced resilience. This is in the context of promote different approaches which fall between the the four-phase (prevention, preparation, response and extremities of the theoretical spectrum which rest recovery) approach to flood management as found in on the notion of resilience. Some of the literature the literature. emphasises the role of policy at both state and local government levels, particularly the implication that planned development incorporates flood mitigation Research methods within an established institutional context and that such an approach is critical to community resilience The research was conducted in early 2012. Background (Thomas, et al. 2011, p.15). On the other hand, the material on the town and the town’s history of flooding notion of resilience is associated with the role of was obtained. Prime source data was gathered in two communities themselves, in part at least, assuming a stages with the assistance of the regional SES. First, a greater role for social capital. However, some of the postal survey of 772 households was conducted which literature has moved towards integrating institutional generated a response rate of 7.3 per cent (57 useable approaches from within state and community responses). Subsequently a follow-up town meeting Images: Ian Manock

Flood waters reached the front door sill of the gallery at the intersection of Gidley Street and Mitchell Highway.

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FIGURE 1. Self-reported preparedness in Molong FIGURE 3. Most likely expectation of help source in in 2012 (Percentages)*. Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*.

was held to which all residents were invited. The mayor, order of preference in some questions, i.e. tick more several councillors, staff from the local SES, a number than one box. Unfortunately, the low response rate of local business leaders, and 26 residents attended the to the survey precluded advanced statistical analysis meeting. Attendees were asked a series of questions beyond basic descriptive results. Therefore, the findings designed to refine and deepen the survey data. It was at and the conclusions drawn from the survey must be this meeting that a clearer understanding of the reasons interpreted as indicative rather than conclusive. When behind the small survey response rate was presented by examined in association with responses from the community members attending. community meeting, a clearer picture of the town’s preparedness and issues relating to the flooding hazard The survey was constructed in terms of the three-phase and the psychosocial impact on residents emerged. approach to flood management. It included questions about specific dimensions of Molong flooding. The survey allowed participants to respond in a prioritised

FIGURE 2. First choice of public warning systems FIGURE 4. Who did help in the response phase in in Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*. Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*.

46 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready FIGURE 1. Self-reported preparedness in Molong Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013 in 2012 (Percentages)*.

Research findings and analysis FIGURE 5. Which institutions provided help in the response phase in Molong in 2012 Preparedness (Percentages)*. Respondent perception of their preparedness for flooding was relatively high. Figure 1 shows that 80 per cent said they assessed they were prepared ‘moderately’ (29.4 per cent), ‘well’ (27.5 per cent), and ‘totally’ (23.5 per cent). In addition, a large majority stated they had insurance cover of home (86.5 per cent), contents (80.8 per cent), and vehicle (65.4 per cent).

Emergency warnings take two broad forms: • informal and largely individual, and • official public. The highest informal warning response (first choice) was weather reports (42.3 per cent) followed by rising river levels (13.5 per cent). The highest public warning sources (first choice) were SES personnel FIGURE 2. First choice of public warning systems doorknock (30 per cent), radio (26 per cent), television in Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*. (20 per cent), SMS (2 per cent), and email (2 per cent).

Figure 2 illustrates the respondents’ preferred method of receiving a warning. This was by SES personnel doorknock (43.1 per cent). For the preparedness phase, warning systems continue to be critical. Whether by general weather reports or specific warnings, the Recovery FIGURE 3. Most likely expectation of help source in Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*. systems most reported as being relied on in Molong are In response to the question about recovery, those emanating from institutions. 52.1 per cent of respondents said they recovered ‘well’ or ‘completely’ compared to 47.9 per cent who said that Response they ‘did not recover’ or ‘just’ recovered. Responses at the town meeting supported this finding and also In terms of response, the survey compared an identified that there were some divisions, particularly expectation of who would help and the reality of who did economic or financial, between community members help. The ‘most likely’ expectation (see Figure 3) was who recovered from the flooding and those who the SES (44.2 per cent) followed by family and local experienced continuing problems resulting from the government (each 17.3 per cent). Neighbours flooding. In terms of the expectation of recovery costs constituted 1.9 per cent. (see Figure 6), respondents stated they relied on family In terms of the ‘second most likely’ expectation, state and friends (32.4 per cent), state government government and the fire brigade were each 7.7 per cent, (21.6 per cent), Federal government (10.8 per cent), FIGURE 4. Who did help in the response phase in community organisations were 5.8 per cent, and community appeals (8.1 per cent), local government and Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*. friends were 1.9 per cent. In short, the expectation was community organisations (5.4 per cent each), and primarily a perception that institutions would play the businesses (2.7 per cent). Clearly, in terms of the most significant role in assistance. expectation as to who would assist them financially, people valued family and friends before institutions. In Figure 4 shows the multiple answers to the response terms of the most beneficial source of recovery phase question ‘…who did help…’. Results suggest a information, respondents rated local government more extensive role for the community, particularly (39.1 per cent) and the SES (21.7 per cent) as the two neighbours (64.7 per cent), friends (58.5 per cent), and most important sources. The other three main family (41.2 per cent). However, the role played by categories were the Federal government, businesses, FIGURE 6. Expectation of reliance of recovery cost institutions (see Figure 5) was also significant with SES and family and friends (each 6.5 per cent). Thus, while in Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*. (64.7 per cent), community organisations (38.2 per cent), community members relied more on family and friends local government (35.3 per cent), and local business to assist with the recovery costs, the local government (26.5 per cent). and SES were the greater source of recovery information. The findings indicate a discrepancy between expectation and reality. Interestingly, the role of people in the The survey attempted to assess the strength of the community is undervalued whereas the role of the key community in several ways. An assessment of a emergency institution (the SES) is valued relatively ‘sense of community’ was explored with a majority highly in terms of both expectation and reality. of respondents stating that it had improved over time (52 per cent) with 36 per cent stating that it had ‘remained the same’ and 4 per cent stating that it had ‘deteriorated a lot’.

