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No. 208 Strategic Forum June 2004 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Turbulent Transition in : Can It Succeed? by Judith S. Yaphe

One year after liberation, most are regime. The confrontations that have Key Points impatient with the military occupation of their occurred—in , Kufah, Fallujah, and s the Interim Government of Iraq country. Although grateful for the removal of Najaf, for example—reflect carefully planned begins to assert authority, diverse ’s cruel and repressive regime, and coordinated attacks on U.S. forces and Acommunities within the country are many assumed the United States and its coali- civilians working on reconstruction. struggling to protect their equities. Critical tion members would soon go home and leave What is important is the absence of dis- issues include Kurdish desires for federalism them to sort out their political, economic, and course on several topics. Little is heard about and a veto on the constitution; Shi’a resist- military fate. The war, after all, had been the rounds of negotiations between extremist ance to separatism and minority veto rights; fought to liberate Iraqis from political tyranny, Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and representa- religious demands that be recognized not to defeat the Iraqi people. Both U.S. and tives of the ayatollahs of Najaf, including Grand as the exclusive source of legislation; and Iraqi expectations were high that the transition Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and his son, yet it is increasing combativeness of Arab Sunnis, from oppression to democracy would be clearly in the interest of the Shi’a clerical hier- facing marginalization after the fall of a smooth and quick and that Iraqi political elites archy to resolve this crisis. Little is heard, as regime they long dominated. would move swiftly to ensure democratic rule. well, about negotiations in Fallujah, yet the Iraqis will grow increasingly fractious as Despite the formation of the Interim emergence of a respected Republican Guard they jockey for political space. However, the Government of Iraq on June 1, 2004, many general and tribal leaders may have opened the risk of civil war between and or Iraqis and their neighbors remain skeptical way to broader conflict resolution in that between Sunni and Shi’a is low. that the United States will give up its control or volatile municipality. And no cleric has yet While fissures are deep, all parties appear to not try to retain control through appointed issued a decree (fatwa) sanctioning rebellion understand that division is not an option and puppets. Success as measured by quick victory against the foreign occupier. Despite the mur- more can be gained through participation and and regime change has been accomplished; ders of Iraqis cooperating with the Coalition negotiation. Two developments could raise the success as measured by rapid reconstruction of Provisional Authority (including a president risk of domestic strife: if Sunni and Shi’a the Iraqi polity and economy has not been and two ministers on the Iraqi Governing extremists succeed in undermining the new achieved and may be in peril. Council, clerics in the Sunni and Shi’a com- government, and if the Kurds, who waver in munities, and officials of both Kurdish factions their commitment to join the government, push Three Dramas in northern Iraq), civil war—meaning between Iraqi Arabs and Kurds, or between Sunni and for greater autonomy and control of Kirkuk. During this turbulent transitional period, Iraqi government efforts to deal with the Shi’a—has not erupted and is not likely to. success will hinge upon the outcome of three Civil war, if it happens, is more likely to United States as a partner rather than a client distinct “dramas.” will bolster its credibility in the eyes of many occur between religious extremists (Sunni and Civil War. The first drama is the specter of Shi’a) and everyone else than between Sunni Iraqis. These efforts will not, however, lessen civil war, which has not happened. Anti-Ameri- terrorist or insurgent attacks. and Shi’a or Arab and Kurd. Iraq is an amal- can violence has increased, as have insurgent gam of Shi’a Arab (approximately 60 percent), Iraqis will remain suspicious that the efforts to spark civil war between ethnic and new government will not be fully sovereign. Sunni Arab (20 percent), and Kurd (Sunni and sectarian elements. Even so, Iraq is not in a Shi’a, approximately 20 percent), but it cannot Success will depend on American officials state of civil war, nor has there been any seri- resisting the temptation to promote Iraqi be simply defined and divided mathematically. ous outbreak of sectarian or ethnic warfare— Generally, Sunni and Shi’a Arabs share an foreign and domestic policies that support yet. Sunni are not fighting Shi’a, and Arabs are U.S. regional goals but could endanger the assumption of Iraqi nationalism and an inten- not at war with Kurds. Nor are Iraqi Shi’a tion to maintain the political and territorial prospects for survival of the new government. wedded to an Iranian-style cleric-dominated

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integrity of the country as defined by the 1920 third drama. The interim government that took Others argue that Iraq cannot be ruled demo- San Remo treaty and the 1932 treaty of inde- over from the Governing Council lacks legiti- cratically or that it is better off being divided pendence. Iraqi Kurds have committed them- macy, and the nature of political institutions into three weak states to ensure protection for selves for the moment to being part of Iraq, but and a permanent constitution have yet to take ethnic and religious groups and remove their their reluctance to accept permanent status in shape. These issues will not be resolved soon, ability to threaten any one but themselves in the Iraq is certainly linked directly to future consti- nor should anyone expect them to be. Political future. They are certainly wrong. tutional and perhaps territorial concessions. institutions and constitutions do not automati- The new government, led by President Transitional Governance.The second cally