Article

Studies in Indian Politics National Narrative and Regional 6(1) 1–11 © 2018 Lokniti, Centre for the Subtext: Understanding the Rise Study of Developing Societies SAGE Publications of BJP in sagepub.in/home.nav DOI: 10.1177/2321023018762676 http://journals.sagepub.com/home/inp

Vikas Tripathi1 Tamasa Das2 Sandhya Goswami3

Abstract The unprecedented mandate in favour of the Bharatiya (BJP) in the 2016 Assembly necessitates a careful understanding of the growth and consolidation of the party in the state. The BJP’s rise in the state can be understood in the backdrop of a favourable social base which has perceivably shifted from the in recent years. Many factors have been responsible for this shift identifiable through a withering Congress dominance and political stagnancy of the AGP. An understanding of the political shift in Assam with the concomitant rise of the BJP is incomplete without a look into the party movement dialectics marking BJP politics. A blatantly vocal rhetoric has been cast aside opting instead for a regionalized portraiture of Hinduism in the state. In this, localized sects and symbols have been inducted into the BJP’s campaign which infused a strong sense of regional identification among the mass of electorate.

Keywords Assam, assembly elections, BJP, Congress, AGP, AIUDF, BPF, BTAD, Hindutva, indigeneity, minority, Muslim, regional, national, tribal

In the mid-1980s, (AGP) emerged as an alternative to the Congress in the state and held a potent sway over the electorate for nearly two decades. However, political stagnation that marked AGP politics led to subsequent revival of the Congress in Assam as the most dominant player. The three successive electoral victories for the Congress since 2001 are a testimony to this. However, the 2014 election marked a withering Congress dominance (Goswami & Tripathi, 2015) and the rise of the (BJP) in Assam. It is significant to note that the 2016 Assembly election in Assam established a cursor as to the BJP’s ability to craft a new social coalition.

1 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, , Guwahati, Assam, . 2 M.A. in Political Science, Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam, India. 3 Former Professor, Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam, India.

Corresponding author: Vikas Tripathi, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, Guwahati, Assam, India. E-mail: [email protected] 2 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

The crafting of a new social coalition based upon the primacy of regional subtext, subsequent to the Lok Sabha elections, by the BJP is an important explanation for its unprecedented performance. Taking cues from its humiliating defeat in the recently held assembly elections to Bihar,4 it crafted a new social coalition as well as an electoral alliance along the ethnic axis in Assam based principally upon the prec- edence of regional subtext.5 Three other factors contributed to the BJP’s performance. First, immediately after the Bihar debacle, the BJP realized the importance of a strong state-level leadership and declared Sarbanand Sonowal as the CM candidate. Second, the BJP could turn this election into a direct contest between the Congress and itself and project the Congress as a party faced with a strong anti-incumbency wave. Finally, the induction of into the BJP facilitated the party’s appropriation of a strong regional space.

Electoral Change: Magnitude and Regional Spread

Assembly Elections of 2016 were held in two phases with 65 seats and 61 seats going to polls in the first and second phase of the election, respectively. While the first phase of election covered largely the constituencies in Upper Assam and the Barak Valley, the second phase elections were held primarily for Lower Assam assembly seats.6 The AGP, the Bodo People’s Front (BPF) and the BJP fought on a common platform of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA); the Congress had a prepoll alliance with the United People’s Party (UPP) in the Bodoland Territorial Autonomous Districts (BTAD) region. The BJP fought on 90 seats and could secure a good 60 seats. In all, the NDA won 86 seats (68% of seats) with around 41 per cent vote share. The BJP-led alliance showed a formidable performance in the first phase with BJP winning 38 seats and its allies winning 10 seats out of the 65 seats. In the second phase, the alliance won 38 seats (BJP—22, allies—16) out of 61 seats. The NDA won 74 per cent seats in the first phase, while it secured 62 per cent seats in the second phase. A phase-wise breakup of the election results indicates that the BJP emerged stronger in Upper Assam and the Barak Valley where it got considerably more seats than its allies. In Lower Assam, the NDA appears to have earned off its alliance partners’ gains wherein the BPF could retain its previously held seats. The BJP gained 55 seats and 18 per cent vote share, while the Congress lost 52 seats and around 8 per cent vote share (Table 1). Nevertheless, the Congress could maintain a 31 per cent vote share. This sug- gests that in the 2016 election, a primary challenge before the Congress had been the conversion of vote share into seat share. For all other parties, other than the BJP and the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), erosion in vote share could be seen. Despite such erosion, the AGP could gain four seats, the BPF could maintain its previous tally of 12 seats, while the AIUDF lost five seats with the vote share

