Running head: DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 1
U.S. Caribbean Drug Trafficking Strategy: Implementation, Effectiveness, and the Future
Michael Krikorian
California State University Maritime Academy
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 2
Abstract
Drug traffickers in Central and South America have been around for decades, and the drugs they traffic are an issue not only for their home nations, but for many states around the world. States in the Caribbean and South America are home to massive and well-organized criminal organizations that transport their illegal products through their waters and over their borders. The United States (U.S.) and its allies work together to deter and capture these drug traffickers in order to keep their states safe. The U.S. utilizes its coast guard to defend its coasts, the coasts of its allies, and the Caribbean as a whole from drug traffickers. Currently the U.S. relies on using its military prowess as a deterrent mechanism to ward off potential drug traffickers, but it only works in the short term. The U.S. should not rely solely, but instead should work with weaker nations in Central and South America in order to improve their economies and security, thus making drug trafficking a less essential and reliable business for people to join.
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 3
Introduction
The international drug trade has been a problem for decades and is showing no signs of slowing down. Over the past five years drug trafficking and usage in the Americas has increased, a trend that is believed to continue in the future (DEA, 2017, August). The United States (U.S.) strategy for the past thirty years has been one of deterrence based around stopping drugs in transit and criminalizing those who may attempt to use them. This strategy, which started with the War on Drugs in 1971, has been prolonged for over forty years and is not working. Despite security increases having next to no effect on drug trafficking, the U.S. has continued to attempt security increases as a means to defeat the drug cartels of Central and South America. Border walls, drone strikes, and an increase in Coast Guard patrols have been suggested as a means to end this international issue. The problem is the U.S. viewing these crime organizations as simple criminals and not a business. They can and have find out ways around any barrier put in their path. Even if a cartel were to have all of its leadership killed, new ones would take its place. As long as drug trafficking is a viable and rewarding business, there will always be those who attempt it. Many of those who join these crime organizations come from these impoverished nations where they have no other options. As such the U.S. should instead focus on working with governments in Central and South America in order to combat drug cartels and repair their economies. Additionally, corruption among these nations needs to be rooted out, and money laundering needs to be monitored and stopped. The U.S. and its allies need people working constantly in an intergovernmental organization that is constantly monitoring, adapting, and combating this issue in order to ever truly make progress. This thesis aims to analyze current and previous policy and strategy in place used to combat drug trafficking in the Caribbean, in order to create a better strategic plan for the future. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 4
History
Drug control policy in the U.S. started in 1914 with the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act which imposed regulations on various drugs, such as cocaine and opioids. Later, in 1937, the
Marijuana Transfer Tax Act was created and taxed the sale of cannabis. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, drugs in the U.S. become much more widespread, but their effects also became more well known. Psychedelic effects as well as a rising death total, which, according to
President Nixon, included children as twenty percent of the deaths, began creating larger calls for drug bans (Andrews, 2012). Between 1960 and 1970 violent crime in the U.S. also saw an increase of nine percent (Andrews, 2012). Marijuana was seen as a gateway drug to stronger and potentially more dangerous drugs like heroin and cocaine and thus was problematic. In 1970 the outcry over the dangers of drug abuse led to the creation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse,
Prevention, and Control Act, more commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which revised existing US drug laws, required the pharmaceutical industry to better secure and restrict certain drugs, and divided drugs into five categories based on their potential for abuse.
Under the CSA drugs like marijuana and heroin were classified as having a high potential for abuse with no medical purpose, and as such were banned. In 1971 the uproar caused by the dangers of drugs led to President Nixon declaring them the number one enemy of the U.S. In
1974 the uproar created over the dangers drugs like marijuana and heroin led to the creation of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which would attempt to develop an understanding of addiction, the biological and behavioral effects of drugs and other addictive substances, and research their various treatments.
The Reagan Administration saw an expansion of the previous drug control strategy, primarily in a change of focus. The previous U.S. strategy revolved around the idea of deterring DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 5
U.S. citizens from using and distributing drugs all together in order to reduce demand and destroy the U.S. market for illegal substances. 1986 saw the creation of Reagan’s National
Security Decision Directive, which refocused drug trafficking as a national security threat. The
1986 National Security Decision Directive was focused more on the supply side of the drug problem, utilizing the U.S.’s military power to persuade foreign governments and crime organizations to stop drug trafficking (Zepeda et al., 2014). Peru and Bolivia who were, at the time, the largest producers of cocaine, saw U.S. funded campaigns that were intended to reduce coca cultivation. But the victories the U.S. saw were short term as operations constantly moved and Colombia became the number one producer of cocaine, where it has remained still in 2018.
Currently Colombia produces approximately just over 180,000 hectares of cocaine, a number that has been steadily increasing since 2013 (International Drug Policy Consortium, 2018). The shift in production has been termed the balloon effect, where drug trafficking will balloon out to other regions whenever major attempts to combat it by governments are attempted (Zepeda et al.,
2014). In 1992 NIDA merged with the National Institutes of Health. Drugs considered dangerous and addictive by the U.S. government had been banned in order to protect the people. After drug trafficking organizations began to be targeted and destroyed by the US and its allies, they simply reformed into smaller organizations that were harder to detect. During the 1990s Colombia was home to many guerrilla organizations and was refusing to allow U.S. direct involvement. In 2000
Former President Andres Pastrana worked with the U.S. on Plan Colombia, which involved more direct military action in the state in order to bring peace. Part of Plan Colombia involved spraying campaigns that would destroy coca cultivations, but this plan failed to decrease cultivation nor did it fix any of Colombia’s underlying issues. In 2005, after the plan was completed, cultivation actually rose by 81 percent compared to the previous year (Office of DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 6
National Drug Control Policy, 2006). Plan Colombia had failed in eradicating drug production in
Colombia as in 2018 the state is still the world’s leading supplier of cocaine with many internal issues. Plan Colombia showcases the U.S.’s faith in the use of force to solve problems, rather than actually solving the underlying issues that would, over time, solve the greater issue. Issues like widespread and large-scale crime organizations cannot be solved with more enforcement, these organizations are too smart and too dedicated toward their illegal businesses and will always find workarounds. The U.S. and its allies tend to view these crime organizations as simple criminals rather than serious businesses like they should. These crime organizations have logistics experts, engineers, managers, and everything else one would expect from a business attempting to thrive. This makes crime organizations too difficult to counter with just enforcement, as with any legitimate business, they will not just give up and go bankrupt, but instead develop new plans and strategies to work around their current roadblocks in order to thrive.
The period of drug banning and enforcement in the 1960s and 1970s began under the banner of treating and understanding these potentially dangerous substances, but quickly expanded into preventing crime and drug trade by scaring people into not participating through the bolstering of law enforcement and classifying these substances as illegal. In 1972 the Shafer
Commission, created by former Governor Shafer of Pennsylvania, called for the decriminalization of marijuana, believing that its classification as a dangerous and illegal drug by the CSA was incorrect and its criminalization and punishments were far worse than the actual use of the drug (Nahas & Greenwood, 1974). As such, the commission called for the decriminalization of marijuana but it was ultimately rejected by the federal government. In July of 1973 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created as a department of the DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 7
Department of Justice in order to better enforce federal drug laws as well as monitor and control drug related activities within the U.S.. Since its creation the DEA has expanded beyond U.S. borders, and within the Caribbean has nine offices throughout the various nations of the
Caribbean including Puerto Rico, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Barbados. These offices aim to coordinate with local officials in order to better establish, manage, and enforce drug laws as well as to coordinate attacks on drugs in transit to stop their trade. Additionally, the DEA aims to set up alliances between nations, and offers to share information and technology as it believes this is the best way to manage the ongoing issue of illegal drug trade. The U.S. Coast Guard works directly with the DEA and local authorities to better monitor the Caribbean Sea, and also requires permission from Caribbean states in order to stop suspected vessels in their territorial seas.