confer legitimacy, establish the rule of law, Ghazi al-Yawar, Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, drama concerns the fate of transitional gover- create checks and balances in government, and and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari, seeks a nance. Squabbling over the nature of the guarantee equal rights and protections for all. transparent and unambiguous transfer of interim government that assumed power on Parliaments are buildings, and constitutions are authority that gives them power over political, June 1, how it was chosen, and who would written on paper. It takes time and trust to create economic, financial, and security policy with- serve in the various cabinet posts exacerbated a free people and an open society. out actual responsibility for security, which relations between the Coalition Provisional In 1920, the British created institutions of they prefer remain in U.S. hands. A small but Authority (CPA) and Iraqis. Both sides had government (parliament) for Iraq, imported a increasingly vociferous number of Iraqis de- unrealistic expectations of what was possible. foreign Arab and installed him by a plebiscite mand removal of all vestiges of U.S. presence, From outward appearances, the Governing of hand-picked natural leaders known to favor from civilian advisers aiding the transition to Council (GC) preempted United Nations pro-British rule, and selected a rainbow coali- military forces assigned to provide security and (UN)–U.S. efforts to select the new interim tion drawn from all the communities of Iraq. fight the insurgents and terrorists. government, which it intended to announce on This government lacked the power and author- Who is right? How does an occupier- June 1, by choosing a new president (a promi- ity to rule Iraq. Not only did the British rule liberator know when enough is enough? How nent shaykh of the million-member Shammar indirectly and closely through political com- do you measure success or acknowledge fail- tribal federation from northern Iraq), two missioners and officers chosen in Whitehall, ure? Any attempt to answer these questions deputy presidents (a Kurd and a Shi’a Arab), but they also wrote the constitution and the requires an assessment of what the new govern- and a prime minister (the head of the Iraq treaties the Iraqis had to sign to gain independ- ment needs to do to survive as a stable and National Accord party, Iyad Allawi, who is a ence. Even after the League of Nations recog- effective element of the country’s new politics secular Shi’a and former Ba’thist who had nized an independent Iraq in 1932, the British and what can be achieved by it, by other Iraqi lived in exile for the past 25 years) a week retained control over security and military leaders, and by the United States. earlier. The new cabinet contains a mix of decisionmaking until the 1958 revolution. former GC members and newly appointed Under the British, Iraqis gained, at best, only Past as Prologue? technocrats, divided among the country’s second-hand experience in democratic institu- diverse groups and including six women. A tions and practices. The United States is in The U.S. Government has been accused of commission to prepare the country for national danger of repeating the errors of the British if it many deficiencies in planning for a post- elections was also named, and a nationwide does not pass real, transparent decisionmaking Saddam Iraq. Accusations range from having assembly is being planned for July to advise the power to the Iraqis. no plan to having the wrong plan—planning interim government and plan for Iraq’s politi- for humanitarian, , and health crises cal future. The elections, when held, will not Where Are We Now? that did not happen—to having hidden agen- ensure perfect democratic governance or a pro- das to retain control of Iraqi wealth. While American government. They should, however, Despite the unanimous passage on June 8 these accusations carry the hallmarks of con- reflect the consensus of the Iraqi people. of the UN resolution recognizing the new in- spiracy theories, one issue stands out. Washing- Municipal elections have occurred in terim government and approving the timeline ton did not adequately consider the impact of many areas, and it is probably at this level that for elections, foreign observers and many Iraqis many of the measures it imposed on Iraq since the greatest progress in democratic rule has probably continue to doubt that the transition of the fall of Saddam Hussein. occurred. Democracy represents two values: political authority from the U.S.-dominated CPA The first American administrator for hu- majority rule and protection of the rights of to Iraqis will occur without the simultaneous manitarian aid and reconstruction, Jay Garner, transition to democracy or Iraqi control of had served in Iraq in 1991 following the abortive minorities. It took Britain nearly 900 years and 1 a civil war to evolve into a truly representative security policy. They suspect that the United Kurdish rebellion in the north. He and his staff government; it has taken the United States States passed power to a group of self-promoting assumed they would face similar crises in 2003: more than 225 years and a civil war to achieve Iraqis who are unelected and do not represent internally displaced people, refugee flows, and a its current state of democracy. How can the the wishes of the people, that Washington will desperate need for housing, food, water, and Iraqis be expected to achieve this in 1 year? retain control of the real centers of decisionmak- health care. He also assumed he would take over Political Institution Building. Longer- ing, and that the exercise will be an opaque one ministries and civil servants in place and, with term political institution building in Iraq is the at best. Only time will tell if they are right. only a few American advisers and contractors, would be able to get government up and run- ning quickly. He had no detailed plans for Judith S. Yaphe is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense widespread de-Ba’thification—removal of University. Please address questions or comments to her attention at [email protected].

