The Caucasus Globalization

Vol. 1 (3), 2007 1 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

INSTITUTE O STRATEGIC STUDIES O THE CAUCASUS

THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

Vol. 1 (3) 2007

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Editorial Council

Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council (Baku) ISMAILOV Tel/fax: (994 12) 497 12 22 E-mail: [email protected] Kanan Executive Secretary (Baku) ALLAKHVERDIEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Azer represents the journal in Russia (Moscow) SAFAROV Tel: (7 495) 937 77 27 E-mail: [email protected] Nodar represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) KHADURI Tel: (995 32) 99 59 67 E-mail: [email protected] Kamil represents the journal in Turkey (Ankara) AGHAGAN Tel: (312) 491 60 97 Å-mail: [email protected]

Editorial Board

Nazim Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) MUZAFFARLI Tel: (994 – 12) 499 11 74 E-mail: [email protected] (IMANOV) Archil Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Georgia) GEGESHIDZE Tel: (99 – 593) 31 77 29 E-mail: [email protected] Akif Deputy Editor-in-Chief (Azerbaijan) ABDULLAEV Tel: (994 – 12) 596 11 73 E-mail: [email protected] Vol. 1 (3), 2007Members of Editorial Board: 3 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Zaza Doctor of History, professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy ALEKSIDZE of Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa Professor, Ankara University (Turkey) AYDIN Irina D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and BABICH Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Baku State University (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus, Executive Secretary EYVAZOV of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of Social and Political Studies (Azerbaijan) Rauf Ph.D., Leading research associate of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the GARAGOZOV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture of the Institute of Strategic Studies of the GULIYEV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Hasan D.Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, department head, Institute of Philosophy, National GULIYEV Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University MCDERMOTT of Kent at Canterbury; Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.K.) Roin Doctor of History, professor, academician of the Georgian National Academy of METREVELI Sciences, President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians, member of the Presidium of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) Fuad Ph.D. (Econ.), Counselor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MURSHUDLI International Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Vladimer Professor, Senior Fellow of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International PAPAVA Studies (Georgia) Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Mehdi Professor, Tehran University, Director, Center for Russian Studies (Iran) SANAIE S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla Doctor of History, professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of YAZKOVA Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

Editorial Office: THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION © The Caucasus & Globalization, 2007 98 Alovsat Guliyev, AZ1009 © CA&CC Press®, 2007 Baku, Azerbaijan © Institute of Strategic Studies of WEB: www.ca-c.org the Caucasus, 2007 4 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Vol. 1 (3), 2007

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND COURTS OF ORDINARY JURISDICTION IN AZERBAIJAN: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF Eldar THEIR INTERRELATIONS MAMEDOV 6

DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF Rustam INTERNATIONAL LAW MAMEDOV 26

THE SELF-DETERMINATION PRINCIPLE Kiamran IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION SHAFIEV 36

GEO-ECONOMICS

THE PHENOMENON OF GLOBALIZATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL ECONOMIES Rozeta (A Case Study of Georgia) ASATIANI 43

THE ROLE OF GLOBALIZATION IN REVIVING THE ECONOMY OF COUNTRIES Vakhtang IN TRANSITION (A Case Study of Georgia) BURDULI 51

NATIONAL ECONOMIC MODEL: Teimuraz AN ALTERNATIVE TO GLOBALIZATION? BERIDZE 59

CREATING AN ECONOMIC MODEL FOR AZERBAIJAN: TYPICAL CHARACTERIZATION AND Hadjiaga NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION RUSTAMBEKOV 65 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION GEOCULTURE

TRADITIONS IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA: Liubov ABKHAZIA IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY SOLOVIEVA 73

ON SOME SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL IDENTITY OF Rena THE AZERI YOUTH KADYROVA 82

GLOBALIZATION-WESTERNIZATION: Guram DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSITION IN GEORGIA SVANIDZE 92

A CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE GLOBALIZATION CONTEXT: Farkhad THE EURASIAN APPROACH ALIEV 102

GEOHISTORY

NATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE GLOBALIZATION CONTEXT AND Roin HISTORIOGRAPHY METREVELI 110

CENTRAL EURASIA IN THE “BIG GEOPOLITICAL GAME” OF THE LATE 19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES Parvin (Pages of Geohistory) DARABADI 119 6 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Eldar MAMEDOV

Vice-President of the International Association for Judicial Administration, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND COURTS O ORDINARY JURISDICTION IN AZERBAIJAN: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS O THEIR INTERRELATIONS

Abstract

his article enlightens several factors same thing. The Constitutional Court and T concerning the building of a qualita- Supreme Court are entirely different judi- tively new judicial system in the Azer- cial bodies, each of which functions within baijan Republic based on democratization the limits of its own jurisdiction in accord- of the judicial system and legal procedure. ance with its own individual procedures. In this context, the creation of a Constitu- The article also looks at several prob- tional Court in the country has increased lems arising in practice relating to the re- the possibility of obtaining judicial protec- view of cases and judicial acts deemed tion of human rights and freedoms and con- vitiated by the Constitutional Court. The tinues to have an influence on many other author concludes that every entity of judi- legal institutions and factors. cial enforcement should have a clear idea The article notes that although consti- and understand the constitutional law in tutional legal procedure, like cassation pro- practice by making use of the correspond- cedure (as well as procedure deriving from ing decisions of the Constitutional Court, it by way of ancillary cassation), is carried which in turn will make it possible to out strictly with respect to law issues, these achieve uniform application of constitution- procedures should not be defined as the al law and ensure legal stability. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION I n t r o d u c t i o n

The division of state powers into legislative, executive, and judicial branches is one of the basic characteristics of a state ruled by law.1 In turn, judicial power plays a special role in the system of division of power by performing the task of resolving different kinds of disputes, conflicts, and other legal problems and ensuring the guaranteed right of each person to fair judicial examination (including the right of access to court and the judicial protection of rights and freedoms from illegal infringe- ments). Acquiring its independence and adopting the Constitution of a state dedicated to building a democratic, law-abiding, and secular state, the highest goal of which is to ensure human and citizen rights and freedoms, as well as profound political, economic, and social changes, required that Az- erbaijan adopt new approaches to the way judicial power and the functioning of the judicial bodies are organized. It is a well-known fact that in countries where an absolute monarchy and religious or estate institutions predominate, the emphasis is placed on state coercion and the use of an entire range of repressive structures. In such countries, courts also become part of the repressive machinery: they are centralized, subordinate, and accountable to higher courts, and they are managed by command-administrative methods. In contrast to them, in countries with a developed democracy, courts, while administering justice, exercise control in order to prevent abuse by the authorities, on the one hand, and to ensure that an individual does not break the law, on the other. In these countries, every person is guaranteed the right to seek judicial protection of his rights and freedoms. When the Constitution was adopted in 1995, Azerbaijan rejected the legal system inherited from Soviet times, and the republic began carrying out judicial reform, keeping in mind the generally accepted international standards. This reform was aimed at building a qualitatively new judiciary based on democratization of the judicial system and legal procedure. To emphasize the special role of judicial power, a separate chapter is devoted to it in the Consti- tution of the Azerbaijan Republic, consisting of 9 articles2 and covering questions relating to the organization of judicial power, the foundations of the judiciary, the fundamental principles and conditions of legal procedure, requirements for those wishing to be judges, guarantees of the independence and immunity of judges, as well as general provisions relating to specific institutions of judicial power. For instance, the Constitution provides that judicial power in the Azerbaijan Republic is executed only by courts administering justice—the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and other ordinary and special courts of the Azerbaijan Republic.3 In order to implement the constitutional provisions and ideas of judicial reform, a whole series of new laws and codes was adopted, new judicial power bodies were created and began functioning, and then a new judicial corps was formed and began working in Azerbaijan. Within the framework of judicial reform, comprehensive measures for reorganizing the judicial system were consistently carried out, new institutions of judicial power were created, the fundamental principles of independence were strengthened, the status of judges raised, judicial administration was decentralized, new rules, procedures, and proceedings in procedural legislation were established (including new appeal and qualitatively new cassation procedure), supervisory proceedings were elim- inated, the functions of the procurator’s office in legal procedure were restricted, a higher level of realizing the right to qualified legal assistance was ensured, judicial review over the restriction of

1 The ideas about division of powers were formulated and conceptually justified as early as the 18th century by humanistic thinkers Montesquieu, Locke, Diderot, d’Alembert, Helvetius, and others. They form the basis of Western Euro- pean and North American legislation. In Azerbaijan, as in other post-Soviet countries, they came into demand after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and formation of the newly independent states. 2 See: Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, Chapter 7, Arts 125-133. 3 See: Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, Art 125, the first and second parts. 8 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION such fundamental human rights as the right to freedom, the right to property, the right to personal immunity, the right to inviolability of residence during inquest and preliminary investigation was introduced, and many other innovations were applied aimed at carrying out justice in keeping with the law, within reasonable deadlines, without any preference, discrimination, or predilection, on the basis of a complete, objective, and comprehensive legal investigation with observance of the equality and adversary nature of the parties. The creation of a Constitutional Court (CC) in the country has significantly increased the possibility of obtaining judicial protection of human rights and freedoms. On the one hand, this is due to its broad powers and vast opportunities in ensuring supremacy of the Constitution, but on the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the “Constitutional Court is an institution of democratic changes which functions in almost all post-totalitarian states for the purpose of protecting the new constitutional values and which ensures the stability of constitutions and the conformity to plan of constitutional development. It promotes adequate interpretation and introduction of generally accepted principles and standards of international law into the national legal systems, in so doing creating prerequisites for bringing the corresponding system closer to the others, primarily to the European legal system.”4 As in other countries, in Azerbaijan, relations between the Constitutional Court and other courts develop from their ties, which can be conditionally divided into institutional, procedural, and functional. Many legal factors influence these relations, including the special features of the judicial system, the competence of courts of ordinary jurisdiction, the model of constitutional review applied in the country, the possibility of appealing to constitutional review and ways of organizing it, the powers of the CC, the legal effect, and the consequences ensuing from the decisions of this court, etc. Therefore, in order to identify the gist of the problem of interrelations among these institutions of the judicial system, we will take at least a brief look at a few of these numerous factors.

Special eatures of the unctioning of Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction in the Azerbaijan Republic

All the courts in Azerbaijan, with the exception of the Constitutional Court, constitute a three- link system of courts of ordinary jurisdiction,5 which include courts of primary jurisdiction, appeal, and cassation instances. Courts of ordinary jurisdiction are organized in conformity with the Azerbaijani Law on Courts and Judges and act according to special procedures, which are usually envisaged by the Civil Proce- dure Code, the Code of Administrative Offences, with respect to conducting administrative legal proceedings, and the Criminal Procedure Code of the Azerbaijan Republic. Most courts of ordinary jurisdiction consist of courts of primary jurisdiction, most of which are district (city) courts. They examine civil and criminal cases (of crimes that do not present high social

4 V.D. Zorkin (Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation), “Voprosy kostitutsionnogo razvitiia,” in: Rol’ Kostitutsii v stanovlenii pravovoi gosudarstvennosti, Collection of speeches at a conference devoted to the 10th anniversary of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, Publication of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic, Baku, 2006, p. 170. 5 We uphold the concept that exists in many countries, according to which courts examining criminal and civil cases are classified as courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION danger or less grave crimes), other documents envisaged by Civil Procedure or Criminal Procedure legislation,6 as well as cases of administrative offences. Specialized courts for economic disputes and military courts are also considered courts of primary jurisdiction. The first group of courts only examines civil cases of disputes between legal or natural persons engaged in business activity without a legal status or with the status of an individual businessman, and the second only examines criminal cases of crimes that do not present a high social danger or less grave crimes and are considered military crimes, crimes against military service, or crimes committed by servicemen. The Court for Cases of Grave Crimes and the Military Court for Cases of Grave Crimes occupy a special place among the courts of primary jurisdiction. They differ from district (city) courts and military courts in that their jurisdiction correspondingly applies to the entire territory or to all the military units of the country’s Armed Forces garrisons,7 examine only criminal cases of grave or especially grave crimes, and do this exclusively as full bench courts (in the presence of three judges).8 All courts of primary jurisdiction examine cases within their competence at judicial sittings in keeping with the regulations of procedural legislation with the participation of the parties and other participants in the trial. They resolve on the merits the legal disputes and conflicts under review, for which they must draw up a full, comprehensive, and objective picture of all the circumstances of the case, give an appraisal of the evidence presented by the parties in court and, after correctly applying the standards of substantive and procedural legislation, issue a final judicial decision (judgment). This judgment of a court of primary jurisdiction comes into force upon expiry of the deadline envisaged by procedural legislation for lodging a complaint (protest),9 which courts of appeal are responsible for examining. These courts10 also belong to the system of courts of ordinary jurisdiction, essentially being regional courts of secondary jurisdiction. They examine complaints (protests) exclusively in full bench judicial sittings (in the presence of three judges) with the participation of all the parties and other participants in the trial in conformity with the rules of appeal proceedings. Courts of appeal choose the scope of such proceedings themselves based on the requirements of procedural legislation, specific arguments of the complaint (protest) applicants, and keeping in mind the circumstances of previous legal proceedings in courts of primary jurisdiction. Courts of appeal have the right to verify the correctness of the actual circumstances of the case established by courts of primary jurisdiction and the standards of substantive and procedural legisla-

6 For example, documents concerning statements about the protection of electoral rights, documents regarding complaints against decisions, acts (omission to act) of officials, documents regarding the execution of judicial decisions (judgments), documents regarding the execution of judicial review during inquests and preliminary investigation, and so on. 7 In keeping with the amendments introduced on 30 December, 2005 into the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Courts and Judges, the creation of a Court for Cases of Grave Crimes in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is also expected. 8 In conformity with Art 359 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in some cases, the law-giver examines criminal cases in these courts with the participation of the jury. But the provisions of procedural legislation relating to proceedings with the participation of the jury will come into force in conformity with the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Approval, Coming into Force of the Criminal Procedure Code and Legal Settlement of Issues Relating to This upon completion of judicial reform and after the adoption of a special law. 9 In keeping with Art 360 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Azerbaijan Republic, the deadline for submitting a complaint (protest) regarding civil cases is one month from the day the court of primary jurisdiction issues its decision. In conformity with Art 384.1 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the deadline for submitting a complaint (protest) regarding criminal cases is 20 days from the moment the court of primary jurisdiction issues the judgment. 10 In conformity with the amendments introduced on 30 December, 2005 into the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Courts and Judges, the functioning of the Supreme Court of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is envisaged in this capacity, as well as five courts of appeal located in the cities of Baku, Ganja, Sumgayit, Ali Bairamli, and Sheki. 10 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tion applied by them. According to the results, they may leave in force, change, or annul judicial decisions (judgments) adopted previously under corresponding cases (documents) by courts of primary jurisdiction, and issue essentially new judicial decisions (judgments). Any decision (judgment) of a court of appeal immediately comes into force after it has been announced. However, the participants in the trial have the right to submit a cassation appeal (protest) in the way and by the deadline set forth by procedural legislation,11 the examination of which falls within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic. The Supreme Court (SC) heads the system of courts of ordinary jurisdiction in our country. It is the highest judicial body for civil, criminal, and other cases relating to the proceedings of ordinary and special courts and functions exclusively as a court of cassation.12 Four collegiums of the SC are engaged in the examination of cassation appeals (protests): for civil cases; for cases of economic disputes; for criminal cases; for cases of military courts. They all function as full bench courts (in the presence of three judges) and hold special judicial sittings with the participation of representatives of the parties to the case on which the protest was made. The Collegiums of the Supreme Court only have the right to verify whether courts of appeal correctly use the standards of substantive and procedural legislation. According to the results of the judicial sitting, they may pass a resolution to leave in force, change, or annul judicial decisions (judgments) adopted by courts of appeal in corresponding cases (documents) and send the case to be examined once more by a court of appeal. The Supreme Court collegiums do not have the right to establish the actual circumstances of the case, but can, by annulling the previous decision, issue essentially new judicial decisions on civil cases, keeping in mind the actual circumstances of these cases established by courts of primary jurisdiction and courts of appeal.13 Within the deadline set forth in procedural legislation,14 resolutions of the SC collegiums may be appealed by way of ancillary cassation proceedings by lodging an appeal (protest) or by making a representation by the Chairman of the Supreme Court.15 Protests are examined by the Supreme Court Plenary Session, which is made up of a chairman, deputy chairman, chairmen of the collegiums, and judges of the Supreme Court possessing equal rights. The Plenary Session gathers at special sittings no less than once every three months, sets to work in the presence of no less than two thirds of its members, and adopts resolutions by a majority vote of those present.16 The Supreme Court Plenary Session may re-verify on the merits the correctness of application by courts of the standards of substantive and procedural legislation and, depending on the results, leave in effect, change, or cancel previously issued decisions on this case. Just like the collegiums of

11 In compliance with Art 405.1 of the Civil Procedure Code, the deadline for submitting a cassation appeal (protest) regarding civil cases is 3 months from the day the decision is adopted. In compliance with Art 410.1 of the Criminal Procedural Code, cassation appeals (protests) regarding criminal cases may be lodged from the day a verdict is issued: in the case of a sentence of acquittal within six months; in the event of a judgment of conviction if the verdict must be aggravated (deterioration of the legal status of the accused)—within 12 months; in the event of a judgment of conviction due to innocence of the accused or the need to alleviate (improve) his legal status—within 18 months. 12 See the first part of Art 131 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic. 13 The provision envisaging this right appeared recently, that is, seven years after the Civil Procedure Code was adopted, as the result of introducing amendments into this Code by the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic of 17 April, 2007. It should be emphasized that there is no such provision in the Criminal Procedure Code. 14 In compliance with Art 426.2 of the Civil Procedure Code, the deadline for submitting a complaint (protest) or representation by way of ancillary cassation regarding civil cases is two months from the day the resolution is adopted by the collegium. In compliance with Art 423.2, a complaint (protest) or representation by way of ancillary cassation regarding criminal cases may only be submitted within 12 months from the day the disputed resolution is passed. 15 In accordance with Art 423 of the Civil Procedure Code, this representation regarding civil cases may only be submitted on the basis of addresses by persons not involved in the case, if the judicial acts affect their interests. 16 In compliance with Art 80 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Courts and Judges, at least two thirds of those present is required to adopt resolutions on the annulment of judicial decisions due to aggravation of the legal status of the convict, a judgment of acquittal, or a resolution on halting proceedings in a criminal case. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Supreme Court, the Plenary Session does not have the right to establish the actual circumstances of the case. In practice, the Plenary Session’s resolutions come into force immediately after they have been signed by the Supreme Court chairman. And in special cases, they may be reviewed, but only during proceedings upon the discovery of new circumstances, or proceedings in case of the discovery of new facts relating to the violation of rights and freedoms.17

The Constitutional Court in the Judicial Power System

Although it belongs to the branch of judicial power, the Constitutional Court in Azerbaijan is essentially a sui generis court. We should take heed of the following in order to understand its purpose, place in the country’s judicial system, and powers with respect to establishing fundamental legal standards. Any contemporary Constitution, following the attributes of a law-abiding state, confirms the supremacy of the law and guarantees respect for and the observance of human rights and freedoms. However, it is not enough just to have a Fundamental Law that meets these requirements. Judicial review must also be exercised to ensure that no one violates this Law. It is also very important that the power system itself (including its legislative, executive, and judicial branches) does not abuse its possibilities. The Constitutional Court is responsible for carrying out this review in full conformity with the “European” model of judicial constitutional review18 in Azerbaijan. The Constitution not only places the Constitutional Court at the head of judicial power, but also, in contrast to other courts, directly stipulates all its powers.19 The CC in our country is the highest body of constitutional justice. It has broad powers of constitutional review which courts of ordinary jurisdiction cannot and do not have by the very virtue of their nature. The Constitutional Court verifies the normative legal acts of the legislative and executive bodies, as well as acts of municipalities, for their conformity to the Constitution and/or normative legal acts of the Azerbaijan Republic which have greater juridical force in the legal hierarchy, as well as juridical acts for their conformity to the Constitution or laws of the Republic. In addition to this, the CC interprets the Constitution and laws; it resolves disputes relating to the division of powers between the branches of power, verifies and confirms the results of elections of

17 Proceedings on new facts relating to the violation of rights and freedoms set forth in Azerbaijan both by the Civil Procedure Code (Chapter 44-1, Art 431.1-431.4), and the Criminal Procedure Code (Chapter I.III, Arts 455-460) as procedures necessary for reviewing adopted legal decisions by way of resolutions of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbai- jan Republic or decisions of the European Court on Human Rights performed by courts of ordinary jurisdiction. 18 The idea of the European model proceeds from the fact that continental law recognizes the supremacy of the law and the subordinate role of judicial practice. This is why there is no desire to give the right to control the constitutionality of laws and other acts to courts of ordinary jurisdiction. After World War II, this idea has been actively used to protect the democratic achievements. So many countries have created special courts or quasi-legal departments (they are often provisionally united under the general name of Constitutional Court), the main task of which is to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution. Today, constitutional courts function in Albania, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and other countries, including in most of the new, post-Soviet states. 19 The powers of the Constitutional Court are set forth in Arts 86, 88, 102, the second and third parts of Art 104, the first part of Art 107, the third through seventh parts of Art 130, and Art 153 of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 12 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION parliamentary deputies; officially announces the results of the country’s presidential election, resolves issues relating to his impeachment in the event he commits a grave offence, his dismissal from his post in the event he resigns or is incapable of performing his duties for health reasons; issues conclusions regarding proposals to amend the Constitution, and so on. It should be emphasized in particular that the Constitutional Court does not have the right to make decisions on amendments to the text of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic adopted at a referendum,20 due to its nature as a court that verifies acts falling under its jurisdiction for their conformity precisely to the Constitution. In this way, the Constitution, which serves as the basis for executing standard control on the part of the CC, can in no way simultaneously be its object. Although the Constitutional Court in the Republic may resolve disputes relating to the division of powers between the power branches, it does not settle questions of competence between different courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Organization of the Court, the procedure for conducting constitutional proceedings, ensuring the status of judges, and other issues regarding the functioning of this body are regulated by the Law on the Constitutional Court, which also sets forth that the main tasks of the CC are ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution and protecting the rights and freedoms of each person.21 It carries out the very important tasks of deciding what restrictions shall be placed on these rights and freedoms and of establishing the permissible limits of these restrictions. It is important to note that “when constitutional review is exercised in the sphere of law-making (rule-making), constitutional courts simultaneously carry out the additional function of assisting legislative activity, both with respect to its improvement and development (through the “negative” and to a certain extent “positive” legislative powers of constitutional courts), and in confirming the constitutional principles in the legislative process. In particular, the legal positions of the Constitutional Court contained in its decisions form the basis for future legislative regulation and act as its criteria, parameters, and peculiar models.22 It should be noted that, within the framework of certain conditions and limits, the Constitution grants the law-giver powers to regulate human and citizen rights and freedoms by adopting laws and corresponding normative acts that regulate the conditions and rules for realizing human and citizen rights and freedoms, as well as the guarantees of their protection and the forms of liability for their violation. But the regulation of human rights and freedoms is in most cases accompanied by the opposition of individual and public interests, as well as of the incompatible rights and legitimate interests of different individuals. This delicate problem is frequently resolved by the Constitutional Court by checking the constitutionality of legislative acts. German legal expert Klaus Stern had the following to say about this: “The existence of all basic rights, even in cases where they follow from natural human rights is reasoned, on the one hand, by the State’s participation in the protection and provision of these rights, and, on the other, by the same State’s opposition to these rights. There is only one way out of this dilemma—to draw a fine differen- tiating line between the protection of basic freedoms and their restriction.”23 If, for some reason, the legislature or law-enforcement bodies did not do this before, the Consti- tutional Court’s main task now consists precisely in making this differentiation, protecting human rights and freedoms, intercepting their violations, and preventing unjustified restrictions on the part of the Fundamental Law.

20 See Art 154 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic. 21 See Art 1.2 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court. 22 See: N. Vitruk (judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation), “Vystuplenie na temu ‘Avtoritet kostitutsionnogo pravosudiia v kontekste osushchestvleniia ego funktsii v gosudarstvakh novoi demokratii,” in: Samostoiatel’nost i avtoritet sudebnoi vlasti,” Collection of conference documents, Publication of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic, GTZ and ABA CEELI, Baku, 2002, p. 246. 23 Quoted from: Obshchaia teoriia prav cheloveka, Norma Publishers, Moscow, 1996, p. 157. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The generally accepted restrictions on human rights and freedoms act as criteria making it possible to define the degree of an individual’s freedom and protection. And the Constitutional Court essentially establishes the correlation of the restrictions imposed by means of various acts, the Consti- tution, and laws, relying in so doing not only on the principle of supremacy of the Constitution and the priority of human rights and freedoms, but also on other generally accepted norms of contemporary international law. They form a single whole in the activity of the Constitutional Court, which, proceeding from this, is called upon to ensure unity of all the judicial practice and rule-making activity of the state authorities and municipalities adopting various acts. As a rule, the Constitutional Court in Azerbaijan cannot initiate constitutional court proceedings on its own initiative.24 Until recently, in order to start up the court’s mechanism, an inquiry was required from one of six entities (the President, the Milli Mejlis (parliament), the Cabinet of Minis- ters, the Supreme Court, the Procurator’s Office of the Azerbaijan Republic, or the Ali Mejlis (parliament) of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic), invested with this right, since they represent the power system. Keeping this in mind, to ensure more effective use of constitutional review for the purpose of protecting human rights and freedoms, the range of entities with the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court was increased by introducing amendments into the Constitution at a national referendum on 24 August, 2002. As a result, each entity was granted the right to lodge a complaint with the CC. Courts of ordinary jurisdiction could appeal to the CC for an interpretation of the Con- stitution or laws, and ombudsman with an inquiry to verify the constitutionality of normative legal acts of legislative or executive power, as well as of the acts of municipalities and courts. Court proceedings held in the Constitutional Court may be of two types: ordinary and special. Under ordinary proceedings, issues are examined regarding the conformity of normative legal acts of the legislative or executive bodies, as well as of the acts of municipalities to the Constitution and/or normative legal acts of the Azerbaijan Republic which have greater juridical force in the legal hierarchy. All other issues relating to the competence of the CC are examined according to special constitutional legal proceedings.25 Persons or bodies sending an inquiry, request, or complaint to the Constitutional Court, or persons or bodies that adopted the act regarding which the inquiry, request, or complaint is lodged, are the parties in ordinary constitutional legal proceedings. Special constitutional legal proceedings are participated in by the entities interested in them. All parties and entities in the corresponding type of constitutional proceedings have similar rights and obligations. For example, in any form of constitutional proceedings, they have the following rights: to participate in and speak at judicial sittings; to present evidence and other documents; to submit proposals and petitions on questions regarding the case; to ask for witnesses and experts to be invited to court; to make a last plea; and to familiarize themselves with the minutes of the judicial sitting and make comments about it. In addition, in ordinary constitutional proceedings, the parties have the right to get acquainted with the materials of the constitutional case; to take excerpts from these materials and make copies; to participate in studying the evidence; to ask questions of each other, the witnesses, and the experts; and to protest against the petitions, evidence, and opinions voiced in the addresses of the other party. The obligations of the parties and entities in each form of constitutional proceedings are as follows: respect for the Constitutional Court; observance of the requirements of the legal proceedings; appearance in the Constitutional Court at the scheduled time; respect for the procedure set forth by the Constitutional Court Statute; and immediate execution of instructions of the person chairing the CC sitting.

24 The only case was envisaged by Art 107 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, in correspondence with which the Constitutional Court initiates the procedure of impeachment of the President of Azerbaijan and completes it after the Supreme Court has drawn its conclusion and held special hearings in the Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan. 25 See Art 41 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court. 14 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In cases where the Supreme Court has submitted an inquiry to the Constitutional Court, it will also be considered the applicant’s party, but if this court or the courts of ordinary jurisdiction have duly appealed to the CC with an inquiry to interpret the Constitution or laws, the initiator of this inquiry will be considered an entity interested in special constitutional proceedings. On the other hand, if a decision of the Supreme Court (and this is also possible at the same time as other judicial acts) is challenged in the Constitutional Court, the SC shall be considered the respondent on that challenge. The Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan consists of nine judges. They are distributed between two chambers which make decisions on the acceptance of inquiries, requests, or complaints for court examination. Constitutional cases are heard on the merits by the CC Plenary Session, to which all of its judges belong and who all enjoy (including the chairperson) equal rights in constitutional legal proceedings and have one vote in the adoption of decisions. The examination of inquiries, requests, or complaints is carried out with a full bench, at open judicial sittings, with the adversary nature of the parties and interested entities and with experts and specialists invited if necessary. Legal proceedings in the Constitutional Court are held in the state language,26 court decisions of the issues examined on the merits are adopted in a conference-room in the form of Plenary Session resolutions by a majority of votes of the judges.27 These resolutions come into force since the time decided by the Constitutional Court itself. In the event the unconstitutionality or unlawfulness of the acts disputed is established on the basis of CC Plenary Session resolutions, they or some of their provisions are deemed vitiated. Res- olutions of the Constitutional Court are final and binding in the Azerbaijan Republic; they may not be annulled, changed, or officially interpreted by anyone. All persons in our country, including officials (as well as judges of all jurisdictions), must unconditionally subordinate themselves to these resolutions. Resolutions of the Constitutional Court are published in official newspapers, a special information bulletin, and freely placed on the CC’s website in Azerbaijani, Russian, and English. Drawing this brief description of the Azerbaijani judicial power bodies to a close, we will note that the special jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, including its direct execution of review over the judicial acts of the Supreme Court, elevates it to a certain extent above the other state power branches, which has led both to the high status of the Constitutional Court among the state power branches and to its promotion to the top of the pyramid of the judicial power bodies.

Procedural and unctional Relations between the Constitutional Court and Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction

First of all, we will note that there are no fundamental relations between the Constitutional Court and courts of ordinary jurisdiction regarding conditions for appointing Constitutional Court judges, as is the case in most European countries.28 All the same, one of the Constitutional Court judges is a member of the Judicial-Legal Council,29 which, incidentally, does not have any particular

26 In so doing, persons who do not have command of the language of the legal procedure have the right to an inter- preter and the right to speak in their native language. 27 In order to adopt resolutions of the CC Plenary Session, it is usually necessary for at least five judges to vote for a particular decision. In certain cases, 6 or even 7 votes must be gathered for adopting a decision (i.e. on the impeachment of the president of Azerbaijan). 28 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and so on. 29 In compliance with Art 1 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Judicial-Legal Council, this body is called a self-government judicial body. It is headed by the Minister of Justice. It includes, in addition to 9 judges (chair- Vol. 1 (3), 2007 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION influence on the relations between the Constitutional Court and courts of ordinary jurisdiction. They have largely been developing by means of their procedural and functional ties. Procedural ties between these judicial bodies are formed by courts of ordinary jurisdiction participating in constitutional legal proceedings. This participation can be provisionally divided into two periods—before and after the institution of constitutional complaint entered into effect. During the first period, only the Supreme Court of the courts of ordinary jurisdiction could appeal directly to the Constitutional Court with an inquiry to verify the conformity of normative legal acts or of the acts of municipalities to the Constitution and normative legal acts which have greater legal force in the legal hierarchy to settle disputes on the division of powers among the branches of power, as well as to interpret the Constitution and laws. At that time, the Supreme Court often made use of its right to send inquiries to the Constitutional Court, but its activity significantly decreased during the period after the institution of constitutional complaints came into effect. For example, whereas between 1999 and 2003, inquiries from the Supreme Court constituted from 38.4% to 73.3% of all the complaints accepted during the year by the Constitutional Court for examination, in 2004, this index had dropped to 6.7%, and in 2005 to 5.6%.30 Beginning in 2006, the Supreme Court stopped sending any inquiries at all to the Constitutional Court. As a result, the overall percentage of Constitutional Court decisions issued on the basis of Supreme Court inquiries currently amounts to 32.6% (44 decisions out of a total of 135 issued). Against this background, other courts of ordinary jurisdiction are more active; they were recently granted the right of direct appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding interpretation of the Consti- tution and the laws on the observance of human rights and freedoms. According to their own initiative, or upon the petition of one of the parties to the dispute or conflict being examined, they halt the proceedings until they issue their own final decision and send a pre-judicial statement to the Consti- tutional Court. The hearing of these statements has already resulted in the Constitutional Court adopting five decisions.31 In general, it should be noted that procedural relations between the Constitutional Court and courts of ordinary jurisdiction are developing differentially, depending on the form in which courts of ordinary jurisdiction act in constitutional legal proceedings. When the Supreme Court applies to the Constitutional Court to verify the constitutionality of acts falling under its jurisdiction as a quo court, or this or any other court applies to interpret the Constitution and laws, they participate in the constitutional legal proceedings as the initiating entity. In this case, it is obvious they want to receive answers concerning questions and problems arising in judicial practice, using the potential of the Constitutional Court. Their increased interest in the legal positions of the Constitutional Court, which acts as an ex officio court, is due to their unconcealed desire to actively make use of these positions for settling specific cases. Possibly, this is due to the fact that, although the Constitutional Court is not authorized to examine the requests of ordinary courts on questions of fact, when hearing complaints of a quo courts, it keeps in mind, and often carefully studies, the facts set forth by an a quo court, even though it is not supposed to assess them sensu stricto. Incidentally, this is possible precisely to the same extent as it is possible for man of the Supreme Court, judges of the Constitutional Court, two judges each from the Supreme Court and courts of appeal, a judge of the Supreme Court of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, and two judges from courts of primary jurisdiction), two representatives of executive power, as well as one representative each from the Parliament, General Proc- urator’s Office, and the Bar Association of Azerbaijan. 30 On the basis of inquiries from the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court issued 23 decisions on the interpretation of laws, one decision on the interpretation of the Constitution, 18 decisions on the conformity of laws to the Constitu- tion, one decision on the division of powers among the branches of power, and one decision on verification of the conformity of a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers to the laws. 31 It should be noted that although the Constitutional Court issued a total of five decisions on statements of various courts of ordinary jurisdiction (apart from the Supreme Court), there were seven such statements, and two of them were not adopted during Constitutional Court proceedings. 16 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION these courts to offer their own decisions and motivation about the constitutionality of some rule or its interpretation in their inquiries or addresses to a body of higher constitutional justice, even though the Constitutional Court has nothing to do with the formulation of questions of a quo courts. After 2003, when a constitutional complaint began to be applied, different qualitatively new procedural relations developed between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. This is largely due to the fact that with respect to complaints regarding judicial acts, the Supreme Court finds itself in the uncomfortable position of appellee in constitutional legal proceedings. The certain amount of tension that arises due to this can to some extent be considered inevitable, since both courts are not only high courts, they are also engaged in law enforcement, which essentially gives rise to the possibility of different perception and implementation of legal rules. Nor should we forget that, in so doing, the Constitutional Court becomes a “controller,” which from the viewpoint of the higher constitutional justice body not only verifies the constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s decisions, but also, if there is reason, deems them vitiated.32 In recent years, the largest number of cases heard by the Constitutional Court are precisely constitutional complaints. For example, beginning in 2004, 47 of the 62 decisions it adopted were issued after the examination of constitutional complaints. Keeping in mind the influence their consideration has on the relations between the Constitutional Court and courts of ordinary jurisdiction, we should note several special features of constitutional legal proceedings on complaints and their consequences. Based on the provisions of the fifth part of Art 130 of the Constitution, each person can be recognized as a subject of the right to lodge a constitutional complaint, although current legislation does not stipulate who “each person” precisely refers to.33 Some demands to recognize a certain person as the subject of such a complaint can nevertheless be formulated based on the constitutional rule itself. For example, it is obvious that the subject of a constitutional complaint should be the bearer of certain rights and/or freedoms and precisely these rights and/or freedoms should be violated by the normative acts of legislative or executive bodies, judicial acts, or acts of municipalities. So the purpose of any constitutional complaint is to restore the rights and freedoms violated by the disputed act.34 For understandable reasons, Azerbaijan, having recognized the right of each person to lodge a complaint with the Constitutional Court, has not borrowed the experience of a few countries and has not established the institution of actio popularis complaint, which gives the right to challenge corresponding acts for their non-conformity to the Constitution in the event the applicant’s rights were not violated. What is more, the applicant must possess the rights against the violation of which he is complaining. Proceeding from this, legal persons or public officials can take advantage of the right to lodge a constitutional complaint only in the event they possess the rights against the violation of which they are complaining, and only as natural persons or on behalf (with the consent) of citizens (natural persons). Disputing questions about the conformity of normative acts of legislative or executive bodies and acts of municipalities to the Constitution or normative legal acts which have greater juridical force in the legal hierarchy, as well as about the conformity of judicial acts to the Constitution and

32 In compliance with Art 66.4 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court, judicial acts recognized by this court to be in non-conformity with the Constitution or laws should not be executed and should be reviewed as envisaged by procedural legislation. It is precisely this circumstance that gives reason to believe that the Con- stitutional Court is in a certain sense the highest judicial body in the hierarchy of judicial power. 33 Therefore in practice, definition of natural or legal person in this capacity has become the task of the Constitu- tional Court. 34 The Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan, on which much depends today with respect to recognizing a particular person as a subject of a constitutional complaint, upholds the certified positions of other Constitutional Courts. For example, it proceeds from the fact that, as in Croatia, Germany, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland, legal persons or public officials can make use of their right to submit a constitutional complaint. But they can do this in their own or personal interests (for example, to protect their rights, which they enjoy in just the same way as natural persons). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION other laws is the subject-matter of a constitutional complaint. In so doing, a legal dispute to be settled by the Constitutional Court absolutely must be based on the violation of human rights and freedoms. This is an integral attribute of the subject-matter of any constitutional complaint. Only normative legal acts of legislative and executive bodies, judicial acts, and acts of municipalities violating human rights and freedoms may be an object of a constitutional complaint. The consideration of complaints with any other content is not within the Constitutional Court’s competence. In this respect, it should also be kept in mind that persons alleging their rights and freedoms to be violated by the acts of local executive bodies or other state bodies35 have the right, as envisaged by the legislation, to ask a court to verify the disputed act or its specific part for conformity to the Con- stitution and laws of the Azerbaijan Republic. When examining complaints, the Constitutional Court usually exercises specific constitutional review36 and only abstract review in certain exclusive cases.37 Therefore, a constitutional complaint should be lodged, as a rule, after all other possibilities of appeal in courts of ordinary jurisdiction have been exhausted. Six months from the day a decision by the last court went into force is the deadline for doing this. This rule is largely explained by the fact that a constitutional complaint performs the function of an exclusive or subsidiary (that is, reserve) legal means of judicial-legal protection, as well as by the desire to reduce the work load of the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that as a result of the preliminary use of other judicial-legal means for protecting rights and freedoms, courts of ordinary jurisdiction establish the actual circumstances of the case and choose certain legal positions for its settlement. This creates a certified basis for the Constitutional Court to settle legal disputes. In this way, full advantage should be taken of any procedural ways to appeal a specific judicial act in the corresponding form of legal proceedings on civil or criminal cases, or cases on administrative offences, before a constitutional complaint is lodged. Incidentally, if the applicant is not permitted to make use of such possibilities, that is, his right to access to court is violated, he may lodge a complaint with the Constitutional Court three months after such a violation has been committed in courts of ordinary jurisdiction. Moreover, in exceptional cases, a constitutional complaint may be lodged immediately with the Constitutional Court without taking into account the general demand for all possibilities of appeal to be exhausted in courts. This is possible if, as the result of the adoption of an act falling under constitutional review (including a judicial act), not only might the applicant’s rights and freedoms be violated, but he might also sustain severe and irreparable damage impossible to prevent by means of other courts.38 This provision of the legislation39 creates the possibility of direct and immediate access to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan uses certain mechanisms for screening (filtering) constitutional complaints.40 For starters, all the complaints lodged are first considered by the Constitu- tional Court apparatus. Depending on the results of this consideration, the court’s staff can:

35 For example, by acts of the Central Elections Commission or the National Bank of the Azerbaijan Republic. 36 A specific type of review arises with respect to the examination in a court of any specific dispute. In this event, both a pre-judicial appeal to the Constitutional Court with a court inquiry for the purpose of ensuring correct law enforcement, and a constitutional complaint, which follows after a court has issued its decision or after the act of an administrative body has been issued, are usually possible. 37 An abstract form of review arises as the result of abstract doubts of the applicant about the constitutionality of a particular disputed act. In this case, a decision on the constitutionality of the act (rule) may be issued independent of its application. In principle, in the Constitutional Court, abstract review is only exercised regarding complaints of state power bodies or public officials listed among the subjects of the right to send such inquiries to court. 38 Current legislation does not indicate what should be understood as a “severe and irreparable damage.” It can be presumed that its criteria will be established by the Constitutional Court in each specific case. 39 See Art 34.5 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court. 40 See Arts 36.1, 36.2, and 37 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court. 18 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

1) send the complaint to be examined by a corresponding state body under its subordination in the event the complaint clearly does not relate to the competence of the Constitutional Court, and inform the applicant of this; 2) inform the applicant in the event clear violations are identified of Arts 34.6, 34.7, and 35 of the Law on the Constitutional Court during drawing up of the complaint, and suggest that he fulfill the requirements indicated in the Law; 3) in other cases, send the complaint and the documents appended to it within five days to the Constitutional Court Chairman, as well as notification that the complaint has undergone preliminary consideration.41 After preliminary consideration of the complaint by the Court apparatus, the Constitutional Court Chairman appoints one or several judge-reporters, who study all the questions in advance and prepare the complaint for review. In so doing, a judge-reporter has the right to gather all the necessary documents and materials for examination of the complaint in the Constitutional Court; ask state power and local self-government bodies to supply documents, materials, and cases relating to the complaint; present the complaint to the parties, receive from them written statements on the complaint, and so on.42 Then, as a rule, within 30 days from the day the statement of the judge-reporter is received, a complaint should be considered at a closed sitting of one of the chambers of the Constitutional Court, which issues a corresponding decision in the form of a court ruling on the possibility of accepting a specific complaint for examination in court.43 Complaints are not accepted for examination by the Constitutional Court only in those cases when they were drawn up without taking the Law’s requirements into account, the issue raised in them does not apply to the Court’s competence; they were lodged by a person without the right to do so; the right to appeal a judicial act was not fully exhausted or documents were not submitted that confirm violation of the right of access to a court of ordinary jurisdiction; or if a Constitutional Court decision already exists on the particular question.44 Constitutional complaints are examined on the merits at sittings of the Constitutional Court Plenary Session, usually no later than 60 days from the day they are accepted for examination by the Court. The parties or interested entities have the right to participate in these judicial sittings, but if they do not make use of this right, or they do not appear at the judicial sitting without good reason, this will not affect the legal proceedings being conducted in their absence. On the other hand, if an applicant withdraws his complaint, the proceedings begun in the Constitutional Court are halted. Constitutional legal proceedings are usually carried out orally, but with the consent of the parties or interested entities (in correspondence with the rules established by the Constitutional Court Statute), the Plenary Session of this Court may review the constitutional case in keeping with a written procedure.45 Today, the opinion abounds in Azerbaijan that a constitutional complaint regarding judicial acts has essentially become a kind of cassation appeal. Theoretically, since it disputes the constitutionality

41 In compliance with the provisions of the Constitutional Court Statute, after carrying out the recommendations of the Court’s apparatus, an applicant may appeal to the Constitutional Court again, or, if he does not agree with the actions of the Court’s apparatus, he may appeal to the Court again and demand an examination of his complaint by the judges. 42 See Art 36.3 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court. 43 A copy of the Chamber’s ruling is sent to the applicant within seven days. After the chamber refuses to accept a complaint for examination by the CC (with the exception of cases when a complaint is not accepted due to the fact it was not drawn up in keeping with the requirements of the new Law, as well as in cases when full exhaustion of the right to appeal judicial acts or violation of the right to access to court has not been confirmed), all repeat complaints from the same applicant on the same subject-matter are sent to the CC without consideration. 44 These reasons are set forth in Art 37 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court. 45 Although this provision is also contained in Art 27.2 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on the Constitutional Court, there has been no such a case so far in practice. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and legality of such acts, and also contains a request to carry out a special constitutional procedure to annul their judicial force, this opinion possibly has some justification.46 But although constitutional legal proceedings, just like cassation proceedings, as well as the proceedings deriving from them by way of ancillary cassation, are carried out strictly on law issues, they should not be defined as the same thing. The Constitutional Court and Supreme Court are entirely different judicial bodies, each of which functions within the limits of its own jurisdiction in accordance with its own individual procedures. During constitutional legal proceedings on complaints regarding judicial acts, the Constitution- al Court does not examine civil or criminal cases, or cases of administrative offences, regarding which the disputed acts are issued. It does not have the authority to establish the actual circumstances of cases reviewed in courts, but investigates only questions of the correct use or interpretation by courts of normative legal acts in order to establish the conformity of these acts to the Constitution and laws, as well as restore violated rights and freedoms. When issuing a decision on a constitutional case, the Constitutional Court does not settle disputes and conflicts settled in other courts. Judicial acts which are deemed vitiated on the basis of Constitutional Court decisions are not executed, and cases regarding which these acts were issued are reviewed in courts of ordinary jurisdiction as envisaged by procedural legislation. In order to do this, the Supreme Court Plenary Session first annuls the judicial acts that have been deemed vitiated on the basis of a Constitutional Court decision and sends the corresponding case to be examined anew from the stage at which the Consti- tutional Court established the violation of rights and freedoms of the applicant of the constitutional complaint. The new examination begins in the court to which the case was sent in keeping with the rules established for examination in the corresponding court, taking into account the legal positions of the Constitutional Court. According to a well-known German professor, Rolf Knipper, “the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany announces an investigation of all the doubts and accusations inclined to become a ‘super supervisory instance’ during investigation of the decisions of ordinary courts, only with respect to the following questions: 1) is the judicial decision based on the significance of basic rights and an “essentially errone- ous act” of broad scope; 2) did the court act arbitrarily; 3) did judicial law-making overstep the bounds of constitutional law or its analogy?”47 Today, if anyone who wishes carefully studies the decisions adopted by the Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan on complaints regarding judicial acts, he can convince himself that we have occupied a position similar to that of our German colleagues.

