Chapter One: the Rise of Hindutva: a Review of Organisation, Ideology and Practices

Chapter One: The Rise of Hindutva: A Review of Organisation, Ideology and Practices

Independent India has experienced an unprecedented rise in militant Hinduism during the late eighties and eariy nineties after more than four decades of the acceptance of democratic values. In 1947, India accepted democracy and secularism as a value enshrined in the constitution despite the fact that the communalisation of both Hindus and Muslims in the colonial period resulted into the division of the subcontinent (Chandra 1993, Sarkar and Butalia 1995, Panikkar 2000). However, the practices of the state in certain cases which emerged in the mid eighties and early nineties—like Shah Bano, Roopkanwar, Mandal commission, opening up of the gates of the disputed site at Ayodhya and later at the time of demolition of the mosque at Ayodhya—were also contradictory to the principles enshrined in the Constitution of India. A few years before the demolition of the mosque at Ayodhya, the idea that the BJP would come to power at the centre was unthinkable. It was also unthinkable that the Hindu religion, whose essential characteristic is plural and which does not lend itself to closed monolithic radicalism especially associated with Muslim, Jewish or Christian ftindamentalism, could be mobilised under 'Hinduism’ by the Hindu right (Jaffrelot 1996). As argued by different scholars, this creation and expansion of ‘Hindu’ as a homogenous category is a modem phenomenon which took place despite the existence of social and religious differentiation within Hinduism and it needs fiarther scrutiny (Thapar 1985, Jaffrelot 1996, Nanda 2004). Different aspects of this have attracted the attention of many social scientists. The rich body of work exploring complex questions—like how and why Hindu nationalists could appropriate a central place on India’s social and political map and how Hindu ftindamentalist organizations and institutions emerged and proliferated—have come from different social scientists from different disciplinary locations. It is impossible to take a comprehensive review of all the available work in a chapter; however, we will attempt a brief review of works that are significant to the argument of this thesis.

16 This chapter is divided in two major sections. In the first section drawing upon a

review of works, we will take a brief review of works, which explains the current

dominant presence of the Hindu nationalists. W e shall try to map their perpetual,

systematic efforts over the colonial and post-colonial decades. In doing such a review, we shall map the debate over what is secular and who is a Hindu. The next

section will be divided into three parts. In the first part, w e will take a brief review

of works emphasizing on the ideology, methods and strategies of different Hindu organizations. In the second part, we will take a brief review of works on different

Hindu nationalist political parties. In the third part, we will take a brief review of

the studies on Hindutva organizations, which have employed the concept of ‘Seva’

(service) to organise and mobilize.

Section I

Emergence of Hindu Nationalism: Colonial and Postcolonial Period

The emergence of Hindu Nationalism in contemporary India must be located in

colonial India. The terai Hindu originally derived from the name Indus and was

used successively by Achaemenids, the Greek and the Muslims to denote the

population living beyond the river Sindhu (or Indus). This was later appropriated by

those who were termed as Hindus (Jaffrelot 1996). Thapar (1985) argues that this is

the first step to be considered in the crystallization of what is now known as

Hinduism. According to her, this has been bom out of an anxiety of being

undefined, o f being the ‘other’, being amorphous and subordinate.

The Hindu consciousness found its principal expression in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries in the empire of Shivaji and later in Maratha confederation

(Jaffrelot 1996). This has been contested by non-brahmin scholars who have argued

how such conceptualisation furthers the process of Hindutva organisations, of

appropriafing Shivaji as a Hindu king (Patil 1982). In 1720, the brahmins took over

the latter kingdom. These two political institutions were formed in the precolonial

period against the Mughal Empire. However, as argued by Lele (1980), they do not

17 represent a nationalist construction, as nationalism developed later. This conquest was never represented as a religious or communal conflict. However, except for spurts of violence at some places, communal conflict was virtually absent for a long time. It began to occur on a large scale in the 1920s (Chandra 1993).

The British takeover of power in Western India marked a disruption in the structure of the social and political relations established during the Peshwa rule. This created new patterns in social relations, which need to be explored. Under the colonial rule, brahmins in Maharashtra augmented their hold, continuing from precolonial

Peshwa times, on new professions and education thus securing their monopoly over administrative posts (Chakravarty 1998, Sarkar 2001). However, from the 1860s they were confronted by an upsurge by the Mower caste’, who had found some space in the lower echelons of administration, education and entrepreneurial activities (O’Hanlon 1985). The new Hindu middle class that emerged under the colonial rule was grounded in the power that the ‘upper caste’ derived from land, service and privileges. It felt threatened by the upsurge in the demand for tenancy rights and the emergence of self-help movements by ‘low caste’ peasants against ritual degradation. In addition to this, the liberal reforms during the colonial period challenged the ‘upper caste’ patriarchal absolutism (Sarkar 2001).

The process of construction of Hindu nationalism as an ideology started in 1870s. It was derived from socio-religious movements initiated by ‘upper caste’ Hindus. The establishment of the Arya Samaj and its expansion in Punjab from the 1870s onwards, was in reaction to the Brahmo, Christian and Muslim proselytisation and grip of the missionaries over the educational institutions. Thus the primary aim of such an organization was to maintain the basic elements o f the traditional social and cultural order of the Hindus and still offer a modernised existence by adoption of some Western ideas and liberal reforms in the case of wom en’s education, caste and gender reforms (Jaffrelot 1996, Sarkar 2001). A new community of people undertook these reforms. They claimed to be the most authentic source of Hindu traditions and denied the claims of other communities to truth and power. Over time, the claim of Hindu supremacy sharpened and prevailed over the impulse

18 toward inner reform (Jones 1976, cited in Sarkar 2001). ‘Lower castes’ were the main contestants in this battle for power by the Hindus. According to Sarkar (2001), this emerged as the absent cause, the salient invisible principle that structured communal stereotypes, anxieties and discourses. The possibility of ‘untouchables' forming separate group would affect the claim of Hindus of being the numerical majority.Hindu nationalist glorification of the vama system must also be interpreted in the context of Hindus trying to establish their claim of being a majority community. In the wake of the anti-caste movement under the leadership of Dr. Ambedkar, attempts were made by the ‘upper caste’ revivalists to promote hierarchical but prestigious social models such as the vama system. This has also led to the development of an explanatory system that held Muslims responsible for the ills in Hindu society rather than the practices within Hinduism (Thapar 1985, Jaffrelot 1996, Sarkar 2001, Panikkar 2002). Consequently, one of the declared objectives of the Hindu Sangathan movement was the integration of ‘untouchables’ and the marginalised groups into Hindu society with the aim to prevent their conversion (Gupta 1997).

As argued by Sarkar (2001), this issue of numerical majority and the project of building a homogenised Hindu community opened up a space for the manipulation of gender in achieving Hindu supremacy. This resulted in the preoccupation with the bodies of ‘upper caste’ women which initiated the process of reform within the then revivalist trend (Sarkar 2001, Gupta 1997). The perception of the threat fi-om the rival community helped to achieve a unified homogenous community that incorporated the marginalised communities without disturbing the existing power relations. Eulogising the golden age theory solved the tension between preservation of culture, the claim to a ‘just’ ‘undivided’ Hindu community, and modernization. Blaming the subsequent foreign invasion, especially by Islam, served the purpose of justifying the then present unequal, unjust society to the colonizers and to those within the group who were asking for reform. Thus the idea of the golden age, created for national self esteem, remained one of the important cornerstones of Hindu nationalism. This process is based on the reinterpretation of the traditional cultural features in order to preserve them and give them fresh meaning.

19 Jaffrelot (1996) emphasises the social background of the reinterpreters who shaped ideologies. Both their social status and their cultural framework determined their choices. Thus Hindu nationalism reflected the brahminical view of the ‘upper caste’ reformers (Jaffrelot 1996).