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anyone who was a party member down to the Both measures sent a clear signal—in as the Basic Law or interim constitution. The third level of responsibility in the party hierar- particular to Sunni Arabs who out of fear and document, written by Iraqis according to Bre- chy—of the civil service or public sector workers loyalty had been Saddam’s pillar of strength. mer, resonates with protections for individual or for the mass demobilization of the Iraqi The Arab Sunni tribes of the so-called triangle rights and civil liberties as contained in Western military forces. Plans in early 2003 for the Iraqi or center—an area bounded by Mosul, Fallu- constitutions. It describes the Iraqi government armed forces were based on downsizing, jah, Tikrit, and Baqubah and including Bagh- as republican, federal, democratic, and pluralis- depoliticizing, and professionalizing. Garner dad—provided most of the recruits and per- tic. Key sections deal with federal versus state’s understood that a large number of suddenly sonnel for the officer corps of the army, rights, Islam as a component rather than the unemployed Iraqis from the military or the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, sole source of legislation, and the structure and bureaucracy could not be dumped on an econ- and other security and intelligence units. They nature of governance. omy already suffering dislocation and high filled the upper ranks of the Ba’th Party and Some Iraqi constituencies have objected to unemployment. Garner had not included the elite group of advisers around Saddam. parts of the law. Shi’a leaders oppose allowing looting, sabotage, and a disappeared civil Bremer’s edicts targeted these Sunni Arab a majority of voters in three governates the bureaucracy among his most pressing post- elites in particular, creating the image of a power to veto a new constitution or legislation conflict concerns. beleaguered and disenfranchised community passed by the majority. Kurds are dissatisfied Unintended Impact of De-Ba’thifica- that had lost its place in Iraqi society, politics, with the geographic basis of federalism and tion. One month after replacing Garner in mistrust the willingness of any Arab-dominated April 2003, new CPA administrator Paul Bre- the far greater number of government to share revenues or political mer implemented several significant policies. Ba’th party members, offices fairly with them. Kurds, Christians, and He first ordered removal of all Ba’th Party secular Arabs object to recognizing Iraq as Arab members from public posts. In September, perhaps 80 to 90 percent, or Muslim. Islamists prefer an avowedly controversial former Iraqi exile Ahmad Chal- had joined out of fear, Islamic government with shariah (religious abi, then serving as president of the Governing pressure, and promises law) as the foundation of all law. While little Council for the month, ordered a much mention is made in Iraq about complying with broader de-Ba’thification: he wanted to extend of better jobs all UN resolutions, at some point this, too, will the purge to the fourth level of the party and probably become a symbol of unfairness and deny local and regional commanders and CPA economics, and governance. The oppressors oppression intended to keep Iraq weak. officials the right to grant exemptions to the would now become the oppressed. In this de-Ba’thification edict. light, the willingness of disgruntled military What Do Iraqis Want? The second Bremer decree closed the officers to join with Saddam loyalists, former Ministry of Defense and demobilized— Ba’thists, and Sunni religious extremists While Iraqi unhappiness with the occupa- fired—all the members of the military and becomes more explicable. tion in general and the Transitional Administra- security forces, including the regular army Transitional Administrative Law as tive Law in particular is easy to chronicle, the and the Republican Guard, and security and Roadmap. In the leadup to the June 30 harder task is to discern what exactly Iraqis intelligence units, including the Special Re- turnover of power, Bremer took several meas- want. The answer varies among the country’s publican Guard, the Saddam fedayeen, and ures to ensure that the interim government different sectarian and ethnic communities. the special militias that served as regime would steer a moderate course. He appointed Iraqi communities have cooperated in the past, bodyguards and secret police. advisers to ministries with multiyear terms that intermarried, and lived together for hundreds of The impact of these actions cannot be go far beyond the life of the CPA and the in- years. Many families, tribes, and clans—includ- easily measured. As many as 50,000 party terim government, and he oversaw the compo- ing that of Saddam Hussein and the Shammar members lost their jobs in civil service, educa- sition of a draft provisional basic law. Dracon- of President al-Yawar—have Sunni and Shi’a tion (kindergarten through university), public ian measures to improve security and to end members. Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, Kurds, health, and the media. Probably only a small the insurgencies that flared in spring 2004 were Turkmen, and Christians live intermingled in percentage were earnest loyalists prepared to implemented. Bremer and the U.S. military many cities and towns, including Baghdad, implement regime edicts and party ideology. commanders also pursued a more cautious Tikrit, Mosul, and Kirkuk. The Arab communi- The far greater number of Ba’th party members, strategy to resolve confrontations with some ties include secular and religious elements that perhaps 80 to 90 percent, had joined out of fear, insurgent elements. In both Fallujah and are both tribal and urban. Iraqi Kurdish and pressure, and promises of better jobs, higher Najaf, the CPA dealt with unelected and influ- Christian communities, however, are avowedly salaries, and personal security. Party member- ential Iraqi power brokers—especially clerics secular and worry about domination by a new ship was required for teachers and any govern- loyal to the relatively moderate Grand Ayatol- Islamist and Arab political constellation. ment bureaucrat, professional, or technical lah Ali Sistani, who heads one of the largest What Are Shi’a Aspirations? The Shi’a are specialist aspiring to a better job and higher endowments in the Shi’a world and is based in not one monolithic community sharing a status. Approximately 450,000 military and the shrine city of Najaf. common vision of the political future. They are security personnel were relieved of their posi- The clearest indicator of the U.S. vision for multiple communities with multiple goals and tions without salaries or other compensation.2 the new Iraq has been set forth in the Transi- conflicting visions of a new Iraq. The majority, tional Administrative Law (TAL), also referred to including Grand Ayatollah Sistani, tend to reject