Decisions of the Constitutional Court as a Source of Law

The legislation of the Azerbaijan Republic defines decisions of the Constitutional Court as normative acts.48 This definition has great and indisputable importance with respect to recognizing court decisions as sources of law.

46 A cassation appeal usually implies asking for the review of a legal decision by a higher instance due to violation of laws or non-observance of the rules of legal proceedings. 47 Rol’ Konstitutsionnogo suda v zashchite demokraticheskikh tsennostei, Collection of documents of the conference, Azerbaijan Publishers, Baku, 2004, p. 301. 48 See Art 3.1 of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Normative Legal Acts. 20 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The precedence49 created by decisions of the Constitutional Court has regulatory significance and, in this sense, they are rules possessing high judicial force, which can be applied to similar circumstances in constitutional-legal relations. Based on this, legislative bodies and law-enforcement bodies (including courts) are obliged in their future activity to be guided by the Constitutional Court’s decisions and the provisions ensuing from them. Nevertheless, in practice, there are still attempts to dispute the question of whether Constitu- tional Court decisions can be considered a judicial precedent.50 In order to do this, the opinion is used that since a judicial precedent can be understood as the use by one court of the legal consequences of cases to which another court came during examination of a case with essentially similar circumstances, we cannot talk about such a precedent with respect to Constitutional Court decisions. Therefore, if this court gave an interpretation of any law, its decision is only binding in cases relating to the application of this particular law. In this case, however, the matter might concern not an analogy, but a similar provision, not the similarity of actual circumstances of the case, but the legal content of the law being applied. On the other hand, when evaluating Constitutional Court decisions, many give priority to the question of their pre-judicial significance. Establishment by this court of the conformity or non-conformity of a particular act or its individual provisions, which falls under its jurisdiction, to the Con- stitution should in itself be perceived as a special fact of pre-judicial significance for all entities engaged in questions of rule-making and law-application, including for courts of ordinary jurisdiction. In particular, this fact makes it impossible for courts to apply an act or its individual provisions that have been deemed vitiated by the Constitutional Court. But an evaluation of the legal nature of Constitutional Court decisions from the viewpoint of their pre-judicial nature cannot fully encompass the essence and significance of these decisions, which not only establish the fact of conformity or non-conformity of particular acts to the Constitu- tion, but also in some sense, by replenishing these acts, transform them into their inherent part. This is particularly pertinent for Constitutional Court decisions adopted with respect to interpretation of the Constitution and laws. In our opinion, we should take a differential approach to the answer to the question of the qualitative significance of the legal force of Constitutional Court decisions in the various legal disputes and conflicts examined in courts. There is no doubt that in the cases being examined by such courts, regarding which inquiries were sent to the Constitutional Court, its corresponding decisions have a specific pre-judicial significance. The juridical force of Constitutional Court decisions applies to all legal relations regulated by the legal rules on which its decisions were issued. Therefore, when considering any case in courts of ordinary jurisdiction, Constitutional Court decisions relating to the interpretation of the Constitution and laws, as well as any act or its provision deemed vitiated due to its non-conformity to the Constitution or laws, are decisions entailing legal consequences of a precedent nature. Constitutional Court decisions also have a precedent nature in those cases regarding which the judicial acts issued were subsequently disputed by means of a constitutional complaint. When settling other cases, courts of ordinary jurisdiction should proceed from the actual circumstances of the cases they ascertained, and when establishing the similarity of legal disputes, the legal positions reflected in Constitutional Court decisions adopted previously on complaints regarding judicial acts under other cases absolutely must be taken into account.

49 A juridical (legal) precedence—decision of a court or any other authorized state body issued on a specific case and binding in the subsequent settlement of similar cases. 50 Keeping in mind that the essence of a precedent consists of the fact that a judicial decision adopted on a specific case has mandatory significance (the force of a legal regulation) during the subsequent settlement of similar cases in courts of law. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Incidentally, when taking Constitutional Court decisions as sources of law,51 only one question is disputed—about whether the meaning of the operative and descriptively motivated part of a Con- stitutional Court decision is different from the viewpoint of legal consequences.52 The Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan noted in this respect: “The high juridical force of a Constitutional Court decision applies to all parts of the decision, as well as to the legal positions forming its foundation. But in some cases, the Constitutional Court’s legal positions acquire an independent significance. Since the force of the Constitutional Court’s legal positions is equal to the juridical force of its decisions and is of a general nature, this decision should apply not only to the circumstances forming the subject-matter of the constitutional case, but also, as a source of law, to similar cases encountered within law-enforcement practice.”53 One of the important questions for perceiving Constitutional Court decisions as a source of law is the interrelation between these decisions and legislative acts. The decisions of this court are often regarded as a source of law in the sense that, with their help, gaps in the law are temporarily filled in. The Constitutional Court often carries out this function when interpreting the laws. But for courts and other law-enforcement bodies, its decision constitutes the legal basis for filling in the gaps until the law-giver himself fills them in. In some cases, the Constitutional Court acts as a “negative legislature”54 and, without a doubt, this activity leads to significant changes in legislation. As a result of this, a problem arises relating to the fact that the Constitutional Court as a “negative legislature,” deeming a legal rule vitiated, does not settle these relations regulated by this rule, as a result of which a gap appears in the legislation. There is a popular opinion in the Azerbaijani juridical community that, along with the basic function of “negative legislature,” the Constitutional Court should also be vested to a certain extent with the functions of a “positive legislature.”55 This is necessary so that when the Constitutional Court adopts a decision to deem a legal rule vitiated to avoid gaps appearing in the legislation, it could temporarily and under certain conditions regulate the relations still unregulated after its decision. But, keeping in mind the principle of division of powers, the Constitutional Court of Azerbaijan avoids interfering in questions relating to the competence of other organs of power. It proceeds from the fact that a legislative or executive body, or other judicial bodies, cannot and should not replace this court. Therefore, after considering specific cases, the Constitutional Court introduces certain recommendations in its decisions, if necessary, on the expediency of undertaking certain measures to legislatively regulate particular questions. It should be noted in particular that a Constitutional Court decision is a legal precedent not only for other courts, but also for itself. It essentially cannot ignore those legal positions that it formulated in its previous decisions. It does not have the authority to review its own decisions, and so in the future, when examining a different case, it can, if necessary, after returning to its previous position, improve it by replenishing it with new ideas. The latter may not contradict the previous position, but they may clarify and develop it.

51 The provisions of Art 13.7 of the Civil Procedure Code and Art 10.3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Az- erbaijan Republic are taken as the basis for this acknowledgement. 52 In particular, the descriptively motivated part reflects the legal positions of the Constitutional Court on the question under review. 53 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic of 25 January, 2005 on Conformity of Item 9 of the third part and Item 7 of the fourth part of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Introducing Addenda and Amend- ments into Several Legislative Acts of the Azerbaijan Republic No. 688-IIQD of 11 July, 2004 to the ninth part of Art 130 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, in: Sbornik postanovlenii Konstitutsionnogo suda Azerbaidzhanskoi Re- spubliki po individualnym zhalobam, Iuridicheskaia literatura Publishers, Baku, 2005, p. 523. 54 Recognizing normative legal acts or their provisions as vitiated, it changes the content of the legal rule and in this way acts as a “negative legislature.” 55 S.A. Mirzoev (head of the apparatus of the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic), “Rol’ Konstitutsionnogo suda v razdelenii vlastei,” in: Rol’ Konstitutsionnogo suda v zashchite demokraticheskikh tsennostei, p. 224. 22 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Some Urgent Problems of the unctional Relations between the Constitutional Court and Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction

The exclusive competence of the Constitutional Court in carrying out so-called rule control with respect to the issue of decisions on the constitutionality of a particular act and endowing it with appropriate validity by means of actual annulment of this act or its provisions extends only to the rules of the Constitution or other normative legal acts adopted by legislative bodies,56 central executive bodies,57 as well as the acts of municipalities. But it should be kept in mind that persons considering their rights and freedoms to be violated by normative acts of local executive bodies have the right to appeal to courts of ordinary jurisdiction as envisaged by civil procedure legislation to verify the conformity of the disputed act or its specific part to the Constitution and laws of the Republic. With respect to the review of cases, the judicial acts on which were regarded as vitiated, several disputed questions have arisen in practice. For example, should there be certain limitations on the legal examination of cases during their proceedings in the Supreme Court Plenary Session and during subsequent legal procedure? The Constitutional Court explained its viewpoint on this question as follows: “During the examination of new circumstances relating to the violation of human rights and freedoms, the hearing of cases on law issues by the Supreme Court Plenary Session should not be a pretext for it to assume the powers of the Constitutional Court or distort (revise, expand, limit, or interpret in some other way) its decisions, being of detriment to the efficacy of constitutional justice, and should be carried out in keeping with the constitutional status of a court of cassation. In so doing, the Supreme Court and other courts should adopt their decisions only within that framework established by the Constitutional Court on the corresponding case. These limits form the law issues indicated in the decisions of the Constitutional Court and the human rights and freedoms recognized by the Constitutional Court to be violated.”58 Another question arousing an ambiguous attitude is which of the possible decisions on sending cases for review to a particular court should the Supreme Court Plenary Session make when annulling a judicial act during the examination of new circumstances relating to the violation of human rights and freedoms? In practice, in 38 cases out of 44, when annulling judicial acts, the effect of which was deemed vitiated on the basis of a Constitutional Court decision, the Supreme Court Plenary Session sent corresponding cases to be reviewed by a court of appeal. The Constitutional Court has the following viewpoint on this question: “With respect to sending cases for a new judicial examination, it should be emphasized in particular that it should be returned precisely to that stage at which the Con- stitutional Court revealed the violation of human rights and freedoms. Returning a case to an earlier stage and repeat examination of the case at that stage of the legal proceedings where no judicial errors had previously been made not only does not correspond to the goals of the institution of proceedings

56 Legislative bodies should be understood as the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic and Ali Mejlis of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, each of which adopts laws and decisions within its competence. 57 Central executive bodies in Azerbaijan should be understood as ministries, state committees, committees, and other bodies of the Azerbaijan Republic equated therewith. 58 Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic of 25 January, 2005 on the Conformity of Item 9 of the third part and Item 7 of the fourth part of the Law of the Azerbaijan Republic on Introducing Addenda and Amendments in Several Legislative Acts of the Azerbaijan Republic No. 688-IIQD of 11 July, 2004 to the ninth part of Art 130 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, in: Sbornik postanovlenii Konstitutsionnogo suda Azerbaid- zhanskoi Respubliki po individualnym zhalobam, p. 524). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION under new circumstances relating to the violation of human rights and freedoms, but it does not serve the efficient restoration of the violated rights.”59 Unfortunately, a certain amount of ambiguity in the current legislation is sometimes responsible for the appearance of acute situations in our country due to a delay in the final settlement of cases in courts. For example, in keeping with procedural legislation, on the basis of a Constitutional Court decision during the proceedings under new circumstances related to the violation of human rights and freedoms, invalidated judicial acts should be annulled by the Supreme Court Plenary Session. This in itself gives rise to several questions. For example, to what extent is the annulment of invalid judicial acts legally legitimate? If it is legally legitimate, why should other types of acts which also fall under constitutional review and are vitiated on the basis of a Constitutional Court decision not be annulled by the respected body that adopted them or by a higher organ of state power? On the other hand, how correct is turning the Supreme Court—the highest judicial body for civil, criminal, and other cases relating to the examination by ordinary and special courts—into a pow- erless “mediator” for reviewing cases with respect to the loss of the legal effect of the judicial acts issued in these cases on the basis of a Constitutional Court decision? Will this kind of “mediation” not be detrimental to the very name and reputation of the Supreme Court? For whom and for what purpose was it necessary to create a formal procedure with the participation of the Supreme Court Plenary Session, if it essentially only redirects the case to a court named by the Constitutional Court? Why, in so doing, is it necessary to have a “legitimate” loss of three months and artificial delay in court proceedings that have exceeded all reasonable deadlines as it is? One of the questions creating tensions in relations between the Constitutional Court and courts of ordinary jurisdiction is taking the legal positions of the Constitutional Court into account in the activity of these courts. It is clear that such courts that examine cases again must act in keeping with a Constitutional Court decision. The high juridical force of Constitutional Court decisions applies to all its parts, as well as to the legal positions forming the foundation of its decisions. But it should also be kept in mind that, in most cases, these legal positions, having been “separated” from the corresponding decisions, are acquiring an independent significance. Due to the fact that their juridical force is equal to the juridical force of the Constitutional Court decisions and is of a general nature, it should be related not only to the case constituting the subject-matter of a specific constitutional case, but, as a source of law, should also apply to all similar cases encountered in law-enforcement practice. The Constitutional Court itself is noting a wider scope of action of the legal positions of its decisions and is pointing to the need to take them into account not only in law-enforcement practice, but also in future activity on legislative settlement. Sometimes repeat complaints are lodged with the Constitutional Court after review in courts of ordinary jurisdiction concerned with judicial acts, the juridical force of which was overturned by the Constitutional Court. These complaints indicate that the violations established by it earlier were re- peated in courts of ordinary jurisdiction during the review of cases. Citizens largely evaluate this as cases of deliberate delay of cases and judicial tyranny. In our practice, there were two cases when the Constitutional Court was forced to examine complaints again and overturn the juridical force of decisions of the Supreme Court Plenary Session because they were issued essentially with the same violations of the applicant’s rights that were noted in the previous decisions of the Constitutional Court, where it also declared these violations and the non-conformity of the judicial acts to the Constitution and laws. There is no doubt that with respect to the supremacy of the Constitution and priority of human rights and freedoms, the Constitutional Court believes such instances to be impermissible. But in order to prevent them, the position of the legislature should be clearly designated. Specific questions should be resolved within the framework of the judicial system. In any case, rapid settlement of all questions is the common task of both legislative and judicial powers.

59 Ibid., p. 526. 24 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Another important aspect giving rise to misunderstanding in the relations between the Constitu- tional Court and courts of ordinary jurisdiction is interpretation of the Constitution and laws. In Az- erbaijan, their official interpretation relates to the competence of the Constitutional Court. As of the present, the Constitutional Court, on the basis of inquiries of the Supreme Court, has adopted 23 decisions on questions regarding interpretation of the laws and one decision on interpretation of the Constitution. In addition, it has also adopted five decisions on the interpretation of laws on the basis of complaints of courts of ordinary jurisdiction (the Sabail District Court, Kiapaz District Court, local economic court No. 1, Court of Appeal of the Azerbaijan Republic, and Sura- khan District Court). Nevertheless, it is a well-known fact that in judicial law enforcement, it is also impossible to settle some questions without a judicial discretion. So a general understanding of the differentiation of cases is required—when there is a real need for official interpretation of the provisions of the Con- stitution or laws by the Constitutional Court, and when these provisions can be applied by courts without any official interpretation—on the basis of a judicial discretion. The Constitutional Court itself does not consider its own authority to interpret the Constitu- tion or laws to be its obligation to interpret any obvious provision of the Constitution or laws in the event courts appeal to it with this question. So, on several occasions, it did not accept their complaints to interpret the laws for examination, pointing out, in so doing, the need to resolve the questions raised in the complaints within the framework of a judicial discretion within the competence of courts on law enforcement. On the other hand, instances are known when, during the examination of cases in courts of ordinary jurisdiction, the official interpretation of the provision of a law given by the Constitutional Court was not taken into account, and decisions were adopted that completely contradicted it. The Constitutional Court adopted decisions in which it noted the impermissibility of such instances.60 It is presumed that each entity of judicial law enforcement is obliged to have a clear idea and understand the constitutional law in practice by making use of the corresponding decisions of the Constitutional Court. Courts of ordinary jurisdiction should fully understand that ensuring legal stability, timely forecasting of government decisions, the authority of the Constitution, and uniform application of constitutional law requires that this law become generally recognized and apply to each as a standard.

C o n c l u s i o n

It stands to reason that a competent, independent, and impartial system of justice is a necessary prerequisite for protecting constitutionality and legality. But if there is no democratic system, there can be no legal procedure from the viewpoint of fair justice. And if there is not the latter, the law cannot be executed fully, and this means there is no living law. Recognizing the independence of judicial power, the forefather of the theory of the division of powers—great French thinker Montesquieu—believed it to be no more than the “mouthpiece of the law.” At the beginning of the 20th century, a supporter of the division of powers—well-known Rus- sian lawyer Vladimir Hessen—noted that implementation of this principle presumes, “on the one hand, supremacy of legislative power, and, on the other, subordination to executive and judicial power.”61 But the absence of any other references, apart from the current legislation, essentially places the

60 For example, Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic of 17 June, 2004 on the Conformity of Legal Decisions to the Constitution and Laws of the Azerbaijan Republic regarding the Complaint of G.A. Mustafaeva (see: Sbornik postanovlenii Konstitutsionnogo suda Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki po individualnym zhalobam, p. 586). 61 V. Hessen, O pravovom gosudarstve. K reforme gosudarstvennogo stroia Rossii, Issue 11, Pravovoe gosudarstvo i vsenarodnoe golosovanie, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 27. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION court on the same level as the executive bodies, making it equal to the applicant subordinate to the legislature. The appearance in courts of the new function of constitutional review unknown to Mon- tesquieu and his contemporaries radically changed the status of judicial power. “Granting courts the right to deem vitiated and annul the rules of power and administration bodies drastically changes the role of the court. It is no longer a body for settling individual disputes, its competence extends to rule-making. In so doing, the authority of the court is to a certain extent raised higher than the authority of the power body, since the court can annul the decision of this body, but it cannot annul a court decision.”62 Without forgetting the system of checks and balances, it should be kept in mind that judicial power is both a subject and an object of the limitations of the state’s plenary powers. The law-giver and the president appoint the members of the higher judicial bodies, the justiceship of a judge, the amount of financing the judicial bodies receive, and so on. It is the legislature which decides precisely which social relations should be legal relations, and, consequently, should be subject to judicial protection. The creation of judicial power and the development of society’s civil self-organization have the same source—a change in the social behavior of the people. The components of judicial power as a social whole, in the form of its bearers and the institutions of civil society in different forms, interact with each other. The nature and direction of this interaction reflects the level of legal and political culture of both parties. The efficacy of judicial power as the most important institution of a democratic state ruled by law depends not only on the number of judges, their professional training, the sufficient financing of courts, and so on, but also on how actively citizens uphold their rights and on their adherence to legal forms of resolving conflicts. The state of judicial power reflects the degree of development of constitutionalism, the level of protection of personal rights and freedoms, as well as the maturity of the civil society structures that are the foundation of democracy. One of the basic criteria of this state is how accessible is the judicial protection of rights and freedoms, the justice of the procedures being used, and the impar- tiality of the judges. When talking about Azerbaijan, we must nevertheless not forget: “On the whole, the degree of autonomy, independence, and authority of judicial power in the European states is determined by historical features and traditions, the level of legal conscience and legal culture of society, the dom- inance of a totalitarian or law-abiding state, and other factors.”63 An important role in this is played by the constitutional recognition of the progressive principles of the judiciary and legal procedure, as well as raising the prestige of constitutional justice. “Time is required for the state not to be declarative, but to respect, observe, and protect human rights and freedoms in practice as its highest value. Long and intense work of political parties and other institutions of civil society is required for human rights and freedoms to begin defining the meaning, content, and application of the laws and the activity of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and of local self-government. In the final analysis, the task of a civil society and political parties as one of its institutions consists in making the Constitution, which declares personal rights and freedoms its highest value, a genuine and living law. Achieving this goal depends on the maturity and creative force of civil society, which should assimilate humanistic and democratic values and create a comprehensive system of legal procedures and institutions based on deep respect for human rights and freedoms.”64

62 R.Z. Livshits, “Sudebnaia praktika kak istochnik prava,” in: Sudebnaia praktika kak istochnik prava, Moscow, 1977, p. 7. 63 G.I. Nikerov, “Sudebnaia vlast v pravovom gosudarstve (Opyt sravnitel’nogo issledovaniia),” Gosudarstvo i pravo, No. 3, 2001. 64 V.D. Zorkin, op. cit., p. 163. 26 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The Constitutional Court of the Azerbaijan Republic is exerting every effort to affirm the principles of the supremacy of the Constitution and respect for human rights and freedoms in the interrelations among all the state bodies, society, and each of its members—including by means of implementing the rules and standards of international law. By playing a significant role in forming democratic institutions of society and a law-abiding state, ensuring people’s power in its diverse forms, upholding the constitutional principle of the division of powers, forming judicial power, establishing the generally accepted principles and standards of international law as a concentrated legal expression for achieving progress in world social development, the Constitutional Court has become an author- itative and pivotal body of the young Azerbaijani state.

Rustam MAMEDOV

Ph.D. (Law), head of the Department of International Public Law, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

DISARMAMENT AND DEMILITARIZATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA ROM THE VIEWPOINT O INTERNATIONAL LAW

Abstract

he article examines the role of inter- militarization, and so on. The conclusions T national law in regulating the naval he draws are based on the standards of activity currently unfolding in the international law and international law Caspian Sea region. In this context, the practice and reflect a realistic picture of author looks at ways to limit military ac- the military-political processes going on tivity: demilitarization, neutralization, non- in this region.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

For almost two centuries, the Caspian was considered Russia’s “inland sea,” and it was the only country with the right to engage in naval activity there. So it is unlikely we shall find a source indicat- ing the qualitative characteristics of this unique kind of military activity. No one knows how many weapons were deployed there or when, or what submarines cruised there, which, incidentally, they still do. We only know that in the Soviet era, the Caspian was part of the action zone of the Soviet Union’s southern military ventures. This vector was considered the most important, since “uninvited” guests always came from the south. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The situation completely changed in the post-Soviet period, when all the Caspian littoral states began holding talks to discuss the security of the Caspian Sea and possible control mechanisms over arms and disarmament. It became clear that the time of Russia’s free military activity in the Caspian had come to an end. New players appeared in the region, including non-littoral, who began to demand that conditions be established for determining the number of arms deployed both in the basin of the sea itself, and on its surrounding territory. During the talks, generally known terms applied at one time by Russian diplomats, servicemen, and seamen with respect to oceans, seas, and other water areas, such as “zone of peace,” “nuclear-free zone,” “demilitarization,” “neutralization,” “arms control,” “use of the zone for peaceful purposes,” and so on, came into active use. Several Caspian states began insistently demanding that international order be established during and after the signing of the Russian-Kazakhstani agreement of 1998 on demarcating the seabed of the northern part of the Caspian. As A.I. Gusher justifiably notes, a situation arose where the Caspian Sea could become an arena of major disputes and conflicts, an arena not only of an economic and political, but also of a military struggle.1 It is a well-known fact that in recent years essentially all the Caspian states have been working to further build up their naval forces in the Caspian Basin. But this animation is fraught with violating stability in the Caspian region. To stave off a disaster, an agreement should be reached on limiting the naval activity of states in different zones of the Caspian Sea.

Demilitarization and Neutralization as a orm of Limiting Military Activity

Attempts to limit military activity in various bodies of water have been going on for a long time now. According to Ph. Pondaven, undertaking specific measures to limit arms on a global scale began with limitations on naval weapons.2 The threat of hotbeds of armed confrontation arising in the region prompted the authorities and nations of the Caspian region to take a serious look at the possible consequences of a hypothetical big or small war. We all know that the approach to resolving the disarmament problem requires efforts in different directions. In some cases, the negotiations should focus on limitation, reduction, or even elimination of certain types of arms.3 In others, it may be more realistic to carry out measures to deter the arms race or prevent it altogether in a particular area of the world. These measures include forming nuclear-free zones, drawing up a set of measures for regional disarmament and, finally, creating zones of peace, since the formation of the latter in different regions is in itself a measure of partial demilitarization.4 Implementation of the principle of the non-use of force is in fact an interrelated process of partial and full demilitarization. According to B.R. Tuzmukhamedov, “...demilitarization implies the contractual international legal regime in a particular territory or area (for example, outer space) that forbids its use for military purposes in peacetime. This measure presumes removing military fortifications and structures from a particular zone and introducing a ban on keeping armed forces there. De-

1 See: A.I. Gusher, “Geostrategicheskoe izmerenie problem Kaspiiskogo moria. Analiticheskaia zapiska,” available at [http://www.analitika.org/article.php?story= 20050523042501631]. 2 See: Ph. Pondaven, Les lacs-frontière. These... Pedone, Paris, 1972, ðp. 103-104. 3 See: V.F. Petrovskiy, Razoruzhenie: Kontseptsiia, problemy, mekhanizm, Politizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1982, pp. 94-96, 180-183. 4 See: Ibid., pp. 202-207, 217-222, 310-317; G.A. Osipov, Mezhdunarodno-pravovoi rezhim nerasprostraneniia iadernogo oruzhiia. Poniatie, osnovnye polozheniia, problema ukrepleniia, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1987, pp. 10-15; Vseobshchaia mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost. Mezhdunarodno-pravovye printsipy i normy: Spravochnik, ed. by B.M. Klimenko, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia Publishers, Moscow, 1990, pp. 40-45, 63-71, 91-100. 28 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION militarization can be full or partial. In the first case, it presumes the elimination or prohibition of any military activity in a particular territory or area, which can apply not only to armed forces, weapons, and military fortifications and structures, but also to the production, importation, and transit (transportation) of materiel and the testing of various types of weapons. It also implies a ban on military training and recruitment into the armed forces, the passage of warships through the area, the flight of military airplanes over it, and so on.”5 According to Ariel Cohen, demilitarization is aimed at strengthening peace and international security. Its implementation makes it possible to exclude particular regions, territories, areas, and cosmic bodies of high strategic and international significance from the arms races and prevent them from being used for military purposes.6 He goes on to note that international agreements on demilitarization usually set forth the specific types and forms of prohibited actions. Whereby the types and forms of prohibited actions in a specific region established by an agreement may not automatically be applied to another demilitarized region or structure.7 B.M. Klimenko shows that demilitarization can be full or partial, temporary or permanent. As a rule, demilitarization of a region, territory, area, or cosmic body also implies its neutralization.8 Summing up the analysis of this legal category, it can be concluded that the concept “demilitarization” includes clearly established and strictly defined types and forms of military activity subject to prohibition in the demilitarized region (territory, sphere, space, or cosmic body). In Western legal literature, there is the opinion that the activity of states aimed at creating demilitarized zones is a component of the struggle for universal and full disarmament. What is more, the definition of the term “demilitarization” envisages putting special measures into practice aimed at strengthening and maintaining peace and international security. In this way, states exclude areas and territories from the arms race, new wars, and conflicts.9 In so doing, the creation of demilitarized zones should be accompanied by drawing up measures for strengthening trust, which promotes mutual understanding and raises the level of confidence in the military activity of the littoral states.10 If there are favorable conditions on the borders of many countries, an entire system of demilitarized zones could be created, which would make a significant contribution to establishing international security. In international practice, demilitarization frequently goes hand in hand with neutralization. The concept “neutralization” means establishing special negotiated legal conditions for particular territories, areas, and cosmic bodies, in compliance with which states are prohibited from conducting military action in them or using them as a basis for warfare. The Spitsbergen Archipelago, Antarctica, zones of the Suez and Panama canals, and the Moon are neutralized.11 The doctrine of international maritime law also suggests neutralizing the open sea, which could be entirely applied to the sea expanses of zones of peace beyond the territorial waters of littoral states.12 The parties concerned strive for neutralization in order to exclude certain territories and regions from the sphere of military action, and in so doing reduce the potential war zone and its destructive consequences, as well as help to reduce the arms race and strengthen trust and cooperation among

5 B.R. Tuzmukhamedov, Zony mira, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia Publishers, Moscow, 1986, pp. 13-14. 6 See: Kh. Ismailova, “Eshche ne vecher. Amerikanskiy politolog Ariel Cohen v interviu “Ekho” obeshchaet, chto my eshche uvidim shagi Vashingtona,” Ekho, Saturday, 18 August, 2001. 7 See: Ibidem. 8 See: B.M. Klimenko, “Sozdanie demilitarizovannykh zon,” in: Vseobshchaia mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost, pp. 170-171. 9 See: R.R. Churchill, A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Juris Publishing, University Press, Manchester, 1999, pp. 430-431. 10 See: V.A. Romanov, “Protiv gonki vooruzheniy i konfrontatsii na moriakh,” Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia Pub- lishers, Moscow, 1989, pp. 158-166. 11 See: B.R. Tuzmukhamedov, “Mery po ukrepleniiu doveriia,” in: Mezhdunarodnoe pravo, mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost. Dialog sovetskikh i amerikanskikh ekspertov, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia Publishers, Moscow, 1991, pp. 315-316. 12 See: L. Timchenko, Quo Vadis, Arcticum? The International Law Regime of the Arctic and Trends in the Devel- opment, State University Press Osnova, Kharkiv, 1996, pp. 55-58. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION states. What is more, it represents those conditions created in particular territories and regions, areas, and cosmic bodies, in accordance with which states are prohibited from conducting military action there or using them as a basis for warfare.13 The composite concepts “demilitarization” and “neutralization” make up the legal content of the term “exclusively for peaceful purposes,” widely used in contemporary international law. Ac- cording to several scholars, it envisages the prohibition of all types and forms of military activity.14 It should also be noted that nuclear-free zones, their possible status and conditions, no matter where they were created, on land or sea, should correspond to the main provisions of international law, otherwise they cannot be recognized as binding for the entities of international law. The parties to an international agreement creating this kind of zone determine the specific content of the zone of peace, keeping in mind its specifics. The agreement indicates the spatial limits of the zone, the scope and nature of the measures to be adopted to form it, as well as the participants in the undertakings to create and preserve the zone of peace. Italian scientist N. Ronzitti emphasizes that there is a tangible link between the zones of demilitarization and neutralization (in particular, nuclear-free zones) and zones of peace.15 Zones of peace can be land or sea areas, as well as border (international) lake regions. In this way, in the theoretical and practical respect, the main elements of the concepts “demilitarization,” “neutralization,” and “nuclear-free zone” can and should be incorporated to various degrees into the concept of “zone of peace.” Whereby these elements can be different for each geographic region in correspondence with the military and political realities existing there.

The ormation and Content of Convention Standards on Demilitarization and Neutralization of the Caspian Sea

The problem of demilitarizing the Caspian expanses was a topic of discussion at almost every meeting of the Special Working Group, particularly after the attack of Iranian warships on Azerbai- jani oil fields on 23 July, 200116 and 11 September, 2001, when peaceful and military American facilities were the target of a terrorist attack. The Iranian side made a frequent and insistent point of the need to demilitarize the Caspian Basin. For example, according to Artie McConnell, “Russia’s military buildup in the region (the Caspian Sea.—R.M.) is perceived by Iranian leaders as a threat to their negotiating position on the Caspian issue.”17 “From idea to law” became Iran’s leitmotif with respect to disarmament and arms control in the Caspian Sea,18 after which Azerbaijan,19 Kazakhstan,20 and Turkmenistan21 followed suit.

13 See: G.S. Gorshkov, G.M. Melkov, Voennoe moreplavanie i strategicheskoe ravnovesie: mezhdunarodno-pravovye aspekty, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 111. 14 See: Ibid., pp. 116-117. 15 See: N. Ronzitti, “Demilitarization and Neutralization in the Mediterranean,” Italian Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 6, 1985, pp. 33-34, 53-54. 16 See: A. McConnell, “Iran Announces Unilateral Decision to Develop Caspian Resources,” p. 2, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav060402.shtml]. 17 Ibidem. 18 See: E. Pastukhov, “More pazdora,” Kontinent, 29 August-11 September, 2001. 19 See: S. Mamedov, “Azerbaijan Wants Demilitarization of the Caspian. In Baku a Working Group Begins Its Work on the Caspian’s Status,” Zerkalo, Friday, 7 October, 2005 (in Azerbaijani). 20 See: S. Gamova, “Kaspiiskii balans. Kazakhstan predlagaet kontrolirovat rost vooruzheniia v regione,” Novye Iz- vestia, 10 June, 2004. 21 See: A. Kurtov, “Kaspiiskoe more: neposledovatelnost Rossii nanosit ushcherb natsionalnym interesam,” available at [www.nasledie.ru]. 30 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

As a result, this initiative found its expression in the draft of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. In particular, Art 3, as proposed by Iran and supported by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, contains Para. 3, which stipulates that activity in the Caspian should be carried out on the basis of the principle “[demilitarization of the Caspian Sea].”22 But sixteen Special Working Group sittings were unable to reach an agreement on it. Russia was against and continues to be against this idea and principle,23 so the draft text contains no explanatory provisions regarding the demilitarization of the Caspian. A broader interpretation of this question can be seen in the speech by former head of the Work- ing Group on the Caspian Sea of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador A. Urnov, presented on 22-23 March, 2001 in London at the summit on problems of Caspian oil and gas: “Russia’s policy in the Caspian Sea region is determined by several factors… A topic of particular concern is the threat of international terrorism and religious extremism. Regional and local conflicts present another threat. Russia is extremely interested in resolving them as quickly as possible…The scope of these interests requires Russia’s multidimensional presence in this region, including military. ...This is why at the current stage we cannot agree to demilitarization of the Caspian Sea.”24 How has Moscow motivated its refusal to disarm the basin of this unique water body all these years? This position was graphically shown at one time by former special representative of the Rus- sian Federation V. Kaliuzhniy, who at the opening of the First International Forum in Astana, said: “Russia is in favor of non-militarization, and not demilitarization, of the Caspian region, as well as of arms limitation and carrying out military-building within the framework of reasonable adequacy. It is not yet time to disarm. Some of our partners are raising the question of demilitarizing the Caspian. This is hard to understand. Demilitarization means disarmament, but how are we to fight terrorists in that case? They have no intention of disarming and will be only too happy to fill the vacuum that will arise if we demilitarize.”25 This statement is tantamount to a refusal to demilitarize the Caspian. Instead a position was offered that calls for non-militarization of the Caspian Sea and the region, i.e. for establishing control over the existing weapons supplies. This is a clear hint by the Russian Federation to their Caspian neighbors who are not entirely disarming. A unique and paradoxical situation has developed in the region: the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), Republic of Kazakhstan (RK), and Republic of Turkmenistan (RT) are very actively supporting demilitarization, while actually comprehensively building up their arms. This primarily applies to Iran, which is intensively arming itself and demonstrating its position at the talks. For example, in the draft of the Agreement on Confidence-Building and Stability Measures in the Caspian Sea it proposed, Art 2.4 offers the Caspian countries codification on a five-way basis of the demilitarization principle of the Caspian Sea, which should serve as “…a factor for guaranteeing regional and international peace and stability.”26 In this way, Iran is conducting a policy of militarization in its northern regions, including the southern part of the Caspian Basin. This is graphically shown by the facts and statements of high-ranking officials in the Iranian government. In turn, Turkmenistan, a supporter of demilitarization and a permanently neutral state, gave instructions as early as 2002-2003 for its naval fleet to be formed in the Caspian.27 And immediate-

22 A Draft Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. Project, Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic For- eign Ministry. 23 See: I. Mamedov, “Iran: konkurent i soiuznik Rossii,” Ekho, Tuesday, 24 July, 2001. 24 A.Iu. Urnov, “Geopoliticheskie problemy Kaspiia,” A Speech at the Summit on the Problems of Caspian Oil and Gas, London, 22-23 March, 2001,” Bulletin “Ispolzovanie i okhrana prirodnykh resursov v Rossii,” No. 3-4, 2001, pp. 8-9. 25 Interview of Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation V. Kaliuzhniy, available at [http://www.mid.ru/ brp_4.nsf]. 26 A Draft Agreement on Confidence-Building and Stability Measures in the Caspian Sea. The IRI’s Project. Ar- chives of the Azerbaijan Republic Foreign Ministry. 27 See: R. Orudzhev, “Turkmenbashi razvorachivaet gonku vooruzhenii. Nagnetanie situatsii v regione budet pro- dolzhatsia,” Ekho, Saturday, 20 November, 2004. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ly after the incident with Azerbaijan “…Ashghabad began openly augmenting its military might.”28 As for Kazakhstan, despite its peace-loving position, N. Aliev and Kh. Ismailova write that “…the military potential of this country in the Caspian cannot be called weak. It is higher than Turkmenistan’s and Azerbaijan’s, although not as high as Russia’s.”29 According to K. Abuseitov, Russia’s negative attitude toward the question of demilitarization is its own business. “The gist of the idea to create small mobile Kazakhstani naval units in the Caspian does not mean that they will be directed against any of the states in the Caspian Basin. Kazakhstan relates the need to create these forces with the potential threats, primarily terrorist.”30 At the same time, the Republic of Kazakhstan believes it necessary to fix the principle of demilitarization in the text of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian. As follows from the above, the problem of neutralization is, unfortunately, still not urgent for the Caspian. A consensus has not been reached on the question of demilitarization, the Caspian states are unlikely to hold talks on neutralization, although it is no less important for objective and subjective reasons. On the other hand, the littoral states are not against counting how many weapons each other has and re-deploying them; therefore, in their initiatives they often touch on the question of arms control in the Caspian Sea and its mechanism.31 In particular, the IRI, in its initiative called “Draft of the Agree- ment on Confidence-Building and Stability Measures in the Caspian Sea,” devoted an article to this question. For example, in Art 10 “Surveillance and Visitation” (with four items), the Iranian drafters note that if they consent to this, each Caspian State shall provide the other Parties with information on the potential of its armed forces in the Caspian Sea […] miles from the coast” (Para. 10.1).32 And, finally, the confidentiality of surveillance. Tehran believes that “information on the amount, capacity, and potential of the forces present in the Caspian Sea will always be kept secret with respect to third parties”33 (Para. 10.4). In other words, the Caspian states in conflict with each other will have joint secrets that are not disclosed to the rest of the world. As strange as it may seem, Kazakhstan presented these proposals to the Caspian states. Its draft of the “Pact of Stability in the Caspian Sea” contains Para. 11, which provides for such cooperation between the Caspian states.34 For example, according to this regulation drawn up by Kazakhstani specialists, “the Parties state the need for creating a control mechanism over the arms in the Caspian Sea, including establishing their stable balance, as well as the quantitative and qualitative limits of such arms by entering a corresponding agreement.”35 In the new Iranian draft called “Treaty on Security and Stability in the Caspian Sea” 2006, Art 13 says that if it is adopted, the parties shall draw up control methods on a five-way basis in order to create a dynamic arms balance in the basin of the Caspian Sea. This will help to control the arms, their quantity and their quality in the Caspian.36

28 A. Aliev, Kh. Ismailova, “Ocherednoi ultimatum. Turkmenistan predupredil Baku o posledstviiakh, k kotorym privedet razrabotka mestorozhdenii, Iran sosredotochil voennye sily na granitse s nashei stranoi, Rossiia popolniaet Kaspiiskuiu flotiliiu novymi boevymi korabliami, a Kazakhstan prizyvaet k miry…,” Ekho, Saturday, 28 July, 2001; N. Aliev, “Oruzhie dlia Turkmenbashi. Sosed Azerbaidzhana prodolzhaet narashchivat vooruzheniia, rasplachivaias za nikh gazom,” Ekho, Saturday, 17 January, 2004. 29 A. Aliev, Kh. Ismailova, op. cit. 30 Ibidem. 31 For more detail, see: R.M. Valeev, Kontrol v sovremennom mezhdunarodnom prave, Center of Innovative Tech- nologies, Kazan, 2003. 32 A Draft Agreement on Confidence-Building and Stability Measures in the Caspian Sea. 33 Ibidem. 34 See: “Kazakhstan predlagaet priniat Pakt o stabilnosti na Kaspiiskom more,” available at [http://www.mideast.ru/ show_2867_rus.html]. 35 Ibidem. 36 See: A Draft Treaty on Security and Stability in the Caspian Sea. The IRI’s Project (2006). Archives of the Az- erbaijan Republic Foreign Ministry. 32 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It should be noted that Iran and Kazakhstan constantly insist during Special Working Group meetings for an examination of the principle of control over the quantity of arms. Although this pro- posal was incorporated into the project’s content (Art 31.3) of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, it has still not been agreed upon and retains its square brackets.37 And, of course, I would like to note the practice of the Caspian states regarding codification of the terms “exclusively for peaceful purposes” or “peaceful purposes”, which are closely related to the problem of demilitarization and neutralization. It is interesting that the Caspian states have already succeeded in agreeing upon this principle, and it is a component of Art 3.2 of the Convention Draft on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. This provision is also contained in the preamble of this document.38 The parties did not ignore the interpretation of the principle offered by the Republic of Kazakh- stan in the draft of the “Pact on Stability in the Caspian Sea:” “The Caspian Sea should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and all questions regarding the Caspian will be resolved by peaceful means by the Caspian States themselves.”39 The Iranian draft of the “Agreement on Confidence-Building and Stability Measures in the Caspian Sea” also recognizes this principle and declares: “The Parties to the Agreement emphasize that they are using the Caspian Sea exclusively for peaceful purposes” (Art 2.23). Art 7 of this project is interesting, in which the content and gist of the use of the Caspian Sea for peaceful purposes are set forth. In particular, in Para. 7.1, “the Parties are asked to assume the obligation to use the Caspian Sea exclusively for peaceful purposes.” For this purpose, the Caspian states are prohibited from any discharge of toxic or explosive substances, including the deployment of sea mines in the Caspian Sea in any form (Para. 7.2).40 The compilers of the Iranian draft believe that the sea may not be used for hostile or aggressive military action.41 Para. 7.4 is of interest from the viewpoint of this analysis. It states that “military technology in the Caspian Sea shall be used exclusively for legal defense purposes in compliance with the United Nations Charter.” In so doing, “the warships in the Caspian Sea shall remain, if possible, within the zone of national sovereignty of that Party to which they belong” (Para. 7.5).42 Para. 7.6 of the Agreement draft is disputable, since it leaves one of the Parties a broad range of possibilities with unpredictable consequences. This paragraph is formulated as follows: “If a sudden or serious threat is posed to the territorial integrity or political independence of one of the Parties, the Party subjected to aggression may defend itself in keeping with international law, providing the correlation between threat and rebuff is observed.”43 The tension created by the above-mentioned provision may be completely defused by Para. 7.7, which sets forth the procedure, according to which “the Parties may not, for various reasons, including preventive measures or the elimination of threats, use the Caspian Sea for military purposes without justification. And in any case, the principle is to use the Caspian Sea for peaceful purposes.”44 An analysis of Art 7 (“Use of the Caspian Sea for Peaceful Purposes”) will make it possible to evaluate the efforts of the Iranian politicians, diplomats, and lawyers engaged in the problems of the Caspian, which encompass essentially the entire range of questions on this problem. This experience may be useful when drawing up a special treaty (pact or agreement) on military problems or activity, which is to be entered on a five-way and bilateral basis.

