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__________________________________________________________ TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS __________________________________________________________ The attached transcript, while an accurate recording of evidence given in the course of the hearing day, is not proofread prior to circulation and thus may contain minor errors. 2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION MELBOURNE MONDAY 19 OCTOBER 2009 (67th day of hearing) BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE B. TEAGUE AO - Chairman MR R. MCLEOD AM - Commissioner MS S. PASCOE AM - Commissioner __________________________________________________________ CRS WORDWAVE PTY LTD - A MERRILL COMPANY. 4/190 Queen Street, Melbourne. Telephone: 9602 1799 Facsimile: 9642 5185 9170 1 CHAIRMAN: Yes, Ms Doyle. 2 MS DOYLE: Commissioners, I will commence with some opening 3 remarks. First, a member of counsel needs to announce his 4 appearance for the United Firefighters Union. I will just 5 ask him to come forward. 6 MR TRAGARDH: If the Commissioners please, my name is Andrew 7 Tragardh. I appear with Mark Dean of Senior Counsel for 8 the United Firefighters Union. 9 MS DOYLE: The hearings this week will focus on the Churchill 10 fire which burned on 7 February this year. There is some 11 background that is relevant to events in the Gippsland 12 area and the Latrobe Valley in particular, including the 13 fact that the Delburn fires had been burning already in 14 this area during late January and in the early hours of 15 7 February the Bunyip fire escaped containment lines. 16 This meant that resources in the area were already 17 somewhat stretched when 7 February dawned. 18 In anticipation of the weekend weather, attention 19 had been given by the CFA and the DSE in the lead-up to 20 the 7th to preparation and resourcing and availability of 21 staff in the Latrobe Valley area. An incident management 22 team was already operating out of the Traralgon DSE 23 offices running the Delburn fire and steps had been taken 24 to locate a pre-positioned level 3 incident management 25 team who attended for duty on Saturday 7th in the same 26 building as the Delburn incident management team. 27 This pre-positioned level 3 incident management 28 team was required to attend essentially in anticipation in 29 case anything occurred during the day on the 7th. 30 Inquiries had been made concerning which resources and 31 strike teams could be available if a fire started on the .Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9171 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 7th and a number of witnesses will attest to the sorts of 2 preparation and rostering that was engaged in. 3 The decision to pre-position the level 3 incident 4 management team at the Traralgon ICC transpires to have 5 been a very prudent step because the Churchill fire broke 6 out almost on their doorstep at 1.30 on the afternoon of 7 the 7th. The fire spread quickly and during the afternoon 8 it burned as far south as Yarram and east as far as 9 Gormandale. The Churchill fire caused enormous 10 destruction. It burnt through approximately 24,000 11 hectares, 11 lives were lost and approximately 240 houses 12 destroyed. 13 The circumstances of the Churchill fire's 14 ignition are suspicious and, as Detective Superintendent 15 Hollowood has already attested in these proceedings, a man 16 has been charged with offences and is waiting prosecution. 17 Those proceedings are ongoing and as a result the evidence 18 presented to this Commission will not consider the causes 19 of the fire in any detail. 20 I will turn briefly to the ignition and early 21 stages of the fire. As I said, the fire started at 22 approximately 1.30 in pine plantations owned by Hancock 23 Victoria Plantations near the intersection of Glendonald 24 Road and Jelleff's Outlet. There were multiple rapid and 25 almost simultaneous reports of the fire. For example, the 26 first entry in the IMS data is for a CAD event logged at 27 1333. There were calls to 000; the fire was almost 28 immediately seen by members of the public and even CFA 29 members who were performing other duties in the area. 30 Aerial reconnaissance was also important throughout the 31 afternoon and in particular early in the day. .Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9172 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 We will hear evidence from the air attack 2 supervisor, David O'Toole, who in Firebird 304 saw the 3 column of smoke at about 1.30. The fire was quickly 4 spotted by at least three fire tower operators in the area 5 at Moornapa, Mount Useful and Blackwarry and we will hear 6 evidence from the Blackwarry fire tower operator. Indeed, 7 shortly after the fire commenced it was seen by the DSE 8 staff themselves from the window of the Traralgon office. 