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TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS ______

The attached transcript, while an accurate recording of evidence given in the course of the hearing day, is not proofread prior to circulation and thus may contain minor errors.

2009 VICTORIAN BUSHFIRES ROYAL COMMISSION

MELBOURNE

MONDAY 19 OCTOBER 2009 (67th day of hearing)

BEFORE:

THE HONOURABLE B. TEAGUE AO - Chairman MR R. MCLEOD AM - Commissioner MS S. PASCOE AM - Commissioner

______CRS WORDWAVE PTY LTD - A MERRILL COMPANY. 4/190 Queen Street, Melbourne. Telephone: 9602 1799 Facsimile: 9642 5185

9170 1 CHAIRMAN: Yes, Ms Doyle. 2 MS DOYLE: Commissioners, I will commence with some opening 3 remarks. First, a member of counsel needs to announce his 4 appearance for the United Firefighters Union. I will just 5 ask him to come forward. 6 MR TRAGARDH: If the Commissioners please, my name is Andrew 7 Tragardh. I appear with Mark Dean of Senior Counsel for 8 the United Firefighters Union. 9 MS DOYLE: The hearings this week will focus on the Churchill 10 fire which burned on 7 February this year. There is some 11 background that is relevant to events in the Gippsland 12 area and the Latrobe Valley in particular, including the 13 fact that the Delburn fires had been burning already in 14 this area during late January and in the early hours of 15 7 February the Bunyip fire escaped containment lines. 16 This meant that resources in the area were already 17 somewhat stretched when 7 February dawned. 18 In anticipation of the weekend weather, attention 19 had been given by the CFA and the DSE in the lead-up to 20 the 7th to preparation and resourcing and availability of 21 staff in the Latrobe Valley area. An incident management 22 team was already operating out of the Traralgon DSE 23 offices running the Delburn fire and steps had been taken 24 to locate a pre-positioned level 3 incident management 25 team who attended for duty on Saturday 7th in the same 26 building as the Delburn incident management team. 27 This pre-positioned level 3 incident management 28 team was required to attend essentially in anticipation in 29 case anything occurred during the day on the 7th. 30 Inquiries had been made concerning which resources and 31 strike teams could be available if a fire started on the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9171 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 7th and a number of witnesses will attest to the sorts of 2 preparation and rostering that was engaged in. 3 The decision to pre-position the level 3 incident 4 management team at the Traralgon ICC transpires to have 5 been a very prudent step because the Churchill fire broke 6 out almost on their doorstep at 1.30 on the afternoon of 7 the 7th. The fire spread quickly and during the afternoon 8 it burned as far south as Yarram and east as far as 9 Gormandale. The Churchill fire caused enormous 10 destruction. It burnt through approximately 24,000 11 hectares, 11 lives were lost and approximately 240 houses 12 destroyed. 13 The circumstances of the Churchill fire's 14 ignition are suspicious and, as Detective Superintendent 15 Hollowood has already attested in these proceedings, a man 16 has been charged with offences and is waiting prosecution. 17 Those proceedings are ongoing and as a result the evidence 18 presented to this Commission will not consider the causes 19 of the fire in any detail. 20 I will turn briefly to the ignition and early 21 stages of the fire. As I said, the fire started at 22 approximately 1.30 in pine plantations owned by Hancock 23 Victoria Plantations near the intersection of Glendonald 24 Road and Jelleff's Outlet. There were multiple rapid and 25 almost simultaneous reports of the fire. For example, the 26 first entry in the IMS data is for a CAD event logged at 27 1333. There were calls to 000; the fire was almost 28 immediately seen by members of the public and even CFA 29 members who were performing other duties in the area. 30 Aerial reconnaissance was also important throughout the 31 afternoon and in particular early in the day.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9172 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 We will hear evidence from the air attack 2 supervisor, David O'Toole, who in Firebird 304 saw the 3 column of smoke at about 1.30. The fire was quickly 4 spotted by at least three fire tower operators in the area 5 at Moornapa, Mount Useful and Blackwarry and we will hear 6 evidence from the Blackwarry fire tower operator. Indeed, 7 shortly after the fire commenced it was seen by the DSE 8 staff themselves from the window of the Traralgon office. 9 As the vegetation in the area where the fire 10 started consists of blue gum and pine plantations and, as 11 Mr Keating who will give evidence this morning will 12 explain, there is also an understorey of shrubs, wire 13 grass, blackberry and other surface fuels, the fire took 14 off quickly and spread rapidly away from Glendonald Road 15 in a south-east direction. 16 From the beginning the fire behaviour was 17 extreme. Early crew on the scene reported the fire 18 started to crown almost immediately. Although a large 19 number of crew were deployed and attended, direct attack 20 was very difficult if not impossible and crew were forced 21 to move quickly to asset protection mode in the immediate 22 area. The fire headed, fanned by the south-east winds, 23 towards the tiny community of Balook. Aircraft 24 observations recorded the fire cresting the ridge on which 25 the Jeeralang Road sits prior to 2.10 pm. By 2.10 the 26 fire had reached Jeeralang Creek west branch. By 2.40 the 27 fire was in the country west of Balook. By 2.45 the 28 eastern flank of the fire had travelled to Thompson Road 29 and had started to impact the microwave tower at the 30 southern end of that road. 31 There will be evidence from members of the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9173 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 incident management team, including those who worked in 2 the predictive and mapping sections, who will indicate 3 that early on it was predicted the forward rate of spread 4 of this fire was about 7 kilometres an hour. 5 By 5 pm there was a spotfire at Mays Bush 6 6 kilometres west of Yarram. The development of a 7 significant fire approximately 20 kilometres ahead of the 8 main fire placed additional pressure on resourcing. In 9 the evening resources were dispatched to Yarram to deal 10 with the significant fire there. By 5.15 the main fire 11 was approaching the slopes of Mount Tassie and there were 12 spotfires on the eastern side of the mount. From 5.45 13 onwards a wind change commenced to impact on the fire at 14 ground. The changed passed through the area in the 15 vicinity of the point of ignition at about 6 pm. 16 By 7 pm yet another quite separate fire had 17 started near Erica and resources also had to be deployed 18 to that area and there are members of the incident 19 management team who will attest to the changes they had to 20 make and the crew that then assembled to deal with that 21 fire. 22 Now, after the wind change that I mentioned, 23 there was in the end an uncontrolled flank of fire running 24 from Glendonald Road in Churchill all the way to the east 25 side of Mount Tassie some 13 kilometres away. The fire 26 was burning in steep inaccessible country with extreme 27 fuel loads. After the wind change a number of towns were 28 affected by the fire, Hazelwood South, Koornalla, 29 Traralgon South, Callignee, Callignee South and North, 30 Jeeralang North, Devon, Yarram and Carrajung South. 31 In the late afternoon, at the time it became

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9174 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 clear the fire would burn through to the east, sector 2 commander and strike team leader Craig Wood set off from 3 the Thompson Road area with resources for Callignee. He 4 will give evidence about the fire suppression efforts he 5 engaged in at Traralgon South and other interaction he had 6 with members of the public. He ultimately arrived at 7 Callignee oval which had been burnt beyond recognition and 8 led a convoy of residents away from the oval to safety at 9 Traralgon South fire station. 10 He is just one example of the witnesses you will 11 hear from who engaged in great acts of courage and heroism 12 in warning locals, alerting people to approaching fire, 13 assisting the injured and securing and ensuring the safety 14 of townsfolk needing safe passage. 15 After 6 pm the fire burned into the Won Wron 16 State Forest. It impacted on Koornalla from about 6.30 pm 17 onwards and parts of Traralgon South at the same time and 18 had impacted on Callignee by 7 pm. It reached Gormandale 19 by about 7.20. By 8 pm the rate of spread of the fire had 20 slowed but it continued to spread in a north-easterly 21 direction. 22 There are some features of the Churchill fire 23 which are important to the narrative and which will be 24 returned to in the evidence you will hear this week. It 25 is significant that the fire was detected very soon after 26 ignition. The initial response was dispatched rapidly and 27 the initial attack and overall deployment was reasonably 28 large, but its rate of spread and its rate of forward 29 spotting were phenomenal. 30 Part of the subject matter of the hearing will 31 obviously focus on the incident management from the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9175 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 Traralgon ICC. You will hear that the Churchill fire was 2 initially managed as a division of the Delburn fire, but 3 as its size and potential became clear the level 3 4 incident management team took responsibility for the 5 Churchill fire alone. This pre-positioned incident 6 management team I have mentioned started work very quickly 7 and blended with members of the incident management team 8 who had been working downstairs. 9 We have prepared for the assistance of the 10 Commissioners and all the parties a chart which deals with 11 the command structure and the resources deployed to this 12 fire which I will turn to briefly now. This will be a 13 helpful aide memoire throughout the evidence. The 14 document starts at tender page (TEN.100.001.0001). 15 Hopefully those who need to look at it most closely have 16 A3 copies. 17 This material is drawn from the witness 18 statements and the evidence that you will hear over the 19 week and it is an attempt to bring together a summary of 20 the command structure, so the incident management team 21 located at the ICC and the key resources deployed to this 22 fire. You will see reference down the left-hand side to 23 the fire towers that are relevant and members of Victoria 24 Police who have supplied statements. 25 In the centre of the document appear the regional 26 level resources and the aerial resources, but most 27 importantly those who were located at the Traralgon 28 incident control centre. The list is not comprehensive, 29 but the key members of the team, many of whom will give 30 evidence this week, are set out there; the incident 31 controller and the deputy incident controller. I should

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9176 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 pause to note Mr Jeremiah is not available to give 2 evidence this week but we will hear from him later in 3 October. The other people mentioned there, of course, are 4 in the operations area, the planning area and a number of 5 gentlemen from those sections will give evidence. HVP, 6 Hancock Victoria Plantations, also had a liaison officer 7 in the ICC, as is noted there, and I will mention in a 8 moment the evidence that is available from Hancocks. 9 Page 2 of the chart moves to the next rung, if 10 you like, the divisional commanders and the sector 11 commanders. As I said, this chart is an attempt to bring 12 together the evidence available, but I should note that as 13 the evidence unfolds it is not always the case there was 14 complete clarity on the fireground as to who was occupying 15 which role at which time. But there were a number of 16 divisional commanders and you will see their names 17 mentioned there, including the fact, as I noted, there was 18 a need to set up a division command for the Erica fire 19 from the evening onwards. 20 There is then reference to the sector commanders 21 and the initial incident controller at the fireground, 22 Mr Barling, from whom you will hear, and then a list of 23 the tankers that were involved in the initial response 24 around the Glendonald area and onwards. As you can see, 25 it was a well-resourced initial attack, including the 26 Churchill pumper and other tankers from right around the 27 area. 28 The third page of the chart then sets out the 29 groups in which the resources were sectorised and also 30 makes note of the Yarram division, which needed to operate 31 during the afternoon by reason of the spotfire there. The

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9177 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 final page summarises some other resources that were 2 available, including the Tarra Bulga area and the Erica 3 division and makes note of the other resources, including 4 the Hancock crew who turned out. We will hear more about 5 the work of the Hancock crew in the evidence. 6 Can I tender, first of all, this chart which 7 I think will be referred to quite often during the 8 hearing. 9 #EXHIBIT 386 - Churchill fire - command structure chart. 10 (TEN.100.001.0001). 11 MS DOYLE: As the chart indicates, although initially four 12 brigades were paged, the tankers which arrived first on 13 scene assessed the fire immediately as very significant 14 and called for 20 tankers. Over the day more than 25 15 tankers attended and a significant number of Hancock crew 16 also attended as a forest industry brigade. The number of 17 crew grew as the afternoon wore on. The evidence you will 18 hear this week does indicate some confusion, as I said, in 19 relation to the division and sector structure and members 20 of the IMT report having had some difficulty establishing 21 and keeping track of which resources were on the 22 fireground. There will be some evidence about 23 difficulties in relation to radio communication between 24 the IMT and the fireground. 25 The second body of evidence that will be 26 significant in the hearing is the question of prediction 27 and warnings. At the incident control centre, Mr Ross 28 Pridgeon in the planning section had early on calculated 29 that the fire was travelling at about 7 kilometres an 30 hour, which would have the fire at Yarram by the evening, 31 even unaffected by a wind change. This allowed those in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9178 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the IMT to start making some plans about both suppression 2 efforts and resources and warning communities in the path 3 of the fire. Mr Gillham, the planning officer, commenced 4 to make predictions about where the fire would travel and 5 a sequence of messages were loaded onto the CFA and DSE 6 websites and read on the ABC. 7 We have prepared a chronology document which puts 8 together the IMS data, transcripts from ABC 774 and ABC 9 Gippsland, some transcripts from 3AW and documents which 10 are already in evidence which establish when these urgent 11 threat and alert messages were posted to DSE and CFA 12 websites. The document starts at (TEN.106.001.0001). 13 Commissioners, first can I tender this overall chronology. 14 #EXHIBIT 387 - Churchill fire - chronology of major events. 15 (TEN.106.001.0001). 16 MS DOYLE: As the document sets out, it is drawn from other 17 exhibits already in evidence but it will be a handy 18 reference to the sequence of events. Some matters I would 19 like to draw attention to arising from this chronology 20 include the following. I should note at the outset that 21 the relevant broadcasts were not just on 774 but also to 22 the local station, 100.7 ABC Gippsland. 23 The first urgent threat message went out very 24 quickly. The fire started at 1.33, that is the first IMS 25 data reference. The first urgent threat was posted onto 26 the websites by 1.45, in the case of the DSE message, and 27 at least by 2.05, in the case of the CFA version. The 28 message warned communities including Hazelwood South, 29 Jeeralang, Jeeralang North and Jeeralang Junction. 30 Throughout the afternoon, as this chronology records, the 31 incident controller, Mr Lockwood, went on radio himself at

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9179 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 least three times providing a firsthand account of the 2 progress of the fire. This will be dealt with in detail 3 in his evidence, but I note for completeness that he 4 participated in radio interviews at 2.10, 2.52 and 4.25. 5 An alert message for the town of Callignee was 6 posted to the websites at 3.30. There is an entry 1530 7 which indicates that there is a CFA alert message 8 effective from 4.20 to 5.03. Commissioners, this is at 9 page 14 of the chronology, if I can just go to that 10 briefly. So we have the time as 1530 but it is said to be 11 effective from 1620 to 1703. 12 There is an alert message posted for Madalya, 13 Womerah, Callignee, Callignee South and North, Currajung, 14 Currajung South and Won Wron. The alert message informs 15 the reader that, "The Glendonald Road fire is currently 16 burning in a south-east direction and spreading rapidly." 17 Those communities, as I said including Callignee, "may 18 experience heavy smoke and ember attack from the fire." 19 The same message went onto the DSE website at 3.30, it 20 appears from the top of page 15. 21 This message was read on the ABC at 3.53. There 22 is an entry for that at page 17 of the chronology. ABC 23 Gippsland, the host Gerard Callinan read the message 24 effectively in terms. He repeated it at 4.05 and at 4.41 25 during a talkback sequence in which a caller from 26 Callignee queried whether the town had been mentioned. 27 Mr Callinan explained at 4.41 that he had previously read 28 an alert for Callignee and effectively read it again. 29 This is at page 24 of the chronology. 30 I have already explained earlier in my remarks 31 that the wind change then commenced to hit the fire area

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9180 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 and impacted the area close to the point of origin at 2 about 6. 3 The next reference to the town of Callignee is on 4 the DSE website at 8 pm. I can take you to that entry at 5 page 49. There is reference to the CFA message and the 6 DSE message was the same. It is now an urgent threat 7 message for the Glendonald Road fire. The time is 8 8 o'clock. It is said to be effective from 8.59 onwards. 9 The incident information is now that, "The Glendonald Road 10 is currently burning in and around Traralgon South and 11 Callignee and Callignee North, Callignee South area. 12 Residents may be directly impacted by fire." 13 The message on the DSE website was in similar 14 terms. It was read on the ABC at 8.30 pm. That appears 15 at page 53 of this document. Jon Faine says, "As we speak 16 I'm handed a printout here of an urgent threat message" 17 and reads the text to which I have just referred. One of 18 the matters that arises from that sequence of events, 19 Commissioner, is the fact that the fire in fact impacted 20 on Koornalla, which is not mentioned at all, from 21 approximately 6.15 and Callignee from 7 pm. In other 22 words, had impacted by the time those messages which refer 23 to the prospect of Callignee being impacted by fire were 24 posted and read. 25 These circumstances raise some questions about 26 the sequence of events which will be explored in evidence. 27 In light of the information which was available in the IMT 28 about the predicted path of the fire from quite early in 29 the day and the fact that an alert message was issued for 30 Callignee at 3.30 and referred to a number of times on the 31 ABC, why was no urgent threat issued for Callignee until

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9181 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 8 pm, if you look at the DSE website, 8.25 in terms of the 2 CFA website and 8.30 in terms of when it could be read on 3 the ABC? By that time the town of Callignee had already 4 been impacted by fire. There are no warnings on any 5 website material or the ABC during the afternoon which 6 mentioned the town Koornalla. 7 In relation to this there also arise the 8 following questions: What attention, if any, was given by 9 the incident management team or others to evacuation of 10 some areas affected by the fire? Some witnesses will 11 attest to particular steps taken during the afternoon to 12 inform residents in particular streets about the approach 13 of the fire; indeed, in some instances going to the step 14 of doorknocking particular areas. But one of the issues 15 which arises on the face of these materials is whether any 16 thought was given to evacuating, for example, Callignee, 17 Koornalla or other small towns in the path of the fire. 18 That is one of the matters that will be explored. 19 A third body of evidence relates to the material 20 available in relation to the wind change which impacted 21 this fire and a red flag warning which was issued from the 22 incident management team to the numerous crew who were 23 fighting this fire in dangerous circumstances in the 24 afternoon. As will be clear and as was the case for the 25 rest of the state, a wind change was expected to impact 26 the fire at some time in the afternoon or evening and, in 27 accordance with the now very familiar pattern, under the 28 influence of that wind change the fire burned across to 29 the east and, again in accordance with the now familiar 30 pattern, the flank became the front. 31 There will be an issue in these hearings as to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9182 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 what information was in the possession of whom and at what 2 time concerning the likely arrival of the wind change. A 3 spotfire weather forecast issued by the Bureau of 4 Meteorology at 3.59 for the Churchill fire said that 5 the wind change was predicted to arrive between 5.30 and 6 7 pm. Now, a red flag warning was issued for the numerous 7 crew working on this fire. Although some now have 8 slightly different recollections of some of the events, a 9 large number of log entries confirm that a red flag 10 warning was issued at about 5.30 and that it warned of a 11 wind change arriving at 7. 12 The wind change affected parts of the fire 13 affected areas at slightly different times, as must be the 14 case, but for the crew located near the point of ignition 15 the wind change came through at about 6, not 7, as the red 16 flag stated. Four groups of CFA crew were involved in 17 dangerous burnover events; three crew issued mayday calls, 18 the Glengarry West tanker, the Hazelwood North tanker and 19 the Boolarra tanker, each of whom have participated in 20 internal CFA investigations into the jeopardy to their 21 safety in which they were placed that afternoon. There 22 was a fourth crew in danger, the Traralgon tanker number 23 1. They didn't issue a mayday, but their strike team 24 leader, Craig Wood, will attest to the desperate efforts 25 he made during the afternoon to attempt to reach that crew 26 who were trapped near a Telstra tower when the wind swung 27 around. 28 This sequence of events also raises questions: 29 Under whose authority was the red flag issued, what 30 precisely were its contents and on what information was it 31 based? In short, why warn for a 7 pm change when the best

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9183 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 information seems to suggest it would arrive earlier? 2 Examination will occur into whether the best information 3 available was relied on and examining generally the risk 4 to safety caused to the crew who were affected. 5 A couple of matters will also be explored in the 6 hearing. As I have noted, the plantation where the fire 7 started was owned by HVP. The CEO, Ms Sewell, will give 8 evidence later in the week about matters including the 9 forest industry brigades that are operated by Hancock. It 10 is a unique opportunity for the Commission to hear 11 evidence about how those brigades are organised and the 12 way in which they turn out to fight fires. She will give 13 evidence about the resources available, the business of 14 the plantation and their fire preparedness and their 15 resourcing on their day, including the efforts of crew who 16 travelled well outside the plantation and were engaged in 17 asset protection of homes in and around the area for some 18 time on 7 February. 19 There is another important matter about the 20 Churchill fire, and that is that important infrastructure 21 is located in the Latrobe Valley and very high attention 22 was paid by those in the incident management team to those 23 significant assets. Great efforts were gone to, including 24 by the incident controller himself, to ensure that he had 25 quickly contacted Loy Yang and that he stayed in contact 26 with them throughout the day and took extraordinary steps 27 to ensure that the best was done to protect these 28 important statewide assets. 29 We will call evidence from Mr Nick Demetrios from 30 Loy Yang who will also attest to the planning Loy Yang had 31 undertaken in anticipation of the weather predicted for

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9184 MS DOYLE Bushfires Royal Commission 1 the 7th and the liaison they were able to engage in with 2 the ICC as the day unfolded and that important power 3 station came under threat. 4 Commissioners, you no doubt have the witness list 5 and you will see it is a full schedule. We intend to 6 start today with Mr Keating who will assist us by 7 operating the STAR Tool and talking to the spread of the 8 fire. We will then hear from the incident controller and 9 then a number of other members of the incident management 10 team, lay witnesses and other members of crew who turned 11 out to the fire, members of Victoria Police, and 12 representatives of local government who engaged in the 13 response and recovery effort. 14 We received some of the material relevant to 15 these proceedings quite late last week. We have done the 16 best we can to be ready. It may be that there are points 17 in the evidence where some witnesses unfortunately may 18 need to be stood down while inquiries are made or even for 19 the purpose of being recalled. Nevertheless, we 20 anticipate we should be able to move quite efficiently and 21 complete the evidence within the allotted four days. 22 Mr Rozen will now lead evidence from Mr Keating. 23 MR ROZEN: Commissioners, I call Stephen Anthony Keating. 24

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9185 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 need to go to the statement at this time. Have you had an 2 opportunity to read through the statement before giving 3 evidence today?---Yes. 4 Is there anything that you wish to change in the 5 statement?---No. 6 Does the statement attach two annexures, the first of which is 7 a report prepared by you described as a fire spread 8 mapping report of the Churchill fire?---Yes. 9 And the second annexure is a list of your 10 qualifications?---That's correct. 11 And are the contents of the statement true and correct?---Yes, 12 they are. 13 I tender the statement. 14 #EXHIBIT 388 - Witness statement of Stephen Anthony Keating 15 (WIT.3004.018.0001) and attachments. STAR Tool 16 presentation. 17 CHAIRMAN: I'm just concerned as to whether you can hear at the 18 back of the room or whether we need to have the microphone 19 closer. If you nod your head, I will assume you can hear. 20 I don't get any shaking of the heads, so that's fine. 21 Stay where you are. 22 MR ROZEN: Mr Keating, for the assistance of the Commission has 23 an audiovisual presentation been prepared based on the 24 narrative description in your report of the Churchill 25 fire?---Yes, it has. 26 Are you able to take us through that audiovisual presentation 27 at this time?---Yes, certainly. 28 I ask you to do that, please?---The Churchill fire was located 29 in the area of Gippsland known as the Strzelecki Ranges in 30 an area approximately 12 kilometres south-east of Morwell 31 and three kilometres from the township of Churchill. The

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9186 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 Strzelecki Ranges themselves are a mountainous feature 2 that run from west to east, from near Warragul over past 3 Gormandale and they separate the Latrobe Valley from 4 the coastal flats of South Gippsland. The native 5 vegetation of the Strzelecki Ranges includes areas of cool 6 temperate rainforest, mixed species and mountain ash 7 forests. There are also large areas of pine and blue gum 8 plantations. The area involved in the Churchill fire has 9 steep valleys and higher ridges that predominantly run 10 down in from a northerly direction. It is important to 11 note that the fire-affected final area and the progression 12 perimeters that we will show in this display include areas 13 that were not burnt on the 7th. It is also important to 14 understand that on the day there were many smaller 15 spotfires that were not mapped and these occurred south of 16 the main fire and also in the area around the township of 17 Yarram. The fire impacted the communities of Hazelwood 18 South, Traralgon South in the north, down to Devon and 19 Yarram in the south. The fire also travelled from areas 20 around Jeeralang Junction in the west over to Carrajung 21 South and Won Wron in the east. Other communities that 22 were impacted by this fire include Balook near the Tarra 23 Bulga National Park, Callignee, Koornalla and Gormandale. 24 The area surrounding Churchill contains many critical 25 infrastructure assets and they are labelled on the 26 presentation. They include the Loy Yang A and B power 27 stations and the open cut coal mine, Basslink Power 28 assets, Mount Tassie communication towers and SP Ausnet 29 microwave tower. On Saturday 7 February at 1.31 pm the 30 automatic weather station at Latrobe Valley airport 31 recorded a temperature of 44 degrees, a relative humidity

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9187 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 of 10 per cent and the wind was 42 kilometres an hour 2 gusting to 64 kilometres an hour from the north-west, 3 giving a forest fire danger index of 103. At 4 approximately 1.32 a call to 000 reported a fire burning 5 in the vicinity of the intersection of Glendonald Road and 6 Jelleff's Outlet. The topography of the area allowed the 7 fire to travel up an initial slope of approximately 5 to 8 10 degrees gradient. The fire started in the bottom of 9 the natural basin known as the Bennett Creek catchment. 10 The land rises from the area where the fire had occurred 11 to the top of the Bennetts Creek catchment by about 12 380 metres over 3.8 kilometres and the catchment is a 13 mixed land use of plantations and natural forests. This 14 natural basin and the forest assisted rapid development of 15 the fire and is viewed here looking from the north-west. 16 The vegetation in the area of origin of the fire consisted 17 of plantation stands of varying ages of blue gums and 18 pine, with understorey of shrubs, wire grass, blackberries 19 and other surface fuels. The fuel hazard assessment of 20 the area of origin or near the area of origin was 21 conducted by an attending fire investigator and 22 categorised as an extreme fuel hazard. Due to the 23 prevailing weather, the continuous fuels of the plantation 24 and the local topography, the fire spread rapidly as a 25 surface and crown fire to the south-east pushed by the 26 wind up the broad valley of Bennetts Creek roughly towards 27 the community of Balook. Observation from aircraft 28 recorded the fire had crested at the ridgetop of the 29 Bennetts Creek catchment that carries the Jeeralang North 30 road, this area here, prior to 2.10 pm. We can 31 demonstrate this rapid fire spread through a series of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9188 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 photos that was taken by a member of the public who was 2 located at the Hazelwood pondage for the afternoon some 8 3 kilometres north-west of the area of origin. The images 4 that I'll show you have approximate times on them, but 5 they do give us an understanding of how rapid the 6 development occurred. This first image, the approximate 7 time of 1.38 pm shows the fire six minutes after the first 8 000 call. The third image, again, you can see the smoke 9 column starting to build eight minutes after the call. 10 Within 14 minutes we see we have a fairly developed fire 11 that's progressing in that south, south-east direction 12 through the Bennetts Creek catchment. At this point in 13 time, after 28 minutes the fire was close to reaching the 14 top of the catchment and progressing over the Jeeralang 15 North Road, as we were aware that 10 minutes later the 16 aircraft had noted that it was past that location. As we 17 can see, at 42 minutes after the first 000 call at 2.14 pm 18 approximately the fire is very well established throughout 19 the catchment area of Bennetts Creek and has a significant 20 convection column becoming established above it. By 2.20 21 observations from aircraft had reported the head fire had 22 reached the Jeeralang Creek west branch. The fire had 23 travelled a distance of seven kilometres in the first 50 24 minutes. We have a following photo which shows us a view 25 taken from one of the regional aircraft flying over the 26 fire. It gives us an indication of the eastern flank of 27 the fire, the area of origin located over on the right and 28 you can see the heavy timbered deep valleys that the fire 29 is beginning to progress through. At 2.40 pm a spotfire 30 was reported from the air and had become established in 31 steep country several kilometres west of Balook, in the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9189 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 headwaters of the Little Traralgon Creek. There are 2 several other spotfires recorded in the same area within 3 the following 20 minutes. Between 2 and 3 pm the western 4 flank of the fire had begun to impact areas in Lidners 5 Road and Jeeralang Junction and at 2.45 pm the eastern 6 flank of the fire had travelled from the area of origin 7 eastwards towards Thompsons Road and under the influence 8 of the steep terrain and the pine plantation fuels it 9 began to impact on the microwave tower at the southern end 10 of Thompsons Road. This fire movement was recorded by the 11 air attack supervisor and photographed by a member of the 12 public. The photos we are about to show you will 13 demonstrate the effect the topography and the fuel had on 14 the flank fire. The area around the microwave tower was 15 under considerable attack for extended periods of time. 16 What you will see occurs over several hours and the 17 movement of the eastern flank of the fire travelling 18 across the hillside, and some of the fire behaviour in 19 this case is of quite high intensity. There is the SP 20 Ausnet microwave link at the top and at 2.30 the main head 21 fire had travelled well south past that location. This is 22 a flank fire coming up the valley behind the microwave 23 link tower under the effect of the valley and the 24 continuous fuels of the plantation again. As you can see, 25 the intensity of that flank fire has then increased into 26 another major run of fire progressing south-east. This is 27 looking back towards the area of origin and the flank fire 28 has reached the north-west corner of the mountain that's 29 containing the microwave tower and again has increased in 30 intensity and taken a significant run, impacting the top 31 of the tower, and then a further run across the front of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9190 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 the mountain. Those photos give us an understanding of 2 how the topography can affect the spread of the fire. At 3 3.02 pm a 000 call reported a fire in the Mays Bush Jack 4 River State Forest, which is located just to the west of 5 Yarram. This native forest 6 kilometres west of Yarram, 6 the spotfire was located 14 kilometres from the spotfires 7 previously reported in the Little Traralgon Creek 8 headwaters and approximately 20 kilometres from the known 9 head fire of the Churchill fire at that time. The 10 spotfire embers are likely to have been released from an 11 elevation between 500 and 600 metres above the southern 12 coastal flats and landed at Yarram in temperatures of 13 43 degrees with a relative humidity of 9 per cent and wind 14 from the north-west, 37 gusting to 53, as recorded at the 15 automatic weather station at Yarram. At 4.20 the fire was 16 reported to have crossed the Grand Ridge Road just to the 17 west of Balook. The fire was burning in the vicinity of 18 the Balook visitor centre by 4.50 pm. Also at 4.50 pm the 19 head fire as reported by the air attack supervisor was in 20 the vicinity of Traralgon Creek Road and Bishops Road 21 intersection at the community of Le Roy and running in a 22 line south-west from that location. It should be noted 23 that there are reports of individuals' homes being overrun 24 by fire in the Le Roy location at 6 pm and the differing 25 times for impact in this area is most likely due to the 26 erratic fire spread because of the topography and the 27 spotting. At 4.50 pm there are also multiple spotfires 28 reported in grassland on the western edge of the township 29 of Yarram and by 5.15 pm the main fire was approaching the 30 slopes of Mount Tassie. Aircraft had also observed there 31 were spotfires established on the eastern side of Mount