Within Homeland Security the Coast Guard perform a variety of functions, such as maritime law enforcement and general security within the maritime domain, but one of their main roles in the Caribbean is the interception and seizure of illegal drugs. The Coast Guard is exclusively tasked with stopping drugs in transit on the high seas as well as in the territorial seas of nations the U.S. has treaties with, such as Haiti and Barbados. 2013 had the interception of
144 drug smuggling attempts, the seizure of 64 vessels, and the arrest of 230 suspected smugglers; this amounted to a total of 88 metric tons of cocaine and 37 metric tons of marijuana being removed from the Caribbean (Bureau of International Narcotics And Law Enforcement
Affairs, 2014). 2017 had an even further increases of the seizure of 207 vessels, the arrest of 708 suspected smugglers, and the confiscation of 223.8 metric tons of cocaine and 12.8 metric tons of marijuana from the Caribbean(Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
2018). The 2017 increase is partially due to a February of 2017 seizure, which was the largest DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 8 single seizure of drugs in history, with a total value of approximately $125 million (Coast Guard
News, 2017). The Coast Guard is the primary organization that polices, deters, and arrests drug traffickers, and 2016 and 2017 have seen them returning with increasingly greater numbers.
Securing safety on the high seas and within the U.S.’s seas has and always will be important, but it will never be a solution to crime.
Plan Colombia as well as the U.S. interventions in Peru and Bolivia showcase the U.S.’s use of force to solve its issues. These previous interventions by the U.S. were very much the start of the modern U.S. drug control strategy, which primarily involves the U.S. using its military to secure the seas. However, these historic accounts are also examples of why even massive increases in security and enforcement will never stop these issues. After the U.S. started seizing drug cartel operations in Peru and Bolivia, the crime organizations simply moved to Colombia.
These organizations are rich and more than willing to move their operations time and time again so long as they are profitable. A military as large as the U.S.’s excels at engagements with other armies, but against a more guerilla strategy its effectiveness begins to waiver. In instances where the U.S. has gone to war with armies, such as in the Gulf War, we have devastated our rivals. But in instances where rebel, criminal, and guerilla organizations our involved, such as in Vietnam or the War on Terror, the effectiveness of a grand military is severally weakened. The same is true for a war on drugs, there is no single target or enemy, it is a small, stealthy, and committed group there to run an illegal business. These crime organizations are well coordinated and committed, and like any business the only way to truly end their organization is to hurt their income. But hurting the flow of cash to crime organizations is not an easy task, security increases will never be able to stop enough shipments of product, and money laundering is extremely common and simple for these organizations. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 9
Drug Proliferation and Strategy
The DEA’s 2017 National Drug Threat Assessment states that Colombia is currently responsible for supplying approximately half of the world’s supply of cocaine, as well as 92 percent of drugs in the continental U.S. (DEA, 2017a). Despite the impressive amount of drugs in transit that were confiscated during 2017 the year still had the highest usage rates for drugs in at least a decade, especially in cocaine usage, and these numbers have been increasing every year since 2013 (DEA, 2017b). The time period from 2013 to 2017 has seen a dramatic increase of
134 percent in drug usage, which has been predicted by the DEA to further increase in 2018 and beyond if nothing is done (DEA, 2017b). Despite the fact that the Coast Guard and DEA have seized record high numbers of drugs in recent years, the number of drugs being smuggled and used has also risen dramatically. The reason the Coast Guard are able to perform with such a rapidly increasing number of successful seizures is likely due to more drugs being attempted to be illegally transported in the first place. As such, many may write off the recent success of the
Coast Guard as a victory, coupled with the simultaneous increase of drugs entering the U.S. and its allies tells a much more foreboding story that drug cartels are getting better resourced and more bold. It has been found that interdiction in general has done very little to reduce overall drug consumption in the U.S. (Keck & Correa-Cabrera, 2015). The mainstream news media will often publish pieces about how $206 million, $400 million, $170 million, and dozens of tons worth of cocaine are constantly seized by the U.S. Coast Guard, and in a way makes the organization seem more effective at solving the issue of the drug trade than they actually are
(Barr, 2018; Crespo, 2018; Foster, 2018; Miller, 2018). Despite the impressive numbers of drugs and millions of dollars’ worth of products the Coast Guard intercepts still millions if not billions are getting through, allowing for the cartels to not only continue operations, but to thrive. This is DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 10 not to say that the Coast Guard are worthless or ineffective, quite the opposite as they are extremely good at stopping drug traffickers in transit. However, the Coast Guard and an increase in security are not a solution, they are merely a hindrance to these foreign large-scale organizations. The Coast Guard cannot be expected to solve the issue of illegal trafficking by themselves and increasing their patrols and improving their tactics will not cause the cartels to simply give up and go home. These cartels are businesses that will adapt and overcome any roadblocks in their way, and while the Coast Guard is essential for security and safety, they are not a means to an end.
Colombia is currently the source for approximately half of the world’s supply of cocaine, as well as 92 percent of cocaine supplied in the continental U.S. (DEA, 2017b). Coca is the plant that is a primary ingredient for cocaine, and is grown throughout the state, even in locations that are not typically suitable for cultivation. Additionally, in 2016 Colombia’s coca cultivation grew to 188,000 hectares, but it is likely higher (DEA, 2017b). Since 2015 Colombian farmers have been growing coca in more and more remote locations making it extremely difficult for suppression efforts to find and remove them. Colombia from 2007 to 2013 Colombia had policy in place that had its security forces hunt down and destroy coca farms with both aerial and manual methods. From 2007 to 2013 these coca suppression efforts saw a drop from 167,000 hectares in 2007 to approximately 80,500 in 2013 (DEA, 2017b). Since the discontinuation of these coca suppression efforts, coca growth in Colombia has been steadily increasing every year.
On top of this the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a rebel guerilla movement, not only encouraged coca growth, but also provided cash incentive with subsidies and investments to areas with a high output of cocaine and would offer them protection. The Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia was the source of a lot of trafficking issues since their creation in 1964. In DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 11
June of 2017 the organization did disarm and reform itself as a political party in Colombia and sign a peace treaty with the UN; however, many within the organization still continue the groups drug production and trafficking history. A lot of the lack of stability in Colombia can be attributed to this revolutionary group; however, due to the still increasing rate at which drugs are produced and trafficked from Colombia, it appears that the reorganization of the revolutionary group has had no effect on the industry and many may still be supporting it. Many former members of the revolutionary group as well as its supporters are still involved in the drug trade as well as other illegal activities (Taj & Aquino, 2018). As such, even internal progress made to the stability of Colombia does not have an immediate effect on the drug trade. In 2017 and for the foreseeable future Colombia has been and will remain the top provider of drugs like Cocaine and Heroin for New York City and the greater U.S. Drugs produced in Colombia will either leave by sea directly for their destination, or will be transported to a neighbor state, such as
Venezuela, where they will be hidden to later be picked up and shipped off from these foreign countries. Drug trafficking organizations are very well coordinated and even make deals with one another for the transport of their product and to ensure its safe arrival in other states (DEA,
2017a). Colombia is a haven for drug production and lack of proper enforcement and security in many parts of the state allows for the proliferation of drug production.
