American Political Science Review Page 1 of 22 August 2012 doi:10.1017/S0003055412000287 Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule STEPHAN HAGGARD University of California at San Diego ROBERT R. KAUFMAN Rutgers University ecent work by Carles Boix and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson has focused on the role of inequality and distributive conflict in transitions to and from democratic rule. We assess these R claims through causal process observation, using an original qualitative dataset on democratic transitions and reversions during the “third wave” from 1980 to 2000. We show that distributive conflict, a key causal mechanism in these theories, is present in just over half of all transition cases. Against theoretical expectations, a substantial number of these transitions occur in countries with high levels of inequality. Less than a third of all reversions are driven by distributive conflicts between elites and masses. We suggest a variety of alternative causal pathways to both transitions and reversions.

re inequality and distributive conflicts a driving wider the income disparities in society, the more elites force in the transition to democratic rule? Are have to fear from the transition to democratic rule and Aunequal democracies more likely to revert to the greater the incentives to repress challenges from authoritarianism? These questions have a long pedi- below. Given this potential indeterminacy, theoretical gree in in the analysis of the transition to democratic models have hinged on a variety of other parameters, rule in Europe (Lipset 1960; Marshall 1963; Moore such as the cost of repression or the mobility of assets. 1966), and have been raised again in newer compar- Even with these refinements, attempts to demon- ative historical work on democratization (Collier 1999; strate the relationship between inequality and regime Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). More type have yielded only mixed results. In cross-section, recently, an influential line of theory has attempted there is a relationship between income distribution and to ground the politics of inequality on rationalist as- the level of democracy: Ceteris paribus, more equal so- sumptions about citizens’ preferences over institutions cieties are more democratic. Yet the causal relationship (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; 2001; 2006; Boix 2003; between inequality and either transitions to democratic 2008; Przeworski 2009). These distributive conflict ap- rule or reversions from it is much less robust. proaches conceptualize authoritarian rule as an insti- We focus on regime change during the “third wave” tutional means through which unequal class or group of democratic transitions from 1980–2000. This period relations are sustained by limiting the franchise and the was marked by the spread of democracy to a wide range ability of social groups to organize. The rise and fall of of developing and postsocialist countries. These in- democratic rule thus reflect deeper conflicts between cluded not only middle-income nations in Latin Amer- elites and masses over the distribution of wealth and ica, Eastern Europe, and East and Southeast Asia but income. also a substantial number of lower income countries, in- Despite its logic, there are several theoretical and cluding in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Al- empirical reasons to question the expectations of these though democratic transitions outnumber reversions new distributive conflict models. Socioeconomic in- from democratic rule, the period also saw a number of equality plays a central role in these models, but has transitions to authoritarian rule. cross-cutting effects. The more unequal a society, the Not only does this temporal focus on the third wave greater the incentives for disadvantaged groups to capture a wide-ranging sample of regime changes but it press for more open and competitive politics. Yet the also overlaps with important changes in international context. During the Cold War era, both right- and left- Stephan Haggard is Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Pro- wing dictators could exploit great power rivalries to win fessor, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Stud- support from external patrons. During the 1980s and ies, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La 1990s, the decline and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Jolla, CA 92093 ([email protected]). Union created a much more permissive international Robert R. Kaufman is Professor, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, 89 George Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 environment for democratic rule (Boix 2011). ([email protected]). Using an extremely generous definition of “distribu- The authors thank Carles Boix, Michael Bratton, T.J. Cheng, tive conflict” transitions, we find that between 55% and Ruth Collier, Javier Corrales, Ellen Commisso, Sharon Crasnow, 58% of the democratic transitions during this period Anna Grzymala-Busse, Allan Hicken, Jan Kubik, James Long, Ir- fan Noorudin, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Celeste Raymond, Andrew conformed—even very loosely—to the causal mecha- Schrank, and Nic VanDewalle for comments on earlier drafts, includ- nisms specified in the distributive conflict models. Thus, ing on the construction of the dataset. We received useful feedback even with an expansive definition of distributive con- from a presentation at the Watson Institute, Brown University, and flict, more than 40% did not conform at all. Moreover, comments from Ronald Rogowski and anonymous reviewers of the a substantial number of the distributive conflict tran- APSR. Particular thanks as well to Christian Houle for making his dataset available. We also thank Vincent Greco, Terence Teo, and sitions occurred under conditions of high inequality, Steve Weymouth for research assistance. a result that is at odds with the expectations of the

1 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012 theory. Approximately 30% of all transitions occurred is limited, permitting more intensive treatment of the in countries that ranked in the top tercile in terms of in- relevant cases and thus more robust inference. equality, and a substantial majority of these transitions We begin in the first section by reviewing distribu- resulted from distributive conflict; this finding is robust tive conflict models of regime change, focusing on the to alternative measures of inequality. These findings do contributions by Boix (2003; 2008), Acemoglu and not necessarily overturn distributive conflict theories, Robinson (2000; 2001; 2006), and Przeworski (2009). but suggest that they are underspecified with respect The next section discusses methodological issues. The to scope conditions and only operate under very par- remainder of the article is structured around a con- ticular circumstances. sideration of transitions to democracy and reversions Given the substantial incidence of nondistributive to authoritarian rule. Our causal process observations conflict transitions, we find several alternative causal show not only that transitions occur across cases with pathways to democratic rule. External actors were de- very different levels of inequality—as the null findings cisive in some cases. In many cases, however, other do- in econometric models already attest—but also that a mestic causal factors induced incumbents to relinquish large number of democratic transitions and reversions power in the absence of strong challenges from below. occur in the absence of significant redistributive conflict Elite incumbents were sometimes challenged by elite altogether. outgroups or defectors from the ruling coalition who The returns from this exercise are both substan- saw gains from democratic openings. In other cases, tive and methodological. First, the findings cast doubt elite incumbents ceded power in the absence of mass on the prevalence of the core causal mechanisms at pressure because they believed they could control the work in the underlying model, including the relation- design of democratic institutions in ways that protected ship between inequality and particular types of elite their material interests. and mass behavior. In the conclusion, we raise ques- An even smaller percentage of reversions—less than tions about alternative approaches and suggest several a third—conformed to the elite-mass dynamics postu- ways in which the theory might be modified: There lated in the theory, and once again, we found little rela- may be other channels through which inequality can tionship between the incidence of these transitions and destabilize democratic rule, and there might be other socioeconomic inequality. However, we did find several economic and institutional factors that condition the alternative causal mechanisms. In several cases, incum- capacity of low-income groups to engage in collective bent democratic governments were overthrown not by action. Second, our methodological contribution raises socioeconomic elites seeking to block redistribution, important questions about the validity of reduced-form but by authoritarian populist leaders promising more panel designs, including with respect to the coding of redistribution. Even more commonly, however, rever- regime type itself. More positively, it suggests a fruitful sions were driven by conflicts that either cut across class way of combining quantitative and qualitative methods lines or arose from purely intra-elite conflicts, particu- that focuses attention on alternative transition paths larly conflicts in which factions of the military staged rather than the partial-equilibrium treatment effects coups against incumbent office holders. of favored variables. Our analysis is motivated by methodological as well as substantive concerns. In contrast to quantitative THEORY tests of the relationship between inequality and regime change, we have constructed a qualitative dataset Adam Przeworski (2009, 291) poses the puzzle of of within-case causal process observations (Haggard, democratic transitions in the clearest terms: “Why Kaufman, and Teo 2012). Our approach differs from would people who monopolize political power ever other such designs in that it examines all discrete decide to put their interests or values at risk by shar- country-years that have been coded as transitions or ing it with others? Specifically, why would those who reversions in two prominent datasets: Polity IV and the hold political rights in the form of suffrage decide to dichotomous coding scheme developed by Przeworski extend these rights to anyone else?” The seminal work et al. (2000) and extended by Cheibub, Ghandi, and of Meltzer and Richard (1981) provides the point of Vreeland (2010). departure for all current distributive conflict models of Critics of “medium-N” designs have argued that regime change.1 The Meltzer-Richard model posits that such designs lack both the detail of individual case the distribution of productivity and income is skewed studies or smaller-N designs and the precision of well- to the right, with most citizens falling at the lower and specified larger-N econometric models. Yet we argue middle range of the distribution and a smaller tail con- that they are particularly useful for evaluating whether stituting the rich; the mean income exceeds the median. the causal mechanisms stipulated in formal models— Where voting rules result in appeals to the median which typically involve complex sequences of strate- voter, the wider the divergence between the median gic interactions—are in fact present in the cases. The and mean income, the more is to be gained from re- approach is particularly useful for testing theories of distribution. Put differently, in countries with more relatively rare events, such as democratic transitions skewed income distributions, the poor have more to and reversions, civil wars, genocides, financial crises, gain from redistribution and should have more gener- and famines. In cross-national quantitative models of ous tax and transfer programs as a result. these phenomena, the number of country-years in the panel is large, but the number of cases to be explained 1 See also Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977).

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In the distributive conflict theories of regime change, have less to lose from competitive politics. Elites have most notably in the work of Boix (2003) and Acemoglu stronger incentives to repress as inequality increases and Robinson (2000; 2001; 2006), these expectations and when assets are fixed. are modified and expanded to endogenize the very Although broadly similar in spirit, Acemoglu and existence of democratic governments. These models Robinson’s (2006) Economic Origins of Dictatorship differ in ways we explicate later, but both rest on com- and Democracy introduces several innovations. Ace- plex causal chains including both structural and game- moglu and Robinson concur with Boix that regime type theoretic components: inequality, distributive conflict, is a function of the balance of power between high- and strategic interactions between incumbents and op- and low-income groups. Although elites monopolize positions over the nature of political institutions. In de jure power, masses potentially wield de facto power models of democratic transitions, low-income groups— through their capacity to mobilize against the regime. sometimes in coalition with middle-class forces—mobi- Like Boix, Acemoglu and Robinson elaborate more lize in favor of redistribution and against the authoritar- complex “three-class” models in which the pressure on ian institutions that sustain inequalities. These theories elites comes from coalitions of middle- and low-income are vague about how collective action problems are groups. However, the establishment of mass democracy solved, but posit that they can be overcome by changes presupposes the engagement of low-income sectors be- in information with respect to the solidity of incum- cause of their sheer weight. Because they constitute the bent power (Boix) or by increasing returns from mobi- majority, masses can sometimes “challenge the system, lization as inequality rises (Acemoglu and Robinson). create significant social unrest and turbulence, or even Faced with the threat of being displaced by force—in ef- pose a serious revolutionary threat” (25). fect, through revolution—elites calculate the net cost of High inequality increases the incentives for au- repression vs. concession, including institutional ones. thoritarian elites to repress these political demands At very high levels of inequality, the threats posed by for redistribution. To this observation, Acemoglu and democratization are too high to accept and they choose Robinson add an important point about credible com- to repress. Yet at low or medium levels of inequality, mitments. When elites are confronted by mobilization redistributive demands can be managed through class from below, they can make short-run economic conces- compromises over institutions and policy that permit sions to diffuse the threat. Yet politically and econom- democratic transitions. ically excluded groups are aware that elites can renege Carles Boix’s (2003) Democracy and Redistribution on these concessions when pressures from below sub- is a significant exemplar of this broad approach. Boix side. Because there is a cost to subsequently reversing defines a right-wing authoritarian regime as one in democracy after a transition has occurred, democratic which the political exclusion of the poor sustains exist- institutions provide a means for elites to credibly com- ing economic inequalities. According to Boix (2003, 37) mit to a more equal distribution of resources not only “a more unequal distribution of wealth increases the re- in the present but into the future as well. distributive demands of the population.... [However] Acemoglu and Robinson agree with Boix that, al- as the potential level of transfers becomes larger, though inequality increases the incentive for excluded the authoritarian inclinations of the wealthy increase groups to press for democracy, it also increases elite and the probabilities of democratization and demo- incentives to repress. High inequality is inauspicious cratic stability decline steadily.” The translation of for democracy. However, Acemoglu and Robinson ar- these demands into a change in institutions hinges on gue that democratization is also unlikely to occur in the balance of power between the wealthy and the authoritarian governments with low levels of inequal- poor. Boix offers an informational model in which ity because the demand for it is also attenuated; de- regime changes are triggered by exogenous shocks that spite political restrictions, excluded groups nonethe- weaken the elite or reveal its weakness (28–30). A less share in the distribution of societal income. They necessary (although not sufficient) mechanism driving conclude that the relationship between inequality and regime change is pressure from below: “As the least democratic transitions should exhibit an inverted-U well off overcome their collective action problems, that pattern, with transitions to democratic rule most likely is, as they mobilize and organize in unions and political to occur at intermediate levels of inequality. parties, the repression cost incurred by the wealthy It is important to emphasize that the theory is not rise[s],” forcing elites to make institutional compro- simply a structural one but operates through strategic mises (13). interactions between elites and masses: incentives for Boix also emphasizes the role played by capital mo- collective action on the part of the masses and repres- bility in mitigating this relationship (see also Freeman sion or concessions on the part of elites. At middle lev- and Quinn 2012). High levels of capital mobility en- els of inequality, grievances are sufficient to motivate hance the bargaining power of elites. Fixed assets, by the disenfranchised to mobilize, but not threatening contrast, limit the options of the wealthy and make enough to invite repression (see also Burkhart 1997; them vulnerable to democratic redistribution and thus Epstein et al. 2006). more resistant to it. Given the decision of the poor to Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) mobilize, the incentives of upper-class incumbents to extend their arguments to a consideration of the sta- repress are a function of the level of inequality and bility of democratic rule and reversion to autocracy mobility of assets. Transitions are most likely when as well. Implicit in the theory is the assumption that inequality is low, asset mobility is high, and elites high-inequality democracies are rare; for that reason,

