Ukrainian Armed Forces in Close Co-operation with NATO

By Major Hennadiy Kovalenko*

‘...If threats arise, will military personnel of the former Soviet and . The structure of the Armed find itself acting as part Union but unfortunately it did not in- Forces of Ukraine was made up of about of a coalition, or will it need herit a hierarchical structure with a Min- 6500 tanks, more than 7000 armoured to act alone?’ istry of Defence and a General Staff as combat vehicles, 1500 combat aircrafts and (Sherr James 2003: 7) such. It was some kind of military muscle more than 350 ships. Moreover, there were without a skeleton, a heart and, most im- 1272 strategic nuclear warheads on inter- 1. Introduction and historical portantly, a brain. continental ballistic , and 2500 tac- background Ukraine established its own Armed tical nuclear missiles. Not necessary to Forces on 24 1991 with more mention here, is how much it cost to It finally seems as if military reorgani- than 780.000 military personnel. The maintain this huge force ensuring their zation in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is structure of the Armed Forces at the time high readiness and proper capabilities. The no longer only a buzzword. At first glance was exactly like the one of the republics worst thing was that the Armed Forces it seems pretty simple to reorganise a small in the big Soviet empire with the centre did not have enough experience or a suf- part of society, but consider the situa- in Moscow. The Ukrainian Armed Forces ficient ability to act independently. Al- tion ten or twelve years ago. In 1991, consisted of three military districts with though Ukraine repatriated more than Ukraine inherited 30 per cent of the total their respective headquarters in , 12.000 military personnel who refused to * Major Hennadiy Kovalenko of the is currently a student of the Joint Command and General Staff Course of the Baltic Defence College.

112 serve in the new independent country, it a 17 per cent share in the military-in- independent state. So far so good, but absorbed almost 33.000 servicemen from dustrial complex output, while 1840 the state must not stand still, and the other former republics of the Soviet enterprises and research centres em- movement should be done in the right Union. For instance, the Ukrainian Air ployed 2.7 million people on a perma- direction. The purpose of this article is Force, which was formed on the basis of nent basis.”1 to elaborate how the Ukraine – NATO the staff of the twenty-fourth Air Army, relationship has developed and, most consisted of four Air Corps, ten Air Di- The most important was that the com- importantly, what steps must be taken in visions, forty-nine Air Regiments, eleven mand, control, communications and in- order to accelerate the process of coop- separated squadrons, training centres and formation (C3I) systems of the Ukrainian eration in the near future. special institutions; a total of about 600 Armed Forces were closely linked with the military units, 2800 aircraft and helicop- corresponding systems in the Russian 2. Steps taken ters and more than 120.000 military per- Federation. It is understandable that the sonnel. According to Leonid Polyakov whole military structure at that time was Obviously, the Ukrainian Armed and Anatoliy Tkachuk´s (“Security Sector designed to deal with defensive operations Forces needed reforms not in the distant Expert Formation: Achievements and against a military threat posed by NATO future but as soon as possible. The time Needs in South East Europe”): as well as with offensive operations led factor was significant in order to avoid “In 1991, some 150 colleges and uni- directly from Moscow. interference from abroad as well as to versities were located within Ukraine. Fortunately, Ukraine was not faced with minimise meddling of some irresponsible One-third were military counterparts. political difficulties in the process of es- politicians or even criminal elements in At the same time, a total of over 300 tablishing its independence. The country its development. Undoubtedly, during specifically military oriented research followed the lead of the Baltic countries, that period Ukraine in general, and the institutions and design bureaus existed and there was not so much opposition Ukrainian Armed Forces in particular, as well in Ukraine. According to statis- from Moscow at the time. It allowed avoid- were extremely vulnerable and sensitive. tical data, a total of 1344 scientific and ing bloodshed or repeating the Romanian The first stage of the official reforms educational centres carried out mili- or Yugoslav scenario. Actually, it was one of the Armed Forces was between 1991 tary-oriented research work. During the of the most important facts at the initial and 1996. This stage played a significant time of the USSR, Ukraine comprised stage in the process of developing a new role because of its impact on the next steps