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no such experience of psychological distress. However, FIGURE 6. Expectation of reliance of recovery cost 45 per cent of respondents did report psychological in Molong in 2012 (Percentages)*. distress at various levels. Among the respondents who reported that they experienced some level of distress, 33 per cent (14.9 per cent of all respondents) asserted that the level of the distress was large to a great degree. While 66 per cent did not have any sense of abandonment or isolation in the aftermath of the flood, 14.6 per cent did report that they experienced a large to a great degree of such emotional upset. The findings indicate that the SES and government organisations need to incorporate an effective mental health support system and psychological recovery framework in their preparedness program for this flood-prone regional country town (see IASC, 2007).

Prevention and mitigation Almost all respondents, 55 out of 57, responded to the question ‘What do you believe should happen to improve future flood management in Molong?’. Almost all respondents identified maintenance of Molong Creek through clearing debris and improved design and construction of drainage systems to prevent the damming of floodwater so that water can flow away In terms of levels of ‘co-operation and help’, faster. A few respondents mentioned an improved 29.5 per cent stated they had experienced this to a ‘very building permission and buyback system for buildings great degree’, 27.3 per cent to ‘a degree’, 25 per cent on the floodplain. In other words, the experience of to a ‘large degree’, 9.1 per cent to a ‘very little degree’, those who answered this question related to technical and 9.1 per cent ‘not experienced at all’. Only moderate preventative and/or mitigating solutions to the problem. response rates were found in terms of ‘making new friends’, ‘bringing family closer together’ and ‘increased The repetitive nature of flooding indicates that the town involvement in the community’. The results suggest that is vulnerable to loss of, or damage to, residences and social capital is improving, providing greater resources businesses. This has the consequence of perceived for a socially-constructed outcome. depreciation of property and inventory values. Consequentially there was a stifling effect on the The perceived psychological impact of flooding was potential of the town to develop and sustain economic also assessed by asking whether respondents felt growth, in some part due to the impact of flooding on helpless, vulnerable and despair in the aftermath of the the businesses within the town’s CBD. One attendee flooding. Around 54 per cent of respondents reported at the community meeting stated “the business centre Images: Ian Manock

At the intersection of Gidley Street and Mitchell Highway floodwaters lapped the bottom of the petrol pumps at the BP Service Station.

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here, has never recovered. Never recovered since 2005. endeavoured to improve the warning regime through Um...as a matter of fact any business that’s here and still earlier doorknocking and issuing specific community operative...they’re all hanging. Just hanging.” While this can bulletins through the media. It was clear from the be the result of a number of factors–including general survey responses and the meeting that the volunteer economic conditions and/or drought–the respondent organisations (SES and Bush Fire Brigade) were praised clearly attributed it to the flooding since 2005. for their past work and valued through all phases of flooding. Given the history of flooding, it seems reasonable to conclude that for whatever reasons (probably those It is possible to argue that social capital is an integral involving public funding of preventive infrastructure part of community organisations and business and that by governments and the resilience of the population community organisations and businesses have a role to to recover) improvement is likely to be slow and play in building up social capital. The results suggest intermittent. Possible solutions include governments that, in terms of assistance during flooding and buying houses in the most vulnerable parts of the town. recovery phases, friends, neighbours and family were At the time of the research there was no indication that important. In other words, the non-institutional forms government, at any level, was addressing the problem in from which social capital is drawn, remains a clear terms of a significant solution. The community identified element of the town’s response to flooding. It is that the most desirable mitigation option was a series interesting that the elements of social capital of technical changes to preventing water from entering (structures, processes and cultures that generate and the most vulnerable parts of the town, including the maintain trust, co-operation and cohesion) were not CBD. This has not materialised. At the meeting it was specifically identified as a key source of surviving the identified that the local government had stated that the flooding, nor extensively discussed in terms of value construction of a levy system on the Molong Creek was and/or criticism. Nevertheless, it did emerge in various too expensive. forms. For example, one resident at the meeting mentioned the local newsagent proprietor whose At the community meeting, one resident said 200 building was destroyed, and that ‘…the morning after the people had attended a meeting after the 2005 flood, flood he had a table on the front and was selling but far fewer people attended the meeting arranged for newspapers. And I thought that was the greatest thing he this study. One member of the Molong flood mitigation could have done because it gave us some familiar part of committee stated, “The saddest thing coming in here our lives…’. By contrast, some institutions, particularly tonight is the number of people here. This place should governments as opposed to the volunteer organisations, be packed, but the reason it’s not packed is because were extensively criticised primarily on the basis that everybody knows that nothing is being done. After all they did not perform the role that the respondents the trouble we’ve been going through for the last 15 expected them to perform. This blaming is common years to get something done....and expenditure in water after the impact of hazardous events and can be reports and feasibility studies...and it’s all come to the expected from a public forum. As Holmes (2010, p.389) fact that nothing can be done.” The community simply points out, “Looking for someone to blame might satisfy feels powerless to influence the management of the our base desires but will it really help us next time flooding hazard to the town. The SES regional staff had around?”. For example residents were critical of the NSW Department of Primary Industry Office of Water for not doing more to undertake upstream mitigation activities on the Molong Creek which was regarded as a way to reduce the impact of flooding in Molong.

Conclusion The most significant finding of this case study is the perception that the established institutional framework at large, but specific organisations such as the SES, local and state governments and community organisations, would play the most significant roles throughout most phases of flooding. This is despite the fact that community members, families and friends were those who provided support. Institutions provided information and some financial relief. It is reasonable to draw the conclusion that the people who responded to the research questions in the survey and attended the meeting were viewing the problem and solutions to it through a technological lens. Most

Image: Ian Manock significant was the related and consistent value placed on institutions. In doing so, this supported and perhaps Molong Railway Bridge showing estimated flood height on entrenched a belief which constituted dependency on the electrical box. those institutions. The fact that the town continues to Molong Railway Bridge showing estimated flood height on the electrical box.