3 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012 less attention is given to the relationship between in- Kaufman, and Teo 2012). Selecting on the dependent equality and democratic breakdown. Nonetheless Boix variable is a central feature of this approach, which postulates a direct linear relation between the degree is designed to test a particular theory and thus rests of inequality and the likelihood of reversion to dicta- on identification of the causal mechanism leading to torship. In high-inequality democracies, redistributive regime change. In contrast to the more common prac- pressures from lower-class groups will be more intense, tice of purposeful (Gerring 2006; 2007a; 2007b) or ran- motivating elites to deploy force against incumbents in dom (Fearon and Laitin 2011) selection of cases for order to reimpose authoritarian rule. Although Ace- more intensive analysis, our approach is to select all moglu and Robinson posit an inverted-U shaped re- transition and reversion cases in the relevant sample lation between inequality and democratic transitions, period (1980–2000). The cases included in our dataset they agree that countries that do manage to democ- come from the dichotomous coding of transitions and ratize at high levels of inequality “do not consolidate reversions in Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland (CGV; because coups are attractive” (38). The costs for elites 2010) and from Polity IV. For the continuous Polity IV of mobilizing against democratic rule are less than metric, we use a cutoff of 6 to indicate a transition, a the losses arising from redistribution under democratic benchmark used in the dataset itself. We have, however, rule. examined alternative cutoff points of 7 and 8 and find that as the bar is raised, the percentage of distributive METHOD: conflict transitions in our sample actually declines to CAUSAL PROCESS OBSERVATIONS 47.9 and 42.1%, respectively, suggesting that the results are in fact robust. At first glance, these theories appear amenable to rel- Within-case causal process observation involves the atively straightforward tests. Is the level of inequality reconstruction of an empirical sequence of actor deci- associated with transitions to and from democratic rule sions, ultimately strategic in form, that are postulated or not? Yet empirical tests are complicated by the fact by the theory to yield the given outcome. Within-case that different measures of inequality capture different analysis codes whether and to what extent individual socioeconomic cleavages and the quality of the data is cases conform with the stipulated causal logic. This cod- notoriously poor. We also find that measures of democ- ing can then be aggregated in a second stage to consider racy commonly used in panel designs leave much to be characteristics of the whole population or subsets of it. desired. In constructing the dataset of causal process obser- The problems of testing these theories are not limited vations on regime change, we begin with the stipulated to the constraints posed by the data: They are also re- causal mechanisms that run from inequality through lated to the reduced-form nature of most cross-national the following elements: the mobilization of distribu- panel designs. These quantitative models typically omit tive grievances by the poor or—more commonly—by the intervening causal processes and focus directly on coalitions of low- and middle-income groups; elite cal- the relationship between some antecedent condition— culations about the costs of repressing these challenges in this case, levels of inequality—and the outcome vari- or offering political concessions; the iterated strategic able, regime change in this instance. However, as the lit- response of the masses to those elite decisions; and the erature on process-tracing and causal process observa- ultimate outcome of regime maintenance or change tion has pointed out,2 the empirical question is not only (see particularly Boix 2003, 27–36, and Acemoglu and whether antecedent conditions are linked statistically Robinson 2006, 181–220, for explication of the basic to the outcome but whether they also do so through the models). In the first instance, we seek to establish stipulated causal mechanisms. In this case, we want to whether distributive conflict is present or not and, if so, know not only whether inequality is associated with whether and how it affects the decisions that result in or regime change but also whether its effects operate constitute regime change. For democratic transitions, through the particular causal mechanisms postulated we first identify the decisions made by authoritarian in distributive conflict theory. leaders to make political concessions or withdraw al- Our method of causal process observation includes together. For reversions, we identify actions taken by two stages: (1) within-case analysis and coding and (2) challengers within or outside the government that re- aggregation across the population of cases (Haggard, sult in the overthrow of democratic rule. For each tran- sition and reversion, we then provide a narrative that 2 The concept of causal process observation (Collier, Brady, and reconstructs the causal process and assesses whether Seawright 2010) grew out of an earlier stream of methodological the key political decisions in question were a result of work on process-tracing initiated by Alexander George (Bennett and distributive conflicts. We then provide a justification of George 2005; George and McKeown 1985) and subsequently joined the coding and references used to make the decision.3 by work on the empirical testing of formal models, including through The selection of all cases for a given time period has “analytic narratives” (Bates et. al. 1998). Although Collier, Brady, and Seawright distinguish between causal process observation and the advantage of permitting what we call “stage two” process-tracing, we see them as essentially the same. However, we prefer the term “causal process observation” because it underscores the link to the testing of a particular theory; we suggest later the 3 We personally researched all cases cited in the dataset and con- particular way in which this approach can be used to leverage causal sulted closely with each other on each coding decision and consis- inference. A related strand of work is associated with the “mecha- tency across cases. Country and regional experts also reviewed cod- nism” approach to causation (Falletti and Lynch 2010; Gerring 2007b; ing decisions, particularly in ambiguous cases (see Haggard, Kauf- 2010; Hedstrom and Ylikoski 2010). man, and Teo 2012).

4 American Political Science Review analysis: the aggregation of the individual causal pro- In principle, multistage models can be constructed cess observations to permit analysis of the population that work from structural causes through intervening as a whole or relevant subsets of it. For example, we pay behaviors to institutional effects (King, Keohane, and particular attention to high- and low-inequality cases Verba 1994, 85–87). Some critics of the mechanisms because the theory has particular expectations about approach have argued that mechanisms may be nothing how such cases should behave. more than such chains of intervening variables (Beck The method of causal process observation has sev- 2006; 2010; Gerring 2007b; 2010; Hafner-Burton and eral advantages that can enrich the testing of formal Ron 2009). Although possible in principle, the con- theories through quantitative empirical designs; we see tinued reliance on reduced-form specification suggests it as a complement to such approaches, not a substitute. that this problem is in fact not addressed, in part be- In a quantitative model, the effects of either structural cause of the labor intensity of recoding existing datasets variables, such as inequality, or behavioral ones such to conform more precisely with the theory being tested. as protest are estimated across a heterogeneous set In each of the remaining sections on democratic of cases, some of which transition as a result of the transitions and reversions, we begin with a review of stipulated causal mechanism and some of which do the quantitative findings on the relationship between not. The focus on average treatment effects masks inequality and regime change and then present both the heterogeneity of transition paths; the variable in aggregate and select case study findings from the causal question is either significant or not. By contrast, causal process observations in our dataset. We show that the process observations do not ask whether the variable in support for the distributive conflict model of regime question is significant, but whether the transition path change is weak, even under highly generous coding in the cases conforms with the causal process stipulated rules. When these rules are tightened, the evidence is in the theoretical model. weaker still. As we see later, the quantitative work on inequal- ity and regime change is highly inconclusive at best and is even more limited for the third wave tran- TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRATIC RULE sitions. Nonetheless, causal process observations can Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) do not present sys- complement quantitative analysis in two ways that can tematic empirical evidence in support of their claims.4 strengthen causal inference. First, if causal process ob- Much of their book is taken up with a discussion of servations showed that elite-mass conflicts did drive the underlying intuition of the theory (1–47, 80–87) transitions in a significant number of cases, it could and the presentation of a family of formal models of reopen null statistical findings. The causal process ob- democratic and nondemocratic regimes (89–172) and servations would suggest, for example, the need for of regime change (173–320). Acemoglu and Robinson better specification of the quantitative model or more do present scatterplots showing a positive relationship appropriate measures of inequality. However, if regime between equality and the level of democracy across a change was not driven by such conflicts in a signifi- global sample of countries (58–61) and provide short cant number of cases, the finding could be considered case studies of Great Britain, Argentina, South Africa, disconfirmatory. More importantly, the finding could and Singapore (1–14). Yet these correlations and cases be disconfirmatory even if inequality were statistically are illustrative at most. significant in the quantitative analysis; this would occur In his analysis of democratic transitions over the very if causal process observation showed that the effects long run (1850–1980), Boix (2003) finds that the distri- of inequality work through causal channels not posited bution of land, proxied by the share of family farms, has by the game-theoretic models. an effect on the transition to democratic rule. More un- In addition to its advantages in more closely test- equal societies are both less likely to make a transition ing the actual mechanisms specified in causal mod- to democracy and less stable when they do (90–97). els, causal process observations also address a second Boix also explores a highly uneven panel of countries important problem in standard quantitative panel de- for the 1950–90 period (only 587 observations), includ- signs: the mismatch between the temporal framework ing developed ones (71–88). Using a Gini index as his of a stipulated causal process and the constraints of measure of inequality, Boix finds some evidence that country-year coding of cases. In cross-national panels, increases in the level of inequality reduce the likeli- each country-year is coded as a transition or nontransi- hood of a democratic transition, but the findings are tion year; these codings constitute the dependent vari- not altogether robust (see for example, 79: Model 2A). able. The causal covariates are similarly either contem- More recently, other quantitative studies have taken poraneous or antecedent with some lag structure. Yet up the challenge raised by Boix (2003) and Ace- the causal sequence of actor choices associated with moglu and Robinson (2006), but with mixed results. transitions and reversions may be more compressed or extended, not constant across cases, and thus not well captured by the artifact of the country-year coding 4 Earlier work (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; 2001) was motivated constraint typical of the panel design. As we see later, by experiences in nineteenth-century Europe and early twentieth- many cases that are coded as transitions prove to be century Latin America. However, in those articles, as well as in the dubious when a more extended but variable temporal later book, the formal theory is cast in general terms, without specify- ing scope conditions that might apply to third wave transitions. In the context is taken into account, a point emphasized more book, moreover, the illustrations from South Africa and Singapore generally in the work of Pierson (2004). rely on much more recent developments.

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Like Boix, Ansell, and Samuels (2010) consider both sequence (mass mobilization followed by authori- long-historical and postwar samples (1850–1993, 1955– tarian withdrawal). 2004). They find that land concentration makes de- mocratization less likely, but that increases in income inequality make it more likely. They argue that increas- In coding the cases, we were deliberately permissive, ing income inequality reflects the emergence of a new writing coding rules that gave the benefit of the doubt capitalist class that challenges landed elites, a dynamic to the theory (Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo 2012). Our consistent with Boix’s (2003, 47–59) and Acemoglu and coding allowed us to consider a variety of distributive Robinson’s (2006, 266–86) extension of their models conflicts that may not be captured by any single in- into three-class variants. equality measure, from urban class conflicts to ethnic The limited number of other tests in the literature and regional ones. Yet such conflicts must be fought generally fail to find a relationship between inequality around distinctive and identifiable inequalities. The and democratic transitions. A cross-sectional design by economically disadvantaged or the organizations rep- Dutt and Mitra (2008) finds a relationship between resenting them need not be the only ones mobilized in inequality measured by the Gini coefficient and “polit- opposition to the existing regime. Although mass mobi- ical instability,” but fails to find a relationship between lization must partly reflect demands for redistribution, inequality and transitions to democratic rule. Chris- it can be motivated by other grievances as well. tian Houle (2009) creates a dataset using an alterna- An important coding issue is the question of “poten- tive measure of inequality: capital’s share of income tial” threats in the absence of actual mobilization. As in the manufacturing sector. Using the dichotomous Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) note in distinguishing coding scheme developed by Przeworski et al. (2000) between de jure and de facto power, the poor can be and Cheibub and Ghandi (2004), Houle shows that in- considered a potential threat in virtually every case. equality bears no systematic relationship to democratic However, the strategic basis of reforms aimed at pre- transitions over the 1960–2000 period, but is a signifi- empting potential long-term threats rests on probabil- cant predictor of reversions to authoritarian rule. In a ity estimates and time horizons on the part of elites that wide-ranging study of the determinants of democrati- differ quite substantially from those that drive elite re- zation, Teorell (2010, 60) also fails to find a relationship sponses to more immediate challenges. Moreover, we between a Gini coefficient and democratic transitions. are also wary of the coding challenge: Virtually any case could be coded as one in which there was a “potential” challenge from below, with a corresponding decline in analytic leverage. However, we do take potential Distributive Conflict and threats into account where there has been a recent Nondistributive Conflict Transitions history of mass mobilization demanding democratic In sum, the quantitative work on inequality and regime reforms. change is highly inconclusive at best, and even more We coded all cases in which such threats from below limited for the third wave transitions. Many of these did not occur at all or appeared to play only a marginal tests do not empirically model the underlying causal causal role as “nondistributive transitions.” Why, in the processes stipulated in the most significant formal absence of significant pressure from below, would elites models. Therefore, to undertake causal process ob- withdraw or make institutional compromises that risk servations, we need to interpret the underlying causal the redistribution of assets and income not only in the mechanisms at work in the theory. Two mechanisms present but also into the indefinite future? As others appear central. First, elites must confront political- have argued (Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; cum-distributive pressure from below, or a “clear and Collier 1999; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead present danger” of it. In the absence of such pressures, 1986), there are a variety of routes from closed political it is not clear why elites would be motivated to cede systems to democracy. We identify three: those driven power at all, as Przeworski’s trenchant question sug- by international pressures, those involving intra-elite gests. Second, there must be some evidence—minimally conflicts and defections, and those in which incumbent in the temporal sequence of events—that the repression authoritarian elites withdraw in the belief that they can of these challenges appears too costly and that elites control the post-transition democratic order in ways make institutional compromises as a result. that limit democracy’s redistributive impact. We therefore code “distributive conflict” transitions International factors played a decisive role in a as ones in which both of the following occurred: number of third wave transitions (Boix 2011; White- head 1996). In a handful of cases—including Grenada • The mobilization of redistributive grievances on (1984), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1994)—outside in- the part of economically disadvantaged groups or tervention took a military form. Yet particularly in the representatives of such groups (parties, unions, wake of the end of the Cold War, aid donors—both NGOs) posed a threat to the incumbency of ruling multilateral and bilateral—became less tolerant of un- elites. democratic regimes that appeared guilty of economic • And the rising costs of repressing these demands mismanagement and outright corruption. Threats or appear to have motivated elites to make politi- withdrawal of aid played an important role in transi- cal compromises or exit in favor of democratic tions in a group of low-income African countries in challengers, typically indicated by a clear temporal particular.

