45 February 2006

SUMMARY

The risk of an Islamist takeover : in Pakistan is a myth invented The Myth of an Islamist Peril by the Pakistani military to consolidate its hold on power. Frédéric Grare Visiting Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace In fact, religious political parties

and militant organizations are he fear of an Islamic threat has been the Although the army’s control is solid, the manipulated by the Pakistani Tdriving force behind most Western coun- situation is not without risks: a few of the mil- Army to achieve its own objec- tries’ foreign policies toward Pakistan in recent itants have turned against the army because of years. The possibility that violent Islamists will Pakistan’s “betrayal” of the Taliban and coop- tives, domestically and abroad. kill President Pervez Musharraf, throw eration with the United States in Afghanistan The army, not the Islamists, is Pakistan into turmoil, take over the country and in the “war on terror.” Moreover, the and its nuclear weapons, and escalate regional infrastructure that supports regional sectarian- the real source of insecurity on terrorism has dominated the psychological ism and Kashmir-Afghan jihadi activities can the subcontinent. and political landscape. Such fears have usu- be hijacked for international terrorism, as ally led to support of the Pakistani military as demonstrated by the July 2005 London bomb Sustainable security and the only institution able to contain the danger. blasts. The risk of a nuclear conflict between But the Islamist threat is neither as great nor India and Pakistan, triggered by attacks simi- stability in the region will be as autonomous as many assume. True, Pakistan lar to the ones carried out by the terrorist achieved only through the rest- has experienced more than its share of religious group Lashkar-e-Toiba in Delhi after the violence, both sectarian and jihadi. But serious October 2005 earthquake, cannot be dis- oration of democracy in Pakistan. law-and-order problems do not mean the fate of missed either. The West should actively promote the state is at stake. No Islamic organization has Yet evidence is scant that these organiza- ever been in a position to politically or militarily tions pose an uncontrollable threat. Also, a the demilitarization of Pakistan’s challenge the role of the one and only center of Pakistan headed by an Islamist party would political life through a mix of power in Pakistan: the army. not necessarily be unstable. In fact, in the On the contrary, the Pakistani Army has existing power setup, politico-religious organi- political pressure and capacity used Islamic organizations for its purposes, both zations have often been used to channel popu- building. Enlarging the pool of at home and abroad. Islamist organizations bal- lar resentment in a socially and politically ance the power of rival mainstream political par- acceptable way, preventing unrest. elites and creating alternative ties, preserving the army’s role as national What the West perceives as a threat to the centers of power will be essen- arbiter. The army has nurtured and sometimes regime in Pakistan are manifestations of the deployed violent Islamists in Afghanistan (with Pakistani Army’s tactics to maintain political con- tial for developing a working U.S. support at first), Kashmir, and other hot trol. The army uses its need for modernist order democracy in Pakistan. ■ spots on the subcontinent. to justify its continued claim on power and, with