113 of the development of the Ukrainian manders, army commanders, corps and in which the forces could be deeply in- Armed Forces. Someone great said that division commanders were changed. This volved. It is understandable that the State even the longest trip in the world begins happened at the first, the most impor- Programme for the Armed Forces Devel- with the first step. In the first stage of the tant, stage of the reforms and develop- opment until 2005 had to be adjusted and reforms the following steps had been ment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. improved. taken: In 1996, the National Security and Yevgen Marchuk, Minister of Defence – The legislative basis was established, Defence Council (NSDC) under the presi- and former Secretary of the National Se- – The institutional basis was created, dency of Volodymir Horbulin, drafted curity and Defence Council said: – The command and control structures up a National Security Concept, which “We are faced with a contradictory were finally adopted, was approved in January 1997 by the situation. The economy is not capable – The current executive structures and Ukrainian Parliament (). to finance security structures the way supporting structures were drafted. At the same time, the State Programme they should be financed, and because A significant number of the legislative for the Armed Forces Development until of that, the structures which are sup- acts in the military sphere were adopted: 2005 was adopted in accordance with a posed to see to internal or external se- The Concept for Defence and Organisation Presidential Decree. Between 1997 and curity become sources of additional ten- of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Laws “On 1999, the programme tried to provide a sion in society themselves. The state of Defence of Ukraine”, “On the Armed special basis for the development of the affairs is such that optimisation of the Forces of Ukraine”, the modern Armed Forces in order to create security structures cannot be executed of Ukraine, and the resolution “On Secu- effective high readiness and deployable promptly and properly or radically be- rity Council of Ukraine”. forces, which will be capable of dealing cause all such measures must be aug- At the same time, there were signifi- with the full range of conflicts. mented by the social adaptation pro- cant difficulties concerning leadership and Significant changes in the global secu- grams. That is why we have to find guidance. From 1991 to 1996, three Min- rity situation confronted the Ukrainian ”golden middle” in the future reforms.” isters of Defence and four Chiefs of Gen- Armed Forces with new challenges. Par- eral Staff changed in office. More than 70 ticularly so with respect to the nature of The period from 1996 till now could per cent of the staff personnel were ro- modern warfare and the forms and meth- be characterised as a further re- tated, and almost all military district com- ods of contemporary military conflicts, organisation and development of the

114 Ukrainian Armed Forces. The steps that were made. Some of these crucial steps can It allows for observing the current pro- have already been taken, particularly in be elaborated as follows: cess and provides the possibility of mak- the military area, could be evaluated from Firstly, the number of troops and the ing necessary corrections and improve- the current perspective. It was an extremely equipment of the Armed Forces were sub- ments. Obviously, dealing with a huge painful process because of the tradition stantially reduced in order to improve and inert object such as the Armed Forces of a strong military community as well as their capabilities and to cut the expenses is time consuming and requires a sus- quite strong support that the military of their maintenance. Moreover, a joint tained and strenuous effort. enjoyed in the society. Nevertheless, it was approach to military operations by the done in order to address the pressing is- MoD, the Armed Forces and other force 3. Ukraine and international sues and to improve the situation. structures was established. organisations First of all, the most important factor Secondly, the Concept of the Armed is the political decision of the Ukrainian Forces 2010 and the State Programme of Now it is time to go from the internal authorities on the non-nuclear status of the Armed Forces Transition Towards current events to the international posi- the state. It was probably one of the most Manning on a Contract Basis were tion of Ukraine in general and of the significant events in contemporary history adopted. Ukrainian Armed Forces in particular. As because it was the first time a state rejected Thirdly, the Law on the Foundations the U.S. President George W Bush stated nuclear weapons on its own initiative. It of National Security was approved by the in his speech in Warsaw in June 2001, “I seems appropriate to admit here, that Verkhovna Rada on 19 June 2003. believe in NATO membership for all of Ukraine followed and Kazakhstan Finally, the draft Military Doctrine was Europe’s democracies that seek it and are in this particular decision. As a consequence approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 8 ready to share the responsibilities that of this process, in the beginning of June April 2003. This Doctrine is newly updated NATO brings.” In order to follow up on 1996 there were no longer any nuclear and gives the main framework for the fu- this statement, some general points con- weapons in Ukraine. Nevertheless, from ture development of the Ukrainian defence cerning the necessity of cooperation time to time the idea of having nuclear policy in general, and the future of the should be mentioned here. Refusing par- weapons is raised by some political observ- Ukrainian Armed Forces in particular. ticipation in the international institutions ers. Furthermore, other important steps All these events certainly reflect that at the beginning of the twenty-first cen- were taken and some important decisions national defence is being planned actively. tury simply means exclusion from the