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the Iranian model of the Islamic republic and and rewarded by Saddam in the 1980s. Shi’a Iraq, however, has several Shi’a extremist Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of vilayat-i faqih conscripts, the majority of the Iraqi army, factions that would like to emulate . They (rule by clerics). An outspoken minority, how- returning from Kuwait in February 1991 saw share a vision of a republic governed by Islam ever, are pressing for Islamic rule. opportunity in the absence of government as the sole source of all law and have little Most of the Iraqi Shi’a community did not forces and, with perceived encouragement from tolerance for Western values or practices, in- convert to Shi’a Islam until the late 18th cen- the United States, staged a revolt. The revolt cluding the emancipation of women. The most tury. These tribes over the centuries had ac- was uncoordinated, Iran failed to back it suffi- prominent is the Supreme Council for the quired the characteristics of a persecuted mi- ciently, and guerrillas and mullahs carrying Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), established nority—alienation from the larger society, an portraits of Khomeini frightened many in by Iran in the early 1980s as an umbrella intense feeling of cohesion, and a pervasive southern Iraq. The rebellion failed. group to unite anti-regime Iraqis in exile in sense of oppression and injustice—that Many of the more urbanized Shi’a are not Iran. Its leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al- Shi’ism accentuated. Iraqi Shi’a were excluded religious or, if so, still favor secular political Hakim, was assassinated in August 2003, after from participation in the Sunni Ottoman rule. On the other hand, traditional Shi’a tend returning from more than 20 years in exile in Empire that ruled the Iraqi provinces for four to be more village- and tribal-centered and Iran; his brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, served centuries; they fared no better under British, more pious and observant. Majorities from on the Governing Council and heads the Badr monarchist, and Arab nationalist rule. They, in both camps follow Grand Ayatollah Sistani as Brigade, the SCIRI militia. turn, rejected Sunni schools, academies, and their guide (marja al-taqlid), and many may The first modern Shi’a extremist faction in governance. Nevertheless, a number served in favor some sort of Islamic governance, with Iraq was the Dawa (Call) Party, founded in government under the monarchy and after the Islam being more than just one among many Najaf in the 1960s by Ayatollah Muhammad 1958 revolution, including as prime ministers sources of state law. There seems to be little Baqr Sadr, who was martyred by Saddam’s and cabinet members. They joined the Com- support for an Islamic republic styled along the regime in 1980. He was a companion of munist and Ba’thist parties and served as Iranian model. Sistani’s political vision for Iraq Khomeini during the latter’s 15-year exile in loyalists to Saddam Hussein, seeing these is not altogether clear. While he opposes rule by Iraq and wrote a political treatise advocating a secular movements as offering a more level clerics, as in Islamic Iran, it is not obvious that role for clerics in governance (similar to playing field than the parties that had domi- an Iraq fashioned along the lines of secular Khomeini’s principle of vilayat-i faqih, or rule nated the state since independence, and favored would satisfy him. Nor is he likely to be by religious jurisprudent). Dawa members were Arab Sunni nationalist causes. happy with Islam as a source (as opposed to involved in anti-U.S. and anti-Western terrorism However, the Shi’a, for the most part, saw the sole source) of law. Sistani, like Khomeini, with the Lebanese Hizballah terrorist infrastruc- themselves as Arab, Iraqi, and Shi’a. The Shi’a may be appalled at the official separation of ture in Kuwait and Lebanon during the 1980s. tribes of the south remained loyal to Baghdad Islam and state in Turkey, even with the cur- They have never been comfortable in their in the Iran-Iraq war, a loyalty acknowledged rent Islamist government in Ankara. alliance with SCIRI, and indicators suggest the

Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law

Islam is the official religion of the country as well as a source (but not the only source) of legislation. Iraq is a country of many nationalities, and the Arab people in Iraq are an inseparable part of the Arab nation. Arabic and Kurdish are recognized as official languages, and Iraqis can educate their children in their own language in state and private schools. An Iraqi citizen is anyone who carries Iraqi nationality. All Iraqis have full equality without regard to gender, sect, opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin. All are equal before the law and have the right to a fair, speedy, and public trial. The Iraqi transitional government will include a national assembly, a presidency council, a council of ministers including a prime minister, and a judiciary. There is separation of powers—legislative, executive, and judicial. The assembly will elect the head of state—a president—and two deputy presidents from its ranks to serve as the presidency council; this council will name a prime minister. One-quarter of the assembly’s 275 representatives shall be women, and all communities shall be fairly represented. Federalism is defined as a system of separation of powers based on geographic and historical realities and not race, ethnicity, nationality, or religious sect (confession). Formulation of national security policy as well as foreign, diplomatic, economic, trade, and debt policies belong to the federal government. Managing the natural resources and distributing revenues also fall under federal authority. The government will also observe checks and balances, with an independent judiciary. The armed forces and the intelligence services come under civilian control, and all military personnel are banned from political office and activity. The transitional government must honor Iraq’s international obligations under international treaties. This includes the Non-Proliferation Treaty and all United Nations resolutions banning weapons of mass destruction. Resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, is deferred until a census has been conducted and people who were compelled by force to leave their homes and region are compensated or returned home. The draft permanent constitution will be presented to the Iraqi people for approval by October 15, 2005. It will be approved if the majority approves it and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more governates do not reject it.

