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No. 208 Strategic Forum June 2004 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Turbulent Transition in Iraq: Can It Succeed? by Judith S. Yaphe
One year after liberation, most Iraqis are regime. The confrontations that have Key Points impatient with the military occupation of their occurred—in Baghdad, Kufah, Fallujah, and s the Interim Government of Iraq country. Although grateful for the removal of Najaf, for example—reflect carefully planned begins to assert authority, diverse Saddam Hussein’s cruel and repressive regime, and coordinated attacks on U.S. forces and Acommunities within the country are many assumed the United States and its coali- civilians working on reconstruction. struggling to protect their equities. Critical tion members would soon go home and leave What is important is the absence of dis- issues include Kurdish desires for federalism them to sort out their political, economic, and course on several topics. Little is heard about and a veto on the constitution; Shi’a resist- military fate. The war, after all, had been the rounds of negotiations between extremist ance to separatism and minority veto rights; fought to liberate Iraqis from political tyranny, Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and representa- religious demands that Islam be recognized not to defeat the Iraqi people. Both U.S. and tives of the ayatollahs of Najaf, including Grand as the exclusive source of legislation; and Iraqi expectations were high that the transition Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his son, yet it is increasing combativeness of Arab Sunnis, from oppression to democracy would be clearly in the interest of the Shi’a clerical hier- facing marginalization after the fall of a smooth and quick and that Iraqi political elites archy to resolve this crisis. Little is heard, as regime they long dominated. would move swiftly to ensure democratic rule. well, about negotiations in Fallujah, yet the Iraqis will grow increasingly fractious as Despite the formation of the Interim emergence of a respected Republican Guard they jockey for political space. However, the Government of Iraq on June 1, 2004, many general and tribal leaders may have opened the risk of civil war between Arabs and Kurds or Iraqis and their neighbors remain skeptical way to broader conflict resolution in that between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims is low. that the United States will give up its control or volatile municipality. And no cleric has yet While fissures are deep, all parties appear to not try to retain control through appointed issued a decree (fatwa) sanctioning rebellion understand that division is not an option and puppets. Success as measured by quick victory against the foreign occupier. Despite the mur- more can be gained through participation and and regime change has been accomplished; ders of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition negotiation. Two developments could raise the success as measured by rapid reconstruction of Provisional Authority (including a president risk of domestic strife: if Sunni and Shi’a the Iraqi polity and economy has not been and two ministers on the Iraqi Governing extremists succeed in undermining the new achieved and may be in peril. Council, clerics in the Sunni and Shi’a com- government, and if the Kurds, who waver in munities, and officials of both Kurdish factions their commitment to join the government, push Three Dramas in northern Iraq), civil war—meaning between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, or between Sunni and for greater autonomy and control of Kirkuk. During this turbulent transitional period, Iraqi government efforts to deal with the Shi’a—has not erupted and is not likely to. success will hinge upon the outcome of three Civil war, if it happens, is more likely to United States as a partner rather than a client distinct “dramas.” will bolster its credibility in the eyes of many occur between religious extremists (Sunni and Civil War. The first drama is the specter of Shi’a) and everyone else than between Sunni Iraqis. These efforts will not, however, lessen civil war, which has not happened. Anti-Ameri- terrorist or insurgent attacks. and Shi’a or Arab and Kurd. Iraq is an amal- can violence has increased, as have insurgent gam of Shi’a Arab (approximately 60 percent), Iraqis will remain suspicious that the efforts to spark civil war between ethnic and new government will not be fully sovereign. Sunni Arab (20 percent), and Kurd (Sunni and sectarian elements. Even so, Iraq is not in a Shi’a, approximately 20 percent), but it cannot Success will depend on American officials state of civil war, nor has there been any seri- resisting the temptation to promote Iraqi be simply defined and divided mathematically. ous outbreak of sectarian or ethnic warfare— Generally, Sunni and Shi’a Arabs share an foreign and domestic policies that support yet. Sunni are not fighting Shi’a, and Arabs are U.S. regional goals but could endanger the assumption of Iraqi nationalism and an inten- not at war with Kurds. Nor are Iraqi Shi’a tion to maintain the political and territorial prospects for survival of the new government. wedded to an Iranian-style cleric-dominated
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integrity of the country as defined by the 1920 third drama. The interim government that took Others argue that Iraq cannot be ruled demo- San Remo treaty and the 1932 treaty of inde- over from the Governing Council lacks legiti- cratically or that it is better off being divided pendence. Iraqi Kurds have committed them- macy, and the nature of political institutions into three weak states to ensure protection for selves for the moment to being part of Iraq, but and a permanent constitution have yet to take ethnic and religious groups and remove their their reluctance to accept permanent status in shape. These issues will not be resolved soon, ability to threaten any one but themselves in the Iraq is certainly linked directly to future consti- nor should anyone expect them to be. Political future. They are certainly wrong. tutional and perhaps territorial concessions. institutions and constitutions do not automati- The new