37 See: Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. 38 See: Ibidem. 39 A Draft of the Pact on Stability in the Caspian Sea, Project of the Kazakhstan Republic. Archives of the Azerbai- jan Republic Foreign Ministry. 40 A Draft Agreement on Confidence-Building and Stability Measures in the Caspian Sea. 41 See: Ibidem. 42 Ibidem. 43 Ibidem. 44 Ibidem. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It is thought that this article could also be supplemented with provisions regarding the creation of a mechanism for defining the nature of action for peaceful purposes. This is particularly important since a biased evaluation of certain actions sometimes provokes a conflict situation. For example, the actions of Turkmenistan and Iran with respect to the well-known oil facilities in the Caspian Sea are still difficult to justify as “military actions for peaceful purposes.” This necessity is confirmed by Art 8 (“Limitations on the Military, Non-Hostile Use of the Caspian Sea”) of the Iranian draft. What obligations are placed on the Caspian states? I think that Para. 8.1 deserves special attention: “The Parties recognize that, in order to avoid military rivalry, the number of weapons in the Caspian Sea and their potential should always remain at a level acceptable to the five Caspian states. The procedure for regulating and controlling this limitation will be coordinated and appended to this Agreement in a separate appendix.” In addition, according to the agreement draft, “The Parties have the right to bring their own military waterborne craft into the Caspian Sea if this does not disrupt the balance of forces and does not raise the potential of the existing forces agreed upon in the five-way format” (Para. 8.2). From the viewpoint of contemporary law, the following three provisions of Art 8 meet international standards (Paras. 8.3, 8.4, and 8.5). Thus it is noted that the military waterborne craft of each of the Parties that leave the zone of national sovereignty of the Agreement member states in keeping with Art 7 do not have the right, without the permission of the other Party, to enter the […]-mile zone of other Parties (Para. 8.3). It is further declared that each of the Parties shall inform the other Parties about the departure of their waterborne craft and their military aircraft from their territory 30 days in advance, if this undertaking is not of an urgent nature (Para. 8.4). According to Para. 8.5, “in the event of urgent military use of the sea in keeping with this Agree- ment, the Parties, observing the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately inform the other Agreement member states about the movement of their military hardware.”45 When summing up the results of the study conducted in this area, it should be emphasized that, despite the absence of coordinated viewpoints and normative provisions on demilitarization, neutralization, and arms control, the Caspian expanses should be a zone of disarmament in order to prevent the possibility in the future of using the military arsenal accumulated there for a showdown between countries. At present there is no common, generally accepted understanding of the legal meaning of the terms “exclusively for peaceful purposes” and “for peaceful purposes” in international law and international practice of the states, although they are widely used in international treaty practice and at various international conferences, meetings, and symposia. Moreover, the concept “exclusively for peaceful purposes” implies only non-military, that is, civilian activity, during which all types and forms of military activity should not be carried out. In the general theoretical and practical respect, full demilitarization and neutralization correlate most to this term, but nevertheless, negotiation practice permits the possibility of using military personnel and equipment for scientific and other peaceful purposes, since this can in no way be regarded as a form of military activity.46 But the concept “for peaceful purposes” does not exclude military activity, including military seafaring and airborne navigation, which should be carried out in full compliance with the U.N. Char- ter and other current principles and standards of international law.47 However, this only applies to full demilitarization and neutralization of zones of peace and freedom from weapons of mass destruction. But, as was mentioned above, a zone of peace is not and cannot be the full composite of the concepts “demilitarization,” “neutralization” and “nuclear-free zone.” Due to the current military-political reality, a zone of peace may be used by all the states for peaceful purposes.48

45 Ibidem. 46 See: G.S. Gorshkov, G.M. Melkov, op. cit., pp. 117-119. 47 See: B.R. Tuzmukhamedov, “Printsip neprimeneniia sily i bezopasnosti na more,” in: Mezhdunarodnoe pravo: sovetskiy i angliyskii podkhody, Documents from a Soviet-British Symposium, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1989, pp. 78-79. 48 Ibid., pp. 119-120. 34 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Even despite the fact that, according to the figurative expression of Russian President Vladimir Putin, “the naval fleet in the Caspian is performing very important functions relating to ensuring stability and security in the zone of peace and the contiguous water area,” it could become a means for warfare in the sea, turn into a lethal weapon, and cause a disaster and the destruction of the Caspian nations.49 When evaluating the situation in the Caspian Sea region, skeptics are saying that “in the next 5-7 years, there will be no need to talk about the possibility of demilitarization in the Caspian.”50

C o n c l u s i o n s

1. Despite the fact that all the Caspian states periodically support the idea of turning the Caspian Sea into a zone of peace, and at present, after the Iranian nuclear programs, into a nuclear-free zone, no one has been talking seriously about its components, that is, what this zone will consist of if it is created. There has been no special practice of creating this kind of zone in border water areas, apart from the so-called nuclear-free zone in the region of Lake Titicaca, the demilitarized zone in the basin of the Great Lakes, the neutralized zones in the region and water areas of the African lakes, in the basin of the River Congo and Lake Geneva (Lake Leman). As for maritime practice, this experience applies to the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. We think it is important to draw up a series of international law provisions regarding the formation of a zone of peace (and possibly also a nuclear-free zone) in the Caspian region and Basin in a separate document (negotiated or declarative) or in the contents of a general treaty on security, confidence measures, and stability. In this way, after analyzing the draft of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, the drafts of the Iranian agreements on confidence-building and stability measures in the Cas- pian Sea, the draft of the Pact on Stability in the Caspian Sea of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and others, it can be concluded that an optimal alternative for building mutual relations among the Caspian states would be to draw up and agree upon a Pact on Security, Mutual Trust, and Political- Military Guarantees for Turning the Caspian Sea into a Zone of Peace. A document of essentially the same name would contain the most successful provisions of all the available treaty drafts offered for discussion. 2. It should be noted in particular that unless this kind of international law document on ensuring international security in the Caspian Sea is adopted, it will be difficult to achieve a positive result at the talks on coordinating and adopting the draft of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Cas- pian Sea. As the last point in the system of components for defining the international legal status of the Caspian, the problem of ensuring the international security of this water body is nevertheless the main factor, which, if ignored, will prompt the Caspian countries to simply refuse to sign the draft of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. The talks of 1992-2006 have graphically shown how and why the littoral states have been evading a final agreement on this basic document year after year. Without the guarantee of their security, many of them have not been striving to ultimately demarcate the Caspian and define its corresponding legal status. In other words, the above-mentioned version of a five-way pact is a necessary prerequisite for drawing up and adopting the international legal status of the Caspian Sea. Without it, the status of sea’s basin will not be legally regulated for a long time to come. What provisions should the draft of the Pact for Turning the Caspian Sea into a Zone of Peace be based on? In this context, it would be worth taking into account the provisions of Para. 64 of the

49 See: “Vladimir Putin pribyl na flagmanskiy korabl Kaspiyskoy flotilii,” 14 July, 2005, available at [http://www. arws.ru/a/2165]. 50 R. Orudzhev, “Militarizatsiia Kaspiia usilivaetsia, nesmotria na zaiavleniia liderov pribrezhnykh stran o kurse na demilitarizatsiiu,” Ekho, Thursday, 23 December, 2004. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Final Document of the first Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Disarmament (1978). It stressed that creating zones of peace in different regions of the world under corresponding conditions, which should be precisely defined in a free procedure by the states interested in creating the zone of peace, taking into account the special features of such a zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as in compliance with international law, could contrib- ute to strengthening the security of the states situated in such zones and international peace and security as a whole.51 Standards defining the geographic (territorial) limits of the zone of peace in the basin of the sea, as well as in the Caspian region, could become the leading provisions in this respect. It is entirely possible that these borders will include the water surface, waters, seabed, subsurface, and air space, as well as the land contiguous to the waters of the Caspian. However, the Caspian region is extremely complex, since it may consist of both the territory of the littoral and the non-littoral states. An important component of the zone of peace in the Caspian could be regulations prohibiting the deployment of nuclear arms in the sea’s basin. In this case, nuclear states (we are talking here about Russia and possibly Iran) should not create nuclear military bases in the Caspian or dissem- inate nuclear arms and other destructive types of arms which pose a great threat to the maintenance of peace and international security. In addition, there should be a ban on all possible attempts to conduct nuclear tests or deploy nuclear arms by the Caspian and other countries both in the waters, on the seabed, and in the subsurface, and on the ships plowing the waters of the Caspian. The “foreign military presence” is one of the main provisions requiring serious discussion by the Caspian states. What should this provision be based on? Do the non-littoral states fall under this provision? In the event that the littoral states agree to the sectoral principle for dividing up the Caspian Sea (this means dividing not only the seabed and subsurface into sectors, but also the water surface), the question of the presence of the Caspian states’ warships will also become pertinent from the viewpoint of the foreign presence in alien waters. But the classical understanding of this question on the whole and with respect to the waters of the Caspian in particular implies a prohibition on the foreign presence of third states, that is, non-littoral states. This provision could imply specific obligations prohibiting the presence of foreign military bases and ships in the region, the conducting of military exercises and maneuvers by the naval forces of foreign states, and the deployment of armed forces and missiles, which could cause great inconvenience and even pose a threat to the security of the Caspian countries. The prohibition or limitation of military presence will be accompanied by demilitarization processes. If foreign naval forces in the Caspian serve peaceful purposes, they may remain temporarily in the sea’s basin until complete withdrawal of these forces and bases. 3. With respect to the military activity of the Caspian states, the following can be noted. The Pact should not prohibit the traditional form of activity of warships, which military seafaring may carry out, using the method of entering the ports of other Caspian states, which, incidentally, may be both planned and forced. In so doing, the naval forces of one littoral state should guarantee the safety of other naval forces, into the ports of which these ships enter. But the creation of zones of peace may be accompanied by a limitation on military seafaring and other forms of military activity of even the littoral states. 4. Under mutual agreement, the countries of the Caspian Sea Basin could draw up international legal provisions for creating a system of regional security based on regulations for implementing regional measures aimed at ensuring peace by creating a regional (subregional) organization on security and cooperation in this territory. In this case, regionalism is an international legal standard ensuring the security both of the sea and of the states and their peoples. Its elements are already being considered by means of the institution of special representatives of the Caspian states for forming the legal status of the Caspian (Special Working Group) created in 1996 and working successfully.

51 See: B.R. Tuzmukhamedov, Zony mira, p. 9. 36 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

When drawing up rules on regionalism, it would be worth referring to the experience and practice of the states of the Black52 and Mediterranean sea basins. It seems expedient to set forth corresponding standards on demilitarization, neutralization, and the peaceful use of the expanses and resources of the Caspian Sea in the Pact draft. It is important that the Caspian countries reach an agreement on a military balance and military might. In addition, the Caspian states should exchange pertinent military-political information pertaining to the problems of the sea’s security. An institution of permanent or temporary military observers should be created. Respect of international law by the Caspian states, in particular of the principles and standards of the U.N. Charter, should also be manifested in their strict observance of and respect for each other’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and in their not being the first to use naval force against each other.

52 For more detail, see: A.F. Vysotskiy, Morskoi regionalizm (mezhdunarodno-pravovye problemy regional’nogo sotrudnichestva gosurdarstv), Naukova Dumka, Kiev, 1986, pp. 33-135; Mezhdunarodnaia bezopasnost i Mirovoi okean, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1982, pp. 150-203.

Kiamran SHA IEV

Deputy head, Department of State-Building Legislation, Milli Mejlis (parliament) of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE SEL -DETERMINATION PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT O GLOBALIZATION

Abstract

he author analyzes the principle of the principle can be realized within a T self-determination of nations in the state’s existing borders and offers an in- contemporary context and points out depth discussion of the problems created that it does not contradict the principle of when the principle is realized by means a state’s territorial integrity; he proves that of secession.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The end of the Cold War, as well as the end of ideological confrontation, created the necessary conditions for the transfer to a new format of international relations. The international community has arrived at the conviction that all countries and international structures should pool their efforts to address the fundamental tasks mankind is facing today. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Regional conflicts ignited by separatism in many countries to the detriment of international stability and security are interfering with productive international cooperation. More than that: they are hampering democratic developments by distracting countries and nations from creative efforts. Sep- aratism is developing into a serious threat to peace, law and order, and human rights; it has nothing to do with the genuine interests of any nation and the global integration trend; it is disrupting the centuries-old economic, family, cultural, and other ties. Under the guise of the self-determination principle, separatism is trampling underfoot the norms and principles of international law and endangering the territorial integrity of many countries. This is a hot issue in the Southern Caucasus where for several decades the right of nations to self-determination in Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) has been used to forcefully change the borders of these republics recognized by the international community. Separatism in not limited to the Southern Caucasus: Catalonia and the Basque area in Spain; Quebec in Canada, Corsica in France, Ulster in the U.K., the southern regions in the Sudan, etc. are facing similar problems. If falsely interpreted, the principle of self-determination breeds separatism, which insists that each ethnic community should have its own state. This causes political and economic instability and social tension, and creates the danger of confrontation and armed struggle. It undermines central power and its ability to govern effectively. For this reason, the right of nations to self- determination and its correlation with the principle of territorial integrity call for scrutiny.

The Correlation between the Principles of Self-Determination and Territorial Integrity

Today, the contradiction between the principle of the right of nations to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity of states that acquired new urgency in the early 21st century can no longer be ignored. The issue cries for a reasonable balance. Indeed, ethnic groups obviously outnum- ber states—the chaos caused by their intention to carve out a state of their own is hard to imagine. When interpreting and applying international legal norms, we should always bear in mind that they form an integral whole and none of them can be detached from its context. The self-determination principle has a long history: the United States and the Spanish domains in America fought for independence under its banners. At that time, the principle was not yet interpreted as the demand to separate part of the territory—it meant that each and every nation had the right to choose its form of governance. In the 1790s, the idea of people’s sovereignty was interpreted as the right of people living compactly on certain territories to decide which state they would like to join. Revolutionary France exploited this ideology when occupying parts of the territories of other countries. World War I created a multitude of new states on the ruins of the Russian and Austro-Hungar- ian empires. It was then that President Wilson of the United States formulated his Fourteen Points program, which he laid on the table of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920. The right of nations to self-determination was one of its central points. The conference was convened to sign peace treaties between the victor powers and the defeated states. It endorsed the emergence of new countries and, in this way, changed the state borders. However, drawing ethnically determined borders proved impossible, which meant that even back then the principle of self-determination could not be implemented in keeping with purely ethnic characteristics. The changed borders did not bring peace and stability to Europe: twenty years later the continent found itself in the midst of the bloodiest war in human history. The geopolitical situation of the post-World War II period called for another revision of Euro- pean borders and disintegration of the colonial system. After the war, when the U.N. was established, 38 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the right of nations to self-determination was registered in the key international documents. This was a turning point in the history of the idea. The U.N. Charter is one the major documents dealing, in part, with the principle of self-determination in Art 1.2, which says that the organization’s purpose is, among other things “to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” Later, the norms of the right of nations to self-determination were set forth in greater detail in many international legal documents, thus making it a generally recognized international legal principle. On 16 December, 1952, the VII Session of the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 637 (VII) “The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination,” which pointed out, among other things, that the population of non-self-governing and subordinate territories had the right to self-determination, while the states that governed these territories “should take practical steps to realize the right to self-determination.” The document dealt with non-self-governed and subordinate territories or colonies. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples adopted by Resolution 1514 (XV) of the U.N. General Assembly on 14 December, 1960 is another key document. It emphasized: “All peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.” The document stipulated: “Any attempts at partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the provisions and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law touched upon the self-determination principle: “All peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” The same document determined the forms in which the right to self-determination could be realized: 1) establishment of a sovereign and independent State; 2) free association or integration with an independent State; 3) emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people. At the same time, the emphasis was on self-determination of the colonial territories. The 1970 Declaration said in part: “The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or a Non-Self- Governing Territory have exercised their right to self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles.” The same declaration reconfirmed an important limiting norm: “Nothing in the foregoing para- graphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or im- pair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or color.” An analysis of the fundamental international law documents reveals that the right of nations to self-determination in the form of independent states was applied to the colonies. This principle was evoked to support the national-liberation movements, since the colonial system could be destroyed only if the principle of self-determination was applied in practice. This means that the principle was primarily aimed against colonialism with the purpose of liberating the colonies from foreign oppression. De-colonization, which ensured the right to self-determination, did not violate the principle of territorial integrity. Life has shown that the territories of peoples living under colonial or another form of foreign domination were never regarded as parts of the governing states. De-colonization occurred on colonial territories that at no time were part of the metropolitan state and were even separated from Vol. 1 (3), 2007 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION it by thousands of kilometers. In this case, the territorial integrity of the metropolitan country remained intact. It should be said that the colonies became independent within the borders established, no matter how arbitrarily, by the metropolitan states, which means that not infrequently peoples remained divided during de-colonization. The idea of restoring pre-colonial statehoods was rejected. After gaining their independence, the young states refused to apply the principle of self-determination (through which they gained their liberty) to the peoples living on their territories. The attempts of Biafra in Nigeria and Ka- tanga in the Congo to gain independence were suppressed by force and condemned by the international community as undermining the territorial integrity of the newly independent states. There are examples of the opposite: in 1965, Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia on mutual agreement. The disappearance of the colonial empires closed the self-determination issue understood as the formation of independent states. Today, any intention to use the principle regarding ethnic minorities infringes on the right of nations to decide their future within the existing states. I have demonstrated above that the right was intended to put an end to colonial oppression and cannot be invoked to divide independent states. The content and approaches to the principle of self-determination have somewhat changed because today the approaches of the de-colonization era undermine international order. The self-determination principle should not be interpreted beyond the context of the changes that have taken place in the world—otherwise world security would be threatened. None of the international legal principles, the principle of self-determination included, can be interpreted in an abstract way divorced from all other international legal principles, such as the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity. The principle of territorial integrity, one of the main achievements of European political practice, which for many decades ensured peace in Europe, should be regarded as the cementing principle of international security. It is one of the central principles of international law as provided by Art 2.4 of the U.N. Charter, which says: “All Members shall refrain … from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” This principle was also fixed in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, which says: “The participating States will respect each other’s … territorial integrity.” According to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe signed on 21 November, 1990: “We reaf- firm the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, with the relevant norms of international law, including those related to the territorial integrity of States.” This principle is highly important in the context of international stability, therefore the right of nations to self-determination should be examined within this context. The self-determination principle cannot be used to encourage separatism or the fragmentation of states, or the violation of their territorial integrity. In his Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros Gali has pointed out in this connection that if every ethnic, religious, or language group claimed statehood, there would be no end to fragmentation, while universal peace, security, and economic prosperity would become even less accessible.1 It is hardly correct to set off the principle of the territorial integrity of states against the principle of self-determination. International law speaks of their combination, equal and consistent application, therefore there are no “conflicts” or “opposition” between them—they are mutually complimentary.

Self-Determination of Peoples During the Globalization Period

The above suggests that the self-determination of peoples up to and including secession and the formation of independent states was limited to the de-colonization period. Today, this right should be

1 See: Boutros Boutros Gali, Agenda for Peaces, New York, 1992, p. 10. 40 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION practiced in conformity with the principle of territorial integrity. Opponents may argue that in the post-de-colonization era (which covered the 1950s-1960s), several sovereign states appeared through application of the same principle. The counterargument is that not all dependent territories gained independence at that time. The fact that East Timor gained its independence not so long ago does not mean that the correlation between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity changed. Until 1975, East Timor was a Portuguese colony; in December 1975, Indonesia assumed control over the territory. The international community, meanwhile, never recognized East Timor as part of Indonesia: the territory was seized by force when Portugal withdrew its troops. In 1999, a referendum on the territory’s status held under the U.N. aegis revealed that the population wanted independence. There is another special case. I have in mind Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony, which has no definite status and is waiting for the U.N. to decide its future. The right of nations to self-determination per se presupposes separation from the state, but this is far from an obligation. Today, self-determination in the form of separation differs from that practiced in the de-colonization period: it was not always based on ethnic elements (at that time, colonies populated by different ethnic groups became independent states). Today, ethnicity has come to the fore. Detachment of part of the country’s territory creates numerous problems that are hard to resolve. Disintegration of the colonies created no such problems. Indeed, the rights of the country’s ethnic majority, which finds itself in the minority in a territory that wishes to separate, should be duly protected. The rights of the ethnic minorities of a “newly formed state” are an issue that should receive adequate attention. Indeed, the will of those who, while forming the majority in the “old state,” are in the minority in the territory that vies for independence should be taken into account. They will hardly hail the idea of independence, which will turn them into a minority. Their position should be taken into account—otherwise their rights will be grossly violated. Kosovo is a pertinent example. Its predominantly Albanian population wants to separate from Serbia and set up an independent state. The Serb minority of Kosovo (Serbs comprise the majority in Serbia) is in favor of the state’s territorial integrity. This means that the right to self-determination is equally applied to all peoples living in any given territory; the will of one ethnic group should not dominate—the rights of all ethnic groups should be equally respected. There are cases when the minority is driven away from its place of permanent residence to enable the separatists to formulate their demands without taking into account the interests of the forcibly displaced persons. Can we, in such cases, accept self-determination in the form of secession? It is not an easy task to identify the territory that belongs to a nation wishing to separate; administrative borders within any country change frequently. The issue of the rights of the “minority” resurfaces in such cases as well. During the referendum on the separation of Quebec, some of its territories (part of the Ottawa valley, western Montreal, and the English townships in the province’s north with their Eng- lish-speaking population) asked the federal government to let them remain in Canada irrespective of the referendum results.2 This meant that the province would be divided. Indeed, if Canada can be divided, then Quebec can also be divided. If Quebec is indivisible, then Canada is also indivisible. There are many more examples of that: in 1974, when France gave the Comoros, an archipelago of four islands—Ngazidja (Grande Comore), Nzwani (Anjouan), Mwali (Moheli) and Mayotte—its independence, the population of the latter voted against secession. Today, the island is France’s over- seas territory. There is another, no less important issue: How can it be determined that part of population wants separation? A referendum is not always objective; the ways of influencing public opinion are numerous and varied: biased election campaigns, vague questions offered for discussion at the referendum, etc. There are several important conditions for the free expression of the people’s will: the territory should not be occupied by a foreign state or be controlled by the separatists; it should not be an arena of military

2 See: A. Zakharov, “Federativnoe gosudarstvo i separatism: kanadskiy variant,” available at [http://www. legislature.ru/fund/persons/zakharov/02p3.html]. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION action; it should be governed by law and central power bodies should operate on its territory; refugees should be returned to their homes. Without the above no free expression of people’s will is possible. There are peoples that live compactly on the territories of several countries. The Basques are one of such example—they live in Spain and the adjacent areas of France. Should this be taken to mean that they should separate from both countries? If their right to secession is recognized in one country, it should be recognized in the other. An affirmative answer makes the disintegration of many states inevitable. There is another important question: What is meant by the word “nation?” Self-determination of the de-colonization era was not based on the nationality principle: “nation” was interpreted as the population of any given territory, not individual ethnic or religious groups. In this context, the right to self-determination was not associated with ethnic groups: it was the territories and their populations, rather than the ethnic groups, that used the right to self-determination. Each of the newly independent territories (this was especially true of Africa) was home to a multitude of nations, none of which set up an independent state. It was the territories and their populations that acquired sovereignty. For this reason, the present state borders in Africa have nothing to do with ethnic borders. There is no universally accepted definition of “nation.” In different contexts, “nation” can be used to denote an ethnic community and the state’s population; in some countries, “nation” is used to describe citizenship, while all other methods of national identity are related to the individual’s personal competence. “Nation” is described as the sum-total of citizens of any given state irrespective of their ethnic origins; in other cases, “nation” is used to describe a group of individuals with a common territory, ethnic origins, language, and customs, that is, people who share one culture. In such cases, the term is limited to ethnic origins and means a group of people of the same ethnic affiliation irrespective of their citizenship and place of residence. Any discussion of the right of nations to self-determination should take into account the fact that international documents deal with nations rather than national minorities. International law pays adequate attention to the rights of national minorities. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of 1 February, 1995 points out that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious specificity of any person belonging to a national minority should be respected and that conditions conducive to the expression, protection, and development of this specificity should be created. The Convention says: “The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of equality before the law and of equal protection before the law… The Parties shall ensure respect for the right of every person belonging to a national minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion … every person belonging to a national minority has the right to display in his or her minority language signs, inscriptions and other information of a private nature visible to the public.” The Convention makes no mention of the right to self-determination. It goes even further to emphasize again the principle of territorial integrity. Art 21 says: “Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be interpreted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and in particular of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.” The Declaration of the United Nations of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities stresses in Art 8.4: “Nothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.” The above confirms that international law resolved the problem of the protection of the rights of national minorities with due account of the territorial integrity of states. The above should not be taken to mean that self-determination in the form of separation is ruled out. Today, when the colonial system is long dead, separation is still possible under certain conditions if, for example, it is envisaged by national legislation. The constitutions of the Soviet Union and 42 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Yugoslavia granted the right to secession and the formation of an independent state (albeit formally) to federation constituents. In the case of Yugoslavia, the world community recognized the newly independent states (former federative republics) within their administrative borders in former Yugoslavia. This means that the territorial integrity principle was applied there. In 1991, the European Union (then the European Commu- nity) set up an Arbitration Commission of five members known as the Badinter Commission, after distinguished French lawyer Robert Badinter, who was elected as its chairman. It was supposed to accept applications from the territorial units wishing to be recognized as independent countries and examine the conditions to find out whether they corresponded to the EU standards and clarify certain legal aspects connected with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Badinter Commission determined that the administrative borders of the federative republics that were part of Yugoslavia by the time it disintegrat- ed should remain the same and become internationally recognized state borders of independent states. It is important to note that this referred to federative republics and not to autonomous formations. The right to self-determination fully applies to the countries (territories) occupied by foreign states; Namibia is a pertinent example. After World War II, South Africa refused to include Namibia (former mandate territory of the League of Nations) in the U.N. system of trusteeship and de facto annexed the territory. In its Resolution of 27 October, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly ruled to annul South Africa’s mandate in Namibia; in December 1973, the South West Africa People’s Organization, which for ten years fought for independence, was recognized as the only true representative of the people. On 29 September, 1978, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 435, which approved the U.N.’s plan of practical steps toward Namibia’s independence. On 21 March, 1990, Namibia became independent and sovereign. States may unify voluntarily—this happened in the case of the FRG and GDR. In all other cases, a nation can realize its right to self-determination within the existing state without impairing its specificity, its cultural, social, and economic processes and its historical development as a whole or the territorial integrity of the state it belongs to. The changes of the last few years say that the normative content of the principle of self-determination needs to be changed. It has not lost its pertinence, even though the period of de-colonization is over. The principle is changing into a qualitatively different form of its realization together with the changing international realities. Today, the right of nations to self-determination is realized within the borders of states on the territory of which any given nation lives and in the forms envisaged by domestic legislation in the form of national-cultural or territorial autonomy, etc.

C o n c l u s i o n

Today, the principles used to create independent states during de-colonization are inapplica- ble—we need new approaches. The right of nations to self-determination means that their rights, realized in a democratic state, can be ensured without violating the state’s territorial integrity. This has been proven by different versions of rich, mainly European, experience. Autonomy is one of such version: it gives the people living in a national-territorial unit the right to address all the issues related to their competence independently. By the very fact of their existence, autonomies presuppose independent administration and are a form of self-determination. This means that the right of nations to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity may be successfully applied only if they are mutually complementary. Self-determination cannot and should not be realized at the expense of other nations and to the detriment of international legal norms. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO-ECONOMICS

Rozeta ASATIANI

D.Sc. (Econ.), professor, Tbilisi Institute of Market Economy and Law (Tbilisi, Georgia)

THE PHENOMENON O GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IN LUENCE ON NATIONAL ECONOMIES (A Case Study of Georgia)

Abstract

his article examines the prerequisites Globalization as a world process dat- T for the rise of globalization and its de- ing back to the 1960s was preceded by velopment patterns, analyzes the pos- the “Keynesian Revolution,” which gave a itive effects of its influence on national boost to qualitatively new economic growth economies, and draws attention to the spe- and paved the way for the democratization cific adverse manifestations of this multi- of ownership and for broad decolonization faceted process in small countries. In this in the 1950s. Globalization was significant- connection, the author gives a general out- ly accelerated by structural changes in the line of the post-Soviet stage in the devel- world on the basis of scientific and tech- opment of the Georgian economy, the nological progress, followed by a transition events that have taken place in the coun- from industrial to post-industrial society in try over the past 15 years, and the specif- the 1970s. In this respect, the end of the ic features of the advance toward a civil socialist era was also an imperative of the society in the context of globalization. times, a kind of echo of globalization.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The origin of any term is associated with certain circumstances: it comes into use only when there is a demand for it. The term “globalization” appeared in the 1980s, when the American economist Theodore Levitt first used it to define the fusion of markets in contrast to their “fragmentation” 44 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(breakup). So, the term “globalization” initially had a purely economic content, but in the following few years it took on a much broader meaning as it spanned across all spheres of social life. In a collection entitled Globalization: Knowledge and Society, published in London in 1990, this term was already used to designate the unity of different countries and peoples, civilizations and cultures. Apart from Martin Albrow,1 the term “globalization” in the broad sense of the word was used that same year by the Japanese business strategist Kenichi Ohmae.2 Today globalization means unification (integration into a single system) of socioeconomic, political, cultural, scientific, technological and other processes at work in all countries and regions of the world in accordance with the requirements (norms, values, criteria, etc.) formulated by the U.S. and other major states of the Euro-Atlantic bloc.

The Origin of Globalization

Globalization came on the scene in the 1960s, although it must be admitted that this overarch- ing process was preceded by the so-called “Keynesian Revolution,” which started in the 1940s and was considered to be a turning point for countries that found themselves in a difficult socioeconomic situation. This revolution gave a boost to new economic growth and promoted the transition of capitalism to a qualitatively new stage. A market economy emerged where the key role was no longer played by the owner of capital, but by the market. It was these open market relations that removed the stamp of “wildness” from capitalism and triggered the process of democratization of ownership and an advance toward its plurality, which played an important role in the rise of globalization. In the 1950s, this process was significantly accelerated by widespread decolonization, and also by structural changes in the world based on scientific and technological progress, primarily expressed in the priority development of the service sector. Economic development acquired a new quality. In the early 1970s, the transition from industrial to post-industrial society gave a new impetus to world development and accelerated the globalization process. The most important aspect of the qualitative leap in mankind’s evolution was that the economy was given a social orientation. The market, which arose in the distant past with the creation of a surplus product, assumed a totally new significance as the greatest achievement of civilization. Along with government regulation of the economy, for the first time in mankind’s existence the market developed into an effective economic mechanism. It should also be noted that during the crisis of the 1970s the switch to a floating exchange rate system entailed a liberalization of international financial markets. At the same time, the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade led to greater openness of the world trading system, a sharp increase in international trade and a deepening of the globalization process. All these events ushered in social transformations and had a positive effect on the formation of contemporary society, of a new social community, which helped to deepen humanization processes. By playing an active role in the social sphere, the state acquired the properties of a “welfare state.” The developed world accepted the challenges of the modern times, laying the foundations of a civil society. Compared to the past period in mankind’s development, this was a step forward and a major advance toward a higher social and, at the same time, a new world order. The “welfare state” policy brought into sharp focus the function of social protection of society, which came to be regarded as one of the main lines of economic stabilization, an essential prerequisite for the implementation of market principles.

1 See: M. Albrow, Introduction in Globalization: Knowledge and Society, Sage Publishing, London, 1990. 2 See: K. Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, Fontana Publishers, Lon- don, 1990. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

It should be noted that a new impetus to globalization was given by the social cataclysms of the 1990s that culminated in the collapse of the “world socialist system” and brought the socialist era to an end. This is precisely why it can be said that globalization, a key distinctive feature of the modern world, “determines the content of world politics.”3 In other words, the content of contemporary social life depends in large part on current global processes.

Globalization and the New World Order

Globalization has a causal relationship with the new world order and the creation of a civil society. Apart from bringing countries closer together and making them interdependent, it promotes and accelerates the creation of an open society in individual countries and destroys closed systems, totalitarian regimes and economies, helping to focus on partner relations and contributing to effective use of resources on a global scale, implementation of scientific achievements in the shortest possible time, dissemination of resource-saving and low-waste technologies, manifestation of intellectual capital, rapid development of the Internet and information industry, free movement of capital, especially greater mobility of financial capital, etc. Whereas in industrial society the key development criterion was the accumulation of physical and financial capital, at the post-industrial stage the emphasis shifts to the accumulation of knowledge. The 21st century has offered the world a new model of economic development based on an innovative economy, where the main accent is on intellectual capital, information and communication technologies. The fact that the 21st century has been recognized as an age of the knowledge-based society significantly changes the very foundation of national competitiveness. It becomes an objective need for any country. Competition in the West, as the main condition of national prosperity, is among the basic values of democratic society. National competitiveness is a key development indi- cator and determines each state’s place and role in the world economy. Today, national development strategy pivots on the question of a global approach to competition. Against the background of the globalization of competition, such national values as abundant natural resources, low interest rate, stable currency, cheap labor, etc., have a significant but not decisive influence on the country’s competitive advantages. Companies today seek to gain competitive advantages by implementing innovations. From 75% to 100% of production growth in the developed countries is achieved through the use of innovations.4 In contemporary foreign trade, the theory of comparative advantage is gradually giving way to the theory of competitive advantage of nations. The new theory has gone beyond the limits of an analysis of production costs and accentuates such values as quality, know-how, a modern market approach, new design, creation of new kinds of products, etc. A popular slogan in today’s world is: “Live down old products by new innovations.” Globalization of competition calls for new thinking on the part of companies. The revolution in information technology and the colossal progress in the transport sector have reduced production costs. Consequently, in the conditions of such a transformation there has been a change in the very nature of the economies of scale. Globalization creates conditions for implementing the main idea of the 19th century: free trade. Transnational companies and world capital markets free business from political constraints, giving increasing freedom to market forces.

3 Z. Davitashvili, Nationalism and Globalization, Metsniereba Publishers, Tbilisi, 2003, p. 189 (in Georgian). 4 [http://www.chelt.ru/2001/12/uzbasbashianz-12.html]. 46 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

So, globalization is essentially universal. That is why, considering its scale and functions, it is very important to understand the extent to which this phenomenon, multifaceted and full of contradictions as it is, will be governable, because otherwise globalization can do great harm to the whole of mankind. In view of the above, one of the main tasks of development in today’s world is combination and integration of global and local processes. This requires a transition from confrontation (accusing fin- ger principle) to compromise (thumb principle), due regard for national peculiarities in the global division of labor, optimization of the balance between market and nonmarket relations and institutions, etc. The formulation of a strategy of sustainable and safe development for various regions and countries is of particular importance.

Negative Globalization Trends

The current globalization, along with many positive results, has certain negative consequences as well. The latter pose a threat, especially to small regions, countries and nations, and have an adverse effect on local cultures. In this sense, the Caucasian region, its countries and peoples are no exception. Today, in conditions of global constraints, it is impossible to pursue an independent strategy in managing national economies. Newly independent states are even less autonomous, particularly when it comes to exercising exclusive control over social and economic processes and preserving national peculiarities and traditions. World processes are increasingly in conflict with the national cultures of small countries. Nation-states today are regarded as municipalities of the global system.5 In spite of this, the leading states have a dominant position in the matter of determining the world economic order. The world economy is increasingly institutionalized. A significant part of political decision- making at the global level is controlled by global organizations, international agencies, trading blocs and major powers. Market openness today depends in large part on the economic policy of the United States. U.S. hegemony is connected with the creation of the Bretton Woods system and is multidimensional. At present, the American economy is the largest economy in the world and the main source of global demand. Although U.S. monetary policy cannot function independently, the American dollar nevertheless remains the key medium of exchange in world trade. Neither the European Union nor Japan are able to perform this role. That is why the United States is so far unmatched by any of its rivals and remains the guarantor of the free world trading system, protecting it from politically motivated fragmentation. National policy today is contested by world market forces, which have much more influence than even the strongest states. National policy can no longer exert particular pressure on economic and social results. Consequently, the functions of effective national economic governance are nar- rowing sharply, while the internationalization of business activity is proceeding apace. States are taking the path of transition from autocratic to democratic forms of government. Given the general recognition of democracy as a universal ideology, undemocratic regimes are seen as a sign of chronic economic backwardness. The view that the Keynesian era has come to an end6 is supported by current events in the world. This is particularly evident in transition economy countries. The socioeconomic processes at work in

5 See: K. Ohmae, “The Rise of the Region State,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, pp. 78-87. 6 See: P.Q. Hirst, G. Thomson, Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Gov- ernance, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Caucasian region are a case in point. Such reformist strategies as full employment, training of low- skilled labor on a massive scale, etc., are inexorably becoming a thing of the past. It is known that investments and financial flows are concentrated in the developed countries, while countries of the developing world, including those of the Caucasus, are still short of investment. An inability to attract finance limits the inflow of investment. In civilized countries, a well-developed banking system operates effectively in a stable financial environment, whereas in transition countries (including those of the Caucasus) with poorly developed financial systems the banking sector is subjected to speculative pressure, which prevents the creation of a healthy investment environment. Be- sides, as we find from world practice, a significant role in the success of innovative business is played by small firms. This trend appeared in the 1980s and is now well-established. It is promoted by pur- poseful government policy in the developed countries, as expressed in measures to upgrade legal regulation, provision of concessional loans, conclusion of contracts and use of other economic instru- ments. Such practices in promoting small business, approved throughout the world, have not yet taken firm root in the Caucasian countries (although some concrete steps have been taken in this direction), and this is reflected in low living standards. The middle class has not yet taken shape and the poverty rate is very high. In the efforts to stimulate innovation processes, special importance is currently attached to venture financing. Venture firms are set up with the participation of banks, pension funds, insurance companies, etc., while venture capital is used to finance R&D projects and inventions. This advanced experience is just as inadequately implemented in the Caucasian region. All these and other factors worsen the investment climate, which leads to a low level of business activity and high unemployment. We fully agree with the idea expressed by Michael Porter,7 a well-known student of competition theory, that a country’s “competitive advantage is created at home,” in the domestic market, and not in foreign markets. It is this undeveloped domestic market, both in the post-Soviet space in general and in the Caucasian countries in particular, that impedes the transition to a market economy and in effect fosters “wild capitalism.” For the civilized world, this is a long-past and very painful stage, which is now part of the history of the developed countries. So, the globalization process at the beginning of the third millennium is sharply differentiated and marked by internal contradictions, for the most part manifested in transition economies. Natural- ly, it cannot develop according to a single model, whether American or European, Japanese or Chi- nese. Globalization is characterized by general patterns which have their specific manifestations, depending on the peculiarities of governance, not only in different regions, but also in individual countries. In this context, we will try to examine in broad outline the economy of Georgia, a Caucasian country which, despite its small size and numerous complicated problems, has attracted the attention of the world community by its originality.

Georgia in the Context of Globalization

After the disintegration of the quasi-socialist system, Georgia, together with other post-socialist states, joined the world globalization process and was naturally faced with totally new tasks. The Georgian Republic is a transition country whose geopolitical position turns it into a bridge between the countries of the West and Central Asia. That is why it seeks to occupy its own place in the globalization process in line with its geopolitical strategy. This is confirmed, among other things, by

7 See: M.E. Porter, On Competition, Harvard Business School Press, 1998, p. 194. 48 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the fact that the groundwork has already been laid for implementing such projects as the Europe-Cau- casus-Asia transport corridor (TRACECA Program), the trans-Caucasus oil pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Supsa), economic cooperation between the Black Sea countries (BSEC), and the construction of a trans-Caucasus gas pipeline. Georgia is among the authors and participants of a historic project of global importance: the Great Silk Road. These projects are a significant factor in deepening interstate relations and will help to extend Georgia’s economic and cultural cooperation with the outside world. The republic was among the first post-Soviet states to join the Partnership for Peace (in 1994) and other programs of cooperation with NATO. Georgia is interesting and attractive in view of its natural resources and its rich economic potential. The country is unique in the diversity of its natural resources and is particularly well-endowed with energy resources (although only a small part of them is currently utilized). A big role in the country’s energy balance is played by “white coal” (hydropower). Georgia has numerous deposits of diverse mineral resources, including fuel and energy materials (coal, oil, brown coal, peat), ferrous and nonferrous metals (iron, manganese, copper, lead, zinc, arsenic, mercury, antimony), chemical feed- stock (andesite, barite, bentonitic clay, diatomite, talc, serpentinite) and nonmetallic minerals (agate, basalt, granite, marble, tuff, fireclay, cement, brick clay, etc.). Thermal and fresh underground waters have a significant place among the country’s mineral wealth. Georgia has a wide variety of mineral waters. Its abundant recreational resources suitable for spa treatment of all kinds of diseases create ample opportunities for the development of health care and tourism: (1) Rich hydromineral resources. Georgia has over 1,300 mineral springs with a daily output of 130 million liters; (2) Healthy climate. Coupled with mineral waters, the medicinal properties of Georgia’s maritime and mountain climate result in a wide range of health resorts. The country has 102 resorts and 340 resort areas, many of them unique. For example, Tskhaltubo mineral water has no parallel in the world. Water similar to Borjomi is found only in France and is known under the name of Vichy. (But Borjomi water, in contrast to Vichy, contains small quanti- ties of sulfates, so that it tastes much better.8 ) In terms of kidney disease treatment, Arkhi- loskalo rivals the world-famous resort of Bayram Ali (Turkmenistan), while Abastumani is often compared with Davos (Switzerland). One of the best Georgian spas is Sairme with its mineral and thermal waters. Bakuriani (located 2,000 meters above sea level) is famous for its mountaineering opportunities. Gudauri should also be mentioned in this context. In addition, Georgia has natural advantages for the development of such resorts as Shovi, Utsera, Bakhmaro, Mendzhi, Lebarde, Avadkhara (1,500-2,000 meters above sea level), Zekari, Amagleba, Kvereti, Lashichala, Surami, Nabeglavi, Nunisi, Tsaishi and others; (3) Therapeutic muds (Akhtala), contrasting nature and picturesque landscapes; (4) Diverse natural sights. Georgia has about 100 caves, whose microclimate can be used to treat various diseases; (5) Numerous ancient cultural monuments and ethnographic peculiarities, ranging from national-style buildings and structures to Georgia’s unique national cuisine. All of this makes a significant part of Georgian territory recreationally attractive. Moreover, each recreation area has its own diverse sectoral structure and its own specialization. The development of the health-resort and recreation industry is seen in the republic as a long- term priority area designed to promote international economic and cultural relations and help to take advantage of the positive aspects of globalization.