However, the ideology of Hindu nationalism was codified in the 1920s, with the most powerful consolidation attained with the establishment of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). By then the stereotypes of communal anxieties were so sedimented that RSS could easily get-away with the reform (Sarkar 2001). RSS has been the most effective organiser and bearer of the Hindu Right. The RSS was founded as an alternative to the anti-colonial struggle. From the beginning, it functioned on an anti-Muslim propaganda (Basu et al, 1993). Subsequently, the women’s wing, Rashtra Sevika Samiti, was established in 1936. Along with this, the qualitative leap to Hindu nationalism was provided by Savarkar, the former head of a terrorist group and the future President of the Hindu Mahasabha. The mechanisms of Hindu nationalist identity-building was through the stigmatization and use of the concept of the ‘threatening others’. According to Savarkar, Hindutva rests on three pillars—geographical unity, racial features and a common culture (Savarkar 1969). He minimizes the role of the religious criteria. It can also be seen as an attempt to deal with the extreme differentiation within Hinduism. Jaffrelot (1996) argues that the three attributes given by Savarkar stem from the mythical reconstruction of the Vedic golden age. Savarkar’s notion of Hindutva rests on cultural criteria rather than on racial theory, which corresponds to the brahminical viewpoint. Still we find some influence of Western theory (Jaffrelot 1996, Nanda 2004). However, as argued by Sarkar (2001), if the threatening other was a necessary imaginary, the ‘endangered women’ could be deployed as a potent weapon for violent mobilization. Savarkar has rewritten the history of India in which, as underlined by Agarwal (1995), the past was not looked at to understand the present; instead the past was used to derive a justification for Savarkar’s political stance, especially in the context of women. Savarkar constructs the image of the Muslim man as a rapist and Hindus as tolerant, using the form of a story or a

20 narrative. This also corresponds with the ‘upper caste’ self-perception of being tolerant and virtuous and having suffered because of that (Agarwal 1995).

The strategy of the Hindu nationalists in identity building and constructing the other, eventually produced Hindutva, which, according to the scholars, has little to do with Hinduism. As underlined by Jaffrelot (1996), this process has introduced many foreign elements, like proselytism, into Hinduism. As argued by Thapar (1989), this is an attempt to redefine and create Hinduism on the model of Christianity. Hindu nationalists tried, on the one hand, to evolve Hindu Rashtra on the model of a Western, egalitarian notion, and on the other hand, promoted in practice, the values of brahminical culture. Jaffrelot (1996) underlines this contradiction as a cause of failure of the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha to mobilize mass support.

In the same period, Indian nationalist politics underwent a radical transformation (Sarkar 1989). There was a shift in leadership fi-om Tilak to Gandhi. Under Gandhi, the Congress Party was more inclusive of peasants, tribals and women. This not only energized the younger leaders but also committed the Congress Party to a democratic ideal of nationhood. At the same time, groups who were outside the mainstream Congress Party developed visions of caste and class equality that went beyond the moderate aim of harmony and bourgeois liberal progress. However, the general sense of deprivation that existed against the colonial masters, cut across the differences within the Party and at times made the differences partly irrelevant (Sarkar 2001). Under the leadership of Gandhi, this process of assimilation became more complicated as the growth of the left, ‘lower castes’ and suffragist politics emerged as a threat to the Hindu nationalist elements in the Congress Party. As this threat looked realizable, it appeared capable of subverting the traditional power structures (Sarkar 1993, Srivatsan 2005). The relative under-development of the capitalist ideology hampered the process of articulation of self-interest as a general good. This generated a large and powerftil tradition of populism in Indian politics that has created problems for democracy in India (Sarkar 2001). At the same time, RSS and other Hindu nationalists, who failed to achieve mass support, concentrated

21 on developing tactic social welfare and tried to win over ‘lower castes’ after 1947. These developments will provide the context to understand the structures of social and political alignment in post-colonial India. This process was so overpowering that it obscured the embeddedness of Hindu nationalism in developing the ideas about Indian culture and political elites.

Hindu Nationalism in tlie Post-Colonial Period

The political situation in India in 1947 was favourable to Hindu nationalists as in India, Hindus formed a majority, and violence had erupted at the time of partition which gave the Hindu nationalists an opportunity to blame Muslims. Albeit the circumstances were far from being congenial for democracy, India accepted democracy. With the acceptance of secularism by the Indian State, adherents of Hindu nationalism were marginalised (Chandra 1993, Jaffrelot 1996, Panikkar 1999). The Indian state’s official commitment to secularism was seen as the guarantor of communal amity and national unity, themselves considered the prerequisites for pursuing the goals of democracy, prosperity, social justice and cohesion of successful modernisation (Vanaik 1997). This choice of secularism and democracy as guiding principles was influenced by the manner in which Indian society was historically constituted. From the ancient period India was home to many sects, different cultural, racial and ethnic groups. It was imagined that only democracy with secularism could preserve this texture of society. Three salient features articulated in the Indian Constitution are—religious freedom, celebratory neutrality and reformative justice. As the Constitution is influenced by European antecedents, the conceptualization of secularism focuses on the relationship between state and religion (Panikkar 1999).

With the acceptance of the principal of secularism, the popularity of Congress under Nehru’s leadership, and the state’s insistence on keeping religion for the private world, kept Hindu nationalists out of active politics. The extremist position taken by the Hindu Mahasabha, which gave rise to the communal conflict, fiirther maligned its image. Thus finally they had to depend on the landowners and their organicist.

22 brahminical viewpoint. In the first two decades of independent India, the Hindu nationalists could not mobilize or proliferate. After Independence, barring a few instances, the direct battle against communal tendencies was not taken up. It was assumed that the acceptance of democracy and secularism, along with the spread of education, economic development and adult franchise, would gradually weaken communal thinking (Chandra 1993, Hansanl999, Nanda 2004, Jaffrelot 2005, Baber 2006). Two decades of institutionalization of the democratic rule and carrying out a degree of welfarist industrialization, enabled Congress to survive as the dominant political institution (Vanaik 1997). A democratic political system had been institutionalized with a strong mass commitment to its preservation. But there was the partial decay of a variety of democratic institutions such as the legislature, civilian bureaucracy, judiciary and the press (Vanaik 1997).

The 1960s questioned the political hegemony of the Congress party but there was no concrete alternative available that could provide a stable government. By the late 70s and early 80s, different ideological groups raised criticism against the Nehruvian principles although the basic principles behind them were not questioned. This was initiated with the rise of political Hindutva through the expansion of the RSS and the rise of the BJP. A fertile ground was provided by the emergency and the anti-corruption movement that gave the RSS-BJP mobilising experience and public legitimacy on much larger scale (Vanaik 1997). During 1984-89, the BJP was successful in creating the impression that the ‘secular’ Indian state was appeasing the Muslims and giving unfair treatment to the Hindus. The Shah Bano case, which was an issue of alimony and exploitation of women under personal laws with the sanction of the state, became the battleground for the identity politics of fundamentalist groups among Muslims and aggrieved Hindus (Das 1995, Vanaik 1997). To refute this charge of appeasement of Muslims, the government appeased Hindu communalists by opening the gates of the disputed site at Ayodhya. This decision of the government enabled the RSS, BJP and VHP to initiate the campaign for the demolition of the mosque at Ayodhya and build a temple there. The massive mob which gathered at Ayodhya to demolish the mosque, and the popular support to the testing of the nuclear bomb, posed several questions to the

23 acceptance of democracy and secularism as an official policy on the one hand, and how to understand this phenomenon of the emergence of Neo-Hinduism, on the other. As underlined by Sarkar and Butalia (1993), Indian governments more often than not either shielded or furthered the violence by groups like ‘upper castes’, landlords, capitalists and men with social power. Thus the violence of 6 December 1992 did not constitute an important event. However, the significance lay in the fact that this act of demolition was a move to transform Indian polity as a whole. The valorisation of Ram and Sita is indicative of a wider point on the idea of Hinduness or Hindutva. These figures in the context of Hindutva emerged as more national figures rather than religious. The project of building a temple has been considered as a national project and thus, any resistance to it has been considered as anti national (Zavos 2005). Therefore the proclamation of India as a Hindu nation and the replacement of the values of secularism and democracy were the main aims of the Hindutva project. The analysis of various documents published by the RSS and other Hindu nationalist organizations clearly indicates a trend towards majoritarian, authoritarian and militaristic state order. Both these events—temple-building and the nuclear bomb—also highlight the feature of reactionary modernism. According to Nanda (2004), the above mentioned developments raised two questions: one, why did Hinduism emerge as a political force now, after more than fifty years of independence; and second, how one could explain the modernist character of Hindu nationalism?

