Speech Acts: Force Behind Words
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Common Ground for Positioning: a Discourse Analysis on Second Language Socialization
Hacettepe Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi (H. U. Journal of Education) 29(2), 160-174 [Nisan 2014] Common Ground for Positioning: A discourse Analysis on Second Language Socialization Konumlandırma Amaçlı Ortak Zemin Oluşturulması: Amerika’da Yaşayan Türk Öğrencilerin Dil Sosyalleşmesi Deniz ORTAÇTEPE1 ABSTRACT: Applying Kecskes and Zhang's (2009) dynamic model of common ground in positioning theory (Davies & Harre, 1990), the present study aims to explore the second language (L2) socialization of Turkish students through the discursive processes as well as the skills they adopted in social interactions with the American speakers during a formal reception at an American university. The findings indicated that the Turkish students endorsed similar discursive processes not only to establish common ground as the American speakers', but also to position themselves in the speech context. This study highlights that engaging in real-life conversations with the target language speakers (Gumperz, 1996) encourages L2 learners/users (Cook, 1999) to embrace the discursive practices that are shared within a particular speech community. It also provides suggestions for future research embracing more longitudinal/ethnographic approahes to examine L2 socialization as well as teaching implications for instructional materials and contexts that reflect authentic social encounters. Keywords: Second language socialization, common ground, positioning, discourse analysis ÖZ: Bu çalışma, Kecskes ve Zhang’in (2009) ortak zemin dinamik modelini, konumlandırma teorisiyle (Davies ve Harre, 1990) bağdaştırarak, Amerika’da okuyan Türk öğrencilerin ikinci dil sosyalleşmeleri üzerine ışık tutmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu amaçtan yola çıkarak, çalışma Amerika’da bir üniversitede düzenlenen 23 Nisan Ulusal Egemenlik ve Çocuk Bayramı resepsiyona katılan Türk öğrencilerin diğer Amerikalı konuşmacılarla aralarındaki söylemleri analiz etmektedir. -
Sentence Types and Functions
San José State University Writing Center www.sjsu.edu/writingcenter Written by Sarah Andersen Sentence Types and Functions Choosing what types of sentences to use in an essay can be challenging for several reasons. The writer must consider the following questions: Are my ideas simple or complex? Do my ideas require shorter statements or longer explanations? How do I express my ideas clearly? This handout discusses the basic components of a sentence, the different types of sentences, and various functions of each type of sentence. What Is a Sentence? A sentence is a complete set of words that conveys meaning. A sentence can communicate o a statement (I am studying.) o a command (Go away.) o an exclamation (I’m so excited!) o a question (What time is it?) A sentence is composed of one or more clauses. A clause contains a subject and verb. Independent and Dependent Clauses There are two types of clauses: independent clauses and dependent clauses. A sentence contains at least one independent clause and may contain one or more dependent clauses. An independent clause (or main clause) o is a complete thought. o can stand by itself. A dependent clause (or subordinate clause) o is an incomplete thought. o cannot stand by itself. You can spot a dependent clause by identifying the subordinating conjunction. A subordinating conjunction creates a dependent clause that relies on the rest of the sentence for meaning. The following list provides some examples of subordinating conjunctions. after although as because before even though if since though when while until unless whereas Independent and Dependent Clauses Independent clause: When I go to the movies, I usually buy popcorn. -
Logophoricity in Finnish
Open Linguistics 2018; 4: 630–656 Research Article Elsi Kaiser* Effects of perspective-taking on pronominal reference to humans and animals: Logophoricity in Finnish https://doi.org/10.1515/opli-2018-0031 Received December 19, 2017; accepted August 28, 2018 Abstract: This paper investigates the logophoric pronoun system of Finnish, with a focus on reference to animals, to further our understanding of the linguistic representation of non-human animals, how perspective-taking is signaled linguistically, and how this relates to features such as [+/-HUMAN]. In contexts where animals are grammatically [-HUMAN] but conceptualized as the perspectival center (whose thoughts, speech or mental state is being reported), can they be referred to with logophoric pronouns? Colloquial