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Islamist Political Activism In : Moderation, Militancy, And Democracy

By: Curtis R. Ryan

Abstract While democracy has proven to be a fragile and elusive form of politics in the modern Arab world, Islamist movements have flourished -- ranging from grass-roots pro-democracy activism to militant jihadism and terrorism. Whether Arab politics witnesses more political liberalization in the near future will depend in large part on the nature of Islamist movements, as well as ruling regimes’ reactions to them. This article examines the broad range of Islamist alternatives within one of the more liberalizing Arab states -- the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan -- with a view to understanding the depth and breadth of Islamist forms of political mobilization.

Ryan, C.R. (2008). Islamist Political Activism In Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, And Democracy. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 12 (2) June 2008: 1-13. Publisher version of record available at: https:// www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ISLAMIST-POLITICAL-ACTIVISM-IN-JORDAN-%3A-MODERATION-Ryan/ d417524c3ac4d78427a8ff2a7636d4506c7b6f40 ISLAMIST POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN JORDAN: MODERATION, MILITANCY, AND DEMOCRACY Curtis R. Ryan*

While democracy has proven to be a fragile and elusive form of politics in the modern Arab world, Islamist movements have flourished--ranging from grass-roots pro-democracy activism to militant jihadism and terrorism. Whether Arab politics witnesses more political liberalization in the near future will depend in large part on the nature of Islamist movements, as well as ruling regimes’ reactions to them. This article examines the broad range of Islamist alternatives within one of the more liberalizing Arab states--the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan--with a view to understanding the depth and breadth of Islamist forms of political mobilization.

The Islamist movement in Jordan has a on the longstanding relationship between the history and heritage as old as that of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite Hashemite regime itself. While Jordan’s main monarchy. It then moves on to study the move Islamist political party--the Islamic Action toward political liberalization in the latter Front (Jabha al-Amal al-Islami or IAF)--was years of King Hussein’s reign and the not legalized until the early 1990s, Jordan’s corresponding shift within the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) movement toward legalized political party maintained a functional relationship with the activism and electoral participation. Yet while Hashemite monarchy especially throughout Jordan’s Islamist movement has, therefore, the reign of King Hussein (1953-1999), who been overwhelmingly reformist rather than tolerated the Ikhwan as a loyal opposition. revolutionary, and democratically-minded Indeed the relationship between the Muslim rather than militant, there nonetheless remain Brotherhood and the Hashemite monarchy alternative Islamist forces that focus on jihadi predates even the reign of King Hussein. Most ideas. The article therefore also examines the strikingly, Islamist activism in Jordanian rise of the Salafiyya movement in the kingdom politics has for more than 60 years emphasized as well as the impact of foreign (including al- reform, moderation, and democratic Qa’ida) jihadists in militant confrontations participation, rather than revolution, with the Jordanian state and society. Finally, radicalism, and militancy. Yet in November of the article discusses the implications of the 2005, militant Islamists affiliated with al- Hashemite regime’s increasing emphasis on Qa’ida in carried out a series of deadly state security at the expense of political bombings in the capital, . Within liberalization, and potentially at the expense of hours, Jordan’s own Islamist movement had moderate forms of Islamism. organized anti-al-Qa’ida demonstrations, condemning al-Qa’ida and militant Islamist THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN terrorism. In doing so, Jordan’s Muslim HASHEMITE JORDAN Brotherhood and other Islamists demonstrated the sharp--but too often underemphasized-- The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in difference between reformist and 1928 in Egypt by the Islamist activist Hasan revolutionary approaches to Islamist activism. al-Banna. The organization quickly developed This article examines the rise of the branches throughout the Arab world, calling Islamist movement in Jordan, with emphasis for a reassertion of Islam into public life in