4 It has been argued that the ’s (MG) remarkable victory in the Bihar Assembly election (2015) in part owes to the campaign strategy which it adopted. In keeping with the campaign strategy, MG was quick to decide on seat sharing, unanimously projected as the face of alliance and could present itself as a cohesive entity. The campaign remained embedded in the regional overtone and was fought on the primacy of state politics vis-à-vis the projected centralisng tendency of Union Government. For an analysis of Bihar election, refer Kailash (2016), and Verma and Kumar (2016). 5 The terms ‘electoral alliance and social coalition’ are used as discrete categories in this article. The former deals with the formal alliance among political parties and involves seat distribution among political parties, like the one between AGP, BPF and BJP. Social alliance is a term used in the context of the informal understanding that the BJP reached with the leadership of Rabha Tiwa organizations and other indigenous groups in the state. On social alliance, see Udayan Misra (2016). 6 The classification is based upon distribution of Vidhan Sabha seats in respective Lok Sabha constituencies. Upper Assam includes Lakhimpur, , Jorhat, Tezpur, Nowgong and Kaliabor. Lower Assam includes Mangaldoi, Gauhati, Barpeta, Kokrajhar and Dhubri. Barak Valley includes Silchar, Karimganj and Autonomous Districts. Tripathi et al. 3

Table 1. Performance of Political Parties Assam Assembly Elections (2011 and 2016)

2016 2011 Change from 2011 (Change Vote Share in Vote Share in Political Party Vote Share (in %) Seat Share (in %) Seat Share Parentheses) BJP* 29.5 60 11.47 5 55 (18) AGP 8.1 14 16.29 10 4 (–8.1) BPF 3.9 12 6.13 12 0 (–2.23) Congress** 31 26 39.39 78 –52 (–8.39) AIUDF 13 13 12.57 18 –5 (0.43) Others 14.5 1 14.15 3 –2 (0.35) Source: Election Commission of India. Notes: *BJP, AGP and BPF had a prepoll alliance. **Congress had a prepoll alliance with UPP. being roughly the same as the 2011 election. The Congress lost five seats to the AIUDF and one seat to an independent candidate; the remaining 46 seats were lost to the NDA. The UPP failed to open its account. The erosion in vote share coupled with a gain in seat share for the AGP and a stable performance by the BPF can be attributed to the coalition strategy adopted by the NDA.

Alliances and Understanding

Working a coalition had both ideological and pragmatic considerations pinned to it. For a major part of its political history, Assam had been witness to a national party’s prepotency despite a strong sense of regionalism which marked the contours of its electoral politics. A strong reason for Congress dominance was its politics of accommodation through institutional measures as well as electoral representation which cut across diverse ethnic and linguistic groups.7 Two factors contributed to the Congress’s electoral stability in three consecutive elections since 2001: first, a high vote share of the Congress and second, persisting fragmentation of opposition votes (Special Statistics, 2011). The fragmentation enabled the Congress to convert vote share into seat share repeatedly. Therefore, working a social coalition with regional players turned out to be a major concern for the BJP because it could enhance its legitimacy and acceptability in a region characterized by deep diversity along regional, religious, linguistic and ethnic lines but could also serve to contain the anti-Congress vote split. While the BJP has more vote share and seat share than the AGP in all Lok Sabha elections since 1998, the AGP had more vote share and seat share in all the assembly elections since 2001. Both the BJP and the AGP had forged alliances for the 2001 Assembly polls and the 2009 Lok Sabha polls, but transfer of votes to either side failed to materialize on both occasions. This led to electoral stagnation for both the BJP and the AGP and concurrently the continued dominance of the Congress. In 2009, however, the BJP secured four seats, out of which three seats were won in Lower Assam and the Barak Valley and one seat in Upper Assam. A comparison of the 2014 Lok Sabha election results with the 2009 Lok Sabha and the