This emergence of Hindu nationalism, as argued by Hansen (1999), must be understood in the context of the longest sustained and successftil trajectory of Indian democracy. This success has resulted not only from the deficiencies in the acceptance of democracy but it is the product of a series of intensely fought elections, intense battle over sites, rituals, spaces and over the meaning of secularism and democracy. At the same time, the success of Hindu nationalism has also revealed ‘the weakness’ in the notions of tolerance, equality and rights. This is despite the fact that Hinduism asserts itself by not rejecting the modem ideas of democracy, secularism and scientific reason. Instead, it is restated in a Hindu civilization idiom (Nanda 2004). The Hindu nationalists have successftilly used this

24 category to state their different identity compared to their Islamic and Christian counterparts.

« The ascendancy of the pohtical forces associated with the Sangh Parivar, deployment of the democratic principles by them and increasing communal strife in India gave impetus to the debate on the acceptance, applicability and success of the secularism in India.

Secularism, Anti-Secularism and the Secularisation of Civil Society in India

Secularism is a juridical arrangement in which there is a formal separation of the state and religion. Secularism is used to denote a variety of legal-political arrangements between the state and the civil society (Nanda 2004). Here the state guarantees freedom of religion to individual and corporate entity. It deals with the individual as a citizen, irrespective of religion. The state is neither consciously connected to a particular religion nor promotes or interferes with any religion (Smith 1996 as cited in Nanda 2004).

In India the acceptance of secularism was questioned by two groups: Hindu nationalists who were putting forth the Hindu version of secularism (notion of

Sarvadahrma Samabhav) and intellectuals who were critical about the applicability of the principle of secularism to India where its citizens are predominantly religious in nature. The Hindutva contention that the separation of religion from state is an inappropriate Western import, has found support from unexpected quarters—the anti-Enlightenment, anti-secularist social theorists (Nanda 2004).

Those who see secularism as Western, argue that secularism is not capable of countering religious fundamentalism. According to Madan, (1987: 748-49 as cited in Baber 2006, Nandy 2001) secularism constitutes in itself an alien ‘cultural ideology’, ‘a gift of Christianity’, ‘an impossible credo of life’ that is ‘impractical as a basis for state action and ‘impotent as a blue print for the future’. Those who

25 were critical of secularism argue that ‘Hinduism must be secularised within the spiritual framework (of Hinduism itself)’ (Nanda 2004). For the masses the notion of Hinduism is tolerant and pluralistic. Hinduism is also considered holistic so it argued that one can not separate faith and politics. Thus any attempt to exclude religion from the public and contain it in the private, will make it intolerant (Nandy 2001).

Scholars who are critical about such formulation underline how such formulation overlaps with that of the most rabid Hindu nationalists (Nanda 2004, Baber 2006). In the anti-secularist position one finds subtle but harmful cultural essentialism at work. Nanda (2004) argues that labelling secularism as ‘Western’ and ‘a gift of Christianity’ will overlook the fact that this Christian experience has become universal in scope: the formation of the modem state, the growth of modem capitalism, and the modem scientific revolution. They also overlook the traditions of movements like neo-Buddhist movement, which stmggle to remove the traditional legitimation of caste and gender.

However the anti-secularists abandon the fact that far from only accepting the Westem model of secularism, the secularism practised in India is an Indian invention and possesses a different character (Beteille 1994, Vanaik 1997, Nanda 2004). In India, the state is neutral regarding religion but is allowed to interfere equally, without preference, in all religions. The Indian Constitution does allow the regulation of any activity related to religion if it conflicts with the guarantee of civic equalities promised as fundamental rights by the Constitution. The Indian meaning of secularism does not suggest the indifference to religion in the public sphere. As argued by Dhavan (2001), India’s secular state was designed to celebrate all faiths, and also enjoined to eliminate some invidious practices sanctioned by the religions in question. Indian secularism is not Westem but it grew out of a response to Westem influence.

Secularism was accepted in India without actually making conscious efforts to secularise social and political structures. Also, as it is based on the existing

26 dominant resources of Hinduism, especially of tolerance and Sarvadharma

Samabhav, thus in that sense it is deeply Hindu. Instead of undertaking the actual secularisation of institutions and its citizens, after Independence, the Gandhians within and outside Congress, the Indian Left, the Congress and the Hindu Right have concentrated on indigenism and cultural authenticity (Nanda 2004). In this process the major beneficiaries were the Hindu nationalists who were able to transmute religion into the political and were able to change the entire political and social discourse of India. The notion of San’adharma Samabhav and the notion of Hinduism being tolerant were used to establish the dominance of Hindus, namely the ‘upper caste’ Hindus, in the socio political domain.

This necessitates an inquiry into how Hindu nationalists have defined ‘Hindu’ and how they have propagated the notion of ‘homogenised Hindutva’.

Hindu Nationalism: Some Key Issues

In the formulation of Hindu nationalism, the question of ‘Who is a Hindu?’ occupies a central place. As mentioned earlier, only linguistic origin and its acceptance would not be enough to imagine the homogenised category of Hindu. The difficulties experienced by the elites in nineteenth and early twentieth century have influenced the development of Hindu nationalism. This, as underlined by Zavos (2002), is because of the absence of theological coherence and debates about the parameters of Hinduism as a social phenomenon. How you defined the boundaries of Hinduism and how its shape was articulated formed a key underlying question in the contest over whether and how religion needed to be reformed and regenerated. The Hindu ideology, which is both deeply revivalist and chauvinistic, and equates India with Hinduness, automatically excludes Muslims and Christians (Nanda 2004, Zavos 2005). As described by V. D. Savarkar (1923), the authentic Hindu is a cultural and religious entity, an integrated body nourished by the vital fluid of Hindutva. Thus only those communities who are native to India and for whom India is not only their motherland but also a Holy Land, and whose religion also developed in the ambience of Hinduism, are part of this Hindu. This

27 encompasses a broad range of traditions, including resistant traditions like Buddhism and Jainism. Savarkar develops a notion of Hindu nationality and works upon the boundaries that mark which individual or group may be considered as Hindu. He produced a formulaic model through which an individual or a group could be identified as Hindu or not (Zavos 2005). Savarkar designed the widely recognised formula of "pitrubhumi-punyabhumf (fatherland and Holy Land). The individual who can identify with both may be considered as a Hindu (Savarkar 1923). Savarkar, and later Hindu nationalists, have used this to exclude Christians and Muslims who locate their Holy Land and their cultural identity outside India. This is an attempt to resolve the threat posed by doctrinal diversity and fragmentation within the Hindu identity, which endorses this diversity as a model (Zavos 2005). This approach has emerged in contemporary Hindu nationalism as a valorisation of Hindu culture. Thus, as argued by Zavos (2005), any assessment of Hindu nationalism must be located in a much broader space; only political or social or cultural spaces will not help us to understand the expanse, ideology and the actual working of the Hindutva ideology. Following this argument, we will take a review of different Hindutva organizations working in different fields like politics, culture, social and spiritual.