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both government and society. While the and this drew the recognition of the state itself. Muslim Brotherhood established a presence in In 1946, King Abdallah I officially recognized almost every Arab country, the individual the Muslim Brotherhood as a charitable organizations remained mainly autonomous, society in Jordan, and the king actually responding to local and national presided over the ceremony himself. Abdallah circumstances. In the case of Jordan, the even included Muslim Brotherhood Secretary Muslim Brotherhood was established Abd al-Hakim al-Din in his governing cabinet, officially in the kingdom in 1945. From the making this early linkage between the very beginning, the Brotherhood made clear Brotherhood and the Hashemites that its agenda was Islamist but not militant, institutionally clear.1 From the outset, the Muslim Brotherhood Beyond more direct political or established a pattern of loyal opposition to the governmental activism, however, the Muslim Hashemite regime. By emphasizing reform Brotherhood has taken very seriously its role rather than revolution, the Brotherhood saw as a charitable organization. With regime itself in partnership with the Jordanian state. approval, the Brotherhood established the As the regime consolidated its rule within Islamic Center Charity Society in 1963, and Jordan, its moderate political positions, pro- was able to tap into funding generated from Western foreign policy, and conservative the oil economies of the wealthy and socially monarchical institutions immediately served conservative Arab Gulf monarchies. For as a target for emerging Cold War ideological several decades now, the Brotherhood has rifts, as well as emerging regional nationalist presided over a range of non-governmental and revolutionary tensions. Thus from the organizations (NGOs). Indeed, the only perspective of the ruling regime, this de facto, organization that patronizes and sponsors if not de jure, relationship between the more social and charitable organizations is the monarchy and its Islamist loyal opposition Hashemite royal family itself. The was intended in part to provide a counter to Brotherhood, meanwhile, established across left-leaning secular oppositional trends the country an array of schools and health ranging from Ba’thism to Nasserism to clinics, including the Islamic Hospital in Communism. central Amman.4 While the regime attempted to curb leftist, While it is clear that relations between the secular, and pan-Arabist political tendencies, Hashemites and the Brotherhood are almost as the monarchy simultaneously permitted its old as the Jordanian state itself, this does not Islamist opposition to flourish. This allowed mean that the two sides have always agreed. the Muslim Brotherhood to become by far the The Muslim Brotherhood did indeed support best organized group in the Jordanian the monarchy through its wars with , its opposition.2 In doing so, the moderation of the foiling of various nationalist coup attempts, Muslim Brotherhood also acted as a counter to and even the Jordanian civil war between the more radical trends within Islamism, such as Hashemite army and the guerrilla forces of the the Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party) that had Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in espoused a more revolutionary brand of 1970-1971. The Brotherhood walked a slightly Islamism, particularly in the 1960s and finer line during the various political 1970s.3 In an effort to enhance its own Islamic upheavals triggered by International Monetary credentials, the Hashemite regime Fund (IMF) economic austerity programs, continuously emphasized the direct lineage of such as the “bread riots” of 1989 and 1996.5 the royal family from that of Muhammad. The Yet at other times the Brotherhood has Brotherhood too has at times emphasized this directly opposed Hashemite policies, even level of Islamic legitimacy, in contrast to the while maintaining its de facto status as loyal many secular, leftist, or nationalist regimes opposition. The Brotherhood adamantly that emerged in the Arab world in neighboring opposed Anwar Sadat’s separate peace treaty Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. with Israel, for example, and viewed the

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Hashemite regime as too mild in its own “defensive democratization.”7 King Hussein opposition to Sadat’s move. When King fired the unpopular Prime Minister Zayd al- Hussein resolutely stood by the shah of Iran in Rifa’i, shuffled the governing cabinet, and 1979 even as the Iranian Islamic Revolution announced the return of elections for swept the monarchy away, the Brotherhood parliament for the first time since martial law again objected to the official Jordanian stance. had been declared in the wake of the 1967 This rift actually deepened following the 1980 War with Israel. Jordan’s political Iraqi invasion of Iran, as Jordan supported liberalization thereafter included several Saddam Hussein’s Ba’thist Iraq in its war with rounds of democratic parliamentary elections the Iranian revolutionary regime. For Hussein, (1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, and 2007), the lifting the prospect of an Islamist movement of martial law (1991), legalization of political successfully toppling a conservative pro- parties (1992), and several rounds of revisions Western monarch was positively chilling. Yet regarding government control of media, press, for the brotherhood, opposing the only and publications.8 Given its longstanding successful Islamist regime in the region was relationship with the regime, and its status as unconscionable. virtually the only officially tolerated form of In more contemporary politics, the major opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood was policy rift between the Islamist movement and perfectly positioned to benefit from the new the Hashemite state has centered on Jordan’s atmosphere of openness. As parliamentary and own peace treaty with Israel signed in 1994. electoral life returned to the kingdom, the The Islamist movement adamantly opposed Brotherhood was able to capitalize on the treaty at the time, and in the years decades-worth of organization. afterward its opposition only grew. The Yet beyond the Brotherhood, Jordan also Brotherhood became a leading part of the has a long tradition of independent Islamist broader “anti-normalization” movement in activism in addition to that of organized Jordan; if the opposition could not prevent the groups such as the Ikhwan, or their treaty, it could and did manage largely to contemporary political party: the IAF. prevent normalization of society-to-society Independent Islamists have tended to resist relations. Since Islamists had tended to win joining organizations like the Muslim democratic elections for the leadership Brotherhood, or parties like the IAF, which positions within most of Jordan’s professional they often accuse of being co-opted by the associations (for doctors, engineers, lawyers, regime. Among the most well-known and pharmacists, for example), the Islamist independent Islamist activists is the outspoken movement was institutionally positioned to Layth Shubaylat, who was among those maintain its self-declared ban on working with independents serving in the 1989-1993 Israeli counterparts.6 parliament. Shubaylat has argued that “institutional” Islamism is effectively a tool of THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT, the regime, which thereby has managed to LIBERALIZATION, AND ELECTIONS “tame” the Muslim Brotherhood.9 Shubaylat’s strident criticism of the regime Jordan’s program of political liberalization and its policies led to his arrest in 1992. In began in earnest in 1989, as a direct response what amounts to a familiar pattern of curbing to widespread political unrest in the kingdom. dissent in the Hashemite kingdom, Shubaylat An International Monetary Fund (IMF) was arrested, tried, convicted, and soon economic austerity program, imposed in an thereafter pardoned by the king. While this is attempt to improve the kingdom’s declining nowhere near the level of ruthlessness one economy, had triggered rioting throughout the finds in other regional regimes, the message country. The depth and breadth of the political and latent threat to the opposition more upheaval had clearly shaken the regime itself, generally is nonetheless clear. Having a which responded with what amounted to criminal conviction also bars an individual