7 Institutional accommodation could be made through creation of six Autonomous Councils. Sarmah (2014) describes the emergence of six Autonomous Councils in Assam. In 1995, three Autonomous Councils were created for Rabhas, Misings and Tiwas by the Assam Government as an assurance for the protection and promotion of their cultural identities. In 2005, three more communities, namely, Deori, Sonowal Kachari and Thengal Kachari, were awarded Autonomous Councils. 4 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

2011 Assembly election results clearly suggests a political shift as the BJP’s rise in Upper Assam could be comprehended at the cost of the AGP and the Congress. In a more profound sense, it indicated a changing social base of the BJP and its unprecedented expansion in the largely Assamese-speaking Upper Assam region of the state. The BJP has traditionally remained strong, even if to a limited extent, in the Barak Valley and Lower Assam regions. The regional transcendence of the BJP witnessed in 2014 can be dubbed as a precursor to the BJP’s rise in the state as it upset the electoral balance previously tilted towards the Congress across regions in Assam (Goswami & Tripathi, 2015). The BJP suffered a humiliating defeat in and Bihar as a result of the consolidation of political opposition in both the states. The coalition thus emerged as a key card for the BJP in Assam, while both the Congress and the AIUDF refrained from forging an alliance and the BPF had broken its alliance with the Congress subsequent to the 2014 elections. The Congress considered a prepoll Congress– AIUDF alliance might intensify polarization along religious lines and may disadvantage the Congress particularly in Upper Assam. On the contrary, the BJP’s alliance formulation worked to its advantage in two ways. Firstly, the Congress–AIUDF competition caused dispersion of opposition votes in Lower Assam and the Barak Valley, and consequently, the BJP could wrest a considerable number of seats from the Congress in these two regions. Despite the AIUDF maintaining roughly the same vote share as in the previous assembly elections, the swapping of seats between the Congress and the AIUDF explains how the AIUDF suffered erosion of seat share as its social base fragmented. Secondly, in Upper Assam, the NDA alliance worked formidably well primarily because the AIUDF has no evidential social base in Upper Assam and the Congress had lost a substantial part of its social base during the 2014 Lok Sabha election. An alliance with the AGP in Upper Assam prevented the dispersion of anti-Congress votes and added to the NDA’s gains. Additionally, the BJP could forge a social alliance with the plains tribes of Assam stretching from Lower Assam (Bodos and Rabhas) to Upper Assam (Tiwas, Kacharis and Mishings). It could take the plains tribes’ leadership into confidence to forge a kind of informal social alliance (Misra, 2016). The NDA won 75 per cent of seats in Upper Assam and 64 per cent and 60 per cent of seats in Lower Assam and the Barak Valley, respectively.

Consolidation of Tribal Votes and Social Polarization

The NDA’s performance in the seats reserved for the Scheduled Tribes (ST) has been the most phenom- enal. It won 14 out of the 16 seats reserved for the STs. The BJP itself could win eight seats, while its alliance partner BPF won six seats. Only one seat went to the Congress and one seat was won by an independent candidate. The regional spread of the NDA’s performance on these seats remains significant as the NDA could win substantially across regions on reserved ST seats in Assam. The BJP’s victory in the Barak Valley is noteworthy; it won four out of five seats from Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills region (Haflong, Howraghat, Diphu and Bokajan). Traditionally, these seats were held by the Congress. Even during 2014 Lok Sabha elections, three out of five assembly segments were retained by the Congress in this region. The BJP taking over almost all the ST seats across regions in Assam is certainly a disturbing result for the Congress.8 It reflects, in a clearer sense, the shift of social base towards the BJP

