GLOSSARY of LEGAL TERMS Ad Damnum
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United States District Court Eastern District of New York
Case 2:06-cv-04746-JFB-GRB Document 624 Filed 07/26/13 Page 1 of 35 PageID #: <pageID> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _____________________ No 06-CV-4746 (JFB)(ETB) _____________________ ANTHONY CONTE, Plaintiff, VERSUS COUNTY OF NASSAU, ET AL., Defendants. ___________________ MEMORANDUM AND ORDER July 26, 2013 ___________________ Joseph F. Bianco, District Judge: review of the record and submissions of the parties, the Court issued a Memorandum and Pro se plaintiff Anthony Conte Order dated September 30, 2010, granting in (“plaintiff” or “Conte”) filed the instant part and denying in part defendants’ motions action against the County of Nassau (“the for summary judgment and denying County”), Robert Emmons (“Emmons”), plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in Philip Wasilausky (“Wasilausky”), William its entirety. Pursuant to that Order, the Wallace (“Wallace”), Christina Sardo following claims survived summary (“Sardo”), Michael Falzarano (“Falzarano”) judgment: (1) plaintiff’s false arrest claim (collectively, the “County defendants”), against Wasilausky; (2) plaintiff’s abuse of Tefta Shaska (“Shaska”), and Larry Guerra process claim against all of the County (“Guerra”) (collectively, “defendants”), defendants except Sardo; (3) plaintiff’s alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Monell claim against the County; and (4) § 1983 for false arrest, malicious plaintiff’s tortious interference with contract prosecution, abuse of process, violation of claim against all of the County defendants the First Amendment, conspiracy, and except Sardo and Shaska. Monell liability against the County. Plaintiff also asserted various state-law claims. The matter was then tried before a jury, which found that (1) Wasilausky subjected Following discovery, both plaintiff and plaintiff to an unlawful arrest; (2) none of defendants filed motions for summary the County defendants maliciously abused judgment with the Court. -
Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: a Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine Harvey S
Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine Harvey S. Perlmant A has a contract with B. TP interferes with its performance, to A's economic detriment. A might recover from B for breach of con- tract, but prior to 1853, in most circumstances, he could not re- cover against TP. In that year, Lumley v. Gye1 established a gen- eral principle of tort liability for intentionally interfering with a contract. Since Lumley, the interference tort has been applied evenwhere the interference is directed at an unenforceable con- tract or a relationship involving only an expectancy not yet formal- ized into a contract.2 Today, courts impose liability under the ru- bric of the interference tort in a variety of contexts, but they have failed to develop common or consistent doctrines. The absence of a coherent doctrine is understandable. The idea that a person should not interfere with another's economic relationships is easier to expound in the abstract than to apply in the particular. The expectations of the parties and, therefore, the acceptability of an interference differ radically depending on the context, terms, and subject matter of the relationship-whether it t Professor, University of Virginia Law School. Several persons commented on earlier drafts, including Tyler Baker, Thomas Bergin, Edmund Kitch, Jeffrey O'Connell, George Rutherglen, Stephen Saltzburg, and participants in the University of Virginia and Univer- sity of Iowa Faculty Workshops. I am particularly indebted to Robert Scott and Charles Goetz for their assistance. Linda Williams, Virginia class of 1982, and David Rosengren, class of 1981, provided valuable research support. -
` United States District Court Eastern District Of
Case: 4:16-cv-01866-CDP Doc. #: 5 Filed: 12/15/16 Page: 1 of 5 PageID #: <pageID> UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DISTRICT CHARMANE SMITH, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:16CV1866 CDP ) MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL, ) ) Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff Charmane Smith for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket No. 2). Upon review of the financial affidavit plaintiff submitted in support of the motion, the Court has determined that plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The motion will therefore be granted. In addition, plaintiff will be allowed the opportunity to submit an amended complaint. Standard of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim for relief, a complaint must plead more than “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a ` Case: 4:16-cv-01866-CDP Doc. -
Lnstructions / Discraimer Documents, Or the Comprehensiveness of The