8 See: R. Asatiani, N. Khatiashvili, “Health Resorts are Our Asset,” Komentari, No. 4, 2005 (in Georgian). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

To what extent does Georgia’s current socioeconomic position meet the challenges of globalization? Despite its unique resources, Georgia remains a less developed country because of its embryon- ic economic relations and integration processes. This circumstance once again warns us of the need to think over our responsibility for Georgia’s future. First of all, we should decide where we are going, what kind of economic system we are building and what kind of country we want to create. The construction of a new economy in Georgia was to have laid the groundwork for a rise in living standards and the creation of a law-based system. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Instead of a socially oriented economy, the main problem in Georgia today is still man’s biological existence and the survival of the nation. Poor governance and a misguided economic policy undermined the economy. The authorities took little account of the requirements of the new world order and the construction of a civil society, with the result that Georgia found itself under a kind of repressive regime. It is common knowledge that business does not seek to protect such universal values as freedom, the rule of law, etc. For their protection, countries create new institutions which are undoubtedly among the benefits gained from globalization. Georgia, among others, created such institutions with significant assistance from international organizations, but since the authorities at that time lacked political will, no further progress was made. That is why the step forward taken by Georgia in the early 1990s was followed by two steps back. As a result, the Soviet monopoly based on the slogan of social justice gave way to a capitalist monopoly based on the interests of clans, with a catastrophic reduction in the responsibility of government agencies. National interests were subordinated to the interests of certain individuals. Property in Georgia was denationalized, but this process did not lead to success in economic growth. A tight fiscal policy, reflected in rising taxes and cuts in government social spending, and a “dear money” policy designed to curb spiraling inflation resulted in extremely low business activity in the country and caused a decline in aggregate demand, which entailed a reduction in the tax base. Concessional loans and grants were misspent; this was coupled with misuse of budget funds, corruption, accounting irregularities, nepotism, etc. The well-tried Keynesian multiplier theory was ignored; by contrast, the decline in consumer demand had a negative effect on market size and led to a sharp drop in production, employment, income and investment activity. This was followed by a paralysis of the clearing system, a deepening payments crisis, a flight of capital and a “brain drain” from the country, etc. At the same time, the hidden economy reached an unprecedented scale, exceeding 70% in some sectors. In addition, smuggled goods that streamed into the country were sold at dumping prices, dealing a severe blow to national production, fettered as it was. Pseu- do innovations and imports of outdated resource- and energy-intensive technologies, and also food products and pharmaceuticals hazardous to health were practiced on a massive scale. A low official monetization ratio (6-7%) and rapid dollarization (36%) generated negative trends, both monetary and fiscal, and had an adverse effect on the entire accounting system. The trade deficit became chronic, and natural resources made up a large part of exports. The persistent trade deficit had a negative effect on economic growth and worsened the country’s financial condition, while its external debt increased rapidly. Western credit “injections” helped to solve only the country’s acute short-term problems caused by the budget deficit, but Georgia found itself facing another huge problem: how to service its external debt. Such was the general picture of the difficult socioeconomic situation in Georgia after 12 years of systemic reforms. That is why the Rose Revolution came, so to speak, as an expression of the need to protect the people’s constitutional rights. In our opinion, it was something of a response to globalization. Now that the world is moving towards a civil society, sustainable economic growth and elimination of poverty are major priorities in achieving this goal. That is why in 2004, after a 12-year fias- co, Georgia embarked on a new stage of radical reforms. In these efforts, it has received significant support from TACIS (EU program of technical assistance to CIS countries), the project for a reform 50 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the business climate in Georgia (USAID), the U.N. Development Program, and others. These projects and programs pay special attention to public administration reform, public expenditure management, and improvements in the structure of Georgia’s judicial system. In the past three years, significant steps have been taken in this direction. Despite these efforts, Georgia is still faced with complicated socioeconomic problems. In conditions of extremely low demand, society is highly stratified and a substantial part of the population is isolated from business activity, especially from fast-track privatization processes. In terms of the Index of Economic Freedom, the republic is still among the lowest-ranking countries in the world. Regrettably, it is outranked by many less developed countries of Africa, South America and Asia. As regards the Human Development Index (for the first time reflected in the U.N. Development Program in 1990), in 1991 it was supplemented by average length of education (years of schooling), which provided the basis for a knowledge index. According to this index, which ranges from 0 to 100, countries are ranked as follows: with a score of 80 or more, as high-level, and with a score of less than 50, as low-level. Georgia was in the middle-level group with a score of 72.9. But during the ill-fated 12 years, it acquired the status of a developing country. So, these indicators are inconsistent with Georgia’s status. In this context, I cannot pass over in silence the much-debated Bologna Declaration. This document provides for European integration in the matter of personnel training and, on this basis, recognition of specialists throughout the world. The Bologna Process is very important in itself. Naturally, Georgia cannot remain on the side- lines, but we should also take into account that this process to some extent destroys the positive tra- ditions9 in the sphere of education and has a negative effect on national culture and on the country’s intellectual potential. That is why the Bologna Process has caused heated debates in Germany, Italy, France and Russia. Europe’s major universities have come out against it. They believe that the Bolo- gna Process will lead to irreparable consequences, that it “bulldozes” not only education, but also each country’s culture, mentality and national traditions. Through copying, leveling and averaging, they believe, this phenomenon downgrades any above-average education.10 Georgia should take this competent opinion into account. It should preserve its state independence based on the development of its own culture, traditions and history; build a European civilization on national soil; make its own contribution to the political security of globalization; and help to cultivate and develop its positive effects in the country while avoiding its negative effects. The republic should not lose its originality or forget its roots, origins or traditions, which are the source of our originality.

C o n c l u s i o n

Globalization has a causal relationship with the creation of a new world order and a civil society. It accelerates the formation of open societies in individual countries and helps to develop intellectual capital and to implement resource-saving, information and communication technologies on a large scale. Globalization is essentially universal, which is why it is important to understand how governable this contradictory phenomenon will be, because otherwise it can do great harm to the whole of mankind, posing a special threat to small countries and nations and having an adverse effect on local cultures, a process particularly pronounced in transition countries such as Georgia. Although this Caucasus republic has unique resources, in view of undeveloped economic relations and integration

9 See: Economic Trends in Georgia, Georgian-European Consultative Center for Economic Policy and Law, Octo- ber 2006 (in Georgian). 10 V.A. Sadovnichiy, “Problemy postroenia obshchestva znanii v sovremennoi Rossii (mify, rify, perspektivy),” Vestnik Rossiiskoi akademii estestvennykh nauk, No, 3, 2005, pp. 5-6. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION processes it is confronted with complicated socioeconomic problems and faces difficulties in building a civil society and in meeting the requirements of the new world order. At the present stage of globalization, Georgia is building a European civilization on the basis of its specific national identity and is contributing to the creation of a new system of international relations.

Vakhtang BURDULI

D.Sc. (Econ.), department head at the P. Gugushvili Institute of Economics (Tbilisi, Georgia).

THE ROLE O GLOBALIZATION IN REVIVING THE ECONOMY O COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION (A Case Study of Georgia)

Abstract

he article analyzes the ways globaliza- make use of such globalization factors as T tion is conducive to reviving technolo- the movement of investments, innovations, gy and raising the product competitive- and knowledge, the formation by transna- ness and economic efficiency of a post-So- tional corporations in transition countries of viet country (Georgia) during its transition enterprises engaged in the mass manufac- to a market economy. With this goal in mind, ture of the latest high-tech products, and so the author looks at the reasons for the tech- on, which is imperative for forming a mar- nological lag and decline in product quality ket economy and raising its competitiveness. in transition states during the pre-reform pe- In the last section of the article, the author riod. He goes on to substantiate, based on looks at the influence of the country’s ac- Professor V. Papava’s “theory of necroeco- tive integration into the globalization proc- nomics during the transition period,” the rea- esses on the increase in domestic goods sons why a “dead economy” exists during turnover and product export, as well as on this period and why it gradually dwindles raising the efficiency of the economy and away and disappears completely as market prosperity of the population in a state with relations develop. He justifies the need to a transition economy.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

For several years now, the world has been moving gradually into the era of globalization. This process is primarily reflected in the economy and economic relations in the rapid spread of technolo- 52 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION gy1 and knowledge,2 as well as in the exchange of capital, goods, and services based on the comparative advantages of the countries involved.3 The Caspian region should also be part of this process. For example, E. Ismailov and V. Papava note: “…in the globalizing world … the Caucasus cannot and should not remain isolated from the global integration processes. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that integration into the world economy requires comprehending the intra-regional integration possibilities.”4 As we know, states with transition economies inherit primarily outmoded, compared with advanced market countries, technology (particularly in the consumer sector) from the old system and experience commodity shortages, as well as the low quality of products manufactured by several industries. After the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a massive breakdown in technological ties (although they were largely obsolete), which aggravated the situation in the economy even more. Profes- sor V. Papava studied the reasons for “necroeconomic enterprises” and the characteristics of the stages of their gradual self-elimination during the canonization of market relations in his “theory of necroeconomics during the transition period.” This study also contains recommendations on how to form the institutional and organizational structures of enterprises in keeping with the requirements of a market economy. The planetary globalization process should promote countries’ accelerated progress toward advanced economic boundaries; in the economic respect, it has significantly enlarged the scope of investment and commodity exchange between states. Therefore, with the appropriate environment, a country is able to incorporate up-to-date technology and innovations into its economy, which makes it possible to increase the turnover of goods and services with other countries.

Non-Economic Distribution as a actor of Outmoded Technology and Low Product Quality

Globalization in the economy is particularly attractive for post-Soviet states that are lagging behind in technological development due to several negative processes going on in the economy, which had a negative effect on the quality and technological level of the products manufactured by most industries (particularly in the consumer sector). The production of the hydropower and mining industries was distinguished by high quality.5 We should also note the production of several branches of the military-industrial complex, space technology, and certain durable consumer goods, which, of course, like any other high-quality product, were in short supply and very inaccessible. “Socialism or state-monopoly feudalism”6 with primarily non-economic distribution of bene- fits7 essentially denies the competitive principles in the economy. As Vladimer Papava notes, “abne-

1 See: V. Burduli, The Coordination of Economic Development at the Regional and Local Levels (A Case Study of Georgia), Meridian, Tbilisi, 2006, p. 171 (in Georgian). 2 See: R. Abesadze, R. Sarchimelia, N. Arevadze, M. Melashvili, Problems of Economic Development and Fore- casting, Universal, Tbilisi, 2004, pp. 19-21 (in Georgian). 3 See: V. Papava, The Political Economy of Post-Communist Capitalism and the Economy of Georgia, PDP Pub- lishers, Tbilisi, 2002, p. 156 (in Georgian); G. Joliia, International Economic Relations, Metsniereba Publishers, Tbilisi, 2002, pp. 61-66 (in Georgian). 4 E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press® AB, Stock- holm, 2006, p. 3. 5 See: V. Papava, op. cit. 6 V.G. Papava, T.A. Beridze, Ocherki politicheskoi ekonomii postkommunisticheskogo kapitalizma (opyt Gruzii), Delo i servis, Moscow, 2005, p. 11. 7 See: V. Burduli, op. cit., p. 13. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION gation of competition in a command economy destroyed the only effective stimulus of economic development, which resulted in the manufacture of low-quality products…”8 There were also several non-economic reasons for this. In the Soviet economy, a significant place was occupied by the so- called prison economy, where the compulsory, at times gratuitous labor of prisoners was made active use of—this formed the foundation of many of socialism’s greatest building achievements (the White Sea-Baltic Sea Canal, the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station—DnieproGES, and so on), as well as the rapid restoration of the national economy in the postwar years. In addition, there was a widespread system of “closed” cities and secret enterprises, and highly qualified specialists worked in the strictest isolation. This was conducive to ensuring performance discipline and reaching the set economic and social goals. However, on the whole, according to Papava’s formulation, “the Soviet economic system was a type of state-monopoly feudalism; since feudal “incentives” actively prevented the introduction of everything new and progressive, such an economic system was fundamentally incapable of ensuring a high level of economic development.”9 Product output based on complex technology requires vast amounts of the means of production—specific parts, accessories, and raw material—which were under central control and strictly allocated with permission from the corresponding state bodies. Since the smooth functioning of enterprises was entirely dependent on the timely allocation of the indicated funds, the directors, as well as the financial and other employees engaged in material-technical provision issues, had to “get a hold” of them in every way they could conceive. This very system gave rise to the first manifestations of corruption, which later acquired enormous proportions. Most of what was manufactured, as the mass media noted at that time, was produced “for the sake of production” (in order to give the workers something to do, fill the storehouses with products, and carry out exchange with related and other enterprises, and so on), that is, there was “production for production’s sake,” rather than for the sake of consumption. For example, the bed of many Siberian rivers is still strewn with unwanted sinkers. All the shortcomings of the militarized Soviet economy, particularly the low level at which the government supplied the population with consumer goods, and, consequently, the low volume of domestic goods turnover, were also characteristic of the economy of Georgia as a post-Soviet country. As in other republics, the inadequacy of centralized commodity exchange was compensated for by the development of the shadow economy and corruption, the consequences of which are still being overcome today.10 Admittedly, this mechanism was accompanied by the absence of unemployment, but this could most likely have been achieved anyway if well-thought-out measures were developed in economic policy, although it could hardly have raised the product quality or helped to overcome the backwardness in technology, keeping in mind that market competition as such was not observed. Due to the developed corruption mechanism, even the technology purchased in the West for producing consumer goods—for manufacturing high-quality goods—could not be used reliably in some countries. This is still continuing to a certain extent today. For example, if a foreign enterprise operates in a post-Soviet state, its contract often stipulates that some of the parts will be produced by corresponding local structures, but often the current technological level of the latter makes it impossible to manufacture accessories of the necessary quality.

8 V.G. Papava, T.A. Beridze, op. cit., p. 92. 9 Ibid., pp. 14, 15, 16. 10 See: G. Tsereteli, V. Burduli, “Problemy razvitiia tovarnogo rynka v postsovetskoi Gruzii na fone evoliutsii mirovoi ekonomicheskoi sistemy,” Ekonomicheskaia nauka sovremennoi Rossii, No. 4, 1999, p. 90. 54 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The “Necroeconomic” Basis of the Reproduction of Backwardness in Post-Communist Countries

The economy of the post-communist countries is characterized by an underdeveloped material- technical base and uncompetitive production, so the goods they manufacture usually do not meet the demands of a market economy, and they are essentially impossible to sell. This results in overstock- ing, that is, a large number of products of labor lie around in storehouses as dead stock. This is of immense detriment to the economy, its development is stymied, and it is impossible to integrate the country into the world economy. Vladimer Papava analyzed the reasons for, essence of, and ways to overcome the consequences of this phenomenon and set them forth in his “theory of necroeconomics during the transition period.” After analyzing the nature and specifics of the processes going on in the post-communist transition economy, Papava comes to the conclusion that almost all the products manufactured in these states are uncompetitive because of their low quality. “There is no market for these products and it can essentially not exist. This kind of economy can be called ‘dead,’ that is, necroeconomic, and the theory for studying it we can call ‘the theory of necroeconomics.’”11 In his works on the “theory of necroeconomics,” the author focuses his main attention on sub- stantiating its nature, studying its components, and looking at the specifics of its manifestation at different stages of the transition period, as well as ways to eliminate the “necroeconomy” and replace it with a competitive economy. In our view, the theory would be even more beneficial if clearer parallels were drawn and a synthesis made with corresponding provisions of the institutional and evolution theories. Although with respect to the latter, it should be noted that under the conditions of an inevitable and sometimes premeditated mass breakdown in the established technological and other production relations (although most of them are “necroeconomic” due to the outmoded technology and products), something akin to a revolutionary overthrow of anachronistic production has occurred (these issues were studied by Vladimer Papava in corresponding works on “necroeconomics”).12 New contemporary production evolved very slowly in Georgia, and only after the Rose Revolu- tion could any noticeable progress in its development be seen in several industries. This applies in particular to the construction and development of infrastructure, including production, since without an up-to-date production structure (finances, roads, power engineering, purification facilities, storehouses, refrigerators, information-communication systems, and so on), there can be no talk of introducing new and latest technology, not to mention modernizing and renovating traditional industries.13 For example, T.A. Beridze shows that “the main obstacle to scientific and technological progress in the post-communist period is the economy’s inability to accept innovations… The use of physically and morally worn-out equipment is debilitating for the economy.”14 Singling out five sectors of the post-communist economy (the “necroeconomy” in the state sector, the “vitaeconomy” in the state sector, the privatized “necroeconomy,” the privatized “vitaeconomy,” and the “vitaeconomy” created by new private investments),15 Papava notes that the fifth group

11 V.G. Papava, T.A. Beridze, op. cit., p. 93. 12 See: V. Papava, op. cit.; G. Joliia, op. cit., Ch. 7; V.G. Papava, T.A. Beridze, op. cit., Essay 11; V. Papava, Makroekonomika postkommunisticheskogo perekhodnogo perioda, Tbilisi University Publishers, Tbilisi, 2005, Topic 4; V. Papava, Necroeconomics (Lesson from Georgia), iUniverse, Inc., New York, Lincoln, Shanghai, 2005; E. Ismailov, V. Papava, op. cit.; N. Kakuliia, “Stimulirovanie protsessa restrukturizatsii proizvodstva kak znachitelniy faktor preodole- niia nekroekonomicheskikh rezultatov,” in: Proceedings of the P. Gugushili Institute of Economics, Georgia Academy of Sciences, “Problemy razvitiia rynochnoi ekonomiki v Gruzii,” Vol. 4, Nauka, Tbilisi, 2004, and others. 13 See: V. Burduli, op. cit., pp. 79-81, 175. 14 V.G. Papava, T.A. Beridze, op. cit., p. 57. 15 V. Papava, op. cit., pp. 32-33. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION demands particular attention from the state. This is because, given a stable macroeconomic environment, it does not present any “necroeconomic” danger to society.16 The following are indicated among the ways to eliminate the “necroeconomy” during the transition period in the first and third groups: the sale of routine material as scrap metal17 (a large part of the production funds of “necroeconomic” nature has already been utilized in Georgia), the efficiency of the Law on Bankruptcy (which is not occurring lawfully: not one debilitated enterprise went bankrupt legally),18 and the replacement of so-called “post-delets” (slick operators) in the leadership of enterprises with market management19 (this process is going on quite actively in Georgia). The “necroeconomy” is retained and exists on a routine material-technical base; its products are not in demand and are alien to any market mechanisms. So the problem of eradicating the “necroeconomy,” as Papava justly notes, can be resolved by means of the rapid and ubiquitous spread of market principles of economic regulation, since under the conditions of a market economy, non-competitive production disappears “automatically” without creating any problems for the rest of the economy.

Globalization and the Development of Countries with a Transition Economy

At present, Georgia is mainly feeling the indirect impact of globalization—primarily through the import of products from different states and the difference in import prices, as well as by means of economic and financial assistance from certain countries and their associations, as well as consulta- tion assistance from international economic organizations. But it has not been able to become truly incorporated into globalization, since this requires learning to assimilate new technology and knowledge on a broad scale in order to use them for producing high-quality state-of-the-art products, including (mainly) for export. This requires the existence of a corresponding investment environment that should include companies involved in introducing new high-tech branches of production (if they are being purchased for investment by domestic producers) and the creation of the necessary infrastructure, mechanisms of sale, service, export (including financial support) of products, insurance of technology, equipment, facilities, products, raw material, and so on.20 An integral part of globalization is the development of local business based on transnational corporations. For countries with a transition economy this is the most convenient alternative, if we exclude the “unloading” of outmoded (already inefficient in developed states) or environ- mentally polluting technology on these countries and create conditions for incorporating new or latest technology. Such enterprises usually draw many local companies into their sphere of activity in order to produce particular parts and units, as well as sometimes to implement R&D.21 This

16 V. Papava, op. cit., p. 36. 17 Ibid., p. 37. 18 Ibidem. 19 Ibid., p. 35. 20 See, for example: V. Burduli, G. Tsereteli, “Finansovaia sistema Gruzii i problemy razvitia i strukturnoi organizatsii proizvodstva,” Izvestia of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1998, p. 153; V. Burduli, G. Tsereteli, “Proble- my dinamizatsii ekonomicheskogo razvitiia Gruzii ,” Izvestia of the Georgian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 7, Nos. 3-4, 1999, p. 125; V. Burduli, The Mechanism of Regulating the Country’s Economic Development and Ways to Implement It in Practice (A Case Study of Georgia), Nauka, Tbilisi, 2004, pp. 52, 214-218 (in Georgian); V. Burduli, The Coordination of Economic Development at the Regional and Local Levels (A Case Study of Georgia), pp. 175-176, and others. 21 See: V. Burduli, The Coordination of Economic Development at the Regional and Local Levels (A Case Study of Georgia), pp. 176-177. 56 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION is also helped by the “outsourcing” that goes on in some corporations,22 when the latter transfer a certain number of their functions to other companies specializing in the relevant processes, and their conformable subdivisions sell or re-profile, thus lowering the costs of their own production, which is extremely important under conditions of intensified competition (particular in the application of innovations). V. Kondratiev believes that “processes, reverse diversifications ... have become a new direction in the activity of corporations. The most important place here is occupied by outsourcing, when companies transfer all their secondary functions (including marketing, logistics, auxiliary production, purchases, and finances) to other companies and are left only with product development (brands), sales, and the servicing of customers...”23 Iu. Iudanov is of the same opinion: “Introduction of the Internet has made it possible to revolutionize production processes, carry out their decentralization, and even implement the principle of outsourcing —the transfer of certain production functions to specialized external organizations.”24 Another aspect caused by the globalization process is the widespread use of different forms of franchising in international economic relations.25 The globalization of economic relations makes it possible to significantly expand financial activity both with respect to direct investment (whereby, as we know, large foreign direct investments go to the most developed countries, for example, to the U.S.), and with respect to various monetary operations.26 The large banks of developed countries in other states are also stepping up their activity. A graphic example is the purchase by a prestigious French bank of a controlling block of stock of Georgia’s Respublika Bank, which should be regarded as an event that proceeded from the integration processes. The guarantees of one of the largest European banks will make it possible to attract industrial corporations into Georgia that will use bank credits not only for commercial purposes, but also for building state-of-the-art enterprises in the republic, and in the future develop the export potential of our country on this basis.

Globalization: Domestic and oreign Goods Turnover

Under globalization conditions, it is difficult for a state with a post-Soviet economic level characterized by a shortage of the raw resources actively consumed in the world to achieve a more or less acceptable export-import balance (not to mention a favorable balance) and to supply the population with products manufactured inside the country, although this is not usual for most small countries (the smaller the country, the more open its economy). But the domestic consumption of products manufactured in the state itself (in addition to VAT, they are a source of profits, social, and, to a significant extent, income tax) brings more revenue into the budget. But globalization, as was shown above, greatly alleviates the modernization of production and the introduction of new and latest technology, the production of which enjoys demand both within the country and abroad, as well as ensures the stable retention of jobs.

22 See, for example: V. Kondratiev, “Makroekonomicheskie problemy konkurentosposobnosti Rossii,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 3, 2001, p. 56; Iu. Iudanov, “Evropeiskie korporatsii v usloviiakh globalizatsii,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 11, 2001, p. 66. 23 V. Kondratiev, op. cit. 24 Iu. Iudanov, op. cit. 25 See, for example: A. Liasko, “Transaktsionnye izderzhki franchaizingovykh i litsenzionnykh kontraktov,” Vo- prosy ekonomiki, No. 9, 2002, pp. 73-75. 26 See: B. Rubtsov, “Mirovye fondovye rynki,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 8, 2001, pp. 37-38. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Each region of the Caucasus, including Georgia, has its advantages, the use of which is ensured by globalization. When carrying out structural changes, more attention should be focused on defining the priority of the industries, taking account of the republic’s relatively small economic scale, size of population, shortage of arable land, and geo-economic position. When planning import-substituting industries and establishing the most important export-oriented vectors, the sales potential of the planned product in Georgia should be identified and similar possibilities in other countries (in particular those nearby) sounded out. Corresponding intergovernmental consultations should be carried out on these issues, and if necessary special agreements should be entered (on cooperation in production, export quotas, mutual preferences, and so on,27 which was also set forth in several provisions of the WTO). Under globalization conditions the main thing is ensuring competitiveness of the manufactured products. For this purpose, local production should first be modernized on the basis of advanced technology and, if necessary, the import of units and parts streamlined in order to ensure the efficient work of already existing industries with complex technology. There are already examples of this, but there are even more possibilities for reviving traditional industries with complex technology by means of renovating competitive technology. The development of export industries is very important for improving the republic’s payment balance: under globalization conditions, the potential for accelerated growth in such industries appears based on the use of the relative advantages of the national economy and a significant reduction in the import tariffs stipulated by the WTO. The resort industry, export of alcoholic beverages, sale of mineral water, as well as sectors whose goods are traditionally exported to nearby countries (including the production of the agroindustrial complex), should be included in such industries. Targeted work should be carried out to study the possibilities of accessing new sales markets for goods produced using our local raw material (cement, brick, other construction material, porcelain, ceramics, and so on).28 With corresponding scientific potential, qualified manpower, and a high level of education in the country, we can also talk of assimilating high technology in certain industries (telecommunication, computer, pharmaceutical, and so on) not only for domestic consumption, but also for export to other countries (in some cases, on the basis of mutual preferences of trade in different kinds of products).29 The attraction of real foreign capital (primarily in the form of the enterprises of transnational corporations) will make it possible to organize the output of more complex products (both for domestic consumption and for export), such as new and latest technology, state-of-the-art materials and structures for the building industry, commodities for the tourist industry or technology for its maintenance, and so on.30 The development of sectors whose products will enjoy steady demand on the domestic market is also a priority. As for import-substituting branches, this particularly concerns the manufacture of electric power, for which there are few possibilities for progress in Georgia. The development of the indicated sectors is very important for building up the production potential of industrially underdeveloped regions of the republic. Here, the most important thing is that processing enterprises of the agroindustrial complex can be created on the basis of the corresponding agricultural industry31 (for example, the processing of raw leather for making shoes using state-of-the-art technology, the production of different types of cheese, and so on). Without touching on the topic of the country’s transit opportunities in this article (which acquires a special nature under globalization), we will briefly discuss the advantages of border trade, to which globalization and the lower customs fees are giving a new boost. In this area, the development of new transporta-

27 See: V. Burduli, “Vneshneekonomicheskie otnosheniia i promyshlennaia politika,” Politika, No. 3, 1999, p. 22. 28 See: Ibid., p. 23. 29 See: Ibidem. 30 See: Ibidem. 31 See: Ibidem. 58 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tion routes is particularly important, for example, the Kars-Akhalkalaki railroad.32 Both industrial and agricultural production based on border trade can significantly progress in the mentioned regions. Of course, globalization has its negative aspects, for example, contamination of the environment. Methods for fighting this are being developed, although their introduction also requires significant expenses. All the same, under globalization conditions, transportation routes are being partially replaced by telecommunications, which reduces the need for energy and, consequently, lowers the level of thermal pollution of the biosphere.

C o n c l u s i o n

The absence of competition in the former socialist republics led to a deterioration in product quality and a lag in the technological level of production behind developed market countries in most industries (particularly those satisfying the consumer demands of the population). A few raw material sectors that brought in high revenue by means of sales abroad, branches of the military-industrial complex and a few others, the production of which was under the government’s strict control, were exceptions. The production of several enterprises was so low in quality that it did not enjoy demand, but the sale of “intermediate” production of such industries (component parts, units, some types of raw material) in the command system was nevertheless realized. After the socialist mechanism of management collapsed in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance countries and the Soviet republics, a multitude of entirely non-competitive enterprises remained in the countries with a transition economy that arose in their place. Their number grew even more after the breakdown in production ties at different levels. Professor V. Papava studied the processes of inevitable deterioration in product quality and technological backwardness that occurred during the past decades of the Union’s existence and after its demise in states with a transition economy. The “theory of necroeconomics” he substantiated for the first time in the economic literature shows how the “necroeconomy” emerged and describes its components, the specifics of its manifestation at different stages of the transition period, the mechanisms of gradual self-elimination (under conditions of a market legislative environment), and its replacement by a competitive economy. The republic’s intensive incorporation into the globalization process will help to ultimately erad- icate the “necroeconomy” and complete the creation of an efficient competitive market economy in Georgia. The formation of a corresponding market environment will cause real investments to be attracted into the country in the form of new and latest technology. The globalization process is providing many new ways to move knowledge and technology from state to state: for example, domestic producers can buy them directly themselves (by means of franchising relations and entering licensing contracts). The attraction of enterprises of transnational industrial corporations is especially important, which will not only create new jobs for the population, but also, through their contract orders, ensure work for several domestic enterprises (accessories, units, marketing, the development of know-how). Widespread incorporation into globalization will serve as a source of sufficient opportunities for increasing domestic and foreign goods circulation. As jobs at new contemporary enterprises are created, the population will have more money; what is more, bank deposits will multiply and the stock market will receive a certain boost. The fact that competitive products will be able to occupy particular niches on the foreign goods markets and, in so doing, improve Georgia’s export-import balance is also very important.

32 See: V. Burduli, The Coordination of Economic Development at the Regional and Local Levels (A Case Study of Georgia), p. 162. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Teimuraz BERIDZE

D.Sc. (Econ.), professor, Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

NATIONAL ECONOMIC MODEL: AN ALTERNATIVE TO GLOBALIZATION?

Abstract

his article analyzes the content of the In order to assess the effectiveness of T “national” in economic relations; ques- the development of small economies, the tions of globalization and its influence author introduces the concept of “structural on economic sovereignty; the benefits gained effect.” by the economy; the role of the solution of national economic problems and gradual integration into the world economic system. The lov, who suggests the following structure: 1. Central author raises the question of the priority of Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia; 2. North- regional economic integration required for ern Caucasus—autonomous border entities of the Rus- sian Federation; 3. Southern Caucasus—regions bor- effective entry into the world economy. His dering on Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia and Turkey theoretical reasoning is supported by an anal- (Southwestern Caucasus) and the northwestern parts of ysis of examples of economic progress in Iran (Southeastern Caucasus) (see: E. Ismailov, “New countries of the Caucasian region.1 Regionalism in the Caucasus: A Conceptual Ap- proach,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Journal of 1 An interesting and fruitful approach to an anal- Social, Political and Economic Studies, Vol. 1 (1), ysis of the Caucasian region is proposed by E. Ismai- 2006, pp. 7-25.)

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The question formulated in the title of this article became a focus of social studies in the late 20th and early 21st centuries,2 which was due, in the first place, to the disintegration of the bipolar world and the emergence of new sovereign states (CIS, Eastern Europe). Their natural response was a desire, on the one hand, to create new “independent” economic systems and, on the other, to enter the world economic sphere. Initially, this desire appeared to be contradictory, because integration into the world economy implied the need to “surrender” (in some measure) their economic sovereignty.3 But it should be noted that economic sovereignty is always relative (“economic independence” in the strict sense of the term is utterly unrealistic), because otherwise it implies a closed (oriented toward maximum self-sufficiency) and, consequently, inefficient economic system. The degree of relativity of economic sovereignty is higher than that of political sovereignty, which fol-

2 See, for example: J. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, W.W. Norton, New York, 2002. 3 The problem of economic sovereignty was examined in: T.A. Beridze, Ekonomicheskie osnovy suvereniteta: novye aspekty vzaimodeistvia ekonomiki i politiki, Siakhle Publishers, Tbilisi, 1995. A fruitful analysis of this problem is given in: H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986; J.H. Franklin, “Sovereignty and the Mixed Constitution,” in: The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450-1700, ed. by J.H. Burns, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 309-328. 60 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION lows from the very phenomenon of economic relations (satisfaction of material needs based on a division of labor and an exchange of its results), and also from the specific nature of human economic activity implying a removal of national, state barriers and the creation of a nationwide and then a worldwide market. This suggests that unity (a contradictory unity) of the international and the national is something of a norm to which economic development “tends.” At the same time, the absence or weakness of one of these factors is a symptom of incomplete or uneven realization of the overall economic potential.

Regarding the Definition of “National Economic Model”

The concept of “national” is used here as an attribute feature of a state entity, in contrast to “national” as an inherent attribute of a certain ethnos. In the latter case, one can only speak of national sovereignty where the actor is a nation (ethnos). A confusion of the concepts of “state” and “national” or their identification can have negative consequences. The trends observed in the territory of the former Soviet Union (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova) are a good example of such confusion. As regards the concept of “model,” its most general definition is a simplified system used to simulate some aspects of the real economy.4 More specifically, one can say that an economic model (paradigm) is a certain mode of organization of socioeconomic life, a type of relationship between economic agents in the production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services. A general requirement here is that an economic model of society should ensure sustainable economic growth and, in consequence of this, reduce unemployment and inflation rates and ensure appropriate distribution of income. The concept of “national” used in reference to “economic model” implies, in the first place, effective use of absolute (to a lesser extent) and relative (to a greater extent) advantages in the course of economic activity. These priorities are conditioned by a number of factors, such as the availability of natural and human resources, convenient geo-economic position (Azerbaijan and Georgia are good examples), etc.5 “National economic model” is a reflection of the natural form of the state’s economic existence since it underlies “relative” economic independence (absolute economic independence does not exist), given that economic sovereignty is always relative and implies, first and fore- most, independence in making and implementing decisions. When speaking of a “national economic model,” we do not mean a “model” reflecting the content, the very type of organization of the “producer-consumer” relationship (market or non-market), but the peculiarities (a number of distinctive features) of a given country’s development. No “model” can be conceived or, most importantly, implemented in practice unless these peculiarities are taken into account. What kind of economic development “model” can be chosen by the states of the Central Cauca- sus? Clearly, this question is not a simple one. The answer to it, in our opinion, could be as follows: first, organization of the economy on market principles; second, reorientation of its structure in accordance with the existing realities (world market conditions, technical and technological ties); and third, due regard for traditions and other noneconomic circumstances. As regards the first factor, everything appears to be quite clear, just as the basic principles of organizing a market-based society, although the experience of the Central Caucasian countries gained

4 See: J. Black, A Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2002. 5 See: T.A. Beridze, op. cit., pp. 24-25. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in the course of market reforms shows that a number of mistakes have been committed in the process of this transition.6 The second factor—reorientation of the economic structure—is, on the one hand, a result of the operation of the first factor and, on the other, a part of current practical politics with all its pluses and minuses. What is the structural composition of the Central Caucasus economies? Despite the region’s small area, one cannot say that the structures of these economies are of the same type. In the case of Azerbaijan, it is an orientation toward energy resources and industry; in the case of Georgia, it is agriculture, small-scale industry, transport, communications and tourism; and in the case of Armenia, it is agriculture and small-scale industry. One can say that all of this is the structural effect of these countries, which should be both the cause and the consequence of the operation of their economies; it should underlie the construction and implementation of a “national economic model.” Strictly speaking, the “structural effect” concept needs to be further specified by economists. Its content could be spelled out as an optimal combination of economic sectors and subsectors ensuring maximum economic efficiency. That is why the definition of “structural effect” is closely connected with the concept of a given state’s comparative advantage.7 How can the “structural effect” be measured? There is no simple answer to this question. Evi- dently, it is a matter of definiteness, the share of key (core) sectors in the total effect, with possible changes in the content of the “structural effect” in view of progress. One-off injections into a country’s economy (say, in the form of foreign investment) cannot reflect the “structural effect,” although they can produce changes over the long term.

Globalization: A Challenge to National Economic Models

Globalization8 in the broad sense of the word implies the interdependence of states and nations in the performance of the socioeconomic function. A distinction should be drawn between the political, economic, technological and cultural components of globalization. Although there are no clear dividing lines between them (for example, economic decisions taken at the supranational level often have a negative political effect and vice versa), let us take a brief look at their content. The second problem arising in this context is how to measure globalization, especially its economic component. In our opinion, there should be different approaches to various aspects of globalization depending on the content of the phenomenon, i.e., qualitative definiteness is the key to quantitative definiteness. The political component of globalization implies the interdependence of states based on common political interests (for example, the creation of the European Union); establishment of regional associations as a means of resolving political problems, etc.

6 See, for example: V. Papava, Mezhdunarodny valiutny fond v Gruzii: dostizhenia i oshibki, Imperial, Tbilisi, 2001. 7 A sufficiently complete analysis of the comparative advantages of the countries of the Central Caucasus is given in the following articles: V. Papava, “Comparative Advantages of the Central Caucasian Countries: Potential, Realized, and Missed Opportunities,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (1), 2006, pp. 87-96; S. Zhukov, O. Reznikova, “Eco- nomic Interaction in the Post-Soviet Space,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (1), 2006, pp. 96-109. 8 The globalization problem is investigated in many books and articles (see, for example: The Globalization of World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, Second Edition, ed. by John Baylis and Steve Smith, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; “Tired of Globalization,” The Economist, November 2005; D. Held, “Democracy, the Na- tion-State and the Global System,” Economy and Society, Vol. 20 (2), 1991, pp. 138—172; P. Krugman, “Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, 1995, pp. 327-377. 62 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The economic component is based on a community of economic interests (trade and provision of services) aimed at maximizing the economic effect. The technological component implies technical progress (primarily in transport and communications) and contributes to the interdependence of countries. Moreover, the very process of globalization initiates an active search in the field of information and communication technologies. The cultural component is based on the multivariant development of cultures, religions and traditions. The political component of globalization in the Central Caucasus varies from country to country. On the one hand, Azerbaijan and Georgia are oriented toward Western values, and on the other, Armenia takes a pro-Russian stand. Such a choice makes some concrete alterations to the political actions of the region’s countries; it is also bound to have an effect on their economic decisions. An- other important aspect of this problem is the question of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia.9 A natural question arising in this context is whether globalization (its political aspect) helps to resolve the problems of territorial integrity. The answer lies in the effectiveness of the activity of international institutions and organizations, and also in the appropriateness of actions taken by the parties concerned. The basis for the solution of this problem is as follows: the concept of “national,” as pointed out above, should be inherent to state entities, in contrast to “national” as an inherent attribute of a certain ethnos. In the latter case, one can only speak of national sovereignty where the actor is a nation (ethnos). A confusion of the concepts of state and national sovereignties or their identification is unwar- ranted. This is evident, for example, from the fact that some national-state and territorial entities proclaim their sovereignty, confusing national sovereignty and state sovereignty, which can and must be inherent only to the state. Another concept used in this context is “popular sovereignty” (sovereignty of the people), where the people are the key actor. The legal nature of the sovereign rights of the above-listed actors differs. In civil society, it is the population—as the citizens of a given state—that constitutes a nation. That is why the concept of “national statehood,” in contrast to social, has a general civil meaning in international practice, i.e., the concepts of “nation” and “state” appear in this context as synonyms. It should also be noted that in cases where the emergence of nations on the whole happened at the same time as the formation of centralized states, nations naturally took a state form and developed into independent nation-states (England, France, Italy). In the east of Europe, on the contrary, the formation of centralized states, accelerated by the need for self-defense (against invasions by the Turks, Mongols, etc.), preceded the emergence of nations. That is why in such cases the latter did not and could not develop into nation-states, but formed several multinational states (Austria, Hungary, Russia). The economic component of globalization should be analyzed with due regard for global contradictions: —Western integration contrasts with Eastern disintegration (to a certain extent). Suprastate (supranational) political integration in the West is accompanied by disintegration of states in the East; —economics and politics are increasingly internationalized in the sense of a common understanding of problems and decision making. At the same time, the importance of regional associations tends to increase; —European integration, nation-states and regional associations—all these realities will continue to influence the political orientation of Europeans.

9 According to experts, Georgia annually loses 20-30% of GDP in view of its territorial integrity problem (to some extent this also applies to Azerbaijan). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Above we mentioned the indicators of globalization. On the economic side, one can speak about trade and its influence on the dynamics of the gross domestic product; about the dynamics of foreign investment (including direct investment); about the creation of multinational companies, etc. If we look at GDP, for example, we will find that in Azerbaijan it increased in 2005 compared to the previous year by 26.4%, in Georgia, by 9.3%, and in Armenia, by 14% (in the past ten years, overall GDP growth in the countries of the Central Caucasus averaged about 5%). It should also be mentioned that whereas due to the 1998 global financial crisis Georgia’s GDP increased by 3.1% in 1998 and 2.9% in 1999, the respective figures for Azerbaijan were 10.0% and 7.4%, and for Armenia, 7.3% and 3.3%. As regards commerce, we are naturally dealing here, in the first place, with foreign trade (exports and imports). According to WTO data, a higher level of foreign trade operations means more effective economic development, faster GDP growth and lower transaction costs. It is also difficult to overestimate the role of foreign investment, such as investment in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which accounts in large part for GDP growth in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Plans of a global nature can be implemented only through the establishment of companies: multinational (MNCs) and transnational (BTC and TRACECA projects). Finally, we can say with certainty that globalization has an institutional component as well. It is the functioning of international economic organizations and institutions (like the World Bank, Inter- national Monetary Fund or European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). They have made and continue to make a tangible contribution to the development of the Central Caucasian countries, especially at the early stages of the transition period. The technological component10 of globalization is largely the result of scientific and technological progress, while technological determinism is the main driving force behind social development. New technologies are the key element in the globalization of culture, transport and communications; they reduce so-called transaction costs, so promoting the growth of the economy and enhanc- ing its efficiency. The cultural component is quite important today, because it implies the need to take into account the multivariant and multivector nature of the world community (otherwise it would be feature- less and uninteresting). There are many examples in today’s world when cultural circumstances and the factor of tradition have a significant positive effect on economic progress.11 States lacking self-sufficiency are more dependent on globalization and have more to gain from it. Does globalization lead to general well-being or, on the contrary, intensifies the struggle for survival? There appears to be no simple answer to this question, but it is a fact that the world has become “smaller” and that countries and organizations are more dependent on their “neighbors,” competitors and partners than before.

Regional Economic Integration as a Way to Join the World Economy

It is no accident that the problems of the regional economy and regional economic integration have come on the agenda. This is dictated by the inner logic of economic research: the region is a

10 See, for example: D. Archibugi, J. Michie, “The Globalization of Technology: A New Taxonomy,” in: Technolo- gy, Globalization and Economic Performance, ed. by D. Archibugi and J. Michie, Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge, 1997. 11 See, for example: M. Porter, H. Takeuchi, M. Sakakibara, Can Japan Compete? Basic Books and Perseus Pub- lishing, New York, 2000. 64 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION major element in the self-organization of economic life. Soviet regional studies developed as a science about the location of production and creation of territorial complexes. Later on, it began to study such areas of the regional economy as housing construction, urban development, communal property, real estate and land management. In Western economic literature, the region (in the economic sense of the word) is seen as a territorial unit that “resolves” certain socioeconomic problems. Our analysis is concerned with regional economic integration of independent states as subjects of political power. In this case, the territory of the Central Caucasus is regarded as a single region.12 Within the framework of a general methodological analysis of this question, we leave aside the region’s taxonomic rank, although it is obvious that each rank of this kind has its own specific features. In our opinion, the effect of regional economic integration can be achieved in two ways: by integration within the region (Central Caucasus) and integration into the world community. This is the optimal alternative, primarily from an economic standpoint. As regards the first way, let us emphasize that, in principle, economic cooperation between the countries of the Central Caucasus is possible and necessary. In fact, this is how things stand in practice, although for well-known noneconomic reasons the potential for such cooperation remains partly “untapped.” The second way is clear enough: the three republics should take part in global economic relations, but the question here is whether this is more effectively achieved through regional integration or through multispeed and multivector steps. The answer here is obvious: the first option is more effective in view of economic factors. Here we can refer to such concepts as “comparative advantage” and “structural effect.” Due to these circumstances, the involvement of the Central Caucasian countries in global economic ties though regional economic integration will be much more effective, because the realization of their economic potentials in this case will mean lower costs and, accordingly, will have a more significant effect.

C o n c l u s i o n

The question formulated in the title of this article (National Economic Model: An Alternative to Globalization?) is by no means a rhetorical one. The answer to it, in our opinion, is as follows: this model will be an alternative if national economic interests and the comparative advantages of states in the interdependent world are not taken into account. At the same time, it will not be an alternative if the globalization process equally ensures economic growth in our interrelated, globalized world. This means, as we see it, that economic globalization will help each country to realize its comparative advantages, while regional economic integration—as a factor of gradual entry into the global economy—will come into full play. Globalization should provide opportunities for using the economic potentials (in other words, the comparative advantages) of the Central Caucasian states. The existence of certain noneconomic problems (political problems in the first place) is further evidence of the truth about the interconnection between economics and politics.