8 Distribution of ST seats across regions in Assam is as following: Upper Assam includes , Dhakuakhana, , Jonai. Lower Assam includes Kokrajhar West, Kokrajhar East, Sidli, Barma, Chapaguri, Udalguri and Dudhnai. Barak Valley includes Haflong, Bokajan, Howraghat, Diphu and Baithalangso. Tripathi et al. 5 and away from the Congress. A performance analysis of political parties on ST seats across regions shows how the Congress had maintained these seats as its traditional social base since 2001. Previously, the BJP had never won a single reserved ST seat in Assam. In terms of both language and ethnicity, heterogeneity among the ST population in Assam is substan- tial. As per the 2001 census, the ST population constitutes 12.4 per cent of the total population of Assam. In all, there are 23 notified tribes which can be broadly categorized into two groups, namely, plains tribe and hills tribe. Of these 23 notified tribes, 14 are enumerated as hills tribe and 9 as plains tribe (Census of India, 2001). The hills tribes are predominantly settled in Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills. The nine plains’ tribes are settled along a belt running through western Assam up to the tip of Upper Assam. Electoral consolidation of distinct tribal groups towards the BJP-led alliance must be placed in the context of 2014 Lok Sabha election results. It was in 2014 that the BJP could make significant break- through across the tribal belts in Assam. The subsequent assembly elections in 2016 continued to show this trend. One of the plausible reasons might be the ethnic groups’ quest for larger folds as protectorates which perceives the BJP government at the Centre in an upbeat mode. In part, this has to do with the BJP’s support for the granting of ST status to six communities including a few tea tribes in the run-off to the 2014 Lok Sabha campaign in Assam.9 As the BJP came to power, an announcement was made in 2015 by the Union Minister for Tribal Affairs, Joel Oram, in this regard (The Assam Tribune, 2015b). This could have probably affected the political shift of the Adivasi votes. There are around 30 seats in the Upper Assam region of Dibrugarh, Jorhat, Tezpur and Lakhimpur10 where Adivasi11 votes play a determinative role. They form about 21 per cent of the state’s population including both tea garden and former tea garden workers. Traditionally, these communities have constituted a ‘vote bank’ for the Congress and have played a decisive role in the victories of the Congress candidates in Upper Assam in successive elections. In recent years, however, the BJP had started supporting tea tribe outfits to consolidate its presence in the tea belt. Also, the All Adivasi Students Association of Assam accused the Congress of overlooking Adivasi interests and declared its support for the BJP during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections (Chakravarty, 2016). The Congress’s failure to ensure ST status for the Adivasis in Assam became a major factor for the latter to rally behind the BJP during the 2014 Lok Sabha elections and subsequently during the 2016 Assembly elections. One major advantage that the NDA had in Upper Assam was that an alliance or understanding between the Congress and the Ganashakti Party could not materialize as both parties failed to reach a consensus over seat sharing (The Assam Tribune, 2016e). The shift of Adivasi votes towards the BJP coupled with a conjectured understanding between the Ganashakti Party and the BJP gave the NDA12 a decisive advantage in Upper Assam (The Assam Tribune, 2016e).

9 Previously, the Government of Assam has recommended ST status for the Koch–Rajbongshi, Tai Ahom, Moran, Mattak and tea tribe communities. 10 Goswami (2004) mentions that traditionally, Dibrugarh, Jorhat, Tezpur, Nagaon and Lakhimpur constitute the tea belt area of Assam. A total of 2,265 out of 2,472 tea estates are located in this belt, as per tea statistics of 1997–1998. 11 Adivasis in Assam are also known as ‘tea community’ or ‘tea tribe community’. It is a composite group that consists of those whose ancestors migrated as tea garden workers from central and eastern India during the period of the British rule. For a long time, these migrant workers did not have much interaction with the world outside the plantations, as they were deliberately kept insulated by the plantation management. Due to the absence of communication facilities in the early years, the workers gradually lost contact with their native places, thus becoming permanent residents of the state. Presently, the Adivasis are included in the OBC group and they have been raising the demand for being recognized as an ST group in the state. 12 Understanding was apparent as Ganashakti did not field any candidate against in 2014 Lok Sabha elections and asked people to cast ‘conscience vote’. 6 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1)