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two may have split. They also have representa- unpopular, and unelectable. He has given tacit years ago this April, when Sunni and Shi’a tives in the new government. approval to the new interim government. Some prayed together, and the arrest of angry Shi’a Finally, a Hizballah party is forming in observers believe his insistence on elections led to an anti-British decree and a rebellion? southern Iraq. Little is known about its activities simply reflects his belief that the majority Shi’a Probably not, but there is evidence that Sunni or backing, but it is apparently building grass- population would naturally choose Shi’a candi- and Shi’a extremist factions are cooperating in roots organizations—constructing schools, dates and thereby create a Shi’a-dominated operations against the foreign presence (Ameri- housing, clinics, mosques, and societies to state. This view is open to question. can and international) as well as against provide martyrs’ benefits to families affected by What Do the Sunnis Want? Sunni Arabs moderate clerics in both communities. the war and occupation in much the same were given control of Iraq by the Turks and the It is easy to see what the Sunni elements manner as the Lebanese Hizballah. Like the British and ruled a secular state under are against: all foreign intervention and any Lebanese version, it almost certainly has ties to monarch and autocrat for eight decades. Reli- progress in reconstruction that would promote radical Iranian clerics and the Iranian Revolu- gious extremism was not a significant force stability and success for the interim Iraqi gov- tionary Guard Corps. under the monarchy or Saddam, who saw ernments. It is harder to see what they are for. The Al-Sadr Phenomenon. The most Islamic extremism of any form as one of the Aside from vaguely worded slogans of an Iraq dangerous movement thus far is that of Muq- most serious threats to his regime. He sup- free of foreign occupation, there seems to be no tada al-Sadr, a junior cleric in his 30s who ported the Sunni extremist Syrian Muslim coherent or consistent vision for the new Iraq. If seems to appeal primarily to disgruntled young Brotherhood only because of their common Fallujah is an example of the post-Saddam unemployed males with a taste for sacrifice and antipathy to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, but Sunni extremist vision, then the desired end- violence. His Mahdi militia and rhetoric por- he suppressed all religious activism inside Iraq state is a rigid Islamist-style rule similar to a tray the struggle against U.S. forces as a holy that he could not control. Taliban-style diktat. No leaders have emerged war (jihad) against the infidel; he wraps him- Despite Saddam’s best efforts, Islamic other than local clerics and the urban legend self in a white shroud to show he is ready for activism has been growing among Iraqi Sun- that is Zarqawi.6 All politics is local in Iraq, and death. He is implicated in the murder of Ayatol- nis. In part, the growth parallels similar devel- the Sunnis in general seem determined to lah Abd al-Majid al-Kho’i in Najaf in April opments in other Arab countries, where per- preserve their local power and status while 2003. Kho’i, a moderate, pro-American leader sonal piety and a retreat to the safeguards of carving out a role in the new national political of a wealthy foundation, had returned to Iraq religion have been gaining strength. Saddam infrastructure. Few call for restoration of and was trying to reconcile factions in Najaf suspected, correctly, that Wahhabi influences Saddam and his regime, which probably had as when he was brutally murdered. (the name given to any Sunni extremism) many opponents as proponents in Fallujah and Sadr follows an Iraqi exile in Iran as his from Saudi Arabia were infiltrating Iraq.5 Saudi the other predominantly Sunni Arab tribal areas marja (source of emulation or guide)—Ayatol- Wahhabi clerics and the Saudi-sponsored of north and central Iraq. lah Ha’iri, who resides in Qom. Sadr does not Muslim Brotherhood have long been active in What Will the Kurds Accept? Iraqi Kurds appear to find much favor with Iranian clerical northern Iraq and among the Sunni tribes of identify themselves ethnically rather than in leaders; more likely, they find him a dangerous central and western Iraq to woo them back to a religious terms. Most are Sunni, and Sufi source of instability and civil strife where they strict and observant Islam. They are building mysticism is popular, while a small number would prefer quiet manipulation and a more mosques in areas of northern and central Iraq. are Shi’a and even Jewish. Few belong to the subtle exercise of their assumed influence.3 The Sunni clerics in Iraq, however, lack the power Ansar al-Islam, which is linked to al Qaeda, or merchants and elders of Najaf and Karbala have and influence exercised by Shi’a clerics. to other extremist or Iranian-sponsored fac- pressured Sistani and the senior clerics of the Whereas the latter have been relatively more tions. Kurdish efforts to exploit the recent hawza, the leadership council of senior clerics, independent of the state in terms of wealth and unrest in central and southern Iraq have been to end Sadr’s reign of terror, which has been status, Sunni clerics were state employees and limited to political debate. Mainstream Kurdish marked by crime and brought a thriving pil- hence controllable by the government. factions, headed by Masud Barzani and Jalal grimage business to a halt. Nonetheless, Sunni Arab and Shi’a ac- Talabani, prefer a secular Iraq. They oppose Finally, there are the senior clerics, most of tivists have been uniting to protest the U.S. inserting Islam into any constitution and fret whom are not Iraqi. They are not always central presence in Iraq. This may seem an unusual that Shi’a efforts to restrict the veto power in to the lives of Iraqi Shi’a. The exceptions are in phenomenon, but it is not a new one. In the the TAL may succeed.7 Attempts to take advan- times of great stress, as in revolt and under 1920 revolt, Sunni and Shi’a clerics prayed and tage of the turmoil in the south and in Bagh- occupation.4 Many senior and mid-level Shi’a preached in each others’ mosques, denounced dad by occupying lands claimed by the Arab clerics in Iraq are Iranian in origin. Sistani, the British occupation, and organized joint and Turkman communities in Kirkuk, however, who came to Iraq from Iran more than 50 years anti-British demonstrations. Ultimately, how- could result in Arabs regrouping to battle them ago, is portrayed as anti-American, but is more ever, it was a Shi’a cleric who issued a fatwa after the United States is gone from Iraq. accurately described as pro-Iraqi. He opposes authorizing rebellion against the British that The Kurds have been winners in Iraqi non-Iraqis writing a constitution for Iraq and led the Shi’a tribes of southern Iraq to revolt. reconstruction so far. The TAL accords them a demands direct elections for the new govern- Since the fall of Saddam’s regime, Sunni and virtual veto over national legislation in the ment and parliament. He probably also was Shi’a religious extremists have held meetings future, including a new constitution. Their unhappy with some members of the Governing similar to those of 1920, which raises the regional government authority, established Council whom he saw as unrepresentative, question: Is this a replay of events exactly 84