Venezuela is also a major player in the production and distribution of cocaine and other illegal drugs, though not as much as Colombia. Colombian organizations typically use Venezuela
“as transshipment points for cocaine shipments bound for Mexico, Central America, and the
Caribbean” (DEA, 2017a). Drugs are typically brought into Venezuela and stored in the remote areas of the state until they can be brought onto a ship or truck to be brought into Mexico for transport into the U.S. Law enforcement have also reported that within Venezuela drugs are DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 12 typically buried underground in virtually undetectable locations that are marked by drug cartels with precise global positioning system (GPS) coordinates. Using GPS to hide their stashes allows drugs to be almost completely invisible to any law enforcement personnel who may be looking for them. U.S. officials also state that over 90 percent of aircraft transporting Colombian drugs take off from Venezuela (“The Americas,” 2011). Additionally, in 2011 Walid Makled, a businessman who helped manage drug cartels and trafficking in the Americas, was arrested for drug trafficking. After being arrested Makled made the claim that “15 Venezuelan generals, the interior minister’s brother and five pro-government legislators [were] on his million-dollar payroll” (“The Americas,” 2011). Venezuela is not unfamiliar with corruption, with billions of dollars going into the pockets of government personnel from oil as well as being paid off by various industries (Gustavo, 2008). Venezuela is still home to corruption, and its recent economic situation in which its inflation rate may hit one million percent is making it extremely difficult for the country to focus on drug trafficking at all. Transparency International, which defines corruption as an abuse of power for private gain, ranks Venezuela as 169 out of 180 of all of the countries it tracks, making Venezuela one of the most corrupt governments in the world. There are also likely many Venezuelan government officials who are on the payroll of various drug cartels, especially considering how many drugs are exported from Venezuela. Many
Venezuelan officials oppose the corruption claims and claim that the large amounts of drugs in
Venezuela is due to Venezuela’s geography. This claim pushes the blame onto the neighboring state of Colombia as the biggest producer of cocaine in the world (“The Americas,” 2011).
Though Venezuelan officials are shifting the blame onto their neighbors and geography, they have yet to make an effort to either secure their borders or better patrol and secure their homeland. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 13
Corruption in general is common in Central and South American states as oftentimes politicians, law enforcement, and legal personnel will be lured in and develop ties with these major crime organizations as it becomes more profitable for them, and in turn they put money over their duties and responsibilities. In turn corruption will ultimately dissuade any form of progress as it hinges on these personnel with power being willing to give up power and take a dramatic decrease in pay. In 2002 Venezuela cut its ties with the DEA, which immediately drew the attention of various drug cartels. Venezuela has since handed over 69 high-level drug traffickers, many of which were given to the U.S. (“The Americas,” 2011). Despite capturing dozens of high-level drug traffickers drug trade and exportation within Venezuela continues to rise. Venezuela currently is plagued with numerous internal issues that make it more difficult to focus on the drug trade, and if they are not solved soon the state is likely to continue to be a global hotspot for the international drug trade. States like Venezuela need to be repaired for any progress to be made in combating this issue.
Transportation and Methods
Entry points for drugs into the U.S. are numerous, being brought in by land, air, and sea, and drug cartels have gotten extremely efficient and well organized in moving their product.
Drugs are often brought into the U.S. through Mexico, where they are either brought to through trucks or by sea, however a majority of drugs smuggled from Mexico are done with ground transportation (Medel, Lu, and Chow, 2015). Within Mexico the primary drug produced is methamphetamine, and its production has grown in recent years due to a decline in seizures of production labs (DEA, 2017a). Criminals in organizations as large as drug cartels do not make random movements or commit their crimes at random. As such, drug traffickers will attempt to go on the path of least resistance in order to reach their objective. Law enforcement in turn does DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 14 not appear randomly and goes where trouble is expected to increase. Because of the way law enforcement responds drug routes are constantly changing, making them increasingly harder to enforce and monitor. Drug trafficking performed by the large cartels earns them billions each year, with the U.S. market alone spending $109 billion annually on drugs (UNODC, 2017).
Within Mexico, drug cartels typically attempt to move around higher populated municipalities, especially those with elected officials from Mexico’s conservative National Action Party (PAN).
Areas that have recently elected PAN officials tend to have an increase in drug related violence, but this is not due to corruption but rather due to a response to attempted crackdowns being imposed. When crackdowns are imposed it does make it more difficult to operate in the short term; drug cartels think in the long term and see these crackdowns as a means to capture territory from other cartels, therefore increasing gang violence. Additionally, approximately twenty percent of homicides within Mexico actually result in an arrest, meaning that violence tends to go unpunished (Dell, 2015). Clashes between different drug cartels do have an effect on their routes; as when feuds and violence begin, law enforcement personnel are sent in to that area as well. But after law enforcement in an area increases because law enforcement personnel are now more heavily monitoring that area, drug traffickers deem it too risky to venture into and start taking alternate routes until the cycle begins again (Medel et al, 2015). Drug trafficking, like most industries, is looked at and done in a way that maximizes profit and minimizes costs all while taking the shortest and most efficient path to a destination. Loss of personnel, either through arrests or deaths, is seen as a cost as it affects current transportation routes and requires new strategic planning and personnel to be recruited. Mexican cartels are determined to move their product and have their methods and resources ready to be altered at any moment they feel they might be compromised. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 15
The approximate $64 billion in drug sales generated every year is fueled by major large- scale crime organization’s ability to transport and sell their product and hide their illicit proceeds within the banking system. Money laundering is the act of attempting to legitimize illegal proceeds generated by crime and making them appear legitimate. Numerous nations in the
Caribbean and South America have been accused by the U.S. of being major hotspots for the laundering of money, particularly in the illegal trade of narcotics (U.S. Department of State,
2018). Countries such as Haiti, Columbia, and Belize, have all been accused of being locations where drug money is legitimized. In Colombia, though, anti-money laundering rules meet international compliance standards, the state suffers from inherent underdeveloped institutional capacity, a lack of legal experts prosecuting financial crimes, and lack of communication between various agencies. Independent agencies within Colombia lack the resources to analyze all of the data, and though the U.S. has information and asset sharing agreements with Colombia that allow for joint investigations, but this does not allow for U.S. involvement in prosecution of
Colombian crimes. Weaknesses in reporting systems are also noted in the U.S. Department of
State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy, which summarizes that internal issues within
Colombia are allowing for money laundering to continue. The U.S. Department of State reports that Venezuela has even worse anti-money launder protections in place than Colombia (U.S.
Department of State, 2018). Primarily this is due to weak anti-money laundering policy and enforcement and general instability in the country. The U.S. Department of State also cites a general unwillingness to change the policy, though is not specific in what or why this lack of will exists. Later on, it does mention that money laundering within Venezuela is performed in a number of areas, such as agriculture and the petroleum industry, but the report also notes that government currency exchanges and commercial banks participate in money laundering. This DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 16 statement implies an amount of underlying layer of corruption within Venezuelan officials.
Despite things like a decrease in poverty and higher literacy rates in many South American countries, corruption as a whole has increased, and many Venezuelan leaders are often accused of colluding with Colombian drug producers (Price, 2013). Additionally, many areas in South and Central America rely on drug cartels for construction of roads and hospitals as well as employment for people, causing cartels to fill a gap the government is unable to. Many
Venezuelan policies, such as the Organic Law Against Organized Crime and Financing of
Terrorism, lack key enforcement mechanisms, which allow many underground dealings to slip through the cracks. Generally, within Venezuela, corruption and a lack of political will are seen as the biggest hindrances in solving crime issues. Oftentimes money generated from drugs from
Colombia will in turn be given to investors within Colombia in exchange for Colombian pesos, which in turn are exchanged for Venezuelan bolivars for an equivalent sum in order to obfuscate where the money originated from. It is currently unknown how Venezuela’s recent introduction of a new currency, prolonged economic issues, and hyperinflation of its old currency have affected the money laundering aspect of drug cartels; however, black markets within Venezuela have both persisted and thrived in 2018 (“Venezuela economy,” 2018).
