CHAPTER IV (4)

Integrative and disintegrative

TrencCs of Iranian Ethnicities towards !NationaC Vnity 115 Chapter IV (4) Integrative and Disintegrative Trends of Iranian Ethnicities towards National Unity

I. Overview

This chapter will explain integrative and disintegrative trends of all these groups towards national unity. In classification of nearly 22 Iranian ethnicities in , they can be classified into three categories comprising: A-Shiite Muslims ethnicities, B-Sunni Muslims ethnicities and C-Non-Muslims ethnicities. While the majority of Shiites are well integrated ethnicities, two Shiite ethnicities and all three Sunni ethnicities, although, also, show strong integrative trends toward national unity, but, witnessed some disintegrative trends and unrests. Non-Muslims, although seek for more religious rights, but mostly show integrative trends. Neighborhood of the Azeris, , Arabs, Baluch and Turkmen with foreign countries and ties of these communities to their ethnic kin in the neighboring states besides language or religion ,somehow, differentiates these five ethnic groups from each other and other ethnicities in Iran. These five ethnic groups are regionally concentrated and also share kin on the other side of the borders with the neighboring countries. The are divided between Iran and the newly independent state of the Republic of -a republic of the former -, and neighbor to Republic of and The Kurds are divided mostly between the three states of Iran, and Turkey with small enclaves in and several republics of the fornier Soviet Union. Majority of in Khuzestan have common border with Iraq," and "Kuwait", and a minority of them in the coastline of Persian Gulf, are neighbors of some 116

Other Arab countries, especially",'' united Arab " and "Oman". The Blochs are divided mainly between Iran and Pakistan and and Turkmen are in the neighborhood of newborn country "Turkmenistan". The trans-border nature of these groups, indeed, presents the Iranian state with potential problems of international dimensions. In point of fact, for the Iranian state the problem of incorporating these groups has been linked, partly, to the ties of these communities to their ethnic kin in the neighboring states and to its own relationships with those states. In Religion and language also is another ethnic distinctive marker for these ethnicities. While Iranian Azeris and Arabs, as the Persians, are Shia Muslims, and differentiate with them, by language, the Turkmen, the Kurds and the Baluch are Sunni Muslims that differ from others Iranian ethnicities by religion and language dialects. These three also differ from each other by language, but common in religion. On the other hand, the Azeris and Turkmen ,as Turkish speakers thus as "Turks", and the Arabs as Arab speaker thus as Arabs , are said to belong to an ethnic stock different from the Persians or at least a mixture of Turks or Arab with other Iranian ethnicities ,while the Kurds and the Baluch, by virtue of the languages they speak, i.e., and Baluchi - both Indo Iranian languages and thus akin to Persian- as well as other ethnographic and historical data, are considered to be of Indo-European stock similar to the Persians. Despite overwhelming similarities of Iranian ethnicities, in modem times, their differences occasionally emerge as political ambitions, largely as a result of provocation from outside powers. Ethnicities with some disintegrative trends and unrest with their location is shown in Diagram Number 2and map NumberS. In this chapter, at first well integrated Shiite ethnicities, shortly, will discussed, then, all five ethnicities with some unrests and disintegrative trends, include two Shiite ethnicity and three Sunni ethnicity will be discussed, and finally a glance will have to the non-Muslims viewpoints towards national unity. 117 II. Shiite Muslims Ethnicities' Integrative and Disintegrative Trends

Shiite can be dividing into two categories A- Well integrated ethnicities and B- Ethnicities with some unrest, but with strong integrative trends. Among Shiite ethnicities only Azeris and Arabs, because of their language, and somewhat their racial origin, in some periods witnessed some unrest and anti- central government trends. After discussing well integrated Shiite ethnicities, disintegrative and integrative trends among these two Shiite ethnicities will be explore.

ILL Well Integrated Shiite Ethnicities

Majority of Shiite Muslim ethnicities, in addition of religion, share common origin, history and other identity markers, and their languages are Persian or dialects of Persian, so these ethnicities in their history haven't any separatist movement and always they have strong integrative trends toward national unity. Even if they had some conflict with central government in their history, that was for some reason like opposition to a dictator or foreign colonial countries, or to gain power, or seeking social justices, share in power, or other reason,-that can not be discussed in this short research-but without any attempt to separate from Iran. In such cases of the opposition to central government and conflict with political leaders from these ethnicities, in the meanwhile they were supporting Iran's integrity, territory and national unity. However, Persian, Lurs, Bakhtiaries, Laks, Gilaks and Mazanderanies, Qashghaies, Talish, and all other small Shiite ethnicities, never had separatist trends. If in some periods of their history Bakhtiaries, Qashqaies and Gilaks had conflict and revolt against central government, they hadn't any separatist demands, in contrast, in some events they conflict with central government for 118 preserving Iran's independence and preserving its integrity. In period of constitution revolution, Bakhtiaries, and Gilaks, were two pillars of three militant forces that occupied the capital, , to preserve the revolution. In period of the national government of Dr. "Mohammad Mosaddeq"' Qashqaies that has important influence in the south of country, supported Mossadiq and his government. One scholar of Iranian studies says "Among Iranian ethnic groups, the Kurds and Lurs consider themselves purely Iranian. Lurs in their value systems demand a strong link with the central and national government .The only time, they have been seen adopting anti-national policies is when they have endeavored to save their ethnic identity from outside threats during political and social unrest; and this has been rare in Iranian history...." Graph number 3, shows Well Integrated Shiite Ethnicities in Iran.

Graph Number3:Well Integrated Ethnicities 119

In sum ,the above mentioned ethnicities who comprises the majority of Iran's Shiite and majority of Iran's population are well integrated toward national unity and diversities between them is decreasing in benefit of unity in the country.In the late centuries, Azeris, Arabs, Kurds, Baluches and Turkmen, relatively, had witnessed more unrests than other Iranian ethnicities.

Map Number4: The location of Ethnics with disintegrative and integrative trends (Azeris, Arabs, Kurds, Baluch and Turkmen.)

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II.II. Shiite Ethnicities with Disintegrative and Integrative Trends, Azeris and Arabs Azeris and Arabs' Disintegrative and Integrative trends will be explored in this part. Although, these two witnessed some unrest in their history, but as 120 research will show, there is a strong integrative trend among the majority of the people of these ethnicities.

II.II.l. Azeris' Disintegrative and Integrative Trends

More Azeris are living in Azarbaijan, so Azeris also are called Azerbaijanis. The term Azarbaijan refers to the newly independent state of Azarbaijan, the capital of which is ''" and was formerly a constituent republic of the Soviet Union and the Iranian Azarbaijan, the capital of which is "", as one of the provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iranian Azarbaijan shares frontiers with the Republic of Azarbaijan and Turkey in the north and west respectively. To the east it is bound by the same republic and Caspian Sea and to the south by the Province of in Iran. The Iranian Azerbaijan has witnessed some conflict and unrest in its history. After First World War until now, there were three major revolts in Iranian Azerbaijan aimed at demanding change and limiting the central government's authority in the region and thereby instituting a new power structure based on a greater measure of local participation. These attempts all ended in complete failure. The first endeavor, "Khiyabani's revolt", dates back to the 1920s, the chaotic years following the First World War; the second under the patronage of the Soviet Union, was made by the Azerbaijan Democratic Party led by Ja'far Pishevari in 1945^6; and the third came in the immediate years following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. There was also some other smaller event and unrest in this region like "Lahuti khan" (the leader of gendarmeiy forces) revolt against Reza Khan, two years after Khiyabani uprising, and some demonstration and riots over the publication in May 2006 of a "cartoon" that many Azeris found offensive to them. At least one of this revolt and events was a separatist revolt, one semi-separatist and some of this event was called ethnic unrest or ethnic tension. 121

Regarding ethnic problems Iranian Azerbaijan also had another problem, with its borders and neighboring countries. Azerbaijan, has borders with Turkish on one side, and with Independent Azerbaijan republic on another side. Pan-Turanism or Turkish and Ethnic unity trends between the people of two Azerbaijan have regarded as two threatening items. In the following after discussing ethnic conflict in and ethnic problems in Iranian Azerbaijan, will be clear that ,despite this Azerbaijan is well integrated with other ethnicities in Iran in a the process of national unity and unity in diversity.

II.II.l.l.Azeris' Disintegrative Trends

After departure of the foreign troops that left a political void in Azerbaijan which the central government was so weak, even to attempt to fill. Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani, a fiery Tabriz preacher, accused the government of discriminating against the provinces in the parliamentary elections, and demanded the establishment of elected provincial councils. In May 1917 he formed a Democratic Party and an autonomous local government and renamed the province "Azadistan"- Land of the Free.^Khiabani had been a member of the liberal nationalist faction in the national parliament, the democrats, and was regarded as an ideologically convinced democrat and Iranian patriot. Opposing to the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 known as "Vosuq-al-Doleh 1919 treaty""^, on April 1920, he openly broke with the Tehran government over the issue of this treaty and called his domain "Azadistan". Whether Khiabani was a separatist and his aim was an independence Azerbaijan from Iran or an uprising against pro-Britain governments in Iran? This was a question from that time until now. The question that frequently was repeated about his contemporary revolutionary leader Mirza Kuchek Khan Jangali, who was the founder of a revolutionary movement based in the forests of Gilan in northern Iran.^ 122

Most of Iranian historian and scholars of Iranian studies avoided to call both of them separatists. Cottam, defending, Khianani writes: "He was a cultured man with a deep love for Iranian history and traditions, and nothing in his early career suggests that he had ever entertained any Azerbaijani separatist idea...there is no ground for suspecting 'Khiabani' of engaging in foreign intrigue. He opposed Turkish efforts to annex Azerbaijan in 1918 and issued a strongly-worded statement condemning all foreigners-Turks, Russians, and English. Nor was he attracted by Bolsheviks' efforts to woo him into an alliance with Kuchek Khan".^ When Mirza Kuchak Khan called for the formation of a popular front with the purpose of restoring the Constitution in Iran, Khiyabani went so far as to compare him to Vosuq al-Dowleh: What is the difference between you and Vosuq al-Dowleh? He wants to rule Iran with the assistance of the British forces and you would do the same with the backing of the Russians.^Although Khiyabani, staunchly, opposed to Iran's centralized administration; he was also committed to presei"ving the countries territorial integrity and to the establishment of Iranian nation-state rather than to independent or even autonomous rule in Azerbaijan. Cottam says Khiabani's continued unwillingness to deal with Tehran, even when government was headed by patriots, apparently lost him support. He was easily defeated and banished.^ Two years later Azerbaijan again broke with Tehran, this time by a military man who was Lahuti Khan, the leader of gendarmerie forces in Azerbaijan. Lahuti revolt, in fact was against Reza Khan, the minister of war and commander of chief of Cossacks force, who wants to destroy the independence of gendarmerie. But Despite his efforts, Lahuti attracted virtually no popular support from Azerbaijanis. Even when Reza Khan, s Cossacks arrived in Tabrize, they were greeted with enthusiasm and were joined by many liberal nationalists who then fought against the gendarmerie.'" Lahuti at last fled to Soviet Union and remained there until his death. Soviet Union, have 123 its role in Iranian Azerbaijan, especially during world war II. As Cottam said, To Stalin in 1946, Iranian Azerbaijan must have resembled a ripe plum already plucked and begging to be devoured ".With this aim the Soviets created "the autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan", by 'Pishevari'.

II.II.1.2. Republic of Azerbaijan

Twenty-five years after Khiabani uprising, an Azerbaijan Autonomous Government of (1945-46) with support of Soviet Union and led by Sayeed Jafar Pishevari, a revolutionary communist, was declared in Azerbaijan. At first, Pishevari, in 1944, encouraged and support by Soviet Union, issued his manifesto of the newly formed "Democratic party of Azerbaijan"'^. Democratic Party soon absorbed the local "Tudah Party"'^ expanded throughout Iranian Azarbaijan, and carried through a local coup d'etat while the Soviet army prevented Iranian reinforcements from entering the province. Some believed that, actually, this was another name for the Azerbaijan branches of communist pro-Soviet party Tudeh.''* Pishevari, claimed the distinctiveness of Azerbaijanis in language, history and culture from Iran, demanded an autonomous government for Azerbaijan. After one yearly dispute and negotiation between Iranian central government on one side, Azerbaijan Autonomous Government and Soviets on other side, specially Prime Minister Qavam's early diplomacy to settle the 'Azerbaijan Crisis', the central government launched its final attack against Pishevari's government and On 12 December 1946, and just one year after it had been established, the Democrats' rule in Azerbaijan came to an end. As a Marxist-Leninist who had spent years in the communist movement, Pishevari not only considered to be a separate nation, but also insisted on championing the Bolsheviks' rallying cry of "the right of nations to self-determination, the right to secede and form an independent 124 state". Pishevari's understanding of autonomy clearly went beyond merely demanding a greater degree of local participation in regional legislation and administration, while remaining within the borders of an established sovereign state.'^ The existence of the then Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan— bearing the same name as the Iranian province of Azerbaijan—made many Iranians wary ,that what really lay behind the Soviet policy was nothing less than the desire eventually to annex the Iranian Azerbaijan. In the face of this lurking suspicion, many politically active Iranians who were generally in favor of greater autonomy for the provinces were reluctant to lend their unconditional support to the Azerbaijani Democrats. In their minds, Pishevari's call for regional autonomy was associated with the nightmare scenario of Azerbaijan's from Iran. The failure of Pishevari to attract and maintain any support for his government by Azerbaijan people, pressures of Iran and international powers, and the security council of the United Nations on Soviets was causes of Soviet decision to withdraw from Azerbaijan and leave Pishevari to his fate. As Sykes said, "...in Tabrize itself prior to the arrival of the army the populace rose and executed all the Democratic officials they could lay their hands on"'^ As mentioned Most works on the Azerbaijan "crisis" focused predominantly on international relations, the role of the Soviet Union, and the effects of cold war developments on events and government policy in Iran. There is another idea that sees internal and ethnic dynamics of this "crisis". Among these groups Atabaki's views on Azerbaijan crisis in 1945-46, is mentionable. In his work "Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran"'^, Atabaki, frequently referred to as the Azerbaijan "crisis," tries to show the internal and ethnic dynamics of this "crisis". He states that growing antagonism between proponents of regionalism and centralism, and the decisive effects of new conceptual shifts concerning such notions as ethnicity. 125 ethnic identity, and nationality'^. Atabaki characterizes his own approach as "unconventional," "nonpartisan," and "balanced" '^emphasized on internal factors behind the emergence of Azerbaijan's democratic movement and autonomous government. He believes that Azerbaijan's autonomous movement was not prefabricated by Soviet Russians; in fact, Russians tried to exploit a genuine revolutionaiy situation in Iran. The primary impetus behind the movement was in fact local grievances and genuine exasperation among the workers and peasants of Azerbaijan with the Iranian central government's incompetence and corruption; Azerbaijani resentment that had accumulated during years of Reza 's attempts at Persianization; Tehran's arrogant denigration of the ; and miseries and injustices that in any other country would be enough to produce a spontaneous revolt were also major factors. Nevertheless, Atabaki is convinced that "in view of what was perceived to be Pishevari's unambiguous involvement with, and dependence on, the Soviet Union, one is obliged to question to what extent the autonomous movement was wholly indigenous"^**. Russians no doubt gave support for their own purposes, which in turn emboldened Pishevari and other Azerbaijani Democrats in their campaign to the point at which their demands and actions went beyond a logical and feasible regional autonomy. Atabaki maintains that the factors that led to the tragic end of Khiyabani's revolt in 1920 and the disastrous fall of the autonomous government of Pishevari in 1946 were "almost identical," the most crucial among them the threat that these movements posed to the territorial integrity of Iran.^' Atabaki offers some warnings concerning the possible revival of autonomous and nationalist movements among Iranian Azerbaijanis in view of the emergence of the newly independent post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. These warnings, however, are targeted only toward Azerbaijani intellectual circles, cautioning them against "an intellectual fantasy which in previous 126 generations has exacted so high a price from its passionate devotees" What this otherwise balanced volume lacks is a corresponding warning to statesmen, state-centrists, Persian Patriotism, and pan-Iranist circles offering positive policy recommendations for a less centralized, more democratic, and multicultural Iran. '^^ Following the fall of the Azerbaijan Autonomous Government of 1945- 46, and in the years following World War II, as Iran's geopolitical location and national Resources, made the West become aware of the importance of her territorial integrity, the country went through a major socio-economic transformation. The process of rapid urbanization and industrialization caused some degree of ethnic dislocation throughout Iran. In the capital, Tehran, also ,in some other big cities in the country, Azerbaijanis formed their community, dominating the local economy. Furthermore, the expansion of education and communication for the most part contributed to a more homogeneous culture in Iran. This tendency towards homogeneity on the social, political and cultural level may be seen to have culminated in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.In spite of this, within the Islamic Revolutionary government there emerged an Azeri nationalist faction led by "Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari", who advocated greater regional autonomy and wanted the constitution to be revised to include secularists and opposition parties. On 25 February 1979, only a few days after the seizure of power by the new revolutionary government, the Muslim People's Republican Party (MPRP) (Hezb-e Jomhuri-ye Khalq-e Mosalman) was set up in Tabriz, with AyatoUah Kazem Shariatmadari's implicit endorsement. In its first declaration the new party announced that its objectives included the establishment of an Islamic, multi-party democracy, and maintaining Iran's territorial integrity. As a tendency outside the mainstream Islamic establishment, the MPRP launched its political campaign with reservation on the plebiscite organized by the government for April 1979 that was to determine the nature of Iran's political 127