government, led by President Transitional Governance.The second cally confer legitimacy, establish the rule of law, Ghazi al-Yawar, Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, drama concerns the fate of transitional gover- create checks and balances in government, and and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, seeks a nance. Squabbling over the nature of the guarantee equal rights and protections for all. transparent and unambiguous transfer of interim government that assumed power on Parliaments are buildings, and constitutions are authority that gives them power over political, June 1, how it was chosen, and who would written on paper. It takes time and trust to create economic, financial, and security policy with- serve in the various cabinet posts exacerbated a free people and an open society. out actual responsibility for security, which relations between the Coalition Provisional In 1920, the British created institutions of they prefer remain in U.S. hands. A small but Authority (CPA) and Iraqis. Both sides had government (parliament) for Iraq, imported a increasingly vociferous number of Iraqis de- unrealistic expectations of what was possible. foreign Arab and installed him by a plebiscite mand removal of all vestiges of U.S. presence, From outward appearances, the Governing of hand-picked natural leaders known to favor from civilian advisers aiding the transition to Council (GC) preempted United Nations pro-British rule, and selected a rainbow coali- military forces assigned to provide security and (UN)–U.S. efforts to select the new interim tion drawn from all the communities of Iraq. fight the insurgents and terrorists. government, which it intended to announce on This government lacked the power and author- Who is right? How does an occupier- June 1, by choosing a new president (a promi- ity to rule Iraq. Not only did the British rule liberator know when enough is enough? How nent shaykh of the million-member Shammar indirectly and closely through political com- do you measure success or acknowledge fail- tribal federation from northern Iraq), two missioners and officers chosen in Whitehall, ure? Any attempt to answer these questions deputy presidents (a Kurd and a Shi’a Arab), but they also wrote the constitution and the requires an assessment of what the new govern- and a prime minister (the head of the Iraq treaties the Iraqis had to sign to gain independ- ment needs to do to survive as a stable and National Accord party, Iyad Allawi, who is a ence. Even after the League of Nations recog- effective element of the country’s new politics secular Shi’a and former Ba’thist who had nized an independent Iraq in 1932, the British and what can be achieved by it, by other Iraqi lived in exile for the past 25 years) a week retained control over security and military leaders, and by the United States. earlier. The new cabinet contains a mix of decisionmaking until the 1958 revolution. former GC members and newly appointed Under the British, Iraqis gained, at best, only Past as Prologue? technocrats, divided among the country’s second-hand experience in democratic institu- diverse groups and including six women. A tions and practices. The United States is in The U.S. Government has been accused of commission to prepare the country for national danger of repeating the errors of the British if it many deficiencies in planning for a post- elections was also named, and a nationwide does not pass real, transparent decisionmaking Saddam Iraq. Accusations range from having assembly is being planned for July to advise the power to the Iraqis. no plan to having the wrong plan—planning interim government and plan for Iraq’s politi- for humanitarian, refugee, and health crises cal future. The elections, when held, will not Where Are We Now? that did not happen—to having hidden agen- ensure perfect democratic governance or a pro- das to retain control of Iraqi wealth. While American government. They should, however, Despite the unanimous passage on June 8 these accusations carry the hallmarks of con- reflect the consensus of the Iraqi people. of the UN resolution recognizing the new in- spiracy theories, one issue stands out. Washing- Municipal elections have occurred in terim government and approving the timeline ton did not adequately consider the impact of many areas, and it is probably at this level that for elections, foreign observers and many Iraqis many of the measures it imposed on Iraq since the greatest progress in democratic rule has probably continue to doubt that the transition of the fall of Saddam Hussein. occurred. Democracy represents two values: political authority from the U.S.-dominated CPA The first American administrator for hu- majority rule and protection of the rights of to Iraqis will occur without the simultaneous manitarian aid and reconstruction, Jay Garner, transition to democracy or Iraqi control of had served in Iraq in 1991 following the abortive minorities. It took Britain nearly 900 years and 1 a civil war to evolve into a truly representative security policy. They suspect that the United Kurdish rebellion in the north. He and his staff government; it has taken the United States States passed power to a group of self-promoting assumed they would face similar crises in 2003: more than 225 years and a civil war to achieve Iraqis who are unelected and do not represent internally displaced people, refugee flows, and a its current state of democracy. How can the the wishes of the people, that Washington will desperate need for housing, food, water, and Iraqis be expected to achieve this in 1 year? retain control of the real centers of decisionmak- health care. He also assumed he would take over Political Institution Building. Longer- ing, and that the exercise will be an opaque one ministries and civil servants in place and, with term political institution building in Iraq is the at best. Only time will tell if they are right. only a few American advisers and contractors, would be able to get government up and run- ning quickly. He had no detailed plans for Judith S. Yaphe is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense widespread de-Ba’thification—removal of University. Please address questions or comments to her attention at [email protected].