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be vulnerable to flooding and there is no guarantee Holmes, A., 2010, A reflection on the Bushfire Royal of significant improvement in institutional responses, Commission – Blame, accountability and responsibility, the only logical conclusion is that Molong will be at Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 69, No. 4, risk of flooding and the community will suffer the pp.387-391. physical, psychological, environmental and economic consequences that flooding causes. Unless there is a IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial change in the perceived attitudes of both institutions Support in Emergency Settings, 2007. www. and the community, little can be done to build humanitarianinfo.org/iasc. Accessed 18 September, 2012. community resilience to inevitable flooding events. Keys, C., 2006, The Evolution of Floodplain Risk Management and Real-time Flood Management in New South Wales, The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 21, No. 1, References pp.3-8. ABC Rural, 2005, Molong Assesses Flood Damage, 8/11/2005, Lindell, M. K., C. Prater and R. W. Perry. 2007. Introduction www.abc.net.au/rural/content/2005/s1500367.htm. Accessed 30 to Emergency Management Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley May 2012. and Sons. Alexander, D. 2002. “From Civil Defence to Civil Protection Miller, K. D. (2009). Organizational risk after modernism. – and Back Again.” Disaster Prevention and Management 11: Organization Studies, Vol. 30(02-03), pp.157-180. 209-13. Norris, F. H., Stevens, S. P., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2011 Census F. and Pfefferbaum, R. L. 2008, Community resilience as a QuickStats, 27/11/2012 www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/census_ metaphor, theory, set of capacities and strategy for disaster services/getproduct/census/2011/quickstat/SSC11572?opendoc readiness, American Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 41, ument&navpos=220. Accessed 27 November 2012 pp.127-50. Central Western Daily, 2010a, Molong Floods, 12/8/2010, Phillips, D. B., Thomas, D. S. K., Fothergill, A. and Blinn- www.centralwesterndaily.com.au/news/local/news/general/ Pike, L. (eds.), 2010, Social vulnerability to disasters, Taylor molong-floods/1911297.aspx. Accessed 30 May 2012 and Francis, Baton Rouge, Florida. Central Western Daily, 2010b, Molong Being Sandbagged, Portes, A. 1998, Social Capital: its Origins and Applications in 9/12/2010, www.centralwesterndaily.com.au/news/local/news/ Modern Sociology, Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 24, pp.1-24. general/molong-being-sandbagged/2021636/aspx. Accessed 30 May 2012. Quarantelli, E. L. (ed.), 1998, What is a disaster? Perspectives on the question, Routledge, London Central Western Daily, 2012, Flood Watch Issued for Orange and Molong, 27/2/2012, www.centralwesterndaily.com.au/ State Emergency Service (SES), 2007, New Molong news/local/news/general/flood-watch-issued-for-orange-and- FloodSafe Guide Launched, www.ses.nsw.gov.au/news/ molong/269086.aspx. Accessed 30 May 2012. archive-2007/new-molong-floodsafe-guide-launched. Accessed 30 May, 2012. Coles, E. and Buckle, P., 2004, Developing Community Resilience as a Foundation for Effective Disaster Recovery, The Tierney, K. J., 2007, From the margins to the mainstream? Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 19, No. 4, Disaster research at the crossroads, Annual Review of p.615. Sociology, Vol. 33, pp.503-525.

Cottrell, A., 2005, Sometimes it’s a Big Ask, but Sometimes Thomas, M., King, D., Keogh, D. U., Apan, A. and Mushtaq, it’s a Big Outcome: Community Participation in Flood S., 2011, Resilience to Climate Change Impacts: A Review of Mitigation, Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. Flood Mitigation Policy in Queensland, Australia, Australian 20, No. 3, pp.27-32. Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp.8-17.

Frandsen, M., Paton, D. and Sakariassen, K., 2012, Fostering Community Bushfire Preparedness through Engagement and Empowerment, Australian Journal of About the authors Emergency Management, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp.23-30. Ian Manock, Dr Rabiul Islam, Prof John Hicks, Dr Richard B. Sappey and Dr Valerie Ingham are Gissing, A., Keys, C. and Opper, S., 2010, Towards Resilience members of the Bangladesh Australia Disaster Against Flood Risks, The Australian Journal of Emergency Research Group Charles Sturt University. They Management, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp.39-45. research community expectations and experiences of emergency management, risk perception and Hewitt, K. (ed.), 1983, Interpretations of calamity: from the social capital and aim to develop a multi-disciplinary viewpoint of human ecology, Allen and Unwin, Boston. and cross-cultural model which will strengthen community resilience.

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FLOOD RISK INFORMATION PORTAL

As part of Phase 1 of the four-year National Flood Risk Information Project (NFRIP, started 1 July 2012), the government launched the Flood Risk Information Portal in November 2012. A main aim of the project is to make existing flood information available from a central location. The web portal is hosted by Geoscience Australia and will be enhanced and updated throughout the life of the project.

What information will be available from the Portal?

The initial phase included significant enhancements to the Australian Flood Studies Database (AFSD) that now contains information on over 1300 existing flood studies. In some cases, digital flood studies are available. A user-friendly interface enables planners, insurers, engineering consultants, and the public to access flood information. Summary information on each flood study is provided, including: • how the study was done • what data was used • what flood maps were produced and for what scenarios, and • the custodian and author (e.g. consultant) details.

Where the study included an assessment of damage, details such as estimates of annual average damage, or the number of properties affected during a flood of a particular likelihood will also be included.

The release also included a pilot series of maps derived from satellite imagery, showing the observed extent of floods over the previous six years for three key study areas: Condamine River, Queensland; Flinders and Norman Rivers, Queensland; and Goulburn and Loddon Rivers, Victoria. The maps can be used to understand where flooding has occurred across large rural regions where flood studies have not been performed.

During the initial phase, an agreement was signed with Engineers Australia to finalise the revision of the Australian Rainfall and Runoff. This national guideline provides technical information key to the development of future flood studies. This is a significant component of NFRIP as the guideline will improve the quality of future flood studies.

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 51 Fire development in focus Nathan Maddock, Communications Officer, Bushfire CRC explains how a team of Bushfire CRC researchers is investigating how bushfires develop.

