2. the POLITICAL PARTIES LAW the New Political Parties Law No

POLICY PAPER: The Impact of the Electoral Law and the Bylaw of the House of Representatives on Parliamentary Blocs

Prepared by: Hussein Abu Rumman Director of the Studies Unit Al Quds Center for Political Studies

September 2016 Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTORAL LAW AND THE BYLAW OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS

Al-Quds Center For Political Studies P.O. Box: 213566 Amman 11121 Jordan Tel :+962-6-5633080 E-mail : [email protected] Fax: :+962-6-5674868 Website: www.alqudscenter.org

Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 23,isma’eel Haqi Abdoh ST. Sweifieh P.O. Box 831025 Amman 11183 Jordan Tel: +962-6-5929777 Fax:+962-6-5933087 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.kas.de/amman

4 THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTORAL LAW AND THE BYLAW OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS

INTRODUCTION

Parliamentary blocs in legislative councils serve as the main tool that governs the parliamentary actions of political parties and powers, and hence the parliamentary governments. Parliamentary blocs have been seen in the consecutive parliaments of Jordan since the 11th parliament of 1989. However, not until the adoption of new statues for the 17th parliament in 2013 did those blocs receive an institutional recognition. A dedicated chapter was introduced to the statue on parliamentary blocs and coalitions, though the experiences of those blocs have been very modest reflecting a weak presence of the partiers in the parliament.

These policy paper tires, in particular, to explore the impact of the Electoral Law and the Statutes of the House of Representatives on the parliament’s blocs. It first reviews the legislative environment that acts upon the activities of the parliament’s blocs. It discusses the calculations involved in determining the winning candidate lists. The paper also discusses the implications of establishing a representation threshold (the decisive rate), the division of electoral districts, the right of lists to use their respective names and symbols in other districts and how this affects the election’s results and the chances for representation of strong parties and lists.

It also looks into the impact of the Political Parties Law on the parliamentary blocs, with particular reference to the Political Parties Subsidization Bylaws for the year 2016, as amended, in respect of financially subsidizing the parliamentary participation of the parties. It addresses the new Statutes of the House of Representatives and explores the particular provisions on parliamentary blocs and coalitions.

It, then, evaluates the experience of the parliamentary blocs in the first ordinary session following the institutionalization of the blocs in the Statutes in light of another study already conducted, for this purpose, by Al Quds Center for Political Studies. Following will be a comparative analysis of the number of members of the parliamentary blocs in the parliaments of a selection of other countries. Lastly, the paper proposes recommendations divided into general recommendations and other ones specifically made for the parliamentary blocs.

5 FIRST: THE PROBLEM OF STUDY

Just as political parties are the corner stone of political life in democracies, political blocs in legislative councils serve as the main tool that governs the parliamentary actions under the parliamentary government system. Since the restoration of the regular parliamentary life in Jordan in 1989, the Jordanian parliaments saw the emergence of blocs encompassing the majority of parliamentarians. However, not until the 17th parliament did the parliamentary blocs receive official recognition as a pillar of institutional work in the parliament as reflected by a dedicated chapter in the parliament’s new Statutes.

This development has surely acceded to the recurrent demands of the civil society organizations. But, it has more importantly answered to the Royal directives of The King Abdullah II as articulated in the Second Discussion Paper on December 16th, 2013, just a weak ahead of the elections of the 17th Parliament. The same directives were reiterated in the Speech form the Throne delivered at the inauguration of the non-ordinary session of the parliament (the First Session).

The King believed that the path towards deepening democracy lies in moving toward parliamentary government, where the majority coalition in Parliament forms the Gov- ernment.

The King stressed that the key driver of the timeline for this transition is the Kingdom’s success in developing platform reliant political parties, as a first step leading up to the changing of the way that prime ministers are appointed in line with the following criteria:

• The new prime minister will be designated based on consultation with the majority coalition of parliamentary blocs.

• If no clear majority emerges initially, then the designation will be based upon consultation with all parliamentary blocs.

• The Prime Minister-designate will then consult with the parliamentary blocs to form the new parliamentary government and agree on its program.

6 The King believes that a full parliamentary government depends on the development of three conditions:

• The emergence of true national parities that are able to express the interests, priorities and concerns of local communities through applicable national platforms

• The Civil Service will need to further develop its professional and impartial non-political abilities to support and advise the Ministers of parliamentary governments.

• A change is needed in parliamentary conventions by developing the Statues of the House of Representatives to contribute to the framing of the mechanisms whereby parliamentary government are formed until platforms are built through consultation and consensus as a basis for cooperation and stable Government Opposition parties will similarly need to agree on conventions for how they cooperate in holding the Government to account and offer an alternative vision (a shadow government).

The Royal directives, in relation to government formation, was put in implementation through consultations made by the Chief of the Royal Court, Dr. Fayez Al Tarawneh in 2013, with the Parliamentary blocs on the designation of Dr. Abdullah Al Nsour as the prime minister. Further consultations followed by the prime minister-designate with the parliamentary blocs on the selection of the ministers and the government’s platform. The discussion, however, did not yield unconventional results, the reason being the fact that the parliamentary blocs themselves did not reflect an acceptable party representation. The number of declared party members in the 17th Parliament accounted to not more than 150. As a result, the parliamentary blocs formed in the first session of the 17th Parliament were marked by a gelatinous and individualistic character.