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9191 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 Tassie. Next we will show you the fire affected area 2 prior to the wind change. I reiterate again the fire 3 affected area includes areas of fuels that were and were 4 not burnt, as some of those were burnt over by spotfires 5 and so it was fairly hit and miss as far as what material 6 had been consumed by that time. The wind change. It was 7 observed in the vicinity of the area of origin at 8 approximately 6.05 pm. The wind change recorded at the 9 Yarram automatic weather station at 6.03 with the wind 10 from the south-west, 44 kilometres an hour gusting to 64 11 kilometres an hour. It strengthened to 50 kilometres an 12 hour, gusting at 70 kilometres an hour by 13 7 o'clock - correction, by 6.30. The wind change had 14 reached the Latrobe Valley airport at 6.16 pm, when the 15 wind speed was reported from the south-west at 44 16 kilometres an hour gusting at 63 kilometres an hour. The 17 Latrobe Valley airport is located 44 kilometres north of 18 Yarram and both weather stations are separated by the 19 Strzelecki Ranges and the fire area. When the wind change 20 impacted the Churchill fire, the fire extended from the 21 area of origin on Glendonald Road, east to the east side 22 of Mount Tassie approximately 13 kilometres away. The 23 fire was burning in very steep and inaccessible country 24 with very high to extreme fuel loads in mixed species and 25 mixed forests, pine and hardwood plantations. When the 26 cold front passed over the fire area it acted like a lid 27 over the convection column that we viewed earlier. The 28 cold front restricted the vertical movement of the smoke 29 and embers and forced the convection column to roll across 30 the terrain. It caused major smoke logging in the areas 31 to the north and east of the fire area. It also

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9192 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 intensified the amount of burning debris which propagated 2 spotting, which in turn increased fire spread. After the 3 wind changed, the fire and embers impacted in grassland 4 pastures as well as the native forests and plantations. 5 Due to the heavy fuel loads, steep terrain and extreme 6 weather, the fire produced massive amounts of burning 7 airborne debris and the high wind carried these embers 8 rapidly through the slopes and valleys of the Strzelecki 9 Ranges and the foothills from Hazelwood North to 10 Gormandale. There are reports of burning embers and 11 spotfires occurring over distances up to 8 kilometres 12 within 15 minutes after the wind change reaching the fire 13 area. The fire travelled as a mass of embers that ignited 14 surrounding vegetation almost instantly on their arrival 15 and then propagated more burning debris to become airborne 16 again. A series of spotfires developed at the time of the 17 wind change on the coastal flats and the southern side of 18 the Strzelecki range, at Won Wron, at Carrajung South and 19 to the east of Yarram, and also near Devon. Immediately 20 following the wind change sweeping over the fireground 21 there were reports of ember attack and subsequent fire 22 development in the communities of Hazelwood South, 23 Hazelwood North, Koornalla, Traralgon South and Callignee. 24 The fire was reported burning in the area around Thompsons 25 Bridge on Traralgon Creek Road, Koornalla, from 6.15 pm. 26 One resident reported that his property became engulfed in 27 flames only two minutes after the wind change. This area 28 was located three to four kilometres from the known 29 eastern flank of the fire prior to the wind change. 30 Callignee North, 8 kilometres from the known flank of the 31 fire prior to the wind change, there were reports of fire

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9193 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 reaching the properties as flying embers from 6.15 in 2 Callignee and Callignee North. The fire continued to move 3 eastwards and began impacting in the Merrimans Creek Road 4 and Gormandale area by 7.20, 8.20 pm. The fire expanded 5 throughout the evening. Active crown fire was still being 6 tracked moving north through the Traralgon South flora and 7 fauna reserve, this area up here, and that was as late as 8 11.30 pm. The fire burned to within several kilometres of 9 the Loy Yang power station. After the increased spotting 10 activity occurred following the wind change, there were 11 reports of people and property being threatened by fire 12 for many hours following. This fire travel was most 13 likely due to the varying wind conditions, differing 14 topography and fuel loads. Many spotfires burned and 15 consolidated throughout the evening. The fire burn had 16 impacted properties from many directions rather than 17 simply from the direction of travel of the prevailing 18 wind, the impact on small communities occurring at varying 19 times. The majority of areas affected by the Churchill 20 fire had been burned through by the morning of Sunday, 21 8 February. However, there was further fire activity over 22 several days around some of the perimeter areas and also 23 in subsequent weeks around Won Wron State Forest. The 24 Churchill fire was listed as under control at 1800 hours 25 on 19 February 2009 and the fire had consumed over 26 24,000 hectares and resulted in the deaths of 11 people. 27 Thank you, Mr Keating. Can I just follow up a couple of 28 matters that you have referred to. The first aspect of 29 your evidence that I would like you to expand on briefly, 30 please, is your description of the cold front acting as a 31 lid on the convection column. Could you please explain

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9194 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 what you mean by that?---With the progression of the cold 2 front across the fire area, there was discussion had with 3 the members of the Bureau of Meteorology about the 4 subsequent travel of embers and smoke logging of areas. 5 Given the Strzelecki Ranges are of reasonable height, up 6 to 700 metres high, and my limited understanding of 7 meteorology, as explained to me the cold front as it 8 slipped in underneath the warmer air had a ceiling height 9 and that ceiling height created an inversion. What 10 happens then is that a convection column, rather than 11 continuing to press upwards, is more forced over and 12 tilted over running along the landscape. So that's why we 13 had less visibility, more embers and the column itself was 14 staying lower to the ground after the wind change. 15 Thank you. A related matter concerns the rate of spread of the 16 fire on the impact of the wind change. As I have 17 understood your evidence, the initial run of the fire was 18 in a south-easterly direction as a consequence of the 19 north-westerly wind?---That's correct. 20 And then on the arrival of the wind change from the south-west 21 we see the fire then spreading in a north-easterly 22 direction and we can see there, can we, the spread of the 23 fire after the arrival of the wind change; is that part of 24 it to the right of the line you have drawn effectively 25 from the point of origin to Mount Tassie?---That line 26 there, yes. The big issue we had in trying to determine 27 our fire spread post-wind change was that it occurred very 28 rapidly and it didn't occur as a single change of 29 direction of that fire. It occurred as a change of 30 direction of the propagation of the spotfires coming out 31 of all of that heavy material. So, on the wind change,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9195 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 what we found is from this area here, so we had active 2 flank fire still around the area of origin, as you saw in 3 those images around the tower, and we had active fire down 4 to the area of Mount Tassie. 5 At the time of the arrival of the wind change?---At the time of 6 the arrival of the wind change. In saying that, that does 7 not mean that that area was one big long line of burning 8 fire. That is one issue we have had with mapping, is 9 trying to explain or demonstrate that, just because we put 10 a line around it, we call this the fire affected area, not 11 the burn perimeter, because there would be substantial 12 areas in here that weren't burnt prior to the wind change, 13 but the propagation of embers would have occurred across 14 that 13 kilometre flank and they occur quite rapidly, if 15 you can go to the next slide, please, Luke. So what we 16 see is we had areas up in here that were affected within 17 15 minutes of the wind change and the same with Callignee 18 and Callignee North. 1815 there were reports of ember 19 attack in Callignee North. However, subsequently there 20 were people who did not get impacted by fire, in some 21 areas on Red Hill Road until 8 o'clock that evening. Most 22 likely they have been impacted by the fire actually 23 burning up out of the valley below them, not by the 24 spotting and the embers moving through with the wind. So, 25 it is quite difficult to actually put a timeframe on that 26 spread in that north-east direction, apart from having 27 just snapshots of where people were affected at given 28 times. 29 Are you able to, and tell me if you are not, indicate whether 30 the spread after the wind change, the fire rate of spread 31 was faster or the same as the earlier rate of spread of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9196 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 the fire before the wind change?---I think using the rate 2 of spread is difficult in this case because we are dealing 3 with movement of embers rather than dealing with a flaming 4 front that is travelling across the landscape. When we do 5 our predictive fire spread we do our predictive fire 6 spread based on the firefront travelling across the 7 landscape. It also includes spotting potential and how 8 far things will spot, but it doesn't take that into 9 account when we have massive spotting and the fire just 10 skips along at a great rate of knots. 11 One final matter, Mr Keating. You indicated that the distance, 12 as I understood your evidence, from the eastern flank of 13 the pre-wind change fire to Callignee North was some 8 14 kilometres?---To one of the addresses where I have 15 received credible reports with timeframes of ember attack 16 was about 8 kilometres. 17 Koornalla would be slightly closer, would it, to the fire flank 18 as we are looking at that map than 8 kilometres?---Yes. 19 The locality map as opposed to this Google Earth image, 20 the locality of Koornalla follows a fairly deep valley 21 that runs some way down. Luke, if you can zoom in on that 22 area just there for me, please. This area in here 23 I believe is Thompsons Bridge, it is a locality known as 24 Thompsons Bridge but it is actually Koornalla. 25 Is that the Traralgon Creek Road?---That's correct. 26 Settlements alongside either side of Traralgon Creek Road is 27 essentially Koornalla?---Yes, and once again witness 28 statement with credible timeframes on it as to the time 29 the fire had impacted their properties was about three and 30 a half to four kilometres from what we knew as roughly the 31 eastern edge of the fire before the wind change.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9197 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 Thank you. They are the matters that I have for Mr Keating. 2 Commissioners, any questions for Mr Keating? 3 COMMISSIONER PASCOE: Mr Keating, I'm interested to know if 4 there had been any controlled burning in the area and if 5 that had any impact on the spread of the fire?---I'm 6 unsure as to the amount of controlled burning in the area. 7 Given that it is plantation - there was modified fuel in 8 the area. There were areas that had been harvested in the 9 years prior to the fire occurring. They have relevance to 10 the spread of the fire in that there's remains left after 11 they finish burning, which they call slash. That slash 12 material sometimes, if the logging has just occurred in 13 those areas, may be significantly higher, but then there 14 are other areas that would be void of fuel as well. 15 I think the change in fuels didn't have a great impact on 16 the fire except for, interestingly, down in the area near 17 the Tarra Bulga National Park where the fire burnt across 18 Grand Ridge Road and still had another hour to go before 19 the wind change had affected it and, once it burnt down 20 into that area, it appears to have burned into a lot 21 wetter forest. It is the southern aspect; it is quite 22 damp. It has actually slowed right down and the intensity 23 of the fire in this area is significantly less. The areas 24 leading up to that point that were or were not fuel 25 reduced, I'm unaware. 26 MR ROZEN: There are no further questions of Mr Keating. Can 27 he please be excused. 28 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you, Mr Keating. You are excused. 29 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 30 MR ROZEN: I should tender the STAR Tool presentation as the 31 exhibit to Mr Keating's statement.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9198 KEATING XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 CHAIRMAN: Yes, that can be part of exhibit 388. 2 MR ROZEN: If the Commission pleases. I call Peter Anthony 3 Lockwood. 4

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9199 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 of some of my interviews". 2 Yes, thank you. The next change?---The next change is on page 3 19, paragraph 77. I wish to add to the end of paragraph 4 77 "and issue red flag warnings". 5 So the last sentence in paragraph 77 will now read, "The 6 direction was given to ground all aircraft and issue red 7 flag warnings"?---That's correct. 8 Thank you. Is there one final change, sir?---There are two 9 other changes. In paragraph 78, and I will read the 10 sentence as I would like the change to be made, "At about 11 this time the operations unit confirmed red flag warnings 12 had been sent." So there would be the deletion of 13 "through the incident management radio system". 14 You are referring there to the second sentence in paragraph 15 78?---That's correct. 16 Is there one final change?---One final change is paragraph 82, 17 on the next page, page 20. If you look down to the last 18 sentence of that paragraph, I would like to include the 19 word "fire" after "the" so it reads "and the fire did get 20 to within a kilometre". 21 That's the third last line of that paragraph, it should read 22 "the fire did get to within a kilometre"; 23 correct?---That's correct. 24 With those changes, are the contents of your statement true and 25 correct?---That is correct. 26 I tender the statement. 27 #EXHIBIT 389 - Witness statement of Peter Anthony Lockwood 28 (WIT.7520.001.0001) and attachments. Statement dated 14 29 April 2009 of Peter Anthony Lockwood 30 (SUMM.044.003.2881_R). Three CFA reports 31 (CFA.001.026.0138), (CFA.001.026.0153),

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9200 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 (CFA.001.026.0171_R). Clear version of annexure 8 2 (WIT.7520.001.0063) (CFA.001.026.0100_R). 3 MR ROZEN: Mr Lockwood, you joined the CFA as a volunteer at 4 11 years of age?---That's correct. 5 For how long did you serve the CFA as a volunteer?---Right up 6 until - I need to refer - the exact time I need to refer 7 to my service history, if I may. 8 Perhaps without going to that I will see if I can avoid that. 9 You do say in your statement you joined the CFA career 10 staff in 1994?---That's correct. 11 Is that when you ceased to become a volunteer?---I maintained 12 some volunteer membership after that. 13 Are you able to indicate for how long?---Roughly until 14 approximately the mid - towards 2000. I can't remember 15 the exact date. 16 What was the highest volunteer rank that you 17 achieved?---Communications officer, I believe. 18 Where does that sit in relation to the other volunteer ranks 19 that we have heard of; for example, captain of a 20 brigade?---That's not an operational rank. It is to look 21 after communications within a fire brigade. 22 I see. You joined CFA career staff in 1994 and you have 23 progressed through the ranks, have you, from firefighter 24 to operations officer?---That's correct. 25 You set out in paragraph 6 of your statement the qualifications 26 and endorsements that you have achieved, and I want to ask 27 you about some of those, if I could. In paragraph 8 of 28 your statement you say, "From about the 2005/2006 fire 29 season until recently, but not before the end of the most 30 recent fire season, I was authorised to perform the role 31 of IC (level 3) under the guidance of a mentor." Do we

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9201 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 take it from that, Mr Lockwood, that as at 7 February 2009 2 you were authorised to perform the role of a level 3 3 incident controller under the guidance of a mentor?---That 4 is correct. 5 Since that time, as you explain in paragraph 9, you have been 6 endorsed as an IC level 3?---That's correct. 7 Does that mean you are now qualified to perform that 8 role?---That's correct. 9 Without the guidance of a mentor?---That's correct. 10 CHAIRMAN: Can I just clarify the position about the guidance 11 of a mentor. How close or remote does the mentor who 12 provides the guidance have to be?---I don't know the 13 answer to that. 14 MR ROZEN: Just if I can follow up that question with one. 15 Prior to 7 February 2009 had you ever performed the role 16 of a level 3 incident controller with a mentor?---No. 17 Did you have a mentor with you at the incident control centre 18 on 7 February 2009 whilst you were performing the role of 19 incident controller?---Not a mentor. 20 Was there any reason for that? Was a mentor not available to 21 you or what was the reason why you didn't have a mentor 22 with you?---I can't provide an explanation. 23 Just before leaving that topic, you attach a document referred 24 to at paragraph 9 of your statement which evidences the 25 endorsement that you presently have to be an incident 26 controller. I will try and do this, if I can, without 27 taking you to the document. But, if you need to go to it, 28 then please indicate that you do?---Yes. 29 It is a table in which your name appears and indicates that you 30 hold the endorsement for IC 3, which is incident 31 controller level 3?---That's correct.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9202 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 It also has another column headed "Priority role", and the 2 priority role as I read it next to your name is OO. Is 3 that operations officer?---That's correct. 4 Can you explain to the Commission your understanding of your 5 priority role, what that means?---Prepared incident 6 management teams, that would be my first choice of role in 7 an incident management team. However, I am qualified to 8 perform those other roles indicated. 9 You set out in part 3 of your statement the experience that you 10 have had of level 3 incidents. Without going through each 11 of those, the position is this, is it not, Mr Lockwood: 12 prior to 7 February 2009 you had not performed the role of 13 incident controller at a level 3 incident?---That is 14 correct. 15 At paragraph 16 of your statement you indicate that the region 16 in which Traralgon is located had about 40 career staff 17 and about 2,500 volunteers available to turn out on 18 7 February 2009; is that a correct description of what you 19 have said there?---The correct description of what I have 20 said there is that there are that many people within 21 region 10. Whether they were available to turn out, 22 I cannot explain. 23 I understand that. You say that the region had two level 3 24 incident controllers, and you identify Mr Greg Flynn and 25 Mr Alan Rankin. I take it what you are referring to there 26 is two officers who were accredited to perform the role of 27 a level 3 incident controller without a mentor?---That is 28 correct. However, Mr Rankin wasn't currently - he was on 29 secondment out of region 10 at that particular time. 30 You describe that in paragraph 17 of your statement. What 31 about the position of Mr Flynn? Where was he on 7 February

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9203 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 2009?---Mr Flynn was at the region 10 headquarters in 2 Sale. 3 In fact I think you had some contact with him in that role, did 4 you not?---That's correct. 5 If I could ask you, please, about the incident management team 6 that you had working for you in your role as incident 7 controller on 7 February 2009. Firstly, it is the case, 8 is it not, that prior to 7 February 2009 you were 9 performing the role of incident controller in relation to 10 what's been referred to as the Delburn complex 11 fires?---That's correct. 12 For how long prior to the 7th had you been performing that 13 role?---Four days prior. 14 There were arrangements in place as you describe in your 15 statement for what's been referred to as a prepared level 16 3 incident control centre in the DSE office in 17 Traralgon?---Can I clarify the question as "control 18 centre" as opposed to "team"? 19 Yes, certainly. That's probably my mistake with the 20 terminology, Mr Lockwood?---There was a level 3 incident 21 management team preformed upstairs at DSE offices, as 22 I recollect. 23 The control centre is the physical location?---Yes. 24 And the team are the people that are there to perform the role 25 inside that location?---That is correct. However, they 26 weren't actually in the incident control centre as such. 27 They were located upstairs in the regional DSE office. 28 You were performing your Delburn role downstairs in that 29 office?---That's correct. 30 As you explain in your statement, upon being alerted to what we 31 are referring to as the Churchill fire, the plans came to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9204 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 fruition and you moved upstairs to take up the role of 2 incident controller in respect of that fire; is that 3 correct?---That's not correct. The level 3 incident 4 management team came downstairs and I remained in the ICC 5 downstairs. 6 The CFA was the control agency for the Churchill fire?---That's 7 correct. 8 And were you involved in the decision that led to the CFA being 9 the control agency?---I had discussions. However, the 10 decision is not my decision. 11 Your deputy incident controller was Mr Laurie 12 Jeremiah?---That's correct. 13 Did you have discussions with Mr Jeremiah as to his role and 14 yours and how you would work together?---My recollection 15 was that Laurie Jeremiah came in and introduced himself as 16 my deputy incident controller. 17 Did you have a discussion with him about what role he would 18 perform as deputy and what role you would perform as 19 incident controller?---I can't remember exact discussions 20 at that time. 21 If I can just go through briefly the other personnel in your 22 team. Once it was established, Mr Geoff Kennedy of the 23 DSE was the operations officer?---Correct. 24 And his deputy was Mr Brett Mitchell?---Correct. 25 The role of operations officer in respect of the Delburn 26 complex fire had been performed by Mr Simon Bloink?---That 27 is correct. 28 Is that the correct pronunciation of his surname?---That's 29 correct. 30 That is B-L-O-I-N-K. He continued to report to you in his role 31 as operations officer for the Delburn complex fire?---That

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9205 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 is correct. 2 You had a planning officer, Mr Andy Gillham, of the DSE?---That 3 is correct. 4 Included in the staff that were working for Mr Gillham in the 5 planning unit were information officers Ms Hunter and 6 Mr Oldroyd?---That's correct. 7 Was there also a gentleman by the name of Peter Merritt, who 8 was performing a function in the incident management 9 team?---I can't recall. 10 Do you know Mr Merritt?---I can't recall, sorry. 11 There are references in the logs to a "Peter - situation". 12 Situation officer is a role within the planning unit under 13 the AIIMS structure?---That's correct. 14 Does that assist you at all in being referred to references to 15 "Peter - situation"? Is it possible that Mr Merritt 16 performed the role of situation officer?---I can't recall. 17 We take it you had no dealings with him - - -?---I dealt mainly 18 with the planning officer. 19 Mr Gillham?---Mr Gillham. 20 Did you also have a minute taker in place to record the 21 discussions you had at incident management team 22 meetings?---Yes, I did. 23 Was that Lisa Howard from the Department of Primary 24 Industries?---Yes, it was. 25 Is that in your experience a role that is often performed in 26 incident control centres, that is having a dedicated 27 minute taker for meetings?---Either a minute taker or a 28 scribe, as we call them. 29 Is that something that you have previously experienced?---No, 30 it's not. 31 Why did you have that in place for 7 February?---There was a

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9206 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 lot of information which we needed to track at all times, 2 and having a minute taker enabled us to be able to record 3 all of the critical or relevant points and be able to use 4 those as a reference for future. 5 Does it also have the benefit of taking some of the strain off 6 you in terms of having to record in your own logs the 7 discussions that occur at incident management team 8 meetings?---Absolutely. 9 And do you see that as being a beneficial aspect of the way in 10 which you worked on 7 February?---Very beneficial. 11 If I could turn to ask you about the resources that you had 12 working on the fireground. Firstly, can I take you to 13 paragraph 21 of your statement. At paragraph 21 you 14 explain how crews first come to be at a fire such as 15 Churchill. I take it that what you are describing there 16 is in fact what happened on 7 February 2009 in relation to 17 the Churchill fire?---That's correct. 18 That the first crews respond to a 000 call through ESTA and the 19 closest available brigades are notified by pager and 20 attend as part of initial response?---That's correct. 21 In fact local crews from Churchill and Yinnar were in fact 22 amongst the first crews that attended at the Churchill 23 fire?---That's correct. 24 And they did so in response to that pager process that you have 25 referred to in paragraph 21?---That's correct. 26 At paragraph 23 you say, and I quote, "For a developing 27 emergency where an IMT and ICC is in place, the CFA crews 28 would then come under the control of the ICC and be 29 directed to change to the incident channels operated by 30 the ICC and managed accordingly." Is the means by which 31 crews are brought under the control of the ICC a direction

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9207 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 to switch channels to the incident channels that are being 2 operated by the ICC; in other words, is that the process 3 by which they are brought under control of the 4 ICC?---That's correct. 5 When did that happen on 7 February 2009?---I can't recall the 6 exact time that that occurred. 7 Is that something that would ordinarily be logged, that process 8 occurring?---It is a transitional process. Ordinarily you 9 try to log as much as you can, but I'm unsure whether that 10 was actually logged at the time. 11 It doesn't appear in your log?---Okay. 12 Is that fair to say? I'm asking you that?---That's fair to say, 13 yes. 14 There is a reference in some of the evidence that's been 15 produced to the Commission to a resource list. Are you 16 familiar with that concept, a resource list listing the 17 resources that are available on the fireground?---I am 18 aware of a list, yes. 19 Was a list maintained in the incident control centre on 20 7 February 2009 of the resources that turned out to the 21 Churchill fire?---I cannot recall. 22 Would that be ordinarily a responsibility of the operations 23 unit to maintain such a list?---That is correct. 24 Did you have any discussions with either Mr Kennedy or 25 Mr Mitchell about whether they were maintaining such a 26 list on 7 February?---I can't recall any such discussion, 27 no. 28 Presumably, Mr Lockwood, having access to such a list is very 29 important from the point of view of planning the use of 30 the resources that you have available, that is to know who 31 is there?---That is correct.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9208 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 Did the absence of such a list on 7 February hinder your 2 ability to control the resources you had on the 3 fireground?---No. 4 At paragraph 63 of your statement you describe a discussion 5 that you had with Mr Mitchell, the deputy operations 6 officer. You say that that discussion took place prior to 7 1500. Are you able to place the time of that discussion 8 because it occurred before the first incident management 9 team meeting that you called at 1500?---I can't recall the 10 exact time of when that discussion occurred. 11 Had the direction to the fireground for the resources on the 12 fireground to come under the control of the incident 13 control centre occurred by the time you had this 14 discussion with Mr Mitchell?---I can't recall. 15 Mr Mitchell told you that the Vic Fire radio channel was 16 overloaded and he was having trouble getting CFA crews on 17 the fireground to change radio channels from Vic Fire to 18 the incident channels; is that correct?---That's how 19 I recall the discussion. 20 And that meant, did it not, that you were having trouble 21 bringing the fireground resources under the control of the 22 incident control centre?---That's correct. 23 If you can't communicate with them by radio, then they are not 24 under your control?---That's correct. 25 And that caused you obviously concerns?---Yes, it did. 26 If they weren't under the control of the incident control 27 centre at that time, whose control were they under?---They 28 would have been under their own control on the fire line 29 at the particular time. 30 And would have been operating through their group 31 structure?---Yes, through the group structure or at this

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9209 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 particular point of time the reference is made to Vic 2 Fire, so they would have been under the dispatch system 3 via ESTA. 4 You describe in paragraph 64 what you did in response to that, 5 that is you contacted Mr Greg Flynn. He was at the 6 Seymour regional emergency - sorry, not Seymour, the 7 regional emergency control centre - where was he 8 located?---In Sale. 9 You asked him to put out a pager message to resolve the problem 10 you were having gaining communication to the crews; is 11 that right?---That is correct. 12 He agreed to put out a pager message?---That is correct. 13 You have actually reproduced the pager message. I if I could 14 take you to that briefly. It is at annexure 13, which is 15 (WIT.7520.001.0115). Mr Lockwood, this was a very 16 important communication for you because this was your only 17 means as incident controller of getting the people on the 18 fireground on to the incident radio channel so that you 19 could communicate with them?---That's correct. 20 As you explain in your statement and as we see from the 21 document on the screen - do you have a hard copy in front 22 of you that you can see, Mr Lockwood?---Yes, I do. 23 This pager message went out as an administrative type message. 24 Are there other types of pager message that the CFA 25 uses?---There is an emergency message for response and 26 also a non-emergency address on each pager. 27 Is that three types of pager message?---That's correct. 28 Emergency, non-emergency and administrative?---That's correct. 29 Is administrative the lowest in terms of importance of pager 30 message?---That's the way I understand, yes. 31 You have explained that this message didn't in fact reach the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9210 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 fireground until very early in the morning of 8 February 2 2009?---That's correct. 3 Do you know why it was sent out as an administrative message 4 rather than an emergency message?---No, I don't. 5 Was that a matter you discussed with Mr Flynn?---I discussed 6 the pager message, not where it would go out on. 7 Does identifying or describing a pager message as 8 administrative rather than emergency affect the speed at 9 which the message goes out to the recipients?---I'm not 10 aware. 11 Did you make it clear to Mr Flynn that this was urgent 12 information that you needed to get out to the 13 fireground?---I can't recall whether I actually stated 14 that. 15 From the context in which you were having the discussion, you 16 would have been satisfied that he would have understood 17 that, though; is that a fair statement?---That's fair. 18 Are you able to explain to the Commission why the pager message 19 took so long to reach the recipients?---I can't explain. 20 Is it a matter you have discussed with Mr Flynn?---It is not a 21 matter I have discussed with Mr Flynn. I have only 22 actually been provided with the hard copy of that pager 23 message recently when compiling the statement. So I have 24 only actually recently received this and realised that 25 that's when the pager message went out. 26 The people to whom the pager message was addressed are 27 described as "region 10 all"?---That's correct. 28 Would that have included yourself?---That's correct. 29 And it would have presumably included the other members of the 30 incident management team, including Mr Mitchell and 31 Mr Kennedy in the operations section?---No, they are not