ABSTRACT

All bushfires start small - how they progress to large fires that can impact on communities and cause wide-scale destruction is being studied by a team of Bushfire CRC researchers. Until now, the existing knowledge of fire behaviour and tools for prediction assumed steady-state spread of a fire. Understanding the chances of a fire occurring, as well as the likelihood of spot fires, is essential to understanding the behaviour of bushfires under all possible weather conditions. Bushfire CRC researchers Dr Andrew Sullivan and Jim Gould from CSIRO observe a fire in the Pyrotron.

The CRC team “These fires were lit at one particular point and then studied for a period of time, sometimes The Bushfire CRC team, comprising of Dr Andrew minutes, sometimes up to an hour, before they were Sullivan, Dr Miguel Cruz, Dr Peter Ellis, Jim Gould and extinguished,” he said. Dr Matt Plucinski, brings together fire behaviour and suppression specialists from the CSIRO with the Bureau In conjunction with the historical data, the team is of Meteorology’s atmospheric boundary layer conducting tests using the CSIRO Pyrotron and vertical meteorologists. wind tunnel. The Pyrotron is horizontal wind tunnel where fires can be studied under repeatable conditions Three key aspects are being investigated: in safety. The vertical wind tunnel allows samples to be burnt at their terminal velocities. Bushfire CRC researchers Dr Andrew Sullivan and Jim Gould • the potential for a fire to start from CSIRO observe a fire in the Pyrotron. • the potential for a fire to be beyond initial first attack, “We cannot control all the variables in field research and and it’s very hard to be in the right place at the right • once a fire starts spotting, when will these spot fires time to make observations.” be beyond initial first attack. Understanding these important phases of fire development helps clarify resource demands placed on fire brigades, provides greater confidence in preseason planning, and assists in issuing public warnings.

Dr Andrew Sullivan is the Bushfire CRC research leader for the project and Senior Research Scientist at the CSIRO. He said the team is looking at the problem from a number of different perspectives.

“We are taking a multi-pronged approach to the research which includes considering a large number of experimental fires that were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s by Alan McArthur and his associates. The Pyrotron allows fires to be studied safely.

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“We’re looking at the rate of growth of fires that were at The probability that a firebrand will ignite once it different sizes when ignited. touches the ground is influenced by its state (flaming or glowing) and its mass when it lands. These “The McArthur experiments play an important part characteristics can only be measured by burning in fire science; science that is still used today. The firebrands at their terminal velocity in the vertical wind experimental fires conducted in the ‘50s and ‘60s have tunnel. been instrumental in the development of the current McArthur fire danger rating systems for forests and “Spotting is one of those aspects of bushfire behaviour grasslands,” said Dr Sullivan. that’s been recognised for many years, and has been investigated a number of times, but is so complex. In addition to developing the fire danger rating Spotting behaviour can fluctuate in response to systems, a vast amount of data was collected during variations in fuel, topography and weather, as well as McArthur’s experimental fires that wasn’t used. This is interactions with the atmosphere. These three aspects the data that Dr Sullivan and his team are drawing on. For example, the rate of growth, which is how fast a fire of the project come together to help predict the spread will develop from a point ignition to a fire that is burning of a fire. at its steady state, wasn’t analysed in the past. “We want to be able to provide fire authorities with Point ignition refers to fires that start at one particular better information on the potential of a fire to be point, such as a lightning strike or from a discarded beyond initial first attack by the time the first fire crew cigarette. This is distinct from fires that may have gets to the site. been burning for some time, or lit in a line, such as “If a fire is beyond the first crew’s control, then prescribed fires. This also includes spot fires. fire authorities need to move to the next phase of “Spot fires are fires that have been started during a suppression,” said Dr Sullivan. bushfire by firebrands lofted ahead of the main fire, or brand new fires – either intentionally or accidentally lit. Simon Heemstra, Manager of Community Planning at the New South Wales Rural Fire Service (RFS), is the “A firebrand can be any type of fuel that becomes lead end user for the project and believes it has the airborne while still burning, such as twigs or bark. potential to fill a major gap in fire behaviour predictions. How easily a firebrand becomes airborne and how far it can be transported is determined by its shape and its “The implications for both the RFS and firefighting terminal velocity while burning,” explained Dr Sullivan. agencies in general are significant.

Firebrands with relatively low terminal velocities (five “A greater understanding of fire growth during the metres per second or less) will become airborne more initial development of a fire has the potential to efficiently than those with relatively high terminal increase the accuracy of fire spread predictions. velocities (eight metres per second or more). How far This helps to warn and protect communities as it will ahead a fire will spot is determined by a firebrand’s increase the accuracy of the predictions of what time a flameout and burnout time. Flameout time is the fire may impact. length of time that a firebrand remains flaming during flight, while burnout time is the total combustion time. “The project also has the potential to increase suppression efficiency, and assist in better resource allocation. This may enable fires to be contained faster, increasing the number of fires that can be contained on days when there are many fires occurring,” he said.

The outcome of the research project will be an increased understanding of fire behaviour that can be incorporated into existing fire behaviour modelling systems or used to improve planning for prescribed burning operations.

The aim is to provide support for fire managers evolved in decision-making, including community warnings, planning, operations, monitoring and assessment.

More information is available at http://www.bushfirecrc.com/research.

Dr Peter Ellis demonstrates how the vertical wind tunnel Dr Peter Ellis demonstrates how the vertical wind tunnel allows firebrand samples (circled) to be burnt at their References terminal velocities in the laboratory, as though they were allows firebrand samples (circled) to be burnt at their terminal velocities in the laboratory, as though they were actually in flight. Bushfire CRC Fire Note, issue 94, http://www.bushfirecrc. actually in flight. com/firenotes

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 53 2012 Resilient Australia Awards: building a disaster resilient Australia

Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

B u ild i n g a d i s a s ter r e silient A u str a l i a

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL – 6 DECEMBER 2012 B u ild i n g a d i s a s ter r e silient A u str a l i a On behalf of The Hon. Nicola Roxon, Attorney-General and Minister for Emergency Management Ms Gai Brodtmann MP, Member for Canberra attended the Awards ceremony to congratulate award recipients. “The Resilient Australia Awards recognise innovative practices that are making our communities safer, stronger, more resilient and better prepared to manage any emergency situation. “Over the last few summer seasons Australia has experienced natural disasters the likes of which many of us have not experienced in our lifetimes. “While wild weather can be unpredictable, we can all be better prepared. “The winning projects and commendations for the Resilient Australia Awards show how communities across our nation are developing innovative and creative ways to better prepare for emergencies and disasters,” said Ms Brodtmann. Formerly known as the Australian Safer Communities Awards, the Resilient Australia Awards were renamed to reflect the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience.