Transportation Technology
Drug traffickers have numerous and constantly changing routes in order to get their products to their destinations. Land, sea, and air transportation are all used to ensure a timely and cost-efficient transportation of product. From the 1980s up until the turn of the century planes were the preferred method of transportation for getting drugs around. Secret air strips were built in Colombia, Mexico, and the U.S., and small aviation craft would transport product on them. As time went on this plane method became more difficult as the U.S. began discovering and DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 17 capturing these planes when they landed. Shortly after planes became less successful drug traffickers began to simply drop the product from the plane for others to pick up and bring to its destination. Dropping cargo from plain was also extremely complicated and provided less than satisfactory results as oftentimes cargo would get damaged, and mistakes could lead to some people dying. The continuing failure and complication of air transportation for drugs led to the rise of maritime transportation. Vessels that would become known as go-fast boats were the first attempt at maritime transportation. These go-fast boats were simply meant to small light ships that could go fast in order to transport their products as quickly as possible. Drugs would be piled on top of these small vessels with crews of around three to five people. The early go-fast ships became problematic as approximately fifty percent of them would sink in transit, wasting millions in drugs (Stelley & Nelson, 2013). Drug cartels wanted a fast, convenient, and reliable way to transport their product. Over the years maritime transportation for illegal drugs has manifested in three different types of vessels; the aforementioned go-fast boats, disguised vessels, and semi-submersible ships. Go-fast vessels have grown in effectiveness since their introduction and are still used as a quick way to transport product to Caribbean and Central
American states. But go-fast vessels lack subtly as product is simply stacked on the deck in plain sight for any security vessel to see. More recent models of go-fast boats have become increasingly more stealthy and harder to track by radar. When a go-fast vessel is spotted it is very easy to legally detain. Disguise vessels get around the issue of immediate capture as these vessels disguise themselves as innocent ships, such as fishing vessels. For the Coast Guard and other agencies to legally detain and capture ships illegal substances have to be found on board.
Because of these detaining rules disguised vessels will hide their product, typically within the hull of the ship or in other hard to access areas. If no drugs are found aboard a suspicious vessel DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 18 then it has to be set free under international law. Disguised vessels are typically stopped when spotted suspiciously far outside of their flagged states exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The U.S. has treaties and agreements with most Caribbean, South, and Central American governments that allow the U.S. to stop their suspicious vessels and detain them if illegal cargo is aboard. If a ship is stopped and no drugs are found the ship is legally innocent and thus can continue on its journey. Stopping ships for no reason does make the U.S. and the Coast Guard look bad and less reliable, which can lead to states questioning their effectiveness. As such the U.S. Coast Guard attempts to ensure that drugs are found on any vessel they stop.
The third and most effective type of vessel is the semi-submersible, first discovered by the Colombian Coast Guard in 1993 (Stelley & Nelson, 2013). As the name implies semi- submersible vessels are partially submerged in the water with only the top peaking out, only about a quarter of the vessel is visible above the waters surface, and have a carrying capacity of around eight tons with a typical crew size of four people. The semi-submerged nature makes these vessels extremely difficult to spot and spotting the vessels has become more difficult as there designs have evolved over the years. These semi-submersibles are typically designed in makeshift shipyards with the base of a go-fast boat that have been expanded and then covered with a ceiling. The drug cartels have then added pipes to the top of these vessels so that the crew may breathe. As these vessels have evolved they have gotten bigger and more aerodynamic which has allowed them to move their product faster and move more of it in a single trip. Drug cartels are able to get away with the construction of semi-submersibles due to them being constructed and stored in extremely remote areas of Colombia. Construction zones are typically in swampy remote areas where these crime organizations can work without disturbance. Though up close it may seem as though these somewhat makeshift and awkward vessels may seem like DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 19 they would stand out, on the open ocean due to their barely skimming the surface and the distances they keep from other vessels they become quite invisible to those attempting to find them. These vessels are typically painted in darker blues which, on the open ocean, is almost invisible to the naked eye. Even radar, sonar, and infrared systems can fail to detect these kinds of vessels due to the material used on the hull. Semi-submersibles can also carry some of the most drugs of these three kinds of vessels, with a single vessel able to carry multiple tons.
Though semi-submersibles lack the speed of go-fast vessels they make up for it with reliability and carrying capacity. Semi-submersibles do have to be made from scratch and parts rather than just using premade boats like go-fast and disguised ships do, and are typically scuttled after delivering their product, and as such they are some of the most difficult and expensive for crime organizations to obtain. In addition to these three types of vessels, there are other ways that drug cartels will attempt to transport their product. Typically when a semi-submersible or one of the other types of delivery vessels is stopped they will attempt to scuttle the ship or destroy the product so that the authorities have no evidence to prosecute them (Stelley & Nelson, 2013). The maritime drug trafficking methods typically take around ten days, with go-fast vessels only taking two or three days to make their voyage.
The main issue with semi-submersibles is that they are easily detected from the sky, and issue drug cartels have been working on minimizing. The aerial issue has led to one of the most innovative developments in using an inconspicuous vessel, similar to a disguised ship, with no drugs actually on board the ship. Instead what these vessels do is tow a small torpedo like device filled with drugs and a GPS tracker inside of it. When this vessel is stopped it will cut the line connected to the torpedo, legally making it so that the ship is committing no provable crime and therefore is released. After being stopped a second ship will use the GPS tracker that only cartel DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 20 ships could read in order to find the torpedo, pick it up, and continue on its journey. The torpedo method was developed as a safer and more reliable way to transport drugs that would be difficult for the U.S. and other security agencies to track. To make the disguise more believable the fishing vessels that are towing these torpedoes do actually fish, and all of the equipment on board that is used for drug smuggling doubles as standard fishing equipment. Suspicion by Coast
Guard personnel is no case for detainment, and because simple tools like GPS trackers and radios are common equipment onboard most ships, the Coast Guard cannot do anything except let them go. These torpedo vessels are one of the hardest to detect methods of drug trafficking due to the inability to incriminate the vessels that tow them. Devices like these are nearly impossible for the
U.S. Coast Guard to track, and even if suspicious of a vessel there is nothing they can do.
Methods like these are becoming more and more reliable for drug cartels, and the U.S. has no way to reliably and consistently capture them.
Air transportation has also made a recent resurgence in the drug trafficking industry.
These newer ultralight planes are only able to carry several hundred pounds worth of product at a time, significantly less than the several tons some ships can carry, but make up for it with speed and stealth (Medrano, 2012). These planes fly low to the ground and even if spotted by border authorities there is not too much that can be done. The most a border security agent can do is follow a plane to its landing spot as they cannot simply shot down an aircraft that is not posing an immediate threat. These aircraft take off from locations in Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico and will land so far as within the mainland U.S. (Medrano, 2012). These aircraft typically do not land, but instead get low to the ground in order to safely drop their load for others to pick up.
Drug traffickers have and always will find ways to move their product to where they want it to be. Due to how lucrative drug trafficking is the cartels are always able to develop and invest in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 21 new, more efficient, and safe ways to transport their product. The devices used by these crime organizations have evolved and are continuing to evolve every day, and these crime organizations have the money to back up these projects. It is getting harder and harder for Coast
Guard and Navy personnel to detect and incriminate these vessels, and the technology may eventually reach the point of full autonomy, with personnel able to pilot unmanned vehicles to where they need to be from hundreds of miles away giving no risk to personnel. It is more than likely that undetected unmanned devices have started being implemented, leaving virtually no risk for drug cartels to move their product.
There are no primary maritime routes that are taken as although it would make sense for these crime organizations to travel along the shortest route possible, it becomes too predictable for the U.S. Coast Guard and other allied Navies to predict and intercept. The routes drug traffickers take can change as often as monthly, meaning that the Coast Guard constantly needs to be alert and aware in nearly every part of the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Oftentimes drug trafficking vessels will travel out of Colombia and around the Southern side of the Galapagos
Islands then make their way into the Gulf of Tehuantepec where someone will receive their load, but if this route is still used is unknown (Stelley & Nelson, 2013). The exact routes and stops are constantly changing so it is impossible to ever get an exact route that can be monitored. Once one route becomes too risky, drug cartels will simply find another. Drug traffickers and the U.S.