As far as the political shift since 2014 elections is concerned, the BTAD region in Assam marks an exception to the continuity.13 It is worth noting that there has been limited resolution regarding the structural issues confronting the indigenous groups of Assam, either it be land encroachment by illegal migrants or solution to the foreigners’ issue. Mahanta (2013) argues that illegal immigration represents one of the most baffling factors of a protracted conflict in Assam which has led to land encroachment of the tribal belts and blocks in the plains tribal areas of Assam. The 2012 Bodoland conflict further polar- ized the indigenes in relation to immigrant Muslims. The Bodos,14 the non-Bodos like the Assamese- speaking people, the Rabhas, the Koch-Rajbanshis and the Adivasis who were up till then fighting each other tactically rounded up against the Muslim immigrants.15 The 2012 violence widened the rift between the Muslims and the tribal population in western Assam. During the 2014 Lok Sabha election, the Kokrajhar Lok Sabha constituency remained insulated from the saffron surge and the election was fought on the plank of local issues, particularly on the issue of domi- nance unleashed by the BPF since the inception of the BTAD. Former ULFA leader Naba Kumar Sarania (belonging to Sarania Kachari community), supported by significant non-Bodo organizations, like Sanmilita Janagostiya Aikkya Mancha (SJA), Obodo Suraksha Samiti (OSS), All Bodo Muslim Student’s Union and All Assam Minority Student’s Union, won the Lok Sabha election by a margin of over 3.5 lakh votes. The Lok Sabha election witnessed a unified consolidation of opposition against the BPF rule and prominent non-Bodo ethnic and linguistic groups in the region supported the independent candidate. The Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) election held in 2015 preserved the trend explicating the break- down of monolithic Bodo politics owing to a perceivable unified opposition at the local level (Goswami & Tripathi, 2015). The BPF won 20 seats and constituted the council for the third consecutive term, the political dominance it enjoyed was challenged, as the People’s Coordination for Democratic Rights (PCDR) won seven seats and the AIUDF, which fought the BTC election for the first time, won four seats. The entry of the AIUDF in the BTAD resulted in ethnic polarization and the BJP opened its maiden account in the region winning a single seat. It became a beneficiary of the polarization which is apparent from the 13 per cent vote share it secured which is more than the AIUDF and the Congress put together. In terms of vote share, the BPF got 28 per cent, the BJP got 13 per cent, the AIUDF got 4 per cent, the Congress got 6 per cent and the independents got 47 per cent votes, respectively (Siddiqui, 2015). The BPF had snapped its ties with the Congress immediately after the 2014 debacle. A modest perfor- mance by the BPF concomitant with the rising opposition at the local level since 2014 drew the BPF closer to the BJP in order to fragment the non-Bodo votes during the assembly elections. There has been a growing sense of marginalization among various factions of the Bodo leadership and among other tribes which has contributed to the polarization of the indigenes in relation to immigrant Muslims. A recent study suggests that the population share of the STs has witnessed a slim decline in western Assam pointing at an increase of non-ST population in the region (Motiram & Sarma, 2014). Also, the population share of the Muslims is higher than that of the STs and seems to be stable or marginally rising in the region. Further, it has been pointed out that while the share of Bengali speakers has increased in the region (as is evident from the 1991–2001 census), the percentage of Bodo speakers has declined during the same period (Motiram & Sarma, 2014). Sensing political marginalization, the BPF formally