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Even if we set aside the role of international pres- of countries ranked in terms of land distribution. More sures, threats from below are by no means the only problematic, and against theoretical expectations in domestic pressures that can cause elites to acquiesce to both Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), democratizing institutional changes. A common cause there was a substantial incidence of distributive conflict of transition in the nondistributive conflict cases is transitions among the high-inequality cases. When in- intra-elite rivalries. These rivalries may stem from com- equality is measured using the Gini, about 75% of high- petition among the political, military, and economic inequality transitions were distributive conflict transi- elites that constitute the authoritarian coalition—for tions; the incidence of such transitions is 60% using the example, when factions within the regime seek to dis- land inequality measure, and 57% using capital’s share place incumbents—or from elite challenges from out- of income. side the regime altogether (Slater and Smith 2012). In Table 2 offers additional insight into the causal role a number of cases, we found that concessions to elites of distributive conflict. Columns 2 and 3 divide the rather than mass challenges appear as important as CGV transitions into distributive and nondistributive distributive conflicts pitting rich against poor. types; columns 4 and 5 replicate the exercise for Polity Even when elites remain relatively unified, they may transitions. We also identify the non-overlapping cases. still acquiesce to—or even lead—democratic reform if The last column shows the average Polity score from they believe they can retain leverage over the political the time of the transition through either the end of the process while reducing the costs of repression. Incum- sample period or until an outright reversion to author- bent elites can do this in several ways, including through itarian rule. the design of political institutions that give them effec- The information contained in Table 2 raises serious tive vetoes or through the organization of political par- questions about the validity of the coding of democratic ties that exploit other cleavages to dampen distributive transitions in these two major datasets and, as a result, conflicts. Dominant parties provide incumbent political casts doubt on the inferences that have been drawn in elites particular organizational advantages that can be the quantitative work that employs them. Only 55.4% redeployed in a more competitive context. of the CGV transitions are also Polity cases, and 21 of Note that each of the alternative domestic causal the 65 CGV transitions had Polity scores of less than 6. mechanisms we have sketched—intra-elite conflict or Even where the two datasets are in agreement, more- defection and authoritarian elites ceding office because over, our examination of the cases raises questions of confidence in their post-transition chances—may in about the validity of the coding process. Insiders and fact be related precisely to the weakness of immediate elites repressed opposition and/or exercised dispropor- threats from below. Where such threats are limited, tionate control over them in the nominallydemocratic elites are more likely to control the transition. Societies cases of Croatia, Niger, and Thailand. Transitions in in which the poor are not mobilized through program- Guatemala (1986) and Honduras (1982) empowered matic parties, unions, or other organizations may be nominally democratic governments that actually inten- especially prone to vote buying, patronage, and other sified repression of social movements that had redis- forms of clientelistic control that would guarantee elite tributive objectives. Death squads continued to terror- control of politics, even in nominally democratic set- ize the opposition in El Salvador after the transition tings (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2006). in 1984. In at least four cases—Ghana under Rawlings; Kenya under Moi; Malawi, where an “insider” won the transitional election; and Romania—the military or Inequality and the Incidence of incumbent elites continued to exercise disproportion- Distributive Conflict Transitions ate influence over the allocation of resources after the transition. In all of these cases, the transitions appear to Table 1 shows the distributive and nondistributive tran- conform more closely to what Levitsky and Way (2010) sitions, using the definition of transitions in the CGV call “competitive authoritarianism” than to democracy. dataset; in the text, we also report the distribution of Because we seek to engage the quantitative analysis these types of cases based on Polity transition cod- that deploys such data, however, we do not discard ing. The cases are arrayed according to three mea- or reclassify cases identified as transitions in the two sures of inequality: Christian Houle’s (2009) measure datasets. of capital’s share of income in the manufacturing sec- What about the theoretical expectations of the role tor (capshare), a Gini coefficient from the University of distributive conflict in democratic transitions? We of Texas Inequality Project’s Estimated Household In- found that distributive conflict played some causal role come Inequality (EHII) dataset (2008), and the Van- in propelling transitions in about 55% of CGV and hanen (2003) measure of land inequality. We divide 58% of Polity transition cases. These are substantial, the sample of all developing countries into terciles of but by no means overwhelming shares of the cases. In high-, medium-, and low-inequality cases and identify combination with the findings in Table 1, the large per- the transitions that fall into each tercile. centage of nondistributive transitions suggests strongly The table shows that transitions occurred at all lev- that the link between inequality and distributive con- els of inequality, regardless of which measure is used. flict transitions is conditional at best. Twenty-nine percent of transitions occurred in the up- Yet even these findings need to be tempered by the per third of countries ranked by capshare and Gini generosity of our coding rules. Although pressure from inequality, and about 34% occurred in the top tercile below did play an unambiguously significant role in a

7 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012 Uruguay (1985) Inequality Measures Malawi (1994)Mongolia (1990)Nepal (1990)Romania (1990) Mongolia Peru (1990) (1980) Ukraine Romania (1991) (1990) Capital Share of Income in Manufacturing Sector Gini coefficient (Texas Inequality dataset) Share of Family Farms (Vanhanen) Albania (1991) Bangladesh (1986) Argentina (1983) Central African Republic Armenia (1991) Central African Republic Bolivia (1982) Chile (1990) Armenia (1991) Ghana (1993) Albania (1992) Belarus (1991) The Philippines (1986) Poland (1989) South Korea (1988) Sudan (1986) Uruguay (1985) 57.1Argentina (1983)Benin (1991)Bulgaria (1990) 42.9El Salvador (1984) CroatiaGuatemala (1991) (1986)Kenya (1998)Latvia (1991) Panama Hungary Pakistan (1989) (1988) (1990)Madagascar (1993) Paraguay (1989)Malawi (1994)Nepal (1990) El Salvador (1984) Senegal (2000) Turkey Indonesia Fiji Peru (1983) (1999) (1980) (1992) 75.0 The Philippines (1986) (1993) Panama (1989) Honduras Sri (1982) Lanka (1989) Suriname Pakistan (1988) (1988) Chile (1990) Fiji (1992) Senegal Congo (2000) (1992) 25.0 Suriname Thailand Argentina (1991) (1992) (1983) El Salvador (1984) Uruguay (1985) Benin Mexico Kenya (1991) (2000) (1998) Senegal Turkey (1983) Pakistan (2000) Malawi (1988) (1993) (1994) Uganda (1980) Comoros 60.0 (1990) The Philippines (1986) Sudan (1986) 40.0% Brazil (1985)Burundi (1993)Indonesia (1999)Nigeria (1999)Peru (1980)Sri Lanka Ghana (1989) Mexico (1993) Nicaragua (2000)Thailand (1984) (1992) Sierra Leone (1996) Sierra Leone Brazil (1998) (1985) Benin Bolivia Burundi (1991) (1982) (1993) Congo (1992) Sierra Leone (1998) Sierra Leone Paraguay (1996) (1989) Bulgaria (1990) Brazil (1985) Guatemala (1986) Bolivia (1982) Kenya (1991) Honduras (1982) Czechoslovakia (1989) Chile (1990) Estonia (1991) Guatemala (1986) Hungary (1990) Nicaragua (1984) Latvia (1991) Lithuania (1991) Panama (1989) Paraguay (1989) distributive and nondistributive conflict cases TABLE 1. Distributive and Nondistributive Transitions by Level of Inequality, 1980–2000 Level of InequalityHigh Distributive NondistributivePercentage of DistributiveMedium Nondistributive Distributive Nondistributive

8 American Political Science Review ity of Texas Inequality Project Suriname (1991) Thailand (1992) (1991) Serbia (2000)Taiwan (1996) South Korea (1988) Sri Lanka (1989) Turkey (1983) Uganda (1980) Inequality Measures Poland (1989)South Korea (1988)Ukraine (1991) Mexico (2000) Macedonia (1991) Nicaragua (1984) Niger (2000) Nigeria (1999) Poland (1989) Sierra Sierra Leone Leone (1998) (1996) Taiwan (1996) Macedonia (1991)Uganda (1980) Madagascar (1993) Nigeria (1999) Czech Republic (1989) Nepal (1990) Hungary (1990) Macedonia (1991) Niger (1993) Serbia (2000) Serbia (2000) Suriname (1991) Taiwan (1996) Capital Share of Income in Manufacturing Sector Gini coefficient (Texas Inequality dataset) Share of Family Farms (Vanhanen) Armenia (1991) Belarus (1991) Estonia (1991) Belarus (1991) Suriname (1988) Cape Verde (1991) Fiji (1992) Central African Republic Albania (1992) Bangladesh (1986) Burundi (1993) Bangladesh (1986) Congo (1992)Estonia (1991)Lithuania (1991)Mali (1992) Cape Verde (1990) Comoros (1990) Czechoslovakia (1989) Niger (2000) Mali Grenada (1992) (1984) Niger (1993) Guinea-Bissau (2000) Sudan (1986) Comoros (1990) Grenada (1984) Sao Tome and Principe Sao Tome and Principle (1991) Cyprus (1983) Grenada (1984) 66.7Niger (1993)Niger (2000)Romania (1990) 33.3 Honduras (1982) (1993) Cyprus (1983) Lithuania (1991) 52.644.4% Latvia (1991) Bulgaria (1990) Cyprus (1989) Croatia (1991) Cape Verde (1990) 55.6% Mali 47.4 (1992) Indonesia (1999) Madagascar (1993) Ghana (1993) Croatia (1991) Guinea-Bissau (2000) 45.0% 68.8 55.0% 31.2% 52.2% 47.8% Mongolia (1990)Suriname (1988)Ukraine (1991) Guinea-Bissau (2000) Sao Tome and Principe (1991) Transitions: Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland (2010); transition types: Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo (2012); capital share: Houle (2009); Gini: Univers distributive and nondistributive conflict cases distributive and nondistributive conflict cases TABLE 1. Continued. Level of InequalityPercentage of DistributiveLow Nondistributive DistributivePercentage of NondistributiveMissing Data Distributive Nondistributive Sources: (2008); share of family farms: Vanhanen (2003).

9 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012

TABLE 2. Distributive and Nondistributive Transitions, 1980–2000

CGV Transitions Polity Transitions

Country/Year Distributive Nondistributive Distributive Nondistributive Polity score

Albania 1991 X Not a Polity transition 4.1 Argentina 1983 X X 7.4 Armenia 1991 X X 7.0 Bangladesh 1986 X Not a Polity transition 2.3 Bangladesh 1991 Not a CGV transition X 6.0 Belarus 1991 X X 7.0 Benin 1991 X X 6.0 Bolivia 1982 X X 8.8 Brazil 1985 X X 7.8 Bulgaria 1990 X X 8.0 Burundi 1993 X Not a Polity transition −1.6 Cape Verde 1990 XX7.1 (CGV), 1991 (Polity) Central African X Not a Polity transition 5.0 Republic 1993 Chile 1990 (CGV), XX8.1 1989 (Polity) Comoros 1990 X Not a Polity transition 2.6 Congo 1992 X Not a Polity transition 5.0 Croatia 1991 X Not a Polity transition −2.0 Croatia 2000 Not a CGV transition X 8.0 Cyprus 1983 X Not a Polity transition 10.0 Czechoslovakia 1989 XX8.2 (CGV), 1990 (Polity) Dominican Republic Not a CGV transition X 8.0 1996 El Salvador 1984 X X 6.6 Estonia 1991 X X 6.0 Fiji 1992 X Not a Polity transition 5.1 Fiji 1999 Not a CGV transition X 5.5 Ghana 1993 X Not a Polity transition 1.0 Grenada 1984 X Not a Polity transition N.A. Guatemala 1986 X Not a Polity transition 4.7 Guatemala 1996 Not a CGV transition X 8.0 Guinea-Bissau 2000 X Not a Polity transition 5.0 Guyana 1992 Not a CGV transition X 6.0 Haiti 1990 Not a CGV transition X 7.0 Haiti 1994 Not a CGV transition X 7.0 Honduras 1982 X X 6.0 Honduras 1989 Not a CGV transition X 6.2 Hungary 1990 X X 10.0 Indonesia 1999 X X 6.0 Kenya 1998 X Not a Polity transition −2.0 Latvia 1991 X X 8.0 Lesotho 1993 Not a CGV transition X 8.0 Lithuania 1991 X X 10.0 Macedonia 1991 X X 6.0 Madagascar 1992 X X 8.2 Malawi 1994 X X 6.0 Mali 1992 X X 6.5 Mexico 1997 Not a CGV transition X 6.5 Mexico 2000 X Not a Polity transition 8.0 Moldova 1993 Not a CGV transition X 7.0 Mongolia 1990(CGV), XX8.2 1992 (Polity) Nepal 1990 X Not a Polity transition 5.2 Nepal 1999 Not a CGV transition X 6.0 Nicaragua 1984 X Not a Polity transition 4.2 Nicaragua 1990 Not a CGV transition X 7.1 Niger 1993 (CGV), XX8.0 1992 (Polity)

10 American Political Science Review

TABLE 2. Continued.