system. While the referendum called on the people to choose between the republic and the monarchy, the MPRP argued that the public should be given more choices. The referendum was held in disregard of such reservation and the electorate overwhelmingly voted for the establishment of an Islamic republic. Following the April referendum, the writing of the country's new Constitution was put on the government's agenda. Ayatollah Shariatmadari and the MPRP boycotted the referendum for the Constitution in December 1979. Then streets of big cities in Azerbaijan, particularly Tabriz, turned into the scene of bloody confrontation between the supporter of Ayatollah Shariatmadari and those of the leader of revolution. Imam Khomeini, both camps dominated by native Azerbaijanis. The main objection raised by Ayatollah Shariatmadari and the MPRP centered on the adoption of the concept of Velayat-e Faqih,-the guardianship of jurist consult. David Menashri, says Shariatmadari also was oppose to Khomeini's pan-Islamism views on pan- Islamism so contrasted to Imam Khomeini's pan-Islamism views. He regarded "Islam as the cohesive element of Iranian nationalism and the main instrument in the strengthening of Iran's national unity, as well as safeguarding its national sovereignty."^^ In spite of this, Shariatmadari, vehemently stressed the territorial integrity of Iran and even asked his Azeri coethnics in 1979 to postpone their communal demands until the government is fully stabilized."'* The Tabriz unrest lasted for another two months, finally, when the political confrontation reached the military establishment, Ayatollah Shariatmadari intervened personally; issuing a statement that disassociated him from the MPRP, and put an end to the chaos in the city after that Sharia'tmadari and his followers were eventually silenced mainly because many Azeris supported the Islamic Republic. 128

After that activities of those advocating the upholding the Azerbaijani cultural was limited to the publication of periodicals such as Yoldash (Comrade), Inqilab Yolunda (On the Revolution's Path), Yeni Yol (New Path), and Varliq (Entity) with limited circulation, mainly amongst the veteran Marxists and ex-Marxists. Indeed, it was the latter group who during the same period formed the Azerbaijan Society and attempted to introduce the notion of self-determination in the revolutionary discourse.^^ However, some events such as some wide protest across major cities of Iranian Azerbaijan in May, 2006 triggered by a cartoon, drawn by an Azeri cartoonist, annual gathering at Babak Castle in the city of "Kalaybar", Azeris have interpreted as seeking Azeri identity.^^During the imposed war between Iraq and Iran Azeris, like other Iranian people actively participated in war against Iraq and defended the revolution and Iranian identity obviously increased among them. By the end of the war in 1988, and the during the period of "reconstruction" and partial liberalization under President Rafsanjani, then President Khatami, the notion of ethnic rights gradually entered into the general discourse of individualism, individual autonomy and citizenship which was the preoccupation of the reformist circles. However, the most dramatic episode during this period was the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of eight republics on the northern frontier of Iran. Regarding the Turkish-speaking neighboring countries with Azerbaijan, regardless, the wars between Safavids and Ottman Sultans, during the movement of pan-Turanism led by young Turks in Turkey, they were advocates of a Turkish-speaking empire from the "Aegean Sea" to the "Great Wall of China", they wanted to annex Iranian Azerbaijan to their country and they believed that Azerbaijan should first declare it's independence then unite with Turkey. On other hand, regardless, the "Tsarist Empire" and Soviet Union attempt to occupy or separate and annex the Iranian Azerbaijan to their territories, at the turn of the millennium by the End of the Soviet Era, across 129

Iran's northern frontiers, a number of small independent states had emerged, some of them home to majority population with corresponding ethno-linguistic groups within Iranian territory. It should, however, be noted that the Soviet historians, particularly some intellectuals of the former Soviet's Azerbaijan, refuted the argument that the Azeris are Iranians who were Turkified by force. David Nissman writes: In Soviet's Azerbaijan there has been a recent effort to establish a Middle Eastern and Caucasian origin for the Turks and to assert that the Azeri language was formed prior to the Seljuk invasion The assertion that the Azeri Turks were originally are from the Trans-Caucasus and Near East, serves to strengthen a Soviet claim to the land of Azerbaijan, including that part situated in Iran. Indeed, in the former Soviet Azerbaijan any reference to the Iranian Azerbaijan was objectionable and the phrase Southern Azerbaijan was utilized in the Azeri literary circles and publications.^^ Calls for unity of the people who share a common language but live under different national flags are occasionally heard, for example, in the newly formed Republic of Azerbaijan, some political groups and intellectual circles initiated a campaign advocating the establishment of a greater Azerbaijan. To attain this goal, once again the call raised for the province of Iranian Azerbaijan to secede and unite with the Republic of Azerbaijan. In June 1989, during a congress in Baku the "Azerbaijan Khalq Jebhesi" (The People's Front of Azerbaijan-PFA), The People's Front supports the restoration of ethnic unity of Azerbaijanis living on both sides of the border.^^ The Azeri people should be recognized as a united whole. With ethnic violence spreading throughout the Caucasus and the crisis of Nagorno-Karabakh, the call for solidarity between all Turkic people of the region, particularly the Azerbaijanis, became the main item on the PFA's agenda. The call for unification was somewhat realized during the last days of 1989, when a crowd of Azerbaijanis from the Nakhjivan province dismantled 130 and crossed the frontier posts and installations, that had been dividing them from Iranian Azerbaijan. On the Iranian side of the border, the event was observed cautiously, with enthusiasm and compassion being confined to the frontier settlers who had family ties in the north. Nevertheless, for some circles in Baku, the event provided an analogy with the recent fall of the Berlin wall. In another comer of Azerbaijan, in the Lenkaran region, too the Azerbaijanis adopted the Nakhjivani practice.^^Free passage across the Iranian border soon became a common exercise. Since the Republic of Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, there has been renewed interest and contact between Azeris on both sides of the border. The Iranian government's response was cautious, welcome to Shi'ite brothers and sisters from the north, whose experience was seen in a religious, rather an ethnic context.According to Michael P. Croissant: Although Iran's Azeri populations is well integrated into Iranian society and has shown little desire to secede, Tehran has nonetheless shown extreme concern with prospects of the rise of sentiments calling for union between the two Azerbaijans.'"In spite of these events the Iranian Azeri people, continually, condemned separatist trends and they are pro-Iranian national unity. Influential participation in constitutional revolution. Islamic revolution and eight years defensive war with Iraq are a part of their national sentiments to their country Iran.

II.II. 1.3.Azeris' Integrative Trends toward the National Unity in Iran

Azerbaijan continually was major province of Iran, and Azeris have common history and culture with other Iranian ethnicities and common religion with the majority. They continually were proud of their Iranian identity, and they have been traditionally well integrated with the multi-ethnic Iranian state. Shi'a religion, Iranian culture, common history with other ethnicities, migration to capital and big cities in Iran ,development of communication 131 education and mass , and good opportunities to have high position in political and economical fields, especially after Islamic revolution are assimilating them into mainstream. The only factor that seems to separate Azeris fi-om the majority is their language. Regarding language, although Azeri is a Turkish dialect and differs with Persian, but all Azeri intellectual accept Persian as their language, and recognize it as their main languages. As will be discussed later Azeri language could not separate Azeris from Iran. In the Iran history Azeris, themselves, were Iranian nationalist. The clear example is their share in two important revolutions in contemporary i.e. constitution revolution 1906 and Islamic revolution of 1979. As Cottam said, the fact that the people of Azerbaijan think of themselves as Iranian is supported by the early history of the liberal nationalist constitutional movement in Iran and even before that Azeris were Iranian nationalists. And he added that No other province joined more completely in the 'MossadeQ movement' than Azerbaijan. ^^ We must add their role in Islamic Revolution 1979 and after that especially in eight years imposed war with Iraq. In above mentioned revolts and ethnic unrests we can't see any majority support for separatism and secessionism. Among all mentioned revolts only Pishevari revolt (1945-6) was a secessionist and separatist movement, that actually was leading by a foreign country i.e. Soviet Union which because of the lack of support by people, by withdrew Soviet Union's troops, failed their power and fled to Soviet country. Atabaki: in his book titled "Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth Century Iran"^^, argues that Pishevari's close alliance with the Soviet Union explains why he did not enjoy unanimous support among Iranian liberals and even communists. He believes that the factors that led to the tragic end of Khiyabani's revolt in 1920 and the disastrous fall of the autonomous government of Pishevari in 1946 were "almost identical," the most crucial among them the threat that these movements posed to the territorial integrity of Iran.^'' He concludes that the successful suppression of both 132

Khiyabani's and Pishevari's revolts can be taken as a sign of "the widespread vigor and legitimacy" enjoyed by a "traditional current" in the reformist that has upheld the idea of "a strong, centralized (not necessarily despotic) government in Iran".^^ Atabaki, goes on to distinguish between "nation-states" and "state-nations," viewing Iran as a nation- state whose borders, by implication, were not arbitrarily drawn and whose different ethnic groups are "so well integrated and mutually dependent that any attempt to lessen the ties, especially the economic ones, is bound to meet with understandable resentment" . In conclusion, Atabaki offers some warnings concerning the possible revival of autonomous and nationalist movements among Iranian Azerbaijanis in view of the emergence of the newly independent post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. These warnings, however, are targeted only toward Azerbaijani intellectual circles, cautioning them against "an intellectual fantasy which in previous generations has exacted so high a price from its passionate devotees"''^. Richard Thomas, Roger East, and Alan John Day states: The 15-20 million Azeri Turks living in northern Iran, ethnically identical to Azeris, have

TO embraced Shia Islam and are well integrated into Iranian society The first factor that integrated Azeris in Iranian population is their religion. Azeris are Shi'a Muslims. They supported Safavid and Qajar dynasties, because they were Shi'a rulers. "Iranian Azeri Turks, who are mainly Shi'a Muslims, are the largest minority in Iran, As Shi'a, they are not subject to any kinds of discrimination and are well-integrated into the economy, Azeris - Turkic speaking and non-Turkic speaking - have participated in Iran's history and politics, and continue to do so. Some of the most famous Azeris of Iran are involved on national levels.Azeris are well integrated and many Azeri Iranians are prominent in Persian literature, politics and clerical world.^' As Ahmadi mentioned most of the famous early Iranian nationalists, namely Talib Zadeh (Talibov), Path Ali Akhondzadeh (Akhondov), Rasul 133

Zadeh, Hasan Taqi Zadeh and , were from Azerbaijan."^" Talibov (1834-1913), one of the first elaborators of Iranian nationalism in the aftermath of the constitutional revolution of 1906, lamented the disintegration of Iran in the nineteenth century and the way important parts of the Caucasus, Afghanistan and Baluchistan were separated from Iran by imperial Russia and Britain."' Akhondzadeh was an admirer of ancient Iran and regarded the Arab conquest as a disaster. His ideas were imitated by Iranians such as Mirza Agha Khan Kermani, who also promoted Iranian nationalism mainly in its pre- Islamic color.Mohammad Rasul Zadeh, like Talebov and Akhondov, viewed Iranian nationalism's ideal form to be pre- Islamic Iran. In his writings, published in Persian journals in the Caucasus and later in Soviet Azerbaijan, he tried to encourage Azeris not to forget their Iranian background."*" Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1945), was preoccupied with proving the Iranian origins of Azerbaijani history and culture. According to Ervand Abrahamian, Kasravi was 'the only intellectual who ever tried to tackle the problem of national integration in Iran'. Educated Iranians respected him for his nationalism, but outside Iran, Kasravi acquired enemies, primarily because he challenged pan-Turkist propaganda against Iranian Azerbaijan. In his famous work on Azerbaijan's language, he argued that the present Turkish language was brought into Azerbaijan in the eleventh century during the rule of the Seljuqs; before that, he claimed, Azerbaijan's language was Azeri, a local dialect of Persian.'*'' "Dr Taqi Arani", an famous Marxist Azeri says that the people of Azerbaijan were anxious to relearn Iranian which they had forgotten as a result of the Mongol invasions, he advocated the elimination of Turkish from his home province: 'All well-wishing Iranians, especially the Ministry of Education, must do all they can to replace Turkish with Persian. They must send to Azerbaijan Persian school-teachers, Persian books, Persian journals, . 44 and Persian newspapers. 134