Coast Guard are in a constant cycle of a new route being created, the Coast Guard finding and stopping ships in it, only for another new route to take its place. This game of cat and mouse between the Coast Guard and drug traffickers is unsustainable as technology develops and drug traffickers are more easily able to move their product. Typically, when moving product by sea
Mexico is the most common landing spot. After landing in Mexico the product will then make its DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 22 way into the U.S. along the borders of California, Arizona, New Mexico, or Texas (Medel et al.,
2015). Anything from trucks to small cars are used to move products across the border, and drugs can and are smuggled inside of shipping trucks alongside legitimate goods. Drug cartels have too many reliable methods of transporting their products that the U.S. and its allies can never hope to truly catch them all. Drug cartels are constantly adapting and innovating making drug seizures more and more difficult. The U.S. cannot hope to combat the cartels with mere security increases, and instead should look at cutting off the products at their source and stopping people from going into this industry altogether. Drug traffickers are getting increasingly more inventive with the technology they use to transport their product, and it is getting more difficult to capture them.
Mexico and the U.S. Border
As one of the most common points of entry for drugs in the U.S. is the U.S. – Mexico border; security along this border is critical. The U.S. has a number of agreements with Mexico about enforcement along the border and within Mexico, and while the U.S. cannot have military personnel operate within Mexico without permission, it does aid them in numerous other ways.
The Merida Initiative is a security agreement between the U.S. and Mexico that aimed at combating crime organizations through the sharing of intelligence, resources, and technology. In total in 2017 the U.S. has given Mexico $1.6 billion in technology and other equipment in order to combat the cartels. The U.S. has also begun to use drones to patrol the border as well as gather intelligence within Mexico on the locations and movements of drug trafficking personnel. The intelligence gathered by drones can then be used by Mexican security personnel to locate and arrest the suspected drug traffickers. Drones have even been suggested by U.S. House
Representative Silvestre Reyes to assassinate drug cartel leaders in an attempt at decapitation DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 23 strategy, which involves eliminating organization leaders believing that the organization will fall apart without them (Correa-Cabrera, Garrett, & Keck, 2014). This strategy has been opposed due to it involving an incredibly direct and significant incursion in a foreign state, that, even with the
Mexican government’s permission, could lead to escalation of U.S. military involvement and policing of foreign states. In 2018 drones have and are still exclusively used in Mexico with the governments permission for the purposes of gathering intelligence. Drug violence within Mexico has led to hundreds of thousands of immigrants to flee from Mexico into the U.S. Drug violence in Mexico has also led to U.S. Representatives to want to categorize certain cartel leaders as terrorists, which would allow for additional tools and assets to be used to combat them (Correa-
Cabrera, et al, 2014). This recategorization come from the cartels ability to undermine the law and democratic institutions in order to commit crimes that attempt to bring harm to others and incite fear among the populace. The U.S. does not want drug violence and cartel wars to spread into the U.S., and as such securing the Mexican border for the sake of national security is one of the highest concerns for the government.
Drug cartels sneaking their product through the U.S. – Mexican border brings forth the idea of a wall along said border. The ability of drugs and other illegal products to get through the border and be sold is a reason why drugs are a problem in the U.S. Migrants attempting to immigrate into the U.S. will also occasionally have drugs and other illegal products that the cartels have paid them to transport. The 2005 Real ID Act passed by congress was a modification to existing immigration laws, and, in addition to tightening migration laws for security purposes, allows the federal government to override any laws that may interfere with the construction of a border wall and construct it without hindrance. Many Mexican cities are dominated and functionally owned by cartels who have paid off local politicians and have recruiters all around. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 24
The dominance of the drug cartels in some areas in turn leads to people fleeing to the U.S. in search of a better life. But for every migrant that is searching for a better life, there will be those who are there to traffic illegal goods. The main issue is that when the U.S. lets in an illegal and undocumented immigrant, it does not know, nor does the U.S. have any way of knowing, the exact motives of said migrant and what they have brought with them. There is nothing wrong with offering to help foreign peoples to make their lives better, but when mass amounts of good people are getting through a border, the intelligent drug cartels see it as an opportunity to conduct their business. While a U.S. – Mexico border wall might be effective at stopping or at least deterring illegal immigration, it will likely have very little to no effect on smuggling and illegal trafficking. Illegal traffickers already use power tools and equipment to bypass places along the U.S. – Mexico border that are fenced off, and are quick enough at doing it that they can get in and out before border patrols is able to arrive (Flores, 2017). Flores compares several other states with walls around the world, such as Egypt and Israel and analyzes the effects they have had to argue how effective a U.S. – Mexico border wall could be. Flores concludes that while a
U.S. – Mexico border wall has the potential to reduce immigration by deterring them from attempting to cross, it will likely have little to no effect on illegal smuggling. Egypt’s wall along its border with Gaza was built specifically to stop smuggling rather than immigration, and, as such, is bombproof, made of highly durable steel, and goes twenty miles underground, and has not stopped smuggling completely, but has decreased it and forced traffickers to take massive detours. The U.S. – Mexico border wall proposed by President Trump would be primarily aimed at reducing immigration, and would likely have minimal effect on illegal trafficking. Drug traffickers attempting to get into the U.S. already have underground tunnels, equipment to get through or over a wall, and are more than well financed and supplied enough to go around a wall. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 25
Unless the U.S. – Mexico border wall is similar to the Egyptian – Gaza wall it will only be a very short-term inconvenience for the drug cartels. The Gaza – Egypt border is also only 7.5-miles, compared to the approximately 1933-mile U.S. – Mexican border, which would make an anti- smuggling wall built with steel that runs underground ludicrously more expensive than just a standard border wall. With how well informed and staffed many cartels are they likely already have plans in place to work around a new border wall. Additionally, many drugs currently being trafficked are hidden among shipments of legal goods, and as such unless all trade is denied along the Mexican – U.S. border drug shipments will not be affected.
Drug cartels are not a simple issue that can be pushed back or kept at bay by simply securing borders, they are already in the U.S. and can get in and out with relative ease. Drug cartels have purchased property along the U.S. – Mexico border for the express purpose of funneling drugs, and from 2006 to 2017 more than 80 tunnels have been discovered along the border, and these are just the ones that are known (Bagott, 2017). The drug cartels are not just an issue the U.S. can keep south of the border, it is already internal. It is believed that there are sects of these cartels operating in over 200 cities within the U.S., in cities such as Phoenix and Atlanta
(Bagley, 2015). Border communities are especially at risk, as many people within these communities on both sides of the U.S. – Mexico border often cross the border for work or to visit family on a regular basis. The U.S. has National Guard troops stationed in the four major border states, but still this is not enough to stop, or even hinder, the influx of drugs to the U.S.
Currently within Mexico drug related violence is reaching an all-time high, but only approximately 25 percent of crimes in Mexico are reported, and only a fraction of those crimes are ever investigated (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). The massive crime organizations within Mexico are extremely violent and well supplied with weapons. These crime organizations have no DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 26 problems with the killing of law enforcement personnel in brutal ways, such as decapitation, and are willing to publicly display their deeds as a message to others who may seek to incriminate them. The publicity of killings in Mexico is used as an intimidation tactic to scare both civilians and law enforcement into conforming. Unfortunately, the availability of data for violence performed by drug cartels from the Mexican government is limited due to lack of reporting of crimes as well as internal issues and lack of communication within the Mexican government and
Mexican security institutions (Shirk & Wallman, 2015). But high levels of crime do not necessarily translate to high violence, and as such levels of violence over the past decade in
Mexico have greatly varied. 2013 saw a 16 percent drop in violence within Mexico, a trend that continued in 2014, but in 2017 the homicide rate has risen to just over twenty per 100,000 inhabitants, four more than in 2012 (Statista, 2018). While the U.S. and Mexico do cooperate on intelligence and certain joint actions against cartels, Mexico is a sovereign state and is responsible for its own internal violence. However, when said violence causes issues for its neighbors it then become an international issue that should be combatted collectively.