In the inauguration of the (first) non-ordinary session of the Parliament, the King in his Speech from the Throne emphasized that the development of the consultation mecha- nism hinges on the development of partisan and parliamentary work, which leads to the emergence of a majority parliamentary coalition on partisan basis. The government would emerge from such coalition, while an opposition

7 parliamentary coalition would take shape to monitor the majority and serve as shadow government. He stresses that “the Lower House’s role in a parliamentary government system requires that the House move quickly to develop its rules of procedure to institutionalize the work of parliamentary blocs and enhance its effectiveness.” The 17th Parliament answered the Royal directives and made large amendments to its statures. The chapter dedicated for the parliamentary blocs was considered as relatively progressive, though further improvements were needed in light of practical insights and experience of other countries. However, the composition of the parliament resulting from the 2012 Elections Law did not help the House of Represent- atives to make a decisive step towards party-based parliamentary governments. A new development was seen with the enactment of the new Elections Law of 2016 as it abandoned the (indivisible) one-man-one-vote system and adopted the open proportional list system on the electoral district’s level. However, it was still flawed by a number of gaps that are expected to mitigate the positive results, rending the new system inadequate to achieve a stride in the performance of the House of Representatives and the parliamentary blocs. The same thing applies to the Political Parties Law, particularly as regards the Political Parties Financing bylaws issued thereby.

SECOND: THE LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS

The legislative environment, which directly affects the parliamentary representation of political parties and the structure of parliamentary blocs and their roles, is particularly defined by the Elections and the Political Parties laws as well as by the Statutes of the House of Representatives as follows: 1- The Elections Law

In light of the Election Law, this section looks into the electoral system (the open proportional list), the provisions on the distribution of the electoral districts, the calculations used to decide the winners, the absence of the representation threshold (the decisive rate) and the right of a list to use its name and symbol in other electoral districts

8 A. The Open Proportional List:

Article (9) of the Elections Law provides that “candidacies for parliamentary seats assigned to electoral districts shall be filled through proportional, open lists”.

The word “list” means that all candidates running will need to be a part of a list and the minimum number of candidates in a list is three and the maximum is the number allocated for the electoral district, falling outside the quotas of women and the three Badia districts. Therefore, women candidates will not be considered within the maximum number of candidates in the list.

The word “proportional” means that each list must be awarded seats in the district in proportion to the number of votes that it won out of the total number of actual voters in that district in relation to the number of seats allocated to the district. (Item 1/a/46)

“Open” means: The voting process is carried out, according to the adopted Jordanian system (Paragraph c/9) in two steps. The voter votes for a candidate list, then, second, he votes for one or more of the list’s candidates or otherwise he may choose none. The winners of the seats will be determined on the basis of which candidates received the highest number of votes in each list; except the candidates for the Christian and Circassian -Chechen seats (Item 2/a/46). The winners of those later seats are the candidates who win the highest votes in the respective district. The same rule applies to women’s quotas in all governorates and the Badia districts, expect for the governments of the Capital, Irbid and Zarqa, which have more than one district. In those governorates, the woman candidate will win a seat if she gains the highest percentage of votes divided by the number of voters in their respective districts.

It is good to mention that political parties generally prefer the closed list. It serves their purposes of arranging the names of candidates in order of preferences. In such a case, the won seats would go to members of the list in a descending order. Such an arrangement would be convenient to a party for two reasons. First, it could top the list with its secretary general or any other senior leader. Alternatively, it helps a party’s coalition to agree on the top representatives in the list.

9 Although we do support any arrangement that would enhance the chances of parties to win seats in the parliament, we still believe the open proportional list is better than the closed proportional list at this stage. It is not only because the parties are weak, but also because the Jordanian experience with the closed proportional list used in the 2013 elections was very weak. It, unfortunately, encouraged the illegal vote buying (political money) enabling large numbers of candidates to form lists assuming the top position of those lists. They bore all expenses of the electoral campaigns, including the payment of lots of money to some candidates in their lists.

B. The Method of Calculating the Winning Seats of the Lists:

Each list will be awarded seats in the district in proportion to the number of votes that it won out of the total number of actual voters in that district in relation to the number of seats allocated to the district. For calculation purposes, the following processes are involved: • The number of votes gained by the list are divided by the total votes in the electoral district them multiplied by the number of the seats allocated to the district. • The district’s seats (other than those allocated to Christians, Circassians and Chechens) are distributed according to the ‘integers’ of votes won by the lists as deduced by the aforementioned calculation. • The remaining seats will be distributed to the lists in serial order following the largest remainder method until the distribution of the seats is completed. The largest remainder method of calculation forms a major weakness in the electoral system. It improves the chances of weak lists to get one seat depriving the strong lists from winning more than one seat. This, in turn, further weakens party representation of the parliamentary blocs. This result is supported by the fact that the number of district seats is generally limited as indicated in Table (1). The vast majority of the districts (90%) has a range of seats, other than the quotas, between 3 and 6 at maximum. This makes it rather difficult for any list to win more than one seat, as the largest remainder method is applied. The Islamic Front Action Party is an exception, but since other parties are not strong enough in the elections, they could win only limited numbers of seats in their respective districts. Even those

10 limited seats can be at sometimes only won with tribal support, which makes it more difficult for the parties to win under the largest remainder method.