CGV Transitions Polity Transitions

Country/Year Distributive Nondistributive Distributive Nondistributive Polity score

Niger 2000 X Not a Polity transition 5.0 Nigeria 1999 X Not a Polity transition 4.0 Pakistan 1988 X X 7.8 Panama 1989 X X 8.6 Paraguay 1989 X Not a Polity transition 5.7 Paraguay 1992 Not a CGV transition X 6.9 Peru 1980 X X 7.2 The Philippines 1986 XX7.5 (CGV), 1987 (Polity) Poland 1989 (CGV), XX8.0 1991(Polity) Romania 1990 X Not a Polity transition 6.4 Romania 1996 Not a CGV transition X 8.0 Russia 2000 Not a CGV transition X 6.0 Sao Tome and X Not a Polity transition N.A. Principe 1991 Senegal 2000 X X 8.0 Serbia 2000 X X 7.0 Sierra Leone 1996 X Not a Polity transition 4.0 Sierra Leone 1998 X Not a Polity transition 0.0 South Africa 1992 Not a CGV transition X 8.6 South Korea 1988 X X 6.5 Sri Lanka 1989 X Not a Polity transition 5.0 Sudan 1986 X X 7.0 Suriname 1988 X Not a Polity transition N.A. Suriname 1991 X Not a Polity transition N.A. Taiwan 1992 Not a CGV transition X 8.0 Taiwan 1996 X Not a Polity transition 8.8 Thailand 1992 X X 9.0 Turkey 1983 X X 7.7 Uganda 1980 X Not a Polity transition 2.5 Ukraine 1991 X X 6.0 Ukraine 1994 Not a CGV transition X 6.9 Uruguay 1985 X X 9.8 Zambia 1991 Not a CGV transition X 6.0 N/% 36/55.4% 29/44.6% 33/57.9% 24/42.1% 6.3

Note: In the dataset, we treat any transitions that are coded within a two-year window as the same case (for example, the CGV coding of the Philippines transition occurring in 1986, the Polity coding as 1987). Outside of this two-year window (for example, Paraguay) or where there is an intervening reversion (Sierra Leone), we treat them as separate cases. There are no Polity scores for Grenada, Sao Tome, and Suriname. Sources: CGV transitions from Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland (2010); Polity transitions from Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (2010); transition types from Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo (2012). number of middle-income countries such as Argentina, groups, calling into question the class dynamics of South Korea, and South Africa, our expansive coding the model even if we allow for cross-class coalitions rules also necessitated the classification of cases as dis- including the poor. tributive conflict where there was considerable ambi- 3. A third source of ambiguity involved judgments guity about its causal weight. The ambiguity in specific about the role played by redistributive grievances cases stemmed from one or more of three factors. in opposition demands; in many instances, it was difficult to separate redistributive demands from grievances that focused on a defense of privileged 1. First, some distributive conflict transitions occurred positions, generalized dissatisfaction with authori- in small open economies that were highly vulnera- tarian incumbents, or nationalist claims. ble to pressure from donors or other international actors, and this pressure may have been decisive. 2. The class basis of protest constituted a second Table 3 lists the cases in the dataset where interna- source of ambiguity; in many cases, protest was tional pressures, the class composition of the protestors, dominated by middle- or even upper-middle-class or the nature of their redistributive grievances made

11 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012

TABLE 3. Ambiguous Cases of Distributive Conflict Transitions

CGV Dataset Polity Dataset

Country Source of Ambiguity Country Source of Ambiguity

Armenia Grievance Armenia Grievance Benin Class Benin Class Bulgaria Grievance Bulgaria Grievance Congo Class El Salvador International El Salvador International Estonia Class/Grievance Estonia Class/Grievance Fiji International Kenya International Lesotho Class/International Latvia Class/Grievance Latvia Class/Grievance Lithuania Class/Grievance Lithuania Class/Grievance Malawi Class/International Malawi Class/International Mali Class Mali Class Mongolia Class/Grievance Mongolia Class/Grievance Niger Class/Grievance/International Niger Class/Grievance/International Sri Lanka Grievance Suriname International Ukraine Class/Grievance Ukraine Class/Grievance Total 17 13 Percent of 26.2 22.8 total transitions the coding of the case ambiguous. Of particular signifi- cause of the presence of mobilization “from below” cance is the coding of several African “distributive con- that affected the transition, protest was primarily lim- flict” transitions, in which incumbent regimes—in the ited to civil servants, students, and other sectors of the midst of severe economic recessions—were vulnerable urban middle class. Moreover, several African cases both to intense donor pressure and the protest of rela- (Lesotho, Kenya, Malawi, and Niger) were also am- tively well-off public employees and student groups. biguous with respect to the role of international pres- Niger provides an example. The pivotal decision in sures. this case was an agreement by the military strongman, The nature of the grievances associated with the se- General Ali Saibou, to convene a National Confer- cession from Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union ence, which then assumed the role of a transitional also warrants special mention. In three such cases— government and organized competitive elections. Dis- Croatia, Macedonia, and Belarus—the coding was un- tributive protests played a role in Saibou’s decision ambiguously nondistributive because mass mobiliza- to yield authority. Yet the opposition came primarily tion on distributive lines was altogether absent or there from the Nigerien Workers Union, which represented is strong evidence that the political process of indepen- Niger’s 39,000 civil servants, and the Union of Nigerian dence occurred as a result of intra-elite processes. Yet Scholars, which represented about 6% of the coun- in the Baltic cases, as well as in Ukraine, Mongolia, try’s school-aged population (Gervais 1997, 93). Both and Armenia, there is ambiguity as to the nature of groups bitterly opposed tough adjustment programs the claims made by groups engaged in mass mobiliza- demanded by the International Monetary Fund, but tion. Several regional specialists whom we consulted in the conflicts did not appear to engage the poor. As constructing our coding objected that these cases did Gervais (1997, 105) writes, “the political stakes raised not fall easily into the distributive conflict category and by ... adjustment policies tended to compromise the should be seen as the outcome of cross-class secession- benefits of the organized groups of the modern sector ist or nationalist movements and the resulting collapse as much as the privileges of the traditional political of multinational empires. In these cases, we believed class.” Notwithstanding our generous coding decision, that the evidence of conflicts within the polity between it is ambiguous at best to claim that the transition indigenous populations and the Russians warranted a process mapped directly to the underlying Meltzer- “distributive conflict” coding, but it is important to ac- Richard model in which the interests of the poor or knowledge the pivotal importance of strong nationalist even middle classes are pitted against the rich. aspirations that cut across class lines.5 If we were to Similar questions can be raised about the class com- position of protest in other African cases, includ- ing Benin, Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, and Mali. Even 5 These cases also posed a second coding problem: whether they though all of these cases meet our coding rules be- should be treated as democratic transitions at all given that they

12 American Political Science Review shift all of the ambiguous cases in Table 3 from the dis- political system to limit its redistributive impact. The tributive to nondistributive categories, the incidence of Turkish military transferred power to a new civilian distributive conflict transitions would fall to only 29.2% government in 1983, but only after crushing violent of the CGV transitions and to about 31% of the Polity left and right factions that had been a feature of Turk- transitions. ish politics in the late 1970s. As it gradually reopened Even with the expansive coding of distributive con- the political space in early 1983, the military vetoed flict transitions, we found a large share of cases—44.6% most of the new parties that had formed around estab- using the CGV measure and 42.1% of Polity cases—in lished politicians and designed institutions that gave it which distributive conflict played only a marginal role veto power over crucial areas of policy. Although the in the transition process. These cases followed the al- military elite was surprised by the victory of the one ternative causal pathways we identified earlier: transi- opposition party it had allowed to function, there is no tions driven by international pressures or by intra-elite indication that threats of mass mobilization influenced conflicts, and elite-led transitions in which incumbents the decision to allow the elections or to permit the believed they could control the democratic process to results to stand. limit its redistributive impact. We see similar processes of reform in Chile, where We have already noted that, in several of the “am- outgoing governments built in quite specific mech- biguous cases” discussed earlier, popular protest un- anisms through which the military would continue folded in the context of severe international pressure. to exercise oversight and supporters of the outgoing However, in other cases, protest was weak or entirely government would be overrepresented (Haggard and absent, and outside intervention was unambiguously Kaufman 1995). These mechanisms included the es- decisive. Transitions in Grenada (1984) and Panama tablishment of national security councils with a veto (1989) hinged almost entirely on U.S. military opera- role for the military establishment, constitutional and tions. In Haiti (1994), the military ruler negotiated his judicial guarantees limiting the authority of incoming exit as an international force of 21,000 troops prepared governments, and the allocation of Senate seats to be to land on the island. External political and economic filled by the head of the outgoing regime. In Kenya, pressures from donors or great power patrons were also Mexico, and Taiwan, incumbents ceded power gradu- decisive in Comoros (1990), Cape Verde (1990), the ally while competing aggressively and successfully in Central African Republic (1993), and Cyprus (1983). the newly liberalized environment. Several communist Intra-elite conflicts appear significant in a number transitions, including Hungary and Mongolia, also fit of nondistributive conflict cases. The 1989 transition in this pattern. Paraguay provides an illustration. The key decision was Two conclusions emerge from our discussion of a palace coup that ousted the aging dictator Alfredo democratic transitions. First, although certainly some Stroessner and initiated a process of constitutional re- democratic transitions are driven by distributive con- form and competitive presidential elections. The coup flict in ways that conform with the theory, these cases do was led by General Andres Rodriguez, Stroessner’s not appear to be related in any systematic way with the second in command, and by a faction of the ruling Col- level of inequality, as the lack of quantitative findings orado party that hoped to extend one-party rule by en- already suggests. Second, the assumption that elites gineering a “nonpersonalist” transition. Mass protest do not yield power in the absence of mass pressure did not pose a serious threat to the regime (Lambert from below is called into question by the high inci- 2000). dence of alternative transition paths. Taken together, In Mexico the ruling PRI was challenged primarily these conclusions indicate that the theory is, at best, by business elites and an opposition party (PAN) that underspecified and needs to delineate more explicitly was outside the regime and its ruling coalition and the conditions in which redistributive conflicts emerge. wanted less rather than more redistribution. Popular We return to these issues in the conclusion. protest over alleged fraud in local elections strength- ened the bargaining leverage of the PAN in its negoti- ations with the ruling party, but the political left played The Collapse of Democratic Rule: only a marginal role in pushing the regime out of power. Causal Process Observations Among other cases in which elite concessions to other elites appeared significant are the military’s acquies- Although Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix cence in the assumption of power by parliamentary (2003) offer diverging predictions about transitions politicians in Pakistan, the Thai military’s accommo- to democracy, they agree that when democracies do dation of emerging political-economic elites from the emerge at high levels of inequality, they are more Northern part of the country, and the Kuomintang’s likely to revert to authoritarian rule. As Acemoglu and accommodation of native Taiwanese elites. Robinson put it succinctly, “in democracy, the elites are Finally, in a number of cases incumbent authoritarian unhappy because of the high degree of redistribution elites opened politics under the assumption—justified and, in consequence, may undertake coups against the or mistaken—that they could effectively control the democratic regime” (222). This view comports with an earlier generation of theory on “bureaucratic authori- are entirely new countries. We chose to include them in the dataset tarian” installations in the Southern Cone (O’Donnell because they cross standard thresholds (Polity) or appear as new 1973; for critiques: see Collier 1979; Linz and Stepan democracies (CGV); see Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo (2012). 1978; Valenzuela 1978): Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966,