U.S. Coast Guard Methodology
The US Coast Guard and other maritime security organization will attempt to locate ships in a number of ways. The main methods of locating ships are with radar, sonar, infrared, and by simply keeping watch for vessels that are seemingly out of place. The Coast Guard has ships and aircraft patrolling the area in order to spot smugglers. Infrared cameras are crucial during the night as it can be extremely difficult to spot ships otherwise. Any small innocent fishing vessels that are suspiciously far outside of their flagged states exclusive economic zone are usually always stopped due to suspicion that they are illegally smuggling. Additionally, a vessel being unflagged is grounds for the Coast Guard to stop them. A go-fast boat will typically always have DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 27 its drugs plainly out in the open, so there is no real search required on these ships. The coast guard will simply detain the personnel involved and seize the illegal cargo. On disguised vessels the drug traffickers will claim that they are innocent and are simple fishermen, and the coast guard will have to search the ship in order to incriminate them. On disguised vessels the Coast
Guard may even need to tear into the walls to find the illegal cargo, and on occasion they do end up with nothing. In addition to hurting the Coast Guard’s reputation and credibility, when a ship is stopped and nothing illegal is found on board, the ship will have to be set free. As such the
Coast Guard attempt to always ensure that when a ship is stopped that it is suspicious enough for illegal cargo to be onboard. Semi-submerged vessels are the hardest for the Coast Guard to spot as from another vessel the semi-submerged ships are nearly invisible. From the air semi- submerged ships are much easier to spot, though they have gotten better at disguising overtime with less pipping on top as well as sleeker and smaller designs. At night however, due to a semi- submerged vessels anti-infrared coat, these ships are nearly impossible to spot and are, for all intents and purposes, invisible. This invisibility makes semi-submerged vessels the most dangerous for the Coast Guard. Semi-submerged vessels are guaranteed to have illegal product aboard them and are pursued immediately whenever they are spotted. When a semi-submerged vessel is spotted the Coast Guard will pursue it and attempt to board it. When pursued semi- submerged vessels will often attempt to scuttle themselves in order to destroy the product and escape. If no product is found the ship has to be set free, and under international law since the ship has sunk the men who were aboard it are stranded and have to be aided and helped back home. Because of the scuttling issue the Coast Guard will typically attempt to tie the semi- submerged vessel to their own ship before it is able to disappear. Detained persons are then transported to their home states where they are transferred to local authorities. They are tried in DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 28 whatever state they are originally from and as such the chances of criminals being prosecuted hinges on the effectiveness of their native legal system.
The amount of drugs actually being intercepted is almost completely unimportant to look at. The Coast Guard prevents millions of dollars’ worth of drugs from being brought into the
U.S. every year, but has only an extremely minor impact on the approximately $34 billion worth of cocaine revenue made from the U.S. every year (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2017a).
There is no way for the Coast Guard to intercept all of the drugs that attempt to enter the U.S., and even if an effective new tactic or technique were to be created it would be quickly countered.
The amount of drugs being intercepted and seized by authorities is inconsequential, and the amount of drugs getting through borders is more than enough for cartels to not only exist, but thrive. It will always be necessary to secure borders and attempt to have peace on the high seas, but a state cannot do it and expect any of these issues of high crime to go away and for organizations to just give up.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), established in 1982, establishes all of the laws and procedures in ocean boundaries, borders, laws, and procedures.
The convention currently has 157 signatories with 60 ratifications, and the procedures UNCLOS sets up are followed by every state that is in any way involved in the maritime domain making
UNCLOS one of the most widespread and widely followed UN conventions. UNCLOS allows for each state to have twelve nautical miles Territorial Sea, which is considered a part of that states territory and they are legally allowed to perform any actions they desire within this
Territorial Sea. Military vessels, such as the U.S. Coast Guard or Navy, are not legally allowed to enter another state’s territorial sea without specific permission from said state. Past this
Territorial Sea is the Contiguous Zone which extends up to an additional twelve nautical miles DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 29 under which a state is given partial sovereign control over it in order to control things like immigration and customs enforcement. Past the Contiguous Zone extending 200 nautical is a states Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which a state has exclusive access to the marine resources, but other states are allowed to freely move in and out of it so long as they do not attempt to exploit the marine resources. Finally, past the EEZ are the High Seas, which are simultaneously owned by everyone and no one. The UNCLOS definition for the High Seas means that states cannot block other states access to the High Seas or their resources. All states have a right to fish and explore the High Seas, and there are no formal requirements or enforcement mechanisms. The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS and as such is not technically bound by its terms, however the U.S. follows UNCLOS and all of its conditions and acknowledges it as establishing the rights and responsibilities of nations on the seas. As such the
U.S. and its Coast Guard, Navy, and flagged vessels will follow all UNCLOS rules and will never violate them.
When trafficking drugs, as previously established, many trafficking vessels will disguise themselves as fishing vessels in order to inconspicuously move their product, and under
UNCLOS they are not doing anything wrong. Because of lack of enforcement mechanisms on the High Seas when illegal activity is conducted states can and will intercept it, but only if they are absolutely certain there is illegal activity being conducted. When the Coast Guard does spot a small Colombian fishing vessel 100 miles outside of its states EEZ it is a safe assumption that they are attempting to illegally traffic goods. UNCLOS also mandates that vessels on the seas must aid ships in distress, and as such when a drug running semi-submersible successfully scuttles itself to dispose of the evidence the Coast Guard vessel that was pursuing it now legally has to aid the traffickers and return them to their home state. Since the semi-submersible was DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 30 scuttled the traffickers not only were given a free ride back home, but also there is now zero evidence with which to incriminate them. Under UNCLOS the U.S. and any other state cannot leave them to drown, they have to be saved. Additionally, to actually stop these vessels the U.S.
Coast Guard does need permission from their home states, which the U.S. has been given by nearly every Caribbean, Central, and South American state through various treaties and agreements, the primary exception being Cuba. The U.S. and every Caribbean, Central, and
South American states are signatories of U.N. International Drug Control Conventions, which lay the groundwork for attempting to stop the international drug trade. The United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 does lay out the groundwork for how states should interact to combat this, with Article 6 stating that states must allow for and provide legal assistance to other states searching their vessels for illegal substances. Seizing a vessel and not finding any illegal substances aboard can cause controversy as a state has just wrongfully infringed on another states right of innocent passage and freedom of travel on the seas. This UN convention calls for international cooperation and sharing of technology, as well as cooperation in the seizure and stopping of suspected vessels. Through intergovernmental agreements the U.S. and its Coast Guard are allowed to stop and temporarily detain any vessel suspected of illegal trafficking.
U.S. and Future Strategies
U.S. legalization of certain drugs to hinder the illegal drug trade, such as marijuana, can be seen as a method of cutting off the Central and South cartels from the major U.S. market.