Table (1) The distribution of parliamentary seats on electoral districts aside from the quota seats Seats allocated to the districts other Number Number No. than those of the quotas of districts of seats

1 3 seats 7 21

2 4 seats 8 32

3 5 seats 2 10

4 6 seats 4 24

5 8 seats 2 16 Total 23 Districts 103 Seats

To explain the limited chances of the strong lists in winning seas under the largest remainder method, we will cite two fictitious but practical examples. The first one will be about the Capital’s third district, which has six seats in total, including one Christian seat and one Circassian-Chechen seat. The second example will be about Balqa Governorate, which has ten seats, including two Christian seats.

The First Fictitious Practical Example: The hypothesis of the first example, as in Table (2), is that there are 11 contesting lists and the total number of voters stands at 108,000. Under this example, the weight of the electoral seat, that is the average votes needed to win a seat, is 18,000 votes. This number results from the division of the number of voters by the number of the allocated six seats for this district. Now, the seats will be distributed as follows: • The first and second seats go to the first and second lists, because each has one integer corresponding to the weight of the electoral seat, which accounts for 18,000 votes.

11 • In the next step, the fractions are cross-examined. The third seat is given to the highest fraction, which is 0.61 (the third list). Then, the fourth seat is given to the next fraction, which is 0.50 (the fourth list). • It needs to be noticed that we have distributed the allocated seats aside from the Christian and Circassian-Chechen seats, which are calculated in a different way. Each of those latter special seats are won by the candidate who gets the highest votes in all running lists in the district, regardless of the number of the general seats that the list gets. Accordingly, the above example shows that to secure two seats for each list means that the list must get 36,000 votes, which is a third of the voters (33.3%). The other scenario is for the list to have, in addition to the 18,000 votes, over 9,000 votes so that it is placed in an advanced position compared with the ‘remainder’ of the fourth list. For example, if it gets 27,500 votes, the nominal seat allocation will be 1.52, so it can win the fourth seat and a total of two seats. Table (2) The distribution of the seats among the lists under the largest remainder method (a fictitious practical example of the Capital’s second district) List Number Seat Seat per Seat per the Number of votes (nominal) 1 integer largest remainder Total 1 20200 1.12 1 (the first) 1 2 18500 1.03 1 (the second) 1 3 11000 0.61 1 (the third) 1 4 9000 0.50 1 (the fourth) 1 5 8200 0.46 6 7600 0,42 7 7300 0.41 8 7100 0.39 9 6800 0.38 10 6500 0.36 11 5800 0.32 Total 108000 2 2 4

12 The Second Fictitious Practical Example: The hypothesis of the second example, as in Table (2), is that there are 13 contesting lists and that the total number of voters stands at 200,000. Under this example, the weight of the electoral seat, that is the average votes needed to win a seat, is 20,000 votes. This number results from the division of the number of voters by the number of the allocated ten seats for this district. Now, the seats will be distributed as follows: • The first, second, third and fourth seats go to the first four lists, because each has one integer corresponding to the weight of the electoral seat, which accounts for 20,000 votes. • In the next step, the fractions are cross-examined. The fifth seat is given to the highest fraction, which is 0.95 (the fifth list). Then, the sixth seat is given to the next fraction, which is 0.75 (the fourth list). The seventh seat will go to the fraction 0.70 (the seventh list), and finally the eight list gets the last seat for a fraction of 0.65. This practical example shows that there is no justice in the distribution of the seats under the largest remainder method. The second list, for instance, has gained 30,000 votes and still wins only one seat equally to the list that got 13,000 votes. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the list that got 30,000 votes ran the elections in two lists and that each sub-list of them got 15,000 votes, it follows that each sub-list would win one seat. In this case, neither list that got 14,000 and 13,000 votes would win a seat. This further shows how the largest remainder method weakens the chances of the strong lists to get the largest allocation of seats. The Representation Threshold: It is common knowledge that the proportional representation systems are usually associated with what is called the decisive rate (representation threshold). The higher the representation rate, the better are the chances for the strong lists to win more seats. When the decisive rate on the national level reaches 5% as in Germany or 10% as in Turkey, then it means that those two countries are looking for an election that yields large parliamentary blocs and stale governments. Conversely, if the representation rate falls, there will be a declining trend of the representation of more parties even with one single seat. As an alternative to the deceive rate, another method than the largest remainder method may be used. The Sainte-Laguë Method, the