13 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012 and 1976), and Chile and Uruguay (both 1973), with other armed forces against democratic rule. We called extensions to other regions as well (for example, Im these nondistributive conflict cases “cross-class” and 1987 on Korea). “intra-elite” reversions, respectively.7 Unlike the quantitative evidence on transitions, Table 4 reports the incidence of distributive conflict there is somewhat stronger cross-national evidence and nondistributive conflict reversions by level of in- that inequality is incompatible with democratic sta- equality. The distributive conflict column aggregates bility (e.g., Dutt and Mitra 2008; Reenock, Bernhard, both elite-reaction and populist reversions; the nondis- and Sobek 2007). Houle (2009) deploys his innova- tributive conflict column aggregates both cross-class tive measure of capital share to test the relationship and intra-elite reversions. Table 5 shows the types of and finds that high return to capital relative to labor reversion, Polity scores of the deposed regimes, and significantly undermined democratic stability between economic circumstances surrounding the change. Al- 1960 and 2000. We replicated his model using the Gini though there is surprisingly little overlap between the and Vanhanen index of land inequality. Although land ranking of cases on the three measures of inequality, shows no effects, the Gini was a significant determinant reversions do cluster at the middle and high levels of of democratic breakdowns, both for the entire 1960– inequality; relatively few took place at the lowest levels. 2000 period and for the third wave between 1980 and However, we find only a minority of cases that con- 2000.6 form with the distributive conflict model. In the CGV Do these findings hold up when subjected to closer dataset, four cases (Bolivia 1980, Burundi 1996, Fiji qualitative scrutiny? To what extent do the causal pro- 2000, and Turkey 1980) or 21% of the cases are elite- cess observations comport with the expectations of reaction reversions. Three cases (16% of the sample)— distributive conflict theories? As with the transition Ecuador (2000), Ghana (1981), and Suriname (1980)— cases, we considered whether political pressures for are populist reversions. A substantial majority (63%) redistribution drove regime change, in this case the of the reversions are nondistributive. breakdown of democratic rule. We identified a category In the 20 reversions identified in the Polity measure called “elite-reaction” reversions that conform with (not shown here), 8 of the cases—40%—are classified the distributive conflict model. In these cases, elites as elite-reaction reversions,8 and there are 2 populist undermine democracy either by (a) seeking to oust reversions.9 Half the cases, however, are classified as incumbent governments that rely on the political sup- nondistributive. Missing data play more of a constraint port of lower class or excluded groups and are actively in allocating the Polity cases across levels of inequality, committed to the redistribution of assets and income but they are somewhat less concentrated at higher lev- or by (b) imposing restraints on political competition in els of inequality, and there is no evidence that higher order to prevent coalitions with explicitly redistributive inequality cases are more likely to be distributive. Four- aims from taking office. In these cases, distributive con- teen Polity reversions fall into the high-inequality ter- flicts are in evidence and elites are acting against gov- cile on one or more of the three measures of inequality; ernments, parties, and organized social forces that are if each case is counted only once, only five are distribu- actively committed to greater redistribution through tive conflict reversions.10 the democratic process. To elaborate the implications of these findings, we We also identified a second type of distributive con- focus on the high-inequality cases using the capital flict reversion in which the incumbent democratic gov- share measure; as the distribution of cases across dif- ernment is overthrown by authoritarian populist lead- ferent inequality terciles suggests, very similar results ers. These types of reversion do not comport with our would be obtained by using different income inequality expectation that reversions are driven by the right, but measures.11 According to distributive conflict models, they clearly involve redistributive conflict and are given these cases are most likely to revert as a result of elite some attention in Boix (2006, 18, 214–19). Whereas reactions to distributive demands from below. Given in elite-reaction reversions, challengers to democratic the low correlation between measures of inequality, rule appeal to elite interests and target the masses for alternative measures would show a different set of repression, in “populist reversions,” authoritarian chal- high-inequality cases. However, as can be seen from lengers appeal to the masses and target the elite. Table 4 no measure of inequality generates a distri- Finally, “nondistributive” reversions are unambigu- bution of reversions that conforms with theoretical ous instances of the null hypothesis, but we dis- expectations for a clustering of distributive conflict tinguished two alternative subtypes. In some cases, reversions among high-inequality cases; selection of support for a reversion cuts across class lines: Au- thoritarian challengers exploit wide disaffection with 7 Precise coding rules are available in Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo the performance of democratic incumbents and invoke (2012). broad valence issues, such as economic performance 8 Armenia (1995), Dominican Republic (1994), Fiji (1987 and 2000), and corruption, that cut across distributive cleavages. Haiti (1991), Turkey (1991), Ukraine (1993), and Zambia (1996). In other cases, purely intra-elite conflicts cause rever- 9 Ghana (1981) and Haiti (1999). sions . The military—or factions within it—might stage 10 Ghana (1981) was a populist reversion; Armenia (1995), the Do- a coup against incumbent office holders, or compet- minican Republic (1994), the Ukraine (1993) and Zambia (1991) were elite-reaction reversions. ing economic elites might mobilize military, militia, or 11 One case, Sierra Leone, is identified as high inequality on the capshare measure, but was not included by Houle (2009) in the 6 Results available on request from the authors. regressions because of a subsequent change in coding of the case.

14 American Political Science Review ty (1982) (1997) Comoros (1995) Guatemala Suriname (1990) Congo (1997) Niger (1996) Nigeria (1983) Sierra Leone Thailand (1991) Uganda(1985) P P E P E E E Populist) Non-distributive Distributive Elite/ ( Turkey (1980) (1997) Pakistan (1999) Ecuador (2000) Congo (1997) Bolivia (1980) Peru (1990) Fiji (2000) Guatemala (1982) Peru (1990) Suriname (1990) Pakistan (1999) Thailand (1991) Sudan (1989) Sierra Leone Uganda (1985) P P E P E E Gini coefficient E Inequality Measures Populist) Nondistributive (Texas Inequality dataset) Share of Family Farms (Vanhanen) Distributive Elite/ ( Ghana (1981) Suriname (1980) (1997) Comoros (1995) Comoros (1995) Suriname (1980) Guatemala (1982) Ecuador (2000) Niger (1996) Nigeria (1983) Burundi (1996) Pakistan (1999) Fiji (2000) Nigeria (1983) Bolivia (1980) Peru (1990) Burundi (1996) Sierra Leone Congo (1997)Suriname (1990) Sudan Niger (1989) (1996) Thailand (1991) Sudan (1989) Turkey(1980) Uganda (1985) Ghana (1981) P P E P E E E Populist) Nondistributive Capital Share of Income in Distributive Manufacturing Sector (capshare) Elite/ ( Bolivia (1980) Suriname (1980) Ecuador (2000) Fiji (2000) Burundi (1996) Turkey (1980) Ghana (1981) : Reversions: Cheibub, Ghandi, and Vreeland (2010); reversion types: Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo (2012); capital share: Houle (2009); Gini: Universi Data of Texas Inequality Project (2008); family farms: Vanhanen (2003). TABLE 4. Distributive and Nondistributive Reversions by Level of Inequality, 1980–2000 Level of Inequality High Missing Medium Low Sources

15 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012

TABLE 5. Distributive and Nondistributive CGV Reversions, Polity Scores, Prior Coups, Per Capita GDP, and GDP Growth, 1980–2000

Distributive Nondistributive Country/Year Reversions Reversions Polity Score Prior Coups GDP/ capita ($) Growth

Bolivia (1980) E −4 3 1070 −1.4 Burundi (1996) E 0 2 113 −8.0 Comoros (1995) X 4 1 386 3.6 Congo (1997) X 5 0 104 −5.6 Ecuador (2000) P 9 0 1295 2.8 Fiji (2000) E 6 1 2075 −1.7 Ghana (1981) P 6 4 224 −3.5 Guatemala (1982) X −5 1 1556 −3.5 Niger (1996) X 8 1 168 3.4 Nigeria (1983) X 7 2 319 −5.3 Pakistan (1999) X 7 0 526 3.7 Peru (1990) X 7 0 1657 −5.1 Sierra Leone (1997) X 4 3 168 −16.7 Sudan (1989) X 7 2 282 8.9 Suriname (1980) P − - 2536 −5.3 Suriname (1990) X − - 2049 −0.5 Thailand (1991) X 3 1 1500 8.6 Turkey (1980) E 9 1 2427 −2.4 Uganda (1985) X 3 2 170 −3.3 % or average 36.8% 63.2% 4.5 1.4 980 −1.6

Notes and sources: E, elite reversion; P, populist reversion. Polity scores are the country’s score the year preceding the reversion (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010). Prior coups is the number of coups (excluding attempted coups or plots) in the 10 years prior to the reversion (Marshall and Marshall 2010; McGowan 2007). GDP/capita and GDP growth refer to the values of these variables in the year of the reversion (World Bank 2010). Reversion types are from Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo (2012). cases based on a different inequality indicator would and clearly less well-off majority, producing a highly therefore yield similar results. fraught political environment (Lemarchand 1996). Be- tween 1966 and 1996, the country experienced no fewer than 11 coups and attempted coups (McGowan 2007), Distributive Conflict I: with periodic episodes of wider violence. The deposed Elite Reactions in Bolivia and Burundi democratic government was led by moderate Hutu Bolivia and Burundi are the only high-inequality cases politician Melchior Ndadaye, but was extremely frag- to revert to authoritarian rule through the causal pro- ile; the coding of the transition to democracy is 1993 cess stipulated by the theory. In Bolivia, a right-wing is dubious. Ndadave died in an unsuccessful coup at- military faction led by General Luis Garcia Meza tempt in 1994, and his successor, Cyprien Ntaryamira, deposed acting President Lidia Gueiler on July 17, was killed in a suspicious plane crash in the same year. 1980, following the victory of leftist Hernan Siles in After a massacre of more than three hundred Tutsis by an election held earlier that year. The coup occurred radical Hutu rebels in 1996, a military coup by former in the context of severe, ongoing conflicts between president Pierre Beyoya restored the Tutsis to power. militant miners’ unions and more conservative polit- ical and economic forces after the breakdown of the Distributive Conflict II: long-standing Banzer dictatorship in 1978. The Meza Populist Reversion in Ghana dictatorship was in turn ousted only two years later by working-class protests that forced new elections. Jerry Rawlings’ coup in Ghana constitutes a clear ex- Significantly, severe distributive conflicts continued to ample of a populist reversion, although once in office threaten the stability of the new democratic regime his military government shifted sharply to the right. In and ended only in 1985, when the elected government 1981, Rawlings overthrew the feckless constitutional harshly repressed union opposition and implemented government of Hilla Limann with the backing of mili- an aggressive structural adjustment program. tant student organizations, unions, and left social move- In Burundi, inequality is by no means correctly cap- ments. By the time of the coup, the economy had deteri- tured by the capshare or other inequality measures; orated badly, and the Limann government faced strikes much more significant are the deep ethnic cleavages and confrontations with workers over back pay and a that divide the country. A Tutsi minority (about 15% of tough austerity program. On seizing power, Rawlings the population) had long dominated the military, civil actively solicited the support of these forces by plac- service, and the economy. Hutus constituted a large ing representatives of radical left organizations on the

16 American Political Science Review military’s Provisional National Defense Council and Nigeria. As in Peru, the 1983 coup in Nigeria oc- creating a raft of populist consultative organizations curred in the context of severe economic deteriora- (Graham 1985; Hutchful 1997). Rawlings’ populism tion and a widespread loss of public confidence in the only aggravated Ghana’s economic problems, and the government. The leader of the coup, Major General military regime ultimately reversed course entirely and Muhaamadu Buhari, was—like his predecessors—tied vigorously embraced the “Washington consensus.” Yet closely to the Muslim north and had held a high po- the initial overthrow of the democratic regime clearly sition within the deposed government. Yet there are appealed to, and mobilized support from, populist and no indications that the takeover was motivated by leftist social forces. class or ethnic demands on the state, nor by the sig- nificant involvement of civil society. Nor is there evi- dence that factional rivalries within the military were The Null Cases: Nondistributive Reversions connected with broader social conflicts that could be modeled in elite-mass terms, whether engaging class, The other high-inequality reversions are Peru, Nigeria, ethnic, or regional interests. The most consequential Thailand, and Sierra Leone. Some of these involved divisions were within the elites, most notably, the mil- broad appeals that cut across class lines, whereas oth- itary, clientelistic politicians, and the business class. ers resulted primarily from conflicts within the elite When oil revenues collapsed, the ruling coalition frag- itself. However, in none of the cases were redistribu- mented under competing claims for patronage. The tive cleavages between elites and masses central to inability of the hegemonic party to reconcile these the reversion, and in several the specific political pres- conflicting interests, argues Augustine Udo (1985, 337), sures stipulated by the theory—redistributive demo- came to a head in a blatantly corrupt election in 1983 cratic governments or social movements—were alto- that exposed “unprecedented corruption, intimidation, gether absent. and flagrant abuse of electoral privilege by all par- ties.” The coup was a response to these democratic Peru. Alberto Fujimori’s decision to close congress failures. and rule by decree in April 1992 drew support from a broad cross-section of Peruvian society. Military back- Thailand 1991. The 1991 coup in Thailand was un- ing was, of course, essential and was motivated in part dertaken by a military faction that bridled under both by the desire for a free hand to confront the Shining the existing military leadership and the efforts of the Path, an insurgency that had pretenses of representing elected assembly to exercise greater control over mili- disadvantaged peasants in some highland areas of the tary spending and prerogatives (Baker and Phongpai- country. Yet in other important ways, the case does not chit 2002). Elected officials were concerned, among correspond with the theory. First, the “self-coup” ini- other things, with channeling patronage resources to tially met opposition from international and some local disadvantaged parts of the country, but they were business sectors—in short, from economic elites—who linked closely to upcountry business interests. Al- were concerned that an outright dictatorship would though the distribution of income had deteriorated in have adverse economic consequences. Although these Thailand during the economic reforms of the 1980s, left sectors eventually warmed to the regime after Fujimori parties remained confined to the fringes of political life, agreed to a fac¸ade of constitutionalism, they were by and a long-standing rural insurgency had long since pe- no means drivers or even supporters of the coup. tered out. The coup had the effect of galvanizing mass At the same time, Fujimori enjoyed surprisingly wide opposition, including groups explicitly representing the popular support, visible in his overwhelming victory in poor, and this opposition subsequently played a role an early referendum on a new constitution that would in the transition back to democratic rule. Yet there is cement his hold on power. The unions and the political no evidence that the coup either responded to popu- left did oppose the coup, but their organizations had lar pressures for redistribution or reflected populist- been decimated by the hyperinflation and economic authoritarian dissatisfaction with democracy’s failure collapse of the late 1980s, and they themselves enjoyed to redress redistributive grievances. little popular support. The large majority of the Peru- vian poor were attracted by a leader who promised to Weak Democracy Syndrome deal with a strong hand with the economic crisis and the insurgency. One 1992 survey showed that almost 76% We do not seek to elaborate an alternative theory of of low-income people supported Fujimori’s plan for democratic instability during the third wave, but our constitutional reform (Rubio 1992, 7; cited in Weyland analysis suggests a “weak democracy” syndrome that 1996, fn 16). While undertaking economic reforms, Fu- comports with a growing body of literature on demo- jimori also strengthened his electoral base through the cratic vulnerability (Diamond 2008; Levitsky and Way expansion of clientelistic antipoverty programs (Wey- 2010). Before turning to this issue, however, we should land 1996). In the late 1990s, as the economy once underscore that at least some of the reversions may be again slowed and corruption scandals surfaced, Fuji- artifacts of coding rules governing these two influential mori’s popularity waned, and he was eventually forced datasets. Table 5 shows that 8 of the 19 cases coded as to withdraw from power. Until that time, however, his reversions in the CGV dataset did not rise above the government rested on a surprisingly broad cross-class standard Polity cutoff score of 6 in the year preced- coalition. ing their collapse (Bolivia, Burundi, Comoros, Congo,