The ethnic marker that differentiates Azeris from other Iranians or more specifically from the Persians is their language, Turki, as it is called by all Iranians and the Azeris themselves. But Iranian historians, among them many Azeri scholars, have argued that the inhabitants of Azerbaijan were of Iranian stock who in pre-Islamic and even Islamic periods spoke a language called "Azari" or "Azari Pahlavi,"'*^ it is said that even a century after the rule of the "*^, Azerbaijan did not have a unified language and the language of the Medes was a tribal language among many others.'^^Some says that there exist some evidences that the people of Azerbaijan even during the Safavids still spoke this language which was one of the Iranian dialects."** Yet, the Safavid courtiers and aristocracy preferred Turkish language due to the fact that most of their tribal supporters were Turkish speaking. This as well as the subsequent rule of the Qajars, themselves of Turkic stock, helped to strengthen and spread Turkish more and more in Azerbaijan. Indeed, various dialects of "Azari Pahlavi" that were being spoken in different towns and villages withered away by being absorbed into the dominant language, And thus emerged a language which is a combination of Turkish, Ghuzi, and dialects of Azeri Pahlavi and is spoken today in Azerbaijan as "Azari Turkish.""*^An Iranian historian "Mashkour", points out the differences between Ottoman Turkish and Azerbaijani language for instance he argues that while there are a great many Persian words in Azeri Turkish and more Arabic words in Ottoman Turkish ^°Mashkour, then, enumerates several characteristics of the Azeri Turkish to prove its original distinction from other Turkic languages and its affinity with Persian^' Indeed, the Azeri's identity is not contrast with an "Iranian" identity; none of them is being contradictory to the other. It is important to note that ethnic boundaries are fluid and flexible.^^ However, there are many factors which explain the Azeris' loyalty to the Iranian state. Among these the most important are: 135

First: The overwhelming majority of the Azeris are Shi'a Muslims. In a Muslim society where religion is and has been one of the most important sources of group identification and ethnic-linguistic and/or national loyalties are relatively recent phenomena, this factor seems to be of the utmost significance. Second ,before the Pahlavi era (1925-1979) that Iran was ruled by Safavid and Qajar dynasties of Turkic origin, Azeris of Iran, thus, do not have a collective memory of humiliation, and degradation; a characteristic that is usually exclusive of oppressed peoples. Third, in respect to social stratification and social structure, Azerbaijan seems to be an extension of the Persian inhabited areas of Iran. The region and its inhabitants have been tightly connected and integrated with the central authority in the country since the Safavid period (16th century). This fact has, undoubtedly, eased Azeri identification with the Iranian state. Forth: Azeri participation in political power. During the Pahlavi era and at present the political elite of Azerbaijan have been readily integrated into the national political elite of Iran. Indeed, some very powerful and politically important individuals have come from Azerbaijan. The average Azeris have considered themselves as part and parcel of one community; that of a Shi'a Iran.^Azeris, participated in the Revolution of 1978-79 in great numbers, this indicates that they well integrated to Iranian nation. In the Islamic revolution, the objectives of the Iranian Azeris were basically identical to those of the Persian-speaking population, i.e., the overthrow of the Shah's regime. Throughout the revolt, not one word about autonomy or communal sentiments was heard from Azerbaijan. After revolution many of the clergy and Non-clergy in the political leadership have been Azeris themselves. Many important religious personalities and a great number of religious students (Tollab) and high clergy of Iran are from Azerbaijan. The important Azeri merchants of the 'Tabriz' and 'Tehran' 136

Bazaars also wholeheartedly assisted and supported the Islamic Republic, nonetheless, have been surprisingly calm. The integration of the Iranian Azeris in the Iranian socio-political, economic and cultural structures and absence of discrimination in different institutions have given them high position in the future of Iran. The Shi'a character of the Iran's government also has intensified the common denominators shared by other Iranian Shiites as Persians and others and Azeri population and thus has helped narrow ethnic boundaries.At present, the Iranian Azeris are not even worry about linguistic and cultural restrictions since there is more freedom in print and broadcasting in local languages. Indeed according to one anthropologist, Azeri integration into the Iranian society has prompted some scholars "not to consider them a national minority."^* Andrew Burke writes: Azeris are famously active in commerce and in bazaars all over Iran their voluble voices can be heard. Currently, the living conditions of Azeris in Iran closely resemble that of Persians: The life styles of urban Azerbaijanis do not differ from those of Persians, and there is considerable intermarriage among the upper classes in cities of mixed populations. Similarly, customs among Azerbaijani villagers do not appear to differ markedly from those of Persian villagers. With a predominant Shi'ite population, Azerbaijan highly contributed to the revolutionary Islamic leadership. In addition, Azeris in Iran are in high positions of authority with the "Ayatollah Ali Khamenei", sitting as the Supreme Leader, the , now is an Azeri, along with much of Iran's military, economic, and political leadership, a fact which seriously undermines claims of discrimination of Azeris in Iran or that they do not have equal opportunities compared to other ethnic groups in Iran, such as Persians. Regarding some Azeris aspirations to use their language in their education, Although Azeri language and culture is still nevertheless taught and studied at the university levels in Iran but 137

According to Article 15 of Iran's constitution the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian. ^^ The pan-Islamism ideology of the government and war with Iraq, also, help to increase Azeris integrative trends to the Islamic government. The government policy in the past 30 years has been one of pan- Islamism, which is based on a common Islamic religion of which diverse ethnic groups may be part, and which does not favor or repress any particular ethnicity, including the Persian majority. According to "Svante Cornell", formerly, the dominance of Persian culture had an effect of socializing many Azerbaijanis into the Persian culture, perceived as the 'high culture' in Iran".^^ However with the advent of the in 1979, emphasis shifted away from nationalism as the new government, and highlighted religion as the main unifying factor. is thus merely used as the lingua franca of the country, which helps maintain Iran's traditional centralized model of government. The outbreak of the war with Iraq in 1980, which lasted for eight years, had far reaching consequence for cultural harmony in Iran. Forced migration and population dislocation refashioned the Iranian identity within the national territory. For the Iranian establishment, the dominant ideology of war was Shi'ite Iran against Sunni Iraq. The Azerbaijani Shi'ites, therefore, turned into forerunners of the war. Regarding Pan-turanism, now, is not a threat for Azerbaijan, if ever pan- turanism was to triumph in Azerbaijan, the period of , was a chance for "The Young Turks", but as we saw the Azeris, never accepted Turks. The idea of "united Azerbaijans" now is a dream and practically impossible. Although there are some similarities in language and culture in both Azerbaijan, but Iranian Azeris are Shi'a, while most of Azeris in Azerbaijan Republic are Sunni Muslims. The religious differences and differences in political culture because of a long historical separation between 138 to Azerbaijan are important divisive factors. Even if this unity, at present time, happens, in the form of bigger Azerbaijan inside Iran will be happen. In short we must conclude that, in spite of separatist movement of P and semi-separatist movement Khiabani and other unrests after the revolution of 1979, and during the rule of the Islamic republic of Iran, Azeris are well integrated in Iran and express Iranian identity and their loyalty to national unity is in high levels. Common history, common culture and religion -Shi'a religion- and share in political and economical power in high levels, their relatively majority in Islamic schools -Hawzehaye Elmieya- and clergies ,especially in the" city of Qom" and their high interests in Islamic republic are some important integrative elements for Iranian Azeris toward national unity, this element were powered with pan-Islamic ideology and Islamic unity plan of the Islamic republic of Iran, the war with Iraq and fundamental rights given by constitution of 1979 to the Iranian ethnicities. Although In the meantime, the Iranian state has to play a more active role to guarantee Azeris' continued loyalty to the state. Differs from the majority with language and common with the majority with religion Arabs, also, have a situation, somehow, similar to Azeris, as will see in the next paragraphs.

II.II.2. Arabs' Separatism, Pro-Federalism and Integrative Trends

Majority of Iranian Arabs, predominantly Shiite Muslim, live in Khuzestan province which is located in southwest of Iran and a minority of them live in other provinces ,more in "Bushehr", "Hormozeghan" and some in "Pars" ,in the coastline of Persian Gulf. Khuzestan is ethnically diverse, home to a number of distinct peoples and tribal groups of Iran, among them Arabs. The province's geographical location bordering Iraq and the "" separated the province from the central . Khuzestan's oil resources also make it a politically sensitive region, particularly given its 139 history of foreign intervention, notably the Iraqi invasion of 1980. At the same time, there are ethnic grievances among the province's population' mostly from some Arab groups. The politics of Khuzestan therefore has international significance and goes beyond the realm of electoral politics. Although the majority of the population of Khuzestan is Shi'a, there are some other small religious groups in the province. The 5-10,000 Mandeans, a unique religious group that is neither Muslim nor Christian, living in Khuzestan claim to have second-class status due to both Arabisation and Persianisation. In the contemporary history of Iranian Arabs were witnessed two periods of anti- central government activities heading by an Arab Sheikh or separatist Arab groups. The first period was during , that began with Sheikh Khaz'al", the Arab's Khan in Khuzestan, in the beginning of the rule of , and then, foundation of a few Arab separatist group in Khuzestan by support of Britain ,Iraq and other Arab countries, during the last decades of Mohammad Reza Shah.. The second period began with the first year of the victory of Islamic Revolution of 1979 that was started by anti -revolutionary activities on 1979 by a few Arab individuals and groups and continued by those groups and some new bom Arab nationalist group, leading by western or Arab countries, demanding independence or federalism. Although, the research will show that the vast majority of Iranian Arabs opposed them and are on the side of Revolution and demand Iran's integrity. In below shortly the two periods will be discussed, then, the integrative trends of the Iranian Arabs towards national identity will be explored. First begin with Sheikh Khaz'al's separatist revolt.

II.II.2.1.Arab Separatism and Pro-Federalism Trends

The most important event in Khuzestan, before the victory of Islamic Revolution, was the Separatist activities led by "Sheikh Khaz'al", the Arab's Khan of Mohammarah -now Khoramshahr. Sheikh Khaz'al Khan was 140 appointed by the Qajar Shah as the provincial governor-general of the west Khuzestan and Qajar king made him an Officer of the Nishan-e-Aqdas - Imperial Order of the Aqdas.^The rest of the province -the eastern and northern regions- remained under the domination of Bakhtiari Khans, Lurs tribal leaders, and Persian groups. Meanwhile, throughout the 19th century, Russia and Britain contended for control of Iran. Both attempted to influence or intimidate the Qajar . Russia dominated the northern parts of Iran while Britain dominated the south. Khuzestan was an area of particular interest to Britain, originally, because of its strategic location, and later due its vast oilfields. For more than a century, Britain was a dominant influence in the area. Following the discovery of oil in Mohammerah-controlled territory, the British moved quickly to establish control over the vast oil resources in the province, which culminated in the foundation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909. The British established a treaty with Khaz'al, whereby in exchange for their guaranteed support and protection against any external attack, he would also guarantee to maintain internal security and not interfere with the process of oil extraction. As part of the treaty they were given a monopoly of drilling in the province in return for an annual payment to Khaz'al and the Shah, and Bakhtiari Khans^^. Khaz'al Khan with the help of Britain and duo to weakness of Qajar king became a semi-independence power in Khuzestan. In 1921 British officials supported a coup mounted by Colonel Reza Khan, which overthrows the and eventually establishes the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. The British believed that Reza Khan would be more effective at holding the country together and resisting Russian (now Bolshevik) incursions from the north. After 1921 coup d'etat, Reza Khan decided to overthrow Khaz'al power in Khuzestan. Khaz'al after some activities against Reza Khan, expecting to find allies between southern tribes of Iran or Iranian national assembly -Majlis- members and Qajar king "Ahmad Shah", against 141

Reza Khan that couldn't receive any help from expecting allies , turned to the British for help, and then ,presented himself as a defender of Islam and Shari'a -Islamic law- against Reza Khan's Iranian secularism.^^ Meanwhile, prior to the rise of Reza Khan, Khaz'al had never attempted to separate his sheikhdom from , to which he had maintained staunch loyalty; he suddenly claimed that Arabs had only recently immigrated to the province and that they had no ties to the people of Iran. He proposed that because of this background, it would not be difficult to separate the Arabs of Khuzestan from Iran.^^ This effort, however, ended in failure. Forced to choose between Khaz'al and Reza Khan, the British completely withdrew their support and protection for Khaz'al's rule, claiming that the only reason they had supported him to begin with was due to the central government's inability to properly enforce its rule in Khuzestan. ^' In 1925 Reza Khan sent his military commanders to the province and asserted. Sheikh Khaz'al had to put an end to his power. Khaz'al spent the rest of his life under virtual house arrest, unable to travel beyond Tehran's city limits and eventually died in May of 1936 while alone in his house. It is said that he did not die of natural causes, but that he was murdered by one of the guards stationed outside his house under direct orders from Reza Shah. After Sheikh Khaz'al Arabs Sheikh or political Arab groups in Iranian Arabs came to struggle or riot against the central government in Iran, until the last decades of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi rule, that with support of Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries some Arab nationalist and separatist groups proclaim their existence. In 1946 - 1979 as with his father before him, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi attempts to modernize Iran by imposing strict central government control and limiting local autonomy and culture. The government seized the settled tribal lands of the Arabs, Bakhtiaris, Laks, and Lurs for the oil industry or government purposes. However Ethnic discontent simmered again during Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reign. In the new circumstances some political anti 142

-Iranian Arab groups with the aims of separatism by the support of Arab countries, especially Iraq, and some cases Britain, was built, that have some activities against Iran. The most important among them, was "Khuzestan Arab Union" and Khuzestan Federation Front-"Al-jebhate-At'tahrier Khuzestan". The first of them was built with support and encourage of "Alen Chalze Trat" the head of British Intelligence services in Middle East ^^and the second, by Iraq and other Arab countries. These groups had some anti-central government activities, during the last decade of Pahlavi. After victory of the Islamic Revolution, these groups and some other small groups with the same aims were built, and all of them have some separatist activities in Khuzestan.