Finnish is claimed to have a logophoric pronoun which has the same form as the human-referring pronoun of standard Finnish, hän (she/he). This allows us to test whether a pronoun that may at first blush seem featurally specified to seek [+HUMAN] referents can be used for [-HUMAN] referents when they are logophoric. I used corpus data to compare the claim that hän is logophoric in both standard and colloquial Finnish vs. the claim that the two registers have different logophoric systems. I argue for a unified system where hän is logophoric in both registers, and moreover can be used for logophoric [-HUMAN] referents in both colloquial and standard Finnish. Thus, on its logophoric use, hän does not require its referent to be [+HUMAN]. Keywords: Finnish, logophoric pronouns, logophoricity, anti-logophoricity, animacy, non-human animals, perspective-taking, corpus 1 Introduction A key aspect of being human is our ability to think and reason about our own mental states as well as those of others, and to recognize that others’ perspectives, knowledge or mental states are distinct from our own, an ability known as Theory of Mind (term due to Premack & Woodruff 1978). -
The Meaning of Language
01:615:201 Introduction to Linguistic Theory Adam Szczegielniak The Meaning of Language Copyright in part: Cengage learning The Meaning of Language • When you know a language you know: • When a word is meaningful or meaningless, when a word has two meanings, when two words have the same meaning, and what words refer to (in the real world or imagination) • When a sentence is meaningful or meaningless, when a sentence has two meanings, when two sentences have the same meaning, and whether a sentence is true or false (the truth conditions of the sentence) • Semantics is the study of the meaning of morphemes, words, phrases, and sentences – Lexical semantics: the meaning of words and the relationships among words – Phrasal or sentential semantics: the meaning of syntactic units larger than one word Truth • Compositional semantics: formulating semantic rules that build the meaning of a sentence based on the meaning of the words and how they combine – Also known as truth-conditional semantics because the speaker’ s knowledge of truth conditions is central Truth • If you know the meaning of a sentence, you can determine under what conditions it is true or false – You don’ t need to know whether or not a sentence is true or false to understand it, so knowing the meaning of a sentence means knowing under what circumstances it would be true or false • Most sentences are true or false depending on the situation – But some sentences are always true (tautologies) – And some are always false (contradictions) Entailment and Related Notions • Entailment: one sentence entails another if whenever the first sentence is true the second one must be true also Jack swims beautifully. -
John Rogers Searle and His Contribution to Speech Act Theory
JOHN ROGERS SEARLE AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO SPEECH ACT THEORY RANSHING PRATAP RAMDAS Ph. D. Research Scholar Department of English Dr. B.A. M.U. Aurangabad (MS) INDIA Pragmatics is the branch of linguistics which studies the meaning communicated through language. Pragmatics studies the process by which native users of a language use native language. Pragmatics studies the meaning in the context sentence is made. Pragmatics is the newer area of language study in linguists. The important development in the pragmatics is the origin of speech act theory. J. L. Austin is the originator of the Speech act theory. According to J. L. Austin all utterances are some type of speech act. People not only produce utterances to convey their feelings but also perform actions in between their speech. Even a simple utterance such as ‘Violets are blue’ might be regarded as a special type of act namely the act of making a statement. This overall approach to language study is known as ‘speech act theory’. INTRODUCTION John Rogers Searle He is born on 31 July 1932. He is an American Philosopher. He is widely noted for his contribution to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, social philosophy. Searle began his early college education at the University of Wisconsin- Madison. He received all his university degrees, B.A., M.A., and D. Phil from Oxford University. He held first position in a faculty. He has five honorary doctorate degrees from four different countries and is an honorary visiting professor. In 2000, he received the Jean Nicod Prize, in 2004 the National Humanities Medal and in 2006, the Mind and Brain Prize. -
Is There an Illocutionary Act of Assertion?