115 most important processes in the political ‘Building the Future for the NATO – This vision is reflected in the official sphere as well as reducing the impact on Ukraine Relations’. At the conference, position of the Ukrainian government: the most important regions of the world. former U.S .National Security Adviser according to the 23 May 2002 declaration In other words, nowadays it is quite easy Zbigniew Brzezinski, one of the most of the Ukrainian National Security and for a state to put itself in difficult cir- experienced persons in the relationship Defence Council, NATO membership is cumstances and in an inconvenient envi- between the USA and the former Soviet the ‘long-term goal’. According to this state- ronment by cutting the programmes of republics, stated: ment it seems useful to consider the rela- international cooperation. On the other “NATO is now entering the third tionship between NATO and Ukraine. hand, active participation in international phase of its post – Cold adapta- Actually, the process of cooperation and institutions such as NATO, OSCE etc. as tion. The first – the Warsaw phase – partnership began even earlier. Since 1997, well as in international exercises creates a involved the strategic enlargement of Ukraine has been one of the most active lot of new opportunities for the state to the Euro-Atlantic space by inclusion participants in the exercises under the Part- promote its national interests and derive in NATO of , the Czech Repub- nership for Peace (PfP) programme. Its practical benefits. The rich and powerful lic, and Hungary. The second – the troops have participated in more than 80 countries can advance their interests uni- Vilnius phase – now underway, involves military exercises since this programme was laterally, by using their national power, the political conflation of NATO’s as launched in 1994. Moreover, Ukraine is wealth and their natural resources, but well as the EU’s eastern boundaries by home for NATO PfP Training Centre at Ukraine has to choose multilateral frame- the almost simultaneous and overlap- Yavoriv and hosts several military exercises work in order to achieve its interests and ping enlargement of both NATO and every year. It seems suitable to list here goals. As Celeste A. Wallander absolutely the EU. The third phase, which in many some of the Ukrainian troops which have correctly observed, “NATO is able to co- respects this conference initiates, in- contributed to NATO’s Partnership for operate at the international level...therefore, volves looking beyond, further east, in Peace programme: cooperation with NATO – while highly the ongoing, complex, but historically 1. 1st Detached Special Forces Battal- desirable – is not the same as cooperation inevitable, expansion both of the At- ion, Ukrainian part of the UKRPOLBAT within NATO.”2 In May 2003 in Wash- lantic community and of Europe’s (KFOR) ington, D.C., there was a NATO –Ukraine identity. Thus, the third phase points 2. 13th Airmobiled Battalion of 95th defence ministerial conference, named at Kyiv...”3 Brigade

116 3. Engineer Company, Ukrainian part July 3, 1992, more than 8000 officers, war- the NATO – Ukraine Commission at its of Multinational Battalion “TYSA” rant officers, non-commissioned officers meeting at the level of foreign ministers 4. 2nd Pontoon-Bridge Battalion of and privates have participated in Ukrai- in Prague. It set out jointly agreed prin- 11th Engineer Regiment nian peacekeeping missions. The Ukrai- ciples and objectives which covered po- 5. U-130 Frigate “Hetman nian Armed Forces have suffered 19 killed litical and economical issues as well as se- Sahaydachniy” and 50 wounded during these operations. curity, defence and military issues, the 6. U-402 Assault Ship “Konstantyn It has to be noted here that the rela- legislative basis and protection of infor- Olshanskiy” tionship which emerged between NATO mation. The Plan also provided a frame- 7. 2nd Squadron of 7th Helicopter and Ukraine over time is distinctive and work for coherent consultations and co- Regiment very different from, for example, the re- operation on political, economic, mili- 8. Four aircraft from 25th Air Group lationship between and NATO. 4 tary and defence issues. Regiment In July 1997, the Charter on a NATO – 9. Detached Transport company of 18th Ukraine Distinctive Partnership led to the 4. Lessons learned? Logistic Regiment establishment of a NATO – Ukraine Com- 10. More than 30 officers for serving mission. Also, a Joint Working Group on Why was Ukraine not invited to join in Multinational Headquarters. Defence Reform (JWGDR) was finally set the Alliance as the other countries from The history of Ukrainian military sup- up. After that, in 2000, Ukraine joined Eastern Europe and the Baltic region and port for peacekeeping operations dates NATO Planning and Review Process why did Ukraine not even receive a back to July 15, 1992, when, following (PARP) and submitted its ‘State Membership Action Plan (MAP)?6 There the Ukraine Supreme Council decision, Programme for the Armed Forces Devel- was a number of reasons, starting with the 240th Separate Special Battalion (550 opment until 2005’ to NATO in order the special geopolitical position of the servicemen) was sent to Former Yugosla- for NATO to analyse it and comment on country and finishing with the existence via. Since that time, Ukraine has contin- it. 5 By 2001 Ukraine intensified its par- of certain political difficulties between the ued to be an active participant in the ticipation in PARP as well as in the Part- Ukrainian government and most NATO peacekeeping process and is among the nership for Peace (PfP) Programme. Fi- governments. In order to illustrate these largest contributors to UN peacekeeping nally, on 22 November 2002, the NATO difficulties, Celeste A. Wallander can be operations (as was mentioned above). Since – Ukraine Action Plan was approved by quoted here:

117 “Relations between Ukraine and the tion. The purpose of the Action Plan is In order to avoid major difficulties in have been strained by dis- to identify clearly Ukraine’s strategic goals the process of the reorganisation and de- agreement over specific issues, such as as well as prioritise them according to the velopment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces the potential sale of the Kolchuga ra- aspirations of full integration into the or in the process of improving the na- dar system to (but no evidence of Alliance. The Plan was created in order to tional defence and security capabilities, it it have been found yet). More funda- provide a strategic framework for cur- seems crucial to analyse some essential mentally, questions about the treatment rently existing as well as future develop- points calling for improvement in the of media, opposition, and the conduct ment of NATO – Ukraine cooperation. NATO – Ukraine Action Plan. It is be- of elections have crystallized serious The main difference between a MAP, yond doubt that NATO carefully evalu- doubts that Ukraine’s political leader- which was issued to aspirant countries at ates current events in Ukraine and their ship is in fact committed to the path the Washington summit in 1999, and an consequences. Because of this, the Action of European and transatlantic democ- AP is that the former, according to the Plan becomes very important for the racy required for full membership in Alliance’s definition, “provides for con- country as well as for the Alliance. The the NATO community. It is impor- crete feedback and advice from NATO to Plan consists of the principles and objec- tant not to minimize the importance aspiring countries on their own prepara- tives in areas like political and economic or depth of this problem, for doing tions directed at achieving future mem- issues, security, defence and military is- so would prevent the serious under- bership. It provides for a range of activi- sues, information protection etc. In or- standing and commitment necessary for ties designed to strengthen each aspirant der to support these principles and ob- repairing it.”7 country’s candidacy”.9 At the same time, jectives in general, the Annual Target Plans the purpose of the NATO –Ukraine Ac- (ATP) had to be developed (Plan, Section Nevertheless, visible progress is still tion Plan is “to identify clearly Ukraine’s 5). Such a plan has been in place since being made in giving more substance to strategic objectives and priorities in pur- early 2003. During the recent meeting at the special partnership. For instance, the suit of its aspirations towards full integra- the level of Foreign Ministers in Decem- NATO – Ukraine Action Plan (AP) was tion into Euro-Atlantic security structures ber 2003 in Brussels, NATO ministers established.8 According to the Ukrainian and to provide a strategic framework for expressed their appreciation of Ukraine’s strategic goals, this plan has to be the cor- existing and future NATO-Ukraine coop- efforts over the past year to implement nerstone of the whole process of evolu- eration under the Charter.”10 the objectives of the Action Plan and the

118 activities of the 2003 Annual Target Plan. which again could lead to mutual distrust lot of room for improving it. First of all, Furthermore, the ministers were also in- and disappointment between Ukraine and the Annual Target Plans should be estab- formed of the status of negotiations on NATO. Finally, the partnership activities lished with much clearer goals. Further- the NATO-Ukraine Annual Target Plan for and implementation of the agreed Action more, a mechanism for achieving short- 2004.11 This plan will include the inter- Plan have to become a focus of the pub- term and long-term tasks respectively nal activities Ukraine plans to undertake lic relation effort on the part of the Ukrai- should be implemented as quickly as pos- during the coming year, as well as many nian government. Common Ukrainian sible in order to avoid wasting time and of the NATO-Ukraine activities which are citizens are still mostly in the dark with postponing real progress. On top of this, foreseen. respect to what is really going on. The it is not enough to have clear purposes Although the Plan is very important process of negotiation has created a lot and clear control mechanisms; it is also as an instrument of managing the rela- of plans and agreements between the state very important to have the relevant crite- tionship and as a reflector of the process and the Alliance, but almost nobody ria and precise timelines for them. Sim- of reforms and development, it has some among the Ukrainian population, particu- ply speaking, NATO and Ukraine have to weaknesses which should be addressed. larly the civilians in countryside, has make a clear line from the previous step First, the formulation of the steps to be enough relevant information about cur- (Action Plan) to the most probable next taken leaves much to be cleared. There is rent events. This situation has already step (Membership Action Plan). It will be a lot of room for misunderstanding and caused some public misperceptions and an additional task for the Joint Working various interpretations, which hampers might become an obstacle to the Ukrai- Group on Defence Reform in close co- the progress and creates friction at the nian political and strategic aspirations. operation with NATO liaison officers. Joint Working Group on Defence Re- Lastly, information about current events form. Next, in the Plan it is quite diffi- 5. Conclusion related to NATO-Ukraine special partner- cult to distinguish long-term objectives ship and its activities must be more widely from short-term ones. Short-term goals Firstly, analysing the NATO – Ukraine distributed; not only to the capital of should be achieved within a foreseeable relationship in general, and the Action Ukraine but to the other large cities, gar- time period. Otherwise, a constant post- Plan in particular, allows to say that it is risons and even to the detached units. To poning of the achievable tasks could give not a plan as such, it is rather a declara- ensure broad public support to the de- many advantages to political speculators, tion of intents. Because of this, there is a fence reforms and to NATO-Ukraine part-