2 Policy Brief

it, a substantial part of state resources. This de When Islamic organizations develop rival- facto army monopoly on power is preventing the ries and compete in elections, they perform emergence of a truly democratic, economically according to their perceived capacity to answer sound Pakistan. voters’ demands. Religious parties have been The Pakistani military is the main source of integrated within the traditional political insecurity on the subcontinent, making it nec- game, but the competition keeps their appeal essary to challenge the common perception and and power balanced. Political competition policy in the international community that sta- arose naturally as well as at the behest of the bility and security depend on not pressuring army, which recognizes the value of being able military sovereigns such as Musharraf. Orderly to balance multiple forms of opposition. By army retrenchment is a necessary but insuffi- keeping all parties weak and allowing a plural- cient condition for progress, hence the need for ity of parties to compete, the army insinuates Frédéric Grare is a visiting new approaches and alternative policies. itself as the indispensable arbiter of politics. scholar at the Carnegie No objective observer believes that Endowment. He holds a Ph.D. Myth of an Islamic Threat Pakistan’s Islamic parties have a chance to in international relations from A distinction should be made between reli- seize power through elections in the foresee- the Graduate Institute of giously inspired political parties and organi- able future. Historically, when the Islamic International Studies, Geneva. zations, and sectarian or jihadi groups. Politi- parties have participated in elections, they From 2003 to 2005, he worked cal parties participate in electoral politics and have captured between 5 percent and 8 per- as counselor for cooperation seek power and influence through democratic cent of the vote, with the notable exception and culture at the Embassy of means; jihadi groups resort to violence. Links of 1988 when they reached 12 percent. In the France, Islamabad. Before his exist between the two: jihadi groups are often 2002 elections, the alliance of religious par- (but not always) the fists of political organi- ties called the Mutahida Majlis Amal (MMA) service in the embassy, he was zations. Notwithstanding occasional mutual collected 11.1 percent of the vote. As impres- director of the Centre de reinforcement, politico-religious parties play sive and worrying as this total appears to Sciences Humaines, New legitimate roles and will be important to Pak- some, the Islamist vote remains limited to Delhi, and worked for the istan’s democratization, but sectarian or jihadi slightly more than one-tenth of the electorate Programme for Strategic and groups behave outside legitimate bounds of despite heavy manipulations in its favor by International Security Studies, any civilized polity. the state machinery. Geneva. His most recent publi- cations include India, China, Politico-Religious Parties: Islamism, Stability, and Security Russia: Intricacies of an Asian Real but Limited Popular Support When Islamic parties gain local power— Triangle (edited with Gilles Any analysis of the electoral weight of Pakistan’s usually by political manipulation as in parts Boquerat); Political Islam in the religious parties needs to note that, unlike in of the North-West Frontier Province Indian Subcontinent: The many Arab states, they do not operate in a (NWFP) and Baluchistan, stability and secu- Jamaat-i-Islami; Pakistan and political vacuum. No matter how manipulative rity are no better or worse than in areas con- the Afghan Conflict 1979–1985: the Pakistani military has been in its dealings trolled by their secular alternatives. When with mainstream political parties, it has been Islamic parties are in opposition, they are At the Turn of the Cold War; careful not to destroy them. The left-leaning used by the regime as a vessel to receive and Beyond the Rhetoric: The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is constrained in channel popular dissatisfaction. The religious Economics of India’s Look East its ability to oppose the government, yet it still parties’ low mass appeal makes them less Policy, and India and ASEAN: functions as the single most important political threatening to the military establishment than The Politics of India’s Look East party in the country. The Pakistan Muslim the more popular PPP. Policy (the last two were edited League may have become a puppet organiza- Demonstrations organized by the MMA with Amitabh Mattoo). tion whose unique raison d’être is to generate during the Iraq War, for example, bolstered a support for Musharraf’s policies, yet it occupies Pakistani government caught between popu- a defined political space and prevents the lar opinion hostile to the war and the govern- Islamic parties from filling that space. Other ment’s need not to alienate the United States. organizations play similar roles. Most observers in Pakistan believed in 2003

Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril 3

that the Iraq War would unleash a series of at least to deny Indian sovereignty over protests and terrorist attacks. Preparations Kashmir, is constant in both the modernist were made and security was reinforced, yet, and Islamist discourses. When Islamic parties not a single incident occurred. get close to power, they often adapt their dis- Musharraf, representing the dominant course to political realities, and sometimes army, got the government’s message out, and they just drop Islamic rhetoric. Pakistan’s rap- the leaders of the large Islamist political par- prochement with the United States following ties and even key terrorist organizations fol- September 11, 2001, for instance, was criti- lowed it. Before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, cized by religious parties on geopolitical Musharraf told a group of businesspeople in grounds, not ideological ones: Islamist parties Lahore that Pakistan would be the next target argued that siding with the United States of U.S. military punishment if it continued would alienate China and Iran, more impor- to be perceived as a state supporting terror- tant friends to Pakistan. ism. Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons only raised the likelihood of a U.S. strike. It By focusing on only Islamist was time for radical groups in Pakistan to lie low and go along with the state’s cooperation militancy, Western governments with the United States. Qazi Hussein Ahmad, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and more radi- confuse the consequence and the cal players such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, fol- lowed along. The remarkable calm showed cause: The army is the problem. the sunny side of the patron-client relation- ship between the Pakistan state establishment Sectarian Violence and Stability and key Islamist parties and forces. Religious violence, in particular sectarian vio- lence—distinct from religious political par- An Islamist Army? ties—is sometimes seen as a more serious The Pakistani Army, which largely controls source of instability in Pakistan. Sectarian the major Islamist organizations, could be violence is indeed a serious problem with infiltrated by Islamist actors who could then deep social, political, and geopolitical roots. seize leadership through a coup d’état or reg- It is a consequence of the 1947 partition of ular promotion. Although the military the subcontinent, which deeply affected the remains opaque, there is so far no evidence demographic balance of some areas in Pak- that it has been widely infiltrated, much less istan. Migrants who went to what is now Pak- controlled, by the Islamists. It seems that the istan’s Punjab province simply moved from army reflects the society: Although Islamists the eastern portion of what had been the are undoubtedly present, there is no reason to united Indian Punjab. The vast majority were believe that their numbers are significantly Sunni, uneducated, and either serving in the greater than in the rest of Pakistani society. armed forces or working as farm laborers. Even if the top echelons of the army hier- Many landless laborers started working on archy were to be occupied by Islamists, it the farms of Shia landlords. Their poverty led would be extremely unlikely to change the to deep resentment, and this marginal group, course of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Islamic deprived of both resources and political rep- parties often provide no more than an Islamic resentation, soon became angry. rationalization of existing foreign policies on If conditions on the ground formed the which a convergence of interests already kindling of sectarian violence, General Zia exists. For example, the Islamic parties pro- ul-Haq lit the match. Fearful of Shia activism vided an Islamic rationale for fighting the following the 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution Soviets in Afghanistan. The similar quest to in Iran, Zia inflamed Sunni fears and mobilized control Muslim-majority parts of Kashmir, or Sunni militants. With the notable exception of 4 Policy Brief