English Studies at NBU, 2015 ISSN 2367-5705 (Print) Vol. 1, Issue 2, 71-84 www.esnbu.org IS THERE AN ILLOCUTIONARY ACT OF ASSERTION? Mariya Chankova South-West University, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria Abstract This contribution analyzes Cappelen’s No-Assertion view arguing that, although appealing, the No-Assertion view is based on a questionable premise, namely, that assertions are sayings. Austin’s notions of locution and saying are examined, in order to show that illocutionary acts concern aspects not covered by either of the previous two terms. Following a reconstructed definition of illocutionary act from Austin’s writings, I suggest that assertion is an illocutionary act, in that it takes effect after it is taken up by a hearer. I further suggest that in this respect the game analogy fails with regard to assertion, since no rules of the constitutive kind or norms can intrinsically define this act. This proposal is based on the idea that illocutionary act analysis should dispose of any preoccupations with propositions. It argues that expressing propositions was not originally and should not be at the core of speech act theoretic problematic. Key words: assertion, illocutionary act, proposition Article history: Received: 13 November 2015; Reviewed: 28 November 2015; Revised: 30 November 2015; Accepted: 21 December 2015; Published: 31 December 2015 Mariya Chankova, PhD, is Chief Assistant Professor in French and English at the South-West University, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. She teaches courses in French linguistics and translation and English punctuation and orthography and pragmatics. Her research interests include pragmatics, with special emphasis on speech act theory, implicit, conversational implicature, meaning generation, discourse analysis, rhetoric, philosophy of language, multimedia environment and communication, plagiarism, and French translation. -
Against Logical Form
Against logical form Zolta´n Gendler Szabo´ Conceptions of logical form are stranded between extremes. On one side are those who think the logical form of a sentence has little to do with logic; on the other, those who think it has little to do with the sentence. Most of us would prefer a conception that strikes a balance: logical form that is an objective feature of a sentence and captures its logical character. I will argue that we cannot get what we want. What are these extreme conceptions? In linguistics, logical form is typically con- ceived of as a level of representation where ambiguities have been resolved. According to one highly developed view—Chomsky’s minimalism—logical form is one of the outputs of the derivation of a sentence. The derivation begins with a set of lexical items and after initial mergers it splits into two: on one branch phonological operations are applied without semantic effect; on the other are semantic operations without phono- logical realization. At the end of the first branch is phonological form, the input to the articulatory–perceptual system; and at the end of the second is logical form, the input to the conceptual–intentional system.1 Thus conceived, logical form encompasses all and only information required for interpretation. But semantic and logical information do not fully overlap. The connectives “and” and “but” are surely not synonyms, but the difference in meaning probably does not concern logic. On the other hand, it is of utmost logical importance whether “finitely many” or “equinumerous” are logical constants even though it is hard to see how this information could be essential for their interpretation. -
Context Pragmatics Definition of Pragmatics
Pragmatics • to ask a question: Maybe Sandy’s reassuring you that Kim’ll get home okay, even though she’s walking home late at night. Sandy: She’s got more than lipstick and Kleenex in that purse of hers. • What is Pragmatics? You: Kim’s got a knife? • Context and Why It’s Important • Speech Acts – Direct Speech Acts – Indirect Speech Acts • How To Make Sense of Conversations – Cooperative Principle – Conversational Maxims Linguistics 201, Detmar Meurers Handout 3 (April 9, 2004) 1 3 Definition of Pragmatics Context Pragmatics is the study of how language is used and how language is integrated in context. What exactly are the factors which are relevant for an account of how people use language? What is linguistic context? Why must we consider context? We distinguish several types of contextual information: (1) Kim’s got a knife 1. Physical context – this encompasses what is physically present around the speakers/hearers at the time of communication. What objects are visible, where Sentence (1) can be used to accomplish different things in different contexts: the communication is taking place, what is going on around, etc. • to make an assertion: You’re sitting on a beach, thinking about how to open a coconut, when someone (2) a. Iwantthat book. observes “Kim’s got a knife”. (accompanied by pointing) b. Be here at 9:00 tonight. • to give a warning: (place/time reference) Kim’s trying to bully you and Sandy into giving her your lunch money, and Sandy just turns around and starts to walk away. She doesn’t see Kim bring out the butcher knife, and hears you yell behind her, “Kim’s got a knife!” 2 4 2. -
The Application of Discourse Analysis to Instant Messaging Communication