12 The basic methodological premises of this approach are given in E. Ismailov’s article, “New Regionalism in the Caucasus: A Conceptual Approach” (see: E. Ismailov, op. cit.). Based on historical analysis, the author rightly believes that the historical process “shows the … trends toward regional integration. In other words, the Caucasus is bound to form a single and integral entity of globalization” (ibid., p. 13). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 65 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Hadjiaga RUSTAMBEKOV

Ph.D. (Econ.), associate professor, International Economic Relations and Management Department, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

CREATING AN ECONOMIC MODEL OR AZERBAIJAN: TYPICAL CHARACTERIZATION AND NATIONAL IDENTI ICATION

Abstract

he national identification of the econo- The criteria and priorities of such modeling T my is a topical aspect of transformation are examined in this article in the context of processes in the post-Soviet countries. Azerbaijan realities. The outlines of the Azer- Of particular importance here are the prob- baijan economic model imply intensive inte- lems of macroeconomic modeling based on gration into the world economy with maximum market principles and national forms of life. protection of national economic interests.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

The globalization process has spread over a vast area from Central Europe to Southeast Asia. In the post-Soviet countries, it has additionally acquired the unique features of system transformation combined with the state sovereignty. This situation has given rise to a historically unprecedented transition period, one of whose main tasks is to create a national economic model. Such a model can also have a decisive influence on the nature of sociopolitical institutions in the country. In this case, the model’s endogenous (set by the object itself) and exogenous (introduced into the object from outside) variables may reach a deterministic state, ensuring society’s sustainable development. The former derive from objective trends in economic evolution, whereas the latter in the transition period are often within the authority of forces that model the economy for utilitarian purposes. But there is also the area of scientific validation of an economic model, in which the future is closely correlated with past and present realities and with national and global factors of economic evolution. Within this range of investigations, researchers are looking for answers to the questions about the methods and purpose of such modeling.

ramework for Modeling the Azerbaijan Economy

The post-Soviet economy stems from the all-Union directive planning system, which ignored all manifestations of national economic organization in the constituent entities of the U.S.S.R. As a 66 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION result, the production system of the Union state came to resemble a “house without a foundation.”1 The collapse of such a “house” was an objective but at the same time unexpected event. The newly independent countries were faced with a whole range of urgent development problems, including the highly important problem of projecting the ultimate, model limits of the transition period. But the transition period implies a choice between alternatives and is not completely predictable, while national economic models take a fairly long time to assume a distinct form. Let us recall that countries with their own economic model have taken many decades to travel the road of reformist trial and er- ror, production crises and recoveries, scientific investigations and search for methods of improving the economy. At the same time, the entire history of economic thought shows that any theory has its national roots, while models built on their basis are usually unacceptable in other conditions. In this connection, a major prerequisite for economic modeling is a development theory that would general- ize the trends in the economic evolution of post-Soviet societies over the centuries, and not only in the period of Sovietization. There are deep layers of sociocultural traditions of economic activity and values influencing the specific features of the peoples’ economic development, and these, together with market relations, should be regarded as the conceptual basis for developing models of the market economy in the post-Soviet countries. In macroeconomic terms, the market appears as an economic mechanism which has its own unique features in each individual country. It is these features, and not market-based economic activity in itself, that determine the rate of economic growth and its social consequences. While developing in accordance with market laws, only about one-sixth of mankind falls into the category of industrially developed and socially successful societies. Hence another set of problems facing the post-Soviet states and associated with the question of which group of countries each of them will eventually join and what kind of market economy model (innovative or depressive) awaits them in the future. The development of a national economic model assumes the existence of an integrated economic actor. Herein lies one of the most difficult aspects of post-Soviet economic modeling. The problem is that the transition period is not a product of the development of each individual Soviet republic. Initially it was conditioned by the crisis of the socialist system, but today it is being overcome within the framework of independent states. In other words, the transition here is not from one system to another, but from the fragments or parts of a past system to multiple national economic organisms, which means that one of the main links—macroeconomic institutional unity—is absent from the modeling framework. In many countries, the role of such a link is assumed by the state with its strong inertia of the socialist past. A choice of model based on traditions, behavior patterns and moral convictions uniting people is evidently more progressive. To quote Friedrich List, “as soon as the existence of nations with their distinct nature and interests is recognized, it becomes necessary to modify the economy of human society in accordance with these special interests.”2 Only then can we speak of the restoration in modeling practice of the geo-economic development code ensuring effective development and operation of the national economy. The transition period experienced by the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries is also distinguished by the fact that global development patterns have a greater effect on it than patterns related to social formations. In this case, the peoples’ attainment of independence also meant a break with the development logic dictated by the global interpolar confrontation; in political terms, this increased the chances for the protection of sovereignty. In the economic sphere, the situation was different. Opening up to foreign markets without hesitation, the “shortage” and undeveloped post-Soviet econ-

1 q.P. Babayev, “Müasir iqtisadi nqzqriyyqnin metodoloji qsaslarI,” Ýqtisad elmlqrJ nqzqriyyq vq praktika (BakI), No. 3-4, 2004, p. 12 (A.P. Babayev, “Methodological Basis of Modern Economic Theory,” Economic Sciences: Theory and Practice (Baku), No. 3-4, 2004, p. 12). 2 F. List, Natsionalnaia sistema politicheskoi ekonomii, Evropa Publishers, Moscow, 2005, p. 116 (F. List, Nation- al System of Political Economy, Augustus M Kelley Pubs, July 1990). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION omy was entering an unfamiliar environment of nationally organized markets. In collision with this environment, the FSU republics have lost and continue to lose a significant part of their national wealth. Market idealism is not disinterested. As a result, instead of a model coordination of the competitive and social parameters of the economy, the peoples have obtained a peculiar symbiosis of Soviet-style “Party-and-economic” substitutes with negative elements of primitive accumulation of capital. This discredits the market and has a depressing effect on the economy, whose modern models usually include mechanisms for reconciling the interests of an overwhelming majority of citizens. The way out of this situation evidently lies in creating an economic model in which national goals would play the leading role, but with one necessary condition: each step in attaining these goals should be directed toward human development. The most general formula—“Models for people, not people for models”—should be followed by a more detailed characterization of the human potential, by institutional support for its development and use. The national economic model implies “a connection of economic phenomena with the whole life of the nation, with political and social events and phenomena of spiritual life.”3 Economic reforms in states that have regained their independence4 are market-oriented as regards their type, but there are numerous questions concerning their specific, national distinctions. Hence the need for a normative, forward-looking targeted approach to modeling the forms and methods of system (market) self-assertion of the economy implying an enrichment of the “norms” of universal market relations with specific national characteristics. Without such an approach it is impossible to project the development of the economy “in itself” and “for itself.” In this process, detailed projects are less important than scenarios of future changes based on national models. In current practice, this means introducing into real economic life such elements of the future model as are required for program activities aimed at creating a balanced macroeconomic whole in the country. The creation of a national economic model must necessarily take into account, as a starting point, the country’s geographical location, its natural resources, the existing production structure and the mentality of the nation. In different states, economic models may be built assuming the priority of one of these factors. For example, the Russian model is often referred to as “The Big Pipe” in view of its orientation mostly toward oil and gas exports. The same is true of the economy of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and a number of other post-Soviet countries. Energy resources still account for the most significant part of Azerbaijan’s production potential, while the share of GDP generated by raw material exports remains sufficiently high (in 2005, it was 26.6%). Such indicators are also due to objective circumstances: a specialization system inherited from the past, low competitiveness in foreign markets of finished products, and a shortage of internal funding sources. But the effectiveness of the use of natural resources in a transition country will depend on the model orientation of its economy. Then its production specialization (exports of raw materials) will be given a different assessment, appearing as a major advantage of the catch-up economic development model.

Typical Characterization of the Azerbaijan Economic Model

Model building in the post-Soviet economy is a multichoice but ultimately obvious process associated with the creation of a market economy. But this does not simplify the situation. Since the

3 W. Eucken, Osnovy natsionalnoi ekonomiki, Ekonomika Publishres, Moscow, p. 295 (W. Eucken, The Founda- tions of Economics). 4 One cannot agree with the concept of “newly independent states,” because the post-Soviet countries are not entirely new political entities that originated at the time of the breakup of the U.S.S.R. They carry within themselves the traditions of sovereign statehood and the achievements of socioeconomic and cultural development for a much longer period, sometimes spanning thousands of years. 68 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION previous economic system denied commodity-money relations as a matter of principle, old and new production relations in the transition period contradict each other. This is most clearly manifested in bureaucratic approaches to the administration of developing market relations. The prevalence of old Soviet traditions of economic management leads in a number of countries to a bureaucratic-corporate model of the market, as contrasted with the model of a socially oriented economy, where competitive relations are coupled with humanitarian development programs. The severity of transition-period contradictions under various model orientations of economic development depends on many factors. A change of model vectors here is not ruled out either. In Azerbaijan, the transition situation is unconventional in this respect, considering such factors inherited from the Soviet past as the imposed natural resource specialization, large volumes of incomplete production cycles, and territorial dispropor- tions. The situation is also exacerbated by the military confrontation forced upon Azerbaijan in its own territory: Nagorno-Karabakh. Model objectives in this situation should protect economic life from drastic measures known as “shock therapy.” The most acceptable option here appears to be normative goal-oriented gradualism, when prolonged economic and social evolution brings society to new forms of economic management, simultaneously formulating the algorithm for structural and institutional reforms. In this process, a study of international experience in economic acceleration based on national traditions is of great practical importance. Conformity of the changing economy to national patterns of life in the country creates prerequisites for unique modeling practices. The objectives of this model, which can be defined as a national-liberal one, are oriented toward the individual in the totality of their material needs, spiritual aspirations and behavior patterns. In the process of its emergence, the national-liberal model of the economy includes two levels: formation of subjects (initiators) of economic interests within the system of market relations and their conversion into agents of both local (private, corporate) and national economic interests. In principle, both these levels imply phased reforms gradually removing the country’s economy from the critical transition state. Peter Senge, a well-known expert in the field of organizational management, wrote: “We keep bringing in mechanics—when what we need are gardeners. We keep trying to drive change—when what we need to do is cultivate change… You don’t just pull out the old and replace it with the new. Something new grows, and it eventually supplants the old.”5 It is true that an economic model should be “cultivated” on ethnocultural soil, which is the only way to grow a “tree of objectives” where national priorities would not limit the freedom of production entities. The creation of a functioning model of this kind is the closing stage of the transition economy. One of the most complicated aspects of modeling is connected with the means of goal achievement. Here we should identify a model set which includes the following components: (1) models of the economic reproduction whole; (2) models of the relationship between economic and social development; and (3) models of domestic and global market coordination, each of which should be considered not on its own, but in relation to the above-mentioned goals. Forms of ownership and their implementation mechanism, competitive production and its social orientation, equilibrium of income and inflation rates—such is the far from complete list of macroeconomic relationships that should be given a model form. In the post-Soviet economies, there are growing differences in reform methods, development rates and the degree of involvement in global processes. This is quite natural and implies the formation of different market models both in terms of content and in terms of economic development rates. A wrong choice in this case can have catastrophic consequences, so that experiments are virtually ruled out. That is why the choice of criteria for the construction of a successful economic model is of vital importance.

5 P. Senge, “Learning for a Change,” Interview (by Alan Weber), Fast Company, Issue 24, April 1999, p. 178. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Criteria for Selecting an Economic Model for Azerbaijan

Different models of economic organization in the general movement toward the market reflect what could be called a search for a balance between the desire for dynamic modernization and existing sociocultural traditions. In this search, it is absolutely necessary to bear in mind the various models of the market economy already known in world practice. The most generalized models have been given national names (American, Swedish, German, Japanese, Korean models). In various modifica- tions or regional combinations, they are used not only in scientific language, but also in modeling practice. None of them can be applied in Azerbaijan in pure form, but this does not diminish the importance of their thorough study from the standpoint of the acceptability of the methods and mechanisms used to achieve the efficient operation of the modern economy. In the most general terms, the American economic model gives priority to individual growth incentives and promotion of entrepreneurial activity. European models are distinguished by an active social policy on the part of the state, while the Japanese model is additionally marked by intracorporate paternalism. Special attention should be paid to the German model, where elements of socialization in the area of health care, education and pension provision derive from production and not distribution principles. Japanese experience, in which “homism” creates maximum incentives for employees to enhance corporate performance, is also interesting. In all likelihood, the optimal parameters for the Azerbaijan economy lie somewhere between the German and the Japanese models, where an orientation toward production growth is combined with the use of traditional institutions. The modeling method in effect amounts to a way of thinking, a mode of understanding real-world processes allow- ing us to perform a certain kind of formalization of the economy. The main criteria of the economic model proposed for Azerbaijan consist in market incentives to production and income growth combined with moral and ethical norms rooted in the ethnic mentality. Historical traditionalism has played a significant role in the successful implementation of economic reforms in postwar Germany as it dismantled totalitarianism and in a number of other countries (Spain, South Korea, Taiwan). Personal interest and realization of entrepreneurial aspirations in these countries were organically combined with the social needs of production personnel. As a result, the sometimes tight political and legal control of the economy acquired a viable basis for its implementation. In such a model, the state’s role is to encourage business initiative coupled with certain restric- tive measures. The latter are applied when economic activity is in conflict with considerations of macroeconomic rationality and stability. These principles were incorporated, for example, in the postwar model of the “German miracle.” Researchers note that “the German mentality and the Euro- pean culture of market relations, including respect for the profession of entrepreneur and for intellect, were of great importance for Germany’s resurgence. Germans are generally industrious and disci- plined, thorough and energetic; they tend to do any job properly and are known for their orderliness, sense of duty and habit of obedience to the authorities.”6 In this definition, we find the main attributes of the national-liberal economic model: market freedom, moral values and state regulation. In various combinations, they have repeatedly demonstrated their success in international practice. “More market and a strong state”—this basic slogan of transition periods is in agreement with the spirit of current transformations in Azerbaijan. Later on, the accents in this slogan regarding the proportion between the market and the state (government) may change, but the moral aspects of the economic model should be intrinsic to it. They endow economic life with an evolutionary algorithm, spiritual richness and psychological comfort, creating an atmosphere conducive to the solution of national problems. Such is the state of affairs, say, in Japan, where unification around a “big cause” with efforts focused on the solution of pressing common problems is based on the Zen Bud-

6 V.A. Dergachev, Mezhdunarodnye ekonomicheskie otnoshenia, Unity, Moscow, 2005, p. 56. 70 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION dhist doctrine of a collective search for enlightenment (satori). Emerging economic models should take into account that the intensive type of reproduction gives priority to spiritual technologies: by overcoming the contradiction between market individualism and socially creative human activities, they open a new era of progress. The human spiritual world, inconceivable outside the context of national forms of life, becomes a factor in economic development and is incorporated in the structure of model criteria.

National Identification of the Azerbaijan Economic Model

Economic models are contextual, i.e., they are meant for the citizens of a particular state. That is why models constructed in the economic sphere should be brought as close as possible to the system of values and preferences, to the norms of interpersonal relations. This also applies to microeconomic, intracorporate models of organization and management. Due regard for differences in national business cultures in today’s world has assumed the importance of a key component of success in economic activity. Being a reflection of national culture as “software” for the collective programming of each individual’s mind,7 business culture leaves a deep imprint on the system of motivations, style of management and relations with partners. With an increase in the role of the human factor, national peculiarities have a growing influence on economic processes. For model constructions, they are now of key importance. A national model, in the first place, indicates the primary area of interest of economic agents in the territory of a given country. The second point is that the model takes shape under the influence of all periods in the development of the national community. Third, the model characterizes the country’s economy as an actor in international economic relations. The latter, in effect, are the result of interaction (competition) between different economic cultures. In these conditions, the lack of a formalized model makes the economy vulnerable in many areas, but most importantly it limits the opportunities for promoting national interests. The global economic system is the scene of desperate competition over the acquisition of the largest possible share of world GDP, which is won by actors representing better organized markets. From this perspective, the development of an economic model is also a measure designed to ensure national security. Azerbaijan, which has the potential to become one of the geo-economic leaders in the region, is in need of a systems approach to the implementation and protection of national interests. An economic model provides the key to the solution of this problem. One should start here by characterizing the nation as a form of human community on an economic, political and spiritual basis, something that requires a more detailed knowledge of the human factor. This problem is fairly complicated and under-researched. Let us take a look at only some of the aspects of its solution in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijanis are a nation that emerged at the cross-roads of the Western and Eastern civilizations, under the impact of Greco-Roman and Caucasian subregional interaction of cultures and sequential evolution of world-view layers of Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Islam. That is why Az- erbaijan has always been distinguished by the exceptional tolerance of its indigenous population, which is now also the titular nationality of the independent state. The country was a cultural space open to the penetration of new ideas and doctrines, a focal point of major international trade and economic communications. Consequently, one can speak of the formation of original and, at the same time, exceptionally communicative ethnopsychological priorities of the Azerbaijanis. Views of life, everyday values, notions about the surrounding world and human virtues—all of these should be thor- oughly studied in the light of the dialectical relationship between inherited achievements and devel-

7 See: G. Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind, Harper Collins Publishers, 1994, p. 4. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION opment prospects, because otherwise it will be impossible to understand the country’s business culture, one of the pillars of the national economic model. The starting point for a characterization of economic and business culture is its relationship with the “geographically determined” types of civilization: maritime (island) and mainland (continental). This original classification is given by President Ilham Aliev, who notes that “peoples belonging to civilizations of the maritime type—traditionally more dynamic, technologically advanced and prone to egoism and individualism—form commercial types of societies.” The opposite, continental type of civilization is represented by peoples of the steppes, plains and deserts, who are more “static, conservative and contemplative, but at the same time valiant and adhering to communal principles.”8 A care- ful analysis leads to the conclusion about the existence of substantial elements of “maritime” civilization in the ethnogenesis and history of the Azerbaijani people. This is connected, in the first place, with the great role of the Caspian basin in Azerbaijan’s commercial, economic and political life since ancient times. P. Darabadi writes that “for three thousand years the Caspian has played an important role in the political, economic and cultural development of the peoples who have outlets to this … great enclosed sea.” He emphasizes that on the Western coast of the Caspian, where the Caucasus Mountains come close to the sea and where the “Caspian Road” runs, a major element of the economic system of the ancient world and one of the main “arteries of powerful ethnogenetic processes” came into existence.9 A “convergence of worlds” has led to the existence of monoactive and polyactive elements in business culture, to the presence of both individualist and collectivist elements in Azer- baijani behavior patterns.10 All of this makes up the picture of a geo-economic phenomenon enhanced in large part by the constant and strengthening system of foreign economic relations. Azerbaijan’s intercivilizational positions are also influenced by the religious factor, but in its somewhat different, unconventional interpretation. Religion, which plays a great role in the history and culture of peoples, can add color to the national economic model. In this case, Azerbaijan is no exception: in our view, the influence of the religious factor on the economic model has a wider range of manifestation in the Euro-Islamic area, which also includes Turkey, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. A distinctive priority of the Euro-Is- lamic subregional model of interaction between national, economic and global development factors is interfaith tolerance, fostered by centuries of close relations (often within a single state) with followers of other religious doctrines. In Azerbaijan, interreligious tolerance has a unique form of manifestation not only in the geographical horizontal of ethnic relations, but also in the historical vertical of the people’s own development. All of this has found a visible expression in the sphere of business cooperation, production partnership, trade and financial operations. Since ancient times, members of other peoples and followers of other faiths in Azerbaijan have enjoyed the same opportunities for economic activity as the native population, and sometimes even special privileges. Euro-Islam is also marked by intensive contacts in the sphere of mutual transfer of cultural, scientific and technological achievements and by high receptivity to technological innovations from outside. In the life of the peoples in this region, Islam has played more of a moral and ethical role than an ideological or political one. All of this should be taken into account in building a big “European home,” a “Europe of the regions” in which Euro-Islamic elements are an organic part and not something introduced from outside. The above should also be assessed in the context of the use of Islamic business practices, which can increase the effectiveness of Azerbaijan’s national economic model along various lines. This could include, in particular, the attitude to resources, which Islam regards as an asset entrusted to people in order to be used for the benefit of all members of society. Or take the financial sector, where

8 I. Aliev, Kaspiiskaia neft’ Azerbaidzhana, Izvestia, Moscow, 2003, p. 372. 9 P. Darabadi, Geostrategia kaspiiskogo regiona i geopolitika sovremennosti, Elm, Baku, 2002, pp. 13-14, 25. 10 For a detailed description of business culture types see: R.D. Lewis, When Cultures Collide: Managing Success- fully Across Cultures, Nicholas Brealey Publishing, London, 1996; E.T. Hall, M.R. Hall, Understanding Cultural Differ- ences: Germans, French, and Americans, Intercultural Press, Yarmouth, ME, 1990. 72 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Islamic rules allow, instead of loan interest, a practice called equity finance, i.e., raising money by selling shares of ownership. Experts (and not only in the Muslim world) increasingly come to the conclusion that such a system of organizing corporate finance is the most effective one. It is no accident that leading Western banks (Chase Manhattan Bank, Goldman Sachs, Nomura Securities) are opening Islamic divisions. Badr Bank, a Russian Islamic commercial bank, was opened in Moscow back in 1998. Despite the crisis that hit the Russian financial system later that year, the bank survived and is currently among the most stable banks in Russia. The point is that return on capital in the Islam- ic financial sector reaches 17% per annum, which is far above the world average. A national economic model for Azerbaijan, including its financial sector, can apparently be built with due regard for the prospects of Islamic banking, given competent management and innovative approaches. Spirituality and traditions not only provide a general background for modern models of the market economy, but also appear as their institutional priorities. However, their actual implementation implies the need for a whole range of organizational and legal measures.

C o n c l u s i o n

The development of a national economic model should respond to the challenges of our time, meet actual needs, and be flexible and dynamic in practice. That is why even within model theory itself we should look for prerequisites and driving forces that would not be at variance with human interests, and not only with scientific dogmas. These interests are the cornerstone of Azerbaijan’s emerging national economic model, which places the market economy in a national context and has a humanistic orientation. At the same time, the creation of such a model envisages active participation by the country and its residents in the international division of labor and production cooperation. It is a matter of turning interstate economic relations into a factor helping to promote national economic interests, for which purpose the national economy should have model immunity to negative external influences. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Liubov SOLOVIEVA

Ph.D. (Hist.), senior research associate at the Department of the Caucasus, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, Russian Federation).

TRADITIONS IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA: ABKHAZIA IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY

Abstract

he correlation between modernization press. She scrutinizes various aspects of T and archaism obvious throughout Ab- contemporary Abkhazian society’s ethnocul- khazia is discussed in the context of tural makeup and identifies its development ethnographic observations; the author also trends. The article deals exclusively with the relies on works published by historians, so- Abkhazian population, all references to oth- cial anthropologists, and political scientists, er ethnic groups are limited to the sphere as well as on materials that appeared in the of their contacts with the titular nation.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

What is happening to the traditional Caucasian societies today, in a time of change? How are they affected by the dramatic economic and political changes underway across the post-Soviet expanse? In an effort to classify societies, some ethnologists suggest dividing them into “closed” and “open” ones.1 Normally the Caucasian societies are described as “closed,” but today this has become

1 See: S.A. Arutiunov, “‘Zakrytoe obshchestvo’—al’ternativa megapolisnomu potrebitel’stvu?” in: Adat. Kavka- zskiy kul’turny krug: traditsii i sovremennost’, Tbilisi, Moscow, 2003; L.M. Melikishvili, “Otkrytye i zakrytye tipy kul’tur etnicheskikh sistem,” in: Adat. Kavkazskiy kul’turny krug: traditsii i sovremennost’. 74 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION an overstatement. Indeed, neither high mountain ranges, nor deep ravines can block information flows, which reach the region’s remotest corners through different channels. Traditions inherited from our ancestors are not immune to change: some of them become modernized by shedding their “patriarchal” features to become better suited to the changing conditions; “the recurrence of archaism” cannot be excluded either. Under the pressure of circumstances, an ethnic group may revive old forms and structures better suited to any given situation. Abkhazia is a relatively small West Caucasian region, as far as its territory and population are concerned, with highly specific features which make it attractive for historians, ethnographers, lin- guists, and other experts. In the past, the stormy developments inside it spread to neighboring and even distant countries; it was a territory of active migration processes (Muhajirism—resettlement of Abkhazians to Turkey and other Middle Eastern countries, while other ethnic groups moved into the thus vacated territories, etc.). At all times there was an avid interest in the Abkhazian ethnic culture, partly because longevity was one of its hallmarks. In the last few decades, Abkhazia, an unrecognized post-Soviet state, has become known throughout the world as the seat of a smoldering ethnopolitical Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Abkhazia is still a polyethnic country, albeit with a changed correlation of ethnic groups. When most of the Georgians were driven away from Abkhazia, with the only exception of the Gali District (which became much smaller than before), the Abkhazians moved to the forefront as the largest ethnic group numbering 94,597 in 2003; there is approximately the same number of Armenians (44,869) and Georgians (44,041); the number of Russians dropped considerably, to 23,420, due to massive economic migration. In 2003, the republic’s total population was 214,016 (according to the all-Union population census of 1989, there were 536,600 people living in Abkhazia).2 It should be said that the 2003 figures are doubted for political reasons; they caused heated debates during the presidential campaign of 2004: A. Ankvab, one of those who ran for presidency, insisted that there were about 65,000 Abkhazians living in the republic and about 60,000 Georgians. About 40,000 Abkhazians, he argued, had gone to Russia in search of employment.3 “Globalization,” a term that has recently won popularity, is now applied to all sorts of situations. It is presented as an absolutely novel phenomenon in human history, which some people hail as be- nevolent, while others condemn as dangerous or even pernicious. Indeed, suffice it to mention the frequent “anti-globalist” actions. Much depends on how the term is interpreted: at times it seems that the opposing sides are talking about two different phenomena. For my part, I think that globalization, if it is understood as overcoming, to one extent or another, all sorts of obstacles, limitations, and other impediments that perpetuate the isolation of continents, regions, countries, people, etc., is a continuous process. It emerged together with mankind and people’s settlement across the world. This is an uneven process that develops in stages: it accelerates or slows down for different reasons; there are regional or ethnic specifics as well. For obvious reasons, globalization was felt much more strongly in Abkhazia, as well as across the entire post-Soviet expanse. At the same time, this coastal region has never been completely isolated: in the 19th century, the local people grew maize, a typically American plant. Since the early 1990s, local society has lived through many hardships (ethnic clashes, war, radical changes in the republic’s ethnic composition, postwar isolation, etc.), which strongly affected the local ethnocultural specifics—the family, clan, religious, linguistic, and other everyday realia.4

2 See: Abkhazia v tsifrakh, Sukhum, 2005. The article uses the figures of the republican population census of 2003. 3 See: N.A. Dubova, A.N. Iamskov, “Sotsial’no-demograficheskie osobennosti abkhazskikh populiatsiy v dolgozhitel’skikh seleniiakh,” in: Sovremennaia sel’skaia Abkhazia, Moscow, 2006, p. 40. 4 Here is an interesting example. The post-war years changed the order of toasting, one of the most stable cultural elements: today the toasts for those who fell while fighting for the freedom of Abkhazia and for those who fell in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 follow one another. They are rarely blended into one: the tragic events are obviously still fresh in people’s memory (see: Field materials gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006, the villages of Chlou, Jgerda, Duripsh, the city of Sukhumi). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

More than that, globalization impulses, which largely affect the younger generation, came mainly from Russia and Turkey (there are very close contacts with the latter; Turkish college, which teaches in Turkish and English, is very much popular in Abkhazia). Under the spell of mainly Russian as well as Turkish TV channels, the Internet, etc., young people accept contemporary behavior patterns, acquire different value systems, and follow life strategies of their own. When those who are currently attend school grow up, Abkhazia will be a different place: more open to outside influence with a much smaller share of traditional structures in the Abkhazian ethnic culture. It will be affected by professional and mass culture to a much greater extent than today. We have already seen this elsewhere in the post-Soviet expanse. There are several important factors in the ethnocultural makeup of contemporary Abkhazian society, which greatly affect its contemporary condition. They will be discussed below.

Economic and Demographic Aspects of Abkhazian Society’s Ethnocultural Development

Postwar years and the consolidation of the Abkhazian ethnos. For several reasons recent decades were marked by an accelerated consolidation of the Abkhazian ethnos. In the post-Soviet era, Abkhazians have established contacts with the large Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey and elsewhere in the Middle East, from which there was a trickle of repatriates. The hardships of wartime (1992-1993) drew the people even closer together: only a closely-knit society, in which everybody helped each other, could survive. According to eyewitnesses, in some houses, 30 to 40 refugees lived with the families of friends, relatives, or even totally unknown people. Many of them came from the Ocham- chira District, which had turned into a battlefield. There was a particularly large number of them in the villages of the Gudauta Region (Bzyb Abkhazia) living with blood relatives, those acquired through marriage, or with people they had never met before.5 Recently marriages between Abzhu and Bzyb Abkhazians became much more frequent, which naturally brought the two groups closer together (ethnographers have already registered mutual influences in rites and rituals, dialects, etc.). Massive post-war migration altered the republic’s ethnic map: the Abzhu and Bzyb Abkhazians are becoming much more united territorially. Central Abkhazia is being settled by those who had to leave their destroyed homes behind and those who felt it wise to move away from their outlaying villages. Muhajir descendants who were allowed to move back to their historical homeland also opted for Central Ab- khazia. If the process continues, the territorial disunity that survived for over a century will disappear. Later, the still existing distinctions among individual groups will also vanish. So far they affect not only the everyday, but also the political life of Abkhazia.6 Problems of economic development. The old agricultural structures have not yet been replaced with new types of agricultural enterprises. Meanwhile agriculture will remain the key economic branch for a long time to come: the salaries in the budget sphere are too low, which means that practically the entire population (in the villages and cities) survives on what it can produce itself. For their survival, those who live in cities rely on their village relatives, who supply them with homegrown products. Many of the city dwellers have plots of land in the countryside where they grow maize, beans, fruit, grapes, etc.7 Primitive implements require hard physical labor,

5 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the village of Lykhny, the cities of Sukhumi and Gudauta). 6 See: A.B. Krylov, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” in: Identichnost’ i konflikt v postsovetskikh gosudarstvakh, Moscow, 1997, p. 191. 7 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Duripsh and Khuap, the city of Sukhumi). 76 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION which means that this situation cannot last for long. No professional, be he a doctor, teacher, or academic, can waste his time and strength tilling the land. If the economy revives, this practice will disappear. Demographic problems. It has been noted that the republic’s agricultural population is shrink- ing: people are leaving the country or migrating within the republic for several reasons. There are no longer collective or state farms in the villages, there are no longer stable or adequate wages (in the past, tea and tobacco brought good earnings; today these crops have essentially disappeared from the Abkhazian countryside). Farm labor has lost its appeal, especially among the younger people. They want to learn urban professions: in the tourist and recreational business, services, computers, etc.8 In the postwar years, a large share of villagers moved, temporarily or permanently, to cities inside the republic and to the south of Russia. This accelerated the urbanization process. There was another factor behind it: people moved into abandoned Georgian flats and houses.9 Sukhumi, Gagra, and Pitsunda are the most attractive cities; a considerable number of migrants go to the cities of the Krasnodar Territory. Abkhazian researchers believe that in the future this will negatively affect the entire situation: the countryside “is the center of the traditional way of life and ethnocultural image.”10 There is another problem. In polyethnic cities the Abkhazian language of the monoethnic villages cannot compete with the Russian as the language of communication. Parents have to work hard to teach their children their native tongue: they send them to Abkhazian kindergartens; speak at home in Abkhazian, and send them to spend their summer holidays with their village relatives. Polyethnic groups of children and teenagers in Abkhazian cities (Sukhumi, Gudauta, Gagra) use Russian, which I can confirm as an eyewitness.11 Accelerated urbanization has created another, no less grave, problem. The majority of young girls leave their native villages for towns, where they study or work, and normally do not return, while tradition forbids young men (mostly younger sons) to abandon their parents and their homes. This makes it hard for them to start a family of their own: today’s girls do not find hard work on the farm and around the house tempting enough. In nearly all the villages there are men who remained single until the age of forty, a very disturbing factor. Girls, in turn, find it hard to marry; they remain single and become old maids. This is a grave and painful problem, especially for the older generation. Not infrequently, concerned parents invite older and highly respected relatives to talk to unmarried sons in the hope of persuading them to marry. Sometimes things go too far: in one village a father stopped talking to his son until he married.12 It should be said that the numerical strength of the titular nation has developed into a political issue, since other ethnic communities, particularly Armenian, in the republic are swelling. In Au- gust 2006, this caused heated polemics on local TV: it was said that the Abkhazians might become an ethnic minority in their own homeland once more if they became outnumbered by the Armeni- ans. It was also said that Armenians illegally move to Abkhazia from the Krasnodar Territory and are registered by corrupt local bureaucrats.13 This adds tension to the already tense demographic issue.

8 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Kulanyrkhva, the city of Sukhumi). 9 See: N.A. Dubova, N.I. Grigulevich, L.T. Solovieva, A.N. Iamskov, “Sotsial’no-kul’turnye i demograficheskie osobennosti sovremennogo sel’skogo abkhazskogo naselenia,” in: Polevye issledovania Instituta etnologii i antropologii. 2004, Moscow, 2006, p. 19. 10 D.A. Kandelaki, A.Sh. Khashba, “Transformatsia polovozrastnoy struktury sel’skikh abkhazov v postsovetskiy period,” in: Sovremennaia sel’skaia Abkhazia, pp. 66-67. 11 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006. 12 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Lykhny, Duripsh, Kulanyrkhva). 13 See, for example, relevant materials in “‘Armianskiy vopros’ v Abkhazii glazami gruzinskikh SMI,” available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news]. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Traditions and the Ethnocultural Development of Abkhazian Society

Modernization and traditionalism. As late as the 20th century, Abkhazian society carefully preserved many of the traditional institutions and customs, even though the extent of their devotion should not be overestimated. A comparison with neighbors—Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, and Russians—threw the archaic nature of many everyday traditions into bolder relief. This is especially true of socio-normative culture—demonstrative respect of elders, hospitality, dedication to the pre-Christian and pre-Islamic religious cults, gender stereotypes, etc. This is probably explained by the fact that until recently the Abkhazians were mostly village dwellers; by the late 1980s, when the share of urban dwellers had become large enough, they still retained close contact with their village relatives. Much has changed in this sphere. While it is still declared that every Abkhazian should follow the “apsuara” norms (be loyal to his Abkhazian nature), which can be described as a code of moral standards inherited from hoary antiquity, real life, described above, is different. In recent years, especially during the war when many of the family traditions were broken (gender roles, social roles of the older and younger groups, etc.), the traditional norms and bans were likewise undermined especially in the eyes of the younger generation. It has been observed that “educated Abkhazians are frequently skeptical about the traditional Abkhazian institutions and cults.” Many of the researchers went on to say that “during the war everything was decided by the young people,” who acted confidently and were guided by their own judgment, very often “contrary to the will of the older people and irrespective of their vacillations.”14 Disdain for the traditions and customs of their ancestors is best illustrated by the stealing of wine from sacred vessels prepared for communal feasts or prayers; this became frequent after the war. To avoid this, people bring wine directly before the feast or prayer. In the Lykh-nykha sanctuary, wine is not poured into the ritual vessels (akhapshchshch’a) until the Sunday before the Easter Sun- day prayer service.15 Abkhazian society has become much more modernized in the last few decades. This is confirmed by the considerable changes in the marriage rites (concealment of the bride and bridegroom has been discontinued—today they are placed at one table with the guests; the same can be said about the recent ban on the bride’s parents visiting the bridegroom’s house on the wedding day). The terms of avoidance, a tradition that prohibited the bride from talking to her husband’s older relatives, have become shorter (this change has reached Bzyb Abkhazia where until recently the daughter-in-law hardly ever spoke to her father-in-law). Parents and children can now freely com- municate in public: today it is not unusual to see fathers carrying their small children in the presence of older relatives, etc.16 Even the outer appearance and clothes worn by people today speak volumes about the social changes in Abkhazia. This is especially true of the women’s dress code. Whereas back in the 1980s, slacks were only worn by teenage girls, while young girls and women never risked appearing in trou- sers in public, today only very conservative-minded people in distant villages condemn the new fash- ions. Today no one objects to daughters-in-law appearing before their relatives without stockings or

14 A.B. Krylov, “Abkhazskoe sviatilishche Dydrypsh: proshloe, nastoiashchee i ustnaia traditsia,” Etnograficheskoe obozrenie, No. 6, 1998, p. 26. 15 See: A.B. Krylov, Religia i traditsii abkhazov, Moscow, 2001, p. 303; idem, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” p. 196. 16 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Ku- lanyrkhva, the city of Sukhumi). 78 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in a sleeveless dress. Beauty contests have become a regular feature, most of those who run for the Miss Abkhazia title are Abkhazians.17 The centuries-old rules of division of labor between the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law and even between men and women are disappearing fast. In the summer, women from mountain villages go down to the coast to earn money working in health resorts, cafes, and hotels, while the husbands and in-laws look after the children and the household. During the hardest years, when Abkhazian men (mainly young and middle aged) were not allowed to cross the border into Russia, it was the women who had to carry the heavy loads of fruit, nuts, and other products grown on their farms across the border to earn money for the family. There is the more or less widespread opinion among Abkhazian women that, despite the changes, men still expect their wives to earn money, which contradicts the traditional idea of man as the “breadwinner.”18 Modernization, which has reached all aspects of social life in Abkhazia, is accompanied by the state’s obvious intention to revive and strengthen archaic structures and institutions and its height- ened interest in this stratum of folk traditions. Statesmen and bureaucrats of all ranks are obviously willing to use the traditional institutions to cement the nation, prevent criminalization, and promote self-administration. Late in the 20th century, pagan rites at numerous Abkhazian sanctuaries were revived after a long hiatus (under Soviet power, Dydrypsh was the only functioning sanctuary). The state is obviously promoting its authority by exploiting the more or less widespread belief in the sacred places. When the war ended, practically all top executives, including President Vladislav Ardzinba, took part in the thanksgiving ceremony at Dydrypsh (in the Achandara village). In the summer of 1996, the Abkhaz- ian president and all of the republic’s leaders asked Dydrypsh “to bring people to their senses to stop criminal activities” and promised annual sacrifices if the wave of crime subdued.19 Local and district bureaucrats frequent Lykh-nykha, the sacred place of the Shakryl family. It is one of Abkhazia’s seven main sanctuaries that were closed in the 1930s when the local Komsomol members smashed the ritual wine vessel buried at the Church of the Dormition of the Mother of God dated to the 10th century. The rituals were revived in 1992.20 There are attempts to restore the social institutions’ traditional role (the council of elders being one of them). Under Soviet power, their role remained purely formal. They are expected to deal with issues belonging to the village community’s unofficial, traditional sphere, such as the eviction of members guilty of adultery, reconciliation of those involved in blood feuds (blood feud still survives in Abkhazia), and changes in traditional marriage, burial, and other rituals.21 In some villages (the village of Khuap, Gudauta District), young people set up youth councils made up of the most respected young men from all families to deal with the misbehavior of their contemporaries. The problems that defy settlement are related to the council of elders.22 There are also district councils of elders that function under the Council of Elders of Abkhazia set up in 1993 to promote national traditions and customs and to “uproot everything that contradicted the Abkhazian spirit.”23 The family-clan system among the Abkhazians is living through a period of renaissance, which can be described as the “revival of archaism.”24 There is a “return to the custom of building social

17 See: E. Tsyshba, “Krasivaia i smelaia na ‘Moda-teks’ zashla,” Ekho Abkhazii, No. 31, 2006, p. 5. 18 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Kulanyrkh- va, the city of Sukhumi). 19 See: A.B. Krylov, “Abkhazskoe sviatilishche Dydrypsh: proshloe, nastoiashchee i ustnaia traditsia,” p. 26. 20 See: A.B. Krylov, Religia i traditsii abkhazov, pp. 299-302. 21 See: R.Sh. Kuznetsova, I.V. Kuznetsov, “Voina, mir i obshchestvo v abkhazskoy derevne Lidzava,” in: Bulleten: Antropologia. Men’shinstva. Mul’tikul’turalizm, New series, Issue 1, No. 1-3, Krasnodar, 2006, p. 102. 22 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2006 (Khuap village). 23 A.B. Krylov, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” p. 199. 24 The term was suggested by V.A. Tishkov (see: V.A. Tishkov, Rekviem po etnosu. Issledovania po sotsial’no- kul’turnoy antropologii, Moscow, 2003, p. 8). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION networks based on blood kinship,”25 which is having a great effect on the social and political situation in the country. Today, the nation is divided into about 600 extended families (azhvla)—some of them small, others quite large. The Kvitsinia (Kutsnia) family united about 320 smaller families with the total number of 1,200 members. The extended families are divided into clans (abipara) with a common ancestor. Large azhvlas are inevitably amorphous; their members are found everywhere across the country; in such cases, the clan serves as the core of a closely-knit collective. During the tragic war years and after the war when the state was fairly weak, these structures helped the nation to survive by shouldering the most important social and economic functions: they protected their members, extended material support to the poorer members, and settled conflicts. The clan is always ready to defend the honor of its members.26 This cohesion has a negative side as well: the interests of the clan and the family come to the fore when one of the members commits an offence. The militia in Sukhumi complained that as soon as it detained an offender, his relatives crowded in front of the precinct in an effort to convince the officers to let their relative go. In some cases, relatives (or those who fought together with the offender) used force to remove the prisoner from the Drandy prison, the only one in Abkhazia. Some time ago the press discussed the possibility of sending Abkhazian prisoners to serve their terms in the Russian Federation.27 Academic circles believe that closely-knit clan structures, which divide society into extended families and lineages, and the rivalry among them are the main contradictions of present-day Abkhaz- ian society and weaken the state.28 I am convinced of the opposite: it was the weak state and its social institutions that forced the family-clan structures to shoulder the responsibilities normally carried by the state. Under Soviet power, they remained alive for the same reason. The present revival of some of the archaic institutions (clans and patrilineages) are the result of the war, economic devastation, and unemployment, as well as the state’s inability to take responsibility for the social and physical protection of its members. Lynching is not infrequent: the victims have to take justice into their hands because the militia shirks its duties for various reasons (corruption or kinship with the offender). In Sukhumi, for example, when the militia “failed to find the killer,” the father of the victim gathered all the necessary evidence and presented it to the militia, which remained passive. Then the father tracked down the killer, murdered him, and pled guilty.29 The religious factor. The Abkhazians follow traditional religious cults described as “pagan” or “earliest monotheism.” At the same time, all Abkhazian families are either “Christian” or “Muslim.” Christianity has been practiced in Abkhazia since ancient times, while Islam arrived much later from Turkey. According to the sources of the 19th and 20th centuries and my own, more recent, field studies, the two religions at no time divided the nation or created problems: there were no obstacles to marriage, sworn brotherhood and foster families, or to everyday communication.30 During the war with Georgia, certain politicians tried to exploit the religious factor by accusing the Abkhazians of “Islamic extremism;” they went as far as describing the conflict as a war being waged by the Muslims against the Christian Georgians. The accusation stood mainly because numerous volunteers from the North Caucasian republics (Kabardins, Adighes, Cherkess, Abazins, Chechens, nearly all of them Muslims), as well as Abkhazians with Muhajir ancestors from Turkey and other countries fought together with the Abkhazians.

25 K.S. Mokin, “Abkhazia. Identichnost’ nepriznannosti. Opyt sotsiokul’turnoy antropologii,” Etnopanorama, No. 3-4, 2006, p. 28. 26 See: A.B. Krylov, “Traditsionnye instituty abkhazov: proshloe i sovremennost’,” pp. 192-193. 27 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2006 (Sukhumi). 28 See: R.Sh. Kuznetsova, I.V. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 103. 29 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004 (Sukhumi). 30 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Ku- lanyrkhva, the city of Sukhumi). 80 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

During the war and after it, the interest in religion (the traditional cults, Islam and Christianity alike) became even stronger. This is easily explained by the tragic events. Little by little the former balance was restored: today the traditional beliefs patronized to a certain extent by the state structures remain in the center of religious life. The nation never embraced Orthodox Islam, mainly because the strict rules demand the abandonment of some basic elements of the local ethnic traditions and stereotypes. Suffice it to say that in Abkhazia wine is more than an alcoholic beverage, it is a sacral drink devoted to the memory of ancestors and to the gods; it is used to bless the newly weds, greet a guest, or remember a dead relative, etc. There are two mosques in the republic—in Sukhumi and Gudauta— attended mainly by repatriates, people from the Northern Caucasus; locals are rarely seen in them.31 Christianity is a different story. Under the impact of recent developments in the Russian Feder- ation and in connection with the events in the Northern Caucasus and all over the world, Christianity has become a “more prestigious” religion, especially among the youth. It is frequently said that Chris- tianity has been practiced in Abkhazia since the times of the apostles (there are holy places associated with the names of St. Simon the Zealot and St. John Chrysostom). Not infrequently young men from “Muslim” families and extended families are baptized. It seems that Christianity is supported at the state level to “improve the country’s image.” Several years ago, a seminary was opened to train Ab- khazian priests; and pilgrimages to the holy places in Abkhazia are gaining popularity. At the same time, certain traditional ideas prevent further consolidation of Christianity: a bearded priest in black is taken for a man in mourning, therefore he might be banned from the places of traditional religious rituals. We were told that probably for this reason a career in Church does not look attractive. Traditions and the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. So far Georgians remain the “enemy.” This will go on until the Georgian refugee issue is finally resolved, the republic’s future becomes clearer, and the unending incidents on the border and in the Gali District end. It is very strange to hear from a teenager born after the war that he hates Georgians—he has had no chance to meet any of them personally. Older people who lived side by side with Georgians are less categorical: they recollect many positive things about them. The fierce armed conflict destroyed the centuries-old ethnic contacts between the Abkhazians and the Georgians, the culturally closest neighbor in the southeast. The Georgians live compactly in the Gali District, there are few of them in other areas. Today, they are all held responsible for what happened. This serves as the background for the thesis that the Abkhazians and the Georgians are not as closely related as the Abkhazians and the Adighes. This newly invented myth holds no water—everyone who is more or less aware of the closeness of the Georgian and Abkhazian traditions and everyday culture knows this. In fact, the only thing that divides them is language. Today there are people who say that the custom of keeping wine in jugs is “Georgian, not our tradition.” The tradition of the first new-year customer hitherto popular in Abzhu Abkhazia is being dismissed as “not ours.”32 Everything “not ours” is doubted and rejected. The council of elders of the Lid- zava village ruled to “purify” the Abkhazian traditions of Georgian influence: cheese was banned from the funereal repast together with other “excesses.”33 At the same time, although some of the Abkhazian rites and mythological characters have Georgian (Mingrel) names (such are khech’khvama, adgyl de- dupal, etc.), this never causes any problems with their observance and veneration. The Abkhazian language abounds in borrowings from the Georgian, which in turn contains borrowings from the Abkhaz- ian. All political cataclysms notwithstanding, we cannot ignore the contacts rooted in hoary antiquity and the ties that have connected the two peoples throughout many centuries. There is any number of family names shared by those who regard themselves as Abkhazians and by Georgians. This is true mainly of the Gali District of Abkhazia and Mingrelia in Georgia. Not in-

31 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2006 (the villages of Chlou, Duripsh, Jgerda, Lykhny, Ku- lanyrkhva, Khuap, the city of Sukhumi). 32 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2005 (the villages of Chlou, Jgerda, Lykhny). 33 R.Sh. Kuznetsova, I.V. Kuznetsov, op. cit., p. 102. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION frequently this is explained by assimilation: there are stories about the ancestors of these families coming to Abkhazia 150-200 years ago. According to folk traditions, the members of such families (Dochia—Abkhazians and Dochia—Georgians, for example) are believed to be relatives. Marriages between them are banned, while the members of both families are regarded as brothers and sisters. In the past, before the 1990s, such families frequently communicated: they visited each other’s homes, especially in the event of death in the family. The war disrupted all of this, but the feeling of kinship remains and is acknowledged. Twenty years ago, marriages to Georgians (especially to Mingrel Georgians) were extremely common, particularly in the Ochamchira District, while today there are very few of them. At the everyday level, ethnic contacts, some of them very interesting, have survived. Here is one example: in the event of a so-called God’s illness (according to the local people, it frequently affects young girls), people go to a Georgian (Mingrel) healer. He lives in Ochamchira, but his fame as the best expert in the necessary rituals has traveled far and wide: people come from all over the republic, even from the remotest corners.34 Traditions and external influences. In recent decades, the vector of economic, political, and ethnic contacts of Abkhazian society changed its direction: Russia has become its main partner. This is a new situation for the Abkhazians: the centuries-old ethnic contacts with its culturally closest southeastern neighbors were grossly disrupted. The new vector is looking to the northwest: this will change the course of the social processes, as well as the family and clan structures, which will probably be modernized at a fast pace. This, plus the fact that many Abkhazians go to Russia to study or to work, as well as tend to leave the countryside to settle in the cities (Sukhumi, Gagra, Novy Afon, etc.), has stirred up transformations in culture and everyday life and has already increased the role of the Russian tongue. The structure of mixed marriages has changed: there are many more marriages between Abk- hazians and Russians and Abkhazians and North Caucasian peoples than before. Men marry outside their ethnic group; there is also a recent, even more striking phenomenon: Abkhazian girls are marry- ing Russians, Adighes, etc.