119 nership, the Action Plan needs to include 4. ‘Prague Summit Declaration’, march/e0324b.htm, accessed on 10 Octo- public relations aspects, which have de facto NATO Web Page, at http://www.nato.int/ ber 2003. become a constituent part of the MAP docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm, accessed 08 11. ‘NATO –Ukraine 2003 Target Plan that seven nations invited to become October 2003. In The Framework of the NATO – Ukraine members of NATO have so successfully 5. ‘NATO – Ukraine cooperation on Action Plan’, NATO Web Page, at http:/ been pursuing. defence reform’. Interview with Edgar /www..int/docu/basictxt/ Buckley, Assistant Secretary General for b030324e.pdf, accessed on 6 October 2003. Bibliography Defence Planning and Operations, In 12. NATO – Ukraine Action Plan ‘, NATO – Ukraine magazine Novyny, Oc- NATO Web Page, at http://www.nato.int/ 1. Leonid Polyakov and Anatoliy tober 2002. docu/basictxt/b021122a.htm accessed on Tkachuk , “Security Sector Expert Forma- 6. James Sherr (2002), ‘Ukraine’s De- 7 October 2003. tion: Achievements and Needs in South fence Reform: An Update’, Conflict Studies 13. ‘Membership Action Plan’, NATO East Europe.”, Geneva Centre for the Demo- Research Centre, July 2002, G112. Web Page, at http://www.nato.int/docu/ cratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003, at http:/ 7. James Sherr (2001), ‘A Failing Part- pr/1999/p99-066e.htm, accessed on 8 Oc- /dcaf.ch/partners/Expert_formation/ nership? Ukraine and the West’, Conflict tober 2003. contents.html-27k, accessed 15 Octber 2003. Studies Research Centre, January 2001, G89. 2. James Sherr, ‘New Documents On 8. Graeme P Herd, ed. (2003), ‘Euro- 1 Leonid Polyakov and Anatoliy Tkachuk (2003). Ukraine’s Security Policy: A Sound Basis pean Security and Post-Soviet Space: In- 2 CSIS Hosts NATO Conference, 2003 3 CSIS Hosts NATO Conference, 2003 For Action?’, Conflict Studies Research Cen- tegration or Isolation?’, Conflict Studies 4 NATO – Ukraine Action Plan tre, June 2003, G121. Research Centre, December 2000, G87. 5 NATO – Ukraine 2003 Target Plan In The 3. CSIS Hosts NATO Conference, 2003: 9. James Sherr (2000), ‘European De- Framework of the NATO – Ukraine Action Plan ‘Ukraine and NATO. Promoting Action fence: Whither Russia and Ukraine?’, Con- 6 Membership Action Plan 7 CSIS Hosts NATO Conference, 2003 on the Action Plan’, Building the Future flict Studies Research Centre, March 2000, 8 NATO – Ukraine Action Plan for NATO – Ukraine Relations, at http:// Occasional Brief 76. 9 Membership Action Plan www.csis.org/pubs/Insights/ 10. ‘Ukraine finalises 2003 Target Plan’, 10 NATO – Ukraine Action Plan 03MayJun.pdf, accessed on 08 October NATO Update Web Page, at http:// 11 Ukraine finalises 2003 Target Plan 2003. www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/03-

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