17 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012

Guatemala, Sierra Leone, Thailand, and Uganda). An- for challengers to act with the acquiescence or even other six cases (Fiji, Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, support from disaffected publics. and Sudan) barely make that threshold with scores of In sum, a close examination of the causal mech- either 6 or 7. The average Polity score for all of the anisms driving reversal during the third wave sug- CGV reversion countries in the year preceding the gests a more deep-seated syndrome in which distribu- collapse of democratic rule is only 4.5. “Reversions” tive conflict plays a surprisingly minor role. Struc- are occurring against democracies that are marginally tural constraints such as low per capita income and democratic at best. weak institutions combined with short-run crises seem Yet the weakness of the distributive conflict theory to be major factors in the breakdown of these weak of regime change is not simply an artifact of the coding democracies. rules; the causal mechanisms stipulated in the theory do not appear to operate either. Electoral competition in Thailand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Honduras, Ecuador, CONCLUSION Ghana, and Guatemala was dominated by patronage parties with close ties to economic elites or the military Viewed over the long run, the emergence of democracy establishment. In none of these cases do we see a sig- in the advanced industrial states resulted in part from nificant presence of parties, interest groups, or social fundamental changes in class structures. Demands on movements representing the interests of the poor that the state from new social classes—first the emergent could serve as the basis for distributive conflict that bourgeoisie and then the urban working class—played would in turn trigger elite intervention. a role in the gradual extension of the franchise. These Rather, conflicts within the political elite—between stylized facts played an important role in the new dis- ins and outs—was more likely to pose a challenge to tributive conflict models of regime change. democratic rule, with the military playing a pivotal Yet these models do not appear to travel well to role. In the 11 cases in which distributive conflicts the very different international, political, and socioeco- were implicated in the collapse of democratic rule, nomic conditions that prevailed during the third wave the military could plausibly be seen as an agent of ei- of democratization. Standard panel designs have found ther elites (elite-reaction reversions) or excluded social at best limited evidence for the inequality-transition forces (populist reversions). However, in many of the logic of the distributive conflict models, and the causal other cases, the military entered politics largely on its process observations reported here show that it does own behalf. Such intervention was more likely to oc- not appear to operate even in cases in which it should. cur where prior military intervention had established Although more refined measures of inequality may ul- a precedent. Cross-national quantitative work on both timately capture ethnic or regional inequalities that Latin America and Africa finds that the likelihood of we are underestimating, our causal process observa- a military coup is strongly affected by the previous his- tions are designed to capture at least the overt political tory of coups (Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Lehoucq and manifestations of a wide array of different distributive Perez-Linan 2009). The data presented in Table 5 are cleavages. It therefore seems likely that the problems consistent with these findings. Thirteen of 19 reversions lie with theory as well as measurement. came in countries that had already experienced at least How should we respond to such findings? Distribu- one prior coup, and in 7 of these cases, the military was tive conflict theories may simply be weaker than their a repeat offender. proponents suggest, and we later highlight several al- The data in Table 4 also highlight the poverty and ternative approaches to regime change. However, the poor economic performance of the countries experi- core insight of distributive conflict theories is intuitively encing reversion. As Londregan and Poole (1990) and appealing, and we are inclined to look for avenues for Przeworski et al. (2000) have shown convincingly, the refinement. One avenue would be to consider whether probability that democratic governments will survive is inequality influences the stability of democratic rule strongly affected by the level of development. Average through channels other than those postulated by the GDP per capita for the reversion cases at the time of the distributive conflict theorists. High inequality may be collapse of democratic rule was only $980, way below a determinant of the “weak democracy” syndrome, for the thresholds for consolidated democracies. Among example by contributing to low growth and poverty the non-African cases, only Thailand, Ecuador, and (Persson and Tabellini 1994), which are in turn re- Peru are middle-income countries. lated to political instability and weak, ineffective states The relationship between short-run economic per- (Londregan and Poole 1990). This causal path may formance and reversions has also been explored in well help explain an important class of low-income some detail (Gasiorowsksi 1995; Haggard and Kauf- cases, as we argued in the conclusion to our discus- man 1995; Kricheli and Livne 2011; Teorell 2010). Prze- sion of reversions; we return to this group of countries worski et al. (2000) show that the odds of democratic later. survival decrease substantially after three consecutive Yet the collective protest of citizens against elites is a years of negative economic growth. On average, the core causal mechanism in distributive conflict theories, economies of the reversion countries declined by 1.6% and such an approach would abandon that insight alto- in the year of the reversion, and a number were in the gether. The incentives and capacity to mobilize such midst of full-blown economic crises (Table 5). Both low protest are central to the theory, yet are either as- per capita income and slow growth provided openings sumed to be a function of levels of inequality or ignored

18 American Political Science Review altogether.12 The free-rider problem highlighted by Ol- Walle 1997). Both transitions and reversion in these son decades ago (1965) problematizes the assumption cases often came at best in response to generalized that shared interests in redistribution will enable large protest against poor economic conditions waged by groups to overcome barriers to collective action. The relatively better-off urban forces, many with close ties question of how to solve this problem has become to the state apparatus. the cornerstone of the literature not only on regime Institutional approaches represent another point of change but also on revolution, collective violence, and departure for explaining collective action. Prior experi- contentious politics. ence with democracy or institutionalized opportunities In the absence of a capacity to overcome barriers to for collective action in semi-authoritarian regimes may collective action, transitions both to and from demo- be important for understanding how collective chal- cratic rule are more likely to reflect narrow, intra-elite lenges are subsequently mobilized. In Latin America, conflicts. Although such conflicts certainly have a dis- corporatist unions, which had initially been financed tributive component—and indeed a highly conflictual and sponsored by the state (Collier and Collier 1991; one—it is harder to root them in the class-conflict logic Schmitter 1974), subsequently formed a core compo- of the underlying Meltzer-Richard model. Although nent of protests against authoritarian incumbents in we found a surprising number of distributive conflict Peru, Bolivia, and Argentina, as did a number of labor- transitions in the high-inequality cases, the concentra- based political parties with close links to the state. tion of income and assets in such settings may also At a more general level, differences in authoritarian empower elites to shape the course of regime change; institutions might shape both the actors and cleavages the effects of transitions on the distribution of income that lead to the establishment or reversal of democracy. could as well be regressive as progressive. Collier (1999) has shown this empirically with earlier We suspect that distributive conflict theories may democratic transitions in Europe and Latin America, ultimately prove to be conditional in form; that is, and an exploding literature on varieties of authori- they are dependent on incentives and capacities for tarian rule raises the possibility for the postwar pe- collective action that are not in fact given by the level riod as well (Geddes 1999; Levitsky and Way 2010; of inequality. What are these additional factors that Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). The effects of the organi- might enable subaltern groups to overcome barriers zational spaces provided by such regimes on collective to collective action? We identify at least three lines of demands for democracy remain a subject of ongoing research, each of which is potentially complementary research. For instance, controlled competition under to the political economy approaches discussed in this semi-competitive regimes might provide opportunities article but may also represent competing approaches for mobilization that subsequently spill over into chal- to regime change. lenges to the regime itself. Yet it is also possible that It may not be necessary to reach beyond a political- controlled opening may yield advantages for incum- economy framework to clarify conditions in which dis- bents by establishing organized channels for recruit- tributive conflict becomes more likely to affect regime ment of supporters, opportunities for control, and the change. One such condition is economic development. revelation of politically useful information, such as the At various points, both Boix (2003) and Acemoglu identity and strength of the opposition. and Robinson (2006) suggest that capacities for col- Finally, the social movement and “contentious pol- lective action are likely to be greater in relatively de- itics” literature provides the starkest alternative to veloped countries where industrialization and urban- political-economy approaches. Work in this area em- ization provide a social basis for organization. Our phasizes the significance of political opportunities, re- case studies also suggest a contrast between middle- sources, and cultural framing, typically casting the ap- income countries with substantial concentrations of in- proach in opposition both to strictly rationalist expla- dustrial labor and poorer countries where low-income nations for collective action and theories that stress groups are concentrated in the agricultural and urban underlying structural conditions such as inequality (see informal sectors and face greater barriers to collec- McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003). As noted earlier, tive action. In relatively industrialized countries such much of the analysis of nationalist and ethnic move- as Argentina, Brazil, Poland, South Africa, and South ments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union Korea, distributive conflict transitions involved or were focuses on the factors emphasized in the contentious even led by workers’ movements with a relatively long politics literature. Kubik (1994), for example, provides history of political mobilization and collective action an important account of how the Solidarity movement (Collier 1999; Drake 1998). Conversely, in a number of mobilized around a protest discourse that emerged in the poorer African transitions we examined, political the wake of Pope John Paul II’s return to Poland in parties and civil society groups representing the poor 1979. More broadly, Beissinger’s (2002) seminal work were often too weak to check the predatory tenden- on anti-regime protest in the Soviet Union emphasizes cies of state elites and of other more privileged social nationalism and ethnic identities, rather than socioe- forces; as a result regime change was better understood conomic grievances, as the principal spur to protest in terms of intra-elite processes (Bratton and van de against Soviet authority. As we argued in our discussion of the coding, such protest can be viewed as a reaction 12 See Green and Shapiro (1994) for a general critique of rational against other forms of inequality. Yet it can also be choice theory and its inability to deal persuasively with collective viewed as an alternative to the structural and rationalist action problems. foundations of distributive conflict approaches.

19 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012

The relationship between these analyses of the as regime change, revolution, financial crisis, war, or sources of collective action and distributive conflict the- famine—and thus amenable to intensive qualitative ories is not straightforward. Economic development, scrutiny. Such an approach combines within-case anal- political institutions, and even the dynamics of con- ysis that is sensitive to context and sequence with tests tentious politics may simply mediate the effects of of the underlying theories and causal mechanisms that inequality emphasized in the distributive conflict ap- are often only implicit in larger-N designs. However, proaches. However, given the agnostic nature of our this approach rests on a willingness to open up exist- findings, they might also prove to be contending ex- ing datasets and recode them in line with theoretical planations that move away from an emphasis on un- expectations to maximize inferential leverage. derlying inequalities altogether. 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Social Origins of Dictatorship and Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press. University Press. O’Donnell, Guillermo A. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic- Haggard, Stephan, Robert R. Kaufman, and TerenceTeo. 2012. “Dis- authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Berkeley: tributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset.” University of California Press. http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/18276 V1 (accessed June 1, 2012). O’Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Hedstrom, Peter, and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. “Causal Mechanisms in Whitehead, eds. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tenta- the Social Sciences.” Annual Review of Sociology 36: 49–67. tive Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Houle, Christian 2009. “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequal- Hopkins University Press. ity Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization,” Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods World Politics 61 (4): 589–622. and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Huntington, Samuel P.1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Press. Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 1994. “Is Inequality Harmful Hutchful, Eboe. 1997. “Military Policy and Reform in Ghana.” Jour- for Economic Growth?” American Economic Review 84: 600–21. nal of Modern African Studies 35 (2): 251–78. Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Im, Hyung Baeg. 1987. “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. in South Korea.” World Politics 39 (2): 231–57. Przeworski, Adam. 2009. “Conquered or Granted? A History of King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Suffrage Extensions.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (2): Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.Prince- 291–321. ton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Kitschelt, Herbert, and Steven Wilkinson, eds. 2006. Patrons or Poli- Fernando Limongi. 2000. Democracy and Development: Political cies? Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Compe- Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: tition. New York: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge University Press.

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Reenock, Christopher, Michael Bernhard, and David Sobek. 2007. Udo, Augustine. 1985. “Class, Party Politics, and the 1983 Coup in “Regressive Socioeconomic Distribution and Democratic Sur- Nigeria.” Africa Spectrum 20 (3): 327–38. vival.” International Studies Quarterly 51 (3): 677–99. University of Texas Inequality Project. 2008. Estimated House- Roberts, Kevin W. S. 1977. “Voting over Income Tax Schedules.” hold Income Inequality (EHII) Dataset. http://utip.gov.utexas. Journal of Public Economics 8 (3): 329–40. edu/data.html (accessed June 1, 2012). Romer, Thomas. 1975. “Individual Welfare, Majority Voting, and the Valenzuela, Arturo 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Properties of a Linear Income Tax.” Journal of Public Economics Chile. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 4 (2): 163–85. Vanhanen, Tatu. 2003. “Democratization and Power Resources Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John 1850–2000.” FSD1216, version 1.0 (2003-03-10). University Stephens. 1992. Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago: of Tampere, Department of Political Science. Finnish So- University of Chicago Press. cial Science Data Archive. http://www.fsd.uta.fi/english/ Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. “Still the Century of Corporatism?” data/catalogue/FSD1216/meF1216e.html (accessed June 1, Review of Politics 36 (1): 85–131. 2012). Slater, Dan, and Benjamin Smith. 2012. “Economic Origins of Demo- Weyland, Kurt. 1996. “Neoliberalism and Neopopulism in Latin cratic Breakdown? The Redistributive Model and the Postcolonial America: Unexpected Affinities.” Studies in Comparative Inter- State.” University of Chicago. Unpublished manuscript. national Development 31 (3): 3–31. Stepan, Alfred 2001. Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford: Oxford Whitehead, Lawrence, ed. 1996. The International Dimensions of University Press. Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford Uni- Teorell, Jan. 2010. Determinants of Democratization: Explaining versity Press. Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge World Bank. 2010. World Development Indicators 2010. Washington University Press. DC: World Bank.