13 Sainte-Laguë Method Modified and D’Hondt’s method are just few examples. Since the new 2016 Elections Law adopts the largest remainder method in determining the winners, we were looking for this method to be associated with the decisive rate. This association will offer the chances for a group of parties or lists to win several seats as a prelude to the formation of parliamentary blocs with appropriate numbers of members. Otherwise, representation will be scattered, given the large number of parties that have only symbolic representation. The law, again, did not do that. We will now explain the practical impact of adopting the decisive rate using the second fictitious practical example. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the decisive rate should overrule the winning of the lists that do not get 80% of the electoral weight of the seat, it follows that a list that does not get 16,000 votes will be excluded from the competition. In this case, those lists will be eliminated from the contest and the votes will be distributed among the next five lists that got over 16,000 votes, each. So, each of the first three lists will win two seats. The fourth and fifth lists will win one seat. What this means is that each of the second and third lists will get an additional seat, but at the expense of the sixth and seventh lists, each of which wining only one seat. Table (3) The distribution of the seats among the lists under the largest remainder method (a fictitious practical example of Balqa’s district) List Number Seat Seat per Seat per the Number of votes (nominal) 1 integer largest remainder Total 1 35000 175 1 (the first) 1 (the sixth) 2 2 30000 1.50 1 (the second) 1 3 25000 1.25 1 (the third) 1 4 23000 1.15 1 (the fourth) 1 5 19000 0.95 1 (the fifth) 1 6 14000 0,70 1 (the seventh) 1 7 13000 0.65 1 (the eight) 1 8 11500 0.58 7 10500 0.53 10 6500 0.33 11 4300 0.22 12 4000 0.20 13 3200 0.16 Total 200000 4 4 8

14 C. The division of the electoral districts :

Article (8) of the Elections Law divided the kingdom into 23 electoral districts and allocated to them 115 seats, in accordance with the Electoral Districts Bylaws No. 75 for the year 2016. Under those bylaws, three types of districts arise: The first one encompasses single-district governorates, which amount to nine out of a total of 12. The second type is of the northern, central and southern Badia regions, which are geographically closed and treated equally with governorates in terms of the women quotas. The third type has the three major governorates of The Capital, Irbid and Zarqa. Those governments have the lion’s share of seats compared with the allocations of the remaining districts. The Electoral Law gave a special attention to those three governorates by dividing them into sub-districts as explained in Table (4). Under the Electoral Districts Bylaws No. 75 for the year 2016 on the distribution of the seats among the districts, the share of those three governorates in total is above half the total seats, aside from the women quota, reaching 51.3%. Table (4) The number of districts and seats allocate for The Capital, Irbid and Zarqa governorates

No. Governorate Number Number of districts of seats 1 The Capital 5 28

2 Irbid 4 19

3 Zarqa 2 12

Total 11 59

The goal of reviewing the division of the electoral districts and distribution of their allocated seats is to explain that the division of the three major governorates into sub-districts has eliminated the chance of the districts, hence the parties, to secure large numbers of seats in the parliament. This is particularly true with the Capital Governorate, which has a total of 28 seats. This number is one seat higher than that allocated for the national list in the 2013 elections. Therefore, had the Capital

15 Governorate remained one district, it could have been a suitable replacement of the national list. The same applies to Irbid and Zarqa governorates, though to less degrees. In addition, the three governorates are home to around three-quarters of the Jordanian population (72.5%), as per the latest census.

D. The right of the list to use its symbol in other districts:

Paragraph (15/B) of the Elections Law granted the electoral list the right to use its same name and symbol in any other electoral district. The purpose was to provide for an environment conducive to parties’ participation in the elections. The political party or the parties coalition has electoral lists running in several electoral districts. This arrangement allows for candidates to run the elections under the same list and symbol in his own district to improve his image in the minds of the voters. It may also afford him the opportunity for getting more votes. However, this benefit will have a limited effect, given the political behavior of the Jordanian voter, who, according to studies, is not affected by electoral propaganda.1 That right could have been more feasible if accompanied by privileges provided by the law to the lists that run the elections under the same name in several districts. An example can include the increase of financial subsidies for the electoral campaigns. Another example is to allocate three seats to the lists to compete on, if they win less than five seat, so that those seats go to the lists with the highest non-winning votes.

2. THE POLITICAL PARTIES LAW The new Political Parties Law No. 39 for the year 2015 made improvements to some of the legal provisions, but not to the extent of a sought-after intrinsic reform of the law. The number of a party’s founders was reduced from 500 to 150, the age of the founding member was reduced to 18 from 21 and the Ministry of Interior was replaced as a reference point in charge of political parties by the Ministry of Political and Parliamentary Affairs. The law is more flexible when dealing with the projects of the parties that have not yet completed their establishment procedures. The new- law, however, used the same definition of the political party as provided by the previous law. By that definition, a party is deemed a tool for participation in public life, overlooking its role in the devolution of powers, per the international prevalent

1 Al Nueimi, Laith, an unpublished MA Thesis titled The impact of the electoral propaganda on the electoral behavior of the Jorda- nian voter, with specific reference to the elections of the 15th parliament in