Section II

In this section, we will take a brief review of the available work on the Hindu cultural organisations like RSS, Hindu nationalist parties, mainly Bhartiya Janata Party, a national level party and Shiv Sena, a more regional or state level party but the major ally of the BJP located in Maharashtra. As discussed earlier, the way these organisations and parties have propagated Hindu nationalism in political terms needs close scrutiny. This is necessary as it will help us, according to Basu (2000), to understand how a party or organisation, to exist in the political field, abides by the formal rules of democracy laid down in the Indian Constitution and yet is considered anti-democratic. Any inquiry into the growth of Hindu nationalism, especially political Hindutva (Hansen 1999) necessitates an inquiry into the multiple identities of the Hindu nationalist organisations (Basu 2000).

28 As argued earlier that many of the Hindu nationalist's organisations do draw from the RSS we would take a brief review of the ideology, proliferation of the RSS first and then the BJP.

The Emergence and Proliferation of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh

The RSS, which was founded in 1925 by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, is the largest and most influential organisation in India committed to Hindu revivalism (Anderson and Damle 1987). The major aim of the organization was to train individuals who work to bring about unity among the Hindus. As underlined by Jaffrelot (2005), Hindu nationalists leaders proclaim that their community needs to organise itself in order to resist its aggressors. They have exploited the feeling of vulnerability and Hedgewar reacted to it by launching the RSS. The RSS has drawn most of its ideological inspiration from Savarkar. Its firm foundation has been laid down by Hedgewar, who was the first Chief (sarsanghchalak) of the RSS, and his successor Golwalkar. The RSS from its inception has called itself a cultural organisation. It believed that Hindus were weak and vulnerable in comparison to the Muslims. Hence, it set out to create a martial brand of Hinduism by reshaping the mind and body of the Hindus in order to make them warrior-like (Jaffrelot 2005). It has avoided direct engagement in politics. It does not look at the conquest of state power as its priority.

Training of the RSS Cadre The RSS training is carried out in shakhas held daily for character building of the swayamsevaks (participants). This training system was intended to build brotherhood, which would transcend the parochial antagonism and social disorder. It was expected that this enlightened group would work together to reshape Hindu society. Daily sessions in the shakha includes commentary on current issues and historical events like Vedic golden age, deeds of Shivaji or other, mostly Hindu, warriors who have fought against Muslim invaders. The shakhas includes members from all castes and classes among Hindus, though it has strong affinity with the Hindu ‘upper caste’. Through shakhas the RSS has expanded its network beyond

Maharashtra. From these shakhas, the organization draws its pracharaks (full-time

29 RSS workers) who are then trained and go on to dedicate their whole hfe to the RSS. These pracharaks are described as karma yogis, saintly characters who act for the benefit of the whole world. RSS actually begins its training from the pre adolescent period which becomes more ideologically oriented later. It expects that the members should necessarily follow self-control, disciplined activity, identification with the group and act with religious zeal (Anderson and Damle

1987). From those who attend the shakhas some became full-time members of the RSS. As a prospective member, he must demonstrate his loyalty to the RSS by regularly attending shakha, baudhik (sessions to sharpen intellectual abilities), festivals and camps. He must conform to the model of the adarsha swayamsevak (ideal participant). He must have the ability to work in a group. After meeting all these condition the candidate is eligible to take the oath that he will submit his life to the RSS.

These shakhas have close affinity with Akharas (wrestling clubs) where traditionally men gather for bodybuilding, exercise and sports. Each akharas is under the authority of a guru who instructs the members in physical and mental discipline. Members of the akhara are recruited from all social classes and develop strong collective attachment to it. Though the inspiration of the shakha was derived from the akhara, it is different than the traditional model especially in its ideological position and form of physical exercise. Traditionally, akharas have concentrated on physical fitness while the shakhas on the cultivation of mind (Jafferlot 1999).

In order to shape the spirit of the group, the RSS celebrates six festivals or utsavs each year. As underlined by Jaffrelot (1999), these also coincide with those observed in Hindu society. Hedgewar has incorporated them in the ritual calendar of the RSS. All these festival celebrations have symbolic meaning attached to it. The first festival celebrated is Padva (Varsha Pratipada) which is viewed as an opportunity to review the previous year’s progress. The second festival is the celebration of the birth anniversary of Shivaji, a Maratha king who fought the Muslims, and hence, the celebrations also honour Shivaji’s ‘Hindu Victory’. The

30 third festival is Raksha Bandhan during which rakhis are exchanged among sangha members, emphasising the ties of kinship among the swayamsevaks. The fourth festival is the occasion of Guru Poomima, during which the swayamsevaks offer money to their Guru-Bhagva Dhwaj (the Banner). Most of the RSS funds are raised at this utsav. The fifth festival is Dasera, during which swayamsevaks demonstrate their martial skills acquired throughout the year in shakhas. The last festival is Makar Sankranti. The major theme of this utsav is personal renunciation and service to the nation (Anderson and Damle 1987).

Another important activity of the RSS towards building its cadre is organizing camps. These camps are used to indoctrinate the swayamsevaks, to offer instruction regarding the samskars (rituals) and to develop a sense of solidarity among participants (Anderson and Damle 1987). In 1927, Hedgewar organised a camp to form corps of pracharaks to constitute the backbone of the RSS. Hedgewar insisted that pracharaks must be sadhus first and must renounce material comfort. Even today following his teachings, many sangh members generally remain celibate in order to devote their life to the RSS mission of regenerating the Hindu community. This call to become like a sadhu, as emphasised by Jaffrelot (1999), enabled Hedgewar to introduce some features of the Hindu sect in the RSS. He found the possibility to unite the Hindus in the sect so that an egalitarian form of individualism can be observed. Since the purpose of the RSS is to unite the Hindus, it finds in the Hindu sect a sociological model for the nation. In this model, as described by Marcel Mauss (1969, cited in Jaffrelot 1999), no other elements come between the nation (rashtra) and the individual. The building of such a nation was the main aim of Hedgewar. Jaffrelot (1999) argues that the religious and more precisely the sectarian appearance of the RSS can probably be explained by the fact that Hedgewar and Golwalkar found in the institutions associated with asceticism a means of developing the sociological structure of an egalitarian, united nation. However, though the RSS dreams of the egalitarian Hindu Rashtra, its leaders’ view of the ideal society is one based on the Varna system. Thus the immediate task seems to become a recovery of the lost hierarchical social structure. From its inception, brahmins were attracted towards the RSS. The first RSS leaders were

31 themselves brahmins belonging to the middle class and lower middle class. The RSS has adopted the sanskritized Hindu culture and even its techniques bear the marks of brahminical culture. While refashioning the Hindu character to make it nationalist, Hedgewar emphasised on Hindu sam skaras mainly associated with the brahminical concept (Jaffrelot 1999). Thus it is important to explore the ideology of the RSS.

Fascist Roots of the RSS The fascist dimension of the RSS has been suggested by its parliamentary style. The authoritarian organisational structure and functioning of the organisation, its vicious propaganda against the enemy and violent mobilisation, do share some of the main characteristics of Fascism. The organicist character of Golwalkar’s ideology is reminiscent of certain aspects of Nazism. It has also demonstrated such character on different occasions. However, there are important dissimilarities in the Fascism or Nazism practised in Europe and that accepted by the RSS (Kanungo 2003). These dissimilarities are—the RSS’s ideology treats society as an organism and concentrates on the socio-cultural aspect rather than the racial (Jaffrelot 1999); and there are absences of the following nature; of a truly charismatic leader, of any anti democratic and anti-working class themes in its campaigns, of any verbal anti capitalist demagogy, of any orientation to the theme of general revolt and so on (Vanaik 1994).

The core of the ideology of the RSS indicates that though it is essentially political in nature, it still does not wish to control the State unlike the fascists. Rather they would like to concentrate on long-term programmes. The RSS espouses its political agenda of Hindu Rashtra under the guise of the cultural. The mission and the motive of the RSS is nothing but political. It employs various cultural means to forge a monolithic Hindu identity (Kanungo 2003). Kanungo (2003) also traces how all five Sarsanghchalaks so far have furthered the RSS’s agenda of Hindu Rashtra by getting hold over state power and effectively using culture.