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from running for office in the future, and the in the kingdom, sexual segregation in some regime therefore managed to remove governmental office buildings, and a ban (later Shubaylat from parliamentary opposition rescinded) on fathers watching their daughters permanently. in competitive sports. It is important to note, Unlike Shubaylat and other critics, the here, that this too played into the state’s Muslim Brotherhood intended not only to strategy. While the Hashemite regime had no compete in the elections, but also hoped way of knowing what specific policies would ultimately to gain positions in government and be implemented, regime officials were certain reform state policy. In the 1989 elections, to that the Islamist ministers--if given room to the surprise of many in the Hashemite regime, maneuver----would in fact rile public opinion the Muslim Brotherhood secured 22 against their various measures. The idea, in parliamentary seats (out of a total of 80), while short, was to ease tensions by including the independent Islamists won an additional 12 opposition in government, but also to allow seats. With a bloc of 34 seats in parliament, them to fall flat in the face of a backlash in the Jordanian Islamist movement elected one public opinion.12 of its most influential leaders, Dr. Abd al-Latif In any event, the government itself was Arabiyyat, to be speaker of the house. For dissolved merely six months later, and Arabiyyat, the events of 1989 served as a replaced with an equally short-lived cabinet “wake-up call” for the Hashemite regime.10 led by new Prime Minister Tahir al-Masri, a Prime Minister Mudar Badran, responding to more liberal and progressive politician. This the Islamist electoral victories, invited several time, the Brotherhood rejected the few token Islamists into his government. This, however, ministries it was offered and instead worked to led to a rift within the movement regarding a oust the Masri government in a no confidence very important proposition: Should Islamists vote. While the vote never carried, Masri’s serve in the government at all? position had become quickly unworkable, and Hardline members of the Islamist once again the government was replaced.13 movement argued that this amounted to a kind The regime clearly remained alarmed at the of capitulation to the state, and in effect a level of Islamist influence and electoral contamination of the movement itself. Many success, however, and government efforts left the Brotherhood over this issue, becoming thereafter turned on limiting Islamist successes part of Jordan’s longstanding traditional of in future elections. The regime therefore independent Islamist thought and activism. responded to the Islamist victories with a Yet the more mainstream members of the sweeping change of the electoral system: Ikhwan saw serving as cabinet ministers as a changing to a one-person one-vote structure well-deserved reward for years of with modified electoral districts. While the organizational effort. Among this latter group earlier system, which allowed Jordanians to were Abdallah Akaylah (minister of vote for multiple MP’s (depending on how education), Yusuf al-Azm (minister of social many would represent the given district) had development), Majid al-Khalifa (minister of perhaps exaggerated Islamist strength, the new justice), Zayd al-Kilani (minister of awqaf and system was designed to do precisely the religious affairs), and Adnan al-Jaljuli reverse. In the 1993 elections, which followed (minister of health).11 the legalization of political parties in the With five cabinet portfolios and leading a kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood did not bloc of 34 parliamentary seats, the Muslim directly participate, returning instead to its Brotherhood had accomplished an astounding traditional role as political, social, and political victory. This was tempered rather charitable movement. Instead, many Ikhwan quickly, however, when public opinion turned members, and even Islamists outside the against many of the measures that the Islamist Brotherhood, formed and joined the IAF.14 ministers imposed. The most notorious of The IAF over time became, in effect, the these included a failed attempt to ban alcohol political party wing of the Muslim

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Brotherhood. As such, the IAF participated in 2000 and preparations looming for a second the 1993 elections, but secured only 16 U.S. war on Iraq, the new Jordanian regime parliamentary seats, while independent decided to put off part of the political Islamists dropped to a mere six seats. liberalization process, by postponing However, this drop off in representation parliamentary elections scheduled for appeared to be due more to the changed November 2001. electoral law, rather than to a backlash against Yet in 2003, after two years of Islamist government policies.15 postponements, Jordan held its fourth round of Following the drop in electoral strength in parliamentary elections since the start of the the 1993 elections, the Islamist movement liberalization process in 1989. The 2003 demanded a repeal of the newer electoral elections were the first under King Abdallah system. They correctly argued that the districts II, and marked the return of the opposition to themselves were unbalanced: over- electoral politics. This time the IAF and the representing more conservative, pro-regime opposition parties eschewed the boycott tactics rural areas, and under-representing more of 1997 and instead contested the elections, urban--and more Palestinian--areas that had which were held under a new set of laws provided key bases of support for Jordanian extending the number of parliamentary seats Islamism. When the government refused to from 80 to 110, including a minimum of six comply with Islamist demands to change the seats to guarantee women’s representation in electoral system, the IAF led a broad-based parliament. Seventeen IAF members gained opposition coalition (including leftist and pan- parliamentary seats. Interestingly, the IAF Arab nationalist parties) in an 11-party boycott parliamentary deputies included Hayat al- of the 1997 elections. The resulting parliament Musani, the first woman elected to parliament naturally proved to be overwhelmingly under the quota system. In addition to the IAF conservative, nationalist, and pro- bloc, five independent Islamists were also Hashemite.16 With only six independent elected to parliament.18 Islamist MP’s in the new parliament, and no While the IAF remained focused on its own MP’s whatsoever from the IAF, Islamist Islamist political agenda, most legislation strength and strategy shifted from parties and continued to emerge from the government parliament, toward the professional itself, with the parliament serving as a associations instead. In short order, Islamist debating forum that usually provided a candidates won the leadership posts of almost legislative stamp of approval for government every professional association in the kingdom initiatives. The IAF had no success in (e.g. engineers, pharmacists, medical doctors), achieving its broadest policy goals. These thereby creating a basis for Islamist political unfulfilled goals included implementing activism outside the halls of parliament, but Shari’a (Islamic law) and abrogating the very much within Jordanian civil society.17 Jordan-Israel peace treaty. Still, the IAF did align itself with more KING ABDALLAH II AND THE secular conservative forces to block repeated ISLAMIST MOVEMENT government attempts to change Jordan’s laws regarding “honor crimes;” that is, crimes In 1999, King Hussein of Jordan died after purportedly linked to family honor in which a long battle with cancer. He was succeeded men kill female relatives who are believed to by his eldest son, Abdallah, who became King have in some way shamed the family. Jordan’s Abdallah II. While the succession itself had monarchy itself has endorsed attempts to proceeded smoothly and peacefully, the same change the kingdom’s otherwise lenient could not be said for regional politics and pattern of sentencing for these crimes. Yet the hence Jordan’s immediate political Islamist movement, in temporary alliances environment. With the emergence of the with other social conservatives in parliament, second Palestinian uprising--or intifada--in has consistently opposed attempts to change