II.II.2.2. Arabs' Ethnic Problems in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Today, there are a number of small Iranian Arab groups, with relatively a vast variety in their ideology, operating out of the country. Although most of these groups are secular in their political outlook, Ideology, tactics, tribal loyalties and personal ambition have prevented these groups from forming a united front. Some advocate armed resistance, while others believe in non­ violent action. Most refer to the entire province of Khuzestan as "Arabestan" (which only refers to a region in the southwest portion) or "Al-Ahwaz, although some define Arabestan as also including territory along the Gulf coast to the "Strait of Hormuz". In short some Arab groups claim that the Arabs of Iran have an Arabic Identity not Iranian identity and so are a separate nation and their native country must be Khuzestan province and called it Arabestan. They claim Arab people comprise more than 7% of Iranian population and more than 70% of the Khuzestan province that according to their claim are suffering from discrimination and unemployment in Iran. These groups claim that, the Arabs, allegedly, suffering higher rates of unemployment, illiteracy and disease than the national average. Some complain over the distribution of the revenue 143 generated by oil resources with claims that the central government is failing to invest profits from the oil industry in employment generation, post-war reconstruction and welfare projects. The Arabs have tended to regard themselves as separate from non-Arabs and, somewhat, have been so regarded by other Iranians. Among the Khuzestan Arabs there has been a sense of ethnic solidarity for many years. Khuzestan as the richest state in Iran was faced with the interferences of Arabs and western countries. Ethnic unrest, frequently, is generated by foreign governments to undermine the country's oil industry and its internal stability. However the Arab small political group, mostly leading or supporting by foreign countries and misusing of socio-economy and political problems of the province started some anti-central government in the region. These groups can divided into two camps: First, those have separatist trends^\ second those seeking regional autonomy within a federal Iran. It said that some of the separatist groups like The Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front (AADPF) and the Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party (AARP) carried out the bomb attacks of June 2005.^'* Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party (AARP) claimed on a pro-Iraqi Ba'athist website that it had exploded a bomb on the Ahwaz- Tehran pipeline.^^ It also claimed responsibility for the June 2005 bombings in Ahwaz City.^^ In contrasts of this separatist group some Arab journalist, activists and some other Arab groups and demand for Autonomy in a federal Iran. Ali Al- Taie, a member of the Democratic Solidarity Party of Ahwaz which upholds a federalist agenda for Iran, said at the debate that: "Despite the long history of persecution, the Arabs of Khuzestan/al-Ahwaz are Iranian. There will never be, nor should there be, disintegration or separatism in Iran. Rather, all Iranian people, regardless of their ethnic background, should live under a pluralistic, tolerant, and federal society." Another Arab activist says Khuzestan Arabs with a common land or geography , a common language, a collective history 144 and a common culture and Religion are a nation in Iranian multinational ,but he don't believe ,Khuzestan must be separated from Iran.^^ The Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz (DSPA) and The Islamic Reconciliation Party (Hezb al-Wefagh) are two Arab groups that demand more autonomy for Khuzestan Arabs in Iran. The Democratic Solidarity Party of Al-Ahwaz (DSPA), based in the US and the UK explicitly rejects the use of violence and advocates what it calls "internal self-determination". It also limits its territorial focus on Khuzestan, making no stand on Arab-populated living outside the province. The DSPA claims that Khuzestan has a historical Arab identity and this means that the province should be given autonomy within a federal political system, but it says it respects Iran's territorial integrity.^'' The Islamic Reconciliation Party -Hezb al-Wefagh-, also known as the Reconciliation Committee -Lejnat al-Wefagh-, was the known Arab group to have been tolerated by the Iranian government. Jasem Shadidzadeh Al-Tamimi was the party's secretary general. He was a member of the Sixth Majlis (2000- 04), representing Ahwaz as a member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front. This group seeking more autonomy and rights for Khuzestan Arabs according to Iran's constitution Al-Tamimi, wrote a letter to the then President Khatami. Indicates that he opposes separatism but he listed a number of grievances that he claimed are bothering Arab and must be solved. A part of his claims was as follow: The high level of drug abuse among Iranian Arabs, which he claims is rooted in poverty, racial discrimination and the official view of Arabs as a security threat and the government's failure to issue activity permits for the Islamic Wefagh Party and affiliated non-governmental organizations.^^ The Islamic Wefagh Party claims to have an "extensive" base of support in Khuzestan. The group was banned in November 2006, as official said, because of spreading racial hatred and provoking ethnic clashes. After explore of a short history of some Iranian Arabs separatists trends now, remain a question, that is, how much of the above mentioned Arab group 145 is correct? And can conclude that Arabs want to be separated from Iran? Are Iranian Arabs demonstrating disintegrative trend or in contrast they are opposed to those small separatist political groups and have intensive integrative trends toward Iran's national unity?

II.II.2.3.Arabs' integrative Trends towards National Unity

Answering to the above questions, must say, although, there are some Local grievances in the province and some political, cultural, social and economic problems in the province, Most Iranian Arabs don't follow the separatist groups and seek Iran integrity following the central government policy. In spite of the separatist groups claim. Separatism has no support among Arabs people in Iran. Separatism has always been instigated by foreign governments - particularly the British - to weaken Iran in order to control the country's natural resources and extend their influence over the Middle East. Arab grievances are very similar to those of other Iranian minorities, such as Baluchis, Kurds and Turkmen. According to Jane's Information Group, "Most Iranian Arabs seek their constitutionally guaranteed rights and do not have a separatist agenda ... While it may be true that some Arab activists are separatists, most see themselves as Iranians first and declare their commitment to the state's territorial integrity."^' Very important factors are counterbalancing the Arabic pull in Khuzestan. The most important these are the fact that a majority of the population in the province are Aryan. Aryans include, "Bakhtirates", "Lurs", "Dezfuly", "Shooshtari", "Behbahni" that all relate to Persians and other ethnicities. In addition more urban middle class are Persian speakers in the province. Second factor is Shiite religion that more relates them to Iran, as a country with majority of Shiite population. Shi'a Arabs have a severe faith to the Shiite Imams, so they can like other Shiite in Iran do their religious exercises and 146

duties. This is veiy important point that Khuzestan Arabs haven't any grievances toward their religion and in the Islamic republic are completely satisfied in this regard. The most important difference between Arabs and other Iranian ethnicities in Iran is their Arabic language. But by many reason we can say this is not an important factor that can separate them from other Iranian people. In the contemporary world bilingualism and multilingualism is natural matter in the most of the countries. Furthermore , the variety of Arabic spoken in the province is Khuzestani Arabic, which is a Mesopotamian dialect, and differs from Modem Standard and Classical Arabic, that is not understood by most other Arabic-speakers and has significant Persian influence .We must add that , Most Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan Province are bilingual, speaking Arabic as their mother tongue, and Persian as their official and country's language. However, since the establishment of Islamic Republic, The Arabic language has been held in high esteem by Islamic government in Iran. Regardless article 15 of the constitution that give Arabs ,like other ethnicities the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, it is allowed in addition to Persian ,that , Modem Standard Arabic and Classical Arabic, are taught across Iran to students in secondary schools, regardless of their ethnic or linguistic background. In fact the constitution of the Islamic republic requires this particular subject to be taught after primary school. Article 16 states:" Since the language of the Qur'an and Islamic texts and teachings is Arabic, and since Persian literature is thoroughly permeated by this language, it must be taught after elementary level, in all classes of secondary school and in all areas of study".^^ This important situation after Persian language just was given to Arabic, not to other ethnic and minority languages in Iran. Now not only Classic Arabic is taught in Schools in allover the country, but also in religious school and education center -Havzehaye-Elmieya- that 147 today have most important rule in political, cultural and educational grounds in Iran, is the main language. Classic Arabic also has a seat in most of Iranian universities. Arabic literature in addition to having a branch of study with the name of "Arabic literature" in most important Iranian universities like 'Tehran University", "Islamic Azad Universities", "Payame noor" and many other government's Universities". It is also the main subject in Islamic studies and law branches and important in study of Persian literature and Philosophy branches. Furthermore, Modem improvements make more changes in toward assimilation to mainstream. Modernization, redevelopment programs improvement in education, communication and Mass media, caused more assimilation to the rest population. Arab children and intellectuals read write and speak Persian language, while many of them can't do that in Arabic. Actually in the Islamic republic regarding language, religion and culture Arabs feel the most similarities and sameness with other Iranians. From the victory of revolution until now Arabs show their loyalty to Islamic Government through participating in all elections, cooperating in all fields. Regardless of their presence in administrative body of the public administrative branches of the government, some Arabs are members of the Islamic consultative Assembly - Majlis or parliament- and other political, economical, cultural educational, military positions in the Islamic republic government. Many of them are members in the Army, the "Islamic Revolution Guards Corps" or "The Mobilized Oppressed" -Basij-^^ and other military forces, that are responsible for guarding the independence and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the order of the Islamic Republic^^. When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 and occupied much of Khuzestan for nearly two years, and Saddam Hussein sought to play the ethnic card, however, an anticipated uprising of the Arab population did not occur, and most of the local Arabs fled the area along with the non-Arab population. The Arab 148 population of Khuzestan stood firmly behind the revolutionary government. Iranian Arabs rejected Saddam Hussien's call to "liberate Arabistan" from Persian rule and overwhelmingly opted to remain loyal to their country. Ultimately, Saddam's rhetoric backfired. Rather than divide Iran, he helped unify the country. Now both the urban and the rural Arabs of Khuzestan are intermingled with the Persians, Turks, and Lurs who also live in the province. The Khuzestan Arabs are Shiites. The Arabs in the area stretching from "Bushehr" to "Bandar-e Abbas" tend to be Sunnis and their religion is more important for them than Arabism, and as they are distinct themselves from non-Arabs Iranian Shiites they distinct, also, themselves from Shiite Arabs and this has helped to strengthen their differentiation from the Arabs of Khuzestan. We must mention that, even those foreigners who were encouraging and supporting Arab separatist ideas confessed that Khuzestan Arab hasn't separatist trends.According to Jane's Information Group, "Most Iranian Arabs seek their constitutionally guaranteed rights and do not have a separatist agenda ... While it may be true that some Arab activists are separatists, most see themselves as Iranians first and declare their commitment to the state's

77 territorial integrity." As discussed above, if language separates Azeris and Arabs, from the rest of Iranians, the religion pulls them to them, especially the other Shiites. Now, regarding three Sunni ethnicities, i.e. Kurds, Baloch and Turkmen, Can one, suppose that the political threat of ethnic separatism is focused along Sunni-Shi'a lines in Iran? In, following pages, this will be responded.

III. Non-Shiite Ethnicities with Some Ethnic Grievances and Unrests: Kurds, Balochis, and Turkmen

In this part three important Sunni ethnicity in Iran, who, comprising nearly 8 percent of Iranian population regarding integrative and disintegrative 149 trends will be discussed. The Kurds are, regarding their population and ethnicity and political issues, the most important non-Shiite ethnicity in Iran.

III.I. Kurds' Conflict, Disintegrative and Integrative Trends

Kurds relatively have a long history in the region and in late centuries, their ethnic demands have been an important issue regards politics, national security in Iran. III.I. 1.A Short History of Kurds' Disintegrative Trends until the Islamic Revolution in Iran (in 1979)

III.I.l.l.Kurds from Safavids until World War I

By dividing Kurds at first between Iranian- Safavid and Ottoman Empires, and after collapse of Ottoman Empires, between Iran, Iraq and Turkey, the Kurdish question became prominent political issue proviso two mentioned Empires and new three nation states. In contemporary history of Iran -from the beginning of Qajar dynasty Rule-, the witnessed some revolt, violence and unrest, that we can divide them in three periods. First, During Qajar rule until beginning of World War II, Second during the rule of Mohammad Reza Shah with establishment of " republic" in Kurdistan, and third, after Islamic Revolution until now. In the late centuries of Iran the Kurdish question became prominent at first in the wars between the Iranian -Safavid and Ottoman Empires. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Kurdistan was a battleground between the Turks and the of Iran. As a result Western Kurdistan became part of the while Eastern Kurdistan became part of Iran. Predominantly Sunni Muslim, the Kurds reside mainly in the northwest part of the country, Iranian Kurdistan and witnessed some conflict, unrest and 150 ethnic grievance in the region.During nineteenth and twentieth centuries, successive Iranian governments faced with two revohs in Kurdish region. One in 1880 against Qajars, led by "Shaikh Ubaidullah" a religious leader from the Ottoman province of Hakari; and the second from 1918 to 1922, when a tribal chieftain named "Ismail Agha Simko", of the Shakkak tribe aided and abetted by a grandson of Shaykh Ubaydallah, against Pahlavis. Simko took action in the area west of Lake and unified some tribes against central government in Iran in 1918 to 1922. Riza Khan, (later to become Riza Shah}, began to take effective action against Simko in 1922, and he was forced to flee in October 1922.^^ In 1926 Simko participated in another rebellion, aligning himself with two Kurdish chief, and finally in 1930 was killed in Ushnaviya in Iran.^^ By Reza Shah's policy towards tribes. Hundreds of Kurdish tribal leaders were deported and made to live in forced residence at Tehran or elsewhere. Deprived of their leaders, and suffering from the corruption government officials, a sense of grievance gradually developed amongst the . After Reza Shah a chain of revolts and violence took place in Iranian Kurdish region, the first led by "Mohammed Hama Rashid". With the occupation of Iran by the Soviets during the Second World War, the situation of the Kurds changed significantly. In the first place, the demobilization of the Iranian army weakened Tehran's control over this area and returned Kurdish tribesmen with their arms to the region. When British and Russian troops entered the country in September 1941, This was Mohammed Hama Rashid, chief of an obscure sub-tribe of the Begzadehs, who collected a body of followers and assumed control in the Sardasht-Baneh-Mariwan region. In the autumn of 1944 however he fell out with another Kurd, "Mahmood Agha" the Governor on behalf of the Mariwan that obtained Iranian support. He drove Hama Rashid across the border into Iraq. Occupation of some areas of Iran during World War II by Allies transformed Iran's politics and weakened the authority of the central 151 government over outlining provinces and tribal areas. With the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran on August 1941, and, the lack of authority of Mohammad Reza, Reza Shah's son and successor, the tribal sociopolitical order began to reassert itself More important was the manipulation of the Kurds by the Soviets who saw in the encouragement of Kurdish separatism a way to consolidate their power in northwestern Iran. Encouraged by Moscow, detribalized Kurds in Mahabad in 1942 took the initiative to organize the "Komala" , a local organization dedicated to promoting Kurdish separatism. The Komala movement in Mahabad drew strength from the advent of '"MuUa Mustafa Barzani", an Iraqi Kurdish leader, who reached there in flight from Iraq at the end of 1945 with several thousand tribal followers. Within this context the Kurdish regionalism reasserted itself and caused some antigovemment actions in Iranian Kurdish region, the most important of them, in the history of this region, was led by who established 'The " in Iranian Kurdistan in 1945.