32 The RSS and its Affiliates Hedgewar and his successor Golwalkar gradually realised that the platform of the RSS would not be enough to attain the ultimate aim to reach to each Hindu. Hedgewar wanted to establish the network that will cover the whole of India. After independence, the threat of the communists, especially their work among students, forced RSS leaders to expand RSS’s matrix and affiliates (Jaffrelot 2005). The idea of building a Sangh Parivar evolved and attempts were made to incorporate those groups and domains, which were still out side the fold of the RSS.

Rashtra Sevika Samiti, founded in 1936 by Laxmibai Kelkar, was based on the RSS model. The Samiti was founded to oppose the Indian left and the liberal women’s movement of 1930, which was believed to represent the Western variety and the ‘wrong’ path for Hindu women (Bachhetta 1996). From the outset, Samiti members were projected as mothers. The stated aim of the Samiti was to make women conscious of their divine identity and to prepare them for the Hindu nationalist cause. The ideal of motherhood accepted by the Samiti has a heroic dimension which, at times, force women to become violent towards other communities. The Samiti provided physical and ideological training to women in order to train them to serve the Hindu nation. In the physical training, a woman’s body is shaped for healthy reproduction while the daily ‘boudhik’, i.e the ideological training, open her mind to the basic lessons of Hindutva politics. Sarkar (2000) underlines how this education imparts an uncritical admiration for Hindu scriptures and customs without familiarising the Sevikas with the text. Samiti maintains the faith in the traditional values. The emphasis upon parental consent maintains the caste and class boundaries of the families and rules out the possibility of transgression, without referring to caste ideology (Sarkar 2000). Though fi-om the beginning the Samiti was engaged in condemning feminism, it has borrowed and appropriated different issues, slogans from the latter and also modelled some of its projects on feminist ones (Bachhetta 1996).

Earlier female recruits mainly came from family members of the swayamsevaks. However, over the period the Samiti has expanded and they have made inroads

33 across class and geographical regions. The network expanded by employing methods like regular visits to the families of the participants, extension of counselling services to battered women (seen as an opportunity to inculcate the traditional patriarchal values). The Samiti encourages its newly-married Sevikas to be docile wives and gain the confidence of women of their families. Through everyday dispositions and normal activities, the Sevikas win new territories. The quite, routinized and local work by the Samitis continues (Sarkar 1999). Sarkar (2000) argues that the Samiti helps women to be in the public world with the consent and support of the family. Later these Sevikas emerge as accepted leaders and advisors who transmit the domestic, gender and political ideas of the RSS.

After independence, in response to the perceived threat of the communists and to expand the first fi-ont organisation of the RSS, the ‘Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad’ (ABVP) was formed in 1948. The basic aim was to resist proponents of class struggle and to promote conflict-less society (Jaffrelot 2005). The RSS has also come up with the programme of launching a network of schools to train the mind and body of the young. This initiated a process to launch a political party. It materialised by the formation of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1953, later to become the BJP. Through these efforts the RSS could exert control over party politics as well as over the entire political domain. Then, in order to counter the growing influence of the Christians on tribals, it initiated the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram in 1952. The RSS along with other allies dedicated one RSS pracharak (full-timer) to do the organisational work. Following a similar pattern, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) was formed in 1955 by lending D. P. Thengadi, one of its pracharaks, for this work to reach out to the workers. This was an attempt to infiltrate the unions formed by the communists (Jaffi-elot 2005). BMS promoted a corporatist socio political arrangement. Later, it emerged as the largest labour union in the 1990s.

In 1960s, attempts were made to organise farmers under Bharatiya Kisan Sabha, which, according to the RSS, would not only think of the interests of the farmers but also of the country. The next major component of the Sangh Parivar is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), founded in 1964. It was formed in the background

34 of the Congress losing its hegemonic presence in North India and the emergence of the BJP as an important electoral alternative to the Congress. The RSS mobilised the political and religious leadership through the VHP. It tried, through the VHP, to unify various communities and sects and evolve a common Hindu cultural programme that would lead to a unified and cohesive Hindu political nation (Katju 2003).

As emphasised by Katju (2003), the political and religious leadership of the RSS- BJP came together to consolidate the non-secular, non-modernist and non socialist/communist opinion against the Congress. It tried to achieve this through revival and propagation of the Hindu dharma among the Hindu diaspora and tribal communities of north-east India. The conversion of thousands at Meenakshipuram came as a defining movement for the VHP. The Ram Janmabhoomi movement led by the VHP brought it immediate publicity. Katju underlies how VHP contributed to the political discourse by consolidating militant Hindu nationalism, religious polarisation and schism. Towards this end, VHP has employed varied mobilisation strategies effectively.

The Rashtra Sevika Samiti (Samiti), the ABVP, the BMS and the VHP were the first components of the Sangh Parivar and they have considerably developed over time. The relationship between the RSS and its affiliates is complex. Since officially each component is separate, the Sangh at times denies the idea that they form a network (Jaffi-elot 2005). In 1977, after realising the need to create a new structure to ensure the cohesion of its affiliates, a co-ordination committee (Samanway Samiti) was founded. This committee is constituted of the ftill-time workers fi'om the RSS and fi'om the affiliated organisations at district and state levels. The RSS plays a role in co-ordinating its parivar. In spite of such efforts, there are tensions within the different components of the Sangh Parivar. These are the results of the inherent contradiction in how the RSS and its affiliates imagine the Hindu nation and their agenda to achieve it. Bachhetta’s (1996) exploration of the Samiti will help us to understand this tension. How the Samiti conceptualises the nation, its history, femininity and masculinity sometimes corresponds but at

35 times also appears contradictory to the ideology of the RSS. However, while understanding the politics, mission and methods of the Sangh, one must not over emphasise these tensions, as the Sangha parivar is never broken (Jaffrelot 2005). While the Sangh Parivar covers a large spectrum of the different streams of public opinion, the RSS monitors its different fronts tactfiilly. As argued by Jaffrelot (2005), this is the corporatist model where unity will not be derived from the transformation of individuals but fi'om the integration of complementary groups in a fixed social structure. This corporatist arrangement has strong affinities with the organicist overtones of the Hindu nationalist ideology.

In order to understand how RSS has intervened into the political domain of Hindutva and transform the discourse on politics, we will take a brief review of the emergence and proliferation of the BJP.

The Emergence and Proliferation of BJP

The BJP was founded in 1980s by ex-Jana Sanghis, after the controversy between non-Jana Sangha members and Jana Sangha members of the Janata Party occurred. Non-Jana Sagha members were apprehensive about the proactive behind the scene role of the RSS in political matters. They feared that RSS would become the extra constitutional authority (Jaffrelot 2005). Therefore the RSS was very careful in concealing their links with the BJP to avoid the controversy of dual membership. As underlined by different scholars, fi'om the beginning, in order to gain power at the national level, the BJP had accepted a ‘moderate’ stand on Hindutva. At some point, BJP began to downplay its Hindu nationalist ideology as many of its allies (who were necessary to occupy power at the Centre) professed some or the other variety of secularism. This also helped BJP to escape the stigma of being fijndamentalist and to disown RSS for electoral purposes. Even during its militant phase, the BJP did not challenge the secular democratic principles because for it, the Indian conception of secularism is inspired by the notion of Sarvadharma samabhav. However, it was critical about the Western concept of secularism, which requires the separation of religion and the state (Basu 2000). The BJP sought to

36 redefine democracy as majority rule with minority rights as a result of special bargaining dependent upon the character of the minority and on terms of the majority. Here the basic point generally stressed by the Hindu nationalists has to be noted, which is that Hinduism is more tolerant than Islam. Individuals for whom the punyabhum i and pitrubhum i are not separate, are considered to be loyal and thus eligible for getting the best treatment from the state, and others would definitely get a secondary treatment (Vanaik 1997, Basu 2000, Nanda 2004, Jaffrelot 2005). As underlined by Jaffrelot (2000), the BJP’s deployment of democracy and secularism is deliberate and significant as it earned them the support of the educated middle classes in India and abroad. This has distinguished them from the religious fiindamentalists.