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the legal system regarding “crimes of in Jordan, but they do not necessarily believe honor.”19 that jihad is either viable or appropriate. For others, jihad is the only alternative. Not Salafists, Jihadists, and “Jordan’s 9-11” surprisingly these latter Salafists include many returned veterans of the Afghan wars. The While the Muslim Brotherhood and the jihadi tendency within the Jordanian Salafi IAF are the best organized, most recognizable movement sees itself as takfiri; that is, those faces of Islamism in Jordan, there also remain who declare the Hashemite state as kafir-- more subtle and even underground forms. unbelievers against whom jihad is no less than Jordan’s Salafiyya movement, for example, a duty. These Salafi jihadists are influenced has grown steadily since the 1980s. The term not only by Shaykh al-Bani, but also by the “Salafi” refers to the earliest Muslim earlier writings of thirteenth century Islamist communities and specifically the immediate Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and twentieth companions of Muhammad. The Salafiyya century Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb.21 movement, in fact, originally emerged from Wiktorowicz has argued that while the the reformist efforts of Islamic Modernist Muslim Brotherhood and IAF rely on formal thinker Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the organization and participation in political nineteenth century. Yet in the late twentieth parties, professional associations, and century the term Salafiyya has changed charities, the Salafi movement has instead dramatically and perhaps even reversed the relied on informal networks for recruitment earlier emphasis on modernism and reform. and activism. He further argues that many of Salafism today, in contrast, usually refers to a Jordan’s religious scholars, the ulama, are more hardline and puritanical approach to themselves Salafists. The informal networks, Islamic revivalism. Some versions of Salafism meanwhile, allow Salafists to at least attempt (although not all) have turned instead toward to continue their activism under the radar of militancy, terrorism, and jihadi activism. state surveillance.22 Still, despite the rise in In the Jordanian case, as in many other Salafiyya ideas and activity, most of Jordan’s countries, the rise in Salafi activity coincided Islamist movement remains more mainstream, with the end of the Afghani mujahidin war reformist, and democratic, while the major against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This terrorist threats have come largely from is, in short, a much more recent phenomenon foreign al-Qa’ida militants. than the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. The worst terrorist attack in Jordan Many credit the rise of a Salafi alternative (to occurred in November 2005, as noted at the both the Jordanian state and its more outset of this article, as al-Qa’ida suicide established Islamist opposition) to the arrival bombers struck three luxury hotels in central in Jordan of the influential Salafi Shaykh Amman, killing 60 people--mostly Jordanians- Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Bani. Shaykh al- -and injuring more than 100. The IAF and the Bani fled to the kingdom from Syria in 1979, Muslim Brotherhood were among the first to as the Ba’thist state was deepening its respond to the tragedy by organizing anti-al- crackdown on Sunni Islamists in Syria. In the Qa’ida demonstrations in the capital. The words of Quintan Wiktorowicz, the arrival of demonstrations underscored the difference al-Bani “precipitated an explosion of Salafi between moderate mainstream pro-democratic activism” as he essentially served as a “focal forms of Islamism (such as Jordan’s Muslim point” for Islamists seeking a return to what Brotherhood) and militant global jihadi they viewed as a more authentic and organizations (such as al-Qa’ida). The traditional approach to Islam.20 terrorists struck on the 9 November 2005-- Still, while the Salafi alternative has hence, it was literally “Jordan’s 9-11”--and all increased in strength in Jordan over time, it were ethnic sent to Jordan merely days also remains of at least two minds. Some earlier on the orders of Abu Mus’ab al- Salafists believe that radical change is needed Zarqawi. Zarqawi, formerly a Jordanian