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in the 1990s, is recognized as the official Near-Term Quandaries not one of throwing the Americans out. Rather, government of the territories under its con- it is the need to establish international legiti- In the year since Saddam Hussein and his trol—Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaymaniya, Kirkuk, macy and internal credibility by acquiring full brutal regime were removed from power, the Diyala, and Ninevah regions as of March 19, sovereignty over financial, diplomatic, and United States won a war with surprising ease 2003—but boundaries of the 18 provinces security interests. Iraqi leaders are painfully only to be confronted with a growing and remain unchanged. The Kurdish regional aware of their vulnerability; if they cannot violent opposition to its continuing military authority will have control over local police and improve standards of living, ensure internal presence and political role. The situation in internal security forces and the power to tax. security and public safety, and provide jobs, Iraq on the eve of the turnover of power on The Kurds worry about their future as a there may be little interest in elections next year. June 30, 2004—violence, political uncertainty, minority in a state that has no experience of U.S. acquiescence with this strategy could help and economic instability—is troubling to most protecting minority rights. The TAL denies the shore up the fledgling interim government. observers. But who can argue that removing Kurds the expanded territory—the city and Nonetheless, more pessimistic scenarios Saddam was wrong? His removal freed Iraqis oilfields of Kirkuk and the city of Mosul—that are certainly possible. The United States could from long years of repression and removed a they demand. They are trying to create a new withhold some decisionmaking prerogatives major security threat in the region. Kurdistani national identification that non- from the interim government. It could insist Iraqis face an uncertain summer. Electrical Kurdish elements living in the north—the that advisers appointed to the ministries by power has not yet been completely restored, Turkmen and Assyrians, for example—could Bremer remain in place and that the TAL be unemployment and underemployment rates are embrace. This, too, is unpopular among popu- adopted as the permanent constitution for Iraq. high, schools and hospitals lack the tools needed lations who reject kurdification just as the It has refused to allow the Iraqi government to to provide adequate education and health care, Kurds rejected arabization by Saddam. Kurdish have veto power over military operations and and crime is rife in the cities and countryside. spokesmen demanded a Kurd be appointed could insist on intrusive measures against The new Iraqi political elites are jockeying for president or prime minister of the new interim insurgents, terrorists, or criminals, regardless of power, uncertain how to adopt the long-denied government, but they had to be satisfied with the Iraqi advice. It could demand that the new political behaviors and practices. The military appointment of several Kurds—some outspoken government sign a status of forces agreement operations in Fallujah and Najaf and the revela- supporters of Kurdish separatism—as deputy that would give legal, extraterritorial protection tions about the abuse of detainees at the Abu president, foreign minister, minister of state, and to U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq. The Gharayb prison have contributed to the rising minister for human rights. United States also could insist that the new anti-American sentiment in Iraq and the region. The ultimate test for the Kurds could government adopt foreign policies, such as The United States has not wavered in its come within the next year. If Kurdish leaders recognizing Israel and supporting the Palestin- determination to transfer sovereignty to the see weakness in Baghdad, they could decide to ian-Israeli peace process and gearing economic Iraqi state by June 30, and yet the practical move to consolidate control over Kirkuk and policies toward total privatization (denational- implications of this transfer remain to be seen. other territories. This would probably trigger izing the oil industry). These measures, how- How much power and authority will the new fighting between Arab and Kurdish militias, ever desirable they may be from the U.S. stand- governmental entity exercise? On what terms both of which are well armed and uncontrolled point, would be resented by the interim will the United States maintain its military by any federal security apparatus. It would government and by most Iraqis, with Kurds presence in Iraq? create a refugee crisis—approximately 200,000 and other minorities being the lone dissenters. Under the most optimistic scenario, the to 300,000 Arabs remain on property in the The new government would lose whatever turnover of power could prove substantial. Kirkuk region contested by Kurds and Turk- credibility and popular support it had mus- Assuring that outcome was one factor prompt- men. The picture in the predominantly Kurdish tered, and the United States would face increas- ing the old Iraqi Governing Council to select its region is further complicated by the rivalry ing security risks with little or no local help. successor by choosing new leaders, establishing between the leaders of the two main Kurdish a new cabinet, and dissolving itself on June 1. factions. Despite having a regional governing The new government understands that it ur- Outside Influences authority, the factions have not merged their gently needs validation of its legitimacy from territories, organizations, or militias. Disarm- In thinking through the next steps in the the United Nations as well as from Iraqis who ing the Kurdish militias—the guerrilla units ongoing transition, U.S. policymakers should still have not had the opportunity to choose called the pesh merga—will be a difficult task, not lose sight of two outside players. The first, their government, who resent the influence of even as some Kurds call for the disarming of in the short term, is the United Nations. The exiles and other self-appointed power brokers, Iraqi warlords and armed bands. The lesson second, in the longer term, is Iran. and who deeply mistrust U.S. intentions to turn the Kurds say they have learned from the recent Is the United Nations part of the problem over real authority. negotiations between the CPA, former Ba’thists, or the solution? The international community In search of recognition and acceptance, tribal leaders, and clerics in Fallujah and Najaf and Iraq’s neighbors have long argued for the new government insisted on participating is that “the squeaky wheel gets oiled”—that to giving the UN authority over Iraqi political with the United States in formulating the terms get attention and realize political objectives, it and economic reconstruction and foreign of the turnover resolution and in obtaining the is necessary to pressure the Americans, the CPA, military forces in the country. Iraqis, however, right to veto American military operations. They and the military presence. are far less enthusiastic; they blame the UN for won on the former but not the latter. The issue is

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implementing U.S.-imposed sanctions after the appear to have influence over Muqtada al-Sadr. politician at the expense of others but should Kuwait war and resent having to comply with Its efforts to negotiate with Sadr and the Sistani encourage the reemergence of the middle UN resolutions that limit Iraqi military capa- elements in Najaf in April reportedly failed. class, professionals, technocrats, civil servants, bilities and insist on reparations payments. In large measure, Iran has created its lack and military officers in a new Iraq. And finally, Why, they will ask, should Iraq be held ac- of influence. Most Iraqis would say the Iranian the United States cannot cut and run. Giving countable for Saddam’s actions, why should revolutionary style of government is not a up on the transition only will compound U.S. we pay off debts he incurred, and why should model worthy of emulation. Hardcore Iraqi problems—and Iraqi miseries—over the we be denied the right to acquire whatever Islamists—Shi’a and Sunni—seem insistent longer term. weapons we need to defend ourselves when our on an Islamic state under strict Islamic law, So can the United States achieve success in neighbors have dangerous weapons systems, but Iran is not their preferred model. Iraqis are Iraq? It is impossible at this stage to predict any including weapons of mass destruction, that more likely to be influenced by their perception definitive outcome, good or bad, with confi- could be used against us? of how much power they will have after June dence, although actions by the new government The United Nations itself has only limited 30, progress on holding direct elections, and led by Yawar and Allawi and responses by the resources to give to Iraq, which suggests that the U.S. and UN roles in determining the shape United States so far are encouraging. Chances the United States avoid presuming too much and authority of an interim government. They for success would be greater if the United States about the UN capacity or room for maneuver. may not view the Iranian experiment in theo- could achieve the following priorities:

Giving the organization a greater political role cratic democracy as a failure, but the majority Strengthen the leading role of the Depart- in Iraq will not end attacks by insurgents or will outright reject the idea of clerical-domi- ment of State in dealings with Iraq. Except for terrorists, and it will not resolve domestic resist- nated politics or the need for a religious security threats and military operations and train- ance to outside influence. It could, however, be supreme leader. Their objection to unelected ing, the U.S. Ambassador should have the same critical to obtaining international assistance as leaders running a country has already been authority over U.S. personnel and presence well as support from Sistani and Iraqis seeking applied to the councils appointed by the United throughout Iraq that Ambassadors have in other a more moderate road to self-rule. countries. It is imperative, moreover, that the United States gain internal agreement on how and As for Iran, the question remains as to the success of the transi- whether it is a spoiler or a supporter of the when its Ambassador can be assured of receiving tion will depend on the military support in the protection of critical transi- transition. Iran looks at Iraq in a somewhat tional activity, such as upcoming elections. condescending manner. The feelings are part U.S. willingness and Treat the new interim government as a religious (Iranians are better Muslims) and ability to empower the partner, not a client. The previous Governing part nationalist (Persians are better than new Iraqi authority Council was hampered by a series of rotating Arabs). Tehran believes it is the preeminent presidents with no agenda other than to enhance power in the region, and Supreme Leader Ali the status of their support networks and push Khamenei views himself as leader of the world States. Iran, then, may have little impact on through temporary bits of self-serving legislation. Shi’a Muslim community. More importantly, by the shape of Iraqi politics and policies, but it For the most part, they failed to win any apprecia- the 1990s, Iran was host to nearly one million will have sufficient influence to play the spoiler ble popular support. Prime Minister Allawi’s base in Iraqi , some of whom were Kurds, most in stirring up ethnic and sectarian unease. Iraq is also negligible, but his efforts to deal with of whom were Arab Shi’a Muslims fleeing the the United States as a partner rather than as a wars or forced into exile by Saddam’s ethnic A Way Ahead client, to rein in the militias, and to broaden the cleansing operations. Ultimately, the success of the Iraq transi- base of the government could gain him a signifi- Iran has a vested interest in Iraqi stabil- cant degree of popular support. ity—or instability—and will watch closely for tion will depend on the U.S. willingness and Give the new interim government real deci- signs of unrest, rebellion, or success, fearing ability to empower the new Iraqi authority, to maintain an effective security presence while sionmaking authority. If any Iraqi official in the potential spillover should civil war erupt or cabinet or ministries must look to the foreign politi- ethnic violence spread. Iran has always had new governmental institutions stabilize and acquire the ability to protect themselves and the cal adviser before making decisions, then he or she diplomats, scholars, clerics, pilgrims, intelli- will lose all credibility and nothing will have been gence agents, and networks of informants active nation, and to support an international effort to rebuild Iraq economically and psychically. achieved but a change of face. More than a change in Iraq. Iranians long dominated the religious of label—to liaison instead of adviser—will be schools and courts of the shrine cities, in partic- Iraqis and their neighbors will view future U.S. intentions in light of how it be- necessary if the new government is to function with ular Najaf and Karbala, and many clerical any degree of self-respect. families own property and burial plots near the haves now. Washington cannot appoint advis- ers for multiyear terms; that is for the Iraqis to Promote the new leaders and civil society mosques. Iran, however, seems unable to capi- that are appearing in Iraq after decades of political talize on its influence. One of its closest allies, do. The United States cannot write legislation or a constitution for the Iraqis, although it can repression. Competent people eager to serve are SCIRI leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al- emerging from exile and from inside Iraq and Hakim, was murdered last August, and its long encourage secular government, the rule of law, and opportunities for all Iraqis—men, creating professional unions, trade associations, support—safe haven, training, arms, and social welfare groups, and university and technical political support—to his organization and other women, Arabs, Kurds, Sunnis, Shi’a, Turkmen, Iraqi exiles has not paid off. Nor does Iran and Christian. It should not favor one party or

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associations. This rebounding middle class needs discouraged by the many instruments of U.S. na- discredited central government will be no encouragement and a hands-off approach from tional power, not just military. The goal in Washing- match for local warlordism and the growth of outsiders eager to reshape Iraq in their own image. ton should be to use economic and trade sanctions, terrorist infrastructures. If this happens, the Support efforts to disband the militias. Most diplomatic isolation, and international pariah outcome will not be the hoped-for democratic Iraqis recognize that private armies cannot coexist status to remind Damascus and Tehran that there is Iraq of 2005 and beyond, but a country more with a new national military and security forces, but a cost to exploiting unrest in Iraq. like Lebanon in the 1980s or Afghanistan in they have felt powerless to deal with well-armed and Avoid replacing all symbolic vestiges of the the 1990s—only in this case a country replete dangerous factions that owe loyalty to a virtual old regime. Designing a new flag and destroying with oil wealth and a great capacity to wreak warlord or local political leader. Allawi has an- Saddam’s palaces will be seen as a U.S. effort to havoc beyond its borders. nounced a