With legal pathways to obtain drugs people will completely abandon the shady and unreliable methods of procurement that they had previously been forced to use. However, drug legalization can hypothetically lead to an increase in crime under the belief that people would commit crimes DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 31 due to the influence of drugs. Oftentimes this is presented in a similar manner to intoxicated driving as drugs can cause similar impairments, however like driving under the influence, driving while under the effects of drugs would be monitored and regulated by highway patrol and other law enforcement personnel. People operating vehicles in the U.S. are already prohibited from drinking alcohol, and as such a similar law would be in effect for legalized drugs. Similar to alcohol, there would be a threat of an increase in crime from persons under the influence of drugs, however there would also be a decrease in other drug crimes, such as illegal exchange and possession. With legalization will come legitimate and taxable businesses who would follow laws and regulations put in place to allow for a safe use by the populace. People are already willing to kill and steal for drugs providing incredible profits for their dealers, legalization would virtually eliminate these crimes by providing a relatively cheap and simple alternative that people can take. In theory these legal drug businesses will push out the drug cartel markets as there will be little to no market remaining thus making it not profitable to transport drugs in to begin with. However, this is under the assumption that all drugs that are currently being illegally trafficked are legalized. While some drugs, such as marijuana, have gained a recent trend of being seen as safe and with nine states legalizing it, other drugs such as cocaine and heroin, have an extensive list of dangers and are not seen as safe by the general public nor by those in power. As such it is unlikely that all forms of drugs will become legal in the U.S. in the foreseeable future, meaning that drug cartels will only take a minor hit to the U.S. drug market. Any damage that makes this illegal business less profitable is a good thing as the riskier and less profitable this activity becomes, the less likely they are to attempt it.
There are ethical arguments over the legalization of all drugs, primarily that individuals should be able to decide for themselves whether they want to subject themselves to substances DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 32 that are potentially harmful. Additionally, it is also argued that subjecting oneself to drugs should not constitute a crime as it does not inherently harm or affect other persons, and thus why should people be regulated on what the subject their bodies to (Cachanosky et al, 2013). Many drugs do have hallucinogenic and other effects that could potentially lead to violence against others, and as such the government should always regulate and monitor drug usage, as well as inform its populace of the potential dangers. It becomes a matter of trying to balance the rights of the individual versus the safety of the populace, and there is an unknown factor how much drug related violence would increase if all forms of currently illegal substances were legalized. The primary potential good to come out of it would be the loss of the U.S. market for these drug cartels who now would have completely lost the U.S market in favor of legal substitutes. Legal substitutes would also have to have better prices than the illegal market, which currently prices cocaine at approximately $160 per gram, and heroin at $902 per gram, otherwise the people who already buy from the illegal market will continue to do so to save money(Drug Enforcement
Administration, n.d.). It is possible that in response to this dramatic loss of a market that these crime organizations would reformat themselves to become legal businesses which distribute drugs, but if they are no longer committing a crime and becoming more legitimate businesses then there is no longer a problem. However, it is unlikely that these crime organizations will give up the power and freedom that a life of crime provides, as they are willing to murder to grab power and territory and become an intimidating and powerful force. As such drug cartels may resort to violence in retaliation and lash out against their neighbors leading to an increase in drug violence in South and Central American states. Drug cartels will begin fighting each other over the now significantly smaller market of the Caribbean, South, and Central America, and, as they have proven in the past, are more than willing to murder one another for territory. Drug DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 33 legalization would see an overall decrease in international trafficking, however it could potentially lead to an increase in gang violence both within the U.S. and within its overseas allies unless steps are prematurely taken to better manage this potential crisis. All of this being said the current war on drugs is not performing well, and with the U.S.’s current strategy there will likely be no decrease in illegal drug usage, trafficking, or violence. Calling the war a failure and legalizing would see the decrease in drug related crime in the long term, and in the short term the
U.S. would need to aid its allies in disposing of what is left of drug cartels. Federal legalization of at least marijuana would be a good start to at least slightly hinder drug cartels, but full legalization of all drugs would be a double-edged sword as a means of viciously hurting cartels, who would then likely retaliate in a violent manner. Cartels cannot be dealt with in a single swift action, they can and will retaliate. These are crime organizations who have shown the capability and willingness to murder to get what they want. These crime organizations need to be slowly bled to death with policy that involves harming their ability to make money from drugs as well as that interrupts their flow of cash and makes it more difficult to operate in a region. As such the
U.S. cannot solve this issue by itself, international issues require international coordination to be solved.
The primary issue with current drug policy in the world is that it is focused in the wrong area. Security, not health or individuals has been the focus of U.S. drug policy, aimed at eliminating, deterring, and destroying drug cartels and their traffickers and attempting to completely eliminate the crime, and not merely reduce it. The International Drug Policy
Consortium has shown that drug strategies and policies that aimed at eliminating or significantly reducing the drug market have failed, and that instead have merely diverted funding from more proven methods, such as public health and development (International Drug Policy Consortium, DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 34
2018). This is not to say that security-based methods have not and cannot work, but more so that they should be designed to work in tandem with public health and development policies. The
Colombian coca suppression efforts from 2007 to 2013 saw a reduction in the amount of coca being grown, and when these efforts were discontinued coca growth in the region has been growing annually ever since. Security methods like coca suppression should be revived and reviewed as clearly, they were effective. Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales and many other world leaders have made the assertion that drug control and suppression policy needs to focus on people and not just the substances (UN News, 2016). The U.S. needs to work with its allies not only in military communication, but also economically in order to support and bolster local economies. Many of the people who traffic drugs and go into crime in general do not do so because of the money as payouts are rather poor for anyone who is not on top. On average a two week trip will only pay at most $5,000 and also subject the crew to cramp and cold conditions
(Stelley & Nelson, 2013). The amount of money that illegal traffickers earn on their trips is pathetic compared to the amount that a trip is bringing in. Most do not want to go into this illegal business but do so because they simply have no other options. Additionally, many of the cartels who control entire towns with politicians and law enforcement on their payroll will attempt to recruit young men into their ranks in order to bolster their numbers and prolong their existence.
Many of these people do not have other opportunities to progress in their lives and not only do these cartels offer employment, but also create a sense of belonging those who are lost and unsure about their futures.
One of the U.S. attempted strategies has been decapitation, which involves assassinating cartel leaders in the hope that the entire organization will fall apart. Removing a leader of a large-scale cartel can be an effective strategy but it is also an unreliable one. Philips (2015) notes DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 35 that a lot of the time terrorist and guerrilla groups leadership can cause the collapse of the organization, or at the very least heavily hinder and fragment it. Forced leadership change is often the result of the unexpected arrest or elimination of a leader, but new leaders often lead to uncertainty in the rest of the organization becoming uncertain, and therefore disrupting their operations. Philips also notes that removal of leadership does generally decrease violence over time. However, leadership removal can also have martyr effects where sympathy is developed, and revenge is sought when a leader is removed. But, the exact leadership roles and personnel differ between a terrorist group and a criminal organization. Whereas terrorists typically join an organization due to a belief in a specific movement, such as a regime change or policy opposition, criminals join their organizations for monetary and material incentive. While in the short term the removal of a leader may lead to a decrease in crime and products shipped, this is only for the short term. Unlike a terrorist organization, criminal organizations are primarily concerned with money, and so long as there is money in the business they will persist. Terrorist organizations can have charismatic leaders who convince people to join for the greater good, but criminal organizations and their members are concerned with the flow of cash. Leadership removal can hinder the flow of paychecks in the short term, as well as have been seen to have a decrease in violence in places like Mexico, but in the long-term violence and crime resulting from criminal organizations either remain the same or increase (Phillips, 2015). This strategy, known as decapitation strategy can also potentially lead to an even greater increase in crime as various rival cartels will attempt to conquer and the territory of the now weakened cartel, and steal their business. Cartels are more than willing to use violence, murder, and intimidation to get their way and to get law enforcement and civilians out of an area and off of their tail.
Decapitation strategy will more than likely just decrease stability in a region, rather than DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 36 decrease the crime rate like it is intended. Decapitation strategy results in the issue of viewing large-scale criminal organizations in the same way as political organizations, in that the leadership is where everything is stemming from.