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national, had become the self-styled leader of more moderate Prime Minister Adnan Badran, al-Qa’ida in Iraq. The attack, it seems, was and replaced him with Ma’ruf Bakhit, Jordan’s meant to punish Jordan for its closeness to the former ambassador to Israel and very much a , among other grievances against security hawk. Conservative royalists retained the Hashemites.23 the speakership posts in both the lower house Jordanian intelligence services had claimed of parliament (under Abd al-Hadi al-Majali) as to have previously foiled no less than 150 well as the upper house or senate (under other plots to public safety and security from former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa’i). Neither militant Islamists affiliated with al-Qa’ida. Yet man was known for his sympathies for all earlier plots had involved Jordanian Islamists, or for for that matter. nationals, while the November 2005 bombings Aware that security concerns had provided were carried out by Iraqi suicide bombers. the pretext for a host of earlier deliberalization These militants, unfortunately, managed to moves over the years, Islamist members of slip through the network of security and parliament urged the regime not to use the intelligence to carry out their attacks. Al- tragedy of the bombings as an excuse to issue Qa’ida militants had, however, earlier struck new martial laws. The government, for its on a more limited scale, including firing part, declared that counterterrorism would be a Katyusha rockets in Jordan’s port city of key policy focus and it called for “preemptive Aqaba, killing one Jordanian soldier.24 war” specifically on militant forms of The scale and barbarity of the Amman Islamism. Although Muslim Brotherhood and bombings, each of which targeted a wedding IAF were not in any way militant, they party taking place in a major (Western) hotel nonetheless feared that new security measures chain in central Amman, seemed to transform might be used against them. In January 2006, Jordanian public opinion regarding Islamist seemingly on cue, the government issued militancy and terrorism. In a poll conducted charges against one of the IAF’s leaders, Jamil by the University of Jordan’s Center for Abu Bakr, for “harming the dignity of the Strategic Studies, responses to the same state.” The charges stemmed from articles on questions varied greatly between 2004 and the IAF website that criticized the government December 2005--one month after the attacks. tendency to appoint officials due mainly to In the 2004 survey, 68 percent of Jordanians connections (wasta) rather than expertise or polled viewed al-Qa’ida as a “legitimate parliamentary consultations. The charges were resistance organization.” In 2005, that number dropped the following month, but the sense of had declined to 20 percent. Similarly, in 2004, harassment remained. The regime meanwhile only 10.6 percent labeled al-Qa’ida as a moved still further in its efforts to rein in more terrorist organization, while in 2005 that militant Islamism, including issuing a new law number had increased to 48.9 percent. When restricting preaching in mosques and issuing the pollsters added a distinction, and asked fatwas only to government-approved ulama. specifically about the Zarqawi-led Finally, perhaps the most ominous sign was organization within al-Qa’ida, 72.2 percent of the new and decidedly elastic anti-terrorism Jordanians saw it as a terrorist organization law that seemed to greatly expand the roles, rather than a legitimate resistance powers, and influence of the intelligence and organization.25 police services in daily life.26 Despite the hostility of most Jordanians, including Islamists, to the terrorist attacks, the The Hamas Factor in Jordanian Politics? Islamist movement in parliament nonetheless soon found itself squaring off with the With the sweeping victory of Hamas in government following a major cabinet Palestinian legislative elections in January reshuffle. The new government made clear 2006, a “Hamas factor” appeared to have that the monarchy had shifted entirely to reinvigorated Jordan’s already well-organized security-mode. King Abdallah dismissed the and well-established Islamist movement. With

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2008) 7 Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy its emphasis on anti-corruption in its political recently unveiled “Lebanon First” agenda, campaign, as well as its maintenance of suggesting that such narrow visions meant that charities, clinics, and schools, Hamas was in surely the United States or Israel lurked as a many ways adopting the electoral strategies close second. While the Jordanian press and tactics of Jordan’s IAF and Muslim castigated the Syrian regime for arrogance and Brotherhood. Yet unlike Hamas, the IAF and a long list of other complaints, the Hashemite Muslim Brotherhood do not have a militant regime remained angered that the Jordanians wing, and instead focus on civilian party and present at the speech had either failed to refute interest group organization and remain very Asad’s comments, or worse, had actually much a part of the pro-democratization applauded.28 movement in the kingdom. Hamas For many Islamists, the Hamas victory representatives were expelled from Jordan in in the 2006 Palestinian elections was inspiring, 1999, when the kingdom severed ties and but it was also a reminder of their comparative closed their offices. limitations. Hamas’ electoral win translated Now, however, with the Hamas victory in immediately into a new Hamas-led the 2006 Palestinian elections, the IAF called government and cabinet. Within Jordan, in on the Jordanian government to restore ties contrast, almost two decades of Islamist and recognize their achievement. Jordan’s electoral strategies had indeed translated to Islamists were also inspired by the relative some success, but to no chance whatsoever to success of Muslim Brotherhood candidates form an IAF government in Jordan. After the (running as independents) in Egyptian Hamas victory, however, a new boldness parliamentary elections as well as the rise of entered the rhetoric of some IAF leaders, who Islamist activists to power in neighboring Iraq. now announced their new political program. Jordanian Islamists, like their counterparts Some aspects remain cornerstones of earlier elsewhere, campaigned on platforms of clean programs: fully implementing Shari’a law, government and inclusion, and their credibility abandoning the Wadi Araba treaty, ending in this area benefited from their already- normalization with Israel.29 Yet others established reputation for civic mindedness, included demands to stop attempting to based on the extensive Muslim Brotherhood “downsize” the Islamist movement through network of charitable organizations.27 electoral laws designed to minimize their In the midst of this Islamist euphoria representation. Azzam al-Hunaydi, the leader over the inspiring electoral successes of of the IAF bloc within parliament, minced no others, however, the IAF and Muslim words when he stated flatly that “that which Brotherhood did nothing to endear themselves faces the Islamic movement--in terms of to an already suspicious Hashemite regime, attempts at marginalization and exclusion, when Islamist activists chose to attend the tailoring of laws and the policy of ceilings-- Arab political parties conference held in will not last indefinitely.” He may have caught Damascus in March 2006. Syrian President the attention of Jordan’s security-focused Bashar al-Asad hosted the conference on regime when he added even more starkly that behalf of Syria’s Ba’thist regime. Thus “the time of downsizing, marginalization, Jordanian Islamists attended an event that showing scorn for people and being captive to banned Islamists from Syria itself. The point foreigners will end soon.”30 was not lost on Syria’s exiled Muslim In the view of Hunaydi and many other Brotherhood, which lambasted the IAF for its Islamist activists, Jordan remained committed lack of solidarity and questionable judgment. to the wrong paths in both domestic and The IAF meanwhile found itself also foreign policy. The IAF therefore presented attacked by the Jordanian government, when itself as an alternative approach, and one that President Asad mockingly referred to the was ready to govern. The “Hamas effect,” in Hashemite regime’s “Jordan First” policy. short, had provided the Jordanian Islamist Asad coupled “Jordan First” with Lebanon’s movement with a renewed optimism.31 IAF