13 BTAD region includes four districts of Lower Assam, Kokrajhar, Chirang, Baksa and Udalguri. 14 Bodos are numerically the most dominant tribal group and constitute around 40 per cent of the total ST population in Assam. They have a significant presence in Baksa, Udalguri, Kokrajhar, Chirang, Goalpara, Darrang and Sonitpur. 15 Dutta (2014) too argues that 2012 violence in BTAD had profound impact over Adivasis and other non-Bodo non-Muslim communities and the BJP remained ‘successful in projecting violence in 2012 as a symbol and symptom of attack on indigenous communities by illegal Muslim Bangladeshis’. Tripathi et al. 7 sealed an alliance with the BJP. To this end, two conditions were put before the BJP: first, a financial package of `1,000 crore to the BTAD over the next three years, and second, granting ST status to Bodos living in Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao districts (The Assam Tribune, 2016a). To forge a Bodo consoli- dation in western Assam, the BPF and the Bodoland People’s Progressive Front (BPPF) announced their merger (The Assam Tribune, 2016b). The alliance turned out to be a master move for the BPF. It could retain its dominance in 12 seats by the twin strategies of withholding the dispersion of Bodo votes through the BPF–BPPF merger and fragmenting the non-Bodo votes. Partly, the consolidation is also due to the fact that the BJP hailed it as an alliance meant to check infiltration in the state (The Assam Tribune, 2016c). A steady AIUDF, particularly in Lower Assam, and a withering Congress, contributed to the tribal consolidation in favour of the NDA as the BJP could broadcast the notion ‘that the Congress and the AIUDF had a secret understanding to jointly form the next government’ (The Assam Tribune, 2016d). Although ruled out all possibilities of alliance with the AIUDF, he had proposed a Mahabujabuji (grand understanding) among all the non-BJP parties, including the AGP, the AIUDF and its former ally—the BPF after the Bihar results, which observably recoiled (Deka, 2016). This contributed, in a major way, to the shift of tribal votes in favour of the NDA without a known previous precedent. The alliance with the BPF had an impact over Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao districts as well.16 Subsequent to the forging of the BJP–BPF alliance, the Prime Minister announced support for ST status to Karbis living in the plains and Bodos living in the two hill districts of Assam (Kashyap, 2016). While the announcement of ST status for Bodos living in the hill districts remained one of the preconditions for BJP–BPF–AGP alliance, the same annunciation for Karbis living in the plains posited a well-marked strategy to craft a social coalition with the Karbi leadership in the hill districts (The Times of India, 2016).

National Narrative and Regional Subtext

Any understanding in regard to the rise of the BJP in Assam cannot remain oblivious of the contribution of various social and cultural wings of the in furthering the agenda of Hindutva. Bhattacharjee (2016) argues, ‘moving away from its standard techniques of mobilizing support through the invocation of Hindu stereotypes like “Ram” or “Ayodhya,” it instead focuses on adapting local cults and symbols such as those associate with Kamakhya and Sankardev-Sattra traditions’. Apart from this, it could consolidate its presence by involving itself in various welfare services like health, education and cultural development. The emergence of the BJP in Assam, a state which has preserved a unique fusion of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups, necessitates an understanding of the convergence as well as divergence marking and regionalism in the state. It is instructive to note that the fact of Hindu nationalism in Assam has not followed the same trajectory as in the rest of the states in India. Barring perhaps the state of ,17 the northeastern states’ including Assam’s brush with Hindu nationalism, a core dimension of BJP politics, has been spasmodic at best. The BJP realized, mostly from its Bihar trouncing that customary politics covering its usually demarcated agendas would not be of much import in Assam. Thus, the content of BJP’s campaigning strategy in Assam had to be realigned specifically to situate itself on a regional orbit. Basu (2002) argues that political parties cannot