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9211 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 in the CFA paging system. 2 They are not?---No. 3 They are DSE members?---Yes. 4 Did you monitor your pager to see if the message that Mr Flynn 5 sent out at 1533 was received by you on your pager as a 6 way of establishing whether it had got to people on the 7 fireground?---I can't recall. 8 I know it is a long time ago, Mr Lockwood, but do you recall 9 now whether you received many pager messages during the 10 course of the afternoon on 7 February?---Through the 11 Delburn and right through the afternoon the pager was 12 going berserk, to use a term. 13 The pager message that we see attached to your statement 14 includes a reference to the wind change being expected to 15 the south-west at around 1900 hours. Is that a matter 16 that you asked Mr Flynn to include in the pager 17 message?---That's correct. 18 Part of your responsibility under the AIIMS incident management 19 structure is sectorisation of resources on the 20 fireground?---That's correct. 21 How did you fulfil that responsibility on 7 February 2009 22 ?---That role was delegated through to planning and 23 operations. 24 To planning and operations?---Yes. 25 So does that mean it was a shared responsibility of Mr Gillham 26 as the head of the planning unit and Mr Mitchell and 27 Mr Kennedy in the operations unit?---They would have been 28 communicating, yes. 29 To fulfil your responsibility as incident controller you would 30 have had some mechanism in place by which they 31 communicated to you what had occurred in terms of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9212 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 sectorisation of the fireground?---That's correct. 2 And what was that mechanism?---There would be a face-to-face 3 communication all through IMT briefings. 4 What was the position prior to the arrival of the wind change 5 which we have heard occurred at approximately 1800 and 6 thereafter, what was the position as you understood it, 7 Mr Lockwood, with sectorisation of the resources on the 8 fireground?---I knew there were sectors in place. 9 However, resourcing of those sectors and the actual 10 geographic location of those sectors I can't recall. 11 There has been evidence before the Commission in relation to 12 other fires of documents produced in incident control 13 centres which describe division commanders and sector 14 commanders. Was any such document produced on 7 February 15 2009 in the incident control centre that you were 16 managing?---I can't recall. 17 The position that you describe in your statement that you 18 raised with Mr Mitchell some time prior to 1500 of 19 difficulties communicating by radio with those on the 20 fireground, did that position improve in the period prior 21 to the arrival of the wind change?---There was no mention 22 of any further problems throughout the day. 23 So after that discussion with Mr Mitchell and your 24 communication with Mr Flynn to get the pager message out, 25 no-one came back to you and told you that this was an 26 ongoing problem?---That's correct. 27 Did Mr Mitchell or anyone else come back to you and tell you 28 positively that the problem had been fixed?---No. Well, 29 I can't recall. 30 If I could turn, Mr Lockwood, to the question of warnings that 31 were sent out by the incident control centre to the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9213 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 public. Firstly, can I ask you what is your understanding 2 of where the responsibility for sending out warnings to 3 the public sits under the AIIMS structure?---When you say 4 "responsibility", who actually performs that role? 5 Yes?---That's usually done in the planning department through 6 the information unit. 7 Is that the way it occurred on 7 February 2009?---That's 8 correct. 9 You describe in your statement how you personally signed some 10 of the warnings that were sent out from the incident 11 control centre. Is the position that other people signed 12 some of the warnings as well?---That's correct. 13 And how did that come about?---My recollection is at the 14 1500 hours IMT meeting a request was made by Mr Gillham 15 that, given that I was extremely busy and inaccessible at 16 times, he be given authorisation to authorise those 17 information briefings. As a result, I authorised 18 Mr Gillham to do so. 19 Were you aware whether Mr Jeremiah, your deputy, also signed 20 some of the warnings that went out?---I'm not aware, no. 21 The compilation of warnings was something that occurred, as you 22 have told us, within the information unit under the 23 control of Mr Gillham, the planning officer; is that 24 right?---That's correct. 25 What role did you personally have in the identification of 26 locations that ought to receive warnings?---I was briefed 27 on when the warnings came out as soon as I was able to be 28 briefed, when I was available, and that involved the 29 handing of the warnings to myself so I could have a look 30 and see where the areas were under threat at the time. 31 I understand you were given warnings once they were prepared,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9214 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 but my question is a different one, Mr Lockwood. What 2 involvement did you have in the identification in advance 3 of warnings being sent out of the locations that ought to 4 be included in warnings?---I can't recall exact 5 involvement. However, the planning unit is that 6 responsible for the issuing of warnings. 7 Did you have any discussions with Mr Gillham about how the 8 planning unit was identifying places to warn?---I can't 9 recall those discussions. 10 You understood from very early on on 7 February 2009, 11 Mr Lockwood, that any fire burning in the Gippsland area 12 would be impacted by a south-westerly wind change later in 13 the day?---That's correct. 14 It was in fact one of the first things you did, as you explain 15 in your statement, was to familiarise yourself with the 16 forecast for the day and specifically in relation to the 17 timing of the wind change?---That's correct. 18 Quite apart from any new fire commencing, you knew from early 19 on 7 February 2009 that the timing of the wind change was 20 of the utmost importance to your role as incident 21 controller for the Delburn fires?---That's correct. 22 And it was important for at least two reasons: firstly, because 23 the fire could flare up on the arrival of the wind change 24 and potentially impact on communities in the vicinity of 25 the fireground?---That's correct. 26 And, secondly, you know from your lengthy experience as a 27 firefighter that firefighter safety can be severely 28 compromised on the arrival of a wind change if 29 firefighters are located in the vicinity of the eastern 30 flank?---That's correct. 31 In relation to the question of warnings, did you have any

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9215 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 discussions with Mr Gillham about the need to warn not 2 only people in the path of the fire whilst it was affected 3 by the north-westerly wind, that is locations to the 4 south-east of the point of origin, but did you also 5 discuss with him the need to bear in mind warning people 6 who would be impacted after the arrival of the 7 south-westerly wind change?---I can't recall those 8 discussions. 9 That would be the sort of strategic level discussion that a 10 person in your position should have with the planning 11 officer in relation to the question of warnings; do you 12 agree with that?---I agree with that. 13 But you say now, do you, Mr Lockwood, that you don't recall 14 whether you had such a discussion?---I can't recall 15 whether I had those discussions. 16 How did you satisfy yourself as incident controller that 17 Mr Gillham was planning in relation to those matters 18 during the course of the afternoon?---I can't recall. 19 One of the members of the information unit was Andrew 20 Oldroyd?---Yes. 21 Is that right?---That's correct. 22 Mr Oldroyd has provided a statement to the Commission in which 23 he explains that there were six people working in the 24 information unit. Were you aware that there were six 25 people working in the information unit on 26 7 February?---The exact number I can't recall. 27 But it was an adequately staffed information unit for the tasks 28 that they had at the time; would you agree with 29 that?---I would agree with that. 30 Mr Oldroyd explains the process by which the towns to be warned 31 were notified throughout the course of the afternoon, and

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9216 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 he does it by reference to a map which I would just like 2 to ask you about. The map is attached to Mr Oldroyd's 3 statement as annexure 3. It appears at 4 (WIT.3004.018.0276). If that could be brought up, and 5 I think a hard copy of the map is being provided to you, 6 Mr Lockwood, that might assist you. Mr Oldroyd explains 7 in his statement, Mr Lockwood, that this is a blank 8 version of the map that he started with at the 9 commencement of the day and it was used progressively to 10 identify locations that ought to receive warnings. My 11 question for you is: were you aware that this map was 12 being used by the information unit as part of that process 13 of identifying towns to warn?---I was aware there was a 14 map being used. 15 Did you actually see this map during the course of the day and 16 their use of it?---I can't recall which maps I viewed on 17 the day. 18 Do you agree that the map that Mr Oldroyd attaches adequately 19 identifies locations both to the south-east and to the 20 north-east of the area affected by the fire for purposes 21 of identifying townships to warn?---Sorry, can you please 22 repeat the first part of your question? 23 Sure. It was a long question. I will see if I can break it 24 down. Do you agree that this map adequately identifies 25 the range of towns that may be affected by both the 26 initial run of the fire and the run of the fire after the 27 wind change for the purposes of identifying which towns to 28 warn?---I believe so. 29 The Commission has heard evidence, Mr Lockwood, that of the 30 11 deaths that resulted from the Churchill fire, four 31 deaths occurred in the township of Koornalla and four

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9217 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 deaths occurred in either Callignee or Callignee South. 2 Have you also become aware of the deaths occurring in 3 those locations as part of your preparation for giving 4 evidence?---Yes, I have. 5 I want to ask you some questions, if I may, concerning warnings 6 to those locations. You have reproduced as an attachment 7 to your statement all of the warnings that were sent out 8 of the incident control centre on 7 February 9 2009?---That's correct. Mr Rozen, do I still need the 10 map? 11 No, perhaps if that could be returned, please. I'm not going 12 to take you to all of the warnings, you will be pleased to 13 know, Mr Lockwood, but I want to ask you about a few of 14 them. The first warning I would like to take you to is 15 the one that was an alert message that went out at 1530. 16 I will just find that in your statement. It is at 17 (WIT.7520.001.0079). In your statement it is part of 18 annexure 10 . Do you have that in front of you?---Which 19 release are you referring to, Mr Rozen? 20 It is the alert message, the fourth page in your statement. 21 I think you are actually being given a hard copy?---Thank 22 you. 23 You will see, Mr Lockwood, that this release bears the time of 24 1530 hours?---That's correct. 25 Ms Hunter was also working in the information unit on 26 7 February 2009; is that right?---I'm aware of that. 27 Kath Hunter?---Yes. 28 Was she the senior-most information officer working in that 29 unit so far as you were aware?---I can't recall who the 30 senior person was. 31 In her statement - and I don't want to take you to it, but if

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9218 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 you would be assisted I will - she describes that release 2 as going out at 1550 hours, despite bearing the time of 3 1530 hours. Were you aware that there was that delay 4 involved in sending releases out from the incident control 5 centre?---I can't recall. 6 Are you able to explain why there would be a 20-minute delay in 7 the posting of such a release?---I can't explain it. 8 The message indicates that it is alerting people to the fire 9 burning in a south-east direction and the communities 10 there identified are Madalya, Womerah, Callignee, 11 Callignee South and North, Carrajung, Carrajung South and 12 Won Wron. It is said that those localities may experience 13 heavy smoke and ember attack from the main fire. At 3.30, 14 or 1530 hours, that was well before you expected the 15 arrival of the south-westerly wind change?---That's 16 correct. 17 Would a message like this in your experience be alerting people 18 in the vicinity of the eastern flank of the fire to the 19 consequences of the fire moving in an easterly direction 20 despite its general movement being to the south-east, if 21 you can understand my question?---Can you please elaborate 22 on the question, sorry? 23 Perhaps I will ask it a different way. Why would townships 24 such as Callignee and Callignee South and North, which 25 were to the north-east of the fire, which at that time was 26 progressing in a south-easterly direction, why would they 27 require an alert message, so far as you are aware?---There 28 may have been reports coming in for that particular, but 29 I can't recall or can't explain why that would have 30 occurred. 31 Can you tell us why the township of Koornalla does not appear

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9219 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 on this alert message?---No, I can't. 2 Was this one of the messages that you personally 3 signed?---I can't recall. 4 But from evidence you have already given us, you did sight all 5 of the messages before they were released from the 6 incident control centre?---No, that's not correct. 7 I signed some. 8 Sorry, perhaps I didn't speak clearly. Did you see them all 9 before they were released?---A lot of the time I didn't 10 see them before they were released, but after they were 11 released I was provided with a copy. 12 You are probably not going be able to tell us whether you saw 13 this one before it was released?---I don't know. I can't 14 recall. 15 The second warning that I would like to take you to is a 16 warning that was released at 1800 hours, 6 pm. It appears 17 at (WIT.7520.001.0086)?---Is that release number 13, 18 Mr Rozen? 19 Yes, it is. I think a hard copy is being handed to you as 20 well, Mr Lockwood. This was an alert message that was 21 released, as we see, at 1800 hours with a review time of 22 2000 hours. Do you agree, Mr Lockwood, that this is the 23 first message released by the incident control centre 24 which refers to the south-westerly wind change?---The 25 first fire information release, yes. 26 We know that a red flag warning went out to firefighters at 27 about 1730 or thereabouts warning them of the 28 south-westerly wind change. Why was the community not 29 warned until half an hour later of the imminent 30 south-westerly wind change?---I can't explain. 31 There was a message that went out at 1730. It is release

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9220 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 number 12, which is the previous one?---I have a hard 2 copy, thank you. 3 Do you have that?---Yes. 4 Do you agree with me that the localities being warned in that 5 message are localities to the south-east of the run of the 6 fire all the way to Devon North, Yarram and 7 beyond?---That's correct. 8 And there is no reference there to the south-westerly wind 9 change?---That's correct. 10 There was a meeting of the incident management team at 11 1700 hours or 5 pm?---That's correct. 12 You were present at that meeting?---That's correct. 13 So was Mr Gillham, the planning officer?---If the minutes 14 reflect that, that would be correct. 15 I ask you to accept from me that they do?---Yes. 16 Was there any discussion at that meeting of the imminent wind 17 change arriving in relation to the fire that you were 18 managing?---Can I refer to the minutes and also to my log, 19 please? 20 Certainly. Perhaps if the minutes could be brought up. They 21 are at (DSE.0029.0256.0016 ). Are you able to locate the 22 hard copy in your statement?---I will be able to if I know 23 what annexure it is. 24 I will just see if I can assist you. It is annexure 14 of your 25 statement?---It was the 1700; is that correct? 26 The 1700 meeting, which is the second page of your 27 statement?---Looking at the minute, I see that we are 28 looking at a 50 kilometre activity front at 1900 at the 29 same speed at 90 kilometres an hour then to 45 kilometres. 30 I will perhaps go back a step, if we could. Firstly, 31 Mr Lockwood, this document is described as draft minutes

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9221 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 from the IMT briefing?---That's correct. 2 Which occurred in respect of the Jeeralang fire. That's the 3 fire we are now calling the Churchill fire?---That's 4 correct. 5 And it is stated to be 7 February, 1700 hours at Traralgon. 6 Can you tell us why the document refers to the minutes as 7 being draft minutes whereas the equivalent document from 8 the earlier meeting does not bear the description 9 "draft"?---No, I can't explain that. 10 In any event, have you had an opportunity to read these minutes 11 as part of preparing to give evidence today?---Yes, 12 I have. 13 Are you able to indicate whether the minutes are an accurate 14 reflection of the matters discussed at the 15 meeting?---There are some corrections to some of the 16 minutes. There are some anomalies to the minutes, and we 17 also have my log. 18 You have identified the anomalies in the minutes in your 19 statement?---I can't recall whether I have put them in the 20 statement or not. I think there is one anomaly I put in. 21 I would need to refer to my statement, sorry. 22 I will ask you to do that. I will see if I can locate that. 23 You refer, Mr Lockwood, to minutes of meetings at page 16 24 of your statement?---Yes. 25 In the middle of the page you are referring to the minutes of 26 the 1500 IMT briefing and you identify two matters that 27 are not referred to in the minutes but were discussed at 28 the meeting. Do you see that?---That's paragraph 67 where 29 it has the (a) and (b); is that correct? 30 Yes?---Yes, I see that. 31 Other than those matters, are the minutes of the 1500 meeting

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9222 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 an accurate reflection of the matters discussed at the 2 meeting?---I can't recall whether they are totally 3 accurate. I rely on those as a reference. 4 You refer in paragraph 69 to meetings at 1700, 1900 and so on. 5 You say that you have recently obtained a copy of the 6 minutes of those meetings, 1500, 1700 and 1900?---That's 7 correct. 8 We are presently focusing on the meeting at 1700. Did you as 9 part of preparing your statement consider whether or not 10 the document described as "draft minutes", which I took 11 you to a moment ago, accurately reflects what was 12 discussed at the meeting?---I believe it does accurately 13 reflect. There may be some small things, but I do believe 14 it is accurate. 15 Could we turn to that document then, please, which is 16 (WIT.7520.001.0118). The reference that we see at the top 17 immediately after those present at the meeting, it says 18 "Situation - Geoff Kennedy", do we take it that they are 19 matters reported to the meeting by Mr Kennedy?---That's 20 correct. 21 And similarly there is "Planning - Andy Gillham". They are 22 matters that were reported to the meeting by 23 Mr Gillham?---That's correct. 24 Were these matters being reported both to the meeting and to 25 you as the incident controller to assist you in your 26 overall direction of the management of the Churchill 27 fire?---That's correct. 28 As you have already told us, Mr Gillham reported to the 29 meeting, and it is the fourth dot point in that part of 30 the document, "Looking at 50 kilometre activity front at 31 1900 hours same speed at 90 kilometre then to 45

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9223 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 kilometres". Is Mr Gillham, so far as you can recall 2 there, describing the forecast wind change at 3 1900 hours?---That's correct. 4 Although it is not referred to there, you understood, did you 5 not, that the wind change was going to come from 6 the south-west; in other words, the north-westerly wind 7 was going to turn to a south-westerly wind?---That's 8 correct. 9 The question for you then is this, Mr Lockwood: having received 10 that information from Mr Gillham at the meeting that so 11 far as he understood it a wind change would impact on the 12 fireground some two hours after the time of the meeting, 13 did you have any discussions with him about how that 14 should impact on the range of towns that were being warned 15 as a result of that occurring?---I can't recall. 16 You would agree with me, wouldn't you, Mr Lockwood, that a 17 quite different category of townships and residents would 18 be affected once the wind changed to those that were 19 affected in the initial run of the fire?---I would agree. 20 Is the position this, Mr Lockwood: that you left it to 21 Mr Gillham and his team to identify the appropriate towns 22 to warn?---I can't recall the discussions, but certainly 23 relying on information through the planning unit. 24 I note the time, Commissioners. I'm about to move on to a 25 slightly different topic. It might be an appropriate time 26 to have a break. I am going to be some time yet with 27 Mr Lockwood. 28 CHAIRMAN: Yes. We will take a break. 29 (Short adjournment.) 30 MR ROZEN: Mr Lockwood, before the adjournment we reached the 31 point where I was asking you about some of the fire

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9224 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 information releases that came out of the Traralgon 2 incident control centre on 7 February 2009. You were 3 answering some questions I had of you in respect of the 4 message that went out at 6 pm. This is release number 13. 5 Do you have that?---I don't have it in front of me. Which 6 annexure is it, please? 7 It is part of annexure 10. It is at (WIT.7520.001.0086). 8 I think you agreed with me earlier this is the first 9 release that identifies the imminence of the 10 south-westerly wind change. Is it correct to say, 11 Mr Lockwood, that as at 1800 hours you were operating on 12 the basis of the wind change arriving at about 1900 hours 13 at the fireground?---At 1800 hours we did 14 receive - actually, no, I believe we were aware of the 15 wind change earlier. 16 Because the wind change was actually impacting on the 17 fireground at almost this very time, at about 1800 hours, 18 was it not?---As I recollect. 19 The communities that are identified as being alerted by this 20 fire information release include towns such as Gormandale, 21 which were considerably or are considerably further to the 22 east than Callignee and Koornalla; would you agree with 23 that?---I would agree with that, yes. 24 Why was this release issued as an alert rather than an urgent 25 threat message, given that as at 1800 hours the towns 26 referred to were in the path of the new firefront as a 27 result of the wind change?---I can't explain, sir. 28 Do you agree that in the circumstances it would be more 29 appropriate to issue an urgent threat message in relation 30 to those towns?---I can't recall that particular time that 31 this came through.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9225 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 I'm not asking you to recall anything, Mr Lockwood. What I'm 2 asking you is, sitting there now, looking at this as an 3 alert message, do you agree that it would have been more 4 appropriate for it to have been issued as an urgent threat 5 message?---An urgent threat message would have been 6 appropriate. 7 It would have been more appropriate than an alert 8 message?---I believe it would have been appropriate. 9 I believe it would have been appropriate. 10 Mr Gillham in his statement, and I will take you to it if 11 I need to, explains that his thinking was alert messages 12 were to go out to towns which could be expected to be 13 impacted within one to two hours of the time of the 14 message, whereas urgent threat messages were just that, 15 messages of an urgent and imminent threat. Do you agree 16 with that as a general description of the two types of 17 message?---I agree with that. 18 If one accepts that distinction, do you agree with me that it 19 would have been more appropriate to have issued a message 20 at 1800 warning of the imminent wind change as an urgent 21 threat rather than an alert message?---I think it would 22 have been appropriate, yes. 23 The townships of Callignee, Callignee South, Callignee North 24 and Koornalla are all closer to the eastern flank of the 25 fire than the towns that are referred to in this fire 26 information release; do you agree with that?---I agree 27 with that. 28 Do you agree that it would have been at least as appropriate to 29 warn the residents of those towns of the likely impact of 30 the post-wind change fire as to warn the towns that are in 31 fact referred to in this message?---It would have been

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9226 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 appropriate to alert those towns. 2 Can you give any explanation to the Commission as to why those 3 towns are not referred to in this message?---Sorry, 4 I can't explain that. 5 Is that a matter we will have to pursue with 6 Mr Gillham?---Well, I can't recall in that particular 7 time, so Mr Gillham might be the appropriate person. 8 Do you recall, Mr Lockwood, making a police statement as part 9 of the investigation of the Churchill fire?---Yes, I do. 10 Prior to giving evidence here today have you familiarised 11 yourself with the contents of the police 12 statement?---I have. 13 The police statement appears at (SUMM.044.003.2881_R). A hard 14 copy of the statement has been placed in front of you, 15 Mr Lockwood. Do you agree that the statement was made by 16 you on 14 April 2009?---Yes, I agree. 17 Are the contents of that statement true and correct?---Yes, 18 they were. 19 I should tender that statement perhaps as part of the same 20 exhibit. 21 CHAIRMAN: That can be as part of 389. 22 MR ROZEN: I want to ask you about two aspects of the 23 statement, if I could, please, Mr Lockwood. The first 24 appears on page 4 of the document, towards the bottom of 25 the page. Do you have that open?---I have that open. 26 Do you see the second last paragraph?---Yes, I see the second 27 last paragraph. 28 You say, "We were continuing to issue urgent threat alert and 29 awareness messages via the media." The "we" you are 30 referring to is the incident management team under your 31 control?---That's correct.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9227 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 You go on, "When the wind change came through we once again 2 reviewed our fire prediction and estimated that all areas 3 to the east of the fire would become affected by the fire 4 which included areas up to Stradbroke, Longford, 5 Koornalla, Callignee, Traralgon South, Gormandale and 6 through as far to Rosedale." When you refer there to "once 7 again reviewed our fire prediction", that was a review 8 that included yourself, did it?---That's correct. 9 And who else was involved in that review?---I can't recall the 10 actual review. However, at the time I was aware of the 11 impending wind change and I believe I made a broadcast to 12 ABC Radio depicting a line drawn from Churchill to the 13 Yarram/Woodside area, and that's how I came up with those 14 particular towns that would be impacted by the fire. 15 Just in relation to that broadcast, I should as a matter of 16 fairness take you to the transcript of that, Mr Lockwood. 17 Perhaps the easiest way to do it is to take you to that 18 part of the chronology at (TEN.106.001.0022). This is 19 exhibit 387, Commissioner, tendered this morning by 20 Ms Doyle. It starts at page 21, Mr Lockwood, if you 21 please turn to that. Do you see about two-thirds of the 22 way down page 21, in the left-hand column, 7/2/2009 and 23 then 1625?---Yes, I do. 24 This is a transcript of the interview you did with ABC 25 Gippsland that you have just referred to a moment 26 ago?---That's correct. 27 If you turn over to the next page, page 22, you will see a 28 quarter of the way down the page the following attributed 29 to you. In response to Mr Callinan, the broadcaster, you 30 say, "Certainly the eastern part of the fire and as I say, 31 those - if you draw a line from Churchill straight through

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9228 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 to where the Yarram/Woodside is and to the east of that, 2 when the fire - when the wind direction changes direction, 3 that is certainly the area it's going to head." Is that 4 the part of that interview you were referring to a moment 5 ago?---That's correct. 6 That interview took place at 4.25 in the afternoon, is that 7 correct?---That's correct. 8 Did I understand you to say a moment ago that what you had said 9 in that interview describes your state of awareness as at 10 that time of the likely impact of the wind 11 change?---That's correct. 12 You would agree, wouldn't you, Mr Lockwood, that not everyone 13 sitting in townships such as Koornalla or Callignee would 14 have a map book that they could get out and draw a line on 15 a map as suggested by you in the interview?---I wouldn't 16 know that. 17 That sort of general information that you provided on the radio 18 is useful, as it obviously is. Would you agree it is not 19 as valuable to residents in such townships as a specific 20 mention of their town being under threat?---It was a very 21 wide - given the number of towns that were east of that 22 particular line, I found it inappropriate to have all 23 that - to name all those towns during that particular 24 interview and I didn't have the particular map with me at 25 the time. 26 I understand that, Mr Lockwood. What I'm asking you about, 27 though, is the naming of townships in the messages, 28 particularly the message that went out at 6 pm. You would 29 agree with me it identifies some townships but not 30 Callignee or Koornalla?---That's correct. 31 In the passage that I took you to in your statement, as

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9229 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 I understand it you are saying there that as part of the 2 review that you conducted you identified both Koornalla 3 and Callignee, along with the other townships that you 4 have referred to, as being ones which would be affected by 5 the fire on the arrival of the wind change?---Sorry, can 6 you repeat that question? 7 Yes. As I understand the paragraph I took you to in your 8 police statement on page 4, what you are saying there is 9 as part of your review, together with other members of 10 your team, on the arrival of the wind change you 11 identified those towns, including Koornalla and Callignee, 12 as being towns that would become affected by the 13 fire?---I cannot recall who I discussed the review with, 14 so I cannot recall who was actually present at that time. 15 I understand that, but you have already told us that you were 16 present?---Absolutely, yes. Sorry. 17 Given the evidence that you have already given us about 18 Mr Gillham's role in relation to the development of 19 warnings, is it likely that Mr Gillham would have been 20 present?---I can't recall. 21 Is this a meeting separate from the 5 o'clock IMT meeting that 22 you told us about earlier?---I can't recall. 23 Mr Lockwood, are you referring here to a meeting as such when 24 you talk about a review?---I can't recall whether I was 25 referring to a meeting at all or whether these are my 26 actual predictions on the day. 27 Given your reference in the statement to having identified 28 Koornalla and Callignee as being affected towns, can you 29 give us any explanation why, firstly in relation to 30 Koornalla, no warning was released at any time on 31 7 February 2009 that identified Koornalla as a town under