8 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2008) Curtis C. Ryan deputies charged that in freer and fairer elections, they might win 40 to 50 percent of Islamists and the 2007 Jordanian Elections the vote. With Islamists rising to prominence and power through nearby elections-- The November 2007 national parliamentary Hizballah in Lebanon, various Islamist Shi’a elections followed an earlier round of parties in Iraq, and Hamas in the Palestinian municipal elections, held throughout the territories--Jordanian Islamists argued that kingdom in July 2007. If that earlier set of they might now be poised to win an outright elections was viewed as a harbinger of things majority in parliament. Given Jordan’s heavily to come, its conclusion did not encourage the gerrymandered electoral districts, which favor Islamists. Amidst widespread charges of vote- rural over urban districts (and hence under- rigging, the IAF announced its withdrawal represent predominantly Palestinian and from the process, but only on election day Islamist areas of the kingdom), the IAF itself. The government quickly argued that the optimism may be unfounded. Even aside from Islamists were merely attempting to save face gerrymandered districts, the party has never in the midst of a resounding electoral defeat, received close to half the overall votes. Yet while the Islamist movement, in contrast, under a new and more even-handed electoral insisted that the regime was engaged in an law, they would nonetheless be likely to do elaborate process of vote-rigging. Both sides fairly well. Indeed, IAF and Muslim may have had a point. At issue was the Brotherhood officials made very clear their practice of busing soldiers to polling places, overall view of the current system, when they who would then vote in very large numbers, repeatedly called on the regime to issue a new presumably tipping the scales to pro- “democratic elections law” (emphasis government candidates even in Islamist added).32 strongholds like Irbid and Zarqa. The Islamists In addition to concerns about the electoral therefore felt that they were being system, Jordanian Islamists also insisted that systematically under-represented, and that this governments should then be drawn from was part of a broader process to sideline them parliament in a truer model of a parliamentary in Jordanian politics and society. Indeed, the system, rather than royally-appointed pending year before, in 2006, the regime had even only the formality of parliamentary approval. dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood’s main IAF deputies remained certain that their means of distributing its social welfare “street” support greatly exceeded their actual programs and funds: the Islamic Center parliamentary power. In the wrangling within Charity.33 Jordanian politics over the next and “final” It was therefore in an atmosphere of law on parties and elections, the IAF insisted increasing wariness, and even mutual hostility that hinted bans on religiously-based parties between the state and the Islamist movement, remain off the table, while a more truly that the national election campaign began. democratic election law remains very much an This tense context only exacerbated divisions IAF interest, so that the alleged Islamist street within the Islamist movement itself, majority could one day become a governing particularly between hawks and doves, coalition. regarding tactics and strategy, if not policy. This issue of linking elections to actual The dovish and moderate wing of the governance was a key sticking point in the movement, which had for so long maintained struggle between the government and its a level of understanding with the Hashemite opposition, when they bargained over the state, even negotiated with the government in ground rules for the next rounds of an attempt to allay the regime’s fears of the parliamentary elections. Yet in effect, the hawks. Indeed, Jordan’s intelligence services government and its opponents were also seemed to view the hawkish wing, led by IAF debating the future nature of the Jordanian Secretary General Zaki Bani-Irshayd, as state itself. increasingly a de facto Jordanian Hamas-style