Internet Discourse: The application of discourse analysis to instant messaging communication Honors Thesis Eric Ketcham, student Heather Littlefield, Ph.D., advisor Linguistics Program Northeastern University Fall 2010 – Spring 2011 *We wish to thank the Honors Office for the opportunity to conduct this research, as well as for an Early Research Grant. We also wish to thank the Provost Office for a Spring 2011 Undergraduate Research Grant. In addition, we wish to thank Jaclyn Karvelas for her work formatting and coding data, as well as Allison Madden for her work coding the data. Eric Ketcham wishes to especially thank Heather Littlefield for her help, guidance, and work all year long. I would not have been able to complete this project without her support and patience. **This research was approved by the Northeastern University Institutional Review Board under IRB# 10-10-03. 1 1. ABSTRACT Internet Discourse (ID) is commonly regarded as a hybrid between Spoken and Written Discourse (SD and WD). This model fails to take into account unique features of ID that cannot be explained by influence from either SD or WD. The present study paired participants to have online conversations on an instant messaging program. The conversations were coded for several features. The expression of emotion, the representation of the physical environment, abbreviations, punctuation and synchronicity were examined among other features. Internet Discourse was found to have many features in common with both Spoken and Written Discourse, but was also found to have enough unique features to be considered its own independent form of discourse. As a result, this paper proposes a triangular continuum model of influence between Internet, Spoken, and Written Discourses as the best conception of the three forms of discourse. -
Arxiv:2106.08037V1 [Cs.CL] 15 Jun 2021 Alternative Ways the World Could Be
The Possible, the Plausible, and the Desirable: Event-Based Modality Detection for Language Processing Valentina Pyatkin∗ Shoval Sadde∗ Aynat Rubinstein Bar Ilan University Bar Ilan University Hebrew University of Jerusalem [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Paul Portner Reut Tsarfaty Georgetown University Bar Ilan University [email protected] [email protected] Abstract (1) a. We presented a paper at ACL’19. Modality is the linguistic ability to describe b. We did not present a paper at ACL’20. events with added information such as how de- sirable, plausible, or feasible they are. Modal- The propositional content p =“present a paper at ity is important for many NLP downstream ACL’X” can be easily verified for sentences (1a)- tasks such as the detection of hedging, uncer- (1b) by looking up the proceedings of the confer- tainty, speculation, and more. Previous studies ence to (dis)prove the existence of the relevant pub- that address modality detection in NLP often p restrict modal expressions to a closed syntac- lication. The same proposition is still referred to tic class, and the modal sense labels are vastly in sentences (2a)–(2d), but now in each one, p is different across different studies, lacking an ac- described from a different perspective: cepted standard. Furthermore, these senses are often analyzed independently of the events that (2) a. We aim to present a paper at ACL’21. they modify. This work builds on the theoreti- b. We want to present a paper at ACL’21. cal foundations of the Georgetown Gradable Modal Expressions (GME) work by Rubin- c. -
A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts
----JOHN R. SEARLE----- - A TAXONOMY ()II' rr.r.oCO'l'IONi\HY i\C:TS a prcdictiou, and ouc a promise? 111 order t:o develop higher order ge 11 · era, we must first know how the species promise, prcclictio11, report, etc., differ one from another. When one attempts to answer that ques A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts tion one discovers that there are several quite different principles of distinction; that is, there are different kinds of differences that enable us to say that the force of this utterance is different from the force of that utterance. For this reason the metaphor of force in the expression "illocutionary force" is misleading since it suggests that different illo I. Introduction cutionary forces occupy different positions on a single continuum of The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a reasoned classifica force. What is actually the case is that there are several distinct criss tion of illocutionary acts into certain basic categories or types. It is to crossing continua. A related source of confusion is that we are inclined answer the question: How many kinds of illocutionary acts are there? to confuse illocutionary verbs with types of illocutionary acts. We are Since any such attempt to develop a taxonomy must take into account inclined, for example, to think that where we have two nonsynonymous Austin's classification of illocutionary acts into his five basic categories illocutionary verbs they must necessarily mark two different kinds of il of verdictive, expositive, exercitive, behabitive, and commissive, a second locutionary acts. In what follows, I shall try to keep a clear distinction purpose of this paper is to assess Austin's classification to show in what between illocutionary verbs and illocutionary acts. -
How to Read Austin
Pragmatics 17:3.461-473 (2007) International Pragmatics Association HOW TO READ AUSTIN Marina Sbisà Abstract The goal of this paper is a reassessment of the contributions provided by John L. Austin’s book “How to Do Things with Words” to pragmatics. It discusses some assumptions belonging to the received reading of the volume, as regards its aim and structure, the conceptions of illocution and of perlocution, and the alleged exclusion of “non-seriousness”. Against the received reading, it is argued that “How to Do Things with Words” is structured as a proof by contradiction of the claim that all speech should be considered as action, that in illocution a major role is played by the conventionality of effects, that perlocution presupposes a conception of action as responsibility, and that Austin had reasons not to deal with “non- seriousness” in detail, albeit recognizing the issue as relevant to the study of the uses of language. In the conclusions, the tenets attributed to Austin are neither crtiticized nor defended, but an attempt is made to say what are their implications for research into language use and for philosophy. Keywords: J.L. Austin; Illocutionary act; Perlocutionary act; Convention; Action. 1. Four assumptions to be disputed In this paper I consider what contributions are offered to pragmatics (in a broad sense, ranging from philosophy to interdisciplinary research into language use) by John L. Austin’s famous booklet “How to Do Things with Words” (1962) It might seem the question is otiose: Everybody who has ever been concerned with pragmatics knows that “How to Do Things with Words” (henceforth: HTW) proposes first the performative/constative distinction, then the distinction between meaning and force and the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.