Department of Primary Industries, Victoria Victorian Emergency Management Animal Welfare Plan The Victorian Black Saturday Bushfires Royal Commission recognised the bonds that people form with animals and the impact these bonds have on decision-making and safety during an emergency. The Emergency Animal Welfare Plan takes an all-hazards and an all- species approach to promote effective planning and management of animals in emergencies. The plan ensures that animals are better considered and protected from suffering during and immediately following an emergency incident.

Gai Brodtmann MP and Dr Brendan Tatham. STATE GOVERNMENT – HIGHLY COMMENDED

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ACT Emergency Services Agency ‘Spot’ - Single Point of Truth: emergency public information program The ACT’s Emergency Services Agency Media and Community Information Unit developed a system called SPOT to gather emergency details from the Territory’s emergency services, local media and social media sources. The information is monitored, assessed, compiled and distributed to the ESA website, senior officers, community outlets and the media as one message.

STATE GOVERNMENT – WINNER Gai Brodtmann MP and Darren Cutrupi.

Wyong Shire Council, NSW Natural Areas Bushfire Management Plan The Wyong Shire Bushfire Management Plan covers more than 3000 hectares of bushland on the NSW Central Coast, with a 66km-long urban interface. The plan includes a fire management plan that includes a review of fire breaks, an audit of fire trails, an analysis of the bush fire risk to a wide range of community assets including water and sewerage infrastructure, community buildings and telecommunications. It also includes an innovative community engagement activity to help take responsibility for improving their property bush fire protection.

Gai Brodtmann MP, Gina Vereker and David Lemcke. LOCAL GOVERNMENT – HIGHLY COMMENDED

Lockyer Valley Regional Council, Queensland Strengthening Grantham Project The small rural Queensland town of Grantham became the single most devastated community of the floods that swept across Queensland in January last year. The Strengthening Grantham Project is designed to protect human lives and critical infrastructure from future flooding. The township and community is moving to higher ground, out of the flood zone. It involves what is believed to be Australia’s first voluntary land swap agreement. This is an innovative and effective solution to relocating flood-prone communities.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT – WINNER Gai Brodtmann MP and Mayor Steve Jones.

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South Australian Veterinary Emergency Management Group ‘SAVEM’ Plan The SAVEM Plan enables the veterinary community in SA to be involved and responded effectively when an emergency incident occurs that involves animals, wildlife, livestock, companion animal, and pet care provided at evacuation centres. Over 100 response-ready volunteer vets and nurses have been trained, along with 40 team leaders. Regional co-ordination centres have been established and are prepared for rapid deployment during emergencies.

Gai Brodtmann MP, Dr Rachel Westcott and Emilis Prelgauskas. VOLUNTEER/COMMUNITY GROUP – HIGHLY COMMENDED

Lower Hunter Zone, NSW Fire Service Wollombi Community Firewise Program The four Group 8 Brigades of Wollombi, Laguna, Bucketty and Millfield developed an integrated community engagement program that includes community bushfire safety forums and presentations, bushfire survival planning workshops, a women’s bushfire safety group, burn workshops and an informal café, and property inspections with bushfire risk assessments and preparation advice. A key element to minimising risk is for the community to focus on understanding how to make the critical survival decision to leave early or stay and defend, following the national motto: PREPARE well, ACT decisively, and SURVIVE.

VOLUNTEER/COMMUNITY GROUP – HIGHLY COMMENDED Gai Brodtmann MP, Glenn O’Rourke and Leanne Bell.

‘Pigs might fly’ community, Victoria Pigs Might Fly – Community Resilience and Disaster Project The Pigs Might Fly project was devised by residents if the small farming and mining community of Carisbrook, two hours north of Melbourne which was devastated by flood in January 2011. The community shared their ‘recovery wishes’ and from that prioritised several projects to rebuild their town. Among the projects is the upgrading of a reserve and swimming area, restoring the old railway station, having an annual festival, creating a welcome kit for new residents, and making safer road crossings for horses.

Gai Brodtmann MP, Lyn Symons, Narelle Harrison, Helen Broad and Sonny Neale. VOLUNTEER/COMMUNITY GROUP – WINNER

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Australian and New Zealand Institute of Insurance and Finance Know Risk Program The Know Risk project aims to better communicate and engage with communities about the risks that people and businesses face so that risk exposures may be reduced, and the impacts lessened. The project uses a range of information tools including social media, websites, PR messages, partnerships, an Insurance Tracker mobile app, photo inventory of possessions, checklists and tips about risk and protection, interactive forums, and real world examples of people who have experienced the impact of loss. The prime objective of the program is to help individuals and businesses better understand and protect themselves against risk and to reduce the levels of under- insurance and non-insurance.

PRIVATE SECTOR – HIGHLY COMMENDED Gai Brodtmann MP and Joan Fitzpatrick.

Queensland Farmers’ Federation Taking Stock: preparing rural business for natural disasters and climate risk The goal of the project was to help farmers and rural business managers be better prepared for natural disasters. The project draws heavily on the expertise of local farmers who share their disaster management techniques and strategies. It provides valuable lessons for the rural sector in northern Queensland and provides useful historic records of the events of the 12 months after Cyclone Yasi in February 2011. A series of fact sheets and a DVD were produced and have been distributed to 3,500 primary producers in the region.