16 There are four seats in Karbi Anglong and one in Dima Hasao districts. Both the districts are administered under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution. 17 Kanungo (2011) writes that the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh represents a deviation when it comes to the northeastern states’ brush with Hindutva. Hinduisation occurred largely in the postcolonial period and Arunachal Pradesh gradually turned into a foothold of Hindutva in the northeast region of India. 8 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1) transform or reinvent themselves at will, given the necessity to abide by prior commitments and ideals of party formation. Hence, strategy changes are likely to be cyclical rather than an overhaul. The BJP engages in such cyclical maneuvers in quite a refined manner. It is simultaneously a moderate party extolling the virtues of secularism, democratic credentials, economic liberalization inter alia and an aggressive party in pursuit of the Hindu nationalist agenda (Basu, 2002). In case of Assam, the BJP demonstrated its ability for flexibility aimed totally at electoral gains whereby it cast off its usual hawkish rhetoric. A notable deviation from earlier assertion on tribal politics could be seen, which until recently used to be an averment of a unique tribal identity of diverse ethnic and linguistic groups. In the run-off to the assembly elections, BJP party president, , reminded the people of ’s promise before the 2014 Lok Sabha election which was to deport all illegal Bangladeshi migrants if elected to power (The Tribune, 2016). The party’s orbital change could be perceived when indigeneity was made the core issue of political mobilization. As argued previously, the discourse of indigeneity which ran through the campaign polarized the indigenes vis-a-vis immigrant Muslims. As such, what came to be articulated as the most important issue of the BJP’s campaign is the protection of the identity of the indigenous people. Sarbananda Sonowal claimed, ‘the issue is to protect the identity of the indigenous and all Indian communities of Assam from the Bangladeshi onslaught’ (The Indian Express, 2016a). On a similar vein, Himanta Biswa Sarma noted, ‘the BJP’s aim in Assam was to protect this unique cultural identity from the massive demographic change that has come about because of Bangladeshi migrants’ (Joshi, 2016). Politics of indigeneity and consequent polarization triggered the emergence of religious identity as the major determinant of electoral choice. The greater salience of religion as compared to language and ethnicity had a casting impact over electoral mobiliza- tion and electoral choice. As per the Lokniti’s analysis of post-poll survey data, ‘Hindus consolidate behind one party much more than Muslims, they also seem to have outdone them in voter turnout’ (The Indian Express, 2016c). It further points out that a greater proportion of Hindus (86%) may have turned out than Muslims (82%). Hindu consolidation advantaged the NDA owing to the split of Muslim votes between the Congress and the AIUDF. Having made significant breakthrough across regions, a major challenge before the BJP was the consolidation of the social base that had shifted towards the party after 2014. It could realize that the Lok Sabha election was exceptional in making development an issue and projecting Modi as a strong and decisive leader which could sync with the electorate in general (Palshikar & Suri, 2014). The BJP’s electoral support extended across different states and social segments and Assam kept true to this norm. The BJP got seven seats with 36 per cent vote share and secured 69 Assembly segments on its own which hinted at the possibility of a mandate transcending ethnic and linguistic barriers. Two years after the formation of the Modi government, repeating a similar moment of ‘ethnic and linguistic transcendence’ required a master narrative that could project the decisiveness and strength of the central government as well as establish the primacy of regional subtext. In the period after the 2014 Lok Sabha election, the BJP employed a threefold strategy to retain the social base it had secured in that election. First, the BJP involved itself unprecedentedly in local politics to upset the local dominance enjoyed by the Congress. The BJP made entry into the Autonomous Councils as well as the Sixth Schedule Councils which enabled it to reach out to the tribal communities and forge social alliances with the tribal leaderships. It contested in the Urban Local Bodies election with a voltaic campaign and established its dominance over 39 out of the 74 Municipal Boards and Committees in Assam (The Assam Tribune, 2015a). The BJP could open its account in the BTAD and subsequently forge a prepoll alliance with the BPF. It reduced the Congress to a minority in the North Cachar