III.I.1.2.Kurds from World War I, until the Victory of Islamic Revolution in Iran

The most serious twentieth-century Kurdish challenge to Iranian authority occurred in 1945, when the autonomous Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was established. The rise and fall of the Mahabad republic must be analyzed within the Soviet expansionist policies in Iranian Azerbaijan, where Soviets hoped sponsorship of a communist-oriented secessionist movement would pressure the Iranian government into granting them economic concessions, especially long-sought access to the Persian Gulf To advance their policies, the Soviets attempted to establish a united Kurdish-Azeri front. In September 1945, Qazi Mohammad^^, a Sunni religious leader who joined to the Kurdish communist party "Komala" as its spiritual leader (in October 152

1944),and other Kurdish leaders visited Tabriz to see a Soviet Consul on the backing of a new republic, and were then redirected to visit Baku and meet prime minister of Soviet Azerbaijan Ja'far Bagherov.^^ Bagherov promised the Kurds financial and military support of their objectives. However, he outlined the Soviet nationalities policy and how the Kurds desire for independence would fit into this policy/'* There, they learned that the Azerbaijan Democrat Party was planning to take control of Iranian Azerbaijan then according to Soviets recommends a new political party, by the name of the "Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)"^^ in September 1954 was established. urged all Kurds, including Komala members to join this new party as the umbrella group for achieving Kurdish independence. Qazi Muhammad decided to do the same, and on December 15, 1945, "the Kurdish People's Governmenf, was founded in Mahabad. On January 22, 1946, Qazi Muhammad announced the formation of the "Republic of Mahabad". The most important of their aims mentioned in the manifesto included Autonomy for the Iranian Kurds within the Iranian state, the use of Kurdish as the medium of education and administration ,the election of a provincial council for Kurdistan to supervise state and social matters. All state officials to be of local origin, and unity and fraternity with the Azerbaijani people.^^ With withdrawal of Soviet's troop from north of Iran, in June 1946 the central government reasserted its control over Iranian Azerbaijan. This move isolated the Republic of Mahabad, eventually leading to the destruction of the republic. By this point, Qazi Muhammed's support was dwindling, mainly from the Kurdish tribes who had supported him initially. Their crops and supplies were dwindling, and their way of life was becoming hard as a result of the isolation. The economic aid and military assistance from the Soviet Union was now gone, and the tribes saw no reason to support Qazi Muhammed. On December 15, Iranian forces entered and secured Mahabad and the young 153 republic came to end after eleven months. Qazi Muhammad was hanged publicly in Mahabad on counts of treason.^^ After some days of talks, the Iranian army moved against the Barzanis; who with his militia was supporting Mahabad Republic, but Mulla Mustafa and 500 followers escaped to the Armenia in the Soviet Union.There is a question that why the Mahabad republic came to end urgently after cut of Soviet supports? The main problem for Mahabad Republic was the growing power of the Tehran government. Also, because all the power of the Mahabad Republic was based on Soviets' supports, when the Soviets agreed to evacuate northern Iran in May 1946, the Azeri and Kurdish states in the north could not stand. The tribes and their leaders had only supported Qazi Muhammad for his economic and military aid from the Soviet Union. Once that was gone, many didn't see the purpose in staying with Qazi Muhammad. Mahabad who was economically bankmpt and it would have been nearly impossible for Mahabad to have been economically sound without harmony with Iran. Furthermore, already internal strains had undermined the loyalty of many of the tribes to the Kurdish cause. Traditional leaders were disturbed by the Communist orientation of some of the Komala agitators; a coalition of tribal chiefs, through the intennediation of the American Consulate in Tabriz, offered their submission to Tehran. However, with the downfall of the Mahabad Republic, the government disarmed the Kurds and stationed the well armed with the expansion of the road system and the spread of social services into the rural areas, the Kurds came increasingly into the tempo of modem existence. In this situation, the government's stringent security measures and efforts to break down the tribal organization effectively deprived the Iranian Kurds. In other sides, the organizational structure of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) disintegrated. Attempts to revive the KDPI inside Iran, through an alliance with the "left", were largely unsuccessful. Although the KDPI's ideology increasingly began to resemble that of the pro-Soviet 'Tudeh Party', and the 154

KDPI's official publication, "Kurdistan", reflected an "essentially socialist line", the Iranian left became disenchanted with the KDPI because of its insistence on treating Kurdistan and Kurdish problems as separate from the broader issues of interest to the Iranian left. Internal dissent also contributed to the weakening of the KDPI. In the early 1970s the KDPI began to rejuvenate itself under the leadership of its new secretary-general "Abdul Rahman Qassemlou."^^Qassemlou had been sympathetic to the 'Tudeh Party', had, indeed, spent time in prison for his alleged membership in the party. However, upon his release Qassemlou eventually went to Europe, where he organized an effective group among KDPI's intellectual and student supporters. During the KDPI's Third Congress in September 1973, the party officially adopted its most important motto-"Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for Kurdistan", and called for armed struggle to oppose the Shah's government. To this end, the KDPI also called for closer cooperation between its forces and such other anti- Shah guerrilla groups as Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas ("Fidii'iydn-i Khalq")^^ and the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI or "Mujiihidin-i Khalq").^Victory of Islamic revolution in Iran, and attempts of some Kurdish elites to take their control on the region, interference of super powers in the region caused a series of violence and conflicts in Iranian Kurdistan.

III.I.2.Kurdish Conflict and Unrest after the Islamic Revolution

The uprising against the Pahlavi monarchy and the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 once again brought the Kurdish issue to the fore. Many Kurds felt they were not receiving their just due within the Pahlavi state, and in 1978 they joined actively in the revolution. The Kurds, like most other Iranian nationalities, welcomed the demise of the monarchy and participated in the revolutionary process from the outset. During the chaotic autumn months of 155

1978, the Kurds took control of army garrisons and seized weaponry. Under the rejuvenated KDPI, the Kurds managed to gain control of the local administration in much of Iranian Kurdistan. The Kurdish forces included primarily the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) and the leftist Komala (Revolutionary Organization of Kurdish Toilers), in de facto, control of their own region, pressed their claims for greater autonomy under the new revolutionary government. The autonomy demands not only were expressed by the KDPI leading by Ghassemlou and Komala , also by a Sunni religious Kurdish clergy, "Shaikh Ezzeddin Husseini". As the new central government refused to recognize this autonomy, the KDPI's secular and "leftist" ideology soon clashed with the new Islamic revolutionary government. Then a vast division, also, occun-ed between the anti- and pro-Islamic Republic forces among the Kurds themselves. In the viewpoint of revolution leaders, the Kurds were viewed as an integral part of the "Islamic Umma;" or community; and hence were not to be treated differently from other Muslim groups in the country.In a speech. Imam Khomeini called the concept of ethnicity and nationalism trends contrary to Islamic doctrines, that who do not wish Muslim countries to be united creating these issues among minorities. ' Opposing to the Islamic leaders viewpoints the KDPI and other secular Kurdish groups in the region boycotted the referendum for establishment of Islamic Republic in Iran. Opposed to secular Kurdish leftist, in 1997, Sunni Kurds like many other Iranians took part in referendum, and after that, they also took part in all elections in the Islamic Republic. By vast participation of the people including Sunni Kurds in the referendum, the secular groups lost their battle, because 98.2% of the voters approved to replace the monarchy with an Islamic government. After that various stages of negotiation between the Iranian government and the KDPI representatives, took place, to solve the crises but some events lead to the collapse of these negotiations and beginning 156 a real war in Kurdistan. After several month of the victory of the Islamic revolution the major Kurdish cities like Mahabad , Paveh, and other Kurdish cities became battlegrounds between the KDPI, aided by the guerrilla forces of the Iranian Fadaiyan and Mujahidine-Khalq, and government forces under the leadership of Defense Minister "Chamran". In objection to the KDPI and other Kurdish leaders claims, Dr. "Mostafa Chamran", the first defence minister of the Islamic Republic, stated that "if the KDPI and other Kurds really believed in the Islamic Revolution, we would give them not just autonomy in Kurdistan but also the control of all of Iran so that they could show us how to give autonomy and freedom to every group in the country. However, if they simply use fancy and misleading slogans to hide their intention to harm Islam and the Revolution and to serve the interests of the foreign powers whose interests are diametrically opposed to those of the Iranian people, including the Kurds, We will fight them to the end." Chamran further chastised the KDPI by saying: "If you are truly fighting for the liberation of the Kurdish people, then why you do need threaten them constantly? Why do you have to terrorize or hang those Kurds who sympathize and cooperate with the Islamic government? Let the Kurdish masses freely choose which side they want to support- the Islamic Republic or a foreign- supported political party." However it was concluded that Kurdish autonomy demands were a Marxist-inspired conspiracy against the Islamic Republic of Iran. By the end of the summer of 1979; the KDPI was banned as a political party and both Ghassemlou and Shaikh Husseini were declared to be corrupters of the earth -Mofsid -efil arz. By Iraq invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, faced with the prospect of total war against an invading enemy, the loyalty of all Iranians was expected in defence of the motherland. The KDPI made the cardinal error of seeking military and logistical support from the invading forces of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Throughout the 1980s, Ghassemlou refused to modify KDPI's demands for Kurdish autonomy, which led to a deadlock 157 with the Islamic Republic. Despite the strong stand, Ghssemlou's negotiating with the Islamic Republic divided the KDPI into hostile sub-factions and may have led to his assassination. On 13 July 1989, Dr. , Secretary-general of PDKI, and two of his collaborators, were assassinated in Vienna (Austria) as they were negotiating in a meeting with representatives of Iranian government in Vienna envoys at the latter's invitation, for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue in Iran. The KDPI was dealt a major blow when Dr. Ghassemlou was assassinated. Ghassemlou's successor, Sadeq Sharafkandi met with the same fate on 17 September 1992 in Berlin where he had attended the Congress of the Socialist International. As "Lise Storm" says: "with the assassination of Qassemlou and other Kurdish KDPI's leaders the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement in Iran was effectively stifled, something it has not recovered from even today."^'* The misfortunes of the KDPI, both before and after Ghassemlou,s assassination, allowed the Komala to emerge as the most important Marxist-Leninist movement in Kurdistan to continue its opposition with Iran government demanding autonomy. Although in the early years after revolution the anti-revolutionary groups lost their power in Kurdistan, and especially from 1982 until now, the central government has control over the area which the Kurds inhabits, but still, there have been some small clashes between Anti-revolutionary Kurds and Iranian security forces. Experts say Israel has increased its ties with Iranian Kurds and boosted intelligence- gathering operations in northwest Iran in order to exploit ethnic fissures between the Kurds and the majority Shiite Persians.^^ Now, in addition to, Komala and Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) another Kurdish militant separatist group with the name of "Party of Free Life of Kurdistan" -Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane or PJAK- have some militant activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran. This Kurdish nationalist group based in northern Iraq in the "Qandiel mountains", that has 158

been carrying out attacks in tlie of Iran and other Kurdish- inhabited areas. It is believed that PJAK is a branch of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) of Turkey Kurdistan. PJAK and PKK appear to a large extent to be one and the same, and share the same goals. They share leadership, logistics and allegiance to "Abdullah Ojalan", the P.K.K. leader imprisoned in Turkey. There is another Kurdish Group that in contrast with anti-revolutionary and separatist groups is pro-Iranian Islamic Revolution, with the name of "Kurdish United Front -Jebhaye-Mottahede Kurd. The Kurdish United Front is a political and social movement in Iran that was established in January 2006 to unite all Iranian Kurds to achieve their rights within the Iranian Constitution.^^

III.I.3.Integrative Trends of Iranian Kurds toward National Unity

The Kurds with some distinctive character sometimes, presented a major problem for Iranian nationalism. If Kurdish history language and culture serve to draw the Kurds toward Iran, religion pushes them away. Iranian nationalism gains great inner strength from having a vast majority of the people members of a single sect, but for those outside of the Shiite orbit identification with this nationalism is more difficult. According to "Curzon", the religious antagonism between Shiite and Sunni was instrumental in Shiekh Obeydolla's preference for Turkish rather than Iranian suzerainty over a united Kurdish people. Now remain two important questions. First, whether the Kurds a "big independence Kurdish state" including the Kurds in for country i.e. Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, will be formed? Therefore will it be a threat to Iranian Kurdistan and a disintegrative element to Iran's national unity? Second, whether the Iranian Kurds want separate country and can not assimilated to Iranian state or their integrative trends to national unity is so much that finally they will protect the national unity and Iran remains a successfully case of unity in diversity? Some say whether language or religion is chosen as the 159 major basis for state unity, the Kurds find themselves in a marginal position. It is feared that with their fellow Kurds in adjacent regions of Iraq and Turkey, has sought either regional autonomy or the outright establishment of an independent Kurdish state. In addition, with new condition in Iraq and the creation of a semiautonomous state in northern Iraq, whether might motivate the Kurdish minorities in Iran and Turkey to press for greater-independence? In the following paragraphs will the questions. Answering to the first question must say, that, differences in language, religion, political culture, rivalry between their individual chiefs and their tribal leaders and severe attempts adopted by the states for keeping their national integrity is among the reasons that indicates that establishment of an big Kurdistan in the region is impossible. The chief obstacle to Kurdish national independence lies in the inability of the Kurds to unite among them. They consist and have always consisted of tribal group wing allegiance to their individual chiefs, ready to unite against a common enemy but jealous of any interference in their own affairs by chiefs of another tribe. George Harris in this regard says: although the Kurds are easily distinguishable from the rest of the world, they are by no means united.^^Kurds are set apart from their neighbors chiefly by language. Kurdish belongs to the Indo-European family and is a close relative of Iranian. Yet Kurdish is not at all a unified tongue. It is divided into at least three major dialects. Kurdi, subdivided into Gurani and Sulaymani, is spoken by many Iraqi Kurds and is the most common written language. But Kirmanji, itself broken into Mil and Zil subdialects, is used by nearly two-thirds of the Kurdish speakers. Zaza, the third major sub- division, is confined to a group of Kurds in central Turkey; it is not readily intelligible to natives of either of the other two dialects. Thus, though language is the surest touchstone of Kurdishness, dialectical differences no militate against a common sense of ethnic identity. Religious behavior also divides the Kurds. To be sure, the overwhelming majority is Sunnis of the 160

Shafii rite, a version of Islam not widely practiced by others in this region. However, on the level of tribal religious practices and adherence to mystical orders, major divisive tendencies come into play. Kurds seem particularly drawn to various dervish brotherhoods (especially the Nakshbandis and the Kadiris) and to unorthodox Islamic sects^ (such as the Nurcular in Turkey and the Ali Ilahis in Iran and Iraq)^^Even more significant, many tribal leaders-for example, the Barzanis in Iraq and the Kufrevis in Turkey- also combine hereditary religious leadership with their temporal authority. This combination serves to intensify tribal distinctions among Kurds. Tribal structure is no doubt an important impediment to a national movement. In such societies, the unit of loyalty rarely ranges beyond the tribe; the individual is born into a series of family relationships from which he cannot disentangle hiraselT as long as he remains within the system- And this traditional organization formed from aggregations of clans suffers from built-in rivalries and conflicts with neighbors. Disputes over grazing rights and marriage partners typically set adjoining tribes against each other. These feuds are so deep and hallowed with time that it takes extraordinary circumstances to bind tribes of a region' together even against outsiders. Tribal organization, however, is gradually breaking down, as the semi-nomadic, transhumant, and pastoral life become less prevalent among the Kurds. In towns and cities of the Kurdish region as well as the major urban centers in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, there are gi'owing numbers of detribalized Kurds. The latter are generally better educated than their rural brothers and are far more likely to identify with an overarching ethnic cause. A number among them have embraced reformist or radical social doctrines, which at least in theory reject the traditional tribal system as archaic and backward. Yet it has been within the tribal structure that all major twentieth-century Kurdish leaders have operated. The most successful(Sheikh Saaeid, in Turkey, Mulla Mustafa Barzani in Iraq, and Qazi Mohammad in Iran) have managed to go beyond 161 their immediate tribal frame to attract confederations of tribes. The bandwagon effect of charismatic personality and the fame of success against a commonly despised central government have combined to bring allies to the cause. But at best, these have been a loose congeries of disparate elements ready to defect in the face of outside strength and always calculating their own factional advantage. These movements have broken down into their basic tribal units with great rapidity once the paramount leader surrendered or was forced off the scene.'"^ Regarding to disintegrative demands of some left Kurdish groups in Iran, as the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran Kumala and Party of Free Life of Kurdistan and fear of growing a separatist movement, like Mahabad Republic, in 1946, and forming an independence Kurdish state in Iranian Kurdistan, the reason of impossibility of this idea is much more than what we discussed before, to refuse the idea of forming big Kurdistan government. As Cottam says, Iranian insists that all Kurds, not only those in Iran, are really Iranian.'°' Regarding between Iranian Kurds as Cottam argues , for the tribesmen, whose particular tribe is his world, Kurdish nationalism is only less inconceivable than Iranian nationalism...the settled Kurdish peasant will find nationalism no more comprehensible than will the tribesmen. The only Kurds who have the attributes necessary for nationalism are the educated urban dwellers, and this constitutes only a tiny percentage of the total .'"^ The Kurds are a branch of the Iranian race and are therefore part of Iran; The Kurds, also, see themselves as the descendants of the ancient Medes who served as the military vanguard for the great Achaemenid and Sassanian dynasties.'°^ In the history itself... the Kurds have not since ancient times formed a stable state of their own, and have been in close alliance with Iran in much of their history. Furthermore there is a religious diversity in Iranian Kurdistan, Which makes a certain amount of tolerance necessary and prevents the Kurds from establishing a solid anti-Iranian front on religious 162 ground. As we mentioned, before, a vast minority of Kurds are Shiite and another minority is Christian, and we know many Kurds that were pro-Iranian nationalism. Many of intellectual Kurds living in Iran have chosen Iranian over Kurdish nationalism, and the attraction of Iranian history and culture remains strong."^"* When the Mossadeqist National Front was in power, several of its most prominent leaders, were Kurds. For example a respected Kurdish intellectual "Karim Sanjabi" became a prominent member of the National Front and a member of Mossadegh's cabinet. This indicates the possibility of attracting the Kurdish intellectuals into an advocacy of Iranian rather than Kurdish nationalism.'°^In the Islamic Republic, also President "Rafsanjan' after him "Khatami" and '"Ahmadinejad" appointed Kurdish ministers and officials in their governments. President, Khatami, in his first term, Khatami appointed AbdoUah Ramezanzadeh to be the first Kurdish governor of the Iranian province of Kurdistan. He also appointed several Sunni and Shi'a Kurds as his own or cabinet member's advisors. In his second term, Khatami had two Kurdish cabinet members; although both of them were Shia. From Kurdish side during last decades, the demands of majority of Kurds were mainly related to the Kurdish language and top-level officials. The increased presence of Kurdish representatives in the sixth parliament led to expectations that some of the voters' demands would be met. After the first round, in which 18 Kurds were elected, one candidate said that he expected there would be more Kurdish instruction at the university in Sanandaj, and he called on the Khatami government to have more Kurdish officials. Subsequently, a 40-member parliamentary faction representing the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Kurdistan, and was formed.'°^ Now by high education of Kurdish youths in the country's universities, the already strong attraction of Iran for Kurds will be strengthened. Now Kurdish as a distinct language, or a dialect of Persian; like 163 all the languages of the Iranian languages is permitted to be used, and wireless programmers broadcast in Kurdish language; but administrative efficiency requires that there shall be only one official language. In many respects the Kurds no doubt feel themselves to be closer to Iran than to Turkey or to the Arab countries.

