A Reappraisal of the American Eugenics Movement, in the Light of German Eugenics (1918-1945)
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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE AMERICAN EUGENICS MOVEMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF GERMAN EUGENICS (1918-1945) Jonathan Andrew Lelliott PhD Dissertation Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies University College, London February 2000 ProQuest Number: U643420 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest. ProQuest U643420 Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT The accepted version of the history of eugenics - put forward by Kevles, Allen and Barkan amongst others - is that the example of Nazi eugenics contributed to the decline of the eugenics movement in the USA. This dissertation challenges that view and argues that Nazism was irrelevant to that decline. In so doing this work argues against the widely held chronology of American eugenics. Whilst most historians suggest that the older (orthodox) style of American eugenics was weakened by 1933 and then killed off by Nazism, this work argues that it was already finished by 1933. Historians have argued that the newer (reform) eugenics movement began to decline and transformed itself into new fields and organisations partly because eugenics was so widely discredited by Nazism. This dissertation suggests that reform eugenics was not a coherent ideology, but was rather a collection of reactions to the older type of eugenics. As such it could only exist while there was an older eugenics movement to react against. It then voluntarily transformed itself into new fields, as it was too diverse to survive. The fields which developed using parts of the eugenics ideology included population control movements, birth control and family planning, human and population genetics. Orthodox eugenics collapsed because of changes in scientific and social scientific knowledge, the emergence of birth control, opposition from groups like the Catholic Church and changes in economic circumstances. By 1933 the programme of the older generation had not changed, but all of its concerns had been removed from the scientific field to the area of social and cultural concerns. Furthermore, there were tangible and clear-cut distinctions between American and German eugenics, in terms of policy and there were fractures in the international eugenics movement that led to a formal distance between German and American eugenics. CONTENTS ABSTRACT pa g e 2 INTRODUCTION p a g e 4 CHAPTER 1 (i) BACKGROUND PAGE 42 (ii) WORLD WAR ONE PAGE 54 (iii) EUGENIC POLICY PAGE 76 CHAPTER 2 - Factors Causing Decline in the USA (I) NAZISM PAGE 124 (ii) SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS PAGE 130 (III) CATHOLICISM PAGE 158 (iv) BIRTH CONTROL PAGE 169 (v) ECONOMICS PAGE 180 CHAPTER 3 - The Effect on the Eugenics Movement (I) ORTHODOX AND RACIAL EUGENICS PAGE 191 (ii) REFORM EUGENICS PAGE 219 (iii) OTHER REASONS PAGE 241 CONCLUSIONS PAGE 250 GLOSSARY PAGE 262 BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION PAGE 263 BIBLIOGRAPHY PAGE 271 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION • American and German Eugenics In 1883, twenty-four years after the publication of Charles Darwin’s Origin of Species and eighteen years after Gregor Mendel first discovered the laws of genetics, Sir Francis Galton coined the word ‘eugenics’ for his science which aimed to improve humanity through improving its gene-pool (or hereditary qualities’ in the language of the day). He defined eugenics as “the science of improving the stock, which is by no means confined to questions of judicious mating, but which... takes cognisance of all the influences that tend in however remote a degree to give the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable’’ [Galton; 1883; 24-5]. The ultimate aim of eugenics was to apply biological answers to human social problems. Raymond Pearl suggested that “a solid foundation is being laid for a truly scientific solution of the problem of national and social welfare” [Pearl; 1908; 9822]. In creating the science of eugenics Galton brought together aspects of contemporary thought in biology, biological history, medicine, anthropology, psychology and sociology and mixed them with middle- class attitudes regarding race, class and modernisation. Eugenics addressed issues within a framework of thought that saw modern culture as encouraging degeneration and counter-selectivity (see pages 46-52). Eugenics was only one in a line of movements stretching back into the nineteenth century, which sought to apply scientific knowledge, especially biology, to human issues. Thus it followed in the tradition of Social Darwinism and other movements and in this dimension at least was not totally new or revolutionary. Eugenicists believed that their work was carried out in a neutral