REQuEsrFoR PRoDUcloN oF DocuMENTs- lnstructions / Discraimer Once a civillawsuit is commenced,a pafi is permittedto seekto obtaininformation relevant to the lawsuitabout other parties to the suit, during the fact-findingpnase Ueioretrial called !is9o1eV. Generalprovisions goveming Discoverylre found in Rul-eZO ot tne NevadaRules of CivilProcedure ('NRCP"). ln general,pirties mayobtainDiscovery about any matterwhich is relevantto the subjectmatter involved in the pendingaction, so long as the informationis privileged. not Informationabout each of thedifferent Disc.-overy tools avaiiable to partiesto a tawsuit, andhow they may be used,can be foundin NRCp30 thr;ugh36. Requestfgr Productionof Documentsis a discoverytool encompassed in Rule 34, and allows any partyto serve upon any other partya requestto producereievant documents. The party makingthe request(or someoneacting on the requesiingparty's behalf) is permittedto inipeit and copyany designateddocuments. "Documenis" include writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs,phonorecords, and otherdata compilationsfromwhicliinformatioi Gn 6e obtained, translated,if necessary,by the respondingparty through detection devices into reasonably usable form. Requestfor Productionof Documentsmay be served upon tfe plaintiffafter the lawsuitis commenced;and uponany other pafi onlyat the timeof or afterthat party is servedwith the summonsand complaint. The party upon whom the Request is served is ihen required to provide a wriftenresponse within thirty (30) days afterservice of the Request.A shorteror longertime may be orderedby the Courtor, in absenceof a Courtorder, agieed to by writtenstipul-ation of the parties,so longas the timeby whichresponse is extendeddoes not interferewit'h any time setfor completionof discovery(see, Rule29). Thepafi reguestingthatdocumenb be copied must pay the reasonablecost therefor, andthe Courtmay direct the respondingparty to lopy the documents. -
4:04-Cv-03384-RGK-CRZ Doc # 450 Filed: 03/11/09 Page 1 of 10
4:04-cv-03384-RGK-CRZ Doc # 450 Filed: 03/11/09 Page 1 of 10 - Page ID # <pageID> IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA CINDY AVILA, individually and as ) 4:04CV3384 Personal Representative of the Estate ) of Steven Avila, Deceased, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) MEMORANDUM v . ) AND ORDER ) CNH AMERICA, LLC, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) This matter is before the court on the plaintiffs’ “motion for reconsideration and for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b)(1)-(2) with request for oral argument” (filing 385). The motion is filed with respect to the court’s memorandum and order entered on January 2, 2009 (filing 382), which granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, Cargill, Incorporated, and also with respect to the court’s judgment entered that same date (filing 383), which dismissed the plaintiffs’ action against Cargill with prejudice. The plaintiffs argue that additional evidence was discovered during Cargill’s corporate deposition on December 9-10, 2008, which makes the granting of summary judgment inappropriate. Alternatively, the plaintiffs argue that they at least should be permitted to complete the corporate deposition, and to depose a former Cargill employee. The plaintiffs also argue that there is a genuine issue as to whether Cargill should have known of the contamination at the Engleman Road facility because, as a manufacturer of chemical pesticides, it should be charged with constructive knowledge of a 1983 study report cited by the plaintiffs’ expert that concerns groundwater contamination caused by the dumping of chlorinated solvents. -
Misc. Docket No. 20-9153 ════════════════════
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS ════════════════════ Misc. Docket No. 20-9153 ════════════════════ ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ FINAL APPROVAL OF AMENDMENTS TO TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 47, 99, 169, 190, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, AND 198 ════════════════════════════════════════════════════ ORDERED that: 1. On August 21, 2020, in Misc. Dkt. No. 20-9101, the Court preliminarily approved amendments to Rules 47, 169, 190, 192, 193, 194, and 195 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to comply with Act of May 27, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 696 (SB 2342), and invited public comment. Following public comment, the Court made revisions to those rules and also revised Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 99, 196, 197, and 198. This Order incorporates the revisions and contains the final version of the rules, effective January 1, 2021. 2. The amendments apply to cases filed on or after January 1, 2021, except for those filed in justice court. The rules amended by this Order continue to govern procedures and limitations in cases filed before January 1, 2021. 3. The Clerk is directed to: a. file a copy of this Order with the Secretary of State; b. cause a copy of this Order to be mailed to each registered member of the State Bar of Texas by publication in the Texas Bar Journal; c. send a copy of this Order to each elected member of the Legislature; and d. submit a copy of the Order for publication in the Texas Register. Dated: December 23, 2020 Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Eva M. Guzman, Justice Debra H. Lehrmann, Justice Jeffrey S. Boyd, Justice John P. -
Sample Pleading Template (Federal Court)