22 The American Political Science Association APSA Volume 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization October 2013 I! T"#$ I$$%& CD INEQUALITY AND REGIME CHANGE: THE ROLE OF “Inequality and DISTRIBUTIVE CONFLICT Democratization: Stephan Haggard, University of California, San Diego Robert Kaufman, Rutgers University What Do We Terence Teo, Rutgers University Know?” In a recent article in the American Political Science Review, we 1 Obituary for Juan Linz Alfred Stepan and Je! Miley attempted to test what we call “distributive conflict” models of regime change using a qualitative data set of transitions to and 1 Inequality and Regime Change 1 Stephan Haggard, Robert from democracy from 1980 through 2000. These models, pioneered Kaufman, and Terence Teo by Carles Boix (2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006)2 rest on complex 1 Rethinking Inequality and Democratization causal chains including both structural and game-theoretic components: inequality, Ben Ansell and David Samuels strategic interactions between incumbents and oppositions over the nature of political 2 RMDs institutions, and the ever-present threat of repression from above and violence from below. Carles Boix 2 Democracy, Public Policy, and Inequality 1. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Democratic Rule,” American Political Science Review 106 (August 2012): 495–516; Stephan Haggard, Robert Kaufman, and Pascual Restrepo and James A. Terence K. Teo, Distributive Con$ict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset, 1980-2008, 2012. Robinson 3 Inequality, Democratization, and 2. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Daron Acemoglu and James Democratic Consolidation Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Christian Houle (continued on page 4) 26 Section News 33 New Research 40 Editorial Committee RETHINKING INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIZATION: HOW INEQUALITY DIVIDES ELITES AND UNDERPINS REGIME OBITUARY FOR CHANGE UAN INZ J L Ben Ansell, Oxford University With the sad news of Professor David Samuels, University of Minnesota Juan Linz passing away on 1 Tuesday, October 1, 2013, we Despite the implications of Przeworski et al. , the search for factors that might felt no need to issue an editor’s drive “endogenous” democratization is alive and well. However, scholarship on note in this issue. We instead the political consequences of economic change has shifted from the hypothesized asked Professor Linz’s disciples impact of economic growth to the question of the political consequences of and friends Je! Miley and di'erent patterns of equal or unequal growth. We owe this ‘redistributivist’ turn - which draws Alfred Stepan to write an attention to a purported tension between democracy and property - to the in(uence of Daron 2 obituary. "ere is poetry and Acemoglu and James Robinson and Carles Boix. )ese studies vary in how they formalize the meaning in that this obituary 1. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development is being written by one of his (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). #rst, and one of his last PhD 2. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, “A )eory of Political Transitions,” American Economic Review 91 (September candidates, both of whom 2001): 938–963; Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (New York: Cambridge University Press, learned from him to his #nal 2003). days, and like all his students, (continued on page 8) (continued on page 3) Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

Articles

RMDS Carles Boix, Princeton University

Redistributive models of democracy (RMD), to use Haggard and Kaufman’s expression, have been criticized on several counts: (1) their empirical performance is weak; (2) they make unconditional predictions about the relationship between structural variables (inequality, asset speci*city, organizational and information parameters) and political transitions; and (3) the parameters of the models are either too narrow and stylized or simply wrong – particularly (a) the assumption of rational, self-interested actors motivated by material interests, (b) the de*nition of ‘classes’, (c) the sequence of the political decision process, and (d) the tax setting model. After examining these critiques brie(y here, I conclude that, broadly speaking, the idea of democracy as an equilibrium (given by the material payo's of relevant social and economic actors) is: (1) relatively robust and (2) the best point of departure (or, in Lakatos’ terms, a core) from which to progressively build a satisfactory theory of political transitions.

Empirical Performance of the !eory Several important empirical tests on RMD *nd that the association between economic inequality, asset speci*city and political transitions either does not exist, is highly unstable or is restricted to democratic breakdowns. Houle (2009) concludes that inequality makes democratic breakdowns more likely but does not a'ect democratic transitions after 1960. Ansell and Samuels (2010) * nd that land inequality explains democratic transitions since the mid-19th century but that income inequality has the opposite e'ect. Haggard and Kaufman (2012) claim that almost half of all political transitions since 1980 are unrelated to distributive con(ict.

As I have insisted elsewhere,1 the examination of the covariates of political transitions has to be systematic to the point of including all the 1. Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does not A'ect Democratization,” World Politics 61 (October 2009): 589-622; Ben Ansell and David Samuels, “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (December 2010): 1543-1574; Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule,” American Political Science Review 106

(continued on page 12)

DEMOCRACY, PUBLIC POLICY AND INEQUALITY Daron Acemoglu, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Suresh Naidu, Columbia University Pascual Restrepo, Universidad de los Andes James A. Robinson, Harvard University )e relationship between inequality and democracy has been theorized since at least Aristotle, but in the last decade it has been subject to intense theoretical and empirical investigation. )e *rst formal models of democratic transitions by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) suggested that there would be an inverse U-shaped relationship between inequality and democratization. Autocracies that were too equal would not democratize because there would not be enough social con(ict to create an e'ective demand for changes in political institutions. Autocracies that were too unequal would not democratize either because democratization would be very costly for non-democratic elites who would attempt to stay in power via repression. )ese models also predicted that democratization itself ought to reduce inequality as the newly enfranchised would vote for redistribution and more active government policy.

)ese theoretical results were obviously conditional on key modeling decisions. For one, political con(ict was conceived of as rich/elite versus poor/citizen with autocracy being associated with rule by the elite and democratization being associated with a transfer of power from rich to poor with a resulting change in policy from pro-elite to pro-poor. )ough this set-up has a parsimonious appeal, the comparative statics are conditional on some very simple models of both types of political regime. For example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) showed that once one relaxed the simple poor versus rich nature of political con(ict in their original models as well as the restriction of policy instruments, the nature of the comparative statics with respect to inequality in the basic model changed.1 Put simply, if the groups in con(ict were not

1. Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson, “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Growth, Inequality and Democracy in Historical Perspective,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000): 1167-1199; Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “A )eory of Political Transitions,” American Economic Review 91 (September 2001): 938- 963; Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). (continued on page 16)

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INEQUALITY, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION Christian Houle, Michigan State University Does inequality a'ect democracy? Recently a large literature has argued that inequality in(uences both the likelihood of transition to and away from democracy, often through similar mechanisms. In this note, I argue that it is necessary to clearly distinguish between the e'ects of inequality on democratization and on democratic consolidation. As demonstrated by Przeworski et al. regarding economic development, for example, some factors may have very di'erent implications for these two transition processes.

Building on my previous work, I argue that inequality harms the consolidation of democracies but does not a'ect the likelihood of transition to democracy itself. In other words,1 unequal countries are not more or less likely to transition to democracy, but once they democratize they are less likely to remain democratic. I extend my previous analysis in three ways. First, my previous analysis used a single measure of inequality: the capital shares of the value added in production. In this note, I show that my results are robust to the use of Gini indexes. Second, I tackle the issue of endogeneity between inequality and democracy by using a novel instrumental variable strategy.

)ird, the capital shares dataset I used in my previous article ended in 2000 and about seventy countries were excluded from the analysis because of the lack of inequality data. Other recent empirical studies typically have an even larger proportion of missing observations. I use the extended version of the capital shares dataset I introduced in Houle.2 It covers 183 countries between 1960 and 2008, and contains more 1. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see, in particular: Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does not A'ect Democratization,” World Politics 61 (October 2009): 589-622.

2. Christian Houle, “Does Inequality Harm Economic Development and Democracy? Evidence from a Complete and Comparable Data Set on Inequality,” in Carol Lancaster and Nicolas van de Walle, eds., Oxford University Press Handbook on the Politics of Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). See Houle, “Does Inequality Harm,” for more information on the imputation technique and the extent to which the dataset satis*es the basic criteria necessary for using such (continued on page 21 )

Obituary for Juan Linz, continued (continued from page 1) love and miss him terribly. works were on inequality and political and therefore help avoid repeating such paralysis in the United States, and on “state collective tragedies. His work on democratic Obituary for Juan J. Linz nations” in countries like India where the breakdowns especially so, motivated as it was On Tuesday October 1, 2013, Juan José e'ort to impose a “nation state” would be in by a sentiment well expressed by Meinecke, Linz Storch de Gracia died at the age of tension with an inclusionary democracy and the great German historian whose reaction 86. Professor Linz was undoubtedly one internal peace. to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor was the *nest political sociologists in the world. one that Linz was particularly fond of Legendary for the encyclopedic breadth of Linz’s undying passion for such diverse but quoting – namely, “)is was not necessary.” his knowledge, his ideas and writings deeply intertwined subjects was largely a product in(uenced debates surrounding a vast array of his traumatic experience growing up Linz came to New York in 1950 to pursue of the century’s most important political in interwar Europe. Born in the Weimar a doctoral degree in Sociology at Columbia problems. Republic to a Spanish mother and German University, an institution with which he father, Linz would witness *rst-hand over would remain a+liated for nearly two Linz’s empirical and theoretical the course of his childhood and adolescence a decades until 1969, when he moved to contributions to scholarly research and sequence of tragic social and political events: Yale where he would stay for the rest of his literature were legion. He contributed *rst in Germany, the economic crisis of the life. Upon his arrival at Columbia, he soon with path-breaking work on regime types, Weimar Reublic, its subsequent breakdown, gained a reputation for his extraordinary the dynamics of democratic breakdowns, and the rise to power and domination of the erudition and unparalleled command of transitions to democracy, democratic Nazis; then, after moving with his mother to comparative European history as well as institutional design, presidentialism versus Spain in the Spring of 1936, the breakdown social and political thought. Having already parliamentarism, parties and party systems, of the country’s Second Republic and been mentored in Spain by Javier Conde, political and business elites, federalism, its bloody Civil War. Linz’s work would he took classes and worked very closely at nationalism, and fascism. His most recent be consistently concerned to understand Columbia with Robert K. Merton, Paul (continued on page 25) 3 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

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HAGGARD, KAUFMAN, AND TEO, CONTINUED (continued from page 1)

We argued that both theoretical and from distributive conflict transitions for authoritarian elites to repress methodological progress could be made appear more robust than those that political demands for redistribution. by undertaking detailed process tracing occur through a non-distributive They also note—contrary to Boix— of the components of these models. route. that at low levels of inequality there is We examined not only the reduced- little demand for democratization. Boix form relationship between inequality Distributive Conflict Models thus sees the prospects for democratic and regime change—on which there The work of both Boix (2003) and transitions to be inversely correlated has been surprisingly little supportive Acemoglu and Robinson (A&R, 2006) with inequality. A&R by contrast evidence for the theory (Acemoglu builds on the seminal Meltzer-Richard conclude that the relationship between et. al., this symposium)—but also the (MR) model (1981).3 MR provide a inequality and democratic transitions postulated mechanisms through which formal model of redistribution under should exhibit an inverted-U pattern, inequality translated into pressures for democratic rule, and thus a baseline with transitions to democratic rule authoritarian or democratic elites to for how the distribution of income most likely to occur at intermediate yield power. would change as a result of a transition levels of inequality. from authoritarian to democratic We distinguished in particular governance. Boix (p. 37) captures A&R add another layer of complexity between distributive conflict and non- the general spirit of these models: “a by considering credible commitment distributive conflict transitions. In the more unequal distribution of wealth problems; these issues are directly former, pressures from below appeared increases the redistributive demands germane to the controversial question to directly influence decisions by elites of the population…. [However] as the of how these models treat collective to make democratic concessions. In the potential level of transfers becomes action. In addition to the possibility latter, pressures from below did not larger, the authoritarian inclinations of repressing outright, A&R note that play a decisive role; transitions resulted of the wealthy increase and the elites can maintain power by making from incumbent initiatives, intra-elite probabilities of democratization and short-run economic concessions conflicts, and/or external pressures. democratic stability decline steadily.” to defuse threats from below. Yet How this strategic interaction between politically and economically excluded In this note, we revisit the theoretical elites and masses plays out depends groups are aware that elites can renege issue of how inequality generates regime on the level of inequality, the capacity on these concessions when pressures change, and the role of distributive to repress and other parameters such from below subside. Lower class groups conflict in particular. We summarize as capital mobility. Nonetheless, the are thus likely to press their advantage new results based on an updated challenge to the authoritarian status during windows when collective action version of our dataset that includes all quo emanates from what Acemoglu problems are temporarily resolved. democratic transitions through 2008. and Robinson call de facto as opposed The results strengthen our earlier to de jure political power: the ability These credible commitment problems finding that a large share of transitions of lower class groups to challenge elite can generate a counterintuitive result. occur in the absence of significant incumbents through mass mobilization, It might seem that transitions would be pressure from below, suggesting that strikes, demonstrations, riots and other more likely when lower class groups are distributive conflict models are at best physical threats to elite security. well-organized. Yet A&R argue that this subject to unspecified scope limitations, is not necessarily the case “because with including the capacity of subordinated While the basic insight of these a frequent revolutionary threat, future groups to overcome barriers to collective distributive conflict models is intuitive, redistribution becomes credible.”4 As action. the details are not. This can be seen an historical example, they cite the fact in differences in the treatment of that Germany—the country with the We conclude with some preliminary inequality, the central causal factor in most developed socialist movement— findings on how the nature of the these models. A&R agree with Boix that created novel welfare institutions transition to democratic rule may affect high inequality increases the incentives without extending the franchise while

the prospects for consolidation. We 3. Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “A Rational political elites in Britain and France find that the democracies that emerge )eory of the Size of Government,” Journal of 4. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 161, Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927. 200.

