INTRODUCTION to LOGIC Lecture 2 Syntax and Semantics Of

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INTRODUCTION to LOGIC Lecture 2 Syntax and Semantics Of Outline INTRODUCTIONTOLOGIC 1 Syntax vs Semantics. 2 Syntax of L1. Lecture 2 3 Semantics of L1. Syntax and Semantics of 4 Truth-table methods. Propositional Logic. Dr. James Studd Logic is the beginning of wisdom. Thomas Aquinas Syntax vs. Semantics Syntax vs. Semantics Syntax Semantics Syntax is all about expressions: words and sentences. Semantics is all about meanings of expressions. Examples of semantic claims Examples of syntactic claims ‘Bertrand Russell’ is a proper noun. ‘Bertrand Russell’ refers to a British philosopher. ‘Bertrand Russell’ refers to Bertrand Russell. ‘likes logic’ is a verb phrase. ‘Bertrand Russell likes logic’ is a sentence. ‘likes logic’ expresses a property Russell has. ‘Bertrand Russell likes logic’ is true. Combining a proper noun and a verb phrase in this way makes a sentence. Syntax vs. Semantics 2.2 The Syntax of the Language of Propositional Use vs Mention Syntax: English vs. L1. Note our use of quotes to talk about expressions. English has many different sorts of expression. ‘Bertrand Russell’ refers to Bertrand Russell. Some expressions of English (1) Sentences: ‘Bertrand Russell likes logic’, ‘Philosophers like Mention conceptual analysis’, etc.. The first occurrence of ‘Bertrand Russell’ is an example (2) Connectives: ‘it is not the case that’, ‘and’, etc.. of mention. (3) Noun phrases: ‘Bertrand Russell’, ‘Philosophers’, etc.. This occurrence (with quotes) mentions—refers to—an (4) Verb phrases: ‘likes logic’, ‘like conceptual analysis’, etc.. expression. (5) Also: nouns, verbs, pronouns, etc., etc., etc.. Use L1 has just two sorts of basic expression. The second occurrence of ‘Bertrand Russell’ is an example of use. Some basic expressions of L1 This occurrence (without quotes) uses the expression to (1) Sentence letters: e.g. ‘P’, ‘Q’. refer to a man. (2) Connectives: e.g. ‘:’, ‘^’. 2.2 The Syntax of the Language of Propositional 2.2 The Syntax of the Language of Propositional Combining sentences and connectives makes new sentences. Connectives Some complex sentences Here’s the full list of L1-connectives. ‘It is not the case that’ and ‘Bertrand Russell likes logic’ make: ‘It is not the case that Bertrand Russell likes logic’. name in English symbol ‘:’ and ‘P’ make: ‘:P ’. conjunction and ^ ‘Bertrand Russell likes logic’ and ‘and’ and ‘Philosophers like disjunction or _ conceptual analysis’ make: negation it is not the : ‘Bertrand Russell likes logic and philosophers like conceptual case that analysis’. arrow if . then ! ‘P ’, ‘^’ and ‘Q’ make: ‘(P ^ Q)’. double arrow if and only if $ Logic convention: no quotes around L1-expressions. P , ^ and Q make: (P ^ Q). 2.2 The Syntax of the Language of Propositional 2.2 The Syntax of the Language of Propositional The syntax of L1 How to build a sentence of L1 Here’s the official definition of L1-sentence. Example Definition The following is a sentence of L1: (i) All sentence letters are sentences of L1: P; Q; R; P1;Q1;R1;P2;Q2;R2;P3;::: ::(((P ^ Q) ! (P _ :R45)) $ :((P3 _ R) _ R)) (ii) If φ and are sentences of L1, then so are: :φ (φ ^ ) (φ _ ) Definition of L1-sentences (repeated from previous page) (φ ! ) (φ $ ) (i) All sentence letters are sentences of L1. (ii) If φ and are sentences of L1, then :φ, (φ ^ ), (iii) Nothing else is a sentence of L1. (φ _ ), (φ ! ) and (φ $ ) are sentences of L1. Greek letters: φ (‘PHI’) and (‘PSI’): not part of L . 1 (iii) Nothing else is a sentence of L1. 2.2 The Syntax of the Language of Propositional 2.3 Rules for Dropping Brackets Object vs. Metalanguage Bracketing conventions I mentioned that φ and are not part of L1. There are conventions for dropping brackets in L1. :P is a L1-sentence. Some are similar to rules used for + and × in arithmetic. :φ describes many L1-sentences (but is not one itself). Example in arithmetic e.g. :P , :(Q _ R), :(P $ (Q _ R))... 4 + 5 × 3 does not abbreviate (4 + 5) × 3. φ and are part of the metalanguage, not the object one. × ‘binds more strongly’ than +. Object language 4 + 5 × 3 abbreviates 4 + (5 × 3). The object language is the one we’re theorising about. Examples in L1 The object language is L . 