fashion and revealed only scientific truths. Charles Davenport suggested that “I suppose the political consequences of the statement of a truth are the last things in the mind of a scientific writer” [CBDP1; Davenport to Grant; 1-vii-1914]. In Germany, in 1926, Alfred Grotjahn stated that “eugenics is an objective science” [quoted in EugR; Apr INTRODUCTION 1939; 105]. The fact that eugenics is now seen as an expression and reinforcement of existing prejudices should not detract from the belief at the time that eugenics was a conventional, unprejudiced science. The relationship between science and society is a complicated one, but went largely unexplored as eugenicists, in common with most other scientists at the time, believed their branch of science to be a neutral and value-free enterprise untouched by the rest of society. In his defence of sterilisation policies Leon Whitney argued that if scientists alone were allowed to make decisions, this by itself would ensure impartiality. In the light of experiences in Germany, British eugenicists seemed to understand more of the complexities of the relationship. In a foot-note Norman Haire, editor of the British edition of Whitney's book pointed out that “experience of Nazi Germany has shown that scientists are no more to be trusted to remain fair and impartial under certain political conditions than anybody else” [Haire in Whitney; 1935; 141]. T U H Ullinger reporting for American readers in 1942 saw no problem or responsibility for biologists conducting work directly for the Nazi regime to determine if somebody was biologically Jewish and their subsequent fate in “the cruel hands of the SS, the SA, and the Gestapo” [JofH; 33 (1942); 142]. The Nazis’ utilising of science for political ends, caused scientists in the post-war world to have a far greater understanding of how their work interacted with the world around them. Eugenics and its basic ideas were formulated in England but they were only the culmination of a process which can be traced back to the increased contact of the European nations with non-European people, rapid industrialisation and urbanisation and the problems that came with these processes, and the development of modern sciences such as medicine and biology as well as the publication of Darwin's theory of evolution. German eugenics under Alfred Ploetz and Wilhelm Schallmayer, more than American eugenics, began as a force independent of the British movement. In the USA Charles Davenport had solicited Britain's leading eugenicist - Karl Pearson - for support and selected him as a referee when he was trying to establish the Eugenics Record Office (ERG) at Cold Spring Harbor [KPP; 674/1; 14-X-1902]. The ERG in the USA was largely based on INTRODUCTION the one in London. Harry Laughlin, superintendent at the ERO referred to the British movement as “the parent... of all eugenic organisations” [WIHM SA/EUG D109; 09- iv-1931]. There are numerous references in the work of American eugenicists to events in Britain, to Britain as a model and even to Britain as the “mother country” [Rice; 1929; 5]. At least in part this is because orthodox eugenicists saw themselves as part of an Anglo-Saxon elite. German eugenicists, especially under Nazism, did acknowledge the influence of British eugenics, at least partly because it added to the legitimacy of German eugenics. In 1932 Eugen Fischer informed Karl Pearson of his being awarded the Rudolf Virchow medal, which had never before been awarded to a non-German (previous recipients included the pro-eugenics plant geneticist Erwin Baur) [KPP; 689/3; 22-xi-1932]. Such moves were attempts to intertwine the major eugenic (and race hygiene) movements. As will be seen a number of Britons - such as J B S Haldane and Julian Huxley - were influential in the history of American eugenics. During the early years of the twentieth century eugenics became a topic of general debate in both the USA and Germany. In part this is due to the rediscovery of Mendel’s work and the confidence given to eugenicists with this apparently simple model of inheritance. Or as Davenport put it, “with the rise of Mendelism a new era opened” [TICE; 1934; Davenport; 18]. (It was supplemented by August Weismann’s rejection, around the same time, of Jean Lamarck’s theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. This debate was not so comprehensively resolved, with some geneticists - such as Herbert Spencer Jennings - uncertain on the issue until into the 1930s). Garland Allen suggests that eugenics was held back in the pre- Mendelian years because it “lacked a firm and workable theory of heredity” [Allen; 1986; 225]. These developments gave eugenics the scientific spur it needed. Looking back over the early years of the century Thurman Rice wrote that “no great movement has forged ahead more rapidly than the great eugenics or race hygiene program ” [Rice; 1929; 367].