As mentioned above, BJP adopted moderate Hindutva when it came closer to occupying national power. According to Jaffrelot (2005), apart from retaining power there are several other reasons because of which BJP has adopted the moderate approach. It believed that at the time of the Ayodhya movement, it has recovered the Hindu self-esteem. Now by watering down the campaign and not succumbing to the pressures of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad to launch a stronger campaign for temple-building when in power, the BJP focussed more on expressing concern about the economic and social order issues. RSS, the force behind the BJP, approves BJP’s moderate Hindutva stance provided it implements the educational and security policies approved by the RSS, including the anti-minority schemes and policies. Though BJP accepted a moderate Hindutva stand on some issues, it periodically revived Hindu-Muslim conflicts to keep alive the public memory of Hindutva and distinguish itself from the other political parties (Basu 2000).

This moderate stand and dilution is in tune with the aim of the expansion of the party beyond the Hindi belt and beyond the fold of the ‘upper caste’. To be a centrist party, BJP had to accommodate people from all kinds of social background especially from the ‘lower castes’. This not only diluted the ideology but also the ‘upper caste’ leaders, who were at the helm of affairs, had to accept it because as a bargain they had to share power with the ‘lower caste’ groups (Jaffrelot 2005).

37 Another major obstacle that prevented the BJP from becoming a centrist party was its network with the Hindu organizations such as RSS and VHP. The BJP for several reasons did not like to break its ties with the RSS, especially since the men who dominated the leadership of BJP had a strong RSS background. RSS and the other organisations have been vital to the BJP’s phenomenal growth. The BJP is also dependent upon the RSS to negotiate the rifts within the party. This results into the cycles of moderation and militancy in BJP's policies. Whether the BJP projects the militant or moderate stand depends upon the character of the state. The general pattern observed is that when the State is in flux, Hindu nationalism has been the most militant; alternatively, when the State exercises high degree of authority and reftises to accommodate their demands, Hindu nationalists have been moderate (Basu 2000). Most importantly the moderation of the BJP is not irreversible (Jaffrelot 2005). However, as underlined by Jaffrelot (2005), RSS disapproves when the BJP wants to expand itself by coalition, indicating the clear division of labour between the BJP and the RSS such that when the BJP adopts the moderate stand correspondingly the RSS becomes more militant. Many observers conclude that the BJP has become a centrist party and has to spend more energy to maintain coalitions and is thus unable to pursue Hindu nationalist goals. As a result, the BJP’s appeals have become more inclusive though it has never abandoned its anti- Muslim position. The Gujarat carnage and policies adopted in Gujarat before and after 2002 reveal that its agenda could be more radical when it is not dependent on coalition partners (Basu 2000, Jaffrelot 2005). The senior leaders in the BJP like L. K. Advani, militant leader of the Ratha Yatra and Atal Behari Vajpayee, a moderate leader, are symptomatic of its tendency for double speak. The 1998 elections have confirmed the ties of the BJP and RSS. The composition of the BJP government’s cabinet also reveals the extent of the RSS influence (Basu 2000). The BJP’s commitment to Hindu nationalism had been vital to the party’s growth and it has been unwilling to relinquish it. As a party in power it could not afford to be anti- Muslim like in the past though it has expressed extreme aggression towards Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim country (Jaffrelot 2005, Basu 2000). There is a religious dimension to the BJP’s revamped Hindu nationalism as seen in its

38 recalling of its campaign in Ayodhya and in the way it described the nuclear bomb as shakti, the principle of female energy or strength. The VHP announced that they would build a temple called Shakti Peeth 50 km from the nuclear testing site, where social reformers would be worshiped, especially for having waged a struggle to protect our women. According to Govindacharya (then VHP secretary), the temple would honour the protection of women. As suggested by Basu (2000), this might be read as the Hindu nationalists’ attempt to project an India that is traditional yet modem.

The emergence, consolidation and the coming into power of the BJP, proved wrong the assumptions that the coalition governments are unstable and that only national parties could come to power at the centre (Adeney and Saez 2005). The BJP’s aim, as discussed by Jaffrelot (1996) and Hewitt (2000), is a long term one. For them the BJP has succeeded in changing the terms of the discourse in relation to minorities. This was witnessed in the public opinion and political debate at the time of the riots after the demolition of the mosque at Ayodhya and the carnage at Gujarat. Thus the question is, what is at stake? The cultural pluralism, minority rights and terms of public debates are under a question mark (Basu 2000).

In Maharashtra, the BJP found Shiv Sena as the main party to form a coalition with, to come into power and also to form a strong opposition Party. This policy was successful in getting them power in the state, which was earlier considered as a Congress dominated constituency. The political domain was largely dominated by the Marathas. In such a situation, the BJP, with the help of the Shiv Sena, succeeded to secure power in 1995. The emergence and proliferation of the Shiv Sena, however, needs fiirther exploration.

The Emergence and Proliferation of Shiv Sena In 1995, the Congress lost power for the first time after the state of Maharashtra was formed to the BJP and Shiv Sena. This event was not only important in terms of the Congress losing its stronghold in Maharashtra but also in terms of the

39 saffronization of the politics of Maharashtra (Patel 1995). The Shiv Sena was launched in 1966 by Bal Thakeray who was disenchanted with the alliance of the communists. He lived in Bombay’s Shivaji Park area. The area was mainly surrounded by Marathi speaking professionals, administrative and clerical workers who responded to the call of the Shiv Sena. Initially, the enemy identified was the 'South Indian’. Bal Thakeray, taking this opportunity, charted the pattern of the Shiv Sena on the lines of the RSS. But as underlined by Gupta (1992), little thought has been given on how particular aspects were to be organised.

At the time when it was founded, the Shiv Sena had a simple programme and a limited constituency: the reservation of jobs and new economic opportunities for the Maharashtrians, mainly in the lower echelons of white-collar employment (Lele 1995). This corresponds with major changes in the structure of the economy of Bombay (now called Mumbai). There was state sponsored private capitalist development and an underworld of extortion, smuggling, drug trafficking and contraband pedalling had also begun to emerge. These changes were potentially threatening to middle class society. Shiv Sena offered a promise to wipe out gangsterdom. In the late sixties, the Shiv Sena had created a significant support for itself in three disparate constituencies. It elicited a wave of sympathy and some activism among salaried white-collar workers through attacks on South Indians. Some inroads were made in the cadre of factory workers through the co-operation between the workers and the management. In 1970s, the Sena could not make a significant impact on the politics of Maharashtra. However, it succeeded in mobilising underemployed and unemployed youth across class and ethnic boundaries. This was accomplished through a constructive strategy of assistance with the needs and difficulties of families in poor neighbourhoods (Lele 1995).

Late 1970s and early 1980s, witnessed the decline of the hegemony of Maratha elites in politics and the critique of the established pattern of development. The dominant castes, as argued by Lele (1995), were on the one hand threatened by a possibility of shift in the loyalty of their savama supporters due to the assets and opportunity polarisation caused by the policies of the seventies and, on the other -13348

40 hand, the ‘arrogance’ of the dahts and MusHms, who traditionally constituted a subservient labour force. In such a situation, the unifying ideology of Hinduism, which was dismissed as a conspiracy of clever brahmins, seemed to hold new promise. In Maharashtra, the political legitimacy of militant Hindutva became overtly pervasive and dominant in the discourse of politics. The Sena wandered through a variety of alliances and enemities. It engaged in violent clashes with Dalit Panthers and Muslim League but also accepted their support during the mayoral contests (Guru 1991, Lelel995). The Sena’s decisive turn to Hindutva came in 1984 when it established alliance with the BJP. Those disenchanted with the unfulfilled promises of the Congress were available for mobilisation under Hindu nationalism. The factionalism within the Congress party often helped Sena. In its anti-dalit and anti-Communist rhetoric and practice, Sena saw a possibility to capitalize on the spreading popularity of Hindutva. However, its initial attempts to collaborate with the other Hindu organisations were not very successful because of its under-class image. Thus one need to focus on the shifts occurring in the material basis of Sena’s diverse constituency, its changing interests and also the different signals the ideology of Hindutva transmits to various sectors of its support.