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9230 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 threat?---No, I can't explain it. 2 In relation to Callignee, Mr Lockwood, I need to take you to 3 one further fire information release. It is one numbered 4 18 and it is part of attachment 10 to your Royal 5 Commission statement. You have that in front of you, 6 Mr Lockwood?---Yes. 7 It is at (WIT.7520.001.0090). You will see, Mr Lockwood, this 8 is an urgent threat message released at 2000 hours or 8 pm 9 with a review time of 2200 hours?---I'm sorry, I must have 10 the wrong one. Did you say 18? 11 Sorry. 17?---Sorry, repeat the question, please. 12 Do you see there that that's a release that came out at 13 2000 hours with a review time of 2200 hours?---Yes, I do. 14 The incident information that is provided reads as follows: 15 "The Glendonald Road fire is currently burning in and 16 around the Traralgon South and Callignee and Callignee 17 North and South area. Residents may be directly impacted 18 by this fire." Do you know what, if anything, prompted 19 the release of this urgent threat message at 2000 hours 20 from the incident control centre?---I can't recall. 21 You understand now, do you not, that the fire had impacted on 22 and in fact severely impacted upon Callignee well before 23 2000 hours?---I can't recall what time I was aware of the 24 Callignee impact. 25 I'm asking you whether you understand that now, though, 26 Mr Lockwood?---After the event I understand that Callignee 27 was impacted prior to then. 28 What was your understanding of the position of the fire 29 relative to Callignee on the night of 7 February 30 2009?---I can't recall. 31 Were you getting reports from the operations section or the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9231 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 planning section about the progress of the fire after the 2 wind change?---I can't recall. 3 A prudent approach to fulfilling your function as incident 4 controller would have involved getting such reports, would 5 it not, Mr Lockwood?---If that information was available, 6 those reports would have been provided. 7 Do you agree with me that issuing an urgent threat message at 8 2000 hours in respect of a town that had been impacted on 9 severely by the fire at least one hour earlier is not 10 serving the communities that are identified in that 11 release well?---Sorry, can you repeat the question? 12 It is pointless, isn't it, issuing a release to a town warning 13 of an urgent threat when the town has already been 14 impacted on fire some one hour earlier?---I don't believe 15 it's pointless, no. 16 What purpose was served by the fire information release number 17 17?---What purpose was served, sorry? 18 By fire information release number 17?---It would have served 19 the purpose that people in that area would have been 20 aware. 21 The people of Callignee and Traralgon South and Callignee North 22 and South ought to have been warned in these terms at 23 least at 6 o'clock when the message that I took you to a 24 moment ago, release number 13, was released. Do you agree 25 with that?---After the fact I would agree with that, yes. 26 Once again, no reference to Koornalla and you can't offer us 27 any explanation why Koornalla is not referred to even in 28 the 8 o'clock message?---No, I can't explain it. 29 Mr Lockwood, can I ask you some questions about what 30 arrangements you had in place to keep abreast of the 31 progress of the wind change. Firstly, can I take you to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9232 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 an entry in your log that you made at 11 o'clock. Your 2 log is an annexure to your statement. It is annexure 8. 3 Perhaps before I take you to that, the copy that we have 4 been provided with is difficult to read. I don't know if 5 that's also the position you have in relation to the entry 6 that appears at the bottom of the page, the bottom of 7 sheet 1 of your log?---Is that the bottom line? 8 Yes. The bottom four lines, in fact six lines, there is a 9 reference to "D Hunter briefing". Do you see that?---Yes. 10 The copy that you have in front of you, can you read easily the 11 words that appear in those six lines?---I can read some of 12 the words. Some of them are illegible. 13 There is another version of your log - sorry, another copy of 14 your log which seems to be a better one, Mr Lockwood. 15 Perhaps if we could go to that and if you tell us you are 16 comfortable that it is the same document. It is 17 (CFA.001.026.0100). Perhaps if that could please be 18 brought up. Just while that's occurring, Mr Lockwood, the 19 reference there to "IC changeover P Lockwood. D Hunter 20 briefing", can you explain that to us, please?---That was 21 a changeover briefing I had with the outgoing incident 22 controller, Daryl Hunter, who was managing the Delburn 23 fire at the time. 24 He managed the Delburn fire overnight on 6 February 2009 and 25 handed over to you Saturday morning, 7 February?---That's 26 correct. 27 Do you agree, Mr Lockwood, that seems to be a better copy of 28 your log that you maintained on the day?---Yes. 29 There is a reference in the last line there, sorry, the second 30 last line "W change on SW 1700". Can you read the next 31 two words?---"To Walpeup," I think, which would be our

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9233 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 weather location. 2 Walpeup is a township near Mildura or near Ouyen?---That's 3 correct. 4 Are you able to assist us as why there is a reference to 5 Walpeup there?---That was a state teleconference with DSE 6 statewide and they were the notes I took at the time. 7 The weather bureau's forecast for Saturday, 7 February 2009, 8 has a wind change line that goes through Gippsland, 9 Melbourne and the north-west and refers to the change 10 reaching Walpeup to Melbourne around 1700 hours. 11 MR CLELLAND: Can we just ask our learned friend which of the 12 forecasts is being referred to? 13 MR ROZEN: Certainly. It appears in the report of Mr Williams, 14 which is exhibit 22 in these proceedings, and the 15 particular forecast is at (WIT.013.001.0213). I have been 16 asked to indicate the time and I can't see a time on this 17 particular chart. It may be part of the 10.45 am 18 forecast. I'm hearing "yes" from behind me. It would 19 seem to be the 10.45 forecast. There is a colour chart 20 that appears on 213 of that document. I don't know if 21 your eyesight is better than mine, Mr Lockwood, but there 22 is a reference under the heading "Fire danger", do you see 23 that halfway down on the left-hand side?---Yes, I see 24 that. Yes. 25 Do you see there is a reference to, "The change is expected to 26 move rapidly reaching Walpeup to Melbourne around 27 1700 hours"?---I see that. 28 Is that the source of the information that you have referred to 29 in your log?---I can't recall. That was the information 30 that was on the teleconference, so I wouldn't have had 31 this in front of me at the time.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9234 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 Didn't you, though, review the bureau forecast on your 2 commencement on 7 February 2009? Isn't that what you say 3 in your statement?---The fire weather forecast that was 4 issued that morning, yes. 5 Is that something other than the document we have up on the 6 screen now?---Yes, it is. 7 So is the position that at the time recorded in your log you 8 were operating on the basis of a 1700 arrival time for the 9 wind change impacting on the Delburn complex fire?---No, 10 that's not the case. 11 I see?---I was expecting that wind change at 1700 at Walpeup. 12 But you were not concerned in your role as the incident 13 controller for Delburn to know when the wind change would 14 impact on the north-west of Victoria, were 15 you?---I certainly was interested in when it would impact 16 on - this was at a teleconference. I didn't play any part 17 of the discussion with this particular teleconference in 18 relation to weather. I was just taking notes at the time. 19 We see a number of references in your log, and I don't want to 20 take you to each of them, of an expectation that the wind 21 change would affect the fireground at 1900. Do you agree 22 that there are such references in your log?---Yes. 23 We have also seen that there is a reference in the incident 24 management team meeting at 1700 to Mr Gillham informing 25 you and others that the wind change was expected at 26 1900?---That's correct. 27 As an incident controller, what sources of information are 28 available to you to track the passage of a wind change as 29 it comes across from the south-west of Victoria so that 30 you've got good intelligence about when it is going to 31 impact on the fireground?---There are usually wind change

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9235 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 charts and spot weather forecasts. 2 During the time that you were incident controller on 7 February 3 2009 in relation to the Churchill fire, did you request a 4 spot weather forecast?---No, I didn't. The planning unit 5 were doing the situation on the day and I was briefed by 6 the - in those discussions, in those briefings, I was 7 quite satisfied that the information I was receiving at 8 1900 was correct. 9 Just so I can understand that, you were satisfied throughout 10 the course of the day of the correctness of the 11 information you were getting that the wind change was 12 expected at 1900?---That's correct. 13 But we know of course, don't we, that the wind change arrived 14 about an hour earlier than that?---That's correct. 15 Did that take you by complete surprise?---Yes, it did. 16 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Could we have the chart just dropped down 17 a shade so we can see the map of Victoria, please. The 18 line drawn on the map, which is a bit hard to see, but it 19 has approximately 4 to 6 pm. I presume that indicates the 20 expected time of the arrival of the change along that 21 line. The weather forecast talks about 1700 hours, 22 I think, for Melbourne. I guess I'm just trying to get a 23 gauge of where that line is in relation to the Churchill 24 fire which has the notation that the wind change will 25 arrive at approximately 4 to 6 pm along that line. Is it 26 possible for someone to give an indication on that line 27 roughly where the Churchill fire is? 28 MR ROZEN: I wonder if Mr Lockwood could be provided with that 29 laser pointer that we saw used so artfully by Mr Keating 30 earlier, if it is still available. Mr Clelland says it is 31 important to be careful with the tool,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9236 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 Mr Lockwood?---I would suggest it would be around this 2 area here. It is very hard with that map because it 3 hasn't got many lines on it, but around that area there. 4 So you are indicating there, Mr Lockwood, a point to the north 5 of the 4 to 6 pm line?---That's correct. 6 And that indicates, does it, the location of the Churchill fire 7 so far as you are able to assist us?---That's correct. 8 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Which on a rough extrapolation could be 9 between 5 and 7 pm if it was to take another hour for that 10 line to reach where you indicated the fire was on the map? 11 Would that be a fair conclusion?---That would be fair. 12 That is an early forecast, too. 13 What was the time of that forecast? 3 o'clock or something 14 like that? 15 MR ROZEN: The time of the forecast was 10.45. 16 Do you agree with me, Mr Lockwood, that in a position such as 17 yours, incident controller of a fire in Churchill, that 18 regular information through the course of the day about 19 the actual passage of the front is the best information 20 you could get to enable you to know when it is likely to 21 impact on your fireground and your 22 firefighters?---I agree. 23 The bureau report that I took you to a moment ago - perhaps we 24 could go to coding page 73 of that document, page 57 of 25 the report. What's being described here, Mr Lockwood, as 26 I understand it, are communications that were made out of 27 the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre in Melbourne 28 to ICCs about weather information. Were you aware that 29 there were bureau forecasters located in the IECC?---No, 30 I wasn't aware. 31 Three quarters of the way down that page, in the fourth last

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9237 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 paragraph, it says "At 2.40 pm the Pakenham incident 2 control centre requested updates on the hour on the 3 position and forecast timing of the wind change through 4 Bunyip". Pakenham was the location of the ICC for the 5 Bunyip fire?---That's correct. 6 Were you aware on 7 February that that was a facility available 7 to you that you could have sought hourly updates from 8 bureau representatives at the IECC?---I wasn't aware, no. 9 Would that be a useful service to someone in your 10 position?---Yes. 11 Were you or other members of the team in contact with the 12 Pakenham ICC to have the benefit of information about the 13 passage of the wind change in their area to assist you in 14 forecasting when it would hit your fire?---I'm not aware 15 if that contact was made. 16 On the following page of the document another meteorologist 17 working in the IECC, Mr Scott Williams, says that he 18 arrived there at 3 o'clock and focused on the progress of 19 the wind change?---Sorry, I don't see where - - - 20 Do you see meteorologist 2?---Yes. 21 It is a reference to Mr Scott Williams who was in the IECC from 22 3 o'clock onwards. He says in the first line there he was 23 focusing on the progress of the wind change. In the 24 second paragraph he says, "Between 4 and 4.45 pm it became 25 apparent that over the central areas of Victoria the 26 change had begun to surge northwards faster than previous 27 forecasts. At 4.50 pm he approached the state duty 28 officer," the "he" being Mr Williams, "and the fire 29 behaviour analysts to indicate that the change should 30 arrive at the Whittlesea area between 6.30 and 7 and at 31 the Churchill fires between 5.30 and 6 pm." He then goes

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9238 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 on, "A series of communications followed between Kevin and 2 Scott," Kevin seems to be the other forecaster, Scott is 3 Mr Williams, "and personnel at incident management teams 4 responsible for each of the major fires including 5 Bendigo/Redesdale, Dargo, Traralgon, Yarram and Yea." 6 Were you aware of any communication from Mr Williams or 7 Mr Parkyn or anyone else at the IECC informing you that 8 the wind change was expected at the Churchill fire between 9 5.30 and 6?---No, I wasn't aware. 10 Given the structure that you had in place on 7 February who 11 would have been the most likely contact point within the 12 ICC at Traralgon for such a communication to have been 13 made?---I'm not aware of who that contact would have been. 14 We know from other evidence, a witness statement of Mr Taylor - 15 are you familiar with Mr Graeme Taylor?---Yes, I am. 16 He was carrying out responsibilities on the fireground at the 17 Yarram end of your fire, was he not?---Yes, that's 18 correct. 19 He says in a statement that he was informed of the likely 20 arrival of the wind change at 5.30 and told that it would 21 impact on the fireground at about 6 o'clock. Are you 22 aware of that?---No, I'm not aware of that. 23 You told us earlier that one of the sources of information 24 available to you in relation to the progress of the wind 25 change are spotfire weather forecasts?---That's correct. 26 And a spotfire weather forecast is a forecast issued by the 27 bureau in response to a request from the CFA, for example, 28 is that right?---That's correct. 29 And it is a request for specific information in respect of a 30 particular fire?---That's correct. 31 The Commission has been provided with a spotfire weather

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9239 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 forecast as part of an investigation report into the 2 burnover of the region 10 spare tanker number 3. I will 3 ask you in a moment a little bit about that burnover, but 4 I want to concentrate at present on the spotfire weather 5 forecast. It appears at (CFA.001.026.0195). A paper copy 6 of that is being provided to you, Mr Lockwood?---Thank 7 you. 8 In fairness to you, the first line that appears on that 9 document, "The following spot weather forecast was issued 10 at 1559" appears to have been added by those investigating 11 the burnover subsequent to the 7 February 2009?---Mm-hm. 12 But the remainder of the document, as we understand the 13 position, was as it was issued by the Bureau of 14 Meteorology. You will see under the bold type "Spot fire 15 weather forecast", do you see that?---Yes, I see that. 16 Underneath it says, "Issued at 3.59 pm EDT on Saturday 17 7 February 2009"?---Yes, I see that. 18 Then it goes on, "Name of fire: Churchill Glendonald" and there 19 is a contact name identified in the right hand column, 20 John Henshaw. Do you see that?---Yes, I see that. 21 I think you told us earlier that Mr Henshaw was working as the 22 deputy planning officer in the IMT on 7 February 23 2009?---That's correct. 24 Did you see this spot weather fire forecast at any time on 25 7 February 2009?---No. 26 Would you have expected Mr Henshaw to discuss its contents with 27 Mr Gillham as his superior in the planning unit?---I would 28 expect that this forecast be made available, yes. 29 If it was in fact received in the IMT, as it seems to suggest, 30 at 1559 hours, would you expect that it would have 31 informed the information that Mr Gillham provided an hour

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9240 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 or so later at the IMT about the best forecast for the 2 arrival of the wind change?---Sorry, can you repeat the 3 question? 4 Sure. If it was received in the IMT, as it seems to suggest, 5 at 1559 hours, would you have expected it to be a document 6 that Mr Gillham would have been aware of when he reported 7 to the IMT meeting an hour or so later at 1700 hours about 8 the likely arrival of the wind change?---Yes. 9 You would agree with me, wouldn't you, that in the text under 10 the heading "Weather overview" it says "Change has moved 11 through Mount Gellibrand well to the west at this time. 12 Looking at the wind change to affect the fire area between 13 1730 to 1900"?---I see that, yes. 14 That was a change, was it not, to the information that you had 15 been operating on which is to expect the change at 16 1900?---That's correct. 17 And that range that is indicated there, that's not unusual in a 18 bureau forecast of a wind change, to give a range of the 19 likely time of impact?---That's usually in the form of a 20 range, yes. 21 Are you able to explain, Mr Lockwood, why the red flag warning 22 that went out at approximately 5.30 to firefighters on the 23 fireground told them of the likely arrival of the wind 24 change as being 1900 rather than a range of times in 25 accordance with this document?---No, I can't explain it. 26 Just in relation to that red flag warning, Mr Lockwood, you 27 refer to it in your statement and you say you were 28 informed, was it, by Mr Mitchell of the red flag 29 warning?---That's correct. 30 At paragraph 78 of your statement you say, "At approximately 31 1745 I was informed that the wind change" - - -?---Sorry,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9241 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 I'm still finding the paragraph. 2 I'm sorry. It is on page 19?---Thank you. 3 Do you see that, paragraph 78, "At approximately 1745 I was 4 informed that the wind change had hit Trafalgar so it was 5 almost upon us." As you have corrected the next line, it 6 reads, "At about this time the operations unit confirmed 7 that red flag warnings had been sent"?---That's correct. 8 Is that something that you had asked the operations unit to do; 9 that is, to send red flag warnings?---I was aware that the 10 red flag warnings had gone out. 11 Prior to them being sent out, though, is it something that you 12 had requested occur?---I can't recall if I requested 13 those. 14 You have deleted the words "through the incident channels radio 15 system" from that line of your statement?---That's 16 correct. 17 Why is that?---When I completed the statement, that was where 18 I had assumed that the red flag warnings had gone. 19 However, I can't confirm that they were actually through 20 the incident radio channels. 21 The incident radio channel that you were operating on was 22 channel 191, was is not?---That's correct. 23 Is the position that, as you sit there now, you don't know the 24 means by which the red flag warning was communicated to 25 the fireground?---That's correct. 26 What other means of communication would be available to the 27 operations unit than the incident channel radio 28 system?---There would be telephone calls. Any 29 communications method available is actually able to reach 30 those on the fire line, so pager would be another option 31 as well.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9242 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 Anyway, the position is you just don't know how the red flag 2 warning - - -?---I wasn't involved in the actual issuing 3 of the red flag warnings, so I can't confirm exactly how 4 they went out. 5 Part of your responsibility as incident controller is the 6 safety of the fireground crews?---That's correct. 7 How did you satisfy yourself that all crews had received the 8 red flag warning?---I can't recall. 9 Mr Lockwood, that's a matter of the utmost importance, isn't 10 it, that your crews get a red flag warning and that you be 11 satisfied that they have received it?---It is critical, 12 yes. That's correct. 13 So surely you had some mechanism in place to enable yourself to 14 be so satisfied?---I had the confirmation that red flag 15 warnings had gone out and if I read - and that they had 16 actually been sent at 1745 hours. 17 The red flag warnings being sent out and then being 18 acknowledged as being received are two different things, 19 aren't they?---That's correct. 20 As I understand your evidence, what you are saying is you were 21 satisfied that they had been sent out?---Yes. 22 But you cannot now recall whether you were informed that they 23 had been acknowledged?---I can't recall whether they had 24 been acknowledged, no. 25 There is in existence and was at 7 February 2009 a standard 26 operating procedure for sending out red flag 27 warnings?---Correct. 28 From your understanding of that procedure and of what occurred 29 on 7 February 2009, are you satisfied that the procedure 30 was followed?---Yes, I am satisfied. 31 Does the procedure require logging of the contents of a red

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9243 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 flag warning?---Can I have a copy of the procedure, 2 please, so I can refer to it? 3 It is just being obtained. Take your time to familiarise 4 yourself with that, Mr Lockwood?---If there is a specific 5 part of the procedure that you are referring to, I will go 6 straight to that, if you like. 7 If you refer to 1.8 of the document on the second page, 8 Mr Lockwood?---Yes. 9 There is a requirement for CFA and support agency members who 10 receive a red flag warning to immediately acknowledge they 11 have received it; do you see that?---Yes. 12 And to notify all CFA and support agency members that they are 13 supervising or who are reporting to them of the red flag 14 warning?---Yes. 15 And to obtain an acknowledgement from CFA and support agency 16 members that they are supervising?---Correct. 17 At 1.9 on the following page, "Any person to crew leader level 18 who receives or forwards a red flag warning shall log the 19 person to whom it has been issued, what information the 20 warning contained, who issued the red flag warning, how it 21 was issued, what time it was issued and time 22 acknowledgment was received." Do you see that?---I see 23 that, yes. 24 Had you been trained in relation to this standard operating 25 procedure prior to 7 February 2009?---Yes. 26 Who in the incident control centre had the obligation to comply 27 with 1.9, the logging obligation?---So, any person to crew 28 leader level who receives or forwards a red flag warning 29 shall log it. So whoever receives a red flag warning and 30 whoever issued a red flag warning. 31 Starting at the top, it is issued from the operations unit in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9244 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 the incident management team?---That's correct. 2 So the issuer of the warning would have the obligation 3 initially in relation to paragraph 1.9?---Under this SOP; 4 that's correct. 5 And that includes logging the information that the warning 6 contained?---In this SOP; that's correct. 7 Did that occur on 7 February 2009?---I am not aware of - I'm 8 unaware of whether that occurred. 9 There is no reference in any of the material that has been 10 provided to the Commission, I suggest to you, Mr Lockwood, 11 that would indicate that it had occurred. Are you able to 12 point us to anything that would suggest otherwise?---No. 13 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Had you had experience previously as a 14 crew member?---Yes. 15 So from that experience you would have been aware that that's a 16 fairly fundamental requirement that goes to the safety of 17 crews?---Is that the logging of the - - - 18 No, the receipt and then the confirmation of receipt?---Yes, 19 that's correct. 20 MR ROZEN: Mr Lockwood, are you aware that there were burnovers 21 in respect of a total of four tankers involved in the 22 Churchill firefight?---Not four tankers, no. 23 How many are you aware of?---I was made aware of the Glengarry 24 West tanker at 2300 hours. 25 At 2300 hours on 7 February?---That's correct. 26 Are you aware presently that there were investigation reports 27 completed in relation to, firstly, the burnover on the 28 Glengarry West tanker 1?---I was aware there were 29 investigation reports, but not which actual appliances 30 were investigated. 31 Did you have any involvement in the investigations that were

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9245 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 conducted in relation to those three burnovers?---No. 2 But you have had an opportunity, have you not, in preparation 3 for giving your evidence here today to look at the 4 investigation reports that were prepared in relation to 5 the three burnovers?---No. 6 You haven't?---No. 7 For completeness, I think I should briefly take you to those, 8 Mr Lockwood. The first of them is at (CFA.001.026.0138). 9 This is a report into the burnover of the Glengarry West 10 tanker number 1. This is the burnover that you became 11 aware of at about 11 o'clock on the night of 7 February; 12 is that right?---That's correct. 13 You would agree with me that the burnover occurred at a house 14 at 400 Glendonald Road, Churchill?---That's what's 15 written, yes, on this report. 16 Is that what was reported to you at 11 o'clock on 17 7 February?---I can't recall the exact details of what was 18 reported. 19 I want to take you to one aspect of that, if I could, please. 20 It is on page 11 of the report. I just ask you to accept 21 from me that the report details interviews with the crew 22 members on the tanker who told the investigator that they 23 had received a red flag warning at about 24 1730 hours?---Excuse me, which page are we on? 25 The bottom of the page there, page 11. I want to ask you 26 specifically about 5.1.10, "Timing of the red flag 27 warning"; do you see that passage?---Yes. 28 It says, "The red flag warning that was received at about 29 1730 hours warned of a south-west wind change for 1900 30 hours. The change in fact impacted the fire area at 31 1805 hours. While the red flag is given as guidance and a

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9246 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 heads-up for field crews and commanders of a significant 2 event coming, in this instance the warning may have 3 provided a false sense of time security by leading the 4 crew to believe they had plenty of time to establish 5 themselves at their new assignment." My question for you 6 is this, Mr Lockwood: do you agree that putting out a red 7 flag warning warning of a wind change arriving at 1900 8 could give a crew a false sense of time security in the 9 period between, say, 1800 and 1900?---Sorry, can you 10 repeat the question? 11 Certainly. Do you agree that giving a red flag warning at 12 1730 hours warning of a wind change for 1900 hours could 13 give a crew a false sense of time security as described in 14 the passage that I have just read out to you?---I would 15 agree. 16 The second report concerns the burnover to the Hazelwood North 17 tanker number 1; (CFA.001.026.0153). Without perhaps 18 taking you to the detail of the findings, unless you need 19 me to, the report concluded once again that the inaccurate 20 time of the red flag warning may have provided a false 21 sense of time security to the crew. You would agree, 22 wouldn't you, that that is the same position for that crew 23 as for the Glengarry West crew?---I would agree. 24 The final report concerns the Boolarra region 10 spare tanker 25 3; (CFA.001.026.0171). There are two aspects of this 26 report I would like to take you to, if I could. The first 27 is on page 19, paragraph 5.9. Do you see the heading 28 "Communications"?---I see the heading, yes. 29 It says, "The communications plan was established at the ICC 30 but was not transmitted to the local crews for adoption at 31 the fire line. The local brigades used a fire ground

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9247 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 channel as no communications plan was established. 2 Communication occurred between the local group members but 3 not to the ICC or to strike teams from outside region 10." 4 In light of the evidence you gave earlier, Mr Lockwood, 5 about your difficulties making radio communication with 6 those on the fireground, is there any comment you would 7 like to make in relation to that finding from your 8 perspective as the incident controller?---No, no comment. 9 Do you agree that there were deficiencies in the communications 10 plan in terms of transmission to local crews for adoption 11 at the fire line?---Sorry, can you repeat that? 12 MR CLELLAND: With respect - - - 13 MR ROZEN: I won't pursue that. The other aspect of that 14 report I would like to take you to is at 5.3 on page 17. 15 This relates to evidence you gave earlier about 16 sectorisation of the fire, Mr Lockwood. You see it says, 17 "The incident command and control structure" - this is 18 under the heading "5.3, incident command and 19 control"?---Yes. 20 "The incident command and control structure in the initial 21 attack phase was based upon local cooperation from the 22 local brigades with command and control responsibilities 23 being left to crew leaders. The incident command and 24 control structure continued to rely upon crew leaders for 25 the duration of the deployment of the crew on 7 February. 26 No sectors or division command and control were 27 established during the deployment of the region 10 spare 28 tanker 3. There appears to have been a high level of 29 disorganisation on the fireground as the region 10 spare 30 tanker 1" - it seems that should be 3 - "found its own 31 work for at least the first half hour or so." Is there any

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9248 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 comment that you would like to make in relation to those 2 findings?---No comment. 3 I think for completeness, Commissioners, I should tender the 4 three reports that Mr Lockwood has seen as part of the 5 same exhibit. 6 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 7 MR ROZEN: I should just clarify that there is a redacted 8 version of annexure 8 to Mr Lockwood's statement, the code 9 for which is (CFA.001.026.0100_R). I just indicate that 10 for completeness. One final matter I should raise with 11 you, Mr Lockwood, concerns your relations with the police 12 officers who were in positions of command on the night of 13 7 February 2009. You had a police liaison officer who sat 14 in on IMT meetings, did you not?---We had a police officer 15 there. I can't recall whether we sat in and which ones he 16 sat in on. 17 Just in relation to that, the minutes of the meeting at 18 1500 hours and the meeting at 1700 hours identify Andy 19 Milburne from VicPol as being present at both the 20 meetings. Was he the police liaison officer in the 21 IMT?---That's correct. 22 His role in the circumstances was to communicate back to police 23 command matters occurring within the incident control 24 centre; is that right?---That's correct. 25 And that would be to assist them in fulfilling their 26 responsibilities in relation, for example, to issues of 27 traffic management?---I can't answer that. That would be 28 between police as to where they go and how they manage 29 that. It would be an internal police thing. 30 But you understood, did you not, that one of the matters that 31 the police were attending to during the course of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9249 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 7 February 2009 was the establishment of traffic 2 management points?---That's correct. 3 It would follow, wouldn't it, that information that Mr Milburne 4 was obtaining would assist them in fulfilling that 5 responsibility?---I would suggest that that would be the 6 case. 7 Did you have any difficulties or experience any difficulties 8 with communication with the police on the day of 9 7 February 2009?---Mr Milburne was with us most of the 10 time, so we were able to communicate directly with 11 Mr Milburne. 12 Do you recall any communications from either Sergeant Clint 13 Wilson, the forward commander based at Traralgon, or 14 Inspector Gardiner at operations command to your incident 15 control centre about concerns the police were having in 16 relation to traffic management issues?---I don't recall, 17 no. 18 Are you aware that Sergeant Wilson wrote a report for Victoria 19 Police in which he details concerns that he had about 20 relations with the ICC?---I'm not aware of that report. 21 There has been no contact made with you from Victoria Police 22 following up on those matters?---No. 23 Do you know if there has been any discussions at any level 24 between the CFA and the Victoria Police about the 25 matters?---I'm not aware. 26 One final matter, Mr Lockwood. Throughout the course of the 27 evidence that you have given today you have indicated on 28 many occasions that you can't recall matters that I have 29 asked you about; would you agree with that?---Yes. 30 You have the benefit of being able to draw on a log that you 31 kept on the day; do you agree with that?---That's correct.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9250 LOCKWOOD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 And you also had the benefit of having a minute taker sit in on 2 your meetings of your incident management team?---That's 3 correct. 4 Is there any reason in those circumstances why you are unable 5 to recall so many aspects of the activities that you 6 carried out on the day of 7 February?---It was a very 7 large fire, we were extremely busy on the day and 8 processing large amounts of information throughout the 9 entire course of the day. We are now eight months down 10 the track and it very difficult to recall due to the 11 intensity of the work we are going through on the day. 12 They are the matters for Mr Lockwood. Mr Clelland has some 13 questions. 14

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9251 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 happened on that day?---I would agree. 2 You told Mr Rozen that your statement had been prepared by 3 I think lawyers retained by the union on your 4 behalf?---That's right. 5 Is it the case that you in the days after 7 February sought 6 some general advice from your union?---That's correct. 7 I don't want to ask you about that advice, but did you 8 establish a relationship and from then on you took some 9 advice from time to time from them?---That's correct. 10 Does the fact that you have retained in effect your own 11 representation rather than that which is provided by CFA 12 or the State signal that there is any difference of 13 opinion or conflict between you and the CFA?---None at 14 all. 15 Mr Lockwood, you were asked a question about your 16 qualifications as incident controller. I understood you 17 to say that, prior to the 2008/09 fire season, you had 18 been authorised to perform the role of incident controller 19 level 3 under the guidance of a mentor and that you had 20 then received formal endorsement?---That's correct. 21 Can I just pick you up on the terminology there. Are you 22 intending - this is paragraph 8, Commissioners - to say 23 that you were not authorised to perform the role of 24 incident controller level 3 or were you really conveying 25 that you were not formally endorsed to perform the role of 26 incident controller level 3?---I was not formally 27 endorsed. 28 It is not a case of you not being authorised and not permitted 29 to operate as a level 3 incident controller?---That's 30 correct. 31 Indeed, you were asked I think whether this was the first