Gai Brodtmann MP and Brad Pfeffer. PRIVATE SECTOR – WINNER

Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre Climate Futures for Tasmania The project uses several climate models to simulate the Tasmanian climate and integrate the impact of climate change on the island’s weather, water catchments, and agriculture. It includes aspects of sea level, flood-risk, heat, and severe winds. The study is a collaboration of 12 participating partners of both state and national organisations, including emergency services, scientific organisations, local authorities, and educational institutions. It has become the Tasmanian Government’s most important source of climate change data.

Gai Brodtmann MP, Prof Nathan Bindoff, Dr Chris White, EDUCATION, TRAINING AND RESEARCH – WINNER Suzy Gaynor and Dr Stuart Corney.

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Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre Bushfire CRC The Bushfire CRC has been running an extension program since 2010 to respond to issues arising from the Victorian Black Saturday fires. The program looks at community benefit resulting from more efficient use of water-bombing aircraft to increased house and vehicle safety; from greater understanding of fire behaviour to smoke management; from better use of volunteers to creating bushfire arson reduction tools; and from the management of biodiversity to improved fire fighter health and safety. The centre brings together the expertise of universities, national researchers and end users from all states and territories, conducting research into social, environmental and economic impacts of bushfire.

Gai Brodtmann MP and Dr Richard Thornton. NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE – HIGHLY COMMENDED

Land Use Planning and Building Codes Taskforce and PlanDev Business Solutions Enhancing disaster resilience in the built environment PlanDev Business Solutions worked with the Land Use Planning and Building Codes Taskforce, set up by the National Emergency Management Committee, to review and scrutinise the performance of land use planning and building code instruments across Australia. A ‘roadmap’ was created aimed at improved safety and resilience in the built environment. The project’s aim was to make legislation easier, to develop processes, data and mapping, and to improve vendor disclosure, governance, education and cross-boundary collaboration.

NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE – HIGHLY COMMENDED Gai Brodtmann MP, Brendan Nelson and Shane Murrihy.

Department for Communities and Social Inclusion, South Australia National Guidelines for Managing Donated Goods The South Australia State Recovery Office developed national a-z guidelines to deal with the influx of donated goods immediately following a major disaster. Donated goods can quickly exceed actual need and inevitably stretch resources and infrastructure. It also diverts efforts from other aspects of recovery, just to manage the donations. The project included a public education package which has resulted in a decrease in unusable goods being donated and an increase in donations of money. The guidelines help the public and corporate sector better understanding how and what to donate for real benefit following a disaster.

Gai Brodtmann MP, Pauline Cole and Ronnie Fagotter. NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE – WINNER

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The AJEM welcomes letters to the editor. Letters should refer to content published in the previous AJEM, focus on issues of emergency management and disaster resilience, and include contact details. Letters should be around 200 words. Longer letters may be published or edited The certificate will be coordinated by the Centre for Disaster Studies and will involve staff Planning, at the editor’s discretion. Human Geography, Psychology and Tropical Medicine.

This course will provide a qualification for emergency managers who already work within the profession I was dismayed to read in your October volume that Stuart time for fire leaders to regroup and for communities to and for graduates from a range of backgrounds who are entering or intending to enter the profession. Ellis, incoming CEO of AFAC, failed to offer unequivocal prepare or evacuate. And even on a day when the headfire support for fuel reduction burning as a measure to is unstoppable, useful work can be done on flank fires Graduating students will have a clearer conceptual understanding of the complexity and systemic nature mitigate bushfire damage. burning in light fuels, helping to secure the danger flank in of the issues encountered in emergency management. This will enable a more confident, problem solving, approach to the practice of emergency management which will complement their existing skills. Mr. Ellis says: “Prescribed burning is likely to reduce the the expectation of a wind change. intensity of bushfires” [my emphasis], and adds that [fuel Fuel reduction cannot prevent bushfires. But it will For the past 12 years the Centre for Disaster Studies at James Cook University has been involved in reduction burning] will “provide little, if any, substantive mitigate (and in some cases prevent) bushfire damage. contributing to research and teaching of social aspects of emergency management. mitigation” on a Code Red day. Under a properly designed fuel reduction burning Neither of these statements is correct. program, 20% of the landscape will always be carrying Simple physics means that less fuel will always reduce fuels less than three-year old. Even under the conditions Course overview bushfire intensity. But this is not just a matter of physics. of Black Saturday, effective suppression is possible on tail The Graduate Certificate in Emergency Management provides professional training in the social and The value of prescribed burning has been demonstrated and flank fires in 0, 1 and 2 year-old fuels. psychological context, policy, legislation and governance of emergency management. It will emphasise in fire behaviour and combustion research since the 1960s both professional and community needs. and is supported by case studies, statistics, simulation The failure of Australian land and fire management studies and thousands of observations over many years. authorities to deal responsibly with bushfire fuels in This course is aimed at graduates from a variety of disciplines who are entering the emergency There can hardly be a firefighter in Australia who has not the expectation of a bushfire is a great national tragedy. management profession, emergency management professionals with extensive experience who wish observed the decline in intensity that occurs when a fire Heavy, long-unburnt forest fuels mean that bushfires can to enhance their qualifications and professionals who want to include emergency management in their crosses from 20-year old to one-year old fuels. become unstoppable even under relatively moderate fire portfolio. True, headfires may be impossible to control on a Code dangers, let alone Code Red. This is an issue to which I Red day (especially in heavy fuels). However, the presence would hope AFAC would assign their highest priority. Some of these entrants might not possess an undergraduate degree, but most will come from a variety in the landscape of fuel reduced areas makes fires on of disciplinary backgrounds. Subjects will be oriented to that diversity. Yours sincerely, the days preceding a Code Red day easier and safer to control, meaning that there are fewer fires still live when Roger Underwood Disaster Day breaks, freeing up resources, and allowing The Bushfire Front Inc Perth, Western Australia Postgraduate program GRADUATE CERTIFICATION EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Graduate Certificate Year: 2013 Graduate Certificate Emergency Management Post Graduate Program Emergency Management, Code: 106111 Mid-year entry: Yes The certificate will be Course overview Entry Requirements Postcoordinated Graduate by the Centre The Graduate Program Certificate in Emergency Completion of an undergraduate course at Mode: PT/Block Mode/Flexible Delivery Management provides professional training this or another University or appropriate for Disaster Studies and will in the social and psychological context, qualifications and experience. involve staff Planning, Human policy, legislation and governance of Credit Points: 12 Students of non English speaking emergency management. It will emphasise Geography, Psychology and backgrounds must have an adequate both professional and community needs. Tropical Medicine. English language capacity assessed This course is aimed at graduates under the Australian International English This course will provide a qualification from a variety of disciplines who are Language Testing System. An IELTS score Entry Requirements for emergency managers who entering the emergency management of 6.0 with no component lower than 5.5 is already work within the profession profession, emergency management required Completion of an undergraduate course at this or another University or appropriate qualifications and professionals with extensive experience and for graduates from a range of Interview (by invitation) for applicants with experience. who wish to enhance their qualifications backgrounds who are entering or other than first degree entry requirement. intending to enter the profession. and professionals who want to include Students of non English speaking backgrounds must have an adequate English language capacity emergency management in their portfolio. Course Structure assessed under the Australian International English Language Testing System. An IELTS score of 6.0 with Graduating students will have a clearer Some of these entrants might not possess Subjects will be in block mode or flexible conceptual understanding of the an undergraduate degree, but most delivery/limited attendance. The expected no component lower than 5.5 is required complexity and systemic nature of will come from a variety of disciplinary time to complete the certificate is one year the issues encountered in emergency backgrounds. Subjects will be oriented to to enable part time attendance. Interview (by invitation) for applicants with other than first degree entry requirement. management. This will enable a that diversity. • Disasters, Communities and Planning more confident, problem solving, • Governance, Policy, Service Delivery and approach to the practice of emergency POSTGRADUATE PROGRAM Philosophy of Emergency Management GRADUATE CERTIFICATION management which will complement • Psychology of Disasters Course structure their existing skills. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Year 2013 • Special Topic Subjects will be in block mode or flexible delivery/limited attendance. The expected time to complete the For the past 12 years the Centre Code: 106111 The Graduate Certificate in Emergency certificate is one year to enable part time attendance. for Disaster Studies at James Cook Mid-year entry: Yes Management will comprise a total of 12 credit points. University has been involved in Mode: PT/Block Mode/Flexible Delivery • Disasters, Communities and Planning contributing to research and teaching Credit Points: 12 For more information please contact of social aspects of emergency Dr Alison Cottrell SEES on 07 4781 4653 • Governance, Policy, Service Delivery and Philosophy of Emergency Management management. or by email at [email protected] • Psychology of Disasters • Special Topic

Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready I 59 The Graduate Certificate in Emergency Management will comprise a total of 12 credit points. For more information please contact Dr Alison Cottrell SEES on 07 4781 4653 or by email at alison. [email protected] Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013 NOTES FROM THE FIELD

Australian Emergency Management Institute forums, workshops and master class activities

In September 2012, AEMI hosted a number of master classes in Mt Macedon, Canberra and at the Sydney Opera House. The master classes – short bursts of intensive theory and practice, focused on a specific aspect of emergency management – were facilitated by internationally-renowned experts in the fields of crisis management, business continuity and organisational resilience.

PREVENTING CHAOS IN A CRISIS: LESSONS security agencies at Federal and State levels. Discussion FROM THE PAST, IDEAS FOR THE FUTURE reflected the keen level of interest in the topic, especially as attendees were in the final stages of their professional Peter Power development program and had been studying aspects Peter Power is a recent member of United Kingdom of success and failure in crisis management and Crisis Management Steering Group and former member leadership. The three international speakers were of New Scotland Yard’s forward planning area, where joined by Michael Jerks from the Attorney-General’s he was seconded to the anti-terrorist branch. Over two Department Critical Infrastructure and Protective days, the masterclass participants considered trends Security Policy Branch who provided a comprehensive in crisis management and outcomes from previous overview of various approaches to organisational disasters. The participants focused on the collaboration resilience. of public/private stakeholders in crisis management and the obstacles that can break down effective crisis CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER’S ROUND TABLE leadership. DISCUSSION

The Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, IS BCM A DEAD-END? THE 21ST CENTURY Roger Wilkins AO invited a number of CEOs to attend APPROACH TO MANAGING IN UNCERTAINTY the Sydney Opera House Board Room to hear Peter Nathaniel Forbes and Scot Phelps Power, Nathaniel Forbes and Scot Phelps present their perspectives on organisational resilience and the policy Nathaniel Forbes, Director, Forbes Calamity Prevention, approaches and strategies being undertaken. Twenty- Singapore, and Scot Phelps, Professor of Disaster three CEOs or their nominated representatives attended Science at the US Emergency Management Academy, the three-hour round table discussion. Scot Phelps’ facilitated a workshop on organisational resilience. presentation in accord with the Australian National Through a series of stimulating, challenging and Strategy for Disaster Resilience, focused on the need to interactive sessions, participants explored how the learn from the past and to create an air of positivism. modern, strategic leader can position their organisation His other key messages were around the importance of to best address the unforeseen, thus turning threats understanding public expectations, learning by doing, into opportunities. The day examined the convergence of exercising, and just-in-time training. emergency, crisis, and business continuity management from a structural and theoretical perspective through to Nathaniel Forbes provided three sometimes confronting the implications of this for risk and governance. case studies on international, cross-border industrial activity. These studies graphically highlighted the MANAGING IN UNCERTAINTY – WHY imperative to understand the context in which TRADITIONAL APPROACHES AREN’T WORKING companies operate. He emphasised that resilience EXECUTIVE LEVEL 2 PROFESSIONAL is not built solely through assurance measures, but by ensuring staff welfare and morale is of primary DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM concern. The right leader is in a position to lead the Peter Power, Nathaniel Forbes and Scot Phelps organisation through crisis and that over reliance on ‘the plan’ is foolhardy. Peter Power, Nathaniel Forbes and Scot Phelps each spoke at the National Security College, Canberra, to a wide range of executive level officers from national