In the mid-eighties, the political economy of the State was changing and predatory capitalism was becoming popular. The constraints imposed by the State on imports and investment were seen as obstacles in future progress. In this argument, the capitalists found a newly rich and vocal middle class as its ally (Lele 1995). As argued by Lele (1995), with the help of the IMF and the World Bank, capitalists sought avenues of exploitation that defied all standards of social justice. There are clear evidences that the Sena was involved in fostering and being fostered by this form of capitalism. It was active at many levels and grew by protecting one and punishing the other. Along with this, the commercial links of Bombay expanded with the Middle East and the names associated with drug trafficking, smuggling, labour migration and shipments to and from the city to places like Dubai and controllers of real estate surfaced up fi'om time to time. Stories related to all these helped to create a false image of Muslims as the main perpetrators of criminal activities (Lele 1995, Patel 1995 and Purandare 1999). The Sena, as argued by

41 scholars on Mumbai and the Shiv Sena, succeeded in using and nurturing this image to label the entire Muslim community as that of traitors, aggressive propagators of faith and wanton producers of too many children. During the eighties, all political parties talked of the Muslim community in their political discourse at the Centre. During the same period, as underiined by Lele (1995), the Shah Bano case, Muslim personal law and Babri Mosque at Ayodhya became household words and the middle class support to Hindutva across India continuously rose. The Sena was able to manipulate the issues not only to consolidate its position in Mumbai but also expand in other parts of Maharashtra. Sena diligently managed to use local issues, which helped them to label Muslims. This was accompanied by either anti-Muslim agitations at the time of the Ayodhya campaign or riots occurring at the time of local events like procession at the time of Moharram or celebration of Ram Navami (a practice initiated mainly by local units of Shiv Sena or their allies); Sena to further it’s politics of labelling Muslims claimed that they were the main instigators (Heuze 1992, Lele 1995). The support to the violence was achieved through careful manipulation of the psyche of the middle class. The targets in riots were carefully chosen, the damage to public property and non-Muslims were avoided. It has been observed that the sense of empowerment has been created among the middle class onlookers. This targeting of Muslims at the time of riots and manipulation of inter caste and inter-religious divisions fetched substantial gains in rural Maharashtra. In addition, their alliance with the BJP gave them an opportunity to enhance their base in the rural constituency (Lele 1995). The alliances, though uneasy during thel990 elections, fetched major electoral gains for both the parties with the realization that staying together involved high stakes. This also corresponds with the shifts in the policies of the BJP, which began to looking at regional parties as its allies.

This transformation of the BJP into a defiant, populist and media manipulating party, matches with Sena’s fascist populism. The serialisation of epics, Lalvani’s m ahayatra and Sena’s mahaartis have grown hand in hand with the liberalisation of material and cultural imports (Sathyamurthy 1991 and Lele 1995). The Sena in order to expand itself has changed its strategies fi*om time to time and has realised the limitation of its traditional mobilisation tactics. Its decision to expand firstly into

42 the OBC constituency (whose members were unhappy with the Maratha elite and the Congress), secondly, into the rural area (where there is a triangular structure with shifting alliances and combination between the Marathas, OBC’s and Dalits), and lastly, its efforts to mobilise women through its women's wing popularly known as ‘Women Shiv Sainiks’ (formed in 1985) gave it a cutting edge. This shows its attempts to enlarge its support across competing constituencies. The white-collar workers and the new rich class in the urban areas received the discourse of Hindutva propagated by the Sena very well. Shiv Sena gave an opportunity to the white-collar workers to indulge in a general blame game, to take revenge on corrupt, spineless occupants of state power and to offer an electoral support to the ‘Rams’ and ‘Shivaji’s’ of the twenty-first century. However, this attempt to broaden its electoral support through the inclusion of dalits, OBC’s and other non-dominant caste groups had a limited effect and in fact has had some negative consequences for the Sena. The retaliation of Chagan Bhujbal, once a trump card of the Sena, whose presence was helpful in authenticating the Sena’s claim to inclusivist Hindutva and the importance of the OBC’s within the party, indicates the paternalistic and ‘upper caste’ nature of the party.

In the rural areas Hindutva as well as the Sena was welcomed by those who were in control of the assets and political power as a way to re-entrench their hegemony. Though, as argued by Lele (1995), in the long run the differentiation within the rural population and the development of distinctive ideological consciousness will counter this alliance. However, Hindutva’s popularity lies in the kind of militant nationalism propagated by Sena which helps to deflect attention from the real issues by evoking different issues related to religious and caste identities (Lele 1995, Setalvad 1995).

The Women’s wing of the Sena came in to existence in 1985 in response to the success of the autonomous feminist groups. In late eighties and early nineties there was a marked visibility of groups of women Shiv Sainiks who were protecting their men who were found guilty of murder, rioting and possessing illegal arms. This highlights the success of the Hindutva ideology’s wooing of Hindu women. This

43 concept of the militant Hindu women needs some exploration. As underlined by Setalvad (1995), the BJP Mahila Morcha and Shiv Sena Mahila Aghadi strengthen their movement through systematic interactions with children by discipline training them and giving them lessons in History. Mothers, wives, daughters, sisters of Hindutva do the home and hearth proud. The women Shiv Sainiks have used religious and cultural functions to gather women together to promote their ideology. Women who participate in such activities believe that they are waging a war to protect Hindu Culture. To rise in defence of this culture and the country, these women are ready to join hands with their men in taking on the enemy. The inherent problems within their organisation get conveniently shelved. It is assumed that the enemy within can be liberated by repeated proof of his nationalistic credentials. They are not concerned about the genuine issues related to women. Instead they use campaigns and planks to further the agenda of Hindutva, chiefly the labelling of Muslims (Setalvad 1995). Setalvad argues (1995) that the violence and vengeance, which are integral parts of this ideology, can be used against the most precious and vulnerable sections of the enemy community especially women from that community.

The expansion of Shiv Sena and its efforts to accommodate different groups are difficult. However, it is clear that the Sena in future will continue to exploit people’s aspirations and dreams in the name of religion, region and language. This is because homogenised Hindutva changes its manifestations along with the material conditions. Its ability to capture the imagination of many, in a highly diverse and divided society, is growing (Lele 1994, Basu 2000).

The decade of the 1990s witnessed the proliferation of fiindamentalism and its coming into power. As explained earlier, this is the result of the work of Hindu nationalists of different shades. Along with all these organisations, there are other Hindu religious organisations involved in social service, charitable and welfaristic activities which have played a crucial role in the proliferation of Hindutva. They are crucial in understanding how the Western concept of ‘seva’ (service) is used and how they negotiate it with some of the existing concepts. The broader aim here is to

44 analyse the wider social, political and cultural relevance of social service ideals and activities (Watt 2005). In the following part of this section we will try to understand how they have negotiated this Western concept of seva with the Hindu living traditions. (Watt 2005, Srivatsan 2006) and how these Hindu religious organisations were identified by the international agencies to implement and deliver service (Patel, mimeo).