III.II. Balochs' Unrest, Insurgency and Integrative Trends

Balochs, as the second Sunni Muslim ethnicity in Iran, not in the scope of Kurds, also witnessed some unrest.

III.II. 1. The Roots of Balochs Insurgency The Baluchs unrest in Iran, have, mostly, roots in three elements: First, Balochi nationalism in Pakistan, Second, religious affairs, and Third, poverty in the region. Baluchs, originally and historically, an Iranian ethnicity now are divided between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Their language is a dialect of Persian language that mingled with other languages. Their Sunni religion differentiates them from the majority Shiites in Iran, which besides other elements, like poverty, caused some anti-central government insurgency and unrests. The insurgency, unrest and ethnonationalist trends in Iranian Baluchistan, completely was affected by the same thoughts and activities in Pakistani Balochistan. It should be pointed out from the outset, that it has been the Pakistani Baluch who have taken the lead in the Baluchi nationalism.Most of the Bloch revolt and major insurgency were in Pakistan Balochistan. In Iran, the small Baluch nationalists look toward the Pakistani Baluch national movement which at times has been united with the national movement of the Pakistani Pathans -Pushtuns.'°^ The Pakistani Baluch, however, with their larger numbers, their much larger middle class and their leftist-oriented tribal 164

leaders have presented themselves as a formidable force. After independence of Pakistan (1948), until now, Pakistan Balochistan Witnessed, at least, five conflicts with central government.'°^ First conflict in 1948 lead by Mir "Ahmad Yar Khan""^^ Second conflict was led by "Nawab Nowroz Khan" in 1958-59,'"'Third conflict was lead by "Sher Mohammad Bijarani Mam" in 1963-69,and Fifth conflict leads by "Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti" and "Mir Balach Marri" in 2004-to date. The "Balochistan Liberation Front" (BLF)'" a separatist group that was founded by "Jumma Khan Marri" for insurgency and revolt in both Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan,"^later found its branch in Iranian Baluchistan. During last century, Many Iranian Baluch freely travel to Pakistani and Afghan Baluch inhabited areas and it is said that some actually carry passports belonging to these countries, "^ Religion is another bone of contention, in a country. Iranian Baluchis, comprising 2% of the Iran's population, predominantly Sunni, reside in the Iranian section of an area known as Baluchistan, in Sistan and Baluchistan province. They profess Sunni Islam, in contrast to Iran's Shia majority. Differences between Sunni and Shiite sometime flames the political problems for central governments in Iran. Iranian officials are well aware of the dangers posed by sectarianism and have sought to solve disputes and divisions between Sunni and Shia. Poverty is another longstanding problem in this arid province. Sistan and Baluchestan is Iran's largest province by area, but is home to just 3 per cent of its population. In this province the social system is based around the distinctive customary structures of the Baluch - a traditionally nomadic community who also live in adjoining parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Yet unlike other ethnicities in Iran who are almost settled, a considerable number of the Baluch still lead a pastoral, nomadic or semi- nomadic existence.The province where Baluchis reside remains the least developed part of Iran with relatively high unemployment rates, that, plus the porous border between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan and perhaps the close 165 cross-border cultural or tribal affinities of the Baluchis has encouraged widespread smuggling of various goods, including drugs. Iran's State Welfare Organization estimates that drug addiction here is the highest in the country. Though, some Baluch men get involved in smuggling, either as small­ time traders running Iranian-produced fuel over the border and bringing in contraband goods, or becoming part of bigger international organized crime rings. This brings them into conflict with Iranian police and border forces patrolling an extended and porous frontier. Many observers believe widespread poverty and unemployment are significant sources of discontent in Sistan and Baluchestan. Mix of poverty, and somewhat discontent creates a relatively dangerous element and emergence opposition groups leading by foreign countries.

III.IL2.Iranian Baluchis from Unrest to Integrative Trends

Iranian Baluchistan, in its histoiy, although not at the level of Pakistan Baluchestan, had witnessed some conflict and insurgency.At the start of 20th century, "Bahram Khan Baloch" supported by British Empire revolt to control Iranian Baluchestan. In 1916 "Mir Dost Muhammad Khan Baluch", succeeds his uncle Bahram Khan and from 1920-28 through a series of insurgency tried to separate Iranian Baluchestan. When Reza Shah came in power, in 1928, Mir Dost Muhammad Khan was captured by Iran's Army, and was killed in Tehran, thus his supporters scattered."'' When Jumma Khan Marri, who was struggling against Pakistan government, formed the Baluchistan Liberation Front in 1963, it was succeeded when two Iranian Baloch tribal leaders, "Mir Abdi khan Sardarzaei" the head of Sardarzaei tribe and "Mir Mawla Daad Shah" and some other Iranian Baluch tribal leaders supported the organization and took its membership and found a branch of it in Iran."^In fact during the twentieth century some other external factors have acted as elements of change 166 in Iranian Baluchistan. Co-ethnics in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and previous Soviet Union Arab countries, were three External factors in changes and unrest in Iranian Baluchistan. The Soviets interference in Baluchistan, was through Marxist-Leninist ideology and by inflaming ethno-nationalism tendencies between Baluchis. The Soviets did indeed consider Baluchistan as a way station to the warm waters of the Persian Golf and Indian Ocean. The Iranian Baluchi, also, were supported in 1950s to 1980s by Baathist regimes of Iraq and Syria and Egyptian leader "Gamal Abdel Nasser". In 1950s Iraq supported 'Daad Shah'. In 1960s Baluchi revolt against Iran, Iraq fully support Baluchis but because of Baluchi tribal leaders made a deal with Shah of Iran, the Iraqi support for Baluchi reduced but Iraq kept its ties with Iranian Baluchi and Central Baluchi. In 1973 Iraq supported Baluchistan Liberation Front in Central Baluchistan insurgence. In 1975, where Algeria settled dispute between Iraq and Iran and Iraq stopped support to Baluchis but Iraq ties with Baloch people did not finish completely. On the other hand since 1970s many Iranian Baluch , have found their way into the Persian Gulf city-states in search of employment. They usually come back to Baluchistan with money, some luxury items to sell and new ideas. The Gulf connection, however, has been more influential for Baluch of Pakistani origins that have been active in Oman and advocating support for Baluch national movement in Pakistan."^ With the ending Iraq's support during these years and killing some Baluch separatist leaders like "Daad Shah", caused that Mir Abdi Khan and some other anti- central government were persuaded by the Shah to return to Iran and gave them privileges to stop their political campaign against Iran. Compound with Shah and cutting the Iraq and foreign supports brought the Anti-government of the Balochi "Sardars" and "Khans", relatively to the End. Although Iraq secretly supported the separatists until the end of 1980s, after the Iran-Iraq War ended, and then openly gave Balochi groups a large amount of financial and military aid. In 1979, Iranian Revolution with it started Iraq- 167

Iran war, which ended from 1980 to 1988, Baghdad Officials again created some problems in Baluchistan for Iran by supporting Iranian Baluchi separatists group. During the war, intelligence established an office in Dubai and ran by Baluchis, from there to send spies into Iran. By victory of the 1979 Revolution the Iranian Baluch waves of ethnic unrest and some cases violence reemerged. Although at first The Sardars and those political leaders, who had supported the Shah's regime, were apprehensive and mostly fled for their lives, but, some of them started to reorganize their previous political and insurgency groups. In 1980 ''Baloch united fronf was formed by "Amanollah Khan" and some other Iranian tribal Baloch leaders."^ Then "Balochistan Liberation Front" and after that "Peoples' Front for Baloch freedom" (1990) was founded in Balochistan, all against the Islamic republic of Iran. On other side the religious Sunni leaders mostly came to the revolution side and supported revolution.. In contrast to opposition Balochis and supporting the revolution and Iranian integrity, a group of "Mavlavi" leaders -Sunni clergies-leading by "Mavlavi Abdolaziez" in 1980 formed "Muslims unity party", but latter the party was weakened some other Sunni Mavlavies."^ During the last three decades of the Islamic republic in Iran some of this Baloch opposition groups have relation with their co-ethnics in Pakistan and in some cases have violence activities against revolution in the Baluchistan. For instance In March 2006, a group called "Jundullah" had some antigovemment activities. The group continued to some other insurgency latter, in Iranian Baluchestan. Jundullah is an armed insurgent group that has claimed responsibility for armed attacks on Iranian security forces in the last couple of years. The group combines Sunni extremism, al-Qaeda tactics, ethnic prejudices and ambitious political slogans. It recently renamed itself the "Peoples Resistance Movement of Iran", perhaps to avoid being identified too closely with the Pakistan-based Jundullah, an Islamist group with which it is reportedly linked. Yet he has 168 claimed responsibility for attacks such as a string of violent acts in the town of "Tasuki" which left 23 people dead in March 2006. The group said it carried out a bombing which murdered 11 Revolutionary Guards on a bus in the provincial capital "Zahedan" in February 2007. Jundullah has copied the tactics used by al-Qaeda in Iraq, such as the brutal murder of captives. Iranian officials say, there is no doubt that the group has links abroad. It is believed that Pakistan and the United States of covertly backing Jundullah, a view shared by some western media outlets which believe Washington is seeking to destabilize Iran in retaliation for Tehran's influences in Iraq. Now remain our important question that is are Baluchis seeking separatist or their ties with Iranian history, culture and government are so strong that, separatism is condemned by majority of Baluch people? Some such as S. Eliz claim that the Kurds and the Balochis demonstrate the highest potential for separatism. Eliz state that "...the fact that they are Sunni border ethnic groups is important, but other significant factors are also present"."'^ She added that their past history of political movements points to an unceasing quest for some type of independent statehood.'^°The research, don't approve such claims ,in contrast, the research shows, in spite of, some unrest among Iranian Balochis, in the last century, the vast majority of Balochis have high integrative trends toward national unity. Today some effective elements of motivation of Baloch ethnonationalism in Iran disappeared. At present with the demise of Iraq and the Soviet Union and a more moderate foreign policy in Iran, the Baluch of Iran cannot depend on the Arab support for their national cause. The Soviet Union was once considered a potential threat to the political stability of the region, Now that such threat is eliminated and the hopes of radical Baluch nationalists for Soviet assistance can not be realized. At the same time that the Gulf War made the United States the uncontested superpower with a visible presence in the area. It is thus questionable that the United States would support a Baluch nationalist uprising against Iran? There is no indication that. 169 in this situation, the United States can do it. Although the relation with co- ethnics in Pakistan and Afghanistan continued, but the Baluchis are separated small ethnic groups, that unity between them is very difficult. "Beatrice Nicolini" says, the ethnic diversity is such that one can find Baluch and "Brohi" Arabs, Jats and Kurds, and also blacks... Furthermore the strong ties with Iran's history, culture, language, geography and state caused Baloch be on the side of Iran than other countries or join a supposed independence Balochistan that is demand of Pakistani Balouchis nationalist groups. As Eliz herself says, Baloch mother tongue is Persian.'^^Although, they speak Balochi language but Baluchi is a dialect of Persian. They are Aryan people with common History with other Iranians, and they have more Persian culture than other cultures. They were lived in Iranian temtory and, from ancient times until now,under Iranian states. Iranian officials are well aware of the dangers posed by sectarianism and have sought to unite between Sunni and Shi'a. In recent years, the country's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, has repeatedly stressed the "brotherhood of Shi'a and Sunni" and argued that western intelligence services are seeking to exploit and widen the divide.