1 ^ and _ bind more strongly than ! and $. Metalanguage (P ! Q ^ R) abbreviates (P ! (Q ^ R)). The metalanguage is the one we’re theorising in. One may drop outer brackets. The metalanguage is (augmented) English. P ^ (Q !:P4) abbreviates (P ^ (Q !:P4)). One may drop brackets on strings of ^s or _s. φ and are used as variables in the metalanguage: (P ^ Q ^ R) abbreviates ((P ^ Q) ^ R). in order to generalise about sentences of the object language. 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic Semantics L1-structures Recall the characterisation of validity from week 1. We interpret sentence letters by assigning them truth-values: either T for True or F for False. Characterisation An argument is logically valid if and only if there is no Definition interpretation of subject-specific expressions under which: An L1-structure is an assignment of exactly one (i) the premisses are all true, and truth-value (T or F) to every sentence letter of L1. (ii) the conclusion is false. Examples We’ll adapt this characterisation to L1. One may think of an L1-structure as an infinite list that Logical expressions: :; ^; _; ! and $. provides a value T or F for every sentence letter. Subject specific expressions: P; Q; R; ... PQRP1 Q1 R1 P2 Q2 R2 ··· Interpretation: L1-structure. A : TFFFTFTTF ··· B : FFFFFFFFF ··· We use A, B, etc. to stand for L1-structures. 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic Truth-values of complex sentences 1/3 Worked example 1 φ :φ L1-structures only directly specify truth-values for P , Q, R,... jφj is the truth-value of φ under A. The logical connectives have fixed meanings. A T F F T These determine the truth-values of complex sentences. Notation: jφjA is the truth-value of φ under A. Compute the following truth-values. Let the structure A be partially specified as follows. Truth-conditions for : The meaning of : is summarised in its truth table. PQRP1 Q1 R1 P2 Q2 R2 ··· TFFFTFTTF ··· φ :φ T F Compute: F T jP jA = jQjA = jR1jA = j:P jA = j:QjA = j:R1jA = j::P j = j::Qj = j::R j = In words: j:φjA = T if and only if jφjA = F. A A 1 A 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic Truth-values of complex sentences 2/3 Truth-values of complex sentences 3/3 Truth-conditions for ^ and _ Truth-conditions for ! and $ The meanings of ^ and _ are given by the truth tables: The meanings of ! and $ are given by the truth tables: φ (φ ^ ) φ (φ _ ) φ (φ ! ) φ (φ $ ) T T T T T T T T T T T T T F F T F T T F F T F F F T F F T T F T T F T F F F F F F F F F T F F T j(φ ^ )jA = T if and only if jφjA = T and j jA = T. j(φ ! )jA = T if and only if jφjA = F or j jA = T. j(φ _ )jA = T if and only if jφjA = T or j jA = T (or both). j(φ $ )jA = T if and only if jφjA = j jA. 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic Worked example 2 For actual calculations it’s usually better to use tables. Suppose jP jB = T and jQjB = F. Let jP jB = T and jQjB = F. Compute j:(P ! Q) ! (P ^ Q)jB Compute j:(P ! Q) ! (P ^ Q)jB What is the truth value of :(P ! Q) ! (P ^ Q) under B? P Q : (P ! Q) ! (P ^ Q) 1 j(P ! Q)jB = F and j(P ^ Q)jB = F 2 j:(P ! Q)jB = T φ (φ ^ ) (φ ! ) 3 j:(P ! Q) ! (P ^ Q)jB = F φ :φ T T T T T F T F F F φ (φ ^ ) (φ ! ) F T F T F T φ :φ T T T T F F F T T F T F F F F T F T F T F F F T 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic Using the same technique we can fill out the full truth table Validity for :(P ! Q) ! (P ^ Q) Let Γ be a set of sentences of L1 and φ a sentence of L1. P Q : (P ! Q) ! (P ^ Q) Definition T T FTTT T TTT The argument with all sentences in Γ as premisses and φ as T F TTFF F TFF conclusion is valid if and only if there is no L1-structure F T FFTT T FFT under which: F F FFTF T FFF (i) all sentences in Γ are true; and The main column (underlined) gives the truth-value of the (ii) φ is false. whole sentence. Notation: when this argument is valid we write Γ φ. fP !:Q; Qg j= :P means that the argument whose premises are P !:Q and Q, and whose conclusion is :P is valid. Also written: P !:Q; Q j= :P 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic 2.4 The Semantics of Propositional Logic Worked example 3 Other logical notions We can use truth-tables to show that L1-arguments are valid. Definition Example A sentence φ of L1 is logically true (a tautology) iff: Show that fP !:Q; Qg j= :P .
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