plan to disarm and disband some of the destroy not Saddam’s identity but rather that of Iraq. militias by offering members posts in the new Iraqi Turning these facilities over to the people for use as Notes 1 military and security forces and in local police forces hospitals, schools, theaters, or libraries would serve Three transitions have occurred: from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the U.S. Embassy; from the Iraqi Govern- or by encouraging retirement. His effort is aimed to remind future generations of past legacies. ing Council to the interim government; and from the coalition specifically at the nine militias that were part of the military force to the Multinational Force–Iraq. The first and third anti-Saddam movement, including the militias will occur on July 1; the second transition occurred on June 1. belonging to the Kurdish factions, Iraqi National Can the Transition Work? 2 Bremer later authorized payment of wages for the rank- Congress, Iraqi National Accord, SCIRI, Dawa Party, Managing the multifaceted transitions and-file military up to the O–6 level. He did not rescind the order, insisting that there was no Iraqi military to disband. Nor Hizballah of Iraq, and Iraqi Communist Party. It that are now unfolding—from Coalition Provi- did he sign Chalabi’s decree on expanding de-Ba’thification. As does not include the Saddam fedayeen, ex-Ba’thist sional Authority to Embassy, from Governing long as the Coalition Provisional Authority was in control, factions now fighting as so-called insurgents or Council to interim government, from coalition Bremer’s signature was required for a measure to become law. terrorists, or Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army. The forces to Multinational Force–Iraq—is a 3 Saddam appointed Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Muhammad hard question remains of how to maneuver the daunting task, one made all the more difficult Sadiq Sadr, to his position in Baghdad; when Sadiq Sadr tried to restore practices banned by Saddam, Saddam had him and two sponsors of militias into a cooperative posture. While by competing egos and desired endstates here of his sons murdered in 1999. This Sadr clan is related to a very the preferred mode is cooptation, utilizing financial and in Iraq. Success for the United States can- important clerical family in Iraq that has figured historically in and economic inducements, and offering security not be measured by wartime military standards Shi’a political activism. Muqtada seems not to have his father’s guarantees, the direct use of American military or election-year political slogans alone. Success brilliance or leadership skills, but he plays on the family’s power against recalcitrant militias may be neces- is not “getting” Muqtada al-Sadr or eliminat- Arabism and loyalty to Iraq, saying they stayed and suffered under Saddam while “others” (the al-Hakims and Supreme sary—despite obvious risks—if the militias refuse to ing all insurgents or terrorists. Success should Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) fled to safety in Iran. cooperate or directly impede the formation of new be measured in the evolution of central govern- 4 Unlike Sunnis, Shi’a Muslims must follow a living governmental structures. ment authority, in popular acceptance of the mujtahid (religious scholar such as Khomeini or Sistani) who can interpret the Quran, collect tithes, and issue fatwas. While Avoid extreme military reactions to insur- legitimacy of the new interim government, and gent attacks. Protection of forces and civilians must in the ability of the new government to improve clerics in both sects can issue fatwas, Shi’a authorities have more latitude to interpret the law and tradition. be a priority, but overreaction can be detrimental to public security, provide jobs, and raise living 5 The Shi’a remember that Wahhabis from Arabia sacked the objectives and impede protection concerns in standards. Success will also be measured in the and burned the Great Mosque in Najaf in the early 19th century. the long run. The use of local mediators, especially disarming of the private militias that roam 6 Zarqawi claims responsibility for some of the most prominent Iraqis whose opinions carry weight, to Iraq and the turnover of security to more and spectacular terrorist attacks in Iraq, including the bombing of resolve pockets of resistance and negotiate an end better-trained Iraqi forces. All of this will take UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, in which UN Special Representative Sergio de Mello was murdered. His faction to local conflicts has proven successful. If the time and patience and require a commitment also murdered a senior U.S. official in Jordan last year. United States does not do this and shuns all ele- by the United States to stay the course. 7 The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) allows any ments that served in Saddam’s military and promi- The consequences of failure could be three governates to form a regional government unit similar to nent tribal leaders, it will miss a key component to devastating to Iraq and the region. If the new the Kurdish Regional Government and to veto national legisla- transition. The focus now should be on reconcilia- government is unable to contain the insurgents tion, should a majority in three governates agree. The Kurds believe that pressure from Ayatollah Sistani kept the TAL from tion and loyalty to the new Iraq, not retribution for and terrorists and if it is unable to win the being included in the draft United Nations Security Council having served in Saddam’s armed forces. The worst support of the diverse ethnic and sectarian resolution recognizing the new government. thing the United States could do would be to kill or communities in Iraq, then a weak and capture Muqtada al-Sadr—making him a martyr and symbol of national resistance will do more damage than letting the Shi’a establishment The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research by marginalize him. books, monographs, and reports on national security members of the National Defense University as well as strategy, defense policy, and national military strategy. other scholars and specialists in national security affairs Balance carrots and sticks in approaching For information on NDU Press visit the Web site at: from this country and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, Syria and Iran. These two countries are part of the http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also and recommendations expressed or implied within are current problem but are also part of the solution. produces Joint Force Quarterly for the Chairman of the those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect Joint Chiefs of Staff; the journal can be accessed at: the views of the Department of Defense or any other Their tacit or active support for insurgent elements http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/index.htm. agency of the Federal Government.

inside Iraq and efforts to build operational bases in INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE the north, in the so-called Sunni center, and the Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear Robert A. Silano predominantly Shi’a areas of southern Iraq must be Director Director of Research Director of Publications

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