16 definition. This reflects on the public official environment where the political parties operate. It follows that the new Political parties law fails to bring about any direct effects on the parliamentary blocs issue, with the partial exception of Article (28), which provides for the allocation of a line item on the state’s general budget in support of the political parties. The law, however, conditioned the amount and manner of dispersing the subsidies to bylaws enacted by the Council of Ministers, which effectively means that the provisions of this very article are under the full control of the government. Since 2008, bylaws enacted by the Council of Ministers in this regard have approved annual subsides of the political parties amounting to JD50,000 dispersed in two batches. More recently, those bylaws have detailed the conditions for entitlement to and spending of such subsidies in line with criteria defined by the same bylaws. In accordance with the most recent bylaws so far issued, namely, the Bylaws of the Contribution to Supporting the Political Parties No. 53 for the year 2016, the conditions for entitlement to the financial contribution are as follows (Article 3): • A lapse of one year after the establishment of the party • The number of founders must not be less than 500 members from seven governorates, provided that the percentage of members for each of the Kingdom’s 12 governorates is not less than 5%. • The percentage of women members must not be less than 10% What is new in the Bylaws of the Contribution to Supporting Political Parties is the approval, for the first time, to allocate an additional amount to the political party up to JD50,000 a year. In addition, every party is entitled to the subsidy of JD2,000 for each parliamentary seat it wins, up to five seats for the year of the elections. The sum of JD5,000 is also granted to each new sub-headquarters of the party created after the head office and four sub-headquarters to be spent on the new branch and its administrative affairs. The government, however, amended those bylaws in July 2016 by the Bylaws No. 11 for the year 2016. Key amendments included the following: • Increase the subsidy stipulated in the original bylaws from JD2,000 to JD5,000 for each seat won by the party up to five seats. This change raises the maximum subsidy from JD10,000 to JD25,000.

17 • Offer a grant amounting to JD20,000 to the parties that are at least one year old if their candidates will run the elections explicitly under the parties’ umbrella in at least 35% of the electoral districts, which means eight of the districts. • Allocate JD5,000 to the political parties that form a proclaimed parties coalition, provided that the participating parties are not less than 12. This provi- sion is not meant only to promote for the elections to the parliament as much as it encourages the formation of party coalitions. The hope is that by financially supporting the electoral participation of political parties, the parties will have better chances in the elections but also in winning seats.The better representation parties have in the parliament, the higher is the likelihood of forming more effective parliamentary blocs. 3- THE STATUES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES The 17th Parliament issued the new Statutes in October 2013. The new Bylaws (No. 801 for the year 2013), whose provisions were amended by the parliament in May 2014, dedicated Chapter Five for parliamentary blocs and coalitions. That chapter has 11 articles that clearly define the principles of forming a parliamentary bloc, how it works, the procedures for its proclamation in the parliament, the restrictions on the movement of members between blocs, the rights of non-bloc independent parliamentarians and the administrative requirements for the bloc’s work. Chapter 5 also stated that a parliamentary bloc is formed by a number of parliamentarians accounting for 10% of the total members in the parliament, that is 15 parliamentarians in the 17th parliament. It also states that two or more blocs can form a parliamentary coalition. The new bylaws granted the parliamentary blocs the right of presence in the parliament’s Executive Bureau, which, according to the bylaws, “shall be formed by the members of the standing bureau, the heads of the parliamentary blocs or their representatives and representatives of the independent parliamentarians, if any.” The bylaws provided that each parliamentary bloc must develop its own statues for the organization of its own work and deposit such statues with the General Secretariat of the Parliament within thirty days from the beginning of the ordinary session. The

18 bloc must elect a chair, vice-chair, rapporteur and spokesperson. It must also notify the speaker of the parliament of its formation, name, names of members, the appointed chair and vice-chair, rapporteur and spokesperson and its own statutes. Another requirement provides that the bloc must notify the speaker of the parliament in writing of any and all changes that may affect its members strength, positions or statutes. The bloc’s chair can coordinate with the parliament’s speaker on political and parliamentary affairs as approved by the bloc or any other matters that are sought to improve parliamentary work. The relevant articles on the rights and obligations of the bloc members provide that: a parliamentarian who resigns or is dismissed form his bloc will lose his position that he assumed as a representative of the coalition in the various committees andthe executive bureau. In such a case, the bloc may replace him with another person of its members. In this connection, the resignation or otherwise dismissal of any member of the collation will not affect the bloc’s quorum until the end of the ordinary session. If such resignation or dismissal results in the bloc losing over half of its members, the bloc will be deemed to have not existed. No parliamentarian may accede to more than one parliamentary bloc. He may not move from one bloc to another except after the end of the ordinary parliamentary session. On the rights and obligations of independent parliamentarians who chose not to accede to any bloc, the Statutes consider them as if they were in in a single bloc. None of them, though, may accede at will to any of the existent blocs. Representative of the independent parliamentarians will be selected to fill in their positions in the parliament’s bodies and committees by direct elections supervised by the Standing Bureau. The Executive Bureau must name the representatives of the independent parliamentarians to fill in their respective positions in the parliament’s bodies and committees if they fail to meet to elect or disagree on their representatives. On the resources issue, the Standing Bureau must offer the parliamentary blocs all necessary support to perform their duties. Chapter 5, however, said this support can be provided but within the limits of available resources.