Nawaz Sharif, all successive Pakistani govern- religious organizations, be they political or ments have continued to manipulate sectarian militant. Both are integral parts of the mili- tensions for political purposes. With the sup- tary system of dominance. port of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the The perpetuation of a party system in Pakistani government also found in the sectar- what is otherwise an authoritarian regime is ian organizations the unofficial manpower it not the consequence of army benevolence or required to sustain Pakistan’s interests in the a sudden conversion to democracy following conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Zia ul-Haq’s death. The military knows that As sectarian conflict has intensified in the appearance of formal democracy is essen- Pakistan, the army has been accused of hav- tial as it deals with the West. Democratic ing created an Islamic Frankenstein it could facades also provide the military the opportu- no longer control. Yet, careful examination nity to withdraw behind the scenes while still shows that the army, including the ISI direc- holding the reins of power and letting civil- torate, has always been able to maintain vio- ians deal with the difficulties of running a lence at an “acceptable” level by dividing government. The presence of Islamic parties is a useful By keeping parties weak and foil to reinforce the regime’s legitimacy abroad and to pressure secular parties domes- allowing them to compete, the tically. In Pakistan’s October 2002 elections, after the fighting and removal of the Taliban army insinuates itself as the from power in Afghanistan, the MMA won political countrywide representation far indispensable arbiter of politics. beyond its real political support. Having failed to secure the support of the PPP, the groups, generating infighting every time an military systematically favored the MMA by organization became too important, and redefining electoral districts and rigging the sometimes physically eliminating uncontrol- election whenever necessary. Military repre- lable elements. Azam Tariq, leader of the sentatives later suggested that the result went Lashkar-e-Janghvi, the most lethal sectarian beyond their initial expectations. Sunni terrorist organization, was assassinated The MMA’s rise to power in the North- on October 5, 2003, for example. West Frontier Province, in particular, enabled The army nevertheless cannot maintain the Musharraf regime to point to the mullahs total control. In December 2004, two suicide and tell the United States, in effect, “If you attackers nearly succeeded in assassinating don’t listen to me and give me what I need, Musharraf. Some extremely militant groups the mullahs will take over. And if you push have become so estranged by the army leader- me too hard to change, I will be thrown out; ship’s turn to the United States that they are and then you will be sorry.” Yet, the MMA beyond the government’s control. In did not create a meaningful domestic political November 2003, when Musharraf banned fif- constraint for the government. On the con- teen to seventeen violent sectarian organiza- trary, the relatively strong presence of the tions, other similar organizations that are MMA in Parliament allowed Musharraf to useful in Afghanistan and Kashmir were pass the constitutional amendments necessary merely kept on a watch list. Although sectarian to transform the parliamentary system into a violence is a serious law-and-order problem, it presidential one and institutionalize the polit- is not a threat to regime stability in Pakistan. ical role of the army through the creation of the National Security Council. Legitimizing the Army’s Political Role Simultaneously, the violence generated by There is more than simply an “objective the sectarians gives credence to the existence of alliance” between the military regime and the an Islamic threat and reinforces the army’s role

Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril 5

as the only institution able to physically control Moreover, the army never confuses it. In that sense even the tiny fringe of sectarians abstract ideological considerations with that is in open rebellion against the regime geopolitics. In its bid to control Afghanistan, unintentionally helps to legitimate it. By threat- for example, the army supported in succes- ening individuals, they reinforce the regime. sion two ideologically different organizations, Potential events such as an assassination Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami and of Musharraf have to be considered in this the Taliban, whose only similarity was their perspective. His death would not significantly Pashtun character. When it was expedient, shift the power center of the country. the army drew a clear distinction between Pakistan would most probably experience the internationalist organizations such as Al brief uncertainty inherent to all transitions, Qaeda, whose impact on Pakistan’s foreign but the nature of the regime would not be policy was negative and whose members fundamentally altered, be his successor mili- could be traded for Western goodwill, and tary or civilian. Instead of being sidelined, the regional organizations whose usefulness in army would feel violated as an institution and Afghanistan or Kashmir had to be preserved. most probably would react most energetically. Three consequences follow: The external constraints that affect ■ Western governments should not let fear of Pakistan today would remain unchanged or an Islamist threat distort their dealings with would even increase as the new leadership Islamabad. Neither in Kashmir, where infil- would be an object of intense scrutiny on the trations had resumed before the recent earth- part of the international community and, in quake, nor in its Afghan policy is the Pak- particular, the United States. The temptation, istani Army constrained by majority public already there, of a change of policy on Kashmir opinion or any specific constituency, be it or Afghanistan would persist, but changes Islamic or anything else. Changes in policy would be just as difficult to implement as they merely reflect changes within the army (that are now. Similarly, the security of Pakistan’s is, the balance of power among the leading nuclear weapons would not be altered because generals), not domestic pressures or Islamic the army, as an institution, is responsible for it. influences. It is unwise and unnecessary to One should not exaggerate the danger implied heed arguments that one should not press the by the possible disappearance of Pakistan’s cur- Pakistani president hard to crack down on rent head of state, notwithstanding the human militants in Kashmir and Afghanistan for fear tragedy of such a loss. of causing his overthrow by extremists. ■ Western governments may believe that Policy Implications arms sales will buy the army’s participation in This analysis does not mean everything is well the West’s campaign against terrorism and in Pakistan or that the terrorist threat should be also perhaps more Pakistani cooperation in dismissed. It simply means that by focusing on blocking proliferation, but such sales will also only Islamist militancy, Western governments increase the Pakistani military’s leverage to confuse the consequence and the cause: The block major internal reforms. Arms sales are army is the problem. Whatever the nuisance understood as implicit approval, or at least capabilities of sectarian and jihadi groups, they consent, for the military’s policies and dimin- were a creation of the army and remain by and ish incentives for reform. From a security large under the army’s control. These groups point of view, arms sales will be at best neu- were first offered a role in the management of tral if they do not affect the current balance the country’s foreign policy, particularly in of power between India and Pakistan, but Afghanistan, during Zia ul-Haq’s dictatorship, they are in no way the solution to Pakistan’s but their role—in Kashmir, Tajikistan, and else- domestic security problem. where—was perpetuated by Zia’s successors as ■ Western governments undermine their own suited the needs of the military establishment. interests by invoking the “Islamist threat” to 6 Policy Brief

justify support of military regimes. This up power. The withdrawal was always accom- approach has contributed to the perception in panied by a redefinition of the political sys- the Muslim world in general, and in Pakistan tem through changes in the constitution, in particular, that democracy is something to cooption of the political elite through eco- be applied selectively. Restoring democracy in nomic policy, and the distribution of key Pakistan should be a priority. civilian jobs to retired generals whose link with the army remained decisive (see box Alternative Scenarios? below). Thus, the army has been able to con- The real question is whether true demilita- trol the main levers of power while civilians rization of Pakistan’s polity can be achieved. have had to bear the burden of day-to-day Historically, the Pakistani Army has government. occasionally withdrawn behind the scenes After they are in government, civilians whenever it could not fulfill the economic, face the almost impossible task of balancing social, and political expectations of society the imperatives of civilian politics with the or when international pressures were too sensitivities of the military’s top commanders, strong. However, the army never really gave a task exacerbated by civilian leaders’ lack of

Snapshot of Influence

PAKISTAN ARMY: 550,000 GENERALS IN PAKISTAN: 770–940 (including Brigadiers) U.S. ARMY: 502,000 GENERALS IN THE U.S: 881

Military and Education Expenditures in Pakistan, 2000–2004 (as a percentage of GDP) Expenditures 2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 Military 4.50 4.70 4.70 4.40 Education 1.96 1.98 2.14 2.70