C o n c l u s i o n

Field studies and ethnographic observations testify to the fact that the events of the last decades have had a strong influence on the development of the Abkhazian ethnos: the contacts inside it have become more intensive (between the Abzhu and Bzyb Abkhazians); there are stronger ties with the Abkhazian diaspora abroad; much has changed in the Abkhazians’ religious awareness; the family- clan structures are changing fast; and the same applies to gender roles. Much of what is going on in the Abkhazian society speaks of its modernization. There is an opposite trend toward archaism of certain aspects of social life: decentralization of agricultural production has forced people to revive the traditional methods of farming on their personal plots; the role of traditional communal and kindred structures has increased against the background of the weaker state institutions; the traditional pagan beliefs have been revived together with the restored institution of pagan priests, etc.

34 Field data gathered by the author. Interviews of 2004-2005 (the villages of Jgerda and Lykhny, the city of Sukhumi). 82 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Rena KADYROVA

Ph.D. (Psychol.), associate professor at the Department of Psychology, Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

ON SOME SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS O THE DEVELOPMENT O NATIONAL IDENTITY O THE AZERI YOUTH

Abstract

he author offers an analysis of some Azerbaijan. She draws on the vast amount T sociopsychological aspects of the de- of empirical data she obtained through her velopment of the Azeri national identity own experimental studies of the development in the specific cultural-historical context of of the national identity of the Azeri youth.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Today, any state’s legitimacy and effectiveness largely depends on its ability to instill an awareness of national identity in its citizens. This explains why the development of statehood and national awareness, which began in Northern Azerbaijan when it gained its independence in the late 20th century, was intimately connected with the development of new identity forms, particularly national identity. Today this problem has become even more intense: the Republic of Azer- baijan is facing several difficulties such as vast migration, highly aggressive Armenian nationalism, and separatism, which have already created about a million refugees and displaced persons. This negatively affects the formation of national, personal, cultural, professional, religious, and other types of identity. In its turn, the sociocultural, historical, economic, and geopolitical specifics of Azerbaijan, a country which is the meeting place of Europe and Asia, the West and the East, as well as globalization and a powerful flow of new ideas and values supplied by the West and the East, offer the young people of this country a wide choice of self-identification matrices. Experts who belong to various theoretical trends (primordialism, constructivism, instrumen- talism, and ethnosymbolism)1 disagree over how to define the nation. The majority, however,

1 Detailed analyses of these ideas are found in the following works: A. Dawisha, “Nation and Nationalism: His- torical Antecedents to Contemporary Debates,” International Studies Association, Vol. 9, Issue 3, June 2002, pp. 3-22; C. Geertz, “Primordial and Civic Ties,” in: Nationalism, ed. by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 27-43; E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Cornell University Press, New York, 1983; The In- vention of Tradition, ed. by E. Hobsbaum & T. Ranger, Cambridge University Press, London, 1983; Nationalism, ed. by J. Hutchinson and A. Smith; H. Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Pol- itics of Nationalism, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo., 1977; A. Smith, Nations & Nationalism in Global Era, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION agrees that national identification can be described as the nation’s cornerstone. The national self- identification process is largely determined by a psychological, subjective factor, in particular the desire and willingness of members of any community to think of themselves as belonging to a specific nation. From this it follows that the national identification process and development of national identity have attracted not only sociologists and political philosophers, but also psychologists, social psychologists included. This means that a sociopsychological analysis of the relevant problems and prospects can and should be employed to clarify the possible future development variants of Azeri society. This article looks at certain aspects of the development of national identity of the Azeri youth related to the following questions: How is the development of national identification unfolding? How is the formation of national identity going on? What place do national identity processes occupy in the development of the nation? I shall analyze them in the context of the findings obtained through a series of experiments carried out in different years. Before going on to the results, I would like to outline the theoretical context of these experiments.

Identity: A Cognitive Category and Social Representation

The experiments were based on the following sociopsychological theories, which supplied the framework for the phenomena of identity. They are: H. Tajfel’s social identity theory;2 J. Turner’s self-categorization theory,3 and S. Moscovici’s theory of social representations,4 which, among other things, postulate the following: the development and creation of national identity is largely related to the ideas of the members of a group about their history, comparisons and correlation with other groups, self-identification, and group assessments.5 The social identity theory stems from the fact of belonging to all sorts of social groups (gender, ethnic, national, professional, etc.) and the fact that belonging to these social groups might develop into part of an individual’s self-concept. H. Tajfel has the following to say on this score: “Social identity—that part of individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of membership of a social group (groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that.”6 An individual’s self-identification with any group is, strictly speaking, a form of social identity. By assuming it, the individual must distance himself from other, alien groups. The self-categorization theory postulates that individuals have a multiplicity of personal and social identities that are organized in the form of a category hierarchy. J. Turner, its author, extended the process of categorization to the “individual self-concept.” According to him, an individual’s conception of himself can be considered self-categorization: the cognitive grouping of characteristics

2 See: H. Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981. 3 See: J. Turner, Social Categorisation and the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory of Group Behavior. Ad- vances in Group Processes, Vol. 2, JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn., 1985, pp. 77-121. 4 See: S. Moscovici, “Notes Towards a Description of Social Representations,” European Journal of Social Psy- chology, No. 18, 1988, pp. 211-250. 5 These diverse manifestations of the phenomena related to the development of different forms of social identity, which have become an object of intensive studies by Western social psychologists in the past few decades, have only recently attracted the attention of post-Soviet academics. Under Soviet power, due to the dominant ideology that insisted on the development of “Soviet man” and ignored the great importance of ethnosocial, linguistic, and religious distinctions of various ethnosocial groups, research into these questions was not permitted. 6 H. Tajfel, op.cit., p. 255. 84 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION inherent in himself and the idea of himself as identical, analogous, and equivalent to a certain class of stimuli distinct from another class of stimuli.7 Finally, the theory of social representations postulates that many of the phenomena that describe the diverse sides of social identity, such as the phenomenon of “in-group favoritism” and “out-group denigration,” are most likely rooted in the system of the ideas generally accepted in the child’s social milieu rather than produced by his own cognitive system. From this point of view, development largely depends on a child belonging to a particular social group and the types of practices and discourses typical of it. These theoretical postulates were used to create special methods and carry out a series of exper- iments8 which measured such elements of national identity as the degree of identification with one’s national group; assessment of the importance of national identity; ideas about one’s own national group and those of others; and national stereotypes and feelings.

Some Experimental Results and Their Interpretation

For the purpose of the present article we have selected, out of the entire body of experimental data, some of the results related to the measuring of the degree of importance of national identity and a child’s degree of national identification and attitude toward other nations.9 The degree of importance a child attaches to his national identity was measured by his comparison of the subjective importance of national identity against certain other identity forms, such as gender and age. The child was offered a set of cards with various identity categories depicted on them and was invited to select those he related to himself. The procedure went on until each card had been selected. In this way, the child ranked the cards and different identity types associated with them. The results were then mathematically and statistically processed; the results obtained indicate in particular that at the age of 6 Azeri children demonstrate an understanding of their ethnonational identity and are capable of identifying themselves with the nation.10 The degree of such identification increased as the child grew older (see Table 1). In turn, the degree of a child’s identification with his/her national group (the degree of Azeri- ness) was measured in the following way: the child was offered a set of cards depicting the following definitions: “not an Azeri at all,” “Azeri to a certain extent,” “true Azeri,” as well as “don’t know” and “other.” The answers were calculated according to the following point system: “not an Azeri at all” earned 1 point; “Azeri to a certain extent,” 2; “true Azeri,” 3. All the children demonstrated a high degree of identification with their national group. Signif- icantly, the 9-year-old—the first generation (in the year 2000, the time of our experiments) born in the new, independent state—showed the highest degree of national identity (see Table 2). Our experiments revealed another important fact, namely, the statistically important role of the language in the degree of identification with one’s own national group: schoolchildren taught in the

7 See: J. Turner, P. Oakes, “Self-Categorization Theory and Social Influence,” in: The Psychology of Group Influ- ence, ed. by P.B. Paulus, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ., 1989, p. 245. 8 The experiments were conducted in 1999-2000 and encompassed 510 schoolchildren from Baku of both sexes and four age groups (6, 9, 12 and 15 years) taught in the Azeri and Russian tongues. 9 As a rule, these types of measurement become important in cross-cultural studies that contain useful comparable contexts. In our case, we found the inner national comparable contexts important that were created by the age, ethnic, regional, and linguistic distinctions. 10 To avoid any misunderstandings caused by the terms of ethnonational identification, it should be said that the term Azeri (Azerbaijanian) relates to both categories—ethnic and national identity—while the term “citizen of Azerbai- jan” undoubtedly relates to the national identity category. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1 Comparative Subjective Importance of Ethnonational Identity Depending on the Respondents Age

Identity Mean Scores H-criterion Kruskal-Wallis Test

Ethnic identity (Azeri) χ2=13.2 6 years 6.46 P < .01 9 years 4.53 12 years 5.67 15 years 5.61

National identity (citizen of Azerbaijan) χ2 = 12.31 6 years 9.58 P < .006 9 years 8.36 12 years 7.38 15 years 6.21

Table 2

The Age 8actor and Degree of Identification with Ones Own Ethnonational Group

Identity Mean Scores Kruskal-Wallis Test

Degree of “Azeri-ness” χ2 = 13.07 6 years 2.86 P < .004 9 years 2.98 12 years 2.88 15 years 2.79

Azeri tongue demonstrated a higher degree of identification. This is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 1 shows the age dynamics of the mean scores of the national identity (citizen of Azerbaijan) chosen by schoolchildren in the Azeri and Russian educational sectors. The scores are calculated from 0 down, since the smaller the score the higher its subjective importance. It was determined by the Kruskal- Wallis test. Fig. 2 shows pairs of mean scores of subjective importance of national identity in different age groups of schoolchildren taught in the Azeri and Russian languages. The smaller the score, i.e. the higher the column of the hystogram, the more important the identity. Fig. 2 demonstrates that, despite 86 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

igure 1 Assessment of Importance of National Identity Among Schoolchildren in the Azeri and Russian Sectors (P < .0001)

6 years 9 years 12 years 15 years 0

6 scores 8

12 Russian Azeri

igure 2

The Importance of National Identity Significantly Grows Only for Schoolchildren Taught in Russian (P < .03)

6 scores 8

12 6 years 9 years 12 years 15 years

The Azeri language sector of teaching The Russian language sector of teaching Vol. 1 (3), 2007 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION a certain amount of “Russification” caused by the language used in school, by the age of 15, schoolchildren in the Russian sector reach almost the same level of subjective expression of national identity as their contemporaries taught in their native tongue. Before going on to discuss the data obtained, let us talk about another highly interesting result produced by the same series, namely, Azeri children’s attitude toward people who belong to different national groups. The children were given a set of six positive and six negative adjectives (“clean,” “dirty,” “happy,” “sad,” “clever,” “stupid,” “hardworking,” “lazy,” “friendly,” “unfriendly,” “good,” “bad”). Each adjective was written on its own card. The children were asked to choose the adjectives they thought best described the national in-group (the Azeris, in our case). Then they were asked whether they liked their in-group. When the child answered this question, he was asked: “To what extent do you like or dislike the Azeris?” Then the children were asked the same questions about out- groups (Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, English, Germans, and Americans). Because half the adjectives were positive and half were negative, we could derive a score which measured the positivity or negativity of the children’s descriptions of their own national in-group (Azeri people) and the out- groups. Table 3 gives the mean scores reflecting Azeri children’s positive attitudes toward the national in-group and out-groups depending on age: the higher the mean score the more positive the attitude. Table 3

Attitudes to the National In-Group and Out-Groups Depending on Age

Mean Scores Age Azeri Russian Ukrainian Georgian English German American

6 years 2.73 1.71 0.68 0.92 1.06 0.67 1.2

9 years 2.86 1.81 1.08 1.27 1.95 1.09 1.9

12 years 2.6 1.8 1.56 1.91 2.3 1.56 2.33

15 years 2.48 1.86 1.42 2.17 2.17 2.09 2.32

Total 2.7 1.8 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.9

As can be seen from Table 3, the child’s own national group received the highest positive values (which testifies to in-group favoritism); the degree of positive attitude toward one’s own national group decreases with age. On the other hand, as children become older (between 6 and 12), their positive attitude toward other national groups (with the exception of Russians) becomes statistically significant. The results of a statistical analysis (the Kruskal-Wallis test) reflecting the degree of positive attitude toward national groups depending on age are given below (see Table 4). There is no agreement among social psychologists about whether one’s “Self” is first associated with the in-group and is then differentiated from the out-groups, or whether these are parallel and interconnected processes. The self-categorization theory mentioned above believes that the desire to acquire a positive in-group self-identity is psychologically primary compared with differentiation from an out-group. This motivation prompts the individual to accept his in-group and to proceed to differentiation from an out-group. This theory, however, ignores the linguistic factor and especially the use of group categories in speech. From our experiments it followed that in-group favoritism in children was not necessarily associated with denigration of an out-group. In real life, however, according to historians, nations behave 88 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 4 The Results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test Reflecting Positivity toward National Groups Depending on Age

National Azeris Russians Ukrainians Georgians English Germans Americans groups

χ2 37.36 1.10 30.5 74.2 62.2 88.8 54.95

reliabi- P < .0001 Not P < .0001 P < .0001 P < .0001 P < .0001 P < .0001 lity reliable differently: they were created in opposition to each other. Michael Billig has the following to say: “Historically, myths about the nation tend to be developed as a nation is being created in contradistinction to other nations. Nations imitate the national forms of others, but do so in ways that proclaim their own national uniqueness. This is apparent as a nation liberates itself from a colonial power… Britain developed many of its modern symbols of nationhood … in conscious contradistinction to French styles of nation-making… The first recorded cartoon, depicting John Bull as an ‘Englishman,’ also shows a Frenchman, as thin and meager as Bull is fat and generous… An identification with the group caricature is also an identification against the rival Other … national affirmation is achieved through negation.”11 In other words, there are fundamental differences in the way national identity develops at the level of the child’s cognitive processes and in the way these processes develop in history. Historical context and speech specifics, which are isolated and never discussed in the cognitive theories of social identity and self-categorization, correct the development of national identity as a type of social identity. M. Billig has pointed out that linguistic discourse, which in an era of nationalism acquires new, nationalist meanings, introduces its own logic and sets its own framework for the development of national identification and identity. In this connection, we shall discuss the third group of facts derived from the experimental research in 2007. We polled 210 respondents between 17 and 19 years of age (schoolchildren and students) who live in Baku, the republic’s capital, and the regional centers (Ganja and Lankaran). One hundred and forty-six of them were Azeris, 54 were ethnic Talyshes, while 10 belonged to other ethnic groups. They were asked to use a seven-point scale (from 1 to 7, 1 being the lowest) when answering the following questions: (1) To what extent do you feel yourself an Azeri? (2) To what extent is it important for you to be an Azeri? (3) When you hear a non-Azeri criticizing the Azeris to what extent do you feel criticized? (4) To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Azeris? The mean value of the points accumulated by these four questions indicated the degree of identification of the individual; in half of the cases, the term “Azeri” was used to denote national identification; in the other half, the term “citizen of Azerbaijan.” The two terms were used to check whether they could be used as categories of national self-identification. Figs. 3 and 4 show the level of identification with the categories “Azeri” and “citizen of Azerbaijan” among Azeris and Talyshes in three age groups.

11 M. Billig, Banal Nationalism, Sage Publications Ltd, London, 1995, p. 81. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

igure 3 The Dynamics of National Identification (Azerbaijani)

7.00

6.00

5.00

4.00

3.00

(Azerbaijani) 2.00

Strength of Identification 1.00

0.00 17 18 19 Age

Respondent’s ethnic group Azerbaijani Talyshes

igure 4

The Dynamics of National Identification (citizen of Azerbaijan)

7.00

6.00

5.00

4.00

3.00

2.00 (citizen of Azerbaijan) Strength of Identification 1.00

0.00 17 18 19 Age

Respondent’s ethnic group Azerbaijani Talyshes 90 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

No statistical data are needed to conclude from Figs. 3 and 4 that as a national identity category the terms were interchangeable. More than that: ethnic Talyshes demonstrated an even more pronounced identification with the terms “Azeri” and “citizen of Azerbaijan.” This speaks of the exceptionally important and integrating role the culture of Azerbaijan plays for at least some ethnic groups as they acquire their national self-identification. In this way, the Azerbaijanian phenomenon is a unique one: from time immemorial, people of different ethnic origins, cultures, and religions have been living side by side in Azerbaijan. They have created a very specific culture, which allows them to continue living together. In Europe much is said about multiculturalism,12 which is emerging as a very complicated issue calling for far from simple solutions. Azerbaijan is an example of a multicultural society which came into being in a natural way in the course of history. In the absence of a state policy designed to protect minorities, we can speak only about a kind of multicultural society in which a rich culture, the product of the concerted efforts of all the peoples of Azerbaijan, assumed the role of moderator. This feature, no matter how advantageous, creates certain problems, mainly because, in a polyethnic society, the state is unable to use ethnic nationalism, a powerful tool of nation-building. We all know that it proved highly useful in Europe in the 18th-19th centuries when nation-building was especially intensive. Without going into detail about the vast body of relevant writings, I shall say that nationalism is a far from simple psychological process rooted in a wide range of sociopsychological conditions and regularities through which national identity develops. All nations involved in nation- and state-building should be aware of this. In the context of the present article, nationalism is regarded as a source of imagination and thinking of the rank-and-file members of imagined communities13 to which all contemporary nation-states belong. Nationalistic imagination is concentrated around the first person plural, since it is an image of what “we” are. This includes an image of one’s own individuality, one’s own “Self,” and its connection with the category, in the way described by the theories of social identity and social self-categorization. The category itself is important, since no in-group can be imagined as a nation.14 A national group is a special type of group: the idea of the nation’s status includes an imagined community with unique spatial-temporal identities claiming the right to political independence. A. Smith used the following words: a population “must be taught who they are, where they come from, and whither they are going”15 to acquire a feeling of national identity. There is a vast body of writing that permits us to trace the emergence of nationalism accompanied by newly created myths and collective memory. Collective reminiscence, and collective forgetfulness for that matter, is achieved through creating common histories that describe the nation as an individual community. In this way, the past makes the present more meaningful; the nation comes to be imagined as a unique entity with a historical destiny and native land of its own. In this connection, it is important to create an awareness of specificity so that “our” nation looks different from others. To achieve this, we must identify the main principles that should underlie the Azeri identity and Azeri nationalism. Here we have to distinguish between “ethnic” and “civil” nationalism. The former cannot be created deliberately—it either exists or it does not. Why do some people possess a very high degree of

12 Multiculturalism is a strategy designed to integrate ethnic minorities into society; it differs from liberalism, which treats the individual’s rights and freedoms as a priority. Multiculturalism concentrates on the minorities’ collective rights and interests, including the right to individual and coexisting identities (see, for example: T.R. Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts, USIP Press, Washington, DC, 1993, p. 427). 13 B. Anderson, Voobrazhaemye soobshchestva. Razmyshlenia ob istokakh i rasprostranenii natsionalizma, KANON-press-Ts, Moscow, 2001. 14 See: M. Billig, op. cit., p. 188. 15 A. Smith, op. cit., p. 184. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ethnic nationalism, while others do not? A. Smith and his studies of “ethni” as an ethnic community that predates the nation provide an answer to the above.16 He argues that there are four conditions that promote ethnic crystallization or emergence of “ethni” in the pre-contemporary era. Acquisition, or later loss, of a definite territory that was believed to belong to the people in the same way as they belonged to it is described as the most important element. This was the “motherland.” Protracted wars against other states and fighting all kinds of enemies, which kept people mobilized for a long time and fed the feeling of community, were another condition: the tradition of battles and wars that thus emerged instilled in later generations a conviction of shared destiny. Its praises were sung in folk poetic tradition and written texts which made myths, heroes, and battles an important part of the ethnic community. The third condition is closely connected with religion, which served as the vehicle by means of which ethnic myths and symbols, in short, collective memory, were passed on from generation to generation. Finally, the fourth condition is associated with a very important, but rarely obtained tool of survival—the myth of being a chosen ethnic group. A. Smith believes that today these four conditions combined encourage ethnic nationalism.

C o n c l u s i o n s

1. Our studies demonstrated that subjective awareness of national identity grows as the child becomes older, that subjective importance of ethnonational identity is rather high in schoolchildren in the Azeri educational sector (especially in 9-year-olds), and that in all age groups children tend to prefer their national groups. 2. At the same time, the intensity of national identity in children is not connected with their attitude toward alien groups, which means that their attitude toward national out-groups does not depend on the degree of their national identification. 3. The children taught in their native tongue (Azeri) attach much more importance to national identity and demonstrated a much higher level of identification with their national group, as well as positive feelings and assessments of their own national group. 4. It should be said that the appearance of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan has opened up new prospects for the nation’s development, which means that we need a specially tai- lored national policy17 to bring together all the ethnic groups and create the Azeri national identity at a new level.

16 See: A. Smith, “Nations and History,” in: Understanding Nationalism, ed. by M. Guibernau and J. Hutchinson, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2001, pp. 9-31. 17 In his Kontseptsia natsional’noy politiki Azerbaizhanskoy Respubliki (Baku, 2003, p. 27) R.A. Huseinov formulated some of the fundamental principles of national policy. 92 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Guram SVANIDZE

Ph.D. (Philos.), works at the Civil Integration Committee, Georgian Parliament (Tbilisi, Georgia).

GLOBALIZATION-WESTERNIZATION: DI ICULTIES O TRANSITION IN GEORGIA

Abstract

he author offers a general sociolo- of the new choice and assesses the de- T gical analysis of the state of Geor- gree of their maturity. He also concentrates gian society during the transition pe- on the hypothetical risks society might riod; he contemplates specific historical, run up against in the globalization pro- culturological, and political prerequisites cess.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Globalization struck root in Georgian minds long ago; more than that—the country has opted for the Western vector. Today, the market economy, the institutions of democracy and civil society, and human rights are treated as the main priorities of the Georgian state. Society accepted on trust the old mythologeme about Georgian culture sharing European values. The truth is not that straightforward. There is an awareness in the country that the unifying nature of globalization and impact of Westernization are fraught with assimilation and the loss of specific ethnic characteristics. An Academy for Saving National Values set up by members of the academic and artistic elite has been functioning in Georgia for some time; it joined with a passion the discussions of educational reform in Georgia. Today, a rational analysis of the current developments is often replaced with heated discussions and tags that say “an abettor of masonry,” “grant hunter,” “Uncle Soros’ agent,” or “Uncle Sam’s nephew twice removed.” Strangely enough, Georgian experts tend to ignore the poly-cultural nature of Georgian society and the fact that it is the home of peoples of diverse cultures that accept globalization (which normally betrays itself as Westernization) to different degrees. Here I have undertaken to discuss this side of globalization.

Westernization’s Negative Sides

Globalization, or rather Westernization, is a dramatic process with numerous inner contradictions; they are acute enough to add dynamism and competitiveness to the entire process and, at the same time, cause numerous frustrations. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

“Some Sociological Aspects of Fascist Movements” authored by classic of American sociology Talcott Parsons,1 written in 1948, revealed the inner prerequisites of fascism inherent in the Western development model. Modernization as an “intensifying” factor imposes a high pace of qualitative changes on society in all spheres of social life, while any culture can accept a limited amount of changes and their pace; if neglected this factor might cause either aggressive crises or deep depression. Rationalization, which forces society to abandon its customs and traditions or bridle its emotions for the sake of effective social action or interaction, can be equally “depressing.” Being drawn into complicated forms of interaction, the individual learns to drop some of his requirements, post- pone their satisfaction, and adjust his actions to the existing resources. Abandoning some of the elements of his sovereignty in favor of interaction causes misgivings that become even worse in the rapidly changing situation. This is fraught with anomie: the habitual traditional landmarks are lost, the system of expecta- tions falls apart; this might cause the disintegration of public consciousness and culture, as well as an identity crisis. Affective responses predominate, while society loses its knack for an adequate assessment of the situation: each novelty causes panic. Talcott Parsons believes that the problem should be treated in a systemic way: fascism is a systemic crisis not limited to activities of the right political spectrum: it is a movement of highly agitated masses.2 Samuel Huntington believes that certain societies and cultures cannot change in principle; they oppose Westernization, which Huntington himself sees as an absolute boon: “Those with Western Christian heritages are making progress toward economic development and democratic politics; the prospects for economic and political development in the Orthodox countries are uncertain; the prospects in the Muslim republics are bleak.”3 In Georgia, this conclusion cannot but cause concern. Public consciousness cannot change smoothly: changes as a rule cause trouble. It can be functional if the system of values has certain reserves for transformation. Society might be pulled back to the traditional fundamental values. The humiliating conditions of the Versailles Peace Treaty stirred up revanchist sentiments among the Germans, which later developed into claims to world domination. They were rooted in the early German myths from which fascism derived the theory of Aryan superiority. The trouble can be limited to certain population strata, it might be caused by the malfunctioning of one of the social mechanisms, not by the entire civilizational paradigm. This may happen in the socialization framework, when the process of sociocultural inheritance is disrupted. For ideological considerations, the wave of youth protest in the West in the 1960s was interpreted in the Soviet Union as a total crisis of capitalism. This was said at a time when the West had reached a very high level of prosperity and living standards. The young insurgents went against the entire civilization, its “repressive reality, which quenched the natural instincts and cost mankind the blessings of natural existence,” etc. The West paid for the stupid rebellion of the youth with demographic gaps caused by the cult of drugs as a way to recreate the “original blessings.”4 The same fully applies to the racial unrest in the United States: the mass actions of the Black population under slogans of racial equality rapidly gave way to anarchy and chaos. The still abandoned neighborhoods of Newark are the result of the riots of the 1960s and a reminder of the recurring

1 See: T. Parsons, “Some Sociological Aspects of Fascist Movements,” in: Essay in Sociological Theory, A Free Press paperback, London, 1964, pp. 124-141. 2 See: Ibid., p. 125. 3 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998, p. 29. 4 Iu. Davydov, I. Rodnianskaia, Sotsiologia kontr-kul’tury. Kriticheskiy analiz, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1980. 94 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION racial troubles. While the Black community has finally found its niche in the system of rational and modern American society and become integrated into it, the Red Indian communities had to seek refuge on reservations. Their example demonstrates that globalization has triggered wide-scale assimilation processes. Under the pressure of rationalization (modernization), traditional cultures are merging (willingly or unwillingly) with the dominant cultures. The academic community has gathered a huge body of data describing the colonization process, as well as the situation of the emigrant communities and indigenous groups. Today this experience is widely used in state programs for the integration, absorption, and repatriation of migrants. These groups counter assimilation with isolationism; not infrequently members of such groups seek refuge in escapism, liquor, or drugs, which leads nowhere except to degradation. Georgia’s recent history has already revealed the cost of revolutionary changes, when the country moved from one civilizational paradigm to another.

On the Brink

Georgia remained in the context of the communist paradigm as long as the model of socialism was actively realized on its territory. The Stalinist communist system based on terror and fear was replaced with the dual standard relations of “developed socialism.” The communist slogans degenerated in people’s minds into mere formalities, while public life was nothing more than a system of rudimentary rituals. The clan structures, although inherent in Stalinism, were never comfortable under it: both the family members of the top party figures and captains of the economy and they themselves were the system’s hostages. Rotation in the elite went on through purges and executions. This made upward social movement a very risky enterprise. After the Khrushchev “thaw,” the top party apparatchiks and leaders of the Soviet economy developed into an elite, which willingly snatched the chance to consolidate for the sake of smooth reproduction and development, a generation later, into an impregnable fortress. Careers depended on the individual’s closeness to the party and economic nomenklatura; the state institutions were used for purely private purposes; a new social dimension appeared—the access of large and small groups to shadow sources of income and services. It was not the communists who invented double standards: they are a sign of a total social crisis and the manifestation of social anomie.5 This presupposed a distorted unity of opposites possible only in the equivocal deal/consensus between the corrupt and legitimate public sectors. The mafia, the shadow structure of the party and economic core, became the factor of power; corruption developed into a systemic characteristic, while national interest deteriorated into the interests of all sorts of mafia—tobacco, tea, and citrus. Nothing done to put an end to this brought positive results, mainly because repressive measures were used against individual phenomena and people rather than the system. The contradiction inherent in the double standards system did not presuppose advance—it led to stagnation that, in turn, degenerated into corruption. In fact, double standards are rooted in the distant past: this could be observed in Georgia long ago and was functional to a certain extent. The centuries-long experience of Georgia’s relations with

5 This should be distinguished from the schizophrenia of culture, which is a conflict between two universal alternatives or inside the paradigm. Turkish society is frequently used as an example, in which the military guarantees and carries out Westernization, while the rest of society guides itself by the traditional Islamic values. Under the conditions of double standards, a collision is taking place between the universal and particular levels (see: S. Huntington, op. cit.; S. Lurie, Istoricheskaia etnologia, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 1998). Vol. 1 (3), 2007 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Oriental empires was not limited to inroads and genocide. There were periods of peaceful coexistence, cultural exchange and borrowings, as well as attempts at assimilation. The Georgian ethnos protected itself against the perpetual threat of aggression and complete destruction by congregating into communities based on blood kinship. Georgian Orthodoxy became the religion of the nation, which was fighting for its physical and spiritual survival. The Church increased the ties inside and outside the communities and blessed them; the ties between the communities were treated as just as important as those based on blood kinship. The Church looked after the people’s cultural heritage and its historical memory. At that time central power with limited (or absent) sovereignty continued to exist through deals with empires. The state institutions were purely pragmatic: they were nothing more than ad- justment tools. What they did was never axiologically valuable. Public memory and historical documents, however, have preserved the memory of great czars who gathered the lands together and who built the state (David the Builder, Queen Tamara). Their rule was remembered as the golden age of Georgia’s history. It was in this context that people learned to doubt the legitimacy of central power. The never-ending manipulations with dynastic inheritance still further undermined the authority of the throne. The country was a conglomerate of communities with an obvious ethnic identity that created the concept of “people” (“eri” in Georgian), but there was nothing that could blend the people into a nation as a community of citizens of one state. The Church was the vehicle of the people’s (not nations’) spiritual unity. Christian Orthodoxy was changing; in the traditional sense it was the factor that made the state sacral. The undeveloped communications and the country’s mountainous terrain regional- ized the country both geographically and politically. The mythologemes about strong peoples who shared a religion with the Georgians and would come to liberate and unify the country were fed by the general craving for legitimate central power and the historical memory of a strong statehood of the distant past. At first this was the West, the first contacts with which coincided with the time of the Crusades. Later Russia, which was building up its influence in the Caucasus, emerged as the central force of the mythologemes. Much later, as part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the Georgians, like all the other peoples of these giant empires, were involved in huge messianic projects: “Moscow, the Third Rome” and “The Soviet Union, the Trailblazer of Communist Construction.” As soon as the projects collapsed, Georgia turned to the West once more: it pinned its hopes on Zviad Gamsakhurdia. His movement freed the country from the burden of its communist past; West- ern orientation was seen as a liberating factor and an alternative to the state of affairs at that time. His movement concentrated on anti-communism, the main subject of all the ideological documents it produced. The top party functionaries preferred to step aside; later this saved them from many troubles and led to a deep-cutting power crisis caused by the drama of 9 April, 1989, when a peaceful rally was ruthlessly dispersed. Most of the Georgian population tried to overcome the anomie caused by the collapse of the communist regime by lauding, with a great degree of fanaticism, the charismatic leader and consolidating around the national idea. After a while the euphoria caused by the democratic advent to power of the first president of independent Georgia was replaced with bitter disillusionment. President Gam- sakhurdia failed to save the social organism: the upper echelons of power were in chaos, while the president tried to rule through permanent public rallies. The negative features of the time deserve special investigation. Events unfolded rapidly and chaotically, the public inevitably trailing behind them. The West refused to cooperate with the Gamsakhurdia regime because he was “swimming against the current.” The situation quickly deteriorated. The “orphaned nation” subject predominated at the rallies and in the media, while hysterics became the main argument. Society developed into a loose entity of hap- hazard social contacts. 96 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

People rapidly armed themselves; the process spiraled out of control and caused numerous fatal accidents. The country was flooded with delinquent behavior, alcoholism, drug abuse, and crime. Cultural monuments, cemeteries, and museums were plundered, the scope of which became threatening. Public order was frequently violated at football matches and elsewhere. The regime speeded up the collapse of communism in Georgia, but it offered no real alternative to it: it was busy fighting communism, while the communists had already betrayed it. President Gam- sakhurdia’s policy was, in fact, undermining the pillars of social order. Was self-annihilation of the communist regime in Georgia absolutely unnecessary, or did society preserve a certain amount of potential to stand opposed to the degradation of the Gamsa- khurdia era? The most eloquent tags of the time (there was a multitude of them) were: “Tbilisi chauvinism,” “provincial fascism,” and “the criminal intelligentsia.” Stuck in the chaos of numerous disorderly and short-lived political contacts, they were used haphazardly with no obvious inner association. The highest point of their confrontation came together with the coup d’etat that removed Gamsakhurdia and developed into fighting in the very center of Tbilisi in December-Janu- ary 1991-1992. The “Tbilisi chauvinists” disdainfully rejected the political styles of “provincial fascists.” The figure of the president gradually developed into an epic hero with all the adequate attributes giving rise to corresponding veneration. Ethnocultural performances that smacked of folklore and involved hired mourners and sorcerers practicing witchcraft against the enemies became one of the political tools. The differences were rooted much deeper than the mere taste for public performances. There was a clash between the cosmopolitan megapolis and the much more narrowly oriented provinces. Having allied, albeit unwillingly, with Mkhedrioni, the intelligentsia became one of the best-organized opposition forces. Indeed, even the tiniest islands of organization in the sea of general chaos developed into fortresses. In this way, the well-organized criminal community became the country’s only real force. The fact that it was headed by Jaba Ioseliani, “the most criminal of the intellectuals,” or “the most intellectual of the criminals,” prettified, to a certain extent, the un- pleasant situation in which the state found itself. Tengiz Kitovani, a political delinquent in command of the National Guard, had an important role to play too: by a quirk of fate, he moved against the president. The 1991 coup brought no stability; however, disintegration of the state slowed down.

Ethno-Nationalism and What Came of It

In some spheres of social life double standards produce immediate and dramatic effects. In Georgia this happened in the sphere of ethnic relations. Proletarian internationalism devised as a tool for forming the Soviet people left imprints that have not yet been studied in depth. The failed attempts to create a “Soviet super-ethnos” slowed down nation-building in the Soviet “sovereign” republics. Negativism was strong enough to prevent the attributes of a civil society from being incorporated into the alternative nation-building projects. So-called ethno-nationalism dominated in all projects that gave no space to shared civil principles and national interests. This contributed to the crisis and negatively affected the course of events in Georgia. Its radical forms took the shape of ethno-egotism, the “inflated and irrational ethnic consciousness.” General civil principles were rejected for the sake of egotistical ethnocratic interests. The narrow interests and attitudes of ethnic groups contradicted the universal values shared by the entire nation. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Mutual mistrust between the titular nation and ethnic minorities was almost inevitable: the ethnic minorities took the titular nation’s desire to preserve its dominant position as an attempt to assimilate them. On the other hand, the titular nation took the ethnic minorities’ preoccupation with their rights for disloyalty. Ethno-nationalism pushes the minorities toward the re-division of territories, undermines their trust in the country they live in, and shifts their loyalty to their historical homeland. Ethno-nationalism was looming high on the domestic scene—it drove many other issues, such as the country’s socioeconomic development, democratic, and human rights slogans, into the background. The vocabulary of the classes and class struggle was excluded from political parlance. Ethno- nationalism Georgian-style has shown us all how a crisis in a multinational state might affect the titular nation. The Mingrelian origins of President Gamsakhurdia (not entirely proven) became all-important; this stirred up the Mingrels, set them against the center (and ignited a civil war in Mingrelia), and played a pernicious role in the war in Abkhazia. There are problems with the Svans, who also insist on special treatment. Ethno-nationalism triggered tragic events in the autonomies. It should be said in all justice that ethnic problems were not a novel phenomenon—they have existed in latent and open forms at all times. The country’s total crisis merely exacerbated them. Today it has become obvious that the separatist movement in Abkhazia has no political overtones—the demand for national self-determination and preservation of ethnic specifics presented it as a textbook case. Reality, however, is again somewhat different: it is not an ethnic conflict, but a clash of mentalities within the Abkhaz- ian ethnos. It can be described in a paradoxical way as self-determination and self-alienation of the ethnos.6 The identity crisis goes back to Soviet times: a small nation found it increasingly harder to preserve its culture and ethnic specifics under the pressure of more universal cultures with much vaster resources. It was highly doubtful that such ethnoses could create their own states: the status of a titular nation inevitably called for alienation; elements of tribal social organization were another stumbling block. Indeed, there are institutions, the council of elders being one of them, that pass judgments about the “possible or impossible coexistence of peoples” and operate with such categories as “blood kinship,” “historical hatred,” etc., which have nothing to do with legal systems. The conflict was fanned by a clear realization that “self-determination” was next to impossible in Georgia; this increased the Abkhazians’ desire to merge with the Russian culture. The Kabardinian intelligentsia (which represents a culture close to that of the Abkhazians) has already resolved the problem for itself by stating that their ethnic culture has exhausted itself and could no longer actively influence the development process of public consciousness.7 The negative impulse of the Abkhazians’ self-alienation was spearheaded against the Geor- gians. Hatred of them was the Abkhazians’ defense reaction; their historical memory weeded out everything that gave reminders of the millennium-long coexistence, of the time when the two peoples lived in one state and had a common history. The Abkhazians accuse the Georgians of the evil intention to assimilate them. In actual fact, however, a large share of the Georgian population of Abkhazia uses the Russian language and is oriented toward the Russian culture, while some of the Georgian sub-ethnoses (Mingrels and Svans) have preserved their local tongues and old customs. The small Abkhazian ethnos was easily drawn into a bloody conflict; today its position is even more vague and more dangerous. The Abkhazian minority was hard hit by its own “victory.”

6 See: G. Svanidze, “National Minorities in Georgia: Problems of Definitions and Legal Status,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (42), 2006. 7 See: I. Babich, “Looking for a Contemporary Mountain Ideology in the Northern Caucasus,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (1), 2006, p. 144. 98 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Indeed, it deprived them of their inner conviction that they were the “victims of violence,” a conviction they enjoyed for the past fifteen years when they denied themselves a chance of normal development. Abetted by a third force, their separatist intentions developed from bold ethno-national dreams or a myth into a program of action. This negatively affected the national minority’s public consciousness. The ethnically based structure is meaningless: it allows anyone who formally belongs to the titular nation, but knows nothing about his native tongue and culture, to climb to the very top.8 The conflict in South Ossetia, on the other hand, did not assume very complicated psychological forms. It is a political conflict caused by the desire to unite with North Ossetia; the fear of assimilation was less pronounced. In fact, in this respect, the situation in North Ossetia is much less favorable than in South Ossetia. We all know that President Gamsakhurdia was often accused of fanning nationalist hysterics, which allegedly complicated national relations inside the country. It should be said in all justice that the first president was politically sober-minded enough to realize that the national question might disrupt the country. He reached a compromise with Abkhazia and tried to maintain relations with Aslan Abashidze, who headed Ajaria. He regularly spoke to the Armenians of Javakhetia. Zviadism, as an inconsistent policy born of the disintegrating system, was inevitably ethno-nationalist. This phenomenon per se cannot bring about a civilizational crisis; extreme ethno-nationalism, like any other extreme policy for that matter, might produce radical results.