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9252 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 occasion on which you had run a level 3 fire as incident 2 controller. You answered "yes". But can I suggest 3 this: that you had been running the Delburn fire as 4 incident controller since about 3 February?---That's 5 correct. 6 And that was undoubtedly a level 3 fire, was it not?---That's 7 correct. 8 Both in relation to that fire and what subsequently became 9 known as the Churchill fire, and primarily why we are here 10 today, did you feel that your training and your experience 11 equipped you to perform the role of incident 12 controller?---Yes, I do. 13 Did you feel that on the day?---Yes, I did. 14 Do you still feel as though you were equipped to perform that 15 task?---Yes, I do. 16 It is not a case of you saying in any sense that you feel as 17 though you were put in a position that you ought not to 18 have been in?---Sorry, can you repeat that? 19 Yes. It is not a case of you saying to this Commission that 20 you were put in a position that you were not equipped to 21 deal with or that you ought not to have found yourself 22 in?---No, it's not a case. 23 CHAIRMAN: When you finish that topic, I just want to raise 24 some questions. 25 MR CLELLAND: Yes. Mr Chairman, I note that it is 1 o'clock 26 and I have a number of matters. 27 CHAIRMAN: We will resume at 2 o'clock. 28 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 29 LUNCHEON ADJOURNMENT 30 31

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9253 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 UPON RESUMING AT 2.00 PM: 2 MS DOYLE: Commissioners, I now call Gavin Sydney Wigginton. 3

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9254 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 process you go through with an organisation called The 2 Trust for Nature. The covenant then provides you with 3 protection in terms of it not being able to be developed 4 and it puts upon you a responsibility to maintain it free 5 of weeds and to restrict access to it in terms of vehicles 6 and so on which might do damage to the biodiversity. So, 7 having got this property, it is normal for such a property 8 to live on the property if you can, because that's the 9 best way of being able to fulfil the terms of the 10 covenant. So, it is usual to have within the covenant a 11 small domestic area where you put a house. In our case we 12 had an area of about 0.7 hectares for that purpose. Then 13 we went through the process of purchasing actually a kit 14 home which we installed on the property. We identified a 15 kit home as a relatively quick way of getting a house onto 16 the property, but it wasn't in any way - by going down 17 that path we weren't in any way trying to avoid the 18 toughest kind of regulations which did apply in terms of 19 the quality of the build. So, it had a lot of 20 fire-resistant features which I have outlined in my 21 statement. Having gone through that process, we had every 22 expectation that for a normal bushfire we would be able to 23 protect the house. 24 If I can take you back on one aspect. You purchased the 25 property in Callignee in July 2007?---Mm-hm. 26 It sits, as you say, on the northern slopes of the Strzelecki 27 hills. When did you start to build the house that you 28 have just referred to?---The build started in the previous 29 October. The buildings were brought to the property in 30 May and the certificate of occupancy was issued in 31 October. So that's - - -

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9255 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Of 2008?---Of 2008. So that's when I officially moved in. 2 You have some photographs of the native flora and fauna that 3 you have referred to in the statement. This is attachment 4 1. Perhaps if you can walk us briefly through a couple of 5 those. The photos start at witness page 0009. This is 6 the first attachment to your statement. You have referred 7 in your statement to the forested areas, and the photos 8 were taken obviously before the fire, but this is in 9 particular the forested areas?---Yes. 10 So the photo we see at 0009 there is obviously part of the 11 landscape?---Mm-hm. 12 You have mentioned the wide variety or the biodiversity in 13 terms of the species there. What can you tell us about 14 these couple of photos in this sequence?---Essentially the 15 predominant trees are messmate and peppermint, apple box 16 and blue gum and there are some other tree species in 17 smaller numbers. The understorey is very diverse. I have 18 to say that I'm not a botanist, so I won't name you 19 flowers and that sort of thing. In fact Andrew will tell 20 you, if you want to know more about that. But there was a 21 very wide diversity; a lot of orchids in particular, 22 including some rare orchids, certainly into double numbers 23 in terms of the number of orchids. Those two pictures are 24 pretty representative of what most of the property did 25 look like, but you have to also bear in mind there is a 26 fall from about 300 metres down to 100 metres. It is 27 supposedly a mixture of damp forest and woodland, so there 28 are gullies with tree ferns in and seasonal springs. 29 The final photo in that sequence is at witness page 0011. 30 Again that's quite representative of - - -?---Yes, that's 31 just one of the heads of the gullies. There are over 100

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9256 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 tree ferns in that particular gully and incidentally there 2 are today. They have come back. 3 You mentioned a moment ago the Trust For Nature covenant. You 4 have actually attached that at attachment 2, so I might 5 ask you to go to that briefly. It starts at page 0013. 6 As you have explained in your statement, this is a 7 covenant that you voluntarily entered into, you and 8 Mr Kleinig, as the owners with the Trust For Nature. In a 9 sense this document has you signing up to certain 10 restrictions and certain obligations in terms of use of 11 your land. Recital B, if we can just look at that on the 12 first page, says that, "The trust and the owner being 13 satisfied that the land possesses the appropriate 14 characteristics and acknowledging that their aims and 15 purposes are conservation of the land," and then it lists 16 some of the features of the property, native plants and 17 wildlife, natural interest and beauty et cetera, "agree to 18 enter into the deed." Having entered into the deed, you 19 were bound by all the covenants that flow on page 14 20 onwards. So I note there that it says, for example, you 21 are not to subdivide the land?---Correct. 22 You were not to do anything that in the reasonable opinion of 23 the trust would be prejudicial to its 24 conservation?---Mm-hm. 25 You were to undertake your best efforts not to allow any of the 26 matters in paragraph 3 to happen; for example, the 27 destruction or removal of local indigenous trees allowing 28 entry of livestock et cetera. These are all quite onerous 29 obligations. Why did you and Mr Kleinig enter into this 30 trust voluntarily?---The purpose of the Trust For Nature 31 is to put together with public land, which is under

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9257 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 national parks and state park management, a portfolio of 2 private properties that have similar value and obviously 3 if you are a conservationist and you believe in the value 4 of biodiversity for future wellbeing and you have the 5 ability or the resources to acquire such a piece of land, 6 that was our motivation, to add to the total amount of 7 land available of that kind in Victoria for the future of 8 the people of Victoria and I should add that we very much 9 regard ourselves as trustees of this land. It is not 10 something that we hold private to ourselves. It is 11 something that we have invested in for the future and for 12 the future enjoyment of the people of Victoria as much as 13 for ourselves. But, on the other hand, of course, we have 14 committed ourselves to restrictions which are enforceable. 15 I'm not sure how easy it would be to actually roll out an 16 enforcement regime, but the importance of those 17 restrictions is that we do have the ability to stop 18 intrusive invasion by vehicles and trail bikes and other 19 things which would damage the biodiversity of that 20 property. 21 One of the restrictions pertains to the number of buildings or 22 structures that you might put on the land?---Yes. 23 And it allows you modestly a dwelling, together with the usual 24 outbuildings, one shed and a number of other types of 25 buildings, but you are restricted to the type of building 26 that's listed in paragraph 4 of the trust?---Correct. 27 As you have mentioned, you did then go ahead and organise a kit 28 home to be installed. What view did you and Mr Kleinig 29 take about fire risk or fire danger at the property and 30 how did that inform the way that you proceeded with 31 building your house?---Well, if you live in Australia you

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9258 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 have to expect that fire will happen in the bush. That's 2 the nature of living in this country and so it is an 3 absolute basic assumption that fire will go through this 4 property at some point. You have to expect it to happen. 5 In the case of this property we are reliably told by 6 people who've lived in the area for some time that the 7 last time a fire went through was in 1944, so you could 8 say that we had an expectation that a fire would occur 9 certainly in my lifetime. So, I was very much conditioned 10 to ensure that we did everything we could with the 11 property, with the building that we were putting onto the 12 property, that it was as well built as possible in terms 13 of being fire resistant. We obviously did a lot of 14 research in terms of the sorts of materials that should be 15 used and I would say clearly the building regulations and 16 the fire management overlay were important aspects of the 17 regulatory regime, but we had our own views which in some 18 respects would be tougher than those regulations would 19 provide. 20 Did you seek any advice or input from either the council or the 21 CFA about the way in which you would change the land that 22 would be close to the house and the way in which you would 23 build the house itself?---Yes, certainly. One of the 24 first people I talked to was the CFA, the local CFA, and 25 talked about suitability of a number of different sites 26 which he had identified. The particular site that we did 27 identify was regarded, not only by the CFA, but by others 28 who were consulted, to be a relatively safe spot on the 29 property simply because it was flat and it didn't have 30 steep slopes next to it. Apart from slope, of course, the 31 vegetation that's next to where you build is very

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9259 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 important. We did a substantial amount of clearing, 2 probably beyond what was required in the fire management 3 overlay. All I would say finally in terms of the fire 4 aspect of it is that it was certainly part of our thinking 5 that in the succeeding years we would undertake controlled 6 burns, obviously working with the relevant authorities, 7 because we regard that as a natural part of having a 8 property that was capable of being defended. 9 In terms of the construction of the house it is probably best 10 done by reference to the photos. If you go to attachment 11 3 you have a couple of photos of the house as it went up, 12 starting at page 24?---Yes. 13 The main part of the house is constructed of fire resistant 14 hardiboard, is that right?---That's right. 15 You had wooden stumps. It was on wooden stumps but they were 16 enclosed with metal cladding. What was the rationale 17 behind that?---That's a fire protection provision, and in 18 the same way we had metal fascias which went around just 19 below the roof covering the wooden section. So the whole 20 idea is to have the minimum amount of wood actually 21 exposed in the event that flames came. Of course, in 22 addition to the stumps you can see on that page underneath 23 the main boards of the house there is an undersection 24 which was also fire-resistant material, so the stumps were 25 inside the metal as well as being inside that 26 fire-resistant material. 27 You say there was no roof cavity and cathedral ceilings inside 28 of the house?---Yes, on the basis that, if fire gets in, 29 it can get into a cavity, so we didn't have that as a 30 risk. 31 You also had guard meshing inside the guttering?---That's

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9260 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 right. That's obviously to stop leaves getting into the 2 guttering. 3 And flyscreens; you took the step of having them made of metal 4 rather than plastic?---That's absolutely right. 5 You say there was also no windowsills. Again, a fire 6 protection measure?---Yes. 7 The windows there, your statement mentions they are 8 double-glazed windows with fire-resistant glass and metal 9 frames?---Double-glazing, mm-hm. 10 Have you since learnt there is even one step above that type of 11 window structure that may have assisted?---Certainly there 12 is tougher glass that you can use, but the main thing 13 I would say about the windows, which we did regard as a 14 weakness of the house, was that we were just talking 15 through our options in terms of the covers that we would 16 have, the shutters that we would have on those windows. 17 I can tell you in the new build we will be having steel 18 shutters because I regard that as the weakest point of the 19 structure. 20 The glass itself?---The glass itself and the aluminium frames 21 within which the glass sits. 22 Your property also had water tanks, a capacity of about 23 40,000 litres?---That's right. 24 And you were able to attach a firefighting hose to 25 that?---That's right. We had a 30 metre hose which 26 obviously stretched around the house. 27 I'm not sure if it is all depicted in the photos, but there was 28 decking. What was that made of?---It was made of 29 blackbutt. Under the regulations that apply there were 30 basically four types of wood you could choose, so that was 31 just one of the ones. It is actually a native wood, so

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9261 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 that's why we chose it. 2 Before or after the home was built, did you undergo any 3 training in terms of either fighting fires or protecting a 4 home against fire?---Absolutely. 5 What was the training that you experienced?---Well, I did a lot 6 of reading to start with, that's just the way I am, and 7 then I obviously got in touch with the CFA. They went 8 through their usual preparation for fire season in terms 9 of holding public meetings, so I went to two public 10 meetings. The first one was a general awareness type 11 meeting. The second one was specifically devised to help 12 you prepare a fire plan using a methodology which was 13 contained in the booklet. So I went to those two meetings 14 and then learnt about the support which CFA will give you 15 in setting up a community fire group. So, working with 16 the CFA, I initiated the establishment of a community fire 17 group along our section of Red Hill Road with neighbours 18 and we had four training sessions in the evening with a 19 trainer from the CFA who took us through a great deal of 20 detail in terms of preparing ourselves and preparing our 21 property. There was a lot of video material to show 22 people defending houses in a bushfire. 23 It seems from what you say in your statement, paragraph 12 24 onwards, that you found the smaller meeting that you 25 assisted coordinate of the Community Fireguard more useful 26 or more directly relevant than the more general 27 introduction?---Absolutely. It was a little seminar, 28 really, going into a great deal of detail and was clearly 29 helping us to prepare sensible fire plans which weren't 30 just some figment of imagination but were something you 31 were actually going to use, which is obviously what we

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9262 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 did. 2 You mention the videos. In paragraph 15 of your statement you 3 refer to some of the video material that was available and 4 about halfway through paragraph 15 you note that the 5 videos you watched included clips of live footage taken by 6 people who had been involved in the passage of a fire. 7 You make mention there of hearing commentary on one of the 8 videos such as, "We've just retreated into the house. 9 Here comes the front." What sort of message or impression 10 did that video material give you about what would happen 11 if you were to stay and defend your home?---Obviously it 12 provided you with some assurance that ordinary folk like 13 myself would be able to cope. Bear in mind these videos 14 had families, including old people, older people, even 15 older than me, and young people and they were coping. 16 When you see the videos, the fire was slowly creeping 17 towards the building and people were fighting embers and 18 then they were retreating indoors and waiting for the 19 front to go through and then they would be going out and 20 continuing with their work on the embers. That was 21 basically the message, that you can do it if you've got 22 the right equipment and you have done the right 23 preparation with the block of land itself and you 24 obviously know what you're doing. 25 Did that place you in good stead in terms of the severity of 26 the bushfire you faced on the 7th?---I would say that it 27 was a combination of what I learnt from that training and 28 what Andrew knew from other sources that stood us in good 29 stead. Probably the most important thing was the impact 30 of radiant heat on us and it never ceases to amaze me 31 that, when I see pictures on television of people

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9263 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 wandering around in T-shirts and shorts, we were covered 2 up, everything was covered; hats, obviously gloves, face 3 mask and boots and everything. So, the personal 4 protection gear was a very important thing and going into 5 the house when the front was coming through was absolutely 6 essential. So those two things, that combination of those 7 two things was really, really important and the CFA 8 training program was very strong on stressing those 9 things. So I think they did a very good job, as far as 10 I'm concerned. 11 I will ask Mr Kleinig more detail about the conditions during 12 the actual passage of the firefront, but do you feel that 13 you had made an accurate assessment or prediction about 14 what you might face on the day prior to the 7th?---No. 15 Clearly I certainly wasn't prepared for what happened on 16 7 February, simply because I had no real experience from 17 that training program of what a severe fire would have 18 been like. I think that the message that would have gone 19 with knowing about severe fires is that you wouldn't be 20 there because the chances are you will lose your life if 21 you be hit by the front. I mean, nobody in their right 22 mind would try and save their house and risk their life. 23 For me I think that was the thing missing from 24 the training program, really, was an appreciation of the 25 fact that very severe fires do happen. The frequency, you 26 know, will change over time, there might not be another 27 one for 100 years, but with climate change there might be 28 one every year, who knows, but the thing is that the 29 program was all about how to deal with the kind of 30 bushfire which we all know about happening quite 31 frequently and I felt quite confident from that program

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9264 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 that I could cope and what happened on that day wasn't 2 like that. 3 What about warnings? You say in paragraph 18 that something 4 that might have contributed to you underestimating the 5 severity was the information you had prior to the day. 6 You say you heard the Premier's warning and you saw a 7 number of forecasts, but something about that you say 8 didn't prepare you. Why do you say that?---Because from 9 all the training that I had had I couldn't from the 10 information that I got from looking at the website and all 11 the other sources, I couldn't really identify in my head 12 that this was a very severe fire. I think the degree of 13 severity is the thing that really doesn't, in the previous 14 regime, and there is a lot of talk now about new systems, 15 but under the system in February a message did not come 16 across, I don't think, through the media of the severity 17 of this fire and how dangerous it was. There is no blame 18 attached there, but I don't think that message was out 19 there. I'm somebody who looked at the website every day. 20 I obviously talked to a lot of people. I was very aware 21 of risk and I listen to the ABC. So, all I can say is 22 I just didn't read from the available - or get from 23 the available information a sufficient warning. That's 24 how I feel. 25 You explain in your statement that you and Andrew prepared a 26 fire plan and it is actually in writing. If we can go to 27 annexure 4, I will just look at that. It starts at page 28 28. It is a well-organised document. It clearly 29 indicates it is the fire plan for your address, 200 Red 30 Hill Road, February 2009. It contains plan A, B and C, 31 different permutations based on who might be there or who

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9265 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 might be away. Was this in part because you had made this 2 your permanent home whereas Andrew was using it more as a 3 weekender?---Correct. 4 And there are general comments which indicate the plan covers 5 you both?---Mm-hm. 6 And you even had a centre you called the resource centre, which 7 in essence was the laundry?---Yes. 8 But you also made it the head of operations, if you like, in 9 the event of fire?---Yes. I mean the most important thing 10 about the laundry probably is that it had a connecting 11 door into the house and it had an external door. 12 So you could enter it from the outside?---Mm-hm. 13 Should you find yourself suffering radiant heat there, but you 14 could also escape if you didn't want to be there any 15 longer?---Right, and it was in the corner of the house 16 immediately adjacent to the shed, which was our ultimate 17 fallback position and incidentally the south-east corner 18 of the house. 19 And that was chosen because, what, that was where you thought 20 it was more likely a fire would approach from?---The fire 21 would most likely come from north or west, so that's the 22 opposite corner of the house. 23 So this would be furthest from the front and give you that 24 time?---Exactly, and bear in mind the way - if you look at 25 the layout of our property, essentially we have the house 26 and the tanks and the shed sitting behind. The shed is 27 actually the most south-east point, behind the two great 28 pillars of water, not to mention the house, so we thought 29 that through very carefully in terms of the layout of this 30 property. 31 So your laundry was the initial refuge?---Yes.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9266 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 The final refuge, if the house was lost, so you are even 2 contemplating loss of the house, is the shed and the car 3 parked inside the shed?---That's right. 4 The plan speaks for itself otherwise. It goes through a number 5 of practical steps that you were either in train, 6 undertaking or that needed to be done on the day. Can 7 I take you to page 29. There is a heading "Readiness 8 during fire season" and it even spells out what you ought 9 to do: Check the CFA website and then do physical things 10 like clear the decks, check the status of the items in the 11 laundry, put batteries in the radio, drinks in the 12 storeroom. Was this plan followed on the 13 day?---Absolutely. 14 You then have a cascading series of events, I suppose. If the 15 threat is emerging, there is then all the things you say 16 in the table there ought to be done?---Yes. 17 And then fire imminent and actual, if we can just look at the 18 bottom of the page. The fire is at the doorstep. The 19 next page of the plan, page 30, kicks in?---Yes. 20 And in red you have typed, "Located inside for 10 to 15 minutes 21 while the firefront passes through." Was that estimation 22 about what you would need to do during the passage of the 23 front something drawn from the training you have referred 24 to?---Absolutely, yes. The CFA will tell you that's the 25 sort of timing you need to allow to be out of the line of 26 fire of radiant heat. 27 The plan that envisages direct threat passes, and then you 28 resume patrolling outside?---That's right. 29 Just out of interest, you brief your CFG members. They are the 30 other members of your community fire group?---That's 31 right.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9267 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 So the plan envisages neighbours helping each other or at least 2 contacting each other in this phase?---Absolutely. 3 Under the heading "Plan for leaving" it refers to decision to 4 leave, timing of departure et cetera. On the day the 5 decision you made was to stay?---Yes. Well, the decision 6 we made was to actually defend. 7 And Mr Kleinig came up to assist with that?---That's right. We 8 went there. 9 The house was lost and he will attest to that?---Yes. 10 The other attachment to your statement, attachment 5, shows the 11 aftermath. Can we start with witness page 32. This is 12 the first photo in attachment 5?---Yes. 13 What are we looking at there? Is that the shed or one of the 14 outbuildings?---That is the only outbuilding. It is the 15 shed. It is a steel shed. The car was parked inside that 16 shed nearest to the wall that you are looking at. 17 So that underwent substantial damage. If we turn the page, 18 photo 33, what's that?---That is the house after the fire, 19 which is basically the roof sitting on the ground. I 20 mean, there is nothing left at all. You can just see, as 21 a matter of interest, on the left-hand side an LPG bottle. 22 There were two LPG bottles. One of them blew its top off. 23 Fortunately it went up and came down and didn't come down 24 on top of the shed, because that would have been pretty 25 lethal, I would think. 26 Photos 34 and 35 show some of the impact on the 27 landscape?---Absolutely. 28 The groundcover just devastated and the trees stripped of 29 foliage?---Absolutely nothing except animal skeletons, 30 nothing green whatsoever and you will notice not even 31 leaves. They are all gone.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9268 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 If we looked at the property today, Mr Wigginton, leaving aside 2 the physical structure, how has the foliage and the native 3 wildlife bounced back?---It's quite remarkable. Remember 4 this is a native forest, so there is something called 5 epicormic growth, which is the leaves growing out of the 6 side of the trees by which the tree regenerates itself. 7 I would say in the area of the property where we have 8 messmate and peppermint trees and apple box, 80 to 9 90 per cent of the trees have got epicormic growth growing 10 from the ground pretty well up to the top of the trees. 11 Some of the older trees don't appear to have survived, but 12 we don't know whether that's because it just takes them 13 longer to spring leaves. So, the trees have come back 14 and, unless you'd seen it, you wouldn't believe how 15 different it is from that picture that you have in the 16 statement. The groundcover, the first things probably to 17 come up were the tree ferns . Virtually all the tree 18 ferns in the gullies have recovered. The groundcover, the 19 first things which came back were bracken and a thing 20 called Xanthorrhoea minor, which is a plant which actually 21 sends up big stems which flower after a fire. The 22 property is covered in those things, but also there are 23 orchids everywhere, blooming at the present time. 24 Take your time, Mr Wigginton. A big change?---I didn't expect 25 that to happen. 26 No problem?---I guess it's a heartwarming thing that the 27 property, the natural part of what this property is, has 28 survived and come back. That's very important to me. 29 I understand. There are only two other things I wanted to 30 touch on with you. One is you mention in paragraph 21 of 31 your statement the steps you went through in terms of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9269 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 securing access to the relief recovery centre, a case 2 manager was appointed to provide you with advice and 3 support, and you say you have received considerable 4 support in terms of financial and material benefits from a 5 number of charities, including a nine month pass to travel 6 on V-Line rail network and the Melbourne tram network, 7 which you have found helpful?---Mm-hm. 8 You indicate, and we will let Mr Kleinig tell his story, that 9 because of the vagaries, I suppose, of your personal 10 positions, it was your permanent residence but not 11 Mr Kleinig's. He has not enjoyed the same level of 12 treatment in terms of access to recovery funds and the 13 like, but your experience has been good in that 14 regard?---It has. I mean, the generosity of people in 15 this part of Victoria is quite amazing. People in 16 Traralgon were obviously very close to what happened and 17 are very aware and there have been many acts of kindness. 18 I have identified the council as having, in our opinion, 19 done a good job, because I think the case manager has been 20 very helpful to me personally and the council has assisted 21 to some extent in helping us with drainage issues and a 22 number of aspects of managing land which are quite 23 important to us. Obviously the financial support is 24 significant and is helping us to reconstruct, which is 25 very important. 26 And you have a good news story in terms of how things went with 27 your insurer. You note at paragraph 22 the claim was 28 settled in a reasonable and timely manner, but in 29 particular the practical assistance that was available was 30 a provision in your policy which enabled you to finance a 31 12 month lease over a property, and that's obviously

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9270 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 important to your physical comfort and being able to get 2 on with your life?---Absolutely. 3 You and Mr Kleinig intend to rebuild your house?---Mm-hm. 4 As you have noted, the land itself is regenerating, which is 5 heartwarming. So, you are now going to rebuild and you 6 are going to take some steps to go even further in terms 7 of fire-resistant material and design. You note in 8 paragraph 23 some of those matters. You are going to use 9 an aerated concrete slab rather than stumps, a better safe 10 room in the house with its own fireproof walls. You have 11 mentioned the roll-down metal shutters already, the 12 concrete panels on the outside and the oxygen bottles. So 13 these are obviously some things that you have taken on 14 board following your difficult experience and the new 15 house will have these features?---Absolutely. If you look 16 at the new BAL system, it probably identifies those sort 17 of things with a flame zone requirement. We've had a BAL 18 survey done which doesn't put us in the flame zone, but we 19 are going to build to that higher standard because it is 20 certainly our intention to defend if a normal bushfire 21 comes through. Clearly if a severe one comes through and 22 we get warning, we won't be there. 23 That much of your plan has been altered?---Absolutely. 24 Mr Wigginton, thank you for your time this afternoon and for 25 sharing your story. There is one question from the State. 26 I shouldn't limit it to one question; he said it's brief. 27 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Could I ask a question first. 28 Mr Wigginton, you explain that you are a scientist?---I'm 29 not a scientist, no. 30 I'm sorry, I thought you said you were a biologist?---No, I'm a 31 conservationist, which isn't quite the same thing at all.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9271 WIGGINTON XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 I was about to say as a man of science, but certainly as 2 someone who I am sure has thought long and hard about the 3 circumstances of this fire, do you have any personal 4 thoughts about why you think it was so different?---The 5 severity of the fire, you mean? 6 Yes?---Clearly it was a combination of circumstances, the high 7 temperature and the low humidity and that change in the 8 wind, and those are very significant factors because the 9 speed at which the fire was travelling was so much faster 10 than any expectation I would have had. So I just don't 11 think that in our community there is that much knowledge 12 and experience for the ordinary person about that set of 13 conditions. It is just not out there. Even if you read, 14 you can read of extreme fires. So, the lack of knowledge, 15 lack of disseminated information about that is a serious 16 issue for the community, which is why, when we made a 17 submission, which we did, a written submission to the 18 Commission in March, we identified education as a very 19 important part of how the community responds to these 20 issues, and we mean both with kiddies, starting at a very 21 early age and continuing right through people's lives, 22 basically. Anyone who is choosing to live in the bush 23 needs to know about the full range of fire activity that 24 can hit you. 25 I think you alluded earlier to the fact that you thought some 26 of the literature that was available to you perhaps 27 understated the risks that were associated with a severe 28 bushfire?---Absolutely. Yes. 29

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9272 WIGGINTON XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR LIVERMORE 1 I just want to ask you briefly about your evidence of the 2 information that was provided to the public in the week 3 leading up to 7 February. Did I understand your evidence 4 to be that you didn't think there was sufficient warning 5 in the week leading up to the 7th as to the severity of 6 the fire risk on 7 February?---My evidence would be that 7 we were given a lot of warning about the danger imminent 8 as a result of a combination of conditions, and I think 9 that warning was there for anybody who wanted to go and 10 find it. My point is that the severity of the fire was 11 not something that was described to give you a sense of 12 the need to be aware more than it was just an average 13 fire. I think it is that question of degree which is the 14 problem. Obviously we need to do something about that. 15 You see it as the need to get across the likely severity of the 16 fire behaviour given the conditions?---Absolutely. 17 Rather than warnings about it's going to be a bad fire day. Is 18 that the sort of distinction you are looking at?---Yes, 19 that's correct. 20 I gather from Mr Kleinig's statement that the two of you 21 returned to the house at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon 22 on the 7th?---4.30 to 5 o'clock. 23 During the week had you been staying at a house where there was 24 a television set?---I was at the property. 25 Did it have a television set?---Absolutely. Yes. 26 Did you see the various warnings given that week as to the 27 severe fire conditions by the Premier and the fire chiefs 28 and so on?---I did. I saw the Premier on television. 29 But the distinction you are seeking to draw, along with the CFA 30 material, is the need to point to that really severe fire 31 behaviour risk on really bad days?---Yes. The ability to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9273 WIGGINTON XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR LIVERMORE 1 protect yourself and your property if you are well 2 prepared. My understanding was that I was well prepared 3 and I was aware and I had done all the things and that 4 I would be able to defend the asset because it was built 5 to the latest building regulations in a fire-resistant 6 house. I think that what we experienced on that day was 7 something a bit different from what my expectation was and 8 I don't think that the system of warnings gave you that 9 information that this was something special, because if it 10 had, I wouldn't have been there. I'm not a stupid person. 11 So, I didn't think I was risking my life by being there. 12 But your pump failed very early in the piece, didn't it, the 13 water pump?---It did. 14 That made life a lot more difficult in defending the property, 15 not having any water available?---Correct, and it failed 16 for a very simple reason, that there was no oxygen. That 17 was a very important piece of learning, as far as I'm 18 concerned. 19 Was that a petrol-driven pump?---It was. 20 Thank you, sir. 21 MS DOYLE: I have nothing further, sir. So if there are no 22 further questions, I would ask that Mr Wigginton be 23 excused. 24 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. 25 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 26 MS DOYLE: We will now complete the story, so to speak, by 27 calling Mr Andrew Kleinig. 28