60 I Disaster Disaster Resilient Resilient Australia: Australia: Get Get Ready Ready NOTES FROM THE FIELD

Australian Emergency Management Institute forums, workshops and master class activities

ENGAGING FOR ENGAGEMENT: EM=COMMUNITY2 traditional ‘command and control’ focus of response agencies has meant that while these agencies work The National Disaster Resilience Community well at the ‘inform’ end of the spectrum, difficulties Engagement Framework (Framework), due for arise at the ‘empower’ stage, particularly for agencies completion in mid-2013, will be a key guiding who are legally mandated to enforce. document to assist Australians understand risk and make decisions as part of communicating the National The workshop attracted approximately 40 high- Strategy for Disaster Resilience. The Framework is being level specialists in emergency management and/or developed by the Australia–New Zealand Emergency community engagement from across Australia. Guest Management Committee’s Community Engagement speakers were Alison Cottrell from the University of Sub-Committee (ANZEMC- CESC) as requested Queensland, who spoke about top-down and bottom- by the Standing Council for Police and Emergency up approaches to community engagement, Anne Management (SCPEM). Leadbeater from Murrindindi Shire Council, who spoke about empowering communities through capacity and With stakeholder and community engagement being an resilience, and Dare Kavanagh from the NSW Land and important part of the development of the Framework, Housing Corporation, who presented a case study in ANZEMC-CESC ,in collaboration with the Australian adaptation and use of the IAP2 spectrum. Emergency Management Institute (AEMI) and the International Association of Public Participation (IAP2) Workshop participants were given the opportunity Australasia, held a national workshop in September to discuss their issues with the structure and layout 2012 at AEMI’s premises in Mount Macedon, entitled of the spectrum as a group, and suggest solutions ‘EM=Community2’. for adaptation. Although the timeframe was tight and expectations were high, the group did manage The main purpose of the EM=Community2 workshop to put together a revised version of the Spectrum was to review IAP2’s Spectrum of Public Participation that addressed many, if not all, issues faced by EM - a widely recognised tool for community engagement practitioners in the community engagement field by the - and tailor it specifically for application in an end of the workshop. emergency management context, with the resulting adapted spectrum to be incorporated into the Many workshop participants continued to provide input Framework. via the consultation process for the Framework, which closed in November 2012. IAP2 is an international association of members who seek to promote and improve the practice of public participation in relation to individuals, governments, institutions, and other entities that affect the public interest in nations throughout the world. In the Australasia region, the term community engagement is more frequently used to refer to public participation. IAP2’s Public Participation Spectrum is designed to assist with the selection of the level of participation that defines the public’s role in any community engagement program. The Spectrum is widely used in Australia and internationally, and is quoted in many community engagement manuals. It is used in the curriculum of some courses run AEMI.

However, it has been acknowledged by EM practitioners as well as AEMI educators and IAP2 Australasia themselves that the spectrum has some limitations in its application within the EM sector. Specifically, the

DisasterDisaster Resilient Resilient Australia: Australia: Get Get Ready Ready I 61 Australian Journal of Emergency Management Volume 28, No. 1, January 2013

EM ONLINE:

AUSTRALIAN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE HUB www.emknowledge.gov.au The Australian Emergency Management Knowledge Hub was launched in November 2012 and is a new interactive website for the emergency management sector and the community. The Knowledge Hub is packed with features. There is an Australian disaster event database that contains records of natural and non-natural disasters within Australia dating back to 1753. And it’s searchable! There’s a clearing house of research and information useful to the EM sector, including online repositories, research papers, journal articles, reports and manuals. And it’s searchable! There’s a multimedia area where libraries of audio, video and image across a wide range of disasters are available. And it’s searchable! The news area has cross-sectoral discussion forums and new media collaboration tools such as Twitter. Users can see latest discussions, contribute resources, share information and interact. Follow us on Twitter @AEMKH or email us at [email protected]

62 I Disaster Resilient Australia: Get Ready Conference Centre

The Australian Emergency The Institute strives to build national capability in emergency Management Institute offers an management and encourages the use of our facility for exclusive, multi-purpose facility related activities. Available for commercial bookings, the located in the picturesque town venue’s idyllic backdrop is ideal for workshops, seminars, of Mount Macedon, Victoria. corporate retreats or other group activities. Contact us today to discuss your next event.

Australian Emergency Management Institute E: aemi ag.gov.au 601 Mount Macedon Road T: 03 5421 5100 | F: 03 5421 5272 Mount Macedon Victoria 3441 Australia www.em.gov.au⁄aemi

AEMI: A Centre of Excellence Building resilience through education, collaboration and innovation Australian Emergency Management Institute

The Australian Emergency Management Institute (AEMI) is a Centre of Excellence for education, research and training in the emergency management sector. In support of the COAG National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011) AEMI:

• Provides education and training • Undertakes applied research • Conducts strategic activities • Promotes community awareness and resilience

Advanced Diploma of Public Safety (Emergency Management) The Advanced Diploma of Public Safety (Emergency Management) is the flagship educational product of AEMI. This nationally-recognised program is undertaken over 2 years full time study under the tutelage of AEMI’s highly experienced emergency management educators and guest lecturers.

Apply now for upcoming units of study or professional development programs 12 – 15 March Community in emergency management 18 – 22 March Facilitate emergency risk management 25 – 27 March Manage recovery functions and services 9 – 11 April Develop and use political nous 9 – 12 April Designing and managing exercises 16 – 18 April Develop and organise public safety awareness programs 7 – 9 May Facilitate emergency planning processes 21 – 24 May Designing and managing exercises 4 – 7 June Coordinate resources for a multi-agency incident For further information visit: www.em.gov.au/aemi Email [email protected] or Phone (03) 5421 5100

AEMI - a Centre of Excellence: Building resilience through education, collaboration & innovation