Case 4:19-cv-01231-JSW Document 4-1 Filed 03/07/19 Page 2 of 30 1 Marísa Díaz, CSB No. 293072 E-mail: [email protected] 2 Christopher Ho, CSB No. 129845 3 E-mail: [email protected] LEGAL AID AT WORK 4 180 Montgomery Street, Suite 600 San Francisco, California 94104 5 Telephone: 415.864.8848 6 Facsimile: 415.593.0096 7 Beth W. Mora, CSB No. 208859 E-mail: [email protected] 8 MORA EMPLOYMENT LAW, APC 9 18 Crow Canyon Court, Suite 205 San Ramon, California 94583 10 Telephone: 925.820.8949 Facsimile: 925.820.0278 11 12 Attorneys for Plaintiff-Intervenor Ayesha Faiz 13 14 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 15 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 16 17 Case No. 4:19-cv-01231 18 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 19 Plaintiff, [PROPOSED] COMPLAINT IN 20 INTERVENTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF: 21 AYESHA FAIZ, 22 (1) TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT Plaintiff-Intervenor, OF 1964; 23 (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; v. (3) CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND 24 FIDELITY HOME ENERGY, INC., a HOUSING ACT; 25 California Corporation; and DOES 1-50, (4) STATE TORT LAW; (5) CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE 26 Defendants. JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 27 28 29 30 {00569825.DOCX} Case No. 4:19-cv-01231 31 [PROPOSED] COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION 32 Case 4:19-cv-01231-JSW Document 4-1 Filed 03/07/19 Page 3 of 30 1 INTRODUCTION 2 1. This is an action for relief from violations by Defendant Fidelity Home Energy, 3 Inc. -
Retiring Workplace Tortious Interference Claims Donn C
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 4 9-1-2016 Retiring Workplace Tortious Interference Claims Donn C. Meindertsma Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons Recommended Citation Meindertsma, Donn C. (2016) "Retiring Workplace Tortious Interference Claims," Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal: Vol. 34 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol34/iss1/4 This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Meindertsma: Retiring Workplace Tortious Interference Claims PRACTITIONERS' NOTES RETIRING WORKPLACE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIMS Donn C. Meindertsma Are you a rung or two lower on the corporate ladder than you expected to be at this point in your career? Sue your boss. Suits by unhappy employees against supervisors or cubicle-mates are nothing new. In at least one manifestation, however, the right to sue coworkers over workplace disputes has developed in an ad hoc manner based on an all-purpose tort theory, tortious interference. As a result of this organic development, the law is unclear and in many respects confounded by inconsistencies. The lack of clarity leaves employers and employees guessing about the legal duties coworkers owe to each other in the workplace.' Courts should freshly examine the viability of claims that a coworker tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs job. -
San Diego Law Review November-December 2003
40 SANDLR 1315 Page 1 (Cite as: 40 San Diego L. Rev. 1315) San Diego Law Review November-December 2003 Symposium Baselines and Counterfactuals in the Theory of Compensatory Damages: What Do Compensatory Damages Compensate? *1315 RETHINKING INJURY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE John C.P. Goldberg [FNa1] Copyright © 2003 San Diego Law Review Association; John C.P. Goldberg Table of Contents I. Introduction ............................................... 1315 II. Perry on Harm ............................................. 1316 III. Harm Versus Injury ....................................... 1321 A. Injury, Harms, Rights Violations, and Lost Expectancies .. 1321 B. Harm and Damages ......................................... 1330 IV. Harms, Wrongings, and a Rationale for Proximate Cause ..... 1332 V. Conclusion ................................................. 1343 I. Introduction Injury and proximate cause form two components of a plaintiff's prima facie negligence case. [FN1] Although equals in this sense, they have received starkly different treatment at the hands of judges and scholars. Proximate cause has long attracted attention, yet has also managed to defy repeated efforts at characterization and explanation. [FN2] Injury, by *1316 contrast, seems to have been largely ignored. [FN3] One of the many virtues of Professor Perry's paper [FN4] is that it prompts reconsideration of this disparate treatment from both ends. By offering a subtle and rich account of the related concept of "harm," Perry permits us to see that the concept of "injury" is normative, contestable, and therefore laden with interesting questions. Likewise, his analysis provides a springboard from which to launch an inquiry into proximate cause. In this Commentary, I will undertake both of these projects, first, by reviewing and elaborating Professor Perry's thoughtful analysis of harm, then by analyzing the distinction between the concepts of harm and injury, and finally by sketching an account of proximate cause that can help explain why it has a legitimate role to play in negligence law. -
Request for Production of Documents