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9274 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Royal Commission. Do you have a copy there?---Yes, I do. 2 Are the contents of that true and correct?---Yes, they are. 3 I tender that statement. 4 #EXHIBIT 391 - Witness statement of Andrew Kleinig 5 (WIT.099.001.0001). 6 MS DOYLE: Mr Kleinig, you co-own the property about which 7 Mr Wigginton has just given evidence?---That's right. 8 You and Mr Wigginton met some 18 years ago through the 9 Australian Red Cross blood service?---Yes. 10 You have a close relationship, almost like father and son, and 11 had made a decision to purchase and work this land and 12 build the property yourselves?---That's right. On the 13 banks of Lake Eildon, probably 10 years ago, we were 14 discussing what we would do with some spare cash that we 15 had. We are both greenies, conservationists, and we 16 thought buying a piece of land that had high biodiversity 17 values was a good use of that money. 18 Mr Wigginton has explained how that works in terms of the trust 19 and the covenant?---Yes. 20 In terms of your background, you've got university 21 qualifications in science specialising in biochemistry and 22 ecology, including units on fire behaviour and fire 23 management. You point that out in paragraph 3. You then 24 commenced working for Melbourne Water. Your current title 25 with them?---Program leader, western catchments, with the 26 waterways and drainage maintenance team. 27 In your work for Melbourne Water have you been engaged in some 28 aspects of work that require you to engage in controlled 29 burning?---Yes, I have. 30 Have you ever been trained in firefighting itself?---Yes. 31 What sort of training have you done with Melbourne Water in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9275 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 relation to that?---At Melbourne Water I have only done 2 training to attend management burns. I formally worked 3 through a contractor where we were involved in a 4 small-scale manner to actually implement various 5 controlled burns. As part of that I also did, I think it 6 was about a three day, four day training course to attend 7 and manage those burns. 8 Did you participate in the CFA training about which 9 Mr Wigginton has spoken?---No, I didn't. 10 But did you work with him on developing the fire plan that we 11 have looked at?---From the day we purchased the property, 12 that was when we first started talking about fire. So 13 from that day to this day we're still talking about how 14 we're going to manage the risk of fire on the property. 15 In paragraph 6 of your statement you talk about the lead-up to 16 7 February. On the 6th you make note of the fact that 17 Mr Wigginton was in Melbourne to celebrate your birthday 18 and to visit his mother?---Yes. 19 You stayed with your family at the family home in Ashburton and 20 you are aware of the hot weather. You say in particular 21 you recall checking the bureau's website and reading there 22 would be a south-westerly change late in the afternoon on 23 the 7th. What did that suggest to you or what did that 24 tell you might be the likelihood for the afternoon?---Not 25 particularly good. One of the scenarios that we had 26 discussed in our fire plan was exactly that that had 27 unfolded on the 7th, and that was there was a fire to the 28 west of the property with a northerly wind pushing it 29 southward into the Strzeleckis and then would you have 30 that south-west change which would blow it directly into 31 our property. So, I had looked at the Bureau of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9276 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Meteorology's website I think on the Friday and I have a 2 memory of seeing wind gusts up to 45 kilometres an hour, 3 and I knew that it wasn't going to be great. I didn't 4 think it would have been as intense as it was. 5 In fact, in paragraph 5 of your statement you say part way 6 through that paragraph, "When I saw the firefront 7 approaching I knew straight away that we would not be able 8 to defend our property against it and that despite our 9 plan we were confronted with scenario Z"?---When we were 10 in the house? 11 On the day itself?---Absolutely, yes. That's correct. 12 So it was more severe than you had predicted?---We shouldn't 13 have been there. 14 What placed you there I think unfolds from paragraph 7 onwards. 15 Mr Wigginton received a telephone call about 11 in the 16 morning from a neighbour in Callignee. She said a 17 bushfire was moving through Gippsland and might threaten 18 your district. You were both clear, however, that what 19 you would do was return to the property and attempt to 20 defend it in line with your plan?---That's right. 21 You say in paragraph 8 you drove out there and as you were 22 driving along the Strzelecki Highway you saw flames in the 23 distance to the south-east. You got back to your property 24 when, shortly before 5?---Yes, I think best guess would be 25 around about quarter to 5. 26 The trip took you a while because you say there were police 27 blocks near Pakenham?---Yes, so we had to head south to 28 Korumburra and then head north and I think we joined the 29 highway again at about Morwell, and that was when we saw 30 some flames in the Churchill area. 31 When you got to the property, what did you do to prepare for

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9277 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 the prospect of the fire coming?---We immediately kicked 2 into implementation of our fire plan and that involved a 3 whole series of events. The first thing we did was put on 4 our PPE, so that was our overalls, boots, hats, gloves, 5 all the rest of it. Then we went about preparing the 6 house, which involved watering it down, putting all the 7 furniture in the middle of the rooms, putting the doormats 8 inside the shed and a whole range of other activities to 9 minimise the risk of something catching fire in or around 10 the house. 11 Mr Wigginton has already explained that your plan was, as a 12 firefront actually passed you would retreat, at least as 13 plan A, to the laundry in the corner of the house?---No, 14 that was the survival plan. 15 Okay. We will come to that in a moment. You say in paragraph 16 10 at about 6.30 there was an eerie smoke fog and a 17 roaring noise. What happened after that?---Around about 18 6.30 we noticed that there was a glow coming from the 19 south-west which was probably downhill from where our 20 house is. The smoke was getting a lot thicker. Probably 21 by around quarter to it was darker than midnight with no 22 moon. It was incredibly dark. The red glow was growing 23 and there was an incredible roaring sound, which told me 24 that the fire was well and truly coming our way and it was 25 time to retreat to inside the house. 26 You say further on in paragraph 10 at about 6.40 you retreated 27 into the house and a wall of red grew?---Yes. 28 At 6.45 all the trees around the house were burning and the 29 front had arrived at the edge of the clearing. You say it 30 was as if the fire skipped the clearing, so did it jump 31 very quickly from the ring of trees to the house

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9278 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 proper?---Well, when the fire got to what we call the 2 domestic area, the flames were so intense that I remember 3 standing inside the living room looking at the floor to 4 ceiling windows that we had there. I probably spent a 5 second to a second and a half just going "Wow". The 6 flames were going horizontally, so the house was actually 7 surrounded in flames so that the flames were hitting the 8 side of the house so hard they had no room to go, they 9 were actually wrapping themselves around the flame. When 10 that firefront hit, it was as though a giant had just 11 slammed their foot down on the landscape. The whole house 12 shook. It was quite an amazing thing to witness. 13 I suppose up until that point I was a bit of a tourist and 14 I thought, okay, this is going to be really bad. I was 15 even taking video footage and describing what had 16 happened. It was quite amazing; within 30 seconds to a 17 minute of the firefront getting there we had fire on all 18 four sides, so it had skipped into the next valley and it 19 was racing up the eastern valley. Because we are sort of 20 on a ridge top, it was either the south-west change or 21 just the winds created by the fire itself. We had this 22 enormous convection wind that was just sucking fire from 23 both sides of the ridge. 24 You are able to estimate the firefront struck the property at 25 about 6.45?---That's right. 26 How do you know that?---We have a clock that semi-melted in the 27 shed and that's pretty much when the fire - well, 28 obviously that's when the fire got there. 29 Your water pump did fail. When did it fail and had it been of 30 any use? Were you able to use it initially?---Yes, we 31 used it to water the house down, but after that it really

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9279 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 wasn't much use. When we retreated to inside the house 2 I had the hose and within, I don't know, half a minute of 3 the firefront getting to the house in the domestic area, 4 I tested the hose and it was just dead. We presumed it 5 was either a lack of oxygen or just the intense heat. The 6 pump was just a puddle of melted metal after the fire, so 7 it was difficult to tell. So, very quickly I came to the 8 conclusion that we were in the scenario that we were not 9 supposed to be there and we were reduced to mops and 10 buckets, and that's when we kicked into survival mode 11 because I thought, "If this house fails in any way, we are 12 not going to be able to defend ourselves or the house." 13 So our fire plan, we call it a bushfire survival plan, it 14 actually had two tiers to it; one was to defend the house 15 while it was defendable and then, when it's not, it became 16 about ourselves and we got to that point very, very 17 quickly. 18 You retreated in the laundry and you say in the statement you 19 were in the laundry for about 15 minutes lying on the 20 floor trying to get oxygen. Can you just explain what 21 happened during the period of time you were in the 22 laundry?---Sure. So, once our fire hose had given up the 23 ghost, we called the fallback which was the laundry. We 24 shut ourselves in there, and I have a digital watch with a 25 little light on it and probably every minute or two 26 I checked and made sure I knew how long we had been in 27 there. We spoke to each other every 30 seconds to a 28 couple of minutes, difficult to tell. I was testing the 29 air by putting my arm up to see how hot the air 30 temperature was, so there's a lot of training and 31 background that's gone into our behaviour. It was a

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9280 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 totally rehearsed way of behaving. It seems absurd, but 2 nothing unpredictable happened to us. We had actually 3 planned for all of this to happen the whole way. People 4 have said to us, "Were you terrified?" We weren't, 5 actually, because only a month ago me and Gavin had 6 gone - we had actually physically rehearsed. We'd gone 7 into the laundry, "Right, now we get on the ground, we sit 8 here for 15 minutes, this is what we do when we are in the 9 laundry." So it felt like we were almost watching a 10 football match. We were observing bits of the house fail 11 and fall around us, but inside the laundry we were pretty 12 hot and we were getting close to being oxygen starved, and 13 it was around about 7 o'clock, 7.05 when I was starting to 14 get a little bit wobbly and Gavin was as well. Part of my 15 training at Melbourne Water has involved me doing a module 16 around confined space entry and part of that training has 17 educated me to understand that it's not the other gases in 18 the air that will cause you to pass out, it will be 19 actually those gases pushing the oxygen out of the air, 20 the space that you are in. Before you know it, you pass 21 out. That's something that you have no control over, so 22 I was very aware of that happening to us. That was why we 23 were talking to each other so frequently because, as soon 24 as I started getting gobbledegook back from Gavin, or he 25 noticed something like that back from myself, we were in a 26 lot of trouble. When we were in there, I kept feeling the 27 heat of the door, kept feeling the heat of the walls. 28 Occasionally I stood up, took a big gulp of breath. 29 I think one of my quotes in the media is we sat in there 30 and basically kissed the floor tiles for 15 minutes, and 31 that is what we did. For people who want to defend under

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9281 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 those circumstances or any sort of bushfire, you have to 2 be prepared to defend a house fire where you can't go 3 outside, and that's the scenario that we were in. We were 4 quite lucky that we had a good house and we got the most 5 out of it and nothing totally unforeseen happened to us. 6 Then at some stage you told Mr Wigginton, "We should evacuate 7 from the house," and you say you took his hand and led him 8 out of the house, down the steps which were on fire and 9 ran over to the shed?---Yes. 10 The shed had been hit by the firefront already, had it?---Yes, 11 it certainly had. A door was blown off and when I rolled 12 one of the roller doors up there were various articles 13 inside the shed that were on fire. 14 And you put that out?---Yes, that's right. 15 Went in, slammed the roller doors and got into the car and lay 16 down in the car in the shed?---That's right. 17 You say in paragraph 15 while you were taking that action, 18 while you were waiting in the car, two LPG tanks next to 19 the house vented and blasted fire almost onto the shed. 20 I assume it got very hot while you were in there?---Yes, 21 it certainly did. Look, in hindsight we probably didn't 22 need to go into the shed. We were on autopilot. We were 23 so full of adrenaline we probably weren't thinking that 24 straight. If I look back at that time, the bush was still 25 on fire but a lot of the fire and fuels had already 26 vaporised and it was hot outside but it wasn't unbearable 27 and it was smoky, but we would have been better off 28 hunkering down behind the water tanks than retreating to 29 inside the shed and then inside the car because what 30 happened is one of the gas tanks flared and it flared 31 directly onto the garage. We were inside the car and it

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9282 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 was like as bright as day; it was unbelievable. We knew 2 what was happening and it got really, really hot. 3 I remember laying in between the front seats and just 4 thinking, "Geez, I don't know how much more of this I can 5 handle." It was as though somebody had turned a tap on my 6 head and the sweat was just pouring off us. 7 By about 7.25 pm, about 15 minutes after going into the shed, 8 you say in paragraph 16 you staggered out the side door 9 and found the house had already burnt to the ground but 10 the radiant heat generally had subsided?---That's right, 11 yes. 12 You say in paragraph 17 about 20 minutes after that you heard 13 voices and it was Louise Mann and her husband and children 14 who had survived the fire themselves a couple of 15 kilometres up the road. They told you about what had 16 happened to them. In terms of getting out of the area on 17 that night, if I can just take you to the end of paragraph 18 17, can you just explain what happened there? You left 19 the property and walked out, seeing burning trees along 20 the way. How did you get out of the area?---We simply 21 walked down Red Hill Road. It took quite a bit of 22 convincing to get me to go down the road. I thought we 23 were fairly safe where we were. So, we had a bit of a 24 debate with the Manns for about five or 10 minutes what 25 the correct thing to do was. I was concerned there was 26 going to be trees that were falling over, there would have 27 been God knows how many obstacles down the road and we 28 didn't know if there was unburnt fuel and forest further 29 down the road. So there was a lot of uncertainty about 30 that, whereas where we were the risk had really abated and 31 we could sit there until the following day. But in

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9283 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 hindsight it was probably the right thing to do. We were 2 fairly traumatised and there were six of us all up, so 3 there was enough eyes and ears to keep an eye out for 4 whatever risks we ran into. When we got down to the 5 bottom of Red Hill Road we bumped into Peter Van Der 6 Liest, who was the South Traralgon CFA captain. He got on 7 the radio and organised transport for us to the CFA 8 station. 9 And they took you into Traralgon South CFA station where people 10 greeted you and were amazed that the group of you had 11 emerged from that area unscathed?---That's right. 12 At least in some senses. Can I just take you to the final 13 matter you refer to in your statement, the treatment that 14 you have experienced during the recovery process. 15 Mr Wigginton has made the point that he has been happy 16 with the experience he has had. Your experience has not 17 been as happy. What's been the reason behind 18 that?---I suppose it's because it's not my house of 19 primary residence, so I have kind of been a little bit of 20 an anomaly or Mr Invisible in the whole process. I'm 21 extremely grateful to the Australian community and all the 22 authorities that have been there to support Gavin and 23 myself through the whole ordeal, and I can't fault it. 24 But my personal experience is that people just generally 25 didn't know what to do with me. Even on the first night 26 people were saying, the people who were dealing with us in 27 the refugee centre, "What do we do with you? All right, 28 we will shack you up with Gavin and he can look after 29 you." I think the following day there was even a $400 30 handout to help you get through those first couple of 31 days. I was just living off Gavin because I didn't slot

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9284 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 in easily anywhere. It was almost as though I was a 2 tourist. We have since been to some of these - I'm not 3 sure what you would call them - but Toll, there was a 4 centre at Clayton and another centre out at Nunawading 5 where you could go and get tools and clothes to replace 6 things that you lost in the fire. One thing that sticks 7 in my mind is I went there with Gavin a couple of months 8 ago and one of the volunteers even said, "I hope you 9 realise that you're not here to get anything yourself. 10 You are here to help Gavin." I didn't need that reminding 11 again. So, there's a whole series of these little events, 12 like even when I went to VicRoads, my understanding is 13 that if you're a bushfire survivor and you lost your 14 licence, VicRoads would just automatically give you 15 another licence. Not me, because it wasn't my house of 16 primary residence. I was a tourist who happened to lose a 17 bunch of stuff. 18 Despite the fact you are one of the owners of the 19 property?---Correct. 20 One other matter I skipped over: of course, in the initial days 21 of the fire you couldn't even get to your usual home in 22 Ashburton because the roads were blocked, so in that early 23 period is that the time during which the assumption was 24 made, I suppose, that Mr Wigginton would be the person you 25 could look to for accommodation and other needs?---That's 26 right. 27 You do note in the final paragraph of your statement that 28 months after the fire you received a $1,000 grant from 29 Centrelink to compensate you for having been away from 30 your primary place of residence. Thus far, that's the 31 only direct assistance you have received from a government

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9285 KLEINIG XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 agency?---Yes. 2 I have no further questions for Mr Kleinig. Are there any 3 questions, Commissioners? No. There is a question from 4 the State. 5

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9286 KLEINIG XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR LIVERMORE 1 If you had have thought that your pump was going to fail almost 2 at the outset - - - ?---I would have stayed in Ashburton 3 in the pool. 4 Thanks very much. 5 MS DOYLE: May Mr Kleinig be excused? 6 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you, Mr Kleinig. You are now excused. 7 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 8 MS DOYLE: We now return to complete the evidence of 9 Mr Lockwood. 10

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9287 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 So he didn't give you the choice at all?---My recollection is 2 they were the words that were spoken. 3 So there was no discussion; he said you will be it?---It wasn't 4 his decision. That decision was made above us in relation 5 to the control of the incident being CFA being the control 6 agency, and I had that discussion with Mr Flynn - - - 7 So you accepted that, regardless of other matters like his 8 experience, because there is a rule in place that says 9 that in those circumstances you will take charge despite 10 his enormous experience, that was the way it had to 11 be?---That was the discussion that was had between myself 12 and Mr Flynn in Sale in regards to the management of the 13 incident, that CFA was the control agency and I would be 14 the incident controller. 15 MR CLELLAND: Can I just take up the Chairman's point. As 16 I understand it, the designation of your being incident 17 controller, Mr Jeremiah being deputy incident controller, 18 did not occur at the time when Mr Jeremiah came and 19 introduced himself to you or informed you that he would be 20 deputy incident controller?---Sorry. I will ask you to 21 repeat that. 22 Yes. When Mr Jeremiah came and spoke to you and said "I'm your 23 deputy incident controller," that is not when you had 24 become aware that you were to be the incident controller. 25 That had happened before that, as I understand?---That's 26 right. 27 And that had been considered by those who had been organising 28 and making decisions about the structure of the relevant 29 incident management team?---That's correct. 30 As I understand it, what had occurred on the day was that there 31 was an incident management team in place for the Delburn

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9288 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 fire?---That's correct. 2 And that fire had been controlled during the course of the 3 morning?---That's correct. 4 And there was a preformed incident management team level 3 5 upstairs at the Traralgon ICC?---That's correct. 6 When the Churchill fire was first notified very shortly after 7 that, the incident management team from upstairs came 8 downstairs and there was an integration between them and 9 the existing incident management team dealing with 10 the Delburn fire?---That's correct. 11 So Mr Jeremiah's announcement was not informing you that you 12 were or were not incident controller; he was simply 13 identifying himself as the deputy incident 14 controller?---That's correct. 15 As you have already said, I think before lunch, that in your 16 mind was appropriate and you felt quite comfortable with 17 that role?---That's correct. 18 Just on that same point, if I might, there were other people in 19 the incident management team, and I wanted to ask you just 20 about what I call the planning department?---Mm-hm. 21 But, as I understand it, there was a Mr Gillham, who was the 22 planning officer?---That's correct. 23 Was he known to you before that day?---Yes, I have worked with 24 Andy a number of times. 25 He was, broadly speaking, with DSE?---That's correct. 26 What was your opinion of his abilities to work in the role of 27 planning officer?---Andy is a very experienced and capable 28 planning officer. 29 You were comfortable with his appointment in that role?---I was 30 more than comfortable. I was quite happy he was there. 31 Likewise, Mr Henshaw?---Same.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9289 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 I think you told Mr Rozen - it was put to you that there was a 2 complement of six people I think in the information unit. 3 You weren't sure that it actually numbered six, but in any 4 event it was well resourced?---That's correct. 5 Amongst those people were Mr Oldroyd and Ms Hunter?---That's 6 correct. 7 And again what do you say about their competence and 8 experience?---Very capable. 9 And again you had worked with them?---That's correct. 10 Were you aware on the 7th of the kind of maps that the planning 11 department were actually using?---There were a number of 12 maps but I can't recall exactly the maps that they were 13 using. 14 Would the appropriate person for me to ask about the actual 15 maps the planning department was using be 16 Mr Gillham?---I believe so, yes. 17 Can I just ask you this: several times you have been asked 18 about the town or township of Koornalla?---Yes. 19 Is there a town of Koornalla?---There are houses in Koornalla. 20 There is no set structure there, so it would be more of a 21 locality, I guess. 22 In terms of locality, we have looked at the Spatial Vision 23 Vicmap books that I think you are familiar with, are you 24 not?---Yes, I am. 25 That shows Koornalla as being an area that seems to be some 10 26 kilometres running north-south, this is on the 27 delineations on the map, and perhaps four kilometres wide 28 at its widest point, so it is an area on the map; does 29 that sound right to you?---That sounds about right, yes. 30 If someone said, "I'm going to meet you at Koornalla," where 31 would you meet them?---You would need to nominate a point.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9290 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 You were also asked some questions about a pager message at 2 1535, and I don't think you were able to explain the 3 reasons why the message might not have been passed on 4 using the pager system until much later in the night or 5 indeed early the next morning?---Yes. 6 But I want to ask you about the communications between an IMT 7 and the fireground. As I understand it, the 8 communications from the IMT ought to be and almost 9 invariably are with the divisional command?---That's 10 correct. 11 Then divisional command - this is on the command channel - then 12 is speaking with sector command?---Yes, that's correct. 13 Then at the fireground level sector command are speaking to the 14 individual crews?---Yes, strike team leaders and crews. 15 Strike team leaders and crews, rather than any direct 16 communication between the incident management team and the 17 crews?---That's correct. 18 It would seem from Mr Brett Mitchell's statement that even 19 before that discussion between you and the RECC at Sale, 20 Mr Barling had contacted Mr Mitchell - this is paragraph 21 27 of Mr Mitchell's statement, Commissioners - at 2.55 and 22 they had confirmed the communications plan and advised 23 that the fireground channel was channel 125 and the PV 24 incident channel was channel 191?---That's the way 25 I understood the communications plan on the day. 26 That was the subject matter of the pager message, wasn't 27 it?---That's correct. 28 That you were asked about. So it would appear, if Mr Mitchell 29 is right, that that information had been given out and 30 received well before that time anyway?---Okay. 31 There were two warnings that you were asked about at 1530, and

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9291 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 these are attachments to your statement. I won't ask you 2 to go to them; you have already been asked about them. 3 I just want to ask you a couple of questions?---Do I need 4 to refer to them, sir? 5 If you feel more comfortable referring to them, do so by all 6 means?---If I might. 7 They are fire information releases 4 and 6?---Sorry. I need 8 the annexure of my statement. 9 Number 10, I'm told?---Thank you. 10 Do you have those?---I have them now. Which one are you 11 referring to there? 12 The first one is what is an urgent threat message for 1530, so 13 3.30 in the afternoon. "The communities of Hazelwood 14 South, Jeeralang, Jeeralang North, Jeeralang Junction, 15 Balook, Le Roy, Jumbuck, Valley View, Budgeree East." 16 They were urgent threat messages and this was a message 17 that it would seem that you were most likely to have seen 18 and signed off on?---That's correct. 19 An alert message at the same time was issued and that was for 20 the communities of Madalya, Womerah, Callignee, Callignee 21 South and North, Carrajung, Carrajung South and Won 22 Wron?---That's correct. 23 That message, amongst other things, provided in its core advice 24 that people in the area need to remain alert as there may 25 not be a warning should conditions change unexpectedly. 26 Further on, after advising that people should listen or 27 continue to listen to the ABC or local radio, they were 28 advised to, "Decide now if you are going to stay or 29 go."?---That's correct. 30 Do you see that?---Yes. 31 In your view, that's appropriate advice when one is delivering

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9292 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 an alert message?---Yes. 2 And for what reason?---The alert message is to advise that the 3 fire is in the area and to enact a plan, so you get a 4 timely warning to be able to leave the area and go to a 5 safer location. 6 You have been asked questions about the content of a number of 7 these information releases. I think what you have said is 8 that, although you may have reviewed them after they had 9 been issued, you weren't the author of them and questions 10 about the actual content of them are best directed to 11 people in the planning unit or even the information 12 unit?---Correct. 13 At 1625 you were conducting one of several interviews that you 14 had with local radio. A precis of that has been put to 15 you or some extracts, I should say more accurately. Could 16 you go to that, please. It is annexure 16 to your 17 statement. This is what you have verified as being an 18 accurate transcript of your discussion with Mr Gerard 19 Callinan on ABC Gippsland at 4.25 on the 7th?---That's 20 correct. 21 I want to take you in particular to the questions that were 22 asked about the wind change. Mr Callinan asked you, and 23 this is at page 3 of the transcript, and it is 24 (CFA.001.015.0187), Commissioners. Mr Callinan said, "We 25 are expecting the change around, what, seven or eight 26 o'clock tonight? We've had people speak to us saying, 27 look, the most - this is dangerous right now, but it's 28 even more dangerous when the change occurs. What's your 29 advice about that? I know it's a couple of hours down the 30 track, but it's worthwhile just noting it now, I guess." 31 Your advice is recorded as, "Well I would say that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9293 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 certainly people who are east of the fire, it is to make 2 your decision now, either - whether you're going to stay 3 and defend your home or whether you're actually going to 4 move to a safer location. Without trying to spread panic 5 to your listeners through the area, we will get further 6 and more accurate and up to date information as the fire 7 goes through and as the change goes through. But I've 8 heard the discussion or the interview with Ivan down at 9 Bunyip in regards to the eastern flank becoming the 10 firefront and that's certainly what we are going to be 11 faced with when the change comes through this evening." 12 Mr Callinan said, "So that's potentially people on the 13 Carrajung Woodside Road, people up as far as Gormandale, 14 Flynn, these sorts of places essentially." Yes?---That's 15 correct. 16 Gormandale is one of the places that was mentioned in the 6 17 o'clock urgent threat message where it warned that the 18 wind change was imminent. I want to ask you this: is 19 there any other town between what was the eastern flank of 20 the fire to become the firefront; was there any other town 21 between that flank and Gormandale?---Along that path, no, 22 I wouldn't think so. 23 You went on and said, "Certainly the eastern part of the fire. 24 And as I say, those - if you draw a line from Churchill 25 straight through to where Yarram Woodside is and to the 26 east of that, when the fire - when the wind direction 27 changes direction, that is certainly the area it's going 28 to head." Can I suggest if one takes a mental line 29 straight from Churchill through to Yarram, you are 30 describing to the east of that theoretical line?---That's 31 correct.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9294 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 Is there a reason why at that time you didn't nominate all the 2 districts, areas or localities that might be or come into 3 play on the wind change?---Through the course of the day 4 we were extremely busy and, whilst issuing the warnings to 5 the community was extremely important, it was certainly 6 our greatest focus of the day in alerting the community, 7 to be able to nail down each locality or township east of 8 that line would have been a fairly significant task. 9 Was it sensible, in your view, to try and nominate every 10 locality in those districts?---No. 11 You went on to talk about some messages that would be issued 12 urging listeners to stay tuned to ABC and then Mr Callinan 13 repeated, "Okay, so that's a couple of hours down the 14 track" and then you are asked to repeat the key advice for 15 the listeners and I won't take you to that. That, can 16 I suggest, was an attempt in anticipation of the wind 17 change to warn all those, in addition to the warnings that 18 had been given out more formally through the fire 19 information releases, to warn all those who might be 20 impacted on the wind change?---That's correct. 21 At 1800, as I have suggested to you, the fire information 22 release, and this is part of annexure 10 or attachment 10, 23 this is release number 13, at 6 o'clock or 1800 the fire 24 information release was worded this way - - -?---Sorry, 25 sir, I'm still catching up. 26 Tell me when you have it?---Okay. 27 Do you have it?---Yes. 28 "The Glendonald Road fire is currently burning in a south-east 29 direction and still spreading rapidly. The predicted 30 south-westerly wind change is imminent. The communities 31 of Willung South, Willung, Stradbroke, Stradbroke West,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9295 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 Giffard West, Darriman, Hiamdale and Gormandale may 2 experience heavy smoke and ember attack from the main fire 3 when the wind changes." Those communities that are there 4 listed, presumably they all fall to the east of the 5 imaginary line or the line of the eastern flank of the 6 fire that you previously nominated on the radio?---That's 7 correct. 8 But in terms of whether there should have been a specific 9 reference to Callignee or Koornalla within that, they are 10 matters we should ask Mr Gillham or someone in the 11 information unit about?---That would be right. 12 You did, though, say in a police statement that you made or at 13 least adopted on 14 April that, "After the wind change 14 came through we once again reviewed our fire prediction 15 and estimated that all areas to the east of the fire would 16 become affected by the fire which included areas up to 17 Stradbroke, Longford, Koornalla, Callignee, Traralgon 18 South, Gormandale, and through as far to Rosedale." By 19 that paragraph are you intending to convey that you and 20 others in the IMT actually identified those particular 21 communities after the wind change?---That's correct. 22 That you actually spoke about those communities as likely to be 23 affected by the fire?---I can't recall discussions that 24 took place. This statement was done with police after the 25 event. I can't recall the actual discussions that took 26 place at the time. 27 Let me ask you this way: the insertion of those names, was that 28 done as part of the statement taking process; that is, 29 identifying names that fell within the area you had 30 identified, or were you recounting actual names that had 31 been discussed in the ICC?---That was through the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9296 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 statement process. 2 Can I ask you now about the wind change information. Mr Rozen 3 took you to a forecast at 10.45 on the morning of the 7th. 4 Can I suggest to you that, amongst others, there were wind 5 change forecasts at 1351 which nominated 1900 hours for 6 the wind change to come through the Latrobe Valley, and 7 later at 1630, so 4.30 in the afternoon the wind change 8 chart showed a line at 2000 hours or 8 o'clock just to the 9 north and to the east of the Latrobe Valley. Did you 10 become aware on the afternoon of the 7th of either of 11 those or any other forecasts to arrive at your expectation 12 or estimation of a wind change coming through the area at 13 about 1900 hours?---I was through the course of the day 14 aware of the wind change at 1900 hours. 15 Do you know whether either of those forecasts, rather than the 16 one earlier in the day that Mr Rozen took you to, were the 17 source of that belief?---I can't recall. I don't know. 18 Just for the Commission's assistance, can I give you the 19 reference for that at (WIT.013.001.0012) at 0220 and 0231. 20 Up until the information about the wind change having come 21 through Bunyip at 1730, did that continue to be your state 22 of mind, that the wind change was expected at 1900 hours 23 through the Latrobe Valley?---That's correct. 24 The other questions that you were asked seemed to relate to a 25 red flag warning. I don't think it is suggested that the 26 crews on the fireground did not in fact get a red flag 27 warning. I will be corrected if I'm wrong about that. Is 28 that, to your understanding, a role for the operations 29 officer within the IMT?---Yes, it is. 30 Were the operations officers at the relevant times Mr Geoff 31 Kennedy and his deputy, Mr Brett Mitchell?---That's

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9297 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 correct. 2 You had been informed that the red flag warning had been 3 issued?---That's correct. 4 Were you told or informed in any other way that in fact there 5 had not been a call back or an acknowledgment by any of 6 the sector commanders or divisional commanders?---I 7 hadn't been advised that there hadn't been, no. 8 Mr Barling, Mr Steve Barling, what role did he perform on 9 7 February, Mr Lockwood?---Mr Barling was a divisional 10 commander. 11 He is recorded in his log receiving the red flag warning at 12 1730, and also Mr Andrew Norman. Are you familiar with 13 him?---Yes, I am. 14 Do you know what role he was performing on the day?---I believe 15 he was either assistant strike team leader or penciller 16 for the strike team leader, Mr Wood. 17 Mr Craig Wood?---That's correct. 18 And he records in his log that they received a red flag warning 19 at 1729. Mr Brett Mitchell, who we understand was 20 Mr Kennedy's deputy, he has also logged the red flag 21 warnings as having been received by Mr Barling and a 22 Mr Incoll. Who is Mr Incoll?---Mr Incoll was also another 23 divisional commander. 24 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Mr Lockwood, could I just ask a couple of 25 questions about the Delburn fire. On the Saturday morning 26 what was the state of the Delburn fire?---We still had the 27 status of the Delburn fire listed as going, with the 28 impending conditions of Black Saturday. We didn't want to 29 call it contained, so it was still going. However, it was 30 well within the containment lines. 31 Were you the incident controller at that stage?---Yes, I was.