Governments do have a responsibility to educate their populace about the dangers of drugs, as well as the threat of cartels and gangs that distribute them. Most people in the U.S. are completely aware of the danger’s drugs may inflict upon them but still decide to use them.
Oftentimes they may be tricked in to trying them and become quickly addicted, but regardless of the reasons there will always be substance abusers and the government will never be able to completely eliminate the demand for drugs in the U.S. It is not plausible for any nation, especially one as large and diverse as the U.S., to convince its entire population to never use drugs, there will always be substance abusers and it is naïve to believe that the US government can convince or manipulate all of its people into quitting drugs altogether. Since there is demand there will always be supply, and as such the U.S. and its allies should focus on making being a supplier less fruitful. The U.S. should aim on supporting the economies of its Southern neighbors and help them grow and develop, creating valuable allies in the future. Similar to China’s involvement in Africa, the U.S. could send aid, donate and work with them to create ports and grow infrastructure, and share technology. In turn as these states develop not only will it be more difficult for cartels to hide, but there would be less people willing to join them as new job opportunities become available. Additionally, greater economic strength will make it easier to track down both drug traffickers and their cartels, making it more and more difficult for them to operate. However, much of this would rely on the planning and commitment of persons in power in these states, and with how corrupt many of these states are it may be difficult to find persons with the will to achieve a more prosperous future. DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 37
Fixing the economies and societies in South and Central America sounds reasonable, but is a task that would take decades of work and requires the commitment of personnel in power in these states. Many politicians in states like Venezuela and Colombia are on the pay grade of these large crime organizations, and as such to convince them to take dramatic and sweeping action to eliminate crime would also require convincing them to take a pay cut and give up power. These politicians by taking money from crime organizations have already demonstrated that they put their own personal profits above the safety and well-being of their own people, and as such it is unlikely that even if presented with a perfect plan for eliminating crime that they would want to support it. Additionally, these large crime organizations will often attempt to manipulate people and businesses by kidnapping and ransoming those close to them. Kidnap ransoming is estimated to earn crime organizations somewhere between $200 and $500 million annually, and showcasing that these crime organizations have gotten more bold and are pursuing larger and more consequential agendas (Panner, 2012). In turn this kidnap ransoming as well as a general increase in organized crime has caused many in the region to attempt to flee to the U.S., which these crime organizations have also monopolized by smuggling migrants across the border for money (Cachanosky et al, 2013). This migrant smuggling in turn creates a vicious cycle where crime increase, the regular populace wants to leave out of fear for their lives and their families, and the crime organizations aid them in leaving. Even worse is that crime organizations have taken businesses and law enforcement personnel under their control in order to have them both transport their product and ensure that it is not interrupted on its voyage. While negotiating with these businesses and law enforcement personnel oftentimes those who do not agree to aid them will be killed, setting an example for others who may have second thoughts of joining them
(economist link below). There are even reports of media personnel who attempt to report on DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 38 these issues being mysteriously assassinated. In Honduras alone between 2009 and 2012 at least
25 journalists were killed who were investigating drug related violence, trafficking, and corruption (Cachanosky et al, 2013). The large crime organizations have ingrained themselves into the economies and societies of Central and South American countries, and it is unlikely that any effort will be able to push them without extensive time, commitment, and effort put in.
It is going to take several years, if not decades, of work and commitment within the U.S. and its allies in order to make any progress in solving this issue. Since this will take numerous years to see anything at all truly improve the U.S. needs to be prepared to play the long game. On top of this, the U.S. and its allies need to be constantly reviewing their situation and alter their plans as needed at least every few years if not annually. Drug cartels will not simply ignore actions against them that are aimed at eliminating them, and will likely retaliate with new technology, propaganda, and even violence. Annual reviews and of international policy must be taken, otherwise cartels and crime organizations will constantly find workarounds rendering the original polices moot. There are dedicated people within the Mexican and other governments, such as previous Mexican president Felipe Calderón who attempted to stop drug violence and corruption. President Calderón eventually discovered that a lot of the corruption within Mexico was so deep rooted it would be nearly impossible to get rid of. International issues like these need to be solved cooperatively with the U.S. investing in countries like Mexico to improve their infrastructure and bolster their economies. Investments into construction and upgrading of ports will open better opportunities for the populace and slowly make illegal drugs less profitable in the area. To tackle this dynamic issue the U.S. and its allies need to be constantly sharing technology, information, and have people constantly working to combat this issue. Drug trafficking is not an issue that can ever truly be solved, merely diminished, and it will take many DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 39 years to see results. The U.S. needs to work to improve the economies and quality of life of these
Central and South American states, and by investing in them will create valuable allies for the future. Economic improvements are critical as the U.S. cannot hope to stop cartels with brute force alone. The rapidly advancing technology available to cartels, such as semi-submersibles and towed torpedoes, is making trafficking more reliable for these criminals. States this close to the U.S. could make for great trade alliances in the future that will bolster both their economy along with the U.S.’s. Drug trafficking is a risky and unrewarding business, but people from these weak nations go into it simply because they have no choice. By improving Mexico and other states the Mexico U.S. border should end up as the last line of defense against drug violence, and not the first.
Conclusion
The U.N. has called the current state of drug policy in the world a failure, as the world has seen recent increases in both trafficking and usage. U.S. drug policy historically has focused on criminalization and security as deterrent mechanisms, relying on drugs being too dangerous to own or trade. But this strategy has been an unfocused failure. The U.S. has no plan for where it wants to be in the future and is more concerned with attempting to keep things as they are. But their enemies are not and are rapidly developing to the point where we will be unable to detect, capture, and halt their activities, such as with a completely submersible vessel. Currently, the
U.S. does not have a strategy, they are relying on security to keep them safe. The U.S. needs to focus on where they want to be in ten years, analyze what is wrong, and what is within their power to fix it. Legalization of drugs is only a small step in solving this issue, and one that is not likely to occur for more dangerous drugs like cocaine and heroin. Money laundering and corruption need to be tackled in states like Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela in order for these DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 40 cartels to truly be disbanded. Making both recruitment and money laundering difficult is the best path forward. As such, improving these states and improving their economies is the only way to both tackle this issue and create valuable allies in the region. Even if the U.S. were to suddenly destroy every international crime organization in Central and South America, then new ones would rise up to replace them again and again.
International illegal trafficking is not an issue where the U.S. can just implement a new plan for 2019 and expect results by 2020. It will take decades of commitment and support to see results and will see not only a decrease in drug trafficking and usage, but a better economy for both the U.S. and its Southern allies. On top of this, the U.S. and its allies need to be constantly reviewing their situation and alter their plans as needed at least every few years if not annually.
Drug cartels will not simply ignore actions against them that are aimed at eliminating them, and will likely retaliate with new technology, propaganda, and even violence. The U.S. and its allies need to set up intergovernmental organizations that are constantly working on and adapting to this issue. The U.S. and Mexico do currently share intelligence, but that is mostly so the U.S. can attempt to solve the issue itself. But there are limits to what the U.S. can do within other sovereign states. They cannot patrol or enforce in places like Mexico without permission from their governments, and the Mexican government is not simply going to allow the U.S. to police it. An international task force able to operate within Mexico would be able to combat these crime organizations better than something like the Coast Guard who are restricted to operating outside of Mexican and other states borders. Making Mexico into a stronger ally that is economically secure and able to better manage cartels and crack down on violence as well as internal corruption. Economically Mexico and many other nations in the area are weak, and thus a lot of people end up joining these cartels with no other options. Opportunities need to be given to DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 41 weaken cartels thus making them less profitable and making drug trafficking an unreliable business. The issue of drug trafficking has only gotten more severe in recent years with more and more drugs being trafficked, and unless the U.S. reevaluates its strategy, there is little hope of stopping this issue.
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN THE CARIBBEAN 42
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