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12 Important Supreme Court Judgments April 16, 2019 firstlaw.in/2019/04/16-important-supreme-court-judgments.html 1. Ashatai v. Shriram City Union Finance Ltd. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Section 21 (b) - The Insurance Act, 1938 - Section 64 VB (2) - the deceased husband of the Appellant had paid the insurance premium by a Demand Draft in favour of the Insurance Company. This has been acknowledged in paragraph 4(c) of the Revision Petition filed by the Respondent – Finance Company, as referred to above. As a consequence, the risk would be covered from the date of payment of the insurance premium. The loan was secured from the date on which the insurance premium was paid. The premium having been paid by the Appellant’s husband during his life​time, the loan was to be adjusted from the insurance policy. The National Commission has erroneously set aside the Order passed by the State Commission on factually incorrect grounds. The Appellant has made out a clear case of deficiency of service on the part of the Respondent – Finance Company. Case Number : C.A. No. 3962 of 2019 16-04-2019 Petitioner's Advocate : Amol Nirmalkumar Suryawanshi Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra Judgment By : Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra 2. Dr. R.S. Grewal v. Chander Parkash Soni The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Section 14 (1) - The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Section 2 (c) - ‘Landlord' - Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property - A landlord within the meaning of Section 2(c) is not necessarily the owner of the property. The definition of the expression ‘landlord’ is relatable to an entitlement to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Section 2 (i) - ‘Tenant’ - The tenant has a protected status. That status cannot be disrupted or brought to an end except on grounds specified in the enactment. The provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 are available to the tenant. The tenant has a protected status. That status cannot be disrupted or brought to an end except on grounds specified in the enactment. The first respondent in whose favour the tenancy was created would be covered under the definition of the expression ‘tenant’ in Section 2(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949. The status of a statutory tenant enures as a consequence of rent control legislation. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949 aims at regulating conditions of tenancy, controlling rents and preventing unreasonable eviction of tenants. For the advancement of these objects, tenants are invested with rights and landlords are subjected to obligations. The first respondent in whose favour a tenancy was created acquired a status of a statutory tenant and that status 1/8 does not stand obviated by the death of Shiv Dev Kaur. The remedy available to the appellants to remove the first respondent from the property is by pursuing eviction proceedings on one or more of the grounds available in the enactment. Section 13 lays down the procedure for eviction of tenants. Only upon the satisfaction of the Controller that sufficient grounds exist for eviction of the tenant can an order be passed directing the tenant to vacate the premises. The protection offered to a statutory tenant can only be overcome by following the procedure laid out in the enactment. [Para 14] Case Number : C.A. No. 11086 of 2018 16-04-2019 Petitioner's Advocate : M.A. Chinnasamy Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta Judgment By : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud 3. Nisha Singla v. Adarsh Colony Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. The Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 - Section 26 (1-D) - The appellants cannot be deprived of a plot allotted to her merely on the basis that she has not made any grievance in respect of possession of the plot allotted on the basis of technicities. Case Number : C.A. No. 3963 - 3965 of 2019 16-04-2019 Petitioner's Advocate : Varinder Kumar Sharma Respondent's Advocate : Vishnu Sharma Bench : Hon'ble Dr. Justice D. Y. Chandrachud, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hemant Gupta 4. Regional Manager, U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Maslahuddin (dead) The U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other than Officers) Service Regulations, 1981 - Whether the respective Drivers would fall in Group “D” or Group “C” ? Both the Labour Court as well as the High Court have committed a grave error in holding that the respective respondents​-Drivers were in Group “D” category and that their age of superannuation would be 60 years. As the pay scale of the respective respondents​Drivers was revised to Rs.335-​8​415​-10​-495 with retrospective effect and in fact they were paid the arrears also, thereafter it was not open for the respondents​-Drivers to contend that as per their original pay scale, their salary was less than Rs.200/​ on the pay scale of 185​-DRO-​3​-215​- 4-​235-​6-​265, they would be in Group “D” category. Once having taken the advantage of the revised pay scale retrospectively and that their pay scale was revised to Rs. 335-​8-​415-​10-​495 with retrospective effect and they were paid the arrears which the respective respondents accepted, in that case, they would fall in Group “C” category and, therefore, considering the Rules, their age of superannuation would be 58 years and not 60 years, as contended on 2/8 behalf of the respective respondents​-Drivers. Therefore, the appellant-Corporation rightly retired/superannuated the respective respondents-​Drivers on completion of 58 years of age. Case Number : C.A. No. 3959 of 2019 16-04-2019 Petitioner's Advocate : Garima Prashad Respondent's Advocate : M.A. Krishna Moorthy Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah Judgment By : Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.R. Shah 5. Bikash Ranjan Rout v. The State Home Department Secretary The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 167(2), 173, 227 and 228 - Whether once the Magistrate passes an order of discharge of the accused, whether thereafter is it permissible for the Magistrate to order further investigation and direct the investigating officer to submit the report? After the investigation is concluded and the report is forwarded by the police to the Magistrate under Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC, the learned Magistrate may either (1) accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (2) may disagree with the report and drop the proceedings, or (3) may direct further investigation under Section 156(3) and require the police to make a further report. If the Magistrate disagrees with the report and drops the proceedings, the informant is required to be given an opportunity to submit the protest application and thereafter, after giving an opportunity to the informant, the Magistrate may take a further decision whether to drop the proceedings against the accused or not. If the learned Magistrate accepts the objections, in that case, he may issue process and/or even frame the charges against the accused. As observed hereinabove, having not satisfied with the investigation on considering the report forwarded by the police under Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC, the Magistrate may, at that stage, direct further investigation and require the police to make a further report. However, it is required to be noted that all the aforesaid is required to be done at the pre​cognizance stage. Once the learned Magistrate takes the cognizance and, considering the materials on record submitted along with the report forwarded by the police under Section 173(2)(i) of the CrPC, learned Magistrate in exercise of the powers under Section 227 of the CrPC discharges the accused, thereafter, it will not be open for the Magistrate to suo moto order for further investigation and direct the investigating officer to submit the report. Such an order after discharging the accused can be said to be made at the post​cognizance stage. There is a distinction and/or difference between the pre​cognizance stage and post​cognizance stage and the powers to be exercised by the Magistrate for further investigation at the pre​cognizance stage and post​cognizance stage. The power to order further investigation which may be available to the Magistrate at the pre​cognizance stage may not be available to the Magistrate at the post​cognizance stage, more particularly, when the accused is discharged by him. As observed hereinabove, if the Magistrate was not satisfied with the investigation carried out by the investigating officer and the report submitted by the investigating officer under Section 173(2) (i) of the CrPC, as observed by this Court in catena of decisions and as observed hereinabove, it was always 3/8 open/permissible for the Magistrate to direct the investigating agency for further investigation and may postpone even the framing of the charge and/or taking any final decision on the report at that stage. However, once the learned Magistrate, on the basis of the report and the materials placed along with the report, discharges the accused, we are afraid that thereafter the Magistrate can suo moto order the further investigation by the investigating agency. Once the order of discharge is passed, thereafter the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to suo moto direct the investigating officer for further investigation and submit the report. In such a situation, only two remedies are available: (i) a revision application can be filed against the discharge or (ii) the Court has to wait till the stage of Section 319 of the CrPC.

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