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movement operating within the broader contrast, felt hard-pressed to contain what they Islamist framework.34 viewed as a Hamas-like shift within Jordanian The moderate wing agreed to field a mere Islamism. Jordanian analyst Hasan Barari, 22 candidates (down from the usual 30 or so) while acknowledging the probability of state in the national elections and even ensured that electioneering, has also argued that the major most of these would be from the dovish wings factor may have been a shift in Jordanian of the IAF and Muslim Brotherhood. Having public opinion itself, especially in the wake of secured 17 seats in the previous parliament, the 2005 Amman bombings.38 Despite the the Islamist movement expected to retain its moderation and reformism of most of Jordan’s earlier strength at minimum. Yet when the Islamist movement, there may have been some votes were counted, Islamist representation level of public backlash and impatience with (out of a parliament of 110) had plummeted to Islamists in general. only six seats. More surprisingly, no Islamist The main victims of the elections, however, candidates were elected in key political bases may have been--not simply Islamists--but such as Irbid and Zarqa.35 Once again, the moderate Islamists. The government’s strategy recriminations flowed swiftly. appeared to be shifting beyond containment of The IAF and Muslim Brotherhood leaders Islamism in the kingdom, and towards a more each accused the government of fraud and active and even aggressive strategy of vote-rigging. Specifically, they argued that disrupting the movement, and deepening intra- vote-buying schemes were widespread, with Islamist divisions. The question, of course, is the government allegedly ignoring widespread whether this electoral disaster for the Islamist irregularities.36 The recriminations did not movement leads it, ultimately, to itself pursue stop there, however, but resurfaced within the its traditional loyal opposition strategy, or shift Islamist movement itself. Hawks such as Bani- to a more radical and more confrontational Irshayd, who had been so skeptical of the approach to the Hashemite state. process in the first place, accused moderates of losing the elections for the Islamist CONCLUSIONS movement. The attempt of the moderates to work with the regime appeared to have back- For more than 60 years, the Hashemite fired. In his analysis of state survival strategies monarchy and its mainstream Islamist in Jordan, Asher Susser has argued that the movement have maintained a cooperative 2007 election outcome was the result, in relationship. In recent years, however, a effect, of the more hawkish Islamist elements pattern of deliberalization threatened to erode greatly overplaying their hand, combined with that long pattern of Islamist loyal opposition to a pronounced sharp reaction of a state that was the monarchy and the state. The monarchy in a defensive and even “punitive” mood. saw these measures as necessary, given the “The attempt by the doves in the movement to extreme and even violent circumstances in the come to an understanding with the region. Jordan remained wedged between government at the last minute was essentially violence in neighboring states: that is, between rebuffed,” Susser argues, “The hawks had a Palestinian uprising and Israeli military crossed a line, and the Islamists as a whole responses, to the west, while to the east, Iraq were going to be taught a lesson.”37 was mired in war, occupation, insurgency, and For both sides the immediate regional civil strife. context was critical. Islamist successes in After the 2005 al-Qa’ida bombings in the elections in Gaza, the , Egypt, capital itself, the regime’s already-established Lebanon, and even Turkey seemed to prompt security emphases simply became that much the Jordanian IAF to push for far more than stronger. Yet the danger remained that the the Jordanian Islamist movement had regime’s security concerns were effectively heretofore achieved, or been allowed to undermining Jordan’s once-heralded process achieve. While the Hashemite regime, in of political liberalization and democratization.

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The regime’s tolerance for Islamist dissent, for council and by electing moderate leader Abd example, was limited indeed. When several al-Latif al-Arabiyyat as head of the council IAF members of parliament paid a condolence itself. The Shura council, therefore, continues call to the family of the late Abu Mus’ab al- to reflect the divisions within the Islamist Zarqawi (killed in Iraq in 2006), they were movement itself The IAF, for its part, had to soon arrested and tried with crimes against the scramble to make the deadline to comply with state. The arrested MP’s included Ali Abu a new political parties law in the kingdom. Sukkar, Ja’far Hurani, and Muhammad Abu While Jordanian Islamists objected to the Faris. Abu Faris angered the regime still newer and more restrictive approach to further (and indeed infuriated Jordanian public political parties, the IAF did manage in April opinion as well) when, in an interview with 2008 to renew its license and hence retain its the satellite television station al-Arabiyya, he legal status in Jordan. As the discussion above stated that Zarqawi was a martyr, but that the makes clear, however, the debates over tactics, victims of the Amman bombings were not.39 strategy, and the role of Islamism in Jordanian The three deputies were convicted of inciting politics nonetheless continued, both within the terrorism, but in a very familiar pattern of Islamist movement and within the Hashemite reining in dissent in Hashemite Jordan, they regime itself. were later pardoned and released. Jordanian government officials often argue Many Islamists read this episode as merely that any restrictive measures are actually quite a small part of an overall campaign against moderate (when compared to most other states them. Moreover, while Abu Faris is indeed in the Middle East) and that they are simply more radical than most Islamists active in prudent given the extreme circumstances in Jordanian public life, the regime’s general the region.41 In contrast, many in the Islamist pattern of actions seemed to be directed not movement feel that the longstanding simply toward individuals, but rather against cooperation between reformist Islamism and the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood more the monarchy may be in decline. These vastly broadly. While the regime would reject this different interpretations are a key issue for the interpretation, many in Jordan’s mainstream future of Jordanian politics, as they will in turn Islamist movement would not. The Islamist affect the policies and tactics of both movement itself, in the meantime, remained government and opposition in Jordan. There divided and indeed strained by the fallout and is, in short, a danger here that the regime’s recriminations from the disastrous 2007 various deliberalization moves in recent years parliamentary elections. (all made in the name of national security) Even as the hawks attempted to sideline may ultimately serve to alienate the moderates moderates, calling for their resignations and who make up the overwhelming majority of blaming them for the loss, the moderate Jordan’s Islamist activists, unwittingly leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood empowering the heretofore smaller but more managed to respond firmly. In April 2008, the militant alternatives. internal party court within the Brotherhood officially suspended radicals Zaki Bani- *Curtis R. Ryan is an associate professor of Irshayd and Muhammad Abu Faris for one political science at Appalachian State year from membership in the powerful Shura University, North Carolina. He holds a B.A. council that runs the organization. 40 Yet Bani- from Drew University and an M.A. and a Irshayd retained his position as secretary Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina general of the IAF, while the hardline at Chapel Hill. He served as a Fulbright Hammam al-Sa’id was elected to be the new Scholar at the Center for Strategic Studies in general guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Just Jordan (1992-1993) and was twice named a as importantly, however, the moderates Peace Scholar by the United States Institute of reaffirmed their position by securing half of Peace. He is the author of Jordan in the seats on the Brotherhood’s ruling Shura Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Lynne