III.III. Turkmen and Their Loyalty to National Unity

Turkmen traditionally are an isolated ethnic group residing in northern parts of Iran. Regarding to race, religion, and language, and in comparison with all Iranian Muslims ethnicities, Turkmen in Iran, are a distinctive ethnicity. They are "Hanafi" Sunni Muslims that differ from the majority Shiites, non- Muslims, and even other Iranian Sunnis that are mostly from other branches of Sunni Islam. Their language differs from Persian and even from Turkish dialect of Azeris and Qashqais. Although they are Turks, but differ in their origin with other Iranian Turks. Their costumes, habits, somewhat is distinctive, compared with other ethnicities. Horse-holding, Inter-marriage is a 170 part of their ethnic markers. They have traditionally led a nomadic lifestyle; however, due to new improvements, many have settled and now engage in agriculture. Vast majority of Turkmen in Iran, mostly, inhabit the region along the northern border of Iran across from what is now the state of Turkmenistan. Traditionally Turkmen as Sunni people had a difference of opinions, with Shiite ruler and dynasties. After declaring Shi'a religion as the formal religion of Iran, the Turkmen were not satisfied. It is related that at the first time, they show their dissatisfactions to Safavids, and this somewhat inclined them toward central Asian "Khanaf'-rulers.'^''Russian Empire, due to the Turkmen dissatisfaction, continued interference in the Turkmen region in Iran and adjacent arias. Turkmen's discontentment also was shown in the Afsharids rules (1736-1796), meanwhile like Safavids, had Turkmen origin themselves. It is probable that "Nader Shahe Afshar" (1736-47), the founder of the , who like his Turkmen kin was a Sunni himself, influenced by them and other Sunnis that in his reign abolished Shi'a as the formal religion of the country. Nader's proposal for religious reforms and his attempt to change the state religion was due to anti-Shiite sentiments that were shown by Sunnis. He wanted Iran to adopt a form of religion that would be more acceptable to Sunnis. He banned certain Shi'a practices which were particularly offensive to Sunnis, such as the cursing of the first three caliphs.'^"^ Although Nader was believed, the Shiite religion had intensified the conflict with the Ottoman Empire which was Sunni. His own army was also a mixture of Sunni and Shi'a Muslims. Nader's other primary aim in his religious reforms was to weaken the Safavids further since Shi'a Islam had always been a major element in support for the dynasty. However, after Nader, in the reign of other dynasties, Turkmen dissatisfactions occasionally were expressed.Turkmen, somewhat, shown their discontentment after Afsharids, in some periods and some events in Zand(1750-1794) ,Qajar (1781 -1925), and Pahlavi (1925-1979) rules. Compared with two other Sunni ethnicities i.e. Kurds and Baluch, Turkmen 171 have fewer clashes with central government in Iran. Meanwhile, some limited unrest and clash happened in the Turkmen region. For instance, in 1925, Reza Shah, Iran's leader, ordered a pacification campaign against the Turkmen. This caused many Turkmen to flee to the Soviet Union but most returned in the 1930s due to the Soviet policies of collectivization and religious prejudices. Some tribes rebelled during the Soviet occupation of Iran that occurred during and shortly after World War II, but these rebellions ended shortly after the Soviets left in 1945. After victory of Iran revolution of 1979, also, Turkmen witness some unrest. By victory of the Iranian revolution in 1979and establishment of Islamic republic that was led by Shi'a "Ulama" -clergies-, a series of unrest happened in "Turkemansahra" and some other Turkmen cities, in the form of ethnic unrests. The unrests actually were a form of anti-Islamic republic led more by non-Turkmen groups, but using from some Turkmen themselves. The unrests led by pro-Marxist-Leninist, "People's Mujahedin of Iran", and, other anti- Islamic government groups, that after a short time declined. Unlike Kurds and Baloches, the Turkmen in Iran do not possess any cohesive opposition organizations, demanding separatism or autonomy. Although the name of "Turkmensahra Liberation Organization" or "Turkmen Liberation Organization" is seen, in some websites, but no effective activities from any Turkmen political group is seen in the Iranian Turkmen society. It seems that Turkmen are continuing to their traditional isolation, and culturally somewhat assimilation into the mainstream. Modernization changed the mode of life of many Turkmen and their language and mode of clothing is somewhat changing. Even some researches that claims there exist some separatist demands among Iranian Ethnic groups, believe that there is no separatist trends among Iranian Turkmen. S. Eliz in her work, "Religious minorities in Iran", states: "...Other cross border group, such as Turkmen -Turkmen Republic- and Azeris -Azerbaijan Republic-, are not particularly separatists". 172

The younger generation of ethnic Turkmen is increasingly adopting Persian ways, even discarding their own language in favour of Persian. All the signposts and shop names were now in Persian rather than Turkmen, and young women were dressed in the black robes and headscarves of Iran rather than their colourful traditional costume. Muhammad Tahir a Turkmen journalist and broadcaster based in Prague says: "The language - closer to Turkish than Persian - was going, said Gorbanzadeh, who is Turkmen himself. Young people chatting in the street mixed in so many Persian words that their speech was barely recognizable as Turkmen at all. Gorbanzadeh recalled, "I went to visit my uncle and was about to knock on the door when a young boy run toward me.... He shouted, 'Dad - a man from Turkmenistan wants to talk to you'. He used pure Persian to address his father and it was a clear example of how they think only people from Turkmenistan can talk in the Turkmen language. Meanwhile distinctiveness still remains in many aspects. Arranged marriages are still very common and families often inter-marry, Rural Men usually, like most of other Iranian Rural people and their Women are wearing traditionally clothes. In spite of this remains distinctiveness, Turkmen are not seeking separatism or autonomy. Regarding ethnic grievances or conflict Turkmen in their history in contrast to Azeris, Arabs, Kurds and Baluchis, witnessed less conflict with Iranian central governments, in their region and no serious separatist movement can be mentioned among them, and now their grievances are limited to some ordinary demands, like having more representatives in Iran's Assembly -Majliss- or more shire in political power more religious freedom, and social justice. For instance, during parliamentary election, ethnic issues are resurfacing among the predominantly Sunni Turkmen. The most of their anxiety and worries is that because of their population is separated in three provinces, i.e. "Mazandaran" "Golestan", and "North Khorasan", living with the other ethnicities, they can't became victorious in elections and send more 173 candidates as parliamentary respective to the Iran' assembly, and this promotes their dissatisfactions. In spite of this the Turkmen love to have relation with their co-ethnic in Turkmenistan, but they don't prefer to be separated from Iran or annexed to Turkmenistan as interview with many of Turkmen, including, Many Turkmen students in India, show. Although, according researcher interviews with them the research find out that they are satisfied and even sometimes proud, that an independence Turkmen country is near their borders. Iran-Turkmenistan relation may affect on the Turkmen grievances in Iran. As an ethnonationalist group, the future condition of Turkmen in Iran will be closely tied to ongoing foreign relations between Iran and Turkmenistan, which for the time being appear relatively stable, regardless of the ideological support that Turkmenistan gives to them. However, the Turkmenistan government has not promoted strong cultural ties with its ethnic kin in Iran, or, promoted secessionist ambitions among them. Instead, Turkmenistan government has consistently sought to build a good working relationship, especially on economic matters, with the Iranian central government. Meanwhile Turkmenistan became a center for gathering of the Turkmen of the entire world. In these gatherings, although Turkmen authorities until now tried not to excite the sensitiveness of Iranian government, but, some non­ governmental association in Turkmenistan tried to extend their relations with their Iranian Turkmen. For instance, in a conference of the World Turkmen Humanitarian Association in Ashgabat, those participants were Representatives from Turkmen communities in 14 countries, Two Iranian representatives were there, too, including Sunni cleric Abdol Rezaq. Speaking at the conference, Turkmenistan's President Sapar Murat Niyazov said that Iranian Turkmen should increase their identification with co-ethnics from other countries. However Due to their kin and their sect of Islam, the Turkmen in both, Iran and Turkmenistan likely to continue to extend their relation in different grounds, including cultural ties, but this not mean bom secessionism in Iranian 174

Turkmen at present time. In short, Turkmen in Iran are a distinct etlinicity, with good relation with their co-ethnic in Turkmenistan; meanwhile they are changing some of ethnic markers toward assimilation in mainstream, but some of their criteria and ethnic markers, like religion remain unchangeable, and their relation with their-GO-€thnic in Turkmenistan, will continue and became stronger than before. In spite of t-hese they haven't separatist trends, and they will be loyal to national unity in future. In sum Iranian Sunni ethnicities demonstrated integrative trend toward national unity and through participating in Administrative affairs and elections, and harmony in other affair show-their loyalty toward integrity of the country. They, also share in.power through Participating in City councils, employment -in Administrative affairs, and-Parliamentary representatives and other spheres. Sunni Muslims, now, _take part in the ordinaiy election process at all constitutional levels.-There are dozens of Sunni members of parliament, mostly from areas with strong Sunni ethnic minorities like Kurdistan andBaluchistan and Turkmen areas.

IV. Non-Muslims Integrative and Disintegrative Trends-A Brief Analysis

Non-Muslims in Iran, include Zoroastrians Christians, Jews, Mandaeans (Sabians) and Bah'ai's. These ethnicities in Iran are common in three characteristics: First of that is very small population of each of them in compare with most of other Iranian ethnicities and in compare with the whole of Iranian population, second is their lack of having a specific geographical location in Iran, and third is their Iranian origin. These characteristics push them to solidarity with other Iranian ethnicities and national unity than to separatist demands. The largest of the non-Muslims ethnicity in Iran is Armanian ethnicity, which only comprises a small portion - less than one third 175 of one percent -of whole Iranian population, who also are separated from each other in small communities in some big cities. Other ethnicities also are small in population and separated, regarding geographical location. The Non- Muslims in Iran also are native ethnicities and mostly have Iranian origins. Zoroastrians are ancient Persian people and their prophet Zoroaster was an Iranian national. Jews historically associated with the Persian Empire of Iran, and are living in Iran from 3000 years or from the establishment of the first Iranian Empire, Achaemenian dynasty. Library of Congress's country study on Iran states that: "Over the centuries the Jews of Iran became physically, culturally, and linguistically indistinguishable from the non-Jewish population. The overwhelming majority of Jews speak Persian".'^''Christians, like Jews, are living in Iran, from ancient time, nearly 2700 years or at least from Parthian -Ashkanian-, until now. Baha'is, are Iranian native and Persian that, recently changed their religion. Other smaller groups also trace back to ancient and . The above mentioned characteristics continually inclined Non-Muslims ethnicity in Iran towards integrative trends regarding national unity. Among all those ethnicities, only Armenians, have a specific co-ethnic outside Iran with special borders and in form of an independence country, which is Republic of Armenia. In spite of this, Armenians in Iran haven't shown any anti-nafional activities against Iran and in benefits of Armenia. In modern history of Iran, like, ancient times, the relations between Aimenian communities and other people and governments in Iran, continuously, were in good conditions. Iranian Armenians participated in Iranian national movements such as the constitutional revolution of Iran (1906-1911). The modernization efforts of the Pahlavi dynasty were beneficial for the Armenian community in Iran and soon Tehran became a major center for Armenian life. After Islamic revolution; they defended Iran against Iraqi forces. If Iranian Armenians are in hope of Armenian nationalism outside of Iran, they are also in hope of Iranian 176

nationalism in Iran, and these two desires are not in contrast, none of them negates others. An Iranian Armenian can have desires of two nationalism in one time, Iranian nationalism inside the country and AiTnenian nationalism outside the country. Other non-Muslim ethnicities in Iran haven't any special desires outside of Iran. Zoroastrians Mandaeans (Sabians) and Bah'ai's in Iran are native of Iranian, and they can't have any hope except Iranian nationalism and freedom in practice of their religious ritual and duties. Iranian Christians and Jews, also, have similar desires. They are living in Iran for long centuries and mostly are migrants of greater Iran to Iranian plateau. Like other Iranian Non-Muslims their demand only is summarized in freedom of their religious duties and more tolerances by Iranian states and other religions especially Muslims. However those ethnicities haven't a specific aspiration to have a separate countiy inside or outside Iranian borders. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution as will be discussed latter the Constitution of 1979 of the Islamic Republic of Iran guarantees the non-Muslims religious rights and, now, the government and other ethnicities shows more tolerance to them. Even the highest hostility between Iran and Israel, following the Islamic revolution in Iran, didn't affects the relation between Iranian governments and people with Iranian Jews in Iran. In sum, all Iranian non-Muslim ethnicities haven't any separatist and disintegrative demands and show their integrative trends towards national unity. In spite of this they were seeking for more civil and religious rights in Iran.

V. Summary In sum, this paragraph concludes that all the Iranian ethnicities, even, the five ethnicities of Azeris, Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis and Turkmen have strong integrative trends toward national unity. Though among those five ethnic groups some people or individuals or groups have held some disintegrative 177

trends in the past, but the majority of the people of those ethnic groups had shown integrative trends in that times and latter and were on the side of central governments in Iran. Furthermore the ethnic grievances between those five ethnic groups mostly agitate for greater rights, not greater autonomy. Most are integrated into Iranian society, participate in politics, and identify with the Iranian nation.Iranian Sunni ethnicities demonstrated integrative trend toward national unity and through participating in Administrative affairs and elections, and harmony in other affair show their loyalty toward integrity of the country. They, also share in power through Participating in City councils, employment in Administrative affairs, and Parliamentary representatives and other spheres. Sunni Muslims, now, take part in the ordinary election process at all constitutional levels. There are dozens of Sunni members of parliament, mostly from areas with strong Sunni ethnic minorities like Kurdistan and Baluchistan and Turkmen areas.In spite of this ,foreign countries ,especially the previous Soviet Union, the Britain, the United States ,Arab countries and Israel stimng up trouble among those ethnic groups .However during Constitutional Revolution all Iranian ethnicities and religious minorities including Azeris, Bakhtiaris and Armenians fought together for establishment of democracy in Iran. Latter, Azeris did not rally to their northern cousins after World War II, when Soviet forces occupied Azerbaijan, and Kurds did not support Pro- Russian Republic of Mahabad when central government came to clash with Kurdish leader of the republic. The harmony and strong unity, also, was shown by all Iranians in the support of the Imam Khomeini and revolution of 1979. This was revealed in the Iran-Iraq eight years War when Arabs of Khuzestan did not join the invaders and all Iranian ethnicities voluntary, participated in war against Iraq invaders. After independence of the republic of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan the Azeris and Turkmen in Iran didn't show tendency to join their co-ethnics in new independent countries. The Azeris, Arabs, Baluch, Turkmen, Kurds, and 178

Armenians although with bonds to their kinsmen on the other side of borders, are conscious of the power and richness of Persian culture and willing to participate in it. The research, also, show that all Non-Muslims in Iran, like other Iranian ethnicities, have well integrative trends. In compare with most of other Iranian ethnicities and in compare with the whole of Iranian population comprised a very small population, haven't a specific geographical location in Iran, and almost have Iranian origin. These characteristics push them to solidarity with other Iranian ethnicities and national unity than to separatist demands. Although Iran has always been a multi-ethnic and multi-language country, but, most Iranians who speak other languages perceive their ethnic identity as a complement to their national identity. Indeed, it has long been understood and widely accepted that this diversity is an asset to one of the world's oldest continuous civilizations. With investigation of the Iranian identity and the basis of unity in diversity in Iran and Islamic unity in the Islamic republic of Iran, in chapter five, the solidarity between all Iranian ethnicity will be clearer. 179