1 SELARZ LAW CORP. DANIEL E. SELARZ (State Bar No. 287555) 2 [email protected] 11777 San Vicente Blvd., Suite 702 3 Los Angeles, California 90049 Telephone: 310.651.8685 4 Facsimile: 310.651.8681 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff(s), [CLIENT’S NAME(S)] 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 COUNTY OF [COUNTY ], [DISTRICT] 9 10 [PLAINTIFF(S)], an individual, Case No. [ ] Honorable [ ] 11 Plaintiff, [Dept. [#]] . vs. 12 PLAINTIFF’S REQUESTS FOR ORP [DEFENDANT(S)], and DOES 1 to [#], PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, C 13 inclusive, SET ONE Blvd., Suite 702 AW 14 Defendants. L Action Filed: [ ] 15 Trial Date: [ ] Los Angeles, California 90049 California Angeles, Los 11777 San Vicente Vicente San 11777 ELARZ 16 Tel: 310.651.8685 • Fax: 310.651.8681 Fax: • 310.651.8685 Tel: S PROPOUNDING PARTY : PLAINTIFF [CLIENT’S NAME] 17 RESPONDING PARTY : DEFENDANT [DEFENDANT’S NAME] SET NUMBER : ONE 18 19 PLAINTIFF [CLIENT’S NAME] (“PLAINTIFF”), requests that Defendant 20 [DEFENDANT’S NAME] (“DEFENDANT”) identify, produce and permit the inspection 21 and copying of the following DOCUMENTS and things, pursuant to California Code of 22 Civil Procedure Section 209.010. PLAINTIFF requests that the following Documents and 23 things be identified, produced and made available for inspection and copying at the law firm 24 of Selarz Law Corp., located at 11777 San Vicente Blvd., Suite 702, Los Angeles, California 25 90049. Alternatively, there may be full compliance with this request by forwarding copies 26 of the items requested herein directly to Selarz Law Corp. If the Defendant chooses to 27 produce the items requested at the office of counsel for PLAINTIFF rather than mail copies, 28 a telephone call or other notice should be provided no less than three (3) days ahead of time 1 PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION, SET ONE 1 so that definite arrangements can be made for someone to be present to conduct the 2 duplication and have the appropriate equipment available. -
Illinois Civil Practice Guide
Practice Series Illinois Civil Practice Guide Andrew W. Vail Colleen G. DeRosa © 2012 JENNER & BLOCK LLP ALL RIGHTS RESERVED www.jenner.com ABOUT JENNER & BLOCK Founded in 1914, Jenner & Block is a national law firm of approximately 450 attorneys. Our Firm has been widely recognized for producing outstanding results in corporate transactions and securing significant litigation victories from the trial level through the United States Supreme Court. Companies and individuals around the world trust Jenner & Block with their most sensitive and consequential matters. Our clients range from the top ranks of the Fortune 500, large privately held corporations and financial services institutions to emerging companies, family-run businesses and individuals. OFFICES 353 North Clark Street 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 3500 Chicago, Illinois 60654-3456 Los Angeles, California 90071 Firm: 312 222-9350 Firm: 213 239-5100 Fax: 312 527-0484 Fax: 213 239-5199 919 Third Avenue, 37th Floor 1099 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 900 New York, New York 10022-3908 Washington, D.C. 20001-900 Firm: 212 891-1600 Firm: 202 639-6000 Fax: 212 891-1699 Fax: 202 639-6066 © 2012 Jenner & Block LLP. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice but to provide general information on legal matters. Transmission is not intended to create and receipt does not establish an attorney- client relationship. Readers should seek specific legal advice before taking any action with respect to matters mentioned in this publication. The attorney responsible for this publication is Andrew W. Vail. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING 1 AUTHOR INFORMATION Andrew W. Vail is a partner in Jenner & Block’s Litigation Department and a member of the Firm’s Complex Commercial and Antitrust Litigation Practice Groups. -
Interference with Business and Contractual Relations
The IDC Monograph Mark J. McClenathan Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, P.C., Rockford Crossing the Line: Interference with Business and Contractual Relations I. Introduction A prospective client approaches you and asks if you are willing to represent her in a real estate case that has been pending for some time. She explains that she fired her attorney and is filing an ARDC complaint against him. You immediately turn down the assignment, and, at her request, give her the names of three local attorneys who specialize in real estate law and are respected litigators. The meeting lasted 20 minutes. Several months later, the client’s discharged attorney serves you with a summons and complaint charging you and the client’s new attorney with tortious interference with business relations. What did you do to deserve this lawsuit? What did you do wrong? Did you “interfere” with another attorney’s relationship with his client? Was your act “intentional”? In today’s litigious society, common law causes of action are being stretched to the limit to give anyone a forum to seek redress for their alleged injuries, damages, failures, and disappointments, especially when something does not go their way. Losing a client or customer happens every day; there are no guarantees. But what if the competitor is not playing “fair”? There are plenty of attempts by business owners to protect what is “theirs.” For instance, employers may ask their employees to sign restrictive covenants, such as covenants not to compete and confidentiality agreements. If employees leave and either start their own business or work for a competitor, we often see employers filing petitions for injunctions to enforce said “contracts” against former employees and their new employers to protect market share and proprietary information.