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9298 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 When the Churchill fire broke out, I think you mentioned this 2 morning that upstairs in the facility that you were at 3 there was a reserve IC team waiting?---Incident management 4 team, that's correct. 5 To be allocated a task. It was decided that they should, 6 I think the term that was used, integrate with your 7 existing team?---That's correct. 8 Would it have been an option to have allocated those people to 9 manage the Churchill as a single fire, given that, as you 10 say, the Delburn fire was still a going fire, such that 11 there could have been two groups dealing with single 12 fires?---From my recollection, the initial plan for the 13 management of the Churchill fire was to make it a division 14 of the Delburn fire. Because the Delburn fire was within 15 its containment lines, then the Churchill fire became the 16 priority for that IMT. 17 But it was still an active fire and it would have still 18 required an incident control team to continue to oversight 19 it and manage it for some time, wouldn't it?---That's 20 correct. 21 So in effect you were asked to not only take over a new fire 22 that had all the portents of being quite a serious fire, 23 even at an early stage, but you also had the added 24 responsibility of continuing to deal with the separate 25 Delburn fire?---That's correct. 26 That was still continuing?---That's correct. 27 Would the facility have permitted two separate incident control 28 teams to be operating independent of each other?---It 29 would have been very difficult to have that situation with 30 the infrastructure that they were operating at the time. 31 Do you think that may have been a consideration in joining the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9299 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 two fires together from an operational point of view 2 because of the impracticability of it being managed as two 3 separate fires?---Sorry, can you repeat the question? 4 I'm wondering, in the light of your previous answer, do you 5 think that the impracticability of having two separate 6 incident control teams operating in the same facility 7 dealing each with separate fires may have been a reason 8 why it was judged the only option available, that the 9 existing incident control team that was active, for it to 10 be strengthened to take over management of both 11 fires?---Bringing the incident management team down 12 enabled us to boost the management of both fires, that's 13 correct. 14 Are you agreeing that it may not have been a very practicable 15 proposition from an operational point of view to have 16 tried to have two separate incident control teams 17 operating separately in that same facility?---My apologies 18 for not understanding the previous question. I believe it 19 would be impracticable, yes. 20 Just as a final general question, could you describe how as an 21 incident controller you believe that role would be 22 exercised by the incident controller in terms of an 23 obligation to warn the community of a potential fire 24 threat?---Sorry, I will get you to - sorry. It's very 25 late in the day. 26 How would you see your role as an incident controller and the 27 requirements imposed on you as an incident controller in 28 terms of your responsibility to warn communities that may 29 be at risk of being threatened by a fire?---The incident 30 controller is - that position and certainly on that day, 31 the warnings out to the community were of the utmost

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9300 LOCKWOOD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR CLELLAND 1 importance and certainly on the day that was my view, or 2 my role as incident controller on the day, so very 3 important. 4 How would you have exercised that role?---In regards to the 5 issuing of warnings? 6 Yes?---There was a planning department there and part of the 7 incident controller's role is to delegate under the 8 incident management team, so the management of that 9 particular function was performed by the planning unit. 10 But that's always the case with the structure of the AIIMS 11 incident management team, isn't it?---That's correct. 12 There is a fixed structure and the planning group and the 13 information group in particular have that 14 responsibility?---Correct. 15 So that always exists in the way the AIIMS structure is 16 established?---At a level 3 incident, definitely. 17

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9301 LOCKWOOD RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 have, at least theoretically, the CFA as the control 2 agency but a DSE officer such as Mr Jeremiah as the 3 incident controller?---There is an SOP in regards to that, 4 but I would have to refer to it to see. But that decision 5 is out of my control as the incident controller. That is 6 made actually at a higher level, at the regional level. 7 You may not know the answer to this, but under the SOP the fact 8 that the CFA is the control agency does not prevent the 9 incident controller being from the DSE, does it?---Without 10 the SOP in front of me, I really would be uncomfortable 11 commenting, sir. 12 All right; we can pursue that separately. You were asked about 13 the township of Koornalla and you will recall that it was 14 put to you that it is a spread-out township. In fact, it 15 consists of a number of houses along Traralgon Creek Road, 16 does it not? Are you aware of that?---Traralgon Creek 17 Road, yes, that's correct. 18 From the police statement that you made in April it is clear, 19 isn't it, that you were aware, in your role as incident 20 controller on 7 February, you were aware of the existence 21 of Koornalla?---I was aware of the existence of Koornalla, 22 that's correct. 23 Just in relation to that police statement, who suggested the 24 names of the townships that are listed in the statement, 25 of which one is Koornalla? Was it you or was it the 26 police officer who was taking the statement?---The police 27 officer was prompting me for names of towns which I tried 28 to recollect at the time during the statement. I didn't 29 have any information in front of me. They were the 30 townships that I actually mentioned to the police officer. 31 I understand that. One final matter, Mr Lockwood. You were

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9302 LOCKWOOD RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 asked about the fire information release that went out at 2 1800 hours identifying Gormandale. Do you recall being 3 asked those questions?---I recall those questions, yes. 4 You were asked about the imaginary line from Churchill to 5 Yarram that you have referred to in your radio transcript, 6 and as I understood the question you were asked whether 7 there were townships between that line and Gormandale. Do 8 you recall being asked that?---I recall being asked that. 9 Could Mr Lockwood please be shown the map attached to 10 Mr Oldroyd's statement. I think you may have looked at 11 this earlier. It is (WIT.3004.018.0276). Just while 12 that's being brought up, Mr Lockwood, do you see the 13 township of Gormandale on the Highland Highway?---Yes, 14 I do. 15 You can see the township of Churchill and the point of origin 16 identified on that map?---Yes, I can. 17 You can see Yarram at the bottom in the middle of that 18 map?---Yes. 19 If you can mentally draw that line between Churchill and Yarram 20 and then line up Gormandale, are there townships between 21 Gormandale and that line?---I can't remember the question, 22 sir, in relation to whether it was in relation to 23 Churchill to Gormandale. I'm unsure whether that question 24 was there. In answer to your question, I can look through 25 with that line there going out to Gormandale, there are 26 some townships there, that's correct. 27 And what are they?---A lot of these are settlements, too, where 28 they are localities, but if I draw the line and go east, 29 I can go across - sorry, it's a little bit difficult 30 there. Actually, most of those are settlements as opposed 31 to, if we are looking due east from Churchill, most of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9303 LOCKWOOD RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 those are settlements as opposed to established townships. 2 Between Churchill and Gormandale, if that's the line, you have 3 Koornalla, do you agree?---Koornalla is more of a 4 locality. I think the question - - - 5 MR CLELLAND: I think Mr Rozen got his answer, Mr Chairman. 6 MR ROZEN: I'm not sure that I have, with the greatest of 7 respect. 8 COMMISSIONER McLEOD: Is the question more, if it is a locality 9 name, do people live there? The issue is about giving 10 warnings to people. Now, whether people are in 11 established towns or in localities, grouped where there 12 are a number of people known to be living where there is a 13 recognised locality term, I would have thought the use of 14 a locality term is no different to the use of the name of 15 a town in respect of a small township. Would that be 16 correct? 17 MR ROZEN: What do you say to that, Mr Lockwood?---My view with 18 townships is they are established townships and 19 localities. They do have residents living in localities. 20 But, as far as establishments, they are more settlements 21 than actual townships themselves. 22 Mr Lockwood, whatever you call them, townships, localities, 23 settlements, there were people living between your 24 imaginary line and Gormandale in places that are called 25 Callignee North, Callignee and Koornalla; 26 correct?---That's correct. 27 Nothing further. Commissioners, I would ask that Mr Lockwood 28 not be excused at this time, really as a precaution. 29 Following on from the observations that Ms Doyle made as 30 part of her opening, we did receive a large number of 31 statements very late last week. We have made every effort

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9304 LOCKWOOD RE-XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR ROZEN 1 to ensure that the matters that ought be put to 2 Mr Lockwood have been, but it is quite conceivable there 3 will be matters arising in the evidence between now and 4 Thursday that should properly be put to Mr Lockwood and he 5 may need to be recalled before the end of the week. 6 CHAIRMAN: I will excuse you on the basis that arrangements can 7 be made to get him back if required. 8 MR ROZEN: I'm quite satisfied with that, sir. 9 CHAIRMAN: Do you understand that?---That's fine. 10 Thank you. 11 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 12 MS DOYLE: We need to change the order of witnesses that was 13 identified in the list sent around this morning slightly. 14 I have informed the state of this change. I am now going 15 to call Mr Mark Macdonald. 16

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9305 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 fire tower observer for DSE?---Yes, that's correct. 2 I'm going to ask you about your work as a fire tower operator 3 first and we will go back to the events that affect the 4 properties you own later. So that really picks up at 5 paragraph 11 of your statement, if we can turn to that 6 first. You explain there your professional background. 7 Your background is as a science teacher, having worked for 8 25 years teaching at university and teachers colleges in 9 the Northern Territory and Victoria?---Yes, that's right. 10 You have worked for the Department of Sustainability and the 11 Environment as a fire tower operator doing what you would 12 call two seasons. You first undertook casual duties at 13 the Blackwarry fire tower in the fire season '07/08 and 14 then in the fire season we are going to talk about in a 15 moment, '08/09?---Yes, that's correct. 16 Those fire seasons, although they occupied some two or three 17 months each, you worked a large amount of time, if I can 18 put it that way, including 32 consecutive days in the 19 period leading up to the fires of 7 February?---Yes. 20 January, as everybody would be aware, was particularly a 21 warm month and very dry month and bringing the need for 22 constant surveillance. 23 Let's just pick up in one of the exhibits or one of the 24 attachments to your statement the location of the fire 25 tower. If I can ask you to go to attachment 2 to your 26 statement, there is a map there where you have marked some 27 of the fire towers in the area. Have you got that colour 28 map? It will come up on the screen if it's not there?---It 29 is not here, but I can see it on the screen, yes. 30 It is attachment 2. If we focus on the area of East Gippsland, 31 can you see there is marked there two fire towers I just

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9306 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 want to draw your attention to, Mount Useful and Mount 2 Moornapa, just below the word "East Gippsland", sort of 3 forming a triangle there?---Yes. 4 There is also an indication of the Longford tower and the Flynn 5 tower further down, almost in line with Traralgon. Do you 6 see those in the little boxes, Longford tower and Flynn 7 tower?---Yes, that's correct. 8 The tower you have worked in is the one below that again, Mount 9 Blackwarry?---That's correct. 10 So it is really above Yarram?---Yes, almost directly north of 11 Yarram. 12 So that map shows a number of DSE fire towers and then the 13 Flynn and Longford fire towers, as far as you know, are 14 Hancock Victoria Plantation fire towers?---Yes, that's my 15 understanding. 16 The fire tower you have worked in, the Blackwarry fire tower, 17 is located on the south side of the Strzelecki Ranges 18 about nine kilometres from the Red Hill Road which runs 19 from Traralgon South through to Mount Tassie. Is that 20 right?---Yes, it is. 21 When you were stationed in the tower, what was your viewpoint? 22 How far could you see and what were the landmarks that 23 were familiar to you while stationed at Blackwarry?---My 24 primary area of observation was to be south of the 25 Strzelecki Ranges because my tower is below the Grand 26 Ridge Road ridge and as a result the Strzelecki Ranges to 27 the north of me are not well covered. To the north, the 28 best facility I can see is Mount Tassie and Mount Tassie 29 actually probably appears in the region where Mount 30 Blackwarry is indicated on the map. Other areas that 31 I can see from where I am are the wind turbines out near

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9307 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 Toora and then towards 90 Mile Beach I can see the old 2 Omega tower and then right down to Wilson's Promontory. 3 Your view to the north is somewhat restricted by the Strzelecki 4 Ranges, is that right?---Yes, that's correct. Anything in 5 the valley beyond the Strzelecki Ranges ridge or Mount 6 Tassie ridge is out of my area of view, though I can sort 7 of place where Hazelwood and the Longford power stations 8 are, based on the steam that they send up from time to 9 time. 10 When you started as a fire tower operator, when you started 11 your first casual season, what training or other 12 information did you receive?---On the first day that 13 I worked I had half a day working with a fire officer from 14 the Yarram area. He was a local, had a farm down that 15 way. Along with me, we went through a number of common 16 features that we could both identify and that we knew from 17 our knowledge of the area, and basically went through the 18 role of a fire tower officer and the responsibilities and 19 I just copied that thereafter. 20 While up in the fire tower, if you can just tell us a little 21 bit about what it's like. In paragraph 19, the entry to 22 the fire tower is up a 60-foot external ladder. What do 23 you have available to you in the tower?---The tower is a 24 small room of about 10 by 10 feet and surrounded by glass 25 windows on all sides and these are protected by shutters 26 that can be raised and lowered. The tower rises some 27 60 feet into the air and made up of approximately 60 steps 28 and they go in rungs of 20 or 10, and within the tower 29 I have access to the CB radios, trunk radios and a 30 telephone line through Telstra. Other than that, there's 31 very few facilities. I take with me a radio run on

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9308 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 batteries to give me some update on what's happening out 2 in the real world. I have been allowed to use a laptop up 3 there. It connects into the landline. The fire tower is 4 provided with some small bottles of drinking water and 5 some larger bottles of water which, depending on the 6 conditions of the day, I take up with me along with my own 7 lunch and other personal items. 8 On a day when there is no fire, is the routine that you are 9 required to contact - I'm talking about in the period 10 about February 7th - the routine is you are required to 11 contact the Mount Useful fire tower regularly, 10.30 and 12 3 pm each day, essentially phone in to say you are there 13 and everything is all right?---Yes, that's right. 14 Previous to this year, when I was working through Yarram, 15 we used to get in touch on the hour, but this year when 16 I was working with the other towers in the Heyfield region 17 it seemed to me was a procedure based on a number of 18 people providing the same sort of information. We were 19 given the requirement of going through one tower, and in 20 this case it was the Mount Useful tower, where we would 21 contact them in the morning and again in the afternoon 22 with relevant information from our area that wasn't 23 outside what was in issue. 24 Can I take you down to paragraph 27 of your statement where you 25 refer to what happens when you do locate smoke. You note 26 there that operators get their bearings and use 27 trigonometry in order to more precisely locate smoke. You 28 do this by communicating bearings to other fire towers, 29 but the situation for Blackwarry is a little different. 30 Can you just explain what the limitations are for 31 Blackwarry and how you worked around them?---Yes. As you

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9309 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 would see from referring to the previous map of fire 2 towers, the Latrobe Valley runs basically through from 3 Mount Tanjil, south of Mount Useful, Moornapa and the 4 like, and again the Latrobe Valley runs north of the Flynn 5 and Longford towers. So those towers to some extent can 6 see anything between them, smoke that may arise, and as a 7 result they use trigonometry whereby each tower provides a 8 bearing from the tower where they can see something that 9 might be of note or interest and, by running the two lines 10 from each tower at the bearings given, you come up with a 11 point and that can be conferred on a map and referred as a 12 site where smoke or dust or whatever the item of concern 13 is. 14 You say in paragraph 28 in your view there aren't enough fire 15 towers in the Strzelecki area. Can you just explain 16 what's led you to form that view?---On my side of the 17 tower I do not have any other towers where I can get 18 bearings against, so it makes it very hard to accurately 19 and quickly pinpoint a location . Most of it is done on 20 my estimate of the distance from the tower, referring to 21 the topography in the area and using landmarks like the 22 manmade constructions I mentioned earlier, or just 23 forestry clearings and the like. Last year there was a 24 bad fire developed out on Snake Island, south of me. 25 Again, this year during the fire season there was a quite 26 extensive fire that everybody would be aware about at 27 Wilson's Promontory and, as indicated, the areas of 28 Waratah Bay, Venus Bay and the like are potential fire 29 risks. By having somebody in fire towers along that 30 ridge, I think it would assist in giving better signals as 31 to where smoke or something may be. For example, in that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9310 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 January period on a very bad fire day with strong winds 2 I gave a call of a possible fire at Wilson's Promontory, 3 only to be advised by people at Foster who went out and 4 checked it for me just in case that it was probably a sand 5 dune eroding away, which there was one in that area. So 6 somebody closer with more local knowledge could have been 7 of better assistance. 8 I take you to 7 February. You were rostered to work on from 10 9 am to 6 pm. I'm picking up the narrative in your 10 statement at paragraph 31. By midday the temperature was 11 39 degrees outside. You had a high wind speed. During 12 the day you say in paragraph 32 you monitored the radio 13 traffic and I want to take you to what you refer to in 14 paragraph 32 at 1.30. You say you heard a fire operator 15 plane was called - this is something you overheard on the 16 radio - to ascertain whether the Delburn fire was flaring 17 up. What did you hear and what observations did you 18 make?---Yes. On that day I recorded the highest 19 temperature - it says in my statement at the tower. It 20 actually would be the temperature outside the tower of 21 39 degrees; within the tower it was somewhat hotter. In 22 fact, at 1 o'clock the temperature did in fact drop 23 slightly and the humidity did increase, and I think that 24 was a result of also there was a slight decrease in the 25 wind speed. But it was the hottest that I had experienced 26 ever there in my time, the driest that I had been aware 27 of, and the wind speed was just like nothing I have ever 28 experienced before. So, as a result of those conditions, 29 I imagine, elsewhere beyond my tower the fires that were 30 previously burning at Delburn, which I understood to be 31 contained, began putting out a lot of smoke and there was

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9311 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 a call over the radio to the HVP fire spotter plane to 2 just go and investigate to see that things were normal. 3 So, I listened to the traffic between the spotter plane 4 and the CFA and the fire spotter tended to indicate that 5 he felt the situation was normal and reported the same and 6 indicated that he would continue on his normal path on to 7 Nupoot dam. I have a property at Mirboo North and it had 8 been previously affected by the fires. So, even though it 9 was out of my area and I couldn't see it very well, 10 I certainly had an interest to what might be happening 11 over that way. 12 You say in paragraph 36 you were concerned about that. What 13 did you do?---On seeing the smoke there and hearing the 14 fire spotter tended to indicate that things were normal, 15 I contacted the Heyfield office. I reported to them that 16 though there was a fire which I was aware of in the 17 Delburn area, a fire spotter had been asked to just go and 18 check that location and he appeared to have given the all 19 clear, but from what I had been observing, because that 20 fire had been going for over a week and had noticed 21 earlier on in that day there was certainly a problem and 22 the fire was putting up a lot of smoke which hadn't been 23 there previously. 24 Do you remember who you spoke to at Heyfield?---I don't 25 remember, no. 26 A Mr Graeme Taylor, who was the assistant operations officer at 27 Heyfield dealing with the Dargo fires, says he remembers 28 you calling in and that he spoke to you. Does that jog 29 your memory or you're just not sure who you spoke 30 to?---That is probably correct. In fact, Graeme was the 31 duty officer who I often spoke to, but you did speak to

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9312 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 other people. Yes, that's probably correct and I know 2 following that I had conversations with Graeme, so he was 3 sort of at hand and had control of the fire room on that 4 day. 5 In paragraph 38 you say you then heard from a fire tower 6 operator at the Flynn tower, one of the Hancock towers, 7 that they called in and reported sighting of the smoke in 8 the Churchill area and gave a bearing. What did you do 9 when you heard that information?---I similarly checked the 10 smoke that they were referring to. It is because I was 11 watching the Delburn fire and the smoke as I indicated 12 seemed to be billowing rather larger than it had been 13 before, so I was paying attention to that area, and 14 I noticed also a small amount of fire or smoke coming from 15 another fire, and so I was watching that thinking that 16 it's all part of the same Delburn complex and noting that 17 the Delburn complex was made up of several fires which 18 were lit in different locations, but when I heard from 19 another tower that they had sighted new smoke and they 20 gave the bearing, I ran a bearing that I had to that fire 21 and that smoke and I called it in on the radio on the CFA 22 channel and explained that I could also see that smoke and 23 I gave my bearing and as a result I marked it on my map 24 and I called that in to the Heyfield fire duty room. 25 Having called it into the CFA and to the Heyfield fire room, if 26 we continue on into paragraph 38, you say there that 27 within 15 minutes of the fire spotter plane having 28 reported that things appeared to be all right, this second 29 column of smoke that you could see had really grown in 30 size. Compared to what you had seen before, it was 31 growing bigger and faster than what you had

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9313 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 experienced?---Yes, that's right. The fire was just 2 phenomenal. It started off and I remember - I still have 3 a picture memory of a small column of smoke next to a 4 quite larger column, being the Delburn fires, and the more 5 you looked the bigger it got. It got higher. It got 6 wider. Before long, probably within 15 minutes, the smoke 7 from that fire was blocking out any fire smoke that 8 I could see from Delburn. 9 In light of what you could see and because you know people in 10 the area, you say in paragraph 41 you decided to call two 11 people in Balook. First of all, your immediate neighbour 12 to that property, an elderly farmer aged over 70, and you 13 say you rang to advise him about the fire that had started 14 in the Churchill area. You also contacted another 15 resident. Why did you do that and did you know what those 16 people's plans were if fire was approaching?---Yes. I had 17 had discussions and obviously it was known to the people 18 that I worked in the fire tower and we often joked about 19 how safe we must be and all the rest of it because they'll 20 get the first reports. But, just as a community thing, 21 these people were involved in what's called a fire tree 22 where they ring around. I wasn't involved in that, but 23 I felt that I should get their fire tree started. So 24 I rang the farmer next door to me to advise him that there 25 was a fire had been spotted and though I believed at the 26 time it may not have been a threat because it was running 27 from a northerly wind and would bypass both of our 28 properties, he should take into account the fact that 29 there was fire in the area and instigate his fire plan, 30 which I knew at the time to be stay and fight the fire. 31 Another neighbour living in Balook itself had a small

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9314 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 daughter and I knew that his fire plan was to leave the 2 area. It was just a matter of where the fire came from, 3 by which road, and I contacted him and advised him 4 similarly of the fire and that he should implement his 5 fire plan. 6 At paragraph 44 you say not long after that you called back to 7 the fire room at Heyfield and told them via the trunk 8 radio that in a few minutes you had observed the smoke 9 column travel from one bearing to another, 308 degrees to 10 262, and you were able to estimate that meant a phenomenal 11 rate of speed; the fire was travelling at 14 kilometres an 12 hour?---Yes. Even though I couldn't see the ground area 13 on that side, obviously the smoke above the Strzelecki 14 Ranges was quite clear and in my tower I have marked the 15 walls above the windows with degrees in every 10-degree 16 marks so I have a good assessment of where things are, and 17 as I watched the fire I watched it grow at such a 18 phenomenal speed, it went from about 308 degrees bearing 19 from my tower to 268 within 15 minutes, and that was so 20 phenomenal I just as an exercise for myself tried to 21 estimate the area of the ground that it went and because 22 I had never experienced anything like that I figured it 23 important to contact again and advise the Heyfield office 24 of how horrific I thought it was and how it was spreading. 25 You say in paragraph 46 that you could still hear the radio 26 traffic. You say it went crazy, the traffic was extremely 27 heavy, and you say at 46 you could hear people say things 28 like, "It's gone, it's out of control." Were you hearing 29 people from the fireground or was that still 30 communications between fire tower operators?---I think it 31 was a bit of a combination, the Flynn and Langwarry towers

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9315 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 speaking and explaining from what they could see or what 2 they were aware of, just general people who were able to 3 speak over the channel 10 region trunk line that we were 4 using and I just picked up conversations from the 5 different CFA bases and I assume the CFA control rooms and 6 the like. 7 So you could hear some of the toing and froing about who was 8 being dispatched and who had arrived and that kind of 9 thing?---Yes, that's correct, and obviously having 10 property in the area I was certainly concerned to know 11 that something was going to be done. It was like nothing 12 else I had experience for. That season I had called in 13 four fires that had been attended to and the year before 14 I had called in four fires that had been attended to. 15 This was just in another league. 16 I want to take you over to 2.30, paragraph 52. The Heyfield 17 DSE fire room contacted you on the trunk radio and 18 suggested you should be evacuated?---Yes. 19 What did you say in response to that and what plans were 20 made?---By 2.30, this is some hour after the initial 21 spotting of the fire, it became obvious to me that nobody 22 in terms of any firefighting outfits were coming up to 23 Balook to save houses, to protect the park or do any 24 firefighting that I had previously observed in terms of 25 other fires that I had noted. So, I became a bit 26 concerned about my farmer who was alone in his 70s faced 27 with this enormous fire. When I was offered the 28 opportunity to go to Yarram, I figured that, well, I would 29 be better served by being at my own property and the 30 farmer's property's next door. Rather foolishly 31 or cheekishly I had hoped by at least having the fire crew