Cabinet Post Held by Retired General ■ Minister of Education: Retired general, former director general of Inter-Services Intelligence

Administrative Training Institutions Run by Retired Generals ■ National Institute of Public Administration at , Lahore, Peshawar, Quetta ■ Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore National Universities Controlled by Retired Army Officers ■ Air University, Islamabad ■ National University of Science ■ , Islamabad and Technology, Rawalpindi ■ Baluchistan University of Engineering ■ Punjab University, Lahore and Technology, Quetta ■ Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad ■ Lasbela University of Agriculture and Marine ■ University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore ■ National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad ■ University of Peshawar Military-Affiliated Foundations ■ . Banking, insurance, real estate, cement, pharmaceuticals, shoes ■ Bahria Foundation. Commercial complexes, shipping, pharmaceuticals, bread manufacturing, boat building, engineering work ■ . Fertilizers, power generation, breakfast cereals, sugar mills, natural gas ■ . Air cargo, TV broadcasting, real estate, knitwear

SOURCES: The Military Balance 2005–2006 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies/Routledge, 2005); military expenditures: SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (Stockholm: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 2005); education expenditures: Ministry of Education (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan).

Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril 7

governmental autonomy. They have not and international community to pay for a sub- could not have performed better than the stantial part of Pakistan’s development expen- military. This, in turn, discredited democratic ditures, while most of the state budget has politics in Pakistan. A formal transfer of been spent on military expenditures and debt power to a civilian head of state who, in prin- reimbursement. It is essential to ensure that ciple, is acceptable to the military institution government money be spent for the benefit of is a necessary yet insufficient step toward real Pakistan’s people and at the same time main- democratization of the country. tain the constraint of sound financial man- Strong internal and external political agement of the country. pressures will be necessary to reform the The army will be tempted to resist this regime because the army will not voluntarily effort if it perceives that it is aimed at margin- empower civilian institutions. Countries alizing the army. But the army is caught in a whose assistance, arms, and counsel Pakistan dilemma as it also realizes that the weakness needs should condition economic and mili- of Pakistan’s human capital is undermining tary aid on steps toward genuine democrati- the country’s technological capabilities and zation and development. Such conditionality economy and therefore its effort to narrow is often claimed but rarely enforced; it is time the gap with India. The army is likely, ulti- to get serious with Pakistan. mately, to accept conditionality, believing Sustained progress can come only through that it will be able to control its scope and enlarging the pool of elite talent and power in direction. Pakistan. Today, access to the levers of political, This effort, if accompanied by sustained economic, and social power runs entirely economic investment, will favor over time the through military channels. Alternative channels development of a substantial middle class that of bringing qualified people into power must be is likely to demand more participatory gover- opened if the army is to return to its barracks. nance. To achieve what can only be a long-term Enlarging the pool of civilian elites and objective, Western governments should developing the middle class will not be suffi- engage now with the Pakistani government in cient, however, if these transitions are not a massive and sustained effort of capacity accompanied by an equally strong effort to building to reinforce Pakistani institutions in develop a true democratic culture in Pakistan. the country’s social, economic, and political Again, a mix of political pressure and capacity life. Education at all levels (including higher building is essential. The army must be education) and administration are prime tar- pressed to stop interfering in the media and gets for a concerted international effort. in political life, but political parties them- But here again, Western governments selves must be pressed and encouraged to must insist that they and their money not adopt democratic practices. Foreign govern- substitute for what is primarily the Pakistani ments should make a point of not inadver- government’s responsibility. The approach tently adding to the irrelevance of opposition here matters as much as the amount spent. parties, and official foreign visitors should The Pakistani government should be made to consider opposition parties as legitimate assume its responsibilities through the West’s interlocutors whenever they visit Pakistan. The Carnegie Endowment normally policy of strict conditionality: Objectives As difficult, as protracted, and as expen- does not take institutional positions must be measurable, and not a single dollar sive as this strategy may be, it is important to on public policy issues; the views or euro should be spent for Pakistan’s devel- remember that constant support to the presented here do not necessarily reflect opment without some substantial financial Pakistani Army and to regimes whose legiti- the views of the Endowment, its and human resource commitment by the macy is questioned by Pakistan’s population officers, staff, or trustees. Pakistani government (or the private sector has led to resentment and suspicion of the with government incentives). Pakistan’s gov- West and has not significantly improved © 2006 Carnegie Endowment for ernment has always managed to induce the either Western or South Asian security. ■ International Peace. All rights reserved. org .

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