19 THIRD: THE PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS The Jordanian Parliament Monitor at Al Quds Center for Political Studies1 conducted an analytical study of the situation of the parliamentary blocs in the 17th parliament in the first ordinary session, which was inaugurated following the enactment of the parliament’s statutes. The study found that those parliamentary blocs, totaling eight, preserved their cohesion more than ever before. They failed, however, to achieve the hoped stride, even to the minimum. They still suffered from distortions similar to those they suffered from before the blocs were institutionalized under Chapter 5 of the Statutes. In the beginning of the first ordinary session of the 17th parliament, the parliamentary blocs were formed driven by political pull factors, topped by the increasing talks about future parliamentary governments. The majority of the parliamentarians had a strong feeling that the formation and membership of blocs will be the best way to secure their future presence with the possibility of their accession to ministerial positions in any future parliamentary government. As the talks of parliamentary governments ebbed, so did the desire of the parliamentarians to accede to blocs decrease. Many members left their blocs to the extent that it was impossible for the remaining bloc members to meet with a legal quorum. The result was lack of commitment to attendance of the meetings and eroding agreement among the bloc members in their own blocs, in the parliamentary committees and in the chamber. The parliamentarians’ attendance of their bloc meeting would be complete only if it involves meeting with the King or the Prime Minister. With the passage of time, blocs suffered from internal disintegration, weakening their presence and influence in the parliament. They could not even play a role in making any political detour. No more talks were made about the blocs. The minimum number of members attended bloc meetings, if ever held. The setback affected the bloc cohesion and work to the extent that observers no longer heard about them since the mid first ordinary session nor about any speech delivered on behalf of a given bloc in the parliament. More precisely, speeches by

1 A report on the parliamentary blocs, prepared by Jihad Al Mansi, the 17th Parliament, the First Ordinary Session (3/11/2013- 3/5/2014) www.jpm.jo

20 blocs came to a halt in the aftermath of the general state budget’s speech. The parliamentarians became more inclined to making their individualist speeches and making their own stances or statements without any prior coordination with their respective blocs. The experience with parliamentary blocs has yielded the conclusion that their formation and functions have not been up to the aspired political platforms, just as happened in the previous parliaments. Most blocs had their attention drifted away from issues of local interest in favor of general matters. Other blocs showed limited attention to specific issues, but not to the extent of a cause advocated for by blocs in the chamber and with the government. The weakness of blocs in terms of collectively adopting public issues stems from the absence of the intellectual, political or ideological grounds to be shared by the bloc’s members. It is also blamed on the mutual weak vision of a parliamentarian action that is intended to achieve clear-cut and specific goals. It is for that reason that the various parliamentary blocs have never bound their members to a unified vote, but opted for the ‘floating’ principle. In other words, the members of a bloc in the parliament would not be based on absolute solidarity among its members. They will be given the discretion in voting according to their personal convictions. The situation is kept floating, therefore, and the members of a bloc are not therefore being asked to take up one and common stance. The implication is that the major voting incidents in the parliament whether on giving a motion of confidence or no-confidence to the government and its ministerial statement will hinge upon the discretion of the individual parliamentarians. Of course, such scattering and divergence of the members of the same bloc were enough to create a state of lack of harmony and homogeneity. In effect, acceding to a bloc would derive from a desire to get a position in the Standing Bureau or the Standing Committees. Such a desire has proven to have much more weight than the political factor that brings together members of the same orientations. This situation has dominated the work of the blocs in general and weakened their performance. As they have also been unable to perform their parliamentary duties to the full extent, we no longer hear about a unified role of parliamentary blocs concerning the amendments of given laws or making reforms in general.

21 The traditional rationale cited for the existence of parliamentary blocs has become confined to the elections inside the House of Representatives for the Standing Bureau and the Standing Committees. After those elections finish, the blocs end their activities and resume their lip-service periodical meetings. It was hoped that the consultations made by the Royal Court with them before the formation of the government, then the consultations made by the prime minister-designate Dr. Abdullah Al Nsour with them, and the subsequent institutionalization of the blocs in the Statutes would serve as an incentive for the blocs to improve their work and move up, even gradually, with a platform vision and orientations. That would be a necessary step if parliamentary governments are sought. In other words, the envisaged environment is one where parliamentary blocs can be resorted to and betted on to fill in a gap in the parliament arising in the absence of strong and influence parties that are able to run the parliamentary life. It is where a platform perspective is used in the presence of a majority and a minority opposition. Yet, the parliamentary blocs did not choose that path and failed to form clear-cut entities across the political spectrum. The blocs’ members did not develop shared ideological or political backgrounds, resulting in the domination of the personal type of relations. As a result, it was difficult to draw distinct lines between the members of one bloc and those of another.

The situation that evolved was a practical result of the Elections Law, which produced individualistic parliamentarians, even within the national lists. What made things worse was that the Islamic Action Front Party, which is the largest and most cohesive political party, boycotted the 17th parliament’s elections. The remaining political parties which decided to participate in the national lists were limited in number. Their yields were equally modest as they failed in producing one single model of a bloc based work.

• THE MUBADARA (INITIATIVE) COALITION

The only exception seen by parliamentary life was the formation of the Mubadara (Initiative) Coalition by a group of cross-bloc parliamentarians. Launched by Dr. Mustafa Al Hamarneh, the imitative did not require its members to leave their blocs. In the beginning, it succeeded in attracting around 33 members. Although the number fell, later on, to 25, it was still larger in number than even the largest parliamentary bloc.

22 That coalition set a new example of unprecedented performance deriving from the principle of ‘positive engagement with the government’. It also made a significant achievement on a special file, that is the civil rights of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, in a deal it struck with the Council of Ministers. As the coalition continued to work under a clear-cut plan and platform, it drew the opposition of increasing numbers of parliamentarians, who claimed that the coalition was not officially registered as a parliamentarian bloc. The coalition had no other option but to register itself as an official parliamentarian bloc in the second ordinary session under the name of the Parliamentarian Initiative Bloc.