Hills Autonomous Councils (The Assam Tribune, 2015c). Both BTAD and North Cachar Hills Autonomous Councils are covered under the Sixth Schedule jurisdiction. BJP also extended Tripathi et al. 9 support to the Tiwa Okiya Manch to constitute the under the leadership of Ramakant Deuri (Sarma, 2015). Secondly, the BJP realized early on that in Assam, a narrative to ostensibly facilitate the strong convergence of the national and the regional is necessitated. Misra (2016) points out, ‘during the entire election campaign the central BJP leadership skillfully avoided highlighting the Hindutva agenda plank of religious polarization and encouraged the BJP leadership to focus almost entirely on regional issues’. This could become probable with the induction of Himanta Biswa Sarma as the convener of the campaign committee and declaration of Sarbananda Sonowal as the Chief Ministerial candidate. Probably, it aimed at crafting a social coalition of caste Hindu Assamese and the tribal population in the state. Notably, Sonowal belongs to the Sonowal Kachari tribal community in Assam. Both Sarma and Sonowal come from a backdrop of the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU). The issue of infiltration and protection of the rights of the indigenous communities have profoundly shaped Sonowal’s political career. Sonowal had been an AGP MP prior to shifting to the BJP in 2011. It was his writ petition that led the Supreme Court, in July 2005, to strike down the Illegal Immigration (Determination by Tribunals) Act, or the IMDT Act of 1983 as the court declared the Act ultra vires to the Constitution of India. Thirdly, the party went on to render a localized portraiture of Hinduization in the region as remarked by Christophe Jaffrelot (2016), ‘the party has adjusted to the local variant of Hindu culture. This vernacularization process resulted in the promotion of an Assamese icon, the 15th16th century Hindu saint and scholar, Sankardev’. Notably, the movement wing of the BJP, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) had previous precedents in Assam which came into play albeit succinctly. The RSS’s inroad into Assam has been facilitated through resident personages which can be seen in the appropriation of Sankardev as Hinduism’s prized insignia in the state. This malformed explication of Sankardev’s role as an agent of Hinduism belies the estimable syncretism of the neo-Vaishnavite movement, Eksaraniya Nama Dharma (Bhattacharjee, 2016). In January, Modi attended the 85th conference of the Srimanta Sankar Sangha in . In March, he visited Majuli, the epicentre of Assamese Vaishnavite culture with over 30 satras. Satras constitute the core of Assamese history and culture. In this election, the BJP could make the issue of Assamese identity a major plank by its adroit campaigning against the encroachment of the satras by alleged immigrants. Himanta Biswa Sarma in one of his campaigns stated publicly, ‘things have come to such a pass that no one can think of winning Batadrava, Sankardev’s birthplace, without blessings of the AIUDF chief ’ (The Indian Express, 2016b). The BJP, however, won the Batadrava constituency, which had been alternately held by the Congress and the AIUDF since 2001.

Conclusion

Religious ardour is deeply entwined with ethnic élan when it comes to Assam and the northeast. Consequently, Hindutva activism had to adopt singular strategies aimed at the intricate particularities of the region. In doing so, it has moved away from its mainstream planks of Ayodhya, cow protection or the propagation of Hindi and Sanskrit languages and has acquired a regional facet through its arrogation of local sects and symbols. In the 2016 elections, the BJP opted for a downplayed version of communal rhetoric and concentrated mainly on regional issues and localized symbols. This worked well for the party as issues of illegal immigration, education, good governance, economic and cultural development resonated with the electorate. To this end, the cultural wing of the party too has been instrumental in assisting the growth and consolidation of the BJP in Assam. The BJP forged social alliances that remained contingent upon three major considerations: the primacy of regional subtext in the election, a strategic 10 Studies in Indian Politics 6(1) consensus over strong state-level leadership and more significantly, an exerted attempt at making it a Congress versus BJP showdown. The threefold strategy, in a way, was dependent upon these aforemen- tioned conditions. In turn, the BJP could also build a successful communicative, punctuating indigeneity and the protection of cultural identity as the core issues in Assam.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of anonymous reviewers and Suhas Palshikar for their comments and suggestions on the article.

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