Seva: An Ideology, a Means to Organise and Proliferate

In the brahminical traditions in India, the term seva denotes what is called service in English. As argued by Srivatsan (2006), it usually comes in the context of menial, demeaning or polluting activities. During the debate over whether to prioritise social or political reforms in the colonial period and in the subsequent acceptance of political reform before social reform, the existing meaning of seva changed. It was then associated with the upliftment of the depressed class through educational, cultural and, sometimes, religious work. Srivatsan’s (2006), work on the Servants of India Society formed by Gokhale and Harijan Seva Sangh formed by the Gandhians, underlines how in the colonial period new meaning was attached to the term ‘servant’ who was an elite political volunteer committed to fiill-time, unpaid political work. In these endeavours, the foreign idea of service, charity and philanthropy were negotiated by Hindu living traditions such as seva, dana (donation for welfare), karmayoga (pursuing ones duties without any expectation of returns), sanyas (renunciation) and brahmacharya (celibacy). Watt (2005) argues that the application of seva is not only a reaction to Christian missionaries but it is also a living tradition within Indian history. It is important to understand the broader social, political and cultural relevance of social service, its ideal and activities in order to understand the nationalist movement and the shaping of India’s civil society. The contemporary connotation to seva is organically linked to the formation of the modem political notion of the nation. In case of Hindu religious organisations, the nation is the Hindu nation. As Patel (memio) underlines, after analysing the Sadhu Vasvani Mission (SVM) and the Patit Pavan Sanghatana

45 (PPS), these organisations mobilised to form the Hindu Nation based on an 'upper caste’ model.

As argued by PateP (mimeo), in Hinduism seva relates to the creation of a band of volunteers (sevaks) to promote Hinduism through humanitarian and/or political service. Seva is employed to foster the national and global Hindu society. Hinduism is a movement structured and organised during the colonial period and reformulated in the present global juncture (Patel mimeo).

Social service and voluntary activities imbued with notions of active, devoted citizenship in the early twentieth century constituted an important fonn of nation building. By tracing the history of the twentieth century and the fomiation of the Arya Samaj (1875), the Theosophical Society (1877), the Servants of India (1905) and the Seva Samiti (1910), Watt (2005) underlines how they have expanded the culture of association used to enter into the public world. Although the social service associations existing between 1900 and 1910, with the exception of the Arya Samaj, claimed that they were open to serving all, they still had difficulties in expanding their appeal (Watt 2005). As mentioned earlier, the organisations employing the modem notion of seva have imparted brahmanical values to the concept of citizenship in all the activities they undertook and when involved in the activities to uplift deprived castes, they imposed ‘upper caste’ notions of civility, propriety and hierarchy. However, Watt (2005) adds that it is not advisable to dismiss all their service activities as motivated by caste, class, community or generational interests. To understand the deployment of seva by Hindu religious organisations like the Sangh and later the growth of the feminine version of seva (Patel mimeo), one needs to understand the ideological roots of seva in Hinduism.

The Ideological Roots of Seva in Hinduism The roots of seva can be traced chiefly to the works of Swami Vivekananda. Both the Ramakrishna Math and Mission founded by him aimed at providing proper

^ I am grateful to Prof. Patel for sharing her forthcoming work on seva which hasjjdpgd me to consolidate my argument on seva.

46 training and nourishment to people. Through seva and sadhana, the sevaks can divert their efforts to spreading education and for overcoming poverty and subjugation of the Hindus in India. Vivekananda believed that it was necessary to get rid of the evils in our society, especially of untouchability, and to survive through the transformatory period (Srivatsan 2006). Patel (mimeo) highlights that Vivekanand’s project is at once social and political. His social project was to reform Hinduism and his political project was to replace colonial domination by mobilising new groups into an institutionalised structure of Hinduism. He tried to change the structure of the brahmanical Hindu thought and interface it with modernity. Patel (mimeo) explores how Vivekananda constructs defining principles by blending three distinct traditions—the orthodox principles of Hinduism incorporated in the vedas, reformist aspects within the religion, and the principle of charity and service as embodied in Christianity. He applied the traditional concept of selfless service and sadhana as a spiritual penance, to the problem of resolving the spiritual and material poverty of religion and of the sevaks. Vivekananda proposes that his disciples, the sevaks need to train themselves to be pure, noble and to appropriate the true character of Hinduism.

This has given new ideas and structure to Hinduism and influenced generations of religious and political thinkers and various Hindu organisations. Vivekananda’s efforts to create new ethics were based on a creative interpretation of tradition and his exploration of Karmayoga is the primary text that yields an understanding of this process. Karmayoga was implied as a moral to be installed among the grihastas (householders). Due to this, the link between the vama theory and the vamashram dharma weakens and the link between vamashram and doing your duties towards society strengthens. Vivekananda shifts the emphasis of dharma and appropriates the Western concept of moral autonomy. This involves a rejection of the restriction to work within the specifications and boundaries of one’s own vama (Srivatsan 2006).

Sumit Sarkar (1997) has argued that Vivekananda’s reconstitution of Hinduism distilled the plural traditions within Hinduism including those associated with the

47 non-brahmanic sects that Ramakrishna had attempted to synthesise in his writings. But it also diluted Vivekananda’s appeal to underprivileged groups in contemporary society.

Vivekananda’s ideas of using education, discipline, organisation and strategy to instil pride in Hinduism appeal many. Among them is Hedgewar who has actually given the territorial notion to seva. While analysing how the concept of seva is employed by the RSS, Beckerlegge (2003) highlights how Hedgewar shifted the emphasis on the humanitarian aspect of seva as propagated by Vivekananda, and how he emphasised upon the creation of a male volunteer group, organised around a physical regime of character-building, to combat apathy and emasculation that he believed was undermining Hindus and Hinduism. Beckerlegge (2003) argues that Hedgewar was influenced by Vivekananda‘s cult of manliness.

Patel (mimeo) highlights that as against this ascetic and aggressive version of seva in the early part of the twentieth century, later there was the growth of a feminine version of seva. This version of seva is conceptualised around care-giving. It identifies the carer, the nurturer and the compassionate individual with the feminine part of human identity usually associated with women. It is expected that these feminine qualities must expand beyond the realm of the family. Seva in this context, embodied a set of duties that children, young girls and wives needed to practise in the modem times, when religious practices no longer remained confined to the household and within the kinship group.

Studies on various cults have explored how the concept of seva has been used differently by them. For example, in case of Mata Amritanadamayi Mission (MAM), as underlined by Warrior (2003), the notion of seva is directed towards the upkeep or expansion of the MAM. Seva is seen as a meritorous activity and not demanding of any renunciation. This appealed to the new modem middle class. It serves as an option to offer some seva to society without resorting to blind faith or forsaking material privileges. Some other cults have reproduced the practises of hierarchy inherited from the caste society and naturalised them through various

48 ways. They have tried to use the feminine metaphor of devotion to mobihse (Patel mimeo).

The above discussion aids us to understand that this concept of seva helped to attack age-old caste-Hindu laws from within the privileged community. In addition, Seva’s ascetic activism opened the capitalist consciousness in a manner which did not essentially demand the breaking of the caste-Hindu’s community structure (Srivatsan 2006). The concept of seva since the colonial period has been used to negotiate rifts within and upsurge by different deprived groups, and also to transform social relations, respond to the Christian missionaries and reform Hinduism to achieve the agenda of Hindutva and to counter the challenge of modernity.

It may be argued that claims of nationalism in colonial India involved social processes of hegemonisation and homogenisation. Since then, the claims of Hindu nationalism have sought to negotiate this vertical and horizontal mobilisation through cultural, political and social service programmes. A review suggests different models of Hindutva in Maharashtra that have emerged at the level of practice the sangha parivar and BJP model which underline the division of ‘cultural’ and ‘political’; the Shiv-Sena model of militant Hinduism and the seva model of service organisations.

Dnyana Prabodhini emerges as an ‘educational’ programme that brings politics, culture and seva in its explicitly stated aim of ‘experiment in Education’ for creating generation of leaders for nation building. The next chapter seeks to map the emergence, ideology and practices of Dnyana Prabodhini.