Prerequisites: Internal and External

By the period of transition from one civilizational model to another we mean the degree of maturity of the situational prerequisites.9 For this purpose we should establish whether society has completely rid itself of the burden of the past in order to assess the scale and nature of innovations and their incorporation into the culture of the titular ethnos, as well as the minorities’ attitude toward them. It turned out that, in the 1990s, the objective conditions of radical reforms were still absent from the country. Society, which was developing according to the double standards principle, had not yet created forces able to bring about genuinely revolutionary changes. The public wrongly perceived the wealth amassed through corruption as entrepreneurship, while it was the large number of very ambitious people as manifestation of bourgeois individualism. Georgia lacked a diaspora socialized in the West. Chaos and anarchy instead of business activities and social stability engulfed the country. An outburst of consumer demands provoked by the crisis of the communist system and the plummeted living standards at the time of the communist system’s death-throes added attractiveness to the Western consumer society and its freedoms. We can say that radical ethno-nationalism brought about a crisis of identity in certain ethnoses and exacerbated the problems between the titular nation and the sub-ethnoses. Populist Gamsakhurdia and cautious politician Shevardnadze were afraid of radical reforms. We can say in all justice that real prerequisites for Westernization appeared together with Shevard-

8 See: G. Svanidze, “An Essay on Caucasus Mentality,” available at [www. Minelres.lv/], January 2001. 9 See: R. Garagozov, “Azerbaijani Dilemma in the Globalization Age: ‘Advance’ to Europe or ‘Retreat’ to Asia,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 1 (1), 2006. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION nadze. It was under him that the country gradually left the time of troubles behind. It was included in geostrategic projects, which meant that it would be integrated into the West. In fact the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline project coincided with Georgia’s pro-Western orientation. There were democratic elections, the outlines of civil society became much clearer, and a system of human rights protection and the free press appeared. Georgia’s advance toward democracy paved the road for its South Caucasian neighbors. At the same time, communist inertia and the fairly passive ageing leader did not allow the conditions of Westernization to develop to the full extent. President Shevardnadze’s balancing policies were not intended for a country that wanted to move forward; double standards, which hindered its advance, were revived little by little. It was at that time that the party nomenklatura developed into the bourgeoisie. In fact, the president himself renounced his past without qualms. The party and economic nomenklatura transformed itself into a new pro-Western nomenklatura. The functionaries of the party and economic structures betrayed their inherent features when privatizing state property with money the so-called magnates earned through shady deals. The country still lacked a middle class— the backbone of the Western world. Laundering corruption money and nomenklatura capitalism set in instead of a free market. The new Georgian leaders brought to power by the Rose Revolution could not deal with all the issues within a short period of time, however, they have already done a lot of useful things. According to the WB report that appeared in July 2006, the corruption level in Georgia, as compared with other countries with transition economies, has dropped. Is it a sign of systemic shifts? Corruption in Geor- gia is a systemic phenomenon, a form of relations between the state structures and interest groups. Has competition replaced bribes, nepotism, cronyism, patron and client relations? Have we reached the point at which the qualitative increase of direct contacts with the Western world might acquire new quality? We all know that the first shoots of a market economy, democracy, and other Westernization attributes might appear in the most unlikely places at the most unlikely times. It was in Western Eu- rope, however, that individual factors combined to form one of the alternatives of world development. Have we acquired a constellation (system) of these institutions in Georgia to be able to count the Georgian state part of Western civilization? Individualism, its status as an institution and part of culture, has often been selected for investigation among the numerous aspects of the ethnic mental predisposition to imbibe the values of other civilizations (up to lexicographic analysis of religious and folklore texts and economic ethos of national culture). For example, the Muslim religious community presents itself as a universal, internally coherent unifying and assimilating super-society. The individualist culture of Protestantism is found at the opposite pole. In the former case, the individual is only physically detached from the group since he belongs to a “privileged mass,” while in the latter case, the individual is free to identify himself with any group, this freedom being a condition of individual religious salvation. The systemic theories postulate that the freer the elements of the whole and the lower the level at which the system restructures itself, the wider the leeway that enables it to maneuver and establish new ties. This is supposed to create a new quality, a new entity, which means that the system acquires necessary flexibility to adjust to modernizing and rationalizing realities. Accordingly, a system that changes at the level at which the individual is free to select his group is more effective and more dynamic. In the ethno-national context, the principle of free choice of identification with an ethnic minority and with the institutions of citizenship comes to the fore. The former should not incur any unwelcome repercussions for an individual (Art 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, etc.). The individual aspect of choice is supplemented with the right of any person “individually, as well as in community with others,” that is, collectively, to preserve and develop their identity. This 100 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION follows from “the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention” (Art 3 of the same convention). In the ethno-national system, restructuring takes place at the ethnic group rather than individual level. Membership is associated with strictly observed roles and statuses. In this case, the individual represents not himself, but a group and his own social role. This is typical of a traditional society, in which the authority of the community is higher than individual freedoms. Membership in such groups is self-sufficient and cannot be analyzed (ethnic conceit is a manifestation of this). While a civil society can be described as the unification of individuals as persons, ethno-nationalism presupposes the sum-total of ethnic groups. It is commonly believed in Georgia that individualism is fairly developed: even at the everyday level, during feast rituals, the subject of “I” (meoba) regularly recurs. Since the 19th century, Geor- gian literature has been discussing the individual/community issue (Vazha Pshavela). The authority of the community and the leader’s infallibility were doubted. The very fact that the inner conflict between the individual/community role attitudes was inherent in the ethnic culture could be described as the first step toward very strong individuality. At the same time, the hero was marginalized, the conflict did not let him move beyond the cultural paradigm. The individual born and educated in a community had even more reasons to rebel when he stood opposed to the state and faced a choice between the law, tradition, and personal honor. In such cases, marginalization was directly associated with criminalization of the apostate hero (Si- mona of E. Ninoshvili). The image of a “greedy scoundrel” typical of pre-revolutionary urban Georgian literature of the turn of the 20th century perfectly fit the system of traditional values. Those preoccupied with amassing capital were not strong enough to move away from communal relations; they were not protected by the ideology of individualism either. This subject was developed by the working people (karacho- geli); it continued the folk Epicurean motifs as a compensatory response to routine and unrewarding labor. Competition Western-style did not strike root: its moral and ethical principles contradicted traditional values. Georgia is a patchwork of system-forming factors and interest groups of all forms and sizes, which objectively presupposes that the individual is more or less independent from the group. The situation in Georgia demonstrates that inner ethnic and sub-ethnic diversity leads to a variety of “group representatives,” but does not presuppose the presence of individuals in their personal capacity. On the one hand, diversity creates the illusion of a strong individualist principle in society; while on the other, there is a lot of talk about Georgians being part of Asian cultures because the traditional way of life is still strong among them. Some people are convinced that mere membership in situational collectives (classmates, childhood friends) guarantees access to the boons to the same extent as the individual’s personal achievements and natural abilities. Under the communists, an outflow of the agrarian population to the cities, particularly to Tbilisi, undermined this type of relations. This means that the efforts to put an end to nepotism and cronyism in the state structures and protectionism that flourished precisely because of such relations could not but be effective. At times, these efforts went too far: it is enough to mention the so-called Mingrelian File opened by the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. in the 1930s. Village- city migration was a more or less planned process that went on together with industrialization of the republic. At that pace cities could assimilate the migrants, while the latter had time to adjust to the universal values of the institutions of citizenship. At that time, the newcomers wanted to look like accomplished urbanites out of fear of being recognized as villagers. The balance was upturned in the 1990s when people fled their impoverished regions. Tbilisi proved unable to oppose the psychology of the newcomers—this looked like an urban culture crisis. Under Shevardnadze, this led in particular to a very specific situation in the human rights sector. Human rights practice, an important and indispensable feature of culture of the developed traditions Vol. 1 (3), 2007 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of individualism, took very specific forms and existed with certain limitation in Georgia. The experience of drawing up state reports about how U.N. documents were put into practice in Georgia revealed that the public formally responded to the “Western” issues: “do we really need laws to follow the traditions of humanism?” This shows that the traditional ideas about human rights were opposed to their rational universal interpretation. Very soon, however, the issue shifted to the sphere of interests: for some time certain people “close to the funds” kept the addresses of these funds secret or feigned deafness when asked about them. Much time passed before the usefulness of the funds was realized and their addresses became common knowledge. In the meantime, grants went to “those who belonged to the right group” rather than to the deserving people who submitted excellent projects. We can say that the practice of grant distribution in Georgia was privatized together with democracy. It turned out that members of one of the sub-ethnoses occupied nearly all the human rights organizations in this country. Studies of the prerequisites for institutionalizing individualism in Georgian Orthodoxy, folklore, and the socioeconomic milieu offer good prospects for those who undertake them. Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the factor of individual land use, which greatly contributes to the development of social and cultural principles of individualism; it did not develop, however, into homesteads. The peasant community was useful when it came to bringing in the harvest: for this reason each peasant was socially tied to the community. We need special investigations to acquire a scientifically substantiated idea about the development of individualism in Georgian society—we should no longer rely on mythologemes.

C o n c l u s i o n

Orientation toward traditional values and interests is not a negative feature that blocks the road toward modernization and rationalization. Double standards can be overcome if the universal values of globalization-Westernization are viewed not through the prism of their opposition to tradition, but in unity with it, which presupposes their interaction and mutual enrichment. In other words, Georgian society should become integrated with the Westernization processes through unity and opposition of the universal and specific and their mutual enrichment. I have already written that almost nothing is being done to study the reserves of the nation’s ethnic psychology. Meanwhile, the reforms have not yet begun in earnest. Those who say that “the market will put everything in order” are hardly more responsible than those who are convinced that a greater flow of investments that calls for a stricter control over its use will increase the number of people involved in the new system of relations. These people either underestimate the risk of assimilation or “by default” presuppose that the old habit of double standards will save the day. This analysis will help us mobilize the resources offered by the nation’s culture and historical traditions, which is needed to withstand the unifying pressure of globalization-Westernization. We wonder whether society will reconcile itself with assimilation if the resources prove scarce. 102 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION arkhad ALIEV

Candidate for a degree at the Academy of State Governance under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

A CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE GLOBALIZATION CONTEXT: THE EURASIAN APPROACH

Abstract

he author looks at the cultural-civili- entities, analyzes the views and opinions T zational dimension of globalization and of the classics of Eurasian geopolitical and cultural transformation from the view- culturological doctrines, and offers a sur- point of Eurasianism. To accomplish this, vey of different conceptions of globaliza- he introduces the concept of compound tion.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

In the post-Soviet expanse, the intensive quest for a new ideological paradigm coincided with intensified globalization, a process that rose to eminence from the ruins of the bipolar world. This inevitably confronted the non-Western societies with the task of preserving their cultural identity in the context of Westernization and the rapidly disappearing cultural boundaries on a global scale. Today, these issues have become the core of all kinds of geopolitical and culturological theories being offered by the non-Western societies. Eurasianism is one such theory: I will use it to discuss the problems of the Cultural Revolution in the globalization era. The first part of the article deals with various views and conceptions related to globalization. The second part offers an analysis of the replacement of the dichotomous system of global confrontation and introduces the conception of compound entities. The third part deals with what the ideologists of Eura- sianism have to say about preserving cultural identity in the context of the global Cultural Revolution.

Globalization: An Objective Process or an Invented Phenomenon?

So far the world academic community has failed to offer a more or less unambiguous definition of globalization. V. Osherov, for example, described globalization as “an attempt to place diverse cultural, political, and economic traditions in the pinching limits of neoliberalism.”1 According to L. Sa-

1 V. Osherov, “Globalizatsia i/ili globalizatorstvo?” Novy mir, No. 1, 2001. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION vin, it is the quintessence of “liberalism, egotism, messianism, and aggressive expansion.”2 By globalization Michael Intriligator means considerable increase of world trade and other processes of international exchange under the conditions of the consistently integrating world economy. While some academics look at globalization as an ever-expanding exchange of commodities, services, financial flows, information, etc. incorporating states and even continents,3 others believe that globalization is more than that. For them, globalization is also an ideology related, albeit indirectly, to neoliberalism and technocratic approaches to economic development and reforms.4 Some people find a similarity between globalization and the international human rights, environmental, and women equality movements. Not infrequently environmental movements act under the slogan “Think globally, act locally.”5 In view of the absence of a straightforward and objective definition of globalization, we can provisionally reduce the entire range of interpretations to the following: 1. Globalization is an objective process created by technological advances, the rapid development of means of information and other scientific and technological breakthroughs, as well as the mounting volumes of international trade, the greater role of transnational economic activities and the increase in the number of super-state structures with much wider roles to play, which are involved and, therefore, interested in the development of international economic and political systems. 2. Globalization is not an objective phenomenon—it is an artificial “process of imposing the Western economic, political, cultural, technological, and information code on all countries and states.”6 3. Globalization is a paradoxical “subjective-objective” process; in this context, globalization is understood as an irreversibly objective phenomenon determined by history yet exploited by a narrow range of entities of international relations to pursue their own clearly stated empirical aims (due to their “privileged” positions and strong military-political and economic bases).

Replacement of the “Dichotomous System” and “Compound Entities”

Globalization created an urge among all kinds of communities within the non-Western ecumene to revive their ethnocultural and confessional identities. In this way, they responded to the attempts to spread the Western patterns to all corners of the world. During political and ideological confrontation, the ethnocultural and confessional elements of the units of objective realities were dismissed as unimportant. These units, in fact, came second after political and ideological identification, since the Capitalism/Socialism dichotomy dominated in the world. The two “centers of power” that represented the dichotomy had their own camps. K. Jowitt said in this connection that for nearly half a century the borders in international politics and in iden-

2 L.V. Savin, Stanovlenie fenomena globalizma i kontrglobalizm, Speech at the International Scientific Conference “Globalizm glazami sovremennika: blesk i nishcheta phenomena” (25-26 September, 2002, Sumy), available at [http:// www.eurasia.iatp.org.ua/globalism.html]. 3 See: M. Albrow, The Global Age, Stanford, 1997. 4 See: P. McMichael, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1996; R. Rob- ertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London, 1992. 5 M.E. Keck, K. Sikkink, Activism Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, New York, 1998. 6 A.G. Dugin, Tezisy o globalizme, Internet site of the Evrazia Party, available at [www.evrazia.org/modules. php?name=News&file=print&sid=557]. 104 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tifying those involved in politics were directly determined by the presence of the Leninist regime with its center in the Soviet Union. Its disappearance was a fundamental challenge to the existing borders and identities. The disappearance of these borders caused traumas because, among other things, they were rigidly set. The world entered a period of Creation once more by moving away from centralized and inflexible state in which it guarded its impregnable borders with hysterical fervor to a new vague state in which everything is mixed up. We were living in a world that, while still preserving some of its former shape, was in a state of Creation.7 The end of the bipolar world marked the beginning of a temporary period of illusory “unification” under the aegis of the “victor”—the West as represented by the United States. Francis Fuku- yama’s “the end of history” was one of the products of this illusion. Arnold Toynbee said at one time that faith in a final victory was a double illusion.8 We have already seen how, during evolution, subjects, slogans, and ideals are changed at certain points in history while perpetual confrontation, as the essence of relations between all kinds of entities acting in empirical reality, remains the same. In other words, “the socialist system that disappeared into oblivion was replaced with extremely amorphous structures. At the turning point in history, they proved unable to erect stable state pyramids in the corresponding countries, but they spoke a lot about drawing closer to the ‘new West,’ acting from the platform of the state’s diminished role in the economy, privatization, and transition to the market.”9 As if to confirm Heraclitus’ thesis about the war as the beginning of all things ethnic, cultural and confessional principles for identifying countries and nations emerged. They differed from the old identification principles. This explains, in particular, the renaissance of the classical “East-West” dichotomy that replaced the “Capitalism-Socialism” one. Confrontation along the East-West diagonal goes much deeper into history than the global ideological struggle. D. Terin has pointed out that the idea that West and East differed in a very fundamental way first appeared in a non-reflexive form in the European study of society of the 18th century.10 Montesquieu’s Lettres persanes were one of the sources of this tradition. The above suggests the following conclusion: the end of the bipolar era ushered in a change of the dichotomous system. As Samuel Huntington has pointed out, the ideological and political slogans were replaced with ethnocultural and confessional ones. This was more confirmation of the law of dialectics about the unity and conflict of opposites. Time and again history demonstrates that perpetual opposition at any level—be it the level of individuals or of the communities such individuals form—is a perpetual mobile of evolution. In view of the above, I have my doubts about the traditional division of all processes along the East-West diagonal, as well as about the absolutization of the very conception of the East. Modern science has already perpetuated this, while remaining indifferent to the specifics of the components of the East. Indeed, what is habitually covered by the blanket term “the East” includes highly varied and very specific ethnic-geocultural-confessional areas. A division into the West and diversified non-West looks to be a happier one. The latter term covers a huge variety of specific cultures and ethnic groups and is characterized by very specific forms of social, political, and economic arrangements. In the absence of clear and commonly accepted definitions of such terms as “civilization” and “culture” and to avoid terminological and etymological ambiguities, the world as a whole, and the non-West in particular, should be divided into “compound entities.”11 Each of the entities is an ethnic-geocultural-confessional community with a complex or-

7 Quoted from: A.I. Utkin, Globalizatsia: protsess i osmyslenie, Logos Publishers, Moscow, 2002, p. 50. 8 Quoted from: B.S. Erasov, Sravnitel’noe izuchenie tsivilizatsiy, Aspekt Press, Moscow, 2001, p. 300. 9 A.I. Utkin, op. cit. 10 See: D.F. Terin, “Zapad i Vostok v institutsional’nom podkhode k tsivilizatsii,” Sotsiologicheskiy zhurnal, No. 4, 2001. 11 The “compound” concept was first used by R. Carneiro when discussing identities; it was used to describe “the process of secondary incorporation of smaller entities” (see: “Process vs. Stages: A False Dichotomy in Tracing the Rise Vol. 1 (3), 2007 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ganization marked by specific historical traditions of its state and institutional structures, as well as the world outlooks of the individuals who make up the community. In turn, each of the compound entities is identified on the basis of individual or confessional-cultural-linguistic and geographic specifics of their sum-total. The table given below demonstrates that the Hindu, Islamic, and Judaic entities are identified according to their religious features, while the Eurasian entity is based mainly on the geographic principle, and the Sinic and Japanese entities are identified according to their ethno-cultural and linguistic features. Today there are at least seven compound entities within the so-called East (see Table 1). It seems that rather than comparing the West and the East, we should compare the West and the non-West. In this case, we should take into account that the non-West has a very complicated ethno- geocultural-confessional structure. In this way, it differs from practically “monolith” Western Europe

Table 1 Compound Entities

Compound Characteristics entities (in alphabetical Dominant Dominant Dominant order) linguistic geographic confessional Altai and Sino-Tibetan language groups, Eastern, Buddhism 1. Buddhist Indo-Aryan group of Southeast (Lamaism) the Indo-European Asia language family

The Turkic group of the Altaic language family, Slavic and Ira- nian groups of the East European, Indo-European lan- West Siberian, Islam, Christian 2. Eurasian guage family, Finno- and Turkestan Orthodoxy Ugric group of the plains of Eurasia Uralic language family, Caucasian-Iberian language family

Indo-Aryan group of the Indo-European Hindustan, 3. Hindu language family, South Hinduism Dravidian language Asia family

Semitic group of the Hamito-Semitic language family, Near and Middle Turkic group of the East, North Islam 4. Islamic Altaic language Africa, Southeast family, Iranian group Asia of the Indo-European language family of the State,” in: Alternatives of Social Evolution, ed. by Nikolay N. Kradin, et al., FEB RAS (Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences), Vladivostok, 2000, pp. 52-58). 106 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 1 (continued)

Compound Characteristics entities (in alphabetical Dominant Dominant Dominant order) linguistic geographic confessional Japonic-Ryûkyûan Japanese archi- Shintoism, 5. Japanese group of the Altaic pelago, Asian- Buddhism language family Pacific Region

Various groups of the Hamito-Semitic language family (Hebrew), West German sub- Middle East, group of the German 6. Judaic12 North America, Judaism group of the Indo- Western Europe European family of languages (Yiddish) (over 20 European languages in all)

Southeast, Various groups of the Eastern Asia, Confucianism, Sino-Tibetan family of 7. Sinic Asia-Pacific Taoism, Buddhism languages Region and its “branch,” the United States. (Indeed, for a long time the so-called white man’s burden was a consolidating racial basis of sorts that brought together Western people who found themselves in alien environments as colonialists.) Today, when a new world order is becoming a reality, the Western compound entity and the “blossoming complexity” of the non-Western compound entities (the Eurasian being one of them) are two poles of the dichotomous system. The above suggests the conclusion that today globalization (whether an objective or an artificial phenomenon) looks like a process of “destruction of the infrastructural complex of spiritual, cultural, economic, political, ethnic, legal, and ethical components that took centuries to emerge in varied forms in different corners of the world and that are vitally important for traditional societies.”13 Globalization, even if interpreted as an objective process, is used by the Western compound entity as an effective Westernization tool. In other words, to quote A. Zinoviev, “the world process tagged with an ideologically neutral term ‘globalization’ is, in fact, a new world war waged by the Western world headed by the United States. It is a war for domination over the entire planet and even mankind’s social evolution. Having left behind the ‘cold’ and ‘warm’ stages, the war entered its ‘hot’ stage, which uses the entire might of the American and NATO armed forces. The non-Western part of the planet has turned into an arena of actual and potential hostilities.”14

12 There is the opinion that Israel belongs to the Western world probably because the Jews live in diasporas outside the Middle East (the area where the Jews first appeared as an ethnos), the role of the Jewish lobby in the United States and Western Europe, and Israel’s position on international issues. The ethno-linguistic and confessional specifics of the Jews and Judaism relate them to the Judaic compound entity of the non-West. 13 L.V. Savin, op. cit. 14 A. Zinoviev, Novy etap globalizatsii. Voyna za gospodstvo v mire pereshla v stadiu goriachey, Paper read at the International Conference on the Global Problems of World History (26-27 January, 2002), available at [http://www. pravda.ru/politics/2002/01/31/36396.html]. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Global Cultural Revolution and How to Preserve Cultural Identity: The Eurasian Approach

Culture, understood as the sum-total of specific, sometimes unique, spiritual and material specifics typical of any of the compound entities, is the linchpin, or the foundation, of this entity. For this reason the problems of the Cultural Revolution on a global scale comes to the fore every time we discuss the current “clash of civilizations” and the unification efforts of Pax Americana to unify the huge amount of complex ethno-geocultural-confessional communities by fitting them into the Western “standard.” In the 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche prophetically pointed out that the concept of politics would dissolve in the war of spirit, while all forms of power in the old society would be blasted. There would be wars like those the world had never beheld before, said he.15 Early in the 1990s, when the clouds of dust raised by the ruins of the bipolar world gradually settled, bringing in a new era, the outlines of which were still barely visible, Prof. Huntington was probably the first to comment on the change of the dichotomous system by saying that world politics was entering a new stage at which neither ideology nor the economy would serve the main source of conflicts.16 Culture would emerge as the great factor dividing mankind and as the primary source of conflicts.17 I. Wallerstein, the author of the World-Systems Theory, has written that we were living in a transition period from one global system of social arrangement—worldwide capitalist economy—to a different global system/systems. It is still unclear whether we shall profit from this; we will never know this until the new era catches up with us, probably fifty years hence. This period will be very hard for those who will live to witness it: it will abound in sharp conflicts and mounting troubles that many fear will go hand in hand with collapsed moral values.18 We can say that “collapsed moral values” together with global Westerniza- tion are the outline and very essence of the current worldwide Cultural Revolution. We all know that culture, confession, and ethnos are intimately connected or even intertwined. It is next to impossible to imagine an ethnic group without certain cultural and confessional specifics, because culture and religion, together with language, make a group of people an ethnos or a compound entity. This means that the shifts in the cultural dimension, “cultural globalization,” as well as aggression on the “cultural front” may affect the entity’s future, cause serious deformations, or even its death. While commenting on the ambiguous and debatable nature of the concept of culture as used by sociology, I. Wallerstein pointed out that by adding the adjective “global” to the noun “culture” we make the latter even more vague.19 No matter what, it is an unassailable fact that, today, the “global culture” (which some academics recognize as a reality while others doubt its existence) is represented by a “hobgoblin” (to use I. Waller- stein’s term). It is born of the American-Western culture of the period of decadence (read decay).20 “Some crassness,”21 to use Z. Brzezinski’s term, of American and contemporary Western culture, which under total American influence is developing into a twin of American culture, is the key to its “trium-

15 See: F. Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, Penguin Classics, 1992. 16 See: S. Huntington, “Voina tsivilizatsiy: pobeditel opredelitsia na kul’turnom fone,” available at [http://www. krotov.info/lib_sec/22_h/han/hunting.html]. 17 See: Ibidem. 18 See: I. Wallerstein, Utopistics, Or Historical Choices of the Twenty-First Century, New York, 1998, p. 35. 19 See: I. Wallerstein, Global Culture(s)—Salvation, Menace, or Myth? (Paper delivered at a conference on “New Cultural Formations in an Era of Transnational Globalization,” Academia Sinica, Taiwan, 6-7 October, 2001). 20 It should be said that contemporary Western culture and its exaggerated American variant have reached the stage of decadence. We should distinguish between the contemporary bearers of the Coca-Cola colonization (to borrow the term from S. Huntington) of the entire planet and the representatives of the great European culture who made their inestimable contribution to the treasure trove of arts and sciences. 21 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 24. 108 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION phal march” across the world. Iu. Kagramanov has noted that in our world only coarse and primitive things are ontologically stable.22 In the context of the so-called global cultural revolution let me remind you that in his article “Istinny i lozhny natsionalizm” (True and False Nationalism), Nikolai Trubetskoy, a prominent Rus- sian philologist and founder of Eurasianism, rejected outright the urge toward the “culture of mankind.” He believed that these words merely camouflaged either the diktat of material requirements or attempts to impose the lifestyle of one ethnos on all other ethnic groups.23 According to Eurasian culturology, unification threatens mankind: a loss of diversity deprives the system of stability. On the other hand, “the collateral process leads to unstable public consciousness and mounting irrationality.”24 Eurasianism understands culture as “a historically changing product of collective creative efforts of the past and present generations of any given social milieu”25 intended to sat- isfy the material or spiritual requirements of any specific social whole or the individuals comprising it. In his article “Vavilonskaia bashnia i smeshenie iazykov” (The Tower of Babel and Language-Mixing), Nikolai Trubetskoy tied together the so-called culture of mankind and spiritual and moral degradation. He put this in the following way: “The establishment of one culture and the absence of diversity and possibility of the emergence of new cultures would have been a death toll for mankind.”26 Eurasian culturology appeals to certain aspects of the theory of systems, namely the postulate that speaks of the necessary level of diversity needed to preserve the stability of the entire system. The very attempt to create a unified “common culture of mankind” was seen by N. Trubetskoy as sacrilegious and unnatural, since, his conception said, despite their apparent diversity, individual national cultures, while preserving their unique nature, were in their totality a harmonious single whole. Their synthesis not only contradicted the law of nature that spoke of the diversity and fragmentation of cultures and, for this reason, was deprived of a future, it was also fraught with “cultural excesses” and other negative repercussions. T. Ayzatulin put the Eurasian approach within this context when he wrote: “Culture is the common denominator of diverse manifestations of the historical process. In the 1920s, when E. Haeckel’s conception of ecology (1866) was not yet widely known, while Tansley’s ecosystem concept had not been formulated, the Eurasians had already grasped and formulated the environmental principle of history, culture, and security based on diversity (today it has been more or less comprehended thanks to environmental education), succession (the continuity of cultures), and inexorable cyclicity (caused, in the final analysis, by the universal rotating motion in the cosmos).”27 Nikolai Trubetskoy explained the pernicious nature of striving toward a single “culture common to mankind” and the prospects “of moral impoverishment” such a culture would bring about: “Any culture levels out, within the framework of any given social whole, the individual distinctions of its members. The generally accepted cultural values erase the imprints of the excessively individual traits of their creators and the too loud voices of the requirements and tastes of the individual members of any sociocultural organism. This happens in a natural way, due to reciprocal neutralization of po- lar, that is, diametrically opposite, individual distinctions. Culture is thus marked by a certain average psychic type present in any social milieu. The greater the individual distinction of the members of a social-cultural whole, the vaguer, more uncertain, and more impersonal is the average type embodied in culture.”28 The same author concluded: “Any imaginary culture created and borne by all of mankind would inevitably have been impersonal and vague to the greatest degree. Indeed, it would have embodied only those psychic elements that are common to all people. Tastes and convictions differ,

22 See: Iu. Kagramanov, “Kakoe evraziystvo nam nuzhno,” Novy mir, No. 3, 2002. 23 Quoted from: A. Ashkerov, “Globalizatsia i evraziystvo: N.S. Trubetskoy,” available at [http://www.traditio.ru/ ashkerov/global.htm]. 24 V.A. Lisichkin, L.A. Shelepin, Global’naia imperia Zla, Moscow, 2001, p. 83. 25 N.S. Trubetskoy, “Vavilonskaia bashnia i smeshenie iazykov,” in: N.S. Trubetskoy, Nasledie Chingizkhana, Agraf Publishers, Moscow, 2000, p. 369. 26 Ibidem. 27 T.A. Ayzatulin, “Evraziskaia geopodosnova osobennoy stati Rossii,” Evraziayskiy Vestnik, available at [http:// www.e-journal.ru/p_euro-st1-2.html. 28 N.S. Trubetskoy, op. cit., p. 370. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION individual distinctions in this sphere are very great, but logic is common to all; material requirements for food, economy of labor, etc. are more or less similar. This means that logic, rationalist science, and material technology will always dominate religion, ethics, and aesthetics of the unified culture common to all mankind; intensive scientific and technological progress will inevitably bring about spiritual and moral degradation.”29 This led the founder of the Eurasian culturological conception to the conclusion that logic and material technology deprived of spirituality leave the individual spiritually bankrupt. Lev Gumilev demonstrated an interesting approach to Trubetskoy’s conception via the general systems theory: “We all know that only a fairly complex system can be viable and effective. A culture common to mankind can appear if the system is simplified to the maximum extent through the destruction of national cultures. The most extreme simplification level means the system’s death. By contrast, a system with a fairly large number of elements with common functions is viable and prom- ising. The culture of an individual ‘national organism’ corresponds to such a system.”30 Referring to the Eurasian culturological conceptions, the author of the theory of passionarity concludes: “A ‘rainbow network’ united and harmonious due to its continuity and at the same time infinitely varied due to its differentiation is formed by national cultures.”31 Lev Gumilev interpreted Trubetskoy’s “rainbow network” as a set of ethnoses at different stages of ethnogenesis. The sum-total of ethnoses tied together by a common historical destiny forms super- ethnoses that can be correlated with Trubetskoy’s “cultural-historical zones” (compound entities). Lev Gumilev believed that an ethnos that included sub-ethnoses and constantly emerging consortiums was a discrete system. It is the ethnos that makes culture differentiated and unites the bearers of this culture. A similar “whole” in reality is the “sum-total of peoples that live in an economically autarchic local development area and are tied together not by common racial features, but by a common historical fate, collective work for the sake of one and the same culture or one and the same state.”32 It is precisely a “common historical fate” that, together with geographic features and the specifics of economic relations within a united continental massif, is understood by the Eurasians as the basis of everything and as a prerequisite for integration in the Eurasian expanse.

C o n c l u s i o n

The Eurasian approach to the global Cultural Revolution discussed above permits the following conclusions: 1. A synthesis beyond individual specifics is impossible since the very coexistence of unique cultural-historical units presupposes their unity in diversity; 2. A culture common to mankind is a utopia; 3. Cultural cosmopolitism and the “unifying globalization trends” in the cultural dimension are merely tools used to achieve empirical aims; 4. The attempts to destroy the “blossoming diversity” of the discrete type by replacing the inherent unity of unique cultures with the mechanistic unity of a culture common to mankind and the desire of the Western compound entity to level out cultural distinctions by introducing unified forms of everyday life and social and state order contradict the natural course of things. In light of the current attempts to culturally unify the world, Eurasianism is acquiring a unique significance as one of the possible ways to preserve the cultural identity of the Eurasian compound entity.

29 Ibidem. 30 L.N. Gumilev, “Istoriko-filosofskie sochinenia kniazia N.S. Trubetskogo,” Nashe nasledie, No. 3, 1991. 31 Ibidem. 32 N.S. Trubetskoy, “Ob idee-pravitel’nitse ideokraticheskogo gosudarstva,” in: Nasledie Chingizkhana, p. 521. 110 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Roin METREVELI

Chairman of the National Committee of Historians of Georgia, Member of the National Academy of Sciences of Georgia (Tbilisi, Georgia).

NATIONAL PROBLEMS IN THE GLOBALIZATION CONTEXT AND HISTORIOGRAPHY

Abstract

he author has undertaken the chal- ed in the past and kept alive not only by T lenging task of tracing the impact of economic and sociopolitical, but also by globalization on nation-states, socie- psychological factors. The specifics of the ty, national economies, and global relation- last decade of the 20th century were de- ships, as well as on the fates of very spe- termined by the collapse of communism cific ethnic cultures. Much space is given and the Soviet Union’s disintegration, two to contradictions among civilizations root- factors that accelerated globalization.

I n L i e u o f a n I n t r o d u c t i o n: Civilizational Contradictions

How will globalization affect the nation-state? Will it upset the cohesion of national society? How will globalization affect national economic development? What will happen to traditional centuries-old cultures? Societies are concerned about these and other questions and are waiting for well- substantiated and reasonable answers. It will take some time to formulate them. Real results alone may supply the answers—either positive or negative. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is not a novel phenomenon. In the past, the West influenced other regions and experienced the counter-influence of other civilizations. Combined, they shaped the future. At one time, British scholar Arnold Toynbee wrote that clashes of civilizations would be inevitable in the course of the development of mankind.1 The Greco-Roman civilization, which spread to a large part of ancient world (India and Britain) and went as far as China and Scandinavia, is of paradigmatic importance. In fact, its scale was very impressive, even by contemporary standards. Today, academics define civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broad- est level of cultural identity. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people.”2 Contradictions between civilizations developed into conflicts between Western (European) civilization and the rest of the world. The former, with its high development level, technological innovations, scientific discoveries, and liberal democracy, was of an expressive nature. This became especially obvious when the United States moved into the limelight to transform the European civilization into a Euro-American one. Today, Americanization is forging ahead despite the frantic efforts of the European nations to preserve their traditions and way of life. Confrontation between the West and the Islamic world dates back to the early Middle Ages when, in 732, the Europeans defeated the Arabs in the Battle of Poitiers. Later there were more military clashes. In the 20th century, the Islamic world embarked on the road of Westernization: it em- braces the outward features of Western civilization while preserving or even consolidating their religious and cultural specifics. The Islamic world can master the most advanced Western technologies and accept European patterns, but its essence remains strictly Islamic with its religious egocentrism and unshakable faith in the chosen path. This happened in the past, and it continues to go on in front of our eyes. The Islamic civilization is obviously displeased with the West’s determination to retain its global domination. On the one hand, the Muslim world tends to oppose this, while on the other, it consol- idates their civilization. When talking about the contraposition of civilizations, we should particularly mention China, a giant country with one of the most ancient civilizations and a huge population. There is a commonly shared opinion that in the 21st century China and the Chinese (Confucian) civilization will come to the fore and dominate the world. Samuel Huntington has pointed to contraposition of the West and the South American and Af- rican civilizations and emphasized that the Western civilization is a modernized civilization. The non-Western countries are trying to achieve a contemporary development level without embracing the Western cultural values—so far, Japan alone has succeeded. A large number of non-Western states is working hard to master the latest technologies, acquire the latest weapons, and train a highly skilled workforce to be able to keep in step with the times; in short, to marry modernization and traditional values and cultures. The Western world/communism opposition dominated the 20th century. Arnold Toynbee distinguished between Western treatment of the Soviet Union, fascist Germany, and militarist Japan. The latter two were sources of a military threat, while the United States was apprehensive of the ideological (spiritual) impact of a propaganda machine to a much greater extent than Western Eu- rope.3 It was a struggle over the spheres of influence on human minds. Communism was dangerous because it revealed the shortcomings of the Westernized world. The West developed through impressive technological breakthroughs and other novelties. It was technological progress and the

1 See: A. Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, Oxford University Press, New York, 1948. 2 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998, p. 43. 3 See: A. Toynbee, The World and the West, Oxford University Press, London, 1953. 112 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION democratic liberalization accompanying it that allowed the West to say that “history has ended.” After World War II, this sounded strange, to say the least. The formula remained shelved and forgotten for a long time. The fact that it was revived in 1989 in the form of the “end of history” formula coined by Francis Fukuyama, an American historian of Japanese descent, should be explained by the specific features of the Western mentality. He believes that liberal democracy and consumer society have conquered the world; that the West and Western ideas have triumphed, while history as a movement has ended. He offered another thought-provoking premise: large-scale conflicts would have inevitably involved big states that would be forced to leave the stage on which they were still prominent.4 We can agree with those who accuse the American historian of an inflated idea of Western (particularly American) liberal democracy and dismiss his idea of the “end of history” as naïve. Kazakh writer Oljas Suleymenov disagrees with Fukuyama. He says that for a definite period of time history was assessed from the Euro-centrist viewpoint and that European politicians and academics contemplated the past in the political and cultural context of the 20th century. Here is his highly imaginative description: “Young and blossoming Europe is looking with distaste through the win- dow of a railway carriage at Asia, a lame and bent old woman. At that moment they both regarded their respective states as eternal. The self-centered young girl found it hard to believe that the wrin- kled witch had at one time been a lively and audacious beauty and that the heavy jewelry she offers the train passengers for a mere pittance had hung around her graceful neck, bobbed up and down on her high bosom, and glimmered in the sun as she rode. Her voice reached Ancient Greece and the wise men of Egypt.”5

Culture, the Main Source of Conflicts

The last decades of the 20th century were marked by the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, as well as by accelerated globalization. Samuel Huntington does not doubt that in the future neither ideologies nor economies will be the main source of conflicts in the world. Culture will come to the fore as the dividing line and a conflicting factor. While nationality will remain the major factor of international relations, conflicts in global politics will unfold between groups and members of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will come to the fore as the dominant factor of world politics.6 The academic community believes that Russia of Peter the Great offered an interesting example of West-East relations. The Russian czar is described as an autocratic Western-type reformer who imposed a technical revolution on his country and initiated grandiose social shifts. It was Peter the Great who involved Russia in technological competition with the West. Significantly, Peter the Great responded to the Western challenge in kind, even though the Russian Empire never blended with the West European civilization: Russia acquired new tools to oppose the West and used them for dealing retaliatory blows.7 Russian historians have their own ideas about the Russian (Orthodox) civilization and stress its cultural rather than social aspects (G. Vernadskiy). There were attempts to regard it as a social

4 See: F. Fukuyama, “Polemika o stat’e ‘Konets istorii’,” Dialog—SShA, No. 45, 1990, p. 12. 5 O. Suleymenov, Az i Ya, Alma-Ata, 1975, p. 20 (for more detail, see: R. Metreveli, “About a Book ,” Mtsire Gu- lani, Kutaisi, 1979, pp. 76-91, in Georgian). 6 See: S. Huntington, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 7 See: A. Toynbee, op. cit. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION system and go back into the past in search of the sources of Russian history as the civilizational processes.8 Prominent Russian historians (B. Grekov,9 M. Tikhomirov,10 B. Rybakov,11 I. Dani- levskiy,12 L. Cherepnin,13 A. Novoseltsev,14 and others) dealt with individual aspects of the Rus- sian civilization. The new methods of the Annales School added even more weight to the socioeconomic studies of civilizations (“global” history, history of “civilization,” “structural” history, “human” history, to be more exact). This approach served as the main factor of the renovation of Russian historical science; the process is still going on.15

Progress or the Disappearance of a Diverse Universe?

What is globalization? Does it mean progress or the disappearance of a diverse Universe? Eve- ryone seems to be aware of globalization on the march, the processes conditioned by the unhampered movement of culture and of human and economic resources. These are natural processes that cannot be likened to the ideology of globalization imposed from the outside.16 The United States is seeking control over globalization; it has already launched mechanisms of financial, political, and military influence on the world as a whole and on the world community’s individual members. The Americans proclaimed themselves a “nation of saviors” and justify their interventionist strategy with lofty civilizational values. Back in 1918, after World War I, American President Woodrow Wilson, in an attempt to openly impose his country’s hegemony in the world, submitted his Fourteen Points program and announced for everyone to hear that America was entrusted with the honor of fulfilling its predestinated mission and saving the world. The high-flown words are still not forgotten: the Americans are sparing no effort to live up to the bombastic statement. The United States has identified the globalization program and, consequently, its own interests with the moral and ethical norms of the universe, which means that those who oppose globalization are viewed as America’s foes. On 23 November, 2002, George W. Bush, another American president, said the following in Vilnius: “We knew that the arbitrary lines drawn by the dictators would be erased, and those lines are now gone. No more Munich. No more Yalta.” A charged statement indeed. We should always bear in mind that contemporary civilization with its powerful information, political, ideological, and psychological impact on the masses and individuals, as well as computer programming, has become dangerous. People should be aware of their individuality, they should re-

8 See: A.N. Poliakov, “Obrazovanie drevnerusskoy tsivilizatsii,” Voprosy istorii, No. 3, 2005, pp. 72-87; L.V. Che- repnin, Novgorodskie berestianye gramoty iz novgorodskikh raskopok, Moscow, 1969; A.P. Novoseltsev, V.G. Pashuto, L.V. Cherepnin, Puti razvitia feodalizma, Moscow, 1972. 9 See: B.D. Grekov, Kievskaia Rus, Moscow, 1953. 10 See: M.N. Tikhomirov, Drevnerusskie goroda, Moscow, 1956. 11 See: B.A. Rybakov, “Gorod Kiya,” Voprosy istorii, No. 5, 1980. 12 See: I.N. Danilevskiy, Drevniaia Rus glazami sovremennikov i potomkov (IX-XII vv.), Moscow, 2001. 13 See: L.V. Cherepnin, op. cit. 14 See: A.P. Novoseltsev, “Obrazovanie drevnerusskogo gosudarstva i pervyy ego pravitel,” Voprosy istorii, No. 2/3, 1991. 15 See: N.A. Khachaturian, “Sovremennaia medievistika Rossii v kontekste mirovoy istoricheskoy nauki,” in: Sred- nie veka, Collection of articles, Moscow, No. 62, 2001, pp. 195-212. 16 About the relationships between globalization and science and education, see: A. Arabuli, Time Has Come to Defend History, Tbilisi, 2005 (in Georgian). 114 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION main free to think and to be masters of their lives and creators of history, which concentrates on man and his mentality. History is a very special science; it has no practical applications, but its essence makes it an applied science. We should never forget that at any time and in any society, the study or cognition of history, as any other type of social activity for that matter, develops according to the trends dominat- ing at any given moment of time and in any given place.17 History looks at human society as a single law-governed process complete with contradictions and diversity. At one time, Ilia Chavchavadze asked: “What is history?” and answered: “It tells us about what we were in the past, what we are now, and what we shall probably be in future.” Alexander Pushkin insisted that we should respect our past: “Respect of the past distinguishes educated societies from savages.” Historical thinking is the product of a long process—progress needs a vast body of empirical data. This alone makes it possible to create genuine history. Vakhrushi Bagrationi built his unique definitive work, Description of the Kingdom of Georgia, on a vast historiographical base that included the historical works of his predecessors, a huge amount of information on the customs and rites of the Caucasian peoples (mainly Georgians), and geographic and ethnographic data. Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903) left us The History of Rome, a veritable masterpiece of historical thinking that appeared in 1854-1856; he compiled a complete body of Latin inscriptions and published an encyclopedic collection on Roman constitutional law. Ivane Javakhishvili is another unique phenomenon: he created from scratch nearly all scientific disciplines related to the history of Georgia (the history of Georgia, history of economics, law, music, numismatic, paleography, etc.). Today, history in the Soviet successor states is undergoing a crisis for obvious reasons: for many decades Soviet historians were kept under strict control; studies were allowed within fairly narrow ideological limits; the latest historical works by foreign colleagues were practically inaccessible, while scholarly works and fiction were translated into the languages of the Union republics only after they appeared in Russian. Georgian historians, and their Russian, Ukrainian, Be- lorussian, and other colleagues were divorced from what was going on in historical science abroad. The narrow pragmatic approaches of Soviet times scarred historical thinking and all other human- ities for that matter. Lack of historical knowledge disoriented contemporaries and made it impossible to plan the future.18 The sphere of social sciences lost its autonomy and its important and traditional ability to freely seek the truth. Freedom of scientific creative efforts was sacrificed to the primitively interpreted social order dispensed by the command administrative system. The optimal correlations were lost, the dividing line between ideology and the social sciences (history included) disappeared. The traces of this treatment of science and history typical mainly of the 1930s-1950s were still felt in the 1970s. Great Russian scholar Dmitry Likhachev wrote with a lot of anguish: “Scientific advance was interpreted as administering justice and dispensing punishment on those who disagreed with the only and a priori correct trends. Accusations and denunciations replaced scientific polemics; at best people were driven away from science, but many were arrested, exiled, imprisoned, or even destroyed… This all developed into total politics.”19 Famous poet and public figure Rasul Gamzatov warned the nation that a pistol shot into the past might reverberate as a salvo. These words deserve attention. In the last ten to fifteen years, the task of delivering science from obsolete stereotypes was formulated; it was recognized that the gnosiological problems of history require fresh investigation, that methods should be freely discussed and analyzed, and that the latest achievements of world historiography should be mastered together with the most valuable results of historical studies.

17 See: A. Toynbee, A Study of History, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, New York, London, I947. 18 See: Repressirovannaia nauka, Collection of articles, ed. by Prof. M.G. Yaroshevskiy, Leningrad, 1991. 19 D.S. Likhachev, Introduction to Repressirovannaia nauka, pp. 5-6. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Interest in Man

The new methods applied to medieval history have become part and parcel of 20th century historical science. This particularly relates to social and economic studies of the Annales.20 The quantitative methods used by medieval history, history of cities, and gender studies can be described as a movement “from structures and systems to people and places.” On top of this, they started in-depth cultural studies. Contemporary medieval studies demonstrate a lot of interest in man, medieval man in particular, which has been amply testified by recent publications,21 conferences, and discussions22 going on in different countries. The World Congresses of Historians23 paid much attention to this issue as well. Historical-anthropological studies with their obvious bias toward man, his personality, family, and related issues are living through a period of mounting interest. The name of the individual is a form of identification in society; it is a meaningful social sign that allows the individual to join a certain social group, on the one hand, and to detach himself from the other members of the same group by finding his and only his place among them, on the other.24 We all know that any culture rests on certain key elements that include the conception of man per se, as well as his attitude toward the social sphere and nature, his ideas about time, power, labor, and economic activities. Cultural differences are caused by different basic elements; to a certain extent they determine the specific features of man’s lifestyle, his attitude toward the world, society, and himself. The “individualist” cultures are dominated by the ethics of “autonomy,” which means that individuals should rely on themselves. They cherish individual values (freedom being one of them) much more than their social ones; human rights are placed above social responsibilities; society pro- tects the rights of the individual, morals and laws are formulated for people, while individual values are placed high above the social in any conflicting situation. “Collectivist” ethical norms dominate in “collectivist” cultures in which all members are mutually dependent. The social responsibilities of the individual are placed higher than human rights; morals and the law are designed to preserve social stability; social values are preferred in any conflict between the individual and the social. Medieval man was mainly a member of a group (collective) and a corporation.25 He could find his bearings in the world thanks to his knowledge and skills, the way other members of his group (collective) treated him and their mental attitudes (individual mentality was rooted in the group traditions).26 He was an obvious conformist with a corporate or “communal” mentality (in some cases the individual could act on his own free will—he still possessed the right of choice).27 To a certain extent this channeled his personal (private) life, which brimmed with problems calling for prompt decisions.