• THE OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATIVE ROLE OF BLOCS

The parliamentary blocs could not systematically establish themselves as an oversight and legislative frame of reference. Their oversight role was merely reflected by some visits by modest numbers of the bloc members to some regions of the Kingdom to learn about the problems and suffering of citizens. Yet, even those visits did not translate into proposals to the parliament or the government.

Some parliamentary blocs held meetings with governmental agencies and civil society organizations. Once again, none of those meetings reflected on the work and positions of those blocs in the Standing Committees or even in the chamber. No bloc requested its members to pose oversight questions to the government on any given activity. The questions raised by the various bloc members were confined to issues of personal concern, or those raised by their districts or by the public opinion. No bloc has been noticed to have held a meeting culminating in a legislative or oversight position as a result of such visits or meetings. Members of the bloc members across the spectrum posed a lot of questions and queries and signed memoranda in the parliamentary session. All of those questions, queries and memoranda, however, were adopted and submitted by the members in their personal capacities without prior coordination with their respective blocs.

Similarly, the legislative role of the blocs did not show up in the Standing Committees or in the parliament. No bloc adopted any systematic legislative trend or sought to build a parliamentary lobby with the purpose of passing specific legislation, with the exception of the Mubadara (Initiative) Coalition.

23 • THE DISTRIBUTION OF BLOC MEMBERS AMONG THE STANDING COMMITTEES

The number of bloc members participating in the Standing Committees ranged between 13 and 20 for each bloc, in addition to six independent members. This brings the total of bloc and independent members participating in the Standing Committee to 127, taking into consideration that there are five members who cannot be members of the Standing Committees as they are members of the Standing Bureau. Those are, namely, the Speaker of the parliament, the two vice-speakers and his two assistants. Therefore, the number of the members who did not participate in the Standing Committees is 18 out of a total of 150. In terms of the number of Standing Committees in which the parliamentary blocs participated, they ranged between 11 and 19 committees for each bloc. In addition, independent parliamentarians participated in nine committees out of a total of 20. It should be noted that each parliamentarian is entitled to membership of up to two Standing Committees and that each committee has around 5-11 members. The strength of each Standing Committee amounted to 11 members, excluding the Countryside and Badia Committee, which had 10 members. This brings the total number of embers of Standing Committees to 219. In this connection, the number of seats occupied by the parliamentary bloc in the Standing Committees ranged between 21 and 34. However, it needs to be clarified that the distribution of bloc members on the Standing Committees is subject, as first choice, to agreement in the Executive Bureau and elections. If no agreement is reached, the Standing Committee will be formed through direct elections. Notwithstanding, Article (61) of the Statutes provides that agreement on the formation of the Standing Committee will be reached as decided by the Executive Bureau on the basis of proportional representation of the blocs. This requires an amendment to the Statutes of the House of Representatives to the effect that all Standing Committees will have to be formed on the basis of proportional representation. What makes this step significant is the need to change the Standing Committee into an entity that represents all blocs on the one hand, and that requires any of its members to act in his capacity as representative of his own bloc. As such, the bloc will have the right to replace that member if he fails to live up to his duties vis-a-vis the Standing Committee and towards his bloc.

24 • PARLIAMENTARY BLOCS, SOCIAL OUTREACH AND THE MEDIA

The eight parliamentary blocs did not benefit from the social media, except for one bloc that created its own Facebook page. The page was, though, modest and did not mention the bloc’s vision or political and ideological orientation, as it was confined to communicating the news of the parliament, the bloc and the bloc’s members.

Notably, the parliamentary blocs did not communicated with the media or public opinion. No parliamentary bloc has ever submitted during the first ordinary session, any report on the media in its activities or on its legislative and oversight achievements. In contrast, the Islamic Action Front Party’s bloc, in previous parliaments, was keen at the end of every parliamentary session to hold a press conference on their achievements. • AVAILABLE RESOURCES IN THE BLOCS:

Article (35) of the Statutes provides that the Standing Bureau must afford the parliamentary blocs the support they need to perform their tasks, but within the limits of available resources. On the practical level, however, the blocs did not have their respective offices, or at least dedicated secretaries to carry out the administrative stuff such as invitations to meetings of the bloc, recording the minutes of meetings, archiving the activities of the bloc and members, making internal and external commutations, among other things. An exception is the National Unity Party’s bloc. It had a secretary to assist in managing its affairs, though the secretary was provided by the party rather than by the Standing Bureau. The Parliamentary Initiative tried also to secure a secretary for the same purpose. FOURTH: A COMPARATIVE READING OF THE PARLIAMENTARY BLOC MEMBERS IN A SELECTION OF COUNTRIES Reviewing an intentional sample of ten countries, including Jordan, and comparing their respective parliamentary blocs, Table (5) reveals two types of identifying the number of the bloc members. The first one requires a minimum number of members (rather than a percentage), which is the choice of the majority of countries. The second one defines a fixed minimum percentage of the parliament’s members, a method adopted by Jordan and Germany.

25 Comparing the percentage of the number of a bloc’s members to the number of parliamentarians in the selected countries shows that most countries adopt little percentages. They range in the cases under study here between 2.2% and 3.9%. This applies to France, Tunisia, Algeria, Belgium, Italy and Canada. Next come other countries that adopted a mean percentage of around 5%, as in Germany and Morocco. The third category of countries adopted high percentages of around 10% as in Jordan and Haiti.