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anyone who was a party member down to the Both measures sent a clear signal—in as the Basic Law or interim constitution. The third level of responsibility in the party hierar- particular to Sunni Arabs who out of fear and document, written by Iraqis according to Bre- chy—of the civil service or public sector workers loyalty had been Saddam’s pillar of strength. mer, resonates with protections for individual or for the mass demobilization of the Iraqi The Arab Sunni tribes of the so-called triangle rights and civil liberties as contained in Western military forces. Plans in early 2003 for the Iraqi or center—an area bounded by Mosul, Fallu- constitutions. It describes the Iraqi government armed forces were based on downsizing, jah, Tikrit, and Baqubah and including Bagh- as republican, federal, democratic, and pluralis- depoliticizing, and professionalizing. Garner dad—provided most of the recruits and per- tic. Key sections deal with federal versus state’s understood that a large number of suddenly sonnel for the officer corps of the army, rights, Islam as a component rather than the unemployed Iraqis from the military or the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, sole source of legislation, and the structure and bureaucracy could not be dumped on an econ- and other security and intelligence units. They nature of governance. omy already suffering dislocation and high filled the upper ranks of the Ba’th Party and Some Iraqi constituencies have objected to unemployment. Garner had not included the elite group of advisers around Saddam. parts of the law. Shi’a leaders oppose allowing looting, sabotage, and a disappeared civil Bremer’s edicts targeted these Sunni Arab a majority of voters in three governates the bureaucracy among his most pressing post- elites in particular, creating the image of a power to veto a new constitution or legislation conflict concerns. beleaguered and disenfranchised community passed by the majority. Kurds are dissatisfied Unintended Impact of De-Ba’thifica- that had lost its place in Iraqi society, politics, with the geographic basis of federalism and tion. One month after replacing Garner in mistrust the willingness of any Arab-dominated April 2003, new CPA administrator Paul Bre- the far greater number of government to share revenues or political mer implemented several significant policies. Ba’th party members, offices fairly with them. Kurds, Christians, and He first ordered removal of all Ba’th Party secular Arabs object to recognizing Iraq as Arab members from public posts. In September, perhaps 80 to 90 percent, or Muslim. Islamists prefer an avowedly controversial former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chal- had joined out of fear, Islamic government with shariah (religious abi, then serving as president of the Governing pressure, and promises law) as the foundation of all law. While little Council for the month, ordered a much mention is made in Iraq about complying with broader de-Ba’thification: he wanted to extend of better jobs all UN resolutions, at some point this, too, will the purge to the fourth level of the party and probably become a symbol of unfairness and deny local and regional commanders and CPA economics, and governance. The oppressors oppression intended to keep Iraq weak. officials the right to grant exemptions to the would now become the oppressed. In this de-Ba’thification edict. light, the willingness of disgruntled military What Do Iraqis Want? The second Bremer decree closed the officers to join with Saddam loyalists, former Ministry of Defense and demobilized— Ba’thists, and Sunni religious extremists While Iraqi unhappiness with the occupa- fired—all the members of the military and becomes more explicable. tion in general and the Transitional Administra- security forces, including the regular army Transitional Administrative Law as tive Law in particular is easy to chronicle, the and the Republican Guard, and security and Roadmap. In the leadup to the June 30 harder task is to discern what exactly Iraqis intelligence units, including the Special Re- turnover of power, Bremer took several meas- want. The answer varies among the country’s publican Guard, the Saddam fedayeen, and ures to ensure that the interim government different sectarian and ethnic communities. the special militias that served as regime would steer a moderate course. He appointed Iraqi communities have cooperated in the past, bodyguards and secret police. advisers to ministries with multiyear terms that intermarried, and lived together for hundreds of The impact of these actions cannot be go far beyond the life of the CPA and the in- years. Many families, tribes, and clans—includ- easily measured. As many as 50,000 party terim government, and he oversaw the compo- ing that of Saddam Hussein and the Shammar members lost their jobs in civil service, educa- sition of a draft provisional basic law. Dracon- of President al-Yawar—have Sunni and Shi’a tion (kindergarten through university), public ian measures to improve security and to end members. Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, health, and the media. Probably only a small the insurgencies that flared in spring 2004 were Turkmen, and Christians live intermingled in percentage were earnest loyalists prepared to implemented. Bremer and the U.S. military many cities and towns, including Baghdad, implement regime edicts and party ideology. commanders also pursued a more cautious Tikrit, Mosul, and Kirkuk. The Arab communi- The far greater number of Ba’th party members, strategy to resolve confrontations with some ties include secular and religious elements that perhaps 80 to 90 percent, had joined out of fear, insurgent elements. In both Fallujah and are both tribal and urban. Iraqi Kurdish and pressure, and promises of better jobs, higher Najaf, the CPA dealt with unelected and influ- Christian communities, however, are avowedly salaries, and personal security. Party member- ential Iraqi power brokers—especially clerics secular and worry about domination by a new ship was required for teachers and any govern- loyal to the relatively moderate Grand Ayatol- Islamist and Arab political constellation. ment bureaucrat, professional, or technical lah Ali Sistani, who heads one of the largest What Are Shi’a Aspirations? The Shi’a are specialist aspiring to a better job and higher endowments in the Shi’a world and is based in not one monolithic community sharing a status. Approximately 450,000 military and the shrine city of Najaf. common vision of the political future. They are security personnel were relieved of their posi- The clearest indicator of the U.S. vision for multiple communities with multiple goals and tions without salaries or other compensation.2 the new Iraq has been set forth in the Transi- conflicting visions of a new Iraq. The majority, tional Administrative Law (TAL), also referred to including Grand Ayatollah Sistani, tend to reject
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the Iranian model of the Islamic republic and and rewarded by Saddam in the 1980s. Shi’a Iraq, however, has several Shi’a extremist Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of vilayat-i faqih conscripts, the majority of the Iraqi army, factions that would like to emulate Iran. They (rule by clerics). An outspoken minority, how- returning from Kuwait in February 1991 saw share a vision of a republic governed by Islam ever, are pressing for Islamic rule. opportunity in the absence of government as the sole source of all law and have little Most of the Iraqi Shi’a community did not forces and, with perceived encouragement from tolerance for Western values or practices, in- convert to Shi’a Islam until the late 18th cen- the United States, staged a revolt. The revolt cluding the emancipation of women. The most tury. These tribes over the centuries had ac- was uncoordinated, Iran failed to back it suffi- prominent is the Supreme Council for the quired the characteristics of a persecuted mi- ciently, and guerrillas and mullahs carrying Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), established nority—alienation from the larger society, an portraits of Khomeini frightened many in by Iran in the early 1980s as an umbrella intense feeling of cohesion, and a pervasive southern Iraq. The rebellion failed. group to unite anti-regime Iraqis in exile in sense of oppression and injustice—that Many of the more urbanized Shi’a are not Iran. Its leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al- Shi’ism accentuated. Iraqi Shi’a were excluded religious or, if so, still favor secular political Hakim, was assassinated in August 2003, after from participation in the Sunni Ottoman rule. On the other hand, traditional Shi’a tend returning from more than 20 years in exile in Empire that ruled the Iraqi provinces for four to be more village- and tribal-centered and Iran; his brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, served centuries; they fared no better under British, more pious and observant. Majorities from on the Governing Council and heads the Badr monarchist, and Arab nationalist rule. They, in both camps follow Grand Ayatollah Sistani as Brigade, the SCIRI militia. turn, rejected Sunni schools, academies, and their guide (marja al-taqlid), and many may The first modern Shi’a extremist faction in governance. Nevertheless, a number served in favor some sort of Islamic governance, with Iraq was the Dawa (Call) Party, founded in government under the monarchy and after the Islam being more than just one among many Najaf in the 1960s by Ayatollah Muhammad 1958 revolution, including as prime ministers sources of state law. There seems to be little Baqr Sadr, who was martyred by Saddam’s and cabinet members. They joined the Com- support for an Islamic republic styled along the regime in 1980. He was a companion of munist and Ba’thist parties and served as Iranian model. Sistani’s political vision for Iraq Khomeini during the latter’s 15-year exile in loyalists to Saddam Hussein, seeing these is not altogether clear. While he opposes rule by Iraq and wrote a political treatise advocating a secular movements as offering a more level clerics, as in Islamic Iran, it is not obvious that role for clerics in governance (similar to playing field than the parties that had domi- an Iraq fashioned along the lines of secular Khomeini’s principle of vilayat-i faqih, or rule nated the state since independence, and favored Turkey would satisfy him. Nor is he likely to be by religious jurisprudent). Dawa members were Arab Sunni nationalist causes. happy with Islam as a source (as opposed to involved in anti-U.S. and anti-Western terrorism However, the Shi’a, for the most part, saw the sole source) of law. Sistani, like Khomeini, with the Lebanese Hizballah terrorist infrastruc- themselves as Arab, Iraqi, and Shi’a. The Shi’a may be appalled at the official separation of ture in Kuwait and Lebanon during the 1980s. tribes of the south remained loyal to Baghdad Islam and state in Turkey, even with the cur- They have never been comfortable in their in the Iran-Iraq war, a loyalty acknowledged rent Islamist government in Ankara. alliance with SCIRI, and indicators suggest the
Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law