20 Since the early 20th century, British historians have remained under the spell of German historiography. Max Weber’s sociological studies became widely popular. This prominent representative of the British school of urban studies showed a considerable interest in the cities’ economic and commercial development. 21 See: Chelovek v krugu sem’i: ocherki po istorii chastnoy zhizni v Evrope do nachala novogo vremeni, ed. by Iu.L. Bessmertny, Moscow, 1996; N.L. Pushkareva, Chastnaia zhizn russkoy zhenshchiny: nevesta, zhena, luibovnitsa (X-nachalo XIX v.), Moscow, 1997. 22 See: Obshchnosti i chelovek v srednevekovom mire. Materialy Mezhrespublikanskoy conferentsii, Moskva, 30 sen- tiabria-2 oktiabria 1991, Saratov, 1992. 23 This was especially obvious in 1990 at the XVII World Congress of Historians in Madrid and in 2000 at the XIX World Congress in Oslo. 24 See: P.Sh. Gabdrakhmanov, “Imia, sem’ia i Familia vo Flandrii XII-XIII vekov: k voprosu o sotsial’nykh ramka- kh chastnoy zhizni srednevekovogo prostoliudia,” in: Srednie veka, No. 62, 2001, pp. 120-131. 25 See: A.Ia. Gurevich, Kategorii srendnevekovoy kul’tury, Moscow, 1984, p. 200. 26 See: A.Ia. Gurevich, Problemy srendnevekovoy narodnoy kul’tury, Moscow, 1981, p. 98. 27 See: A.A. Svanidze, “Zhivye obshchnosti, obshchestvo i chelovek v srendevekovom mire Evropy,” in: Obshch- nosti i chelovek v srednevekovom mire, pp. 11, 16 (see also: “Dialektika obshchnosti i lichnosti v Srednie veka,” in: Obsh- chnosti i chelovek v srednevekovom mire, p. 30). 116 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In the Middle Ages, medieval groups (family, clan, tribe, parish, etc.) influenced individuals. The poor source base makes it hard to study the problem in depth; this is especially true of the Georgian sources that offer little information about the peasantry, the largest social group of the Middle Ages. It is not by accident that in July 1872 Ilia Chavchavadze wrote to David Eristani: “...our history... is a history of wars and kings, there are no people in it. I am not particularly interested in kings and wars... People are the most important, while they are nowhere to be seen in our history.”28 People had their own ideas about the universe; they were not always perspicacious or wise, but they acted according to their thoughts. The “new science of history,” which busied itself with mentality, added a new dimension to history and showed the way toward revealing the very essence of the largest social group, which, in fact, formed the cornerstone of society. In Europe, this issue has been more or less carefully studied; Georgian history, too, turned its attention to the problem of mentality. I have written about this.29 Much has to be done, however, to achieve serious results. On the other hand, studies of mentality (started in the 1930s-1940s by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre and developed in the 1960s by Georges Duby, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Jacques Le Goff, and others) offered much greater possibilities for immeasurably more profound historical studies. The principles of historicism obviously triumphed. In the Middle Ages, most of the population had to survive in hard economic conditions. This bred uncertainty and diffidence in people’s minds and souls and determined their acts. In an effort to overcome these negative sentiments, the Church called people to solidarity in each of the social groups and instructed them to overcome the contradictions between these groups. The people blamed the devil for their misfortunes and were never sure of salvation. Fear triumphed over hope. Jacques Le Goff30 quotes Franciscan Berthold of Regensburg, who said that only one out of 100,000 had the chance of salvation. The correlation between the saved and those doomed to eternal punishment was illustrated by Noah’s Arc and the number of those who perished in the Flood. It was in natural calamities that medieval man expressed spiritual reality and his assessments. Mentality, emotions, and acts were obviously suggested by a craving for inner balance.

Interaction of Societies in Time

The chronicler of David the Builder showed a very special and highly interesting attitude toward natural calamities and the connection between them and the misfortunes that befell Geor- gia of that time. In 1088 an earthquake ruined the fortress of Tmogvi killing Kakhaber, Niania’s son, and his family. The loss of life was catastrophic, the earthquake destroyed many towns and villages. The people interpreted this as a divine scourge for the sins of the royal court and Czar George II. The historian described the drama with passion: “It was a time of troubles in the country. No prosperity was possible because of people’s unseemly deeds. People of all ages and every man sinned and abandoned the righteous way as they saw fit. This angered God, whose nature was be- nevolent and merciful; it was people who passed a harsh sentence on themselves that the Prophet

28 For more detail, see: R. Metreveli, Historicism in the Works of Georgian Writers, Tbilisi, 1999, pp. 3-21 (in Georgian). 29 Studies were mainly conducted at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi University, Department of the History of Georgia. 30 See: J. Le Goff, “Mental’nost, mir emotsiy, formy povedenia (X-XIII vv.),” in: Tsivilizatsia srednevekovogo Za- pada, Ekaterinburg, 2005, pp. 393-438. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Isaiah intended for the sinful nation.”31 Here the historian quotes the Prophet: “Ah sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evildoers, children that are corrupters: they have forsaken the LORD, ... they are gone away backward… your land is desolated, your cities are burned with fire; your fields—strangers are devouring them in your presence, it is desolation, as overthrown by strangers” (Isaiah, Chapter 1: 4, 7). They obviously knew the Old Testament well; it determined the mentality and behavior of that time. The problem of sin and mercy was especially important: people believed that sins would be punished. The Church and the “holy books” were highly respected; people frequently turned to the Old Testament. The Church Fathers explained the texts to the people. The historian of David the Builder frequently referred to the Old Testament and went into detail about punishment: “For this reason God’s anger was not assuaged, because we never repented and never heeded, and we did not act as we should have before God.”32 He obviously believed that catastrophes were punishments for the unrepentant, those who refused to listen to divine admonitions and misbehaved, and added: “This was because other awful things were added to the evil that was already present in the country. God sent people suffering so that the sinner could not say: ‘These earthquakes were not caused by our sins and were not sent by God. They coincided with the change of times.’”33 The historian went on to explain: “God brought down his anger on the country and caused devastating earthquakes.”34 There are many more examples of the same in other sources. Earthquakes and solar eclipses were exciting events that medieval man took for miracles. He was attracted by them as by everything else that looked supernatural or anomalous. Miracles were used to confirm sanctity—the examples of this are numerous. Folk prejudices and religious doctrines were blended into one.35 Here is an example. In the late 12th century, popes claimed the right of canonization that belonged to vox populi. Miracles were absolutely indispensable for canonization. Ac- cording to popular belief, miracles did not necessarily happen through the offices of saints—they could happen in the lives of ordinary people. The so-called Justice of Heaven confirmed the truth through miracles. Here it is important to identify the position of science and religion: will they coexist and demonstrate mutual tolerance? Will the spheres of knowledge be delimited? Science should study and develop knowledge of the material world; religion is supposed to promote knowledge about man’s spiritual and moral principles found in the Holy Books. The conception of dualism that recognized two—spiritual and material—principles of the world formulated in the Middle Ages has come to the fore. Historically, the philosophic relations between religion and science differed from one period to another and vacillated between confrontation and mutual understanding. Today, religion plays the main role when it comes to spiritual and moral education (I have in mind the post-Soviet expanse) because science is gradually shedding its ideological garments. Science (including history) should be relieved from any political and narrow social influences. Objectivity should become its main feature. Historiography of the 21st century (like sociology and philosophy) inherited the task of present- ing man as an integral whole. Freudism has long dissipated the idea of the spirit’s supremacy over the flesh. The famous “I think, therefore I am” that dominated philosophy for a long time was finally dropped. It was Nietzsche who created a philosophy permeated with the physical-Dianic message and who believed that he wrote his books with “body and life.”36 The philosophers, he argued, had no reason to separate the spirit from the body. Freud developed this teaching into the theory of the uncon-

31 Historian of David the Builder, The Life of David, the King of Kings. The Life of Kartli, Vol. I, Tbilisi, 1955, p. 322 (in Georgian). 32 Ibid., p. 323. 33 Ibidem. 34 Ibidem. 35 See: J. Le Goff, op. cit., p. 398. 36 Nietzsche, Sochinenia, in two volumes, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1990, p. 23. 118 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION scious. Later, the academic community agreed that the “soul and the body” should be viewed as insep- arable and the rational and physical in man should not be separated. History is called upon to show society its face and body. It does not merely demonstrate them, but also supplies a moral and emotional message, assessment scale, and food for thought about people and “man as the central element of society and history. Historiography of the 20th century admitted that man was the main postulate of history.”37 The human essence in the moral sphere of the past is best seen in the gap that separates the unavoidable circumstances and vicissitudes of life, that is, the space in which man is free to use his will and to choose.38 History writing is a very responsible task because society needs a genuine history. In 1904, Ivane Javakhishvili wrote: “Each educated nation endowed with self-cognition should know the history of its past social life; it should know its true, genuine history, not an inflated and false one.”39 Civil society should know its history. To supply it with this knowledge we should have teachers, textbooks, and reference literature. Enlightenment and the entire body of its semantic or stylistic knowledge and shades cannot adequately reveal its primordial universal nature. It can be understood as development of an in- born creative potential and individuality through the study of cultural heritage and the past. The science of history hails any methodological novelty, but we should never forget past achievements. The historian of David the Builder, for example, knew quite well that a chronicler should have materials (sources) related to the described object and be a past master of the “art of rhetoric.” The author of The Life of David, the King of Kings wrote: “Having decided to tell a story about David’s deeds I was bold enough to mention Homer and Hellene Aristobulus, a Jew Joseph, the great and famous writers, one of whom told us about the Trojans and Achaeans and about the hand-to-hand fighting between Odysseus and Orestes and showed us the winner. Another described Alexander’s victorious wars, his courage and his triumphs; the third, Jew Joseph told us about Caesar Vespasian.”40 The historian believed that these chroniclers did not have enough information and that they “used their high art to write an expansive history.” The Georgian historian was convinced that a high- level historical work requires a lot of professional skill and the ability to make a good story out of even a minor event.41 The methodological comments of the chronicler, who lived some eight centuries ago, are still valid. Other historians, too, were of the same opinion: history developed along with society and accepted new methods of study. The new century has widened that range of novelties. We should always bear in mind that our past should not be forgotten (here I have in mind methodology); history teaches us that. Historical memory is needed to inherit culture, it is needed for the very existence of society and its evolution, as well as for personal and national identification. History, like life, should be regarded as a permanently unfolding chain. Continuity is the interconnection between consecutive periods and phases of history of the same society and, at the same time, it is the interconnection among societies in time.

C o n c l u s i o n

An investigation of national problems in the context of globalization confirms that globalization is an objective process that cannot be stopped. It is conditioned by the movement of cultures and

37 In 2004, the St. Petersburg and Ivane Javakhishvili universities set up a joint center for the study of man. It has already published several collections of articles (see: Chelovek, gosudarstvo, globalizatsia, St. Petersburg-Tbilisi, 2005). 38 See: M.A. Iusim, “Neskol’ko shtrikhov k portretu istorii,” in: Srednie veka, No. 64, 2003, p. 347. 39 Iv. Javakhishvili, Patriotism and Science, Tiflis, 1904, p. 5 (in Georgian) (see also: R. Metreveli, Patriotism and Science. Jubilee Collection to Mark 100th Birth Anniversary of Iv. Javakhishvili, Tbilisi, 1976, pp. 22-28, in Georgian). 40 Historian of David the Builder, The Life of David, the King of Kings, p. 322. 41 See: Ibidem. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION human and economic resources. Contemporary civilization armed with powerful tools of information, political, ideological, and psychological influence on the individual and the masses, as well as computer programming, has acquired dangerous dimensions. Under its pressure, man could lose his ability to think and act freely; his awareness of his “Self,” and his free will as an architect of his life and history. Meanwhile, man and his mentality are a central subject of history.

Parvin DARABADI

D.Sc. (Hist.), professor at Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

CENTRAL EURASIA IN THE “BIG GEOPOLITICAL GAME” O THE LATE 19TH-EARLY 20TH CENTURIES (Pages of Geohistory)

Abstract

he author offers a glimpse of one of the role of the Caucasian factor in the T the most dramatic episodes of geopo- Crimean War, and the main stages of the litical rivalry between the Russian and empires’ confrontation in Central Asia. British empires that unfolded in the Cen- Prof. Darabadi pays a lot of attention to tral Eurasian mega-region in the latter half the so-called railway policy Russia and of the 19th and early 20th centuries. He Britain pursued in Persia, as well as to presents an in-depth analysis of the ge- the oil factor of the geopolitical games in ostrategic aims pursued by both empires, the Caspian.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

In the first half of the 19th century, Russia turned its attention to the Caucasus and the Caspian once more and revived its military-political involvement to complete the struggle for Russia’s absolute hegemony there started by Peter the Great and continued by Catherine the Great. Iran and Turkey likewise turned their gaze to the same region while Russia, Britain, and France found themselves competing for the Middle East and the Caspian region in particular. Military assistance from Napoleon’s France and Britain did not save Iran and Turkey from crip- pling defeats in three wars with Russia (the Russo-Iranian wars of 1804-1813 and 1826-1828 and the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829). The Southern Caucasus and the eastern Black Sea coast, as well as the exclusive right to keep its navy in the Caspian, were Russia’s main strategic prizes. 120 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

This buried Britain’s hope of stationing its navy in the Caspian in the more or less near future. Russia, on the other hand, secured one of its key geopolitical priorities—undivided rule in the Cauca- sus and the western shores of the world’s largest landlocked water body. Alexander I described Rus- sia’s main geopolitical task as “we should stand firmly in the Caucasus.”1 In the first third of the 19th century, Russia acquired an important geostrategic toehold from which it could threaten Anatolia and Western Iran while moving toward the Persian Gulf.

The Caucasian actor in the Crimean War

By the early 1830s, the Russian Empire gained complete control over the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian, areas described as geopolitical East-West and North-South crossroads. This vantage point allowed Russia to spread its control over the vast neighboring territories—the Caucasian mountains in the west and the deserts of Central Asia in the east. By the same token, it threatened Britain’s main communication lines connecting it to its Indian colonies. Indeed, under favorable geopolitical conditions, Russia could not only block them, but also move its armies toward India either across Iran and Afghanistan or across Central Asia. These victories gave Russia certain military-strategic advantages: first, for a very long period it remained in control of the Caucasus’ natural riches (the Baku, Grozny, and Maikop oil); second, it moved the borders of Christian Orthodoxy far to the south with considerable geopolitical consequences; third, it gained control over the region’s key communication lines, including part of the Great Silk Road; fourth, by the mid-19th century, it finally conquered the Caucasus; and fifth, it set up a military-strategic toehold that allowed it to move into Central Asia in the 1860s-1880s, thus threatening Britain’s colonial interests in the Middle East and Central Asia. It was no accident that, in the mid-19th century, Russian military-political and academic circles revived the idea of a channel between the Azov and the Caspian seas. It was expected to strengthen Russia’s military-strategic and economic position in Central Asia and to “realize the great idea of maritime access to Asia’s heartland.”2 A Russian outpost on the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, to quote General Rostislav Fadeev, Russian military theoretician of the mid-19th century, was a bridge “that connected the Russian coast and the heart of the Asian continent; it was a wall that protected Central Asia against hostile influences, and a stronghold that defended both the Black and the Caspian seas.”3 By that time, Russia was bogged down in the Caucasian War of 1817-1864, which gave London the chance to revive its involvement in the region in the hope of detaching the Caucasus from the Rus- sian Empire. It should have been transformed from a Russian military-strategic toehold into an anti- Russian Britain-dominated buffer zone. In 1837, the “Vixen” incident caused quite a stir: the British ship was delivering gunpowder and weapons to Caucasian insurgents and was arrested by the Russian authorities. This triggered heated debates in the British parliament over the real importance of the region for British interests in the East; more than that, it nearly triggered an armed clash between Britain and Russia.4 Later, in the mid-19th century, another Eastern crisis developed into the Crimean War of 1853- 1856, which revived the Caucasian issue of Britain’s foreign policy. This was an absolutely natural development: H.D. Seymour, a prominent British politician and diplomat of the mid-19th century, said at one time that his country never recognized Russia’s rule in Cherkessia or over the Christian provinces

1 Quoted from: L.G. Ivashov, Rossia ili Moskovia? Geopoliticheskie izmerenia natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossii, EKSM Algoritm, Moscow, 2002, p. 117. 2 Morskoy sbornik, Vol. XLIV, No. 11, 1859, p. 193. 3 Quoted from: L.G. Ivashov, op. cit., p. 127. 4 See: V.V. Degoev, Bol’shaia igra na Kavkaze: istoria i sovremennost’, Russkaia panorama Publishers, Moscow, 2001, pp. 120-138. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to the south of the Caucasus.5 Lord Palmerston said at the very beginning of the Crimean War that his cherished aim was to let Turkey claim the Crimea and Georgia and grant Cherkessia independence or else establish the sultan as its sovereign.6 When outlining the tasks of the future war, the British premier said that in future peace in Europe could have been guaranteed if Russia was deprived of some of its fringe territories: Georgia, Cherkessia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, Poland, and Finland.7 From the very beginning of the Crimean War, the allies were aware of the Northern Caucasus’ immense strategic importance as a territory on which the mountain peoples led by Shamil were still fighting the Russians. The fairly complicated military-political situation there was succinctly described by Karl Marx, who said that the legs of the vast empire (the Southern Caucasus) were detached from its body.8 Britain was resolved to exploit the favorable situation to detach the Southern Caucasus from the Russian Empire and divide Georgia into several principalities (Georgia, Mingrelia, Imeretia, Guria, and Armenia) under the joint British-Turkish protectorate and restore the territories Russia had acquired under the Gulistan, Turkmanchai, and Adrianople peace treaties to Iran and Turkey. The Times of Lon- don said in so many words that Russia should be limited by the northern lands beyond the Terek and Kuban rivers.9 It is interesting to note that, seen from the West, Armenia looked like part of Georgia. The Western allies planned to exploit the fact that the Russian troops were tied down by the mountain peoples’ resistance to deliver a blow to Russia; they counted on the Turks and the mountain peoples to attack from the front and the rear to defeat the Russians in the Caucasus and drive them back beyond the Terek and the Kuban.10 However, despite Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, it fought successfully in the Caucasus and captured the Turkish fortress of Kars. This not only buried the British plans, but also fortified Russia’s position in the region. On the whole, the British, who planned to detach the Caucasus from Russia while fighting in the Crimea, failed for two reasons: first, it proved impossible to fight simultaneously in the Crimea and the Caucasus; second, France betrayed no enthusiasm over Britain’s “Caucasian plans.”11 Russian diplomats skillfully used the Anglo-French contradictions to remove the “possible independence of Cherkessia and Daghestan” issue from the Paris Congress agenda. On 5 May, 1856, the House of Lords accused the Foreign Office of failing to insist in Paris on “independence for Cherkessia” as a barrier to Russia’s pressure toward India, Iran, and Turkey. Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon, in turn, explained the failure by the fact that during the war Shamil had not manifested the desire to join the allies.12 During the last Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the Russians captured the fortresses of Kars, Ardahan, and Bayazet in the Caucasus, as well as Andrianople (Edirne) in Turkey’s European part. Under the San Stefano Peace Treaty of 3 March, 1878, Russia acquired Kars, Ardahan, and Batum, thus strengthening its military-political position in the Caucasus. In the 1860s, when Russia had secured its position in the Caucasus, the British-Russian rivalry shifted to Central Asia, to Afghanistan. The Russian Empire’s “brain trust”—the staff of the Russian Caucasian Corps—was the first to realize that the Caucasus and Central Asian were in fact one geopolitical entity. This happened in the latter half of the 1850s-early 1860s when General Fadeev, who belonged to the “brain trust,” wrote in his Letters from the Caucasus (1865) that the situation in the Caspian-Black Sea area “is vitally important for Russia’s southern half stretching from the Oka to the

5 Quoted from: O.P. Markova, Rossia, Zakavkaz’e i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia v XVIII v., Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 298. 6 Quoted from: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza, Vol. 2, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, p. 184. 7 Quoted from: L.G. Ivashov, op. cit., p. 126. 8 See: K. Marx, F. Engels, Sochinenia, 2nd Edition, Vol. 9, Moscow, 1957, p. 408. 9 See: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza… Vol. 2, p. 185. 10 Ibidem. 11 V.V. Degoev, op. cit., p. 149. 12 See: Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza… Vol. 2, p. 193. 122 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Crimea… Russia can defend its southern basins only from the Caucasian isthmus. If Russia’s hori- zons were limited in the south by the snow-capped mountains of the Caucasian range, the entire western continent of Asia would be outside our influence. Today, when Turkey and Persia are weak, a new master or masters would have been quick to appear.”13

The Eagle and the Lion: A Geopolitical Confrontation in Central Asia

The sad results of the Crimean War forced Russia to seek a new weapon against Britain to coun- terbalance its domination on the seas; it should have been quite effective, even if foggy Albion allied with another power against Russia. In 1882, Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai Girs instructed Russian Ambassador to London Baron de Morenheim: “This was the aim of our advance in Central Asia.”14 During the Crimean War, the Russian military were working on several combat operations that recommended pressing on toward India and shifting the main thrust of the fighting against Britain to that country. Since maritime communications were easy to develop, it was recommended that the onslaught begin from the southeastern Caspian coast and Ak-Kale be used as an outpost.15 Although the Russian top military remained convinced that it would be advisable to move toward India from the Caspian shores, along the border of Northern Iran via Herat and Kabul, the War Ministry rejected the projects as unrealizable at that time. On 28 February, 1856, the ministry issued a resolution that recommended, in particular: “1. To use all means and forces to cement our domination in the Caspian by developing navigation and strengthening our flotilla. The Cabinet has grown accustomed to the idea and has begun implementing it. 2. Communication between the coastal and inland areas of the Trans-Caucasian territory should be improved together with navigation; this done, we shall be able to turn Baku into the main military depot of the Trans-Caucasian forces. 3. When the depot receives sufficient amounts of military supplies and foodstuffs—this can be done without stir- ring up suspicion—we shall be able to exploit the favorable circumstances to carry out a surprise move of our troops to the southeastern Caspian coast and entrench ourselves on the Persian border in Turkestan. 4. If the present war (the Crimean War.—P.D.) lasts for many more years, we shall probably manage to develop navigation on the Caspian and build up military depots in Baku to the extent that some time later we shall be able to undertake something against the British domains in India.” The document said at the same time: “This bold adventure, which demands complete secrecy, will require many years of preparation. Today this enterprise can be described as unrealizable.”16 This obviously geopolitical document proves beyond doubt that the top Russian military attached great importance to the Caspian Sea and Baku in view of the future military operations against Britain “in the Afghan-Indian sector.” Defeated in the Crimean War, however, Russia was unable to realize these grandiose geopolitical plans. Turkestan was on the agenda. In 1870s-1880s, Russia and Britain clashed in Central Asia in an effort to carry out further expansion. Both were seeking stronger power over the already conquered lands by demonstrating their military might and establishing control over the key trade and communication routes. Afghanistan found itself in the very center of confrontation. The Russians moved into the Trans-Caspian area back in 1869 when the troops of General Sto- letov landed on the eastern Caspian coast and founded the port and city of Krasnovodsk as a toehold. In 1877, the Russians took Kyzyl Arvat. The Russian Empire hastened to cement its position in Turkestan; in 1881, General Skobelev took the Akhal-Tekin oasis; three years later the Russians took

13 Vostok, No. 3, 2003, pp. 70-71. 14 G.A. Khidoyatov, Britanskaia ekspansiia v Sredney Azii (Pende, mart 1885), Tashkent, 1981, p. 32. 15 See: Ibid., p. 33. 16 Ibid., p. 35. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Merv; on 12 January, 1881, the Geok-tepe fortress; and several days later, on 18 January, the village of Askhabad. A year later, in 1882, the Russians set up the Zakaspiyskaia Region with its center in Askhabad as part of the Caucasian Region ruled by a governor-general. In the late 1890s, the newly formed region became part of the Turkestan Area.17 The Trans-Caspian railway built in 1880-1888 was an important military-strategic and economic tool of further expansion. In a relatively short period of time, the Russians moved into Turkestan to find themselves in the region bordering on Afghanistan; in March 1885, they came dangerously close to the Afghan troops at Panj. A war between Russia and Britain looked imminent. In March 1885, during the Panj crisis, the contradictions between the two countries in Afghan- istan reached their highest point and brought the rivals to the brink of war. At that point, Russia could have gained a military and strategic advantage by moving to Herat and by building a railway to connect the Akhal-Tekin oasis and the Caspian coast. It was at that time that the War Ministry ordered mobilization of two army corps in the Caucasus; there were also plans to move enough troops across the sea from Baku to Krasnovodsk on ships chartered from the Kavkaz i Merkuriy Company.18 When planning its war with Russia, Britain intended to strike from the Black Sea to repeat the Crimean War maneuver. The British counted on Turkey’s help to land on the Caucasian Black Sea coast for the simple reason that the enemy was using the Caucasus as a toehold for its operations beyond the Caspian—their communication routes connected Krasnovodsk and Baku. Russian diplomats upset these plans by putting pressure on Turkey: as a result, the Caucasus and the western Black Sea coast were out of British reach. Russia also managed to come to terms with the Emir of Afghan- istan by exchanging the Zulfagar area for Panj; the Russians, however, retained their control over the exit to the Zulfagar mountain pass. Britain, too, had to recognize Panj as a Russian domain.19 Prof. F. Kazemzadeh (Yale University, the U.S.) has pointed out: “From London’s point of view, Russia’s presence in Central Asia was disturbing, if not threatening. From St. Petersburg’s point of view, it was the natural outcome of consecutive steps that began three centuries earlier under Ivan the Terrible, Fedor Ioannovich, and Boris Godunov. The British, treated as aliens in Asia, were shattered to see that the Cossacks on the Oxus banks felt absolutely at home among Turkic peoples, who for centuries had been their neighbors, rulers, and subjects.”20 On the whole, the advance of the Russians in Central Asia in the 1880s caused a lot of apprehension among the British administrators in India, who feared that Horasan, Seistan, and Afghanistan might become the next victims.”21

Railway Policy in Persia: Britain and Russia

The Russian-British rivalry was not limited to Central Asia; the two empires competed for domination in Persia as well. Britain looked at this large Eastern country as a terrain from which it could oppose Russia in the Southern Caucasus and undermine its position in Turkestan. Southern Azerba- ijan was the key to possible military actions against the Russian Empire, while Horasan could have played an important role in weakening Russia’s influence in Turkestan.22 F. Kazemzadeh has provided us with a formula that best described Persia’s place and role in the events that unfolded in the 19th-

17 See: Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia, Vol. 26, Moscow, 1977, pp. 344-345. 18 See: G.A. Khidoyatov, op. cit., p. 153. 19 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, Diplomatia v novoe vremia. 1871-1914, GIPL, Moscow, 1963, p. 204. 20 F. Kazemzadeh, Bor’ba za vliianie v Persii. Diplomaticheskoe protivostoianie Rossii i Anglii, ZAO Tsentrpoli- graf, Moscow, 2004, pp. 10-11. 21 F. Kazemzadeh, Bor’ba za vliianie v Persii. Diplomaticheskoe protivostoianie Rossii i Anglii, ZAO Tsentrpoli- graf, Moscow, 2004, p. 336. 22 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, p. 75. 124 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION early 20th centuries in Central Eurasia: “Evil fate placed Persia between the Russian hammer and the British anvil.”23 He goes on to say: “The clashes between the two giant empires, be it over Constan- tinople, Central Asia or the Far East, immediately echoed in Tehran. After two decades of Russia’s continuous onslaught in Turkestan and the Trans-Caspian, Persia was very much aware of the pressure coming from St. Petersburg and London.”24 In the latter half of the 19th century, Persia became a de facto Asian semi-colony of both empires; since 1879, the Persian shah used Russian Cossacks, another lever of Russia’s influence, as his personal bodyguards. The Russian troops stationed in the Caucasus could easily occupy Persia’s richest and densely populated northern provinces, while the British naval forces were in control of the Persian Gulf coast. While in Afghanistan, the two powers found themselves on the brink of war, in Persia, they remained mostly economic rivals. Their competition over concessions for transportation projects, railways in particular, was known as the railway policy. In the early 1870s, the issue of railways in Persia was raised by Paul Julius Baron von Reuter (the founder of the famous news agency) who intended to build a railway between the southern Cas- pian coast and Tehran and to extend it later to the Gulf. Despite Nasir al-Din Shah’s preliminary agreement and the fact that the British had lain the first 12 km of rails, the Iranian side, not without Russia’s interference, annulled its permission.25 In 1873-1878, Ferdinand de Lesseps, the famous builder of the Suez, put forward the idea of Le Grand Central Asiatique railway to connect Calais, Orenburg, Samarkand, Peshawar, and Calcut- ta. The Russian side approved the project, which failed in turn thanks to the diplomatic maneuvers of the British who feared (with good reason) that it would bring Russia into Afghanistan and India.26 A Russian company, which late in the 1880s tried to build a railway between Rasht and the Chahbar Bay on the Indian Ocean coast to realize Russia’s dream of reaching the warm Indian Ocean, likewise failed.27 In his article “Russkaia politika na Blizhnem, Srednem i Dal’nem Vostoke” (Rus- sian Policy in the Near, Middle, and Far East), which appeared in the Rech newspaper on 1 March, 1911, Pavel Miliukov was very open about the purposes of the Indo-European and Trans-Persian projects: “Our old railway projects in Persia were intended to bring us to the ‘warm sea.’”28 In the late 1880s, Henry Wolff, British envoy to Persia, worked hard to implement a project for a Trans-Persian railway and draw the Russians to his side by demonstrating the project’s obvious advantages to them. In his letter to Prime Minister Salisbury, he argued that while the Suez had shortened the route between London and Bombay by 2,492 miles, the Trans-Persian railway would shorten the route between Baku and Karachi by 3,072 miles to Russia’s advantage.29 On 16 February, 1890, Russian War Minister Petr Vannovskiy opposed the project at a special meeting on Persia and insisted that a railway between Tiflis and Tabriz would be strategically more advantageous. He was dead set against a railway along the Caspian’s western shore because, as he put it, “we have always been aware of the Caspian’s exceptional importance. For this reason, any project that will attract foreign interest to the Caspian basin should be regarded as incompatible with our position.”30 According to Director of the Asian Department of Russia’s Foreign Ministry I. Zinoviev, the Tiflis-Tabriz railway was primarily important in the military-strategic respect. Control over Azerbaijan could become an important factor in the next Russo- Turkish war, but unconnected with the Russian railways it would remain useless.31

23 F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 124. 24 Ibidem. 25 See: M. Pavlovich, “Istoria Prikaspia,” Kaspiyskiy tranzit v dvukh tomakh, Vol. 1, DI DIK Tanais, Moscow, p. 517. 26 See: Ibid., pp. 518-523. 27 See: Ibid., p. 523. 28 Ibid., p. 552. 29 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, p. 82. 30 F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 187. 31 See: Ibid., p. 190. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Finally, under the conventions of 1885 and 1889, Britain and Russia agreed to refrain from building railways in Persia and to keep third countries away until 1910. In this way, Persia was deprived of this type of communication for a long time to come.32 The commanders of the Indian army expressed their opinion of a Trans-Persian railway in an article that appeared in The Times on 21 July, 1912. One of the British officers wrote that the idea of a Russian invasion of India looked an absurdity at first glance, in same way as before the Russo-Japanese war a half-million invasion of Manchuria had been unthinkable… The Trans-Persian railway would force us to considerably increase the Indian army. No matter how large the army was, the public would have a nervous response to all the alarming signs. We should always bear in mind that even if there was complete agreement between Britain and Russia, this attitude would survive in the suburban theaters with their penchant for melodrama—there were millions of them—in which a villain, who abducted a British virgin and bribed a killer to get rid of a valiant bridegroom, always appeared in a uniform that brought Russians to mind. Our Tommies high up in the gallery (in the garrisons of India the enemy was invariably imagined as clad in a Cos- sack uniform) enthusiastically applauded.33 Still, early in the 20th century, Britain rejected its traditional railway policy in Persia. On 11 July, 1912, speaking in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Grey said that the cabinet considered it un- wise to continue opposing construction of a railway that would be built sooner or later anyway. In fact, to protect its interests in this area Britain should have immediately joined the Trans-Persian project.34 The recommendation was prompted by the fact that despite the earlier agreements with London, Russia tried to build a Trans-Persian railway to reach Bandar Abbas. In his book, Zheleznodorozhniy put’ cherez Persiu (A Trans-Persian Railway), which appeared in St. Petersburg in 1900, Russian engineer P. Rittikh pointed to the project’s special military-political importance, which could help Russia establish its domination over entire Persia and bury the “plan of dividing it into spheres: the Northern under Russian and the Southern under British influence. No division and no spheres can be tolerated: all of Persia should be ours.”35 The planned railways—the keys to India of sorts—were obviously of huge geopolitical importance as a powerful weapon of struggle for the hegemony in Central Eurasia Russia and Britain would not hesitate to use. Naturally enough, Russia’s greater involvement in Persia, which by the late 19th century had grown even weaker, caused a lot of concern in the British ruling circles bogged down in South Africa. In fact, the British-Russian rivalry eased the British pressure on South Africa. According to George Curzon, a brilliant expert in the Orient, the British interests in Persia could be divided into three categories—economic, political, and strategic; the latter two, said Curzon, were of especial importance for India.36 He was also convinced that geography and history supplied Russia with a dominant role in Northern Persia, while Britain should have concentrated on establishing its domination over Central and Southern Persia.37 Being absolutely aware of Russia’s intention to penetrate Central and Southern Persia to reach the Gulf, Lord Curzon concluded that, no matter how heavy the financial and military burden caused by the ever shortening distance between the Russian Empire and the northern and northwestern borders of India between the Pamirs and Herat, his country was also very concerned about the prospect of Russia becoming a neighbor of Eastern or Southern Persia. This would inevitably make the burden much heavier, warned he.38 In the final count, both powers needed a united but weak Persia; any plans for its dismember- ment were blocked by an important factor: Russia’s probable move toward the Gulf, something that

32 See: Ibid., p. 192. 33 See: M. Pavlovich, op. cit., pp. 556-557. 34 See: Ibid., p. 530. 35 Quoted from: Ibid., pp. 525-526. 36 See: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 278. 37 See: Ibid., p. 279. 38 See: Ibidem. 126 Vol. 1 (3), 2007 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Britain could not tolerate. Its main rival in Central Eurasia should have been deprived of this geopolitical victory. In the spring and summer of 1900, Britain’s fears were confirmed by Russia amassing its troops on the Persian and Afghan borders and sending its warships to the Gulf. The situation never developed further: Russia turned its attention to the Far East and preferred other forms of rivalry with Britain in the Middle East.39 Following the defeat of the Iranian revolution of 1905-1911, not without Russia’s contribution, early in 1913 the Russian government obtained a concession to build the Julfa-Tabriz railway; this was the first step toward annexing Southern Azerbaijan and the Urmian district, which could be turned into a strategically advantageous operational terrain for further pressure on Eastern Turkey.40

The Oil actor in the Geopolitical Games in the Caspian

In the 1870s-1890s, the oil factor moved to the fore in everything that was going on in the region. In the latter half of the 19th century, the western Caspian area and Baku acquired a much more ramified industrial and transport infrastructure. In 1873, Baku became the main base of the Caspian flotilla. In 1883, the Baku-Tiflis railway was commissioned; in 1900, the Baku–Derbent–Port-Petrovsk (Ma- khachkala) railway was completed. Later it was extended to Grozny and Beslan to join the Russian railway network. It was at that time that Baku, in which the oil industry was rapidly developing, became the best equipped and the largest Caspian port; it held the first place among all the other ports on the empire’s inner seas, where the total tonnage of merchant sailing ships was concerned; his steam-powered fleet was larger than those of the White and Baltic seas and was second to the Black Sea and Azov fleets. By the early 20th century, about 80 percent of oil products were taken to the world markets by sea, the rest was moved by railways. At that time, Baku produced over half of the world’s total oil.41 In the late 19th century, the Grozny and Maikop oil areas, the cities of Novorossiisk, Ekaterinodar, Vladikavkaz, Port-Petrovsk, as well as the Vladikavkaz railway with the Mineralnye Vody and Tikhorets- kaia stations, acquired great military-strategic and economic importance for the Russian Empire. In 1901, over 90 percent of kerosene used in India came from Baku; India also served as a transit base for the Russian oil deliveries to the Far East.42 At the same time, due to the transportation problems, Baku oil was losing its competitiveness on the world markets: it was taken from Baku to Batum on the Black Sea coast by rail where it was loaded onto ships to be taken through the Suez Canal to India and the Far East. In 1884, a Russian project of an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf appeared.43 If implemented, it (which Nicholas II described as a “tremendously important issue”) could have created Russian commercial interests in the Gulf and ensured Russia’s military presence in the form of Russian troops deployed to protect the pumping stations, repair shops and other structures along the pipeline. By the same token, Russia would have increased its influence on the Indian Ocean coast.44 The pipeline could have added competitiveness to Baku’s oil industry, which was losing money under pressure from Standard Oil, its main rival, which was pushing Russian oil products from the European and Asian markets.45 The British worked hard to thwart these plans. The Russian Empire was denied the pipeline concession, while the British confirmed the D’Arcy concession. According to B. Anan’ich, this

39 See: Ibid., pp. 287-288. 40 See: M. Pavlovich, op. cit., pp. 558-561. 41 See: Istoria Azerbaidzhana, in three volumes, Vol. 2, Baku, 1960, pp. 231-235. 42 See: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 293. 43 See: Ibid., p. 294. 44 See: Ibid., p. 295. 45 See: Ibid., p. 311. Vol. 1 (3), 2007 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION meant “one of the first defeats of Witte’s economic policy in Persia on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war. It only took the Russian government a few years to grasp the meaning of it.”46 While chasing two birds in the bush, Russia missed the bird in the Persian Gulf. British Ambassador to the Russian Empire Sir Arthur Nicholson put this in a nutshell by saying that the Japanese War buried Russia’s dream of a vast Asian empire.47

Russia’s Attempt to Reach the Warm Seas: A Shelved Geopolitical Dream

The 1907 agreement brought Russia and Britain closer, but by 1909 Russia had concentrated considerable military force (150,000-strong) in the Turkestanian and Caucasian military districts, the closest to India. The British could not help but be concerned about the security of their Indian colonial possessions.48 Meanwhile, Persia’s decline continued. In the early 20th century, the country was in an acute social and political crisis, which added vehemence to the Russo-British rivalry there. The threat of a Russian invasion became very real, something that the British could not overlook. In the event of Russia’s invasion of Tabriz or Mashhad from the north, they were prepared to establish their control over the strategically important area of Seistan (which bordered on Afghanistan and Baluchistan) and the Gulf. British envoy Ch. Harding believed, with good reason, that the Russians aimed to reach Seistan in the south to finally approach the borders of India.49 George Curzon, in turn, pointed out that a Russian port in the Persian Gulf, the cherished dream of the patriots from the banks of the Neva or the Volga, would have caused uneasiness in the West even in peacetime. It would have destroyed the balance, the result of persistent efforts, destroyed trade worth of many millions of pounds sterling, and unleashed hostile nationalities always ready to go for each other’s throats.50 By that time, however, the old rivals were tied down elsewhere—Britain was fighting the Boers, and Russia the Japanese. They were obviously unable to pay enough attention to their strategic interests in the region and be more actively involved militarily. Their rivalry over influence on the Persian shah was limited to diplomatic battles and intrigues of their secret services. The revolution that started in Persia in 1905 prompted the sides to sign an agreement in 1907. Russia’s direct military interference in Persia’s domestic affairs during the revolution and Britain’s diplomatic maneuvers helped to suppress the revolution, which threatened the interests of both powers. Persia was seen as a strategic key to the security of the Russian Empire’s southern borders in the Southern Caucasus and across the Caspian. It was in a state of permanent border conflict with Turkey, the common enemy of Persia and Russia; their relations with the Ottoman Empire were strained in the 1870s. The fairly large military force Russia kept in the Southern Caucasus and Persia’s dependence on the Russian market added weight to Russia’s influence on Persia. In the fall of 1873, under St. Peters- burg’s pressure, Nasir al-Din Shah had to annul the concession treaty signed in 1872 with British banker Julius Reuter for a railway between Rasht on the Caspian and the Gulf. It was presumed that the railway would later be extended to the railways of other countries “in the direction of Europe or India.”51 If realized, Persia’s economic development would have been controlled by the British. The memorandum issued by the Foreign Ministry stated that Russian trade along the Caucasian border and in the Cas- pian would have been dealt a heavy blow.52

46 Ibid., p. 316. 47 See: Ibid., p. 431. 48 See: M. Pavlovich, op. cit., p. 556. 49 See: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 338. 50 See: Ibid., p. 351. 51 Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, pp. 78, 80. 52 See: Ibid., p. 80. 128 2007 Vol. 1 (3), THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russia’s victories beyond the Caspian strengthened its strategic position on Persia’s northern border and in the northern provinces of Southern Azerbaijan, Gilyan, Mâzandarân, and Horasan. On 9 December, 1881, Russia and Persia signed a convention in Tehran that delimited their domains to the east of the Caspian.53 Britain dominated Southern, Southeastern, and Central Persia; its navy controlled the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean. The country was de facto divided between Britain and Russia; the latter’s intention to reach the Indian Ocean via Persia and Afghanistan remained a geopolitical dream.

C o n c l u s i o n

By the early 20th century, Russia found itself on the Iranian and Afghan borders: it began its geopolitical pressure along the Western Caucasian coast and the Eastern and Central Asian Caspian coast in the 18th century and never relented throughout the 19th century, pressing on in the Persian and Afghan directions. Russia’s conquests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, joining Georgia, Northern Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenia to the Russian Federation, and the vassal dependence of Khiva and Bukhara brought the northern empire dangerously close to India. By the late 19th century, the British reassessed their ideas about Iran as a factor of India’s security. This, and the emergence of a new center of power in Europe, the German Empire, which nurtured ambitious plans in the Orient, forced the old rivals to abandon at least some of their political disagreements. Early in the 20th century, they brought their viewpoints on Iran much closer than before and registered the positive shifts by signing an agreement on 31 August, 1907 on delimiting the spheres of influence in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet. This ended in the creation of Entente.54 At the same time, by the late 19th century, Russia already controlled 90 percent of the Caspian shoreline, thanks to its active expansionist policy. It entered the 20th century as the dominant geopolitical force in the Caspian. Britain, in turn, was seeking protection over Iran, the closest neighbor of India, its largest colony. Russia was pursuing different aims: it was seeking military and political control over northern Iran, over highly unstable Southern Azerbaijan, to be more exact. This explains its active military- political interference in the revolutionary events of 1905-1911 and its temporary occupation of Southern Azerbaijan and Gilyan. Britain did not remain passive either—it moved in to control South- ern Iran. The rivals wanted to preserve the Iranian state intact—on the one hand, it blocked Russia’s access to the Indian Ocean, on the other, it did not allow the British to infiltrate the Caucasus and Western Turkestan. On the whole, it can be said that the acute Russian-British rivalry preserved Iran as an independent state and saved it from becoming a colony. George Curzon put this in a somewhat flowery way: “Turkestan, Afghanistan, Transcaspia, Persia—to many these names breathe only a sense of utter remoteness or a memory of strange viccisitudes and of moribund romance. To me, I confess, they are the pieces on a chessboard upon which is being played out a game for the dominion of the world.”55 These words, said at the dawn of the 20th century, are still pertinent in the early 21st century.

53 See: Istoria diplomatii, Vol. II, p. 206. 54 See: M.S. Ivanov, op. cit., p. 220. 55 Quoted from: F. Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 10.