9 As the vegetation in the area where the fire 10 started consists of blue gum and pine plantations and, as 11 Mr Keating who will give evidence this morning will 12 explain, there is also an understorey of shrubs, wire 13 grass, blackberry and other surface fuels, the fire took 14 off quickly and spread rapidly away from Glendonald Road 15 in a south-east direction. 16 From the beginning the fire behaviour was 17 extreme. Early crew on the scene reported the fire 18 started to crown almost immediately. Although a large 19 number of crew were deployed and attended, direct attack 20 was very difficult if not impossible and crew were forced 21 to move quickly to asset protection mode in the immediate 22 area. The fire headed, fanned by the south-east winds, 23 towards the tiny community of Balook. Aircraft 24 observations recorded the fire cresting the ridge on which 25 the Jeeralang Road sits prior to 2.10 pm. By 2.10 the 26 fire had reached Jeeralang Creek west branch. By 2.40 the 27 fire was in the country west of Balook. By 2.45 the 28 eastern flank of the fire had travelled to Thompson Road 29 and had started to impact the microwave tower at the 30 southern end of that road. 31 There will be evidence from members of the .Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9173 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 incident management team, including those who worked in 2 the predictive and mapping sections, who will indicate 3 that early on it was predicted the forward rate of spread 4 of this fire was about 7 kilometres an hour. 5 By 5 pm there was a spotfire at Mays Bush 6 6 kilometres west of Yarram. The development of a 7 significant fire approximately 20 kilometres ahead of the 8 main fire placed additional pressure on resourcing. In 9 the evening resources were dispatched to Yarram to deal 10 with the significant fire there. By 5.15 the main fire 11 was approaching the slopes of Mount Tassie and there were 12 spotfires on the eastern side of the mount. From 5.45 13 onwards a wind change commenced to impact on the fire at 14 ground. The changed passed through the area in the 15 vicinity of the point of ignition at about 6 pm. 16 By 7 pm yet another quite separate fire had 17 started near Erica and resources also had to be deployed 18 to that area and there are members of the incident 19 management team who will attest to the changes they had to 20 make and the crew that then assembled to deal with that 21 fire. 22 Now, after the wind change that I mentioned, 23 there was in the end an uncontrolled flank of fire running 24 from Glendonald Road in Churchill all the way to the east 25 side of Mount Tassie some 13 kilometres away. The fire 26 was burning in steep inaccessible country with extreme 27 fuel loads. After the wind change a number of towns were 28 affected by the fire, Hazelwood South, Koornalla, 29 Traralgon South, Callignee, Callignee South and North, 30 Jeeralang North, Devon, Yarram and Carrajung South. 31 In the late afternoon, at the time it became .Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9174 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 clear the fire would burn through to the east, sector 2 commander and strike team leader Craig Wood set off from 3 the Thompson Road area with resources for Callignee. He 4 will give evidence about the fire suppression efforts he 5 engaged in at Traralgon South and other interaction he had 6 with members of the public. He ultimately arrived at 7 Callignee oval which had been burnt beyond recognition and 8 led a convoy of residents away from the oval to safety at 9 Traralgon South fire station. 10 He is just one example of the witnesses you will 11 hear from who engaged in great acts of courage and heroism 12 in warning locals, alerting people to approaching fire, 13 assisting the injured and securing and ensuring the safety 14 of townsfolk needing safe passage. 15 After 6 pm the fire burned into the Won Wron 16 State Forest. It impacted on Koornalla from about 6.30 pm 17 onwards and parts of Traralgon South at the same time and 18 had impacted on Callignee by 7 pm. It reached Gormandale 19 by about 7.20. By 8 pm the rate of spread of the fire had 20 slowed but it continued to spread in a north-easterly 21 direction. 22 There are some features of the Churchill fire 23 which are important to the narrative and which will be 24 returned to in the evidence you will hear this week.