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Rienner, 2002) as well as articles published in the Middle East Journal, Middle East Insight, 10 Author’s interview with Abd al-Latif Arab Studies Quarterly, Israel Affairs, Arabiyyat, Amman, Jordan, February 25, Southeastern Political Review, Journal of 1993. Third World Studies, Middle East Policy, and 11 Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Middle East Report. His new book is on Inter- Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Arab Alliances (forthcoming in 2008, Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan University Press of Florida). (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), Chapter 3. NOTES 12 Author’s interviews with Islamist activists and Jordanian government officials, Amman, 1 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Islamists, the State, Jordan, March 1993. and Cooperation in Jordan,” Arab Studies 13 Author’s interviews with former Prime Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1999), p. 4. Minister Tahir al-Masri, Amman, Jordan, 2 Marion Boulby, The Muslim Brotherhood March 2, 1993 and July 14, 2001. and the Kings of Jordan (Landham, MD: 14 Dalil al-Hayat al-Hizbiyya fi al-Urdun: University Press of America, 1999). Hizb Jabha al-Amal al-Islami [Guide to Party 3 Wiktorowicz, “Islamists, the State, and Life in Jordan: The Islamic Action Front Cooperation in Jordan,” pp. 4-5. Party], (Amman: al-Urdun al-Jadid Research 4 Ibid, p. 7. On the linkage between charitable Center, 1993). organizations and Islamist movements, see in 15 Abla Amawi, “The 1993 Elections in particular Janine Clark, Islam, Charity, and Jordan,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social 3 (1994), pp. 15-27. Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen 16 Dirasat fi al-Intakhabat al-Niyabiyya al- (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Urduniyya [Studies in the 1997 Representative 2003). [Parliamentary] Elections], (Amman: al- 5 Curtis R. Ryan, “Peace, Bread, and Riots: Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, 2002). Jordan and the International Monetary Fund,” 17 Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Middle East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1998), Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen pp. 54-66. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 6 Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, 2006). “’Normalization’ and ‘Anti-Normalization’ in 18 On women and the Jordanian Islamist Jordan: The Public Debate,” Israel Affairs, movement, see Lisa Taraki, “Islam is the Vol. 9, No. 3 (2003), pp. 141-64. Solution: Jordanian Islamists and the Dilemma 7 Glenn Robinson, “Defensive of the Modern Woman,” The British Journal Democratization in Jordan,” International of Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1995), pp. 643- Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 61. On the 2003 Jordanian elections and their (1998), pp. 387-410. implications, see Curtis R. Ryan and Jillian 8 For comparative analysis of the elections, see Schwedler, “Return to Democratization or Curtis R. Ryan, “Elections and Parliamentary New Hybrid Regime? The 2003 Elections in Democratization in Jordan,” Democratization, Jordan,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 11, No. 2 Vol. 5, No. 4 (1998), pp. 194-214. On the (2004), pp. 138-51. entire process of political and economic 19 This draws on an earlier discussion of transitions, see Curtis R. Ryan, Jordan in Islamist activism within parliamentary Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah politics. See Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordan: Islamic (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 2002). Action Front Presses for Role in Governing,” 9 Wiktorowicz, “Islamists, the State, and Arab Reform Bulletin, February 2006. Cooperation in Jordan,” p. 12. 20 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The Salafi Movement in Jordan,” International Journal

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of Middle East Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2000), p. 222. 21 Wiktorowicz, “The Salafi Movement in Jordan,” pp. 222-26. 22 Ibid, pp. 219-20. 23 International Crisis Group, “Jordan’s 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Islamism,” Middle East Report, No. 47 (November 2005). 24 Sana Abdallah, “Al-Qaida Still Haunts Jordan,” United Press International, March 5, 2006. 25 Fares Braizat, Post-Amman Attacks: Jordanian Public Opinion and Terrorism (Amman: Public Polling Unit, Center for Strategic Studies, 2005). 26 Ryan, “Jordan: Islamic Action Front Presses for Role in Governing.” 27 Daniel Williams, “Political Islam’s Opportunity in Jordan,” Washington Post, April 13, 2006. 28 Al-Arab al-Yawm, March 11, 2006. 29 Ryan, “Jordan: Islamic Action Front Presses for Role in Governing.” 30 Al-Hayat, January 30, 2006. 31 Thanassis Cambanis, “Jordan’s Islamists see a Path to Political Power,” Boston Globe, March 21, 2006. 32 Jordan Times, January 24, 2006. 33 Asher Susser, “Jordan: Preserving Domestic Order in a Setting of Regional Turmoil,” Middle East Brief, No. 27 (Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, March 2008), pp. 4-5. 34 Susser, “Jordan,” pp. 4-5. 35 Muhammad Ibn Hussein, “Islamists Dealt Heavy Blow in Elections,” Jordan Times, November 22, 2007. 36 Al-Sabil, November 27, 2007. 37 Susser, “Jordan,” p. 6. 38 Hassan Barari, “Elections in Jordan: Poor Showing for Islamists,” Policy Watch, No. 1317 (Washington Institute for Near East Studies, 2007). 39 Jordan Times, July 25, 2006. 40 Al-Arab al-Yawm, April 23, 2008. 41 Author’s interviews with Jordanian government officials, Amman, Jordan, May 2005.

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