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9316 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 take me to my property, there was a chance that at least 2 somebody might stay and assist us, because nobody else 3 appeared to be coming. 4 Were you doing this with any view to defending your property in 5 Balook or was this more about your elderly 6 neighbour?---No, this was more about my elderly neighbour. 7 Previous to that season and to me doing firefighting in 8 the tower, the fire spotting in the tower, I had become 9 aware that the area that I lived in was becoming a 10 vulnerable area. We had a CFA representative come onto 11 the site to examine the property and advise on ways to 12 mitigate any fire and I had taken up that opportunity, but 13 basically had been told that, because of the age and the 14 nature of the buildings, they probably weren't defendable 15 and certainly a number of mountain ash trees that were on 16 the property would represent a risk. So I removed those 17 trees and, on the advice of the people who had removed the 18 trees, had done some earthworks to further protect the 19 building from ember attack and the fire heat. But I had 20 no intention; I've got two little girls and I'm aware of 21 the risk that's involved, but certainly not the risks that 22 were involved on that day. I had written off the house. 23 If it was to be burnt, that was one thing, but I was of 24 the opinion that my house and the farmer's next door 25 weren't going to be attacked by the fire because there was 26 a strong northerly wind blowing and the fire was to the 27 north-west of us and would probably go over the top of the 28 Strzelecki Ranges in an uninhabited area. So, it was just 29 to be by the farmer and to see if he needed assistance. 30 In paragraph 54 you note that at about 3.50 or a few minutes 31 after, two DSE slip-ons with four crew came out to the

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9317 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 tower, the idea being that they were going to help you 2 evacuate, escort you out. They escorted you back to the 3 farmhouse, to your neighbour's farmhouse. You mentioned a 4 firefighter there, Nathan. Is that Nathan Stamkos?---Yes. 5 That would be Nathan who was my supervisor from Yarram. 6 Mr Stamkos has provided a statement that will be tendered 7 later. You note there that on the way to your neighbour's 8 house you drove past the township of Balook and you could 9 see smoke in the area. Coming down into the Traralgon 10 Creek valley you could see the firefront itself. As you 11 began to drive towards the property you say at the end of 12 paragraph 55 you became concerned you might have made a 13 reckless decision in asking the DSE crews to take you 14 there. By the time you got to the neighbour's house, 15 where was the firefront?---The firefront was just a couple 16 of kilometres below us. When I was in the tower and the 17 option was to go to Yarram and be evacuated, it seemed an 18 easy call saying, "I live nine kilometres up the road. 19 Just drop me off there. That would be far better." As 20 I indicated, I thought the fire possibly wouldn't come to 21 us. It wasn't until I was driving along Grand Ridge Road 22 just past the guest house that I realised how reckless a 23 decision I had made. The road is narrow, it winds quite 24 sharply and there was smoke across the road, obviously 25 getting thicker and thicker as we drove and closer to my 26 property, and on one occasion as I went around the corner 27 I could see down into Traralgon Creek where there were 28 plantations and I could actually see the fire burning in 29 the rows of plantations. I was so scared and I realised 30 I had done the wrong thing, so I had actually asked if 31 Nathan could just speak with the farmer and see if he was

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9318 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 going to stay or if he had already, you know, he may have 2 left, in the hope that he probably would leave with us and 3 that we would all get out of there. 4 I might just ask you to look at attachment 1. We will bring 5 that up on the screen. Attachment 1 is a printout from 6 the Google map, just because it shows the location of your 7 property in Balook on Grand Ridge Road and how close you 8 are to the Tarra Bulga National Park. You see there where 9 it is marked "A", is that where - you have mentioned you 10 have the other property in Mirboo North. That is where 11 your Balook property is located?---Yes, that's right, and 12 if I can just do a plug for Google, it is such an 13 incredible thing, I can actually see my house and all the 14 rest of it on the other satellite scale far better. But 15 I live probably just under that little balloon dot and it 16 probably takes about two acres and the farmhouse and my 17 farmer, my neighbour, lives next door. We are the only 18 two properties in that Tarra Bulga region. Opposite us in 19 the white section, not marked, that's plantation timber 20 consisting of pines, but basically mountain ash and blue 21 gums and the like. 22 I will just pause there to note - this is back in paragraph 5 23 of your statement - you have been unlucky this fire 24 season. Your other property is at Mirboo North off the 25 Strzelecki Highway about 16.5 acres in size. That 26 property unfortunately was affected by the Delburn fire 27 the previous week and you note in your statement the CFA 28 attended that property and water bombing was undertaken 29 and, while the main building was saved, the grounds, 30 fencing and vegetation were burnt in the Delburn 31 fire?---Yes, that's correct. I was aware of that fire

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9319 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 also on the time that it was burning and then I noted when 2 the Lyrebird Walk fire took off. In fact, I spent a lot 3 of time doing a bit of rough measurements and calculating 4 to see if it was my place or not my place. I have a 5 property 500 metres from the Lyrebird Walk and the fire 6 started there and went off in - well, blowing from the 7 north-west, it went in a south-easterly direction and it 8 burnt into Darlimurla Estate, Darlimurla and Boolarra and 9 later on in the week the wind changed and it blew back 10 from the south to the west and so the fire blew back over 11 those areas and then blew from my property. Fortunately, 12 because of the timing and better able to stay sort of 13 control, from what I understand from the tracks on my 14 property through the burnt-out grass area, there were 15 about three fire trucks attended and I could also see 16 evidence that a helicopter also bombed the roofs of 17 several of the buildings, so the buildings were all saved. 18 But the grounds, there's 16.5 acres, two-thirds of which 19 is bush. The grounds were burnt out completely, as was 20 the vegetation behind me, but it gave me some reassurance 21 that help can be there when you don't even know it. 22 I take you back to your Balook property and pick up in your 23 statement at paragraph 57. When you returned to the 24 Balook property you say you asked the DSE crew whether 25 they might perhaps stay and help you, but they phoned in 26 to their office and the word back from their office was 27 that they shouldn't do that. So the DSE crew left and 28 headed for the information centre at Tarra Bulga National 29 Park?---Yes, that's correct. I became by this time aware 30 that the real danger that I had posed to myself, the 31 danger my neighbour was in and I felt that with two

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9320 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 slip-ons we had a discussion as to how much water they 2 were carrying and how much water the farmer had, to 3 whether it would be viable for them to stay. They made 4 several calls to Heyfield, and rightly so. We were 5 advised that they shouldn't be in the area, but they were 6 given a fallback position of going to the information 7 centre at Balook. In fact, it is my understanding that 8 they moved back to the information centre, along with some 9 other people who had taken refuge there. But then it was 10 decided that they should evacuate and return to Yarram. 11 In doing so, they went down Bulga Park Road to Yarram and 12 the fires from - the Churchill fire by this time had gone 13 right over the top and was now burning in an area around 14 Yarram and ultimately they were threatened by the fires 15 and had to have a tanker from Yarram come out to save 16 them. So, I feel rather stupid and I am sincerely sorry 17 to those people whose lives I'd put in danger. 18 Let's go back to what happened for you. As you say in 19 paragraph 57, after they left you and your neighbour were 20 alone and you started hosing his place down. He had some 21 backpack water pumps that you found quite helpful?---Yes, 22 that's correct. Because I hadn't intended to ever stay 23 for the fire, I had lent him my petrol generator and he 24 used that to connect up to his electric supply pump as a 25 backup. So he had at the back of his house a tap with a 26 hose running off my generator and the water pump and he 27 also had a petrol pump which he was watering the front of 28 his house, but he also had mops, he had a couple of 29 buckets at his doorstep and the like, but he also had one 30 of these very large, I think they might be about 20 litre 31 backpack pumps which you pump with a handle and I took it

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9321 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 on to use that because of the stronger nature that I was 2 than he, and I found it to be fairly useful. In fact, 3 I was surprised how easily the backpack and water put out 4 fires. 5 Not long after you started that preparatory work you saw some 6 flashing lights and you thought perhaps the CFA or DSE 7 were coming. In fact it was a police car who pulled in, a 8 senior sergeant from Sale traffic management unit and what 9 did he tell you?---Yes. Soon after the DSE guys had left, 10 I saw flashing lights. By now it was very smoky and the 11 area was very dark, so any lights flashing sort of 12 reflected all around. I saw these blue and red lights 13 flashing and I just assumed the CFA had arrived, but 14 I imagine that what had happened was the DSE guys had gone 15 to the information centre where the policeman was. 16 Hearing that there were two people down the road, he took 17 it on himself to come and warn us to leave. By that time 18 the area was so smoky, the wind was blowing an incredible 19 gale over from the wind of the day and the fire creating 20 its own wind currents. I was obviously disappointed when 21 a police car pulled in as opposed to a fire truck and he 22 expressed the need for us to leave because we were in 23 great danger. The farmer at this point was still 24 convinced that he had done all the preparatory work and if 25 I could just say at this point of time to those two 26 gentleman that I heard earlier on, I drove past their 27 place several times when the property was being built, 28 when it had been built. I drove past it the following day 29 of the fire. When I heard that two people had survived in 30 that garage, I didn't think it was at all possible. 31 I don't think they either gave as severe account as what

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9322 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 they must have suffered. To have survived is I think just 2 an incredible thing. So, the planning is what saved them 3 and Andrew I think can be commended for his knowledge. 4 Other lay people like myself had no chance, wouldn't have 5 survived, but the farmer figured that he had all the 6 equipment he needed and the knowledge and so he chose to 7 stay. At that point, also being aware of issues from news 8 and radio where most people can often be killed by leaving 9 the scene and having an accident and the like, I was 10 pretty adamant that I was probably safer with the farmer 11 and his backpack and his hoses than in some police car in 12 an area that was basically burning out. 13 You say in paragraph 60 you commend the bravery of this 14 sergeant whose name you don't know, this senior sergeant 15 from Sale who went beyond the call of duty in attempting 16 to get you out. Ten minutes later he himself would have 17 been caught in the fire?---Yes. Look, I even went to the 18 trouble to get in touch with Sale precinct and I asked 19 what I could do to nominate somebody for a bravery award. 20 They gave me the procedure, but it's fairly complicated 21 and lot of Is dotting and Ts crossing and with time I've 22 let it go by, but if he hears this statement and he is out 23 there, I thank you truly for what you tried to do for us 24 on that day. To drive into - after I had come through 25 that area with the fires and all the rest of it and the 26 smoke, it was certainly a heroic thing to have done, but 27 in all fairness to all other police in the services and 28 all the rest of it, I don't think you should be required 29 to put your life in danger. The following morning - and 30 even later that day another couple of vehicles, which 31 I refer to in my statement, tried to go past along that

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9323 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 road and they couldn't because trees had come down. You 2 know, did they come down two minutes after he passed, five 3 minutes? If he had come across a tree on those bends and 4 that, he was gone. So, I think it was a reckless thing, 5 but he obviously did it without thought for his own safety 6 and was just concerned with us. I apologise to him that 7 we were in that situation and I thank him, but I would 8 like others to become aware of their responsibilities. 9 You and the farmer were there preparing as best you could. The 10 firefront came up the hill and it hit you. You spent 11 hours there fighting the fires at both your properties, a 12 difficult night. Can you explain what happened to you 13 during the evening?---Yes. Initially as the firefront, as 14 they like to refer to it, came to our properties, it first 15 came to the west of my own property and I noted with some 16 glee that as it went over the ridge just above the Grand 17 Ridge Road and then it started to burn down the other 18 side, I said to the farmer that, "We're saved, we're 19 saved. You know, I was right, it's going to burn to the 20 west of us and we'll be fine." The farmer, who had known 21 the area far better than I and paid an interest in finding 22 out about how fires would react in the area, advised me 23 that, no, the worst was probably still to come. He said 24 that what would probably happen is the fire would go down 25 the other side and then begin to burn back up the hill, 26 and that's exactly what happened. So, once the fire had 27 crossed over Grand Ridge Road and over the ridge itself 28 just west of our properties, it burnt down into the 29 national park. It then continued to burn along the 30 national park to eventually coming onto our boundaries. 31 At this same time the fire, which was obviously spreading

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9324 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 in its front to the south of us, again came up to the side 2 of us and within no time we had fire all around us. We 3 had fire coming from the north, we had fires burning on 4 the west of us and then from the south and then eventually 5 the fire from the north went over past the farmer's house 6 and that area that you saw in the national park and his 7 own property, that area marked in white was all on fire. 8 Initially I found it easy to fight the fire. What started 9 to first happen was small pockets of fire would develop in 10 the grass in his paddocks and we mainly let them burn, but 11 on occasion they would burn a vegetable garden that he 12 had, and with a tank and a pump we'd go out there and we'd 13 put out the fire and I was surprised how well the pump put 14 fire out. What I didn't realise is it puts the flame out 15 but what's there left behind still smoulders. So we went 16 around his place. The fire at one stage came right up to 17 his back door. We put that out by the way of hoses and 18 I put out fires that were burning along the fence line of 19 his farmhouse property. This was a slow process in how 20 things began to develop, and I now became more confident 21 about being in a fire area, the noise and the like. My 22 place is only about 200 metres from his farmhouse. 23 I could see quite clearly; there is just an open paddock 24 between us. I now could start to see my place begin to 25 burn. A large wood shed began to catch on fire. The 26 chook shed that I had next to the wood shed began to burn. 27 I asked the farmer if he would mind, because I did feel 28 obliged to be there and it was his equipment, if I could 29 attempt to go out and put out those fires that were 30 beginning to burn at my place. Initially I had seen them 31 and been aware of them and thought, "Well, you know,

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9325 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 that's it." I was expecting that. But then I had seen 2 how easy it was to put things out. So I went over. 3 I initially put out the fires that had begun around the 4 chook shed, the wood shed and the like. I then returned 5 and again assisted him around his property, then only to 6 find that the fires began at my place again. I went over 7 several times until eventually one time that I went over 8 the fire had become so intense, the smoke had become so 9 great that it wasn't possible for me to return to the 10 farmer's house. At that time my own place, not only the 11 shed, the chook shed, trees all on my block, trees, 12 mountain ash trees that I had removed, just the stumps 13 were there, they would ignite and catch on fire in the 14 middle of green grass. The lawns I had kept quite well 15 and the trees had no way of getting alight apart from sort 16 of spontaneous combustion or a small ember landing on one 17 of the stumps and it going into flames. So in no time all 18 around the house, the eaves, different parts of the house 19 caught on fire and the like. I fought that until I felt 20 it was safe to go back to the farmer, whose place was also 21 equally alight from one end to the other. But, with his 22 two hoses and the like, we were able to put them out. 23 Mr Macdonald, there are only a couple of paragraphs to go in 24 your statement. I'm conscious that the stenographer has 25 been working hard all day. I can even just pause 26 now - - - 27 CHAIRMAN: No, finish. 28 MS DOYLE: I'll pretend to take a long time to turn to the next 29 paragraph to give him a short rest?---Could I just make 30 this point, if I could. I did suffer emotionally as a 31 result. I did actually ask that the history and some of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9326 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 which I just delve upon there wasn't included in my 2 statement because it was very traumatic to me. However, 3 now being here and trying to be a bit more courageous and 4 listening to the statements of the two men, I feel at some 5 stage, if not here but somewhere else, that what I went 6 through and what I experienced should really maybe be told 7 to other people because it is horrific, it was unbearable 8 and I never intend and I will never put the DSE through 9 that again by asking to be evacuated there. I'm sorry to 10 make it more, but the message just has to get out. It is 11 a monster. If you survive, it is through good luck. In 12 this case of those two gentlemen, it was through some 13 incredible planning. I think we should all take our hats 14 off. I'm sure not very many people went through what they 15 did to save their own life. 16 You were just telling us about the time when you went over to 17 your house, having spoken to the farmer about the fact 18 that you would do that, and that's when I interrupted you. 19 What happened after you went over to your house?---Shall 20 I go through all the details? 21 If you feel comfortable?---Different things were burning all 22 around. My house is an old house built some time in the 23 '60s. One of the things that I think saved it was because 24 it is made of rendered cement on chicken wire or the like 25 over a veneer of wood and plaster inside, and it goes 26 right to the ground. So, even though the fire burnt right 27 up to the walls of my house because it was cement, it 28 obviously affected it, the paint, the white paint, the 29 house is painted white, was singed and the like, but the 30 concrete stood firm and there was no damage. Three 31 windows on the northerly side of the house had cracked

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9327 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 from the heat. But because they were the older style 2 windows supported by a steel frame I believe that that 3 held the integrity of the windows. I noticed elsewhere 4 aluminium windows melted, and wooden windows of course 5 were perilous with ledges because of the embers. There is 6 some extension to my property which was made of pine logs, 7 which was popular in the old days. All the logs caught on 8 fire. No sooner would I put out the fire on the logs, the 9 heat from the area, the heat from the fire was so intense 10 that the water would just evaporate and eventually they 11 would ignite again. In order to save my own self I was 12 pouring buckets of water over me. At one stage I thought 13 I was actually on fire because I could see all this smoke 14 coming off. It was steam. The heat was so great that 15 over my jacket it had evaporated. Another factor, and 16 I hear that the guys' petrol pump didn't work, and maybe 17 as a tip to everybody else, this certainly wasn't planned 18 on my behalf, it was just sheer fluke, one of my tanks 19 isn't on the water pump system, it is a standalone tank. 20 It has two taps at its base. Because they are just 21 gravity fed, the tanks were quite full, the water just as 22 I switched on the tap ran out. That's what saved me. 23 So simple gravity feed?---Yes. 24 After working on trying to put out some of those fires and some 25 of the smouldering over at your house, what did you 26 do?---Eventually I went back. Does the stenographer have 27 the patience to go with me on a few things that happened 28 before I went back? 29 I will keep an eye on him. If you can just tell us what 30 happened and then we will move to the end?---At one stage 31 the fire was too great - the smoke, the noise, the heat -

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9328 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 and so I retreated inside. Not being a drinker but 2 addicted to Coke, I had a couple of cans in the fridge. 3 So I grabbed a Coke and figured there's nothing I could do 4 but sit down and have a break. I became conscious that 5 I had left the farmer and that he had sort of almost been 6 now counting on my assistance. So I tried ringing him on 7 his mobile phone, and it didn't answer. So then I tried 8 to ring him on his landline. The phone rang but, 9 unbeknownst to me, the switch at the exchange was out of 10 order. As a result, the phone was ringing but it was not 11 going through to his place. The fire was so intense, the 12 heat was so great, the smoke was so horrific that 13 I figured he must be in his house. If he is not answering 14 his phone and he is not answering his mobile, he must be 15 dead. I thought it only a matter of time before I would 16 be that same way. As fate have it, my first ex-wife rang 17 and said she had heard about the fires. She had been to 18 my property several times, so she knew where we were 19 situated amongst the bush. I said to her that things were 20 really bad, "The corridor is filling up with smoke." 21 I had a towel around me to help me breathe and to stop the 22 smoke. The back of my place, I couldn't see past my 23 fence. I couldn't see the road. All I could see was this 24 massive glow that was the roar and the like. I was 25 virtually saying my goodbyes. Through her I have a 26 23-year-old son. I was making it clear that I loved him 27 and I hoped all for the best. Following that, I received 28 another call. That was from my second wife. I had my 29 daughter crying in the background. I could hear her. 30 I explained to her the similar situation that I have 31 previously explained. I said that, you know, "I think

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9329 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 this is it." I finished the conversation in the same 2 manner as before. However, I noticed after that that the 3 Coke that I had been drinking I had put in my pocket to 4 answer the mobile phone and it had run out over the floor 5 and over my pants and the like, but because I was so wet 6 I hadn't been aware. I resiled myself that I wasn't going 7 to let this thing beat me and I was going to survive the 8 fire. I went back to the fridge and I got another can of 9 Coke. I didn't open it. I put it in my pocket and I said 10 to myself, "That's for when things are safe and I can take 11 a break." I then went to the kitchen sink where I had put 12 in a plug to fill water earlier. I damped the towel and 13 I put it around my face. I stood in the corridor looking 14 outside through the sliding windows waiting for the 15 supposed firefront to pass. If I could just acknowledge 16 that in some cases obviously there is a firefront. In our 17 case I don't believe that was the case because no sooner 18 had the fire stopped coming, the wind change obviously 19 kicked up the fire again and it came the other way. So 20 I was there standing, waiting for the firefront to pass 21 and run on to the burnt ground and be safe, that I noticed 22 another building on our property alight and on fire. Just 23 the automatic response was to run out and throw the bucket 24 over it and put the fire out. I continued to do that. 25 I kept on feeling guilty about having left the farmer. So 26 eventually when I thought I had put out enough around my 27 own property and it seemed safe to do so, I filled his 28 backpack with water again from that gravity-fed tank and 29 I walked across a small area of ground to what I thought 30 was just going to be very bad. As I got closer his shed 31 appeared to be alight, but it was the trees that we had

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9330 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 had removed several years earlier that he had chopped up 2 into blocks for his firewood. That was full alight and 3 burning his garage. So as I came around I saw him, he was 4 as delighted to see me as I was him, and asked if I could 5 continue watering his garage and another shed that he had 6 where he had a greenhouse, and it had 7 that perspex material. It was burning and on fire. In 8 there he had his lawnmowers and petrol and the like. So 9 he went and fought that. Look, it may have been 10 different, but it is my belief that if there hadn't been 11 the two of us fighting that fire together one of the 12 buildings - one contained hay and his vehicle and the 13 other one contained equipment, chainsaw, petrol, either 14 one would have gone up, and his house was a log house and 15 it probably would have gone too. 16 Now, Mr Macdonald, in paragraphs 66 through to 72 you explain 17 the rest of what happened that night, and your statement 18 stands as the record of the events later in the night. 19 The two of you eventually got a small amount of sleep. 20 I want to take you to paragraph 73, where you are 21 reflecting back on the night. Just tell us about the view 22 you express there. You say you don't want to be involved 23 in fighting another fire. What view have you formed after 24 the experience you had on the night of the 7th?---If there 25 is one thing I wish out of this Royal Commission that 26 I can contribute it is that lay people like myself are not 27 qualified, are not trained, are not experienced to undergo 28 the protection of their own houses, even regardless of the 29 state of the fire. I have come up with my own little 30 slogan. Instead of the "stay or go" policy, I believe we 31 should tell people, "Go or gone; it's your choice."

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9331 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 I just came back from Queensland last week where you will 2 be aware that there are several fires in that region. On 3 the day that I was returning to Victoria it showed on the 4 news in an area very close to where I was staying that a 5 man in his mid-50s, similar age to myself, was on his 6 property defending his house in conjunction with CFA 7 assistance and he suffered a heart attack and died. His 8 house was saved, but unfortunately he has now passed away. 9 If there is anything that comes out of this, it is some 10 sort of recognition that you can't, unless you are as 11 capable, as prepared as those other gentlemen, expect to 12 save your house and save your own life. Given that we 13 don't know what fires we are going to have in the future 14 with some sort of climate change and a warming effect, the 15 recommendation should go out, "You go or you are gone." 16 You then explain that the next morning you were almost on 17 automatic pilot; went back to do your next shift at 18 Blackwarry fire tower dressed in the clothes in which you 19 had fought the fire. But, having spoken with people on 20 duty there, it was made clear that you weren't needed and 21 you could go and look after your own affairs. You say in 22 paragraph 77 that you drove out of the area, down from 23 Balook, and things were even then still burning and 24 smouldering. You drove out past Mount Tassie, just 25 destruction all around you, and when you finally came out 26 at the bottom of the hills through a roadblock people 27 converged on your car, amazed to see you come down from 28 the fire that you had fought up there?---Yes, that's 29 correct. Obviously at some stage we had lost power and so 30 radios and the like were not an option. I certainly 31 hadn't planned to be there, so I had no transistor radios

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9332 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 and the like. But at 7 o'clock in the morning the farmer 2 drove his four-wheel-drive out and switched the radio on. 3 We got the ABC news and we heard that 11 people had died. 4 Well, that was an incredible shock, to think that 11 5 people had died in Victoria on that day. But I had no 6 understanding or no knowledge of how bad and severe the 7 fires were. I felt - even though again not knowing how to 8 fight fires and be prepared, I had gloves, I had those 9 cheap gloves that you buy in the supermarkets with leather 10 on one side and some stripes on the other side. On my 11 left hand the gloves had actually burnt through to the 12 fingertips. I had steel-capped boots on and both of the 13 soles had melted, and on my left side the leather had 14 actually burnt. I had a jacket. I had overalls on. But 15 I had no knowledge or thought of goggles. So my eyes were 16 terribly, terribly sore. They had been damaged there. 17 Just thinking there is a fire in the area and I would be 18 required to attend, not having any communications by phone 19 or by mobile, I made my way to the Blackwarry fire tower. 20 There were three trees that I had to chainsaw through to 21 get there and a number of branches to remove from the 22 road. I was advised that, no, I shouldn't be in the tower 23 and, you know, to leave at once. So a bit later on that 24 day at about midday I drove down, and it then became 25 obvious to me how horrific a fire it had been. On the 26 road south of Mount Tassie there were several carcasses, 27 as the gentleman had indicated earlier, of kangaroos. 28 I think I saw one koala dead on the road. Then I turned 29 off the road that runs to Mount Tassie from Traralgon 30 South and took the shortcut road, which is Red Hill Road, 31 Callignee. The first house that I came to was a brick

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9333 MACDONALD XN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MS DOYLE 1 house. It was burnt to the ground. The second house 2 I came to was standing, and it just seemed remarkable that 3 the house next door could be standing. The third house 4 I came to was an incredible house. It sits on the top of 5 the ridge. It has a view of all of the valley. In fact 6 the week before my vehicle had overheated in the heat and 7 I had called into that house and got some water from their 8 tap. So I knocked on their glorious front door, which was 9 a double white door with leadlight and all the rest of it. 10 It was burnt to the ground. The house next door was a log 11 cabin type structure. The guy's plastic water tank had 12 melted and run out. His concrete tank had cracked but 13 fortunately had enough water to save his own house which 14 had caught on fire, because it showed the scars of 15 burning. As I continued down that road weaving myself 16 around the logs and the twigs and the trees I counted 19 17 houses burnt to the ground - I had no comprehension of 18 that being the case - until finally I got to the Yallourn 19 power station where the traffic lights are and the police 20 had placed a roadblock. I was obviously going slow at the 21 time, but slowed to get through the roadblock. Then as 22 I drove through the roadblock there were cars on either 23 side of the road and people standing by their cars. They 24 just swarmed to my vehicle and started asking questions 25 about, "What was it like up there? Did you see different 26 ones" and whatever. It then began to sink in the true 27 nature of what had happened on that day. 28 Mr Macdonald, the State wants to ask a couple of questions. 29 Are there any questions, Commissioners, before we move to 30 that? 31 CHAIRMAN: No.

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.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9335 MACDONALD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR LIVERMORE 1 seemed pretty determined to stay, despite you trying to 2 convince him to leave, along with the DSE and the police 3 officer. How do you think any agency would go trying to 4 forcibly evacuate a street full of people like your 5 neighbour? How easy or difficult a task do you think that 6 would be?---It would be so difficult, and that's why it is 7 important that stories like mine go out so that people 8 realise - my neighbour is in his 70s. He is retired. He 9 has his house and the farm and his cows and his sheep and 10 his chooks, and that's his life. His daughter passed away 11 several years ago. His one remaining son, 39 years of 12 age, died several months ago this year. So for a man like 13 that all he has is his house. I suppose it's his kingdom 14 and he feels that he should stay to fight and protect it. 15 If somehow or other you can get a message to him and 16 others that it's not just worth it, that would make me 17 happier and I suppose a lot of people in this audience who 18 have to put their lives in danger to protect us would be 19 happier to. 20 MS DOYLE: Thank you, Mr Macdonald. May Mr Macdonald be 21 excused? 22 CHAIRMAN: Yes. Thank you, Mr Macdonald. We appreciate you 23 giving your evidence?---My pleasure, and thank you for 24 opportunity. 25 <(THE WITNESS WITHDREW) 26 MS DOYLE: Commissioners, it has been a long day. What we 27 propose in order to catch up time generally is the 28 possibility of starting at 9 o'clock tomorrow, is one 29 prospect that will assist. We have also obviously had to 30 move on the evidence of Mr Pridgeon and Mr Gillham. So 31 what we propose to do tomorrow in terms of the order of

.Wordwave:MB/SK 19/10/09 9336 MACDONALD XXN Bushfires Royal Commission BY MR LIVERMORE 1 witnesses is starting with Mr Demetrios from Loy Yang 2 Power, his evidence will be brief, and then returning to 3 members of the incident management team; so Mr Pridgeon 4 and Mr Gillham. 5 There are a number of other witnesses scheduled 6 for tomorrow. We are going to talk to the State this 7 evening about who best to move where. So we propose 8 starting at 9, if there is agreement with that, starting 9 with Mr Demetrios, then Mr Pridgeon and then Mr Gillham. 10 There is also going to be a view tomorrow night 11 at 5 pm at the DSE offices at 71 Hotham Street for the 12 parties only. We ask that parties who attend keep their 13 numbers to a minimum. Obviously it is a workplace and 14 space, so there is limited room there. Parties only; no 15 members of the public or the media. It will be a brief 16 event, we hope. Can those parties who are sending one or 17 more representatives advise Ms Ruth Hart by 9.30 tomorrow 18 of who will attend and how many will attend. 19 Is it convenient for the Commission to start at 9 20 tomorrow? 21 CHAIRMAN: Yes. 22 MS DOYLE: Thank you for that. In that case we don't propose 23 trying to squeeze in any more this evening. 24 ADJOURNED UNTIL TUESDAY, 20 OCTOBER 2009 AT 9.00 AM 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

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