*References and endnotes

' That was during the nationaUzation of the Iranian oil industry and oil nationalization movement that caused a crisis between Iran and Britain, ^ Fahime Hoseynzade, a Comparative analysis of Iranian ethnic groups, in An Anthology of Iranian studies No.9, (Tehran, Alhoda International a Publication) p: 18. ^ For texts of Khiabani's speeches and pamphlets see 'A. Azari, Qiyam-i Shaykh Muhammad Khiabani ( Shykh Muhammad Biabani's Revolt) (Tehran, Bungah-i Safi 'Ali Shah, 1950). '' This treaty was a colonial treaty that was imposed on Iran by Britain. ^ He was the founder of a revolutionary movement based in the forests of Gilan in northern Iran that became known as the Nehzat-e Jangal (Forest movement). This uprising started in 1914 and remained active against internal and foreign enemies until 1921 when the movement was defeated. See Ebrahim Fakhrayi, Sardar-e Jangal (The Commander of the Jungle), Tehran: Javidan, 1983. And Gregor Yaghikiyan, Shooravi and jonbesh-e jangal (The Soviet Union and the Jungle Movement), Editor: Borzouyeh Dehgan, Tehran: Novin, 1984. '' Richard, Cottam ,Nationalism in Iran,pp. 122-23 ^ Touraj Atabaki Ethnic diversity and territorial integrity of Iran: Domestic harmony and regional challenges, in Iranian Studies, volume 38, number 1, March 2005, p.34.(eds) Gerigor Yaqikiyan, Showravi va Jonbesh-e Jangal, Yaddasht-ha-ye Yek Shahed-e 'Eyni, (Tehran, 1984): 137. ' Ibid.33-34 ** For more study of Khiyabani's revolt see Homa Katouzian, "The Revolt of Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani", Iran, XXXVII, 1999, reprinted in Katouzian, Iranian History and Politics (London and New York, 2003). '° Richard, Cottam,p: 123-24 "Ibid,p.ll8 '^ Democratic Party of Azarbaijan (Firqah-i Dimukrat-i Azarbaijan) was the second Communist party created by Soviets in Iran. '^ The Tudah was a pro-Soviet Communist Party that was fonned by a circle of young Marxist intellectuals in Tehran soon after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of 1941. See Ervand Abrahamian ,Iran between two revolutions,pp.355-415. '•^ For more study about see. Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudah and the Firqah-1 Dimukrat International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4. (Oct., 1970), pp. 291-316 '^ Atabaki.ibid, p.35. '^ Christopher Sykes, Russia and Azerbaijan,Soundings,(February 1947), quoted in Cottam. 128. 180

" Touraj Atabaki ,Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran (London: British Academic Press, 1993). Pp.238. '*Ibid:p: vii. "ibid pp:vii-viii. ^° Ibid p: 181 ^'Ibidp:l80-185 ^Mbid,p. 184-6. ^^ Menashri, David. 1980. "Shi'ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies." Iranian Studies XIII. P: 130. ^^ Ibid., p. 131 ^' Ibid, pp: 39-40. ^* "Ethnic Tensions Over Cartoon Set Off Riots in Northwest Iran" - The New York Times (retrieved 12 June 2006) "Iran Azeris protest over cartoon" - BBC (retrieved 12 June 2006 ^' - Nissman, David B. The Soviet Union and Iranian Azarbaijan: The Use of Nationalism for Political Penetration. (Boulder: Westview Press 1987). P. 11 ^Vtabaki, Ibid, 41-2 '' Ibid. ^°Ibid. •^' Michael P. Croissant, "The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications" , Praeger/Greenwood, 1998, pg 61 "Cottam,pp.ll9,129 " Toraje Atabaki Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran (London: British Academic Press, 1993). ^Mbid,?. 180 "lbid,p.51. '''Ibid,p.l83 "lbid,p. 184. "** Richard Thomas, Roger East, Alan John Day,Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe, Routledge, 2002, pg 41 " Burke, Andrew. Iran. Lonely Planet, Nov 1, 2004, P 42-43 '°Ahmadi,H.ibid,p.l32 *' Ibid, quoted from: Ferydoon Adamiyat, Andisheha-ye Talibov-e Tabrizi [The ideas of Talibov of Tabriz] (Padideh, 1984),pp. 79-93. ''Ibid. 132 181

'^ Ibid quoted from: Ahmad Kasravi, Azeri ya Zaban-e bastan-e Azerbaijan [Azeri, or the ancient language of Azerbaijan (Jar, 1355/1976). ''^Ervand Abrahamian, Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudah and the Firqah-I Dimukxat International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4. (Oct. 1970), p.298. ^^ Kasravi, Ahmad.. "Azari ya zaban-e bastan-e Azarbaijan" (Azari or the Ancient Language of Azarbaijan). In Karvand-e Kasravi [Kasravi's Essays]. ( 1352/1973). "** The Medes who founded the Median state in the early 8th century B.C. ruled Azarbaijan. '*' Mashkour, Mohammad,. Javad. Nazari be tariiche Azarbaijan va asar-e bastani va j ami'at sehnasi an [A Look At The History of Azarbaijan and Its Ancient and Anthropological Works],(Tehran: Bahman Publications 1349/1970). P: 92. "* Ibid, pp. 224-250. ^"ibid.pp. 251-252. '° Ibid. ^' Mashkour, ibid., pp.261-263 " See: Middleton, John And Ronald Cohen, From Empire to Nation in Africa. (Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Co), P.9. For more about flue ethnicity infomiation see: Thomas Hillary Erekson Ethnicity and nationalsm,esp.p::3776 " See Farzanfar, Ramesh, Ethnic Groups and the State: Azaris, Kurds and Baluch of Iran, Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ph.D., in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology June, 1992. ^''Ramesh Farzanfar, opt.p426, quoted from Beck, Lois. 1990. "Tribes, and the State in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Iran." In Tribe and State Fonnation in the Middle East, Berkeley: University of California Press. P: 212. '' The Constitution of Islamic republic of Iran '^ Svante Cornell. Iranian Azerbaijan: A Brewing Hotspot, p.5 " For more information about Shiekh Khazal and Reza Shah and Britain state. See: Ahmad Kasravi,Tarikh-e Pahnsad Saal-e Khuzestan (Five Hundred Year History of Khuzestan) . and Ahmad Kasravi Jang-e Iran va Britannia dar Mohammerah (The Iran-British War in Mohammerah) .Also Yahya Dolatabadi ,Hayat-e Yahya (The Life of Yahya) (Tehran, 1948-52) Also Ansari, Mostafa ~ The History of Khuzistan, 1878-1925, unpublished PhD. dissertation. University of Chicago, 1974. Also ,Sir Percy Sykes ,History of Persia (2 volumes), (1915) ^* Abdollah Mostavfi , Tarikhe Ejtemai va Edari Dore Qjarieh (The Administrative and Social History of the Qajar Era) (Tehran, 1945-47) Forth Volum,p471. 182

^^ See: Hosien Maki, Tarikh Bist Sallleh Iran (Twenty years history of Iran),(Tehran,1945- 47,third vol. "" Ibid, p: 219. ^' Ibid, p: 260-77. ^^ Maghsoodi,Mojtaba,Tahvolate ghawmi dar Iran , elal-va-zamieneha(Ethnic changes in Iran,the Causes and backgrounds), National institution studies,Tehran,1380(2002),p:358. ""^ Among the first groups we can name, "The Arabic Front for Liberation of Ahwaz" -Aijebhate- Alaraibya-Le- attahriere-Al-ahwaz-, "The Ahwaz Federation Movement" -Alharakate_ attahriere- Ai-ahwaz-, The Al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples Democratic Popular Front (AADPF), the Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party (AARP), Ahwaz Arab Renaissance Party (AARP), and The Ahwaz Liberation Organization (ALO). '''' Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia online , Politics of Khuzestan Province,Arab politics and separatism, quted from http://www.atimes.coiTi/atimes/Middle_East/GK03Ak02.html ''' http://www.federalcongress.org/ '''' http://www.federalcongress.org/ ''\ttp://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1166/summary.asp. The Unknown Iran, Another Case for Federalism ^* Yousef Azizi bani-turoof ,The Identity and Ancestry of the indigenous Khozestani (Ahwaz)Arab of Iran Speech delivered by Yossef Azizi Bani-Turoof at the Industrial University of IsfahanTranslation by Abdolreza Ameri Reproduced from Ahwaz Studies Center by the British Ahwazi Friendship Society, 2005. P.O Box 2397 London, W8 4ZS [email protected] » www.ahwaz.org.uk P: 7-17. ^' http://www.federalcongress.org/ ™ http://www.ahwaz.org.uk/news/2005_05_01_archive.html ,Former Iranian MP in Ahwazi appeal ^'http://www.janes.com/security/intemational_security/news/jid/jid070105_l_n.shtml,2006 Jane's Information Group ''^ The Constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran/Article 15. "Ibid, Article 16 ^'* The Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, organized in the early days of the triumph of the Revolution, is to be maintained so that it may continue in its role of guarding the Revolution and its achievements. ^^ A volunteer based Iranian paramilitary that serve as an auxiliary force engaged in activities such as law enforcement, emergency management, social service providing, public religious 183 ceremony organizing, and more controversially morals policing and dissident gathering suppressing. The Basij are subordinate to, and obey the orders of, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The official name of the body means Basij Resistance Force. It has a local Basij organization in just about every city in Iran. ^^ The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran/Article 143. ^''http://www.janes.com/security/intemational_security/news/jid/jid070105_l_n.shtml ,Anger among Iran's Arabs, 05 January 2007. ^^ Hassan Arfa,The Kurds (London:Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 64-7; Longrigg, 'Iraq, p. 159. '"' Nader Entessar, opt.pl2, 13. ^° Komalah (Komele in Kurdish) is a Marxist Kurdish opposition group, that was funded In 1967 in Iranian Kurdetan. The word Komeleor komala in Kurdish is derived from Komel (Society) and means association. The Komala's origin can be traced to the Kurdish uprisings of 1967_1968, which were organized by Kurdish Communist activists such as Ismail Sharifzadeh and Sulayman and Abdullah Moini. Unlike other Kurdish movements that sought to strengthen Kurdish ethnicity through psychological ties to Kurdish history and past struggles, the Komala attempted to establish grass­ roots support among the Kurds by paying particular attention to political education and by teaching "village boys and girls the principles of class and guerrilla warfare." The Komala also emphasized decentralization "throughout the organization, armed operations included. In 1983 Komalah formed a political organization with other Iranian Marxist and socialist groups called the . *' William Eagleton, the Kurdish Republic of 1946 (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1963), pp. 33-40. ^^ He was the son of Qazi Ail, who collaborated with Ismail Agha Simko when Simko forces briefly occupied Mahabad in 1920s, *^ Nader Entessar,opt.p.l9 '' Ibid. ^' The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (Kurdish: Hizbi Demokirati Kurdistan! Eran) is a Kurdish opposition group in Iranian Kurdistan which seeks the attainment of Kurdish autonomy within a democratic federal republic of Iran. Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan" (PDKI) was founded in Mahabad, Iran, on August 16, 1945. PDKI replaced the Komeley Jiyanewey Kurd (Council of Kurdish Resurrection) which had been formed three years earlier. Just 159 days after its foundation in January 22, 1946, the Party, availing itself of expedient circumstances in a 184 section of Iranian Kurdistan, established the " Republic of Kurdistan ", usually referred to by historians as the Republic of Mahabad , the reason being its choice of Mahabad as the capital. The latest General Secretary of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), were Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Sadeq Sharafkandi and it's General Secretary current is Mustafa Hijri.the most important PDKI slogan in the last three decades was : "Democracy for Iran, Autonomy for Kurdistan". In the program of the Kurdish Democratic Party, the central government would "retain control over long-term planning, the armed forces, foreign policies, and the monetary system," while other affairs, including internal security, would be in the hands of elected Kurdish officials. Kurdish would be the official language, with Persian as a second language. Minorities would be allowed to teach and publish in their own languages. *'' McDowall, David, A Modem , (I. B. Tauris, 1996). pp.240-241 " For details see: Nader Entesar,opt. and Yassin, Burhaneddin A., "A History of the Republic of Kurdistan", The International Journal of Kurdish Studies, 11, nos. 1-2 (1997): 115-240. ** Ghassemlou was the most recognizable political leader, of The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran who established an extended political network in Europe. ^'' The People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI, also MEK) (sazman-e mojahedin-e khalq-e iran) is a paramilitary Anti Islamic Republics of Iran;s government organization with a mixture ideology of Socialist and Islam. Founded in 1965, and now is the main organization in the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an "umbrella coalition" which was founded in 1981 against the Islamic Republic of Iran. ""^ The Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (Cherik-hayeh Fadaeyeh Khalgheh Iran, IFPG) is an Iranian opposition organization with a Marxist-Leninist ideology. '' Ayatollah Khomeini's Speech, Radio Tehran, December 17, 1979. Quoted in David McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 271 '^ Nader Entessar ,opt.p:34 " Ibid. ''' Lise Storm Ethnonational Minorities in the Middle East, Bebers ,Kurds and Palestinians, in Youssef M. Choueiri, A Companion to the history of the Middle East, (Blackwell publishing,)p,472. ^' Hussein D. Hassan, Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities (CRS report for Congress, May 25, 2007) P.5. ^^ For more information about Kurdish United Front see:http://www.kurduf com/ 185

" See, George S. Harris, Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 433, Ethnic Conflict in the Worid today (Sep.,1977), pp. 112- 124.espicially pp. 112. 'Mbid,p: 113. "> Ibid. "^Ibid,p: 115. '°' Cottam, Nationalism in Iran,p:67 '°^ Ibid, p: 68. '°^Ibid, p: 66. '"^ Ibid. '"' Ibid, p: 74. '°*W. G. Elphinston,The Kurdish Question, Journal of International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, p. 97 '"^ See for details: Baloch, InayatuUah. 1980. "Afghanistan, , Baluchistan." Aussen politik 31. PP. 283-301. '"* See Imran Umar Baloch,Ethno nationalism: Understanding the dynamic of unrest in Balochestan ,Ittehad Chemicals Limited ,Karachi '"'Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the storm (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) p.l33. "" Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation,(Camegie Endowment, 1981) pp.27-28. '" Balochistan Liberation Front played an important role in insurgency and ethnic unrests in both Pakistan Iranian Balochistan frmom 1968-1980s "^ Rule Aysha Jalal, The State of Martial (Sang-e-Meel 1999), page 40. "^ Askari, Naser. Mogadameh-e bar shenakht-e "'' For details, see: Inayatoullah Baluch, the problems of Greater Baluchistan, 140-150. "^ Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan Shado, 106. "^ For details, see: Amin, Tahir, Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors. (Islamabad;Institute of Policy Studies, 1988). P: 155. "'Hossienbor,172 "* Hamid, Ahmadi, Ethnicity and ethnonationalism in IRAN, P: 264. '" Sanasarian Eliz, Religious minorities in Iran,p:14 '^° Ibid. 186

'^' SeeiBeatrice Nicolini, Makran, Oman, and Zanzibar: Three-Terminal Cultural Corridor in the Western Indian Ocean (1799-1856) (Leiden: Brill Academic, 2004).also '^^ Sanasarian Eliz, Religious minorities in Iran,p:12. ''^ Mojtaba Maghsoodi, TahvoUate-Qavmi Dar Iran, in Persian language,( The ethnic evolutions in Iran ),p:215. '^''http://www.iranica.com/newsite/articles/ot_grpl0/ot_nadershah_20060329.html Ernest, Tucker Encyclopedia Iranica, March 29, 2006 '•^^ Michael Axworthy, biography of Nader, The Sword of Persia (I.E. Tauris, 2006), pp.137-174 '^'' Sanasarian Eliz,Religious minorities in Iran,p:14 '"Muhammad Tahir, Turkmen Identity on the Wane in Iran. See: http://regimechangeiran.blogspot.com/2006_03_26_archive.html, '^* http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2000/2-100100.html '^'' http://www.country-data.coiTi/cgi-bin/query/r-6443.html,lran,Jew.