It might be interesting to note that some countries have their parliamentary seats distributed among widely representative political parties. Yet, they adopt a minimum membership of their parliamentary blocs. The conclusion is that those countries want thee membership to be at a minimum to avert any exclusion of blocs created by any political party that gained modest representation, ranging, for example from 5 to 12 members. In the case of Tunisia, for example, the minimum number of bloc members is seven. However, there is only one bloc with a number of seven or less members, compared with the remaining blocs in the parliaments whose members amount to: 69, 67, 25, 15, 12 and 10 members, in addition to 12 independent members who are not members of any bloc.1

In the Jordanian case, the required minimum number of the bloc’s members is high, standing at 10% of the total parliamentarians. The justification is that most parliamentary

blocs bring together non-party members, and therefore it is not a problem if the minimum number of the bloc’s membership is raised to attract independent parliamentarians. However, the Jordanian formula does not consider the scenario where a party accedes to the parliament with a number of seats less than the mandated minimum threshold. In such a scenario, it would be wiser to allow the parties with the minimum number of five members to form a bloc or a parliamentarian group. The Moroccans mandate a minimum number of members of a parliamentary bloc, which they call ‘team’. The Statutes, however, allow for the formation of a parliamentary bloc of as low as four members though with less rights.

1 See The Nominal Lists of the Parliamentary Blocs http://www.arp.tn/site/main/AR/docs/groupes/liste_groupes.jsp

26 Table (5)

Ratio of parliamentary bloc’s members to total parliamentarians in a selection of countries

Minimum number Number No. Country Percentage of bloc’s members of MPs 1 Haiti 10 99 10.1% 2 Jordan* (...) (...) 10.0% 3 Morocco 20 395 05.1% 4 Germany** (...) (...) 05.0% 5 Canada 12 308 03.9% 6 Belgium 5 150 03.3% 7 Tunisia 7 217 03.2% 8 Italy 20 630 03.2% 9 France 15 577 02.6% 10 Algeria 10 462 02.2%

* This percentage accounts for 15 members of the 17th parliament of 2013. The figure, however, will fall to 13 in the 18th parliament as a result of the new Elections Law for the year 2016, which defined the number of members of the House of Representatives by 130.

** This percentage accounts for 32 members because the German Bundestag’s membership has stood at 63 in the most recent elections in 2013, which is amenable to slight amendments per the results of subsequent elections.

FIFTH: RECOMMENDATIONS 1- GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

• Introduce drastic amendments to the Elections Law with the purpose of strengthening partisan life and political parties and to allow for the accession to the parliament of politically and ideologically aligned blocs. This would require the strengthening of the parliamentary blocs and making them more effective. There is also a need for a shift whereby those blocs are able to consult with the prime minister-designate and form parliamentary governments.

27 • the formation of Standing Committees, subject to the proportional representation of the parliamentary blocs. More strict controls should be placed on the blocs in respect of their abidance by their own statutes and general principals.

• Amend the Bylaws on the Contribution to Supporting the Political Parties so as to increase the subsidies given to each party for the first five won seats from JD5,000 to JD10,000. The subsidies, afterwards, should be transferred into an annual financial support payable throughout the entire life of the parliament rather than being confined to the elections year. The parties that run the elections but do not win any seat should also be entitled to subsidies pro rata to the votes they earned.

• Enforce the provisions of the new Statutes of the House of Representatives in terms of following up on withdrawals and resignations from the parliamentary blocs, and enforce the penalties provided in the Statutes towards imposing a travel ban on any member who resigns from his bloc.

• Designate in the parliament’s building an office and a secretary from the General Secretariat for each bloc. The secretary will be in charge of following up on the affairs of the bloc and record all necessary activities thereof.

• Prevent bloc members from making speeches in their personal capacities.

• in the sessions of debating the State’s General Budget Law and the motion of confidence of the government, and bind them to speak in harmony with their bloc’s orientation. Independent members must be given some limited time to make their speeches.

• Amend the provisions on parliamentary blocs and coalitions in the Statutes by allowing any party with five parliamentarians or above to form a parliamentary bloc, which must be entitled to the same rights given to the other blocs, subject to their numerical differences. 2- RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BLOCS • Strengthen the unity and cohesion of blocs, maintain clear stances towards every single element of the legislative and oversight functions.

28 • The bloc to draw up its own political platform, in addition to its statutes. The platform should address issues of political, economic, social, educational and cultural concerns in a manner that would allow for the convergence of views and holding the bloc accountable vis-a-vis commitment to its platform. • Enforce the relevant provisions of the statutes of every bloc and apply the mandated penalties for the absence of members, and enforce the provisions on the devolution of chairmanship of the bloc and the organization of periodical elections of its leadership body. • Ensure the existence of special records for the blocs to document their work and refrain from using just oral communication in note-taking and document the minutes of all of the bloc’s meetings. • Use the Parliament’s Media Office to reach out to the press, media and public opinion with the purpose of disseminating the bloc’s works and statements. • Create a website or Facebook page for each bloc to announce for its platform and activities and to serve as a communication outlet with the public. • Hold press conferences at the end of every legislative session for each bloc where its chairperson or spokesman talks about the bloc’s achievements.

29 30