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were forced to extend the franchise as a on the effects of inequality and other contrast, were ones in which these result of pressures from below. structural variables. But if distributive elements were missing. Elite withdrawal We are hard pressed, however, to think conflict models are correct, we would was motivated by international of contemporary examples in which a expect to see democratic transitions pressures, intra elite conflicts, or what high capacity for collective action on preceded by mass mobilization that we call “pre-emptive” motives, in which the part of the poor was responsible for threatens authoritarian incumbents and elites initiated regime change in the stable, redistributive authoritarian rule. forces them to withdraw. belief that they could remain in office The primary focus of Economic Origins or effectively veto their democratic is on situations in which sporadic—if The qualitative data set that provided successors. unexplained—collective action drives the empirical base for the APSR regime change. The basic game on paper5 looks directly at this causal In coding the cases, we were deliberately which all others build distinguishes mechanism. Our data set assessed permissive, writing coding rules that between a low threat situation in which the role of distributive conflict in all gave the benefit of the doubt to the there are high costs for citizens to transitions indicated in the Polity theory. Unlike the extant inequality solve collective action problems and a IV (n=57) and Cheibub, Ghandi and data, our coding allowed us to consider high threat situation in which “citizens Vreeland (hereafter CGV; n=65) a variety of distributive conflicts that are able to solve the collective action datasets between 1980 and 2000.6 We may not be captured by any single problem relatively costlessly and/or drew a simple dichotomous distinction inequality measure, from urban class elites are not well organized in their between distributive and non- conflicts to ethnic, regional and sectoral defense…” (p. 145). To what extent do distributive conflict transitions. We ones. The economically disadvantaged contemporary transitions comport with coded “distributive conflict” transitions or the organizations representing them this distinction between “high threat” as ones in which both of the following need not be the only ones mobilized and “low threat” environments? occurred: in opposition to the existing regime. Although mass mobilization must partly Some simple tests R5 " 5 ')#.#)(5 ) 5 , #-.,#/.#0 5 reflect demands for redistribution, it Despite their differences, these grievances on the part of economically can be motivated by other grievances distributive conflict theories share disadvantaged groups or representatives as well. Yet mobilization must arise two important assumptions that are of such groups (parties, unions, NGOs) around distinctive and identifiable amenable to empirical observation. posed a threat—a “clear and present inequalities at least to some extent. First, although there are disagreements danger”—to the incumbency of ruling about the political dynamics of low and elites, and Even with a very permissive coding, intermediate levels of inequality, there is we found a large share of cases (44.6 agreement that democratic transitions R5" 5 ,#-#(!5 )-.-5 ) 5 , *, --#(!5 ." - 5 percent of the CVG transitions and are unlikely at high levels of inequality. demands appear to have motivated 42.1 percent of the Polity cases) in Second—and more important for elites to make political compromises or which distributive conflict played only our purposes—it is assumed that exit in favor of democratic challengers. a marginal role. Using three separate democracy is likely to occur when The presence of this causal mechanisms measures of inequality (capital’s share lower class groups are able to overcome was indicated at a minimum by a clear of income in the manufacturing sector, barriers to collective action—even if temporal sequence—mass mobilization a Gini coefficient from the Estimated only temporarily—and mobilize “de followed by authoritarian withdrawal— Household Income Inequality Data facto power” in favor of democracy. but where possible we drew on other Set and the Vanhanen measure of land The assumptions about collective evidence as well, including elite inequality) we also found that between action receive only limited attention in statements. 29 and 34 percent of all transitions the two books (Boix, this symposium); occurred in countries ranked in the in fact, A&R explicitly assume the Non-distributive transitions, by upper tercile of these measures; a high problem away by treating “citizens” as a share of transitions were taking place 5. Haggard and Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime 7 unitary actor in the formal models. And Change”. in high-inequality settings. Moreover, the role of mass mobilization is almost 7. Christian Houle, “Inequality and Democracy: entirely ignored in the econometric 6. José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not James R. Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship A'ect Democratization,” World Politics 61(October literature, which focuses more directly Revisited,” Public Choice 143(April 2010): 67-101. 2009): 589-622; University of Texas Inequality

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a high proportion of these were heterogeneity. For the Third Wave of a negative role in non-distributive ones. distributive conflict transitions. Using recent democratization—when there the Gini as the measure of inequality, was in fact substantial divergence in We also find that the type of about 75 percent of the high-inequality political developments across cases- authoritarian regime appears to have transitions were characterized by -a large share of transitions simply a differential effect on the likelihood distributive conflict; the incidence of do not reflect the causal mechanisms of distributive and non-distributive such high-inequality transitions was stipulated in the theory, either with transitions. Challenges from below are 60 percent using the land inequality respect to the role of inequality or less likely under authoritarian regimes measure and 57 percent using capital’s distributive conflict. with multiparty legislatures—perhaps share of manufacturing income. We because of their capacity to coopt drew two conclusions: that inequality Extensions opposition—and more likely under did not appear to have the stipulated Despite these findings, the distributive military regimes that did not typically effect on the likelihood of transitions; conflict approach reopens the debate provide such channels of representation. and that distributive conflict was not a about the causes and consequences of On the other hand, the distinction uniform driver of democratization. At different transition paths. Do these between military and multiparty best, the effect of inequality worked paths arise from different causal regimes was not consequential in non- under scope conditions that were not roots? And more importantly, does the distributive transitions, which were clearly specified in the theory. distinction between distributive and driven primarily by elite actors who non-distributive conflict transitions were either tolerated by incumbent We have subsequently extended the have any enduring effect on the nature rulers or parts of the ruling circle itself. Haggard, Kaufman, and Teo data of democratic rule? We report some set through 2008, adding 14 cases to preliminary findings here. The likelihood of non-distributive the CGV transitions (n=79) and 16 transitions was, however, affected by cases to the Polity ones (n=73). The To explore the first question, we ran economic and international factors results remain essentially the same; if separate rare event logit estimates proxied in the regressions. Low or anything, they are even less favorable with country-clustered robust standard negative growth consistently predicted to the distributive conflict approach. errors and cubic time polynomials on non-distributive as well as distributive Between 34 and 45 percent of all the likelihood of each type of transition. transitions, presumably by intensifying transitions were in the most unequal Given space limitations the regressions elite struggles over rents or diminishing countries—again measured by the top are not presented here but are available their capacity to manipulate electoral terciles—and of these, between 37.5 from the authors on request. support. Non-distributive transitions and 55.6 percent were distributive (but not distributive ones) were affected conflict transitions. The percentage of As noted, we are particularly interested as well by the incidence of neighboring distributive conflict transitions among in the capacity of mass groups to democracies, an indication of the the CGV coding fell from 54.4 to 53.2 overcome barriers to collective action. relative importance of diffusion effects percent; Polity transitions conforming One factor – industrialization – has and other forms of external pressure. to the distributive conflict model long been viewed as a foundation for fell from 57.9 to only 49.3 percent. mobilization along class lines. In the Again, inequality had no effect on Boix (this symposium) argues that regressions, we use the size of the either type of transition. valid tests of the model must include manufacturing sector to proxy for this the full historical record to capture potential. Of course, the role played The Effects of Transition Paths the initial divergence associated with in collective action by non-economic The implicit question raised by democratization in the advanced factors such as ethnicity or religion the discussion in the preceding industrial states. However, this approach also require examination. Nevertheless, section is whether “non-distributive” makes strong assumptions about the it is noteworthy that manufacturing transitions—dominated by external ability to control for incredible panel –a basis for worker coordination and influences and intra-elite politics—are Project, Estimated Household Income Inequality organization–does have a consistently less likely to result in full democracies (EHII) Dataset, Available at http://utip.gov.utexas. edu/data.html; Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization significant impact on distributive than ones driven at least in part by and Power Resources, 1850-2000, 2003, Available at transitions and an insignificant or even pressures from below. Distributive http://www.fsd.uta.*/en/data/catalogue/FSD1216/.

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Table 1. Regression Estimates of the E"ects of CGV Distributive and Non- Distributive Transitions on Polity Score in the Year Following the Transition, be associated with regime change in 1980-2008 a straightforward way, as Acemoglu et. al. note in this symposium. Core theoretical assumptions about the causal

importance of distributive demands from below appear to pertain only in a subset of cases. Distributive and

non-distributive transitions are driven by distinct political and economic dynamics, including differences in the potential for mass groups to

overcome barriers to collective action. We also find preliminary evidence that distributive conflict transitions

generate more robust democracies, at least in the short run. These results suggest the importance of revisiting the logic and consequences of different transition paths.

Stephan Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Professor of Korea-Paci#c Studies and director of the Korea-Paci#c program at University of California, San Diego. Robert R. Kaufman is a professor of political science at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. conflict transitions may pose dangers of in model 4). Terence K. Teo is a PhD candidate in political destabilizing polarization for newly science at Rutgers University. established democratic governments, A distributive transition increases but it is also reasonable to assume a country’s Polity score by almost 5 that such governments would be more points relative to a “non-transition” responsive to a mobilized citizenry. year; a non-distributive transition by Governments emerging from non- only about 2.7 points. These results distributive transitions face no are robust to the inclusion of a variety equivalent pressures or restraints on the of control variables, including: GDP, abuse of power. growth, trade openness, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and prior rule by a The fixed-effects regressions below military dictatorship. In future work, address this issue by examining the way we will consider the longer-run path distributive and non-distributive CGV of democratic consolidation in the two transitions, defined more narrowly on types of transitions, but preliminary the basis of transitional elections, affect inspection of the cases suggests that subsequent Polity scores, which provide non-distributive conflict transitions are a broader measure of differences in followed by democracies that are not political form that includes political only weaker but more prone to reversal. rights and government accountability. Both distributive and non-distributive Conclusion CGV transitions have a significant The work of Boix and A&R has impact on the Polity score, but the opened up new avenues of research coefficients for distributive transitions about how conflicts over redistribution are almost twice as large as those for affect authoritarian and democratic non-distributive ones (4.93 versus 2.71 rule. Yet inequality does not appear to

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(continued from page 1) interplay between economic structure and which entails some redistribution. )e connected social-class structures to political outcomes and in their empirical higher the inequality, the more the di'erent Gini coe+cients. Redistributivist approaches to testing hypotheses, but they autocratic elite have incentives to dig in arguments assume that a relatively low begin from the same simple theoretical their heels, just as the poor have stronger Gini implies that the median voter premise: the emergence of democracy is a incentives to rebel. Democracy is thus least is a member of the (relatively large) function of the incumbent autocratic elite’s likely when inequality is high, when the “middle” class, sociologically speaking, relative fear of redistribution to (and by) wealthy have less to fear from redistribution and likewise assume that a high Gini the poor – and the higher the inequality, to the poor. (Boix and A&R di'er indicates that the middle class is relatively the greater the fear. regarding the poor’s relative incentives to small, and that the median voter is poor. push for democracy under low inequality.) )is syllogism between democracy and In fact, this is backwards. Consider redistribution has become conventional We suggest that the redistributivist the example we provided in our 2010 wisdom. It is intuitive, has deep approach to regime change is theoretically paper: which country - China in 1880 philosophical roots, and has long been misleading and misses the mark empirically. or the UK in 1867 - is more likely to invoked on the political left and right In our 2010 article,4 we argued that this democratize? Everyone knows the answer (albeit for di'erent reasons – to evoke hope approach relies on a set of questionable to this question, but what remains less well- versus instill fear). Moreover, the argument assumptions - about the nature of known is that China’s Gini at that time was gained widespread academic credence with inequality, about the relevant actors in .24, while the UK’s was .51. In the 19th Meltzer and Richard’s seminal median- democratization, and about those actors’ century, the UK had a large and growing voter model.3 )is model assumes that political preferences - and also *nds little “middle” class, while China did not. )ese under democracy the tax system will be empirical support in cross-national analysis. are not outliers: In poor and economically progressive: All citizens pay the same In our view democracy is not a function of stagnant societies, a low Gini does not proportion of their income, but bene*ts the monolithic elite’s fear of the poor, it imply a large middle class. It means that are universal and uniform, so that everyone is about the emergence of splits between nearly everyone is equally poor - and receives the same amount in subsidy. )is incumbent and rising economic elites, that the median voter is a member of the means that the rich pay more than they with the latter fearing the expropriative impoverished masses. In contrast, relatively receive while the opposite is true for the power of the state far more than they fear poor but growing societies typically poor. Consequently, those with below- the redistributive threat from the poor. see higher Ginis not because the “1%” mean incomes favor redistribution, while exploits the “99%,” but because economic those above the mean oppose it. Because the Our argument o'ers a novel explanation development brings about greater inter- income distribution is always right-skewed, of the political consequences of inequality. group income di'erentials. With very the median voter has below-mean income While redistributivist arguments conceive few exceptions, in sociological terms high and hence desires redistribution, and this of inequality as the ratio of incomes between Gini coe+cients in a developing country desire intensi*es as the gap between mean rich and poor, we di'erentiate between the indicate a relatively large middle class, even and median income widens. )e implication political consequences of land and income if the majority of a country’s population is straightforward: higher inequality inequality. We concur that land inequality remains poor, as in Victorian-era Britain. implies greater redistributive pressures. retards democratization, signifying the political power of landed elites, who seek )is last point is crucial: A low Gini means )is same logic underpins redistributivist to maintain the political and economic that the impoverished masses comprise well theories of regime change. As such, status quo. However, counterintuitively, over a majority of the population - 98% the question of “who matters” in these we suggest that income inequality – in 1880 China, e.g.. Yet even in wealthy approaches boils down to the con(ict counterintuitively for the conventional examples such as 19th-century Britain, the between the rich and the relatively poor wisdom – promotes democratization. (sociological) “middle” classes (bourgeoisie median voter, who - under majority rule - and white-collar workers) are not to be sets the tax rate. )e elite wants to maintain )e conventional view is misleading found in the (mathematical) “middle” of the the autocratic status quo, under which taxes because scholars have never properly income distribution but in the top decile, or are zero, while the poor prefer democracy, at most the top quintile. )e working classes 4. Ben Ansell and David Samuels, “Inequality and 3. Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “A Rational Democratization: A Contractarian Approach,” comprise at most the next 30% (usually )eory of the Size of Government,” Journal of Comparative Political Studies 43 (December 2010): much less), while incumbent autocratic Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927. 1543-1574.

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elites are (again, at most) in the top 1-2%.5 elites comes from other relatively wealthy state9 to the study of regime change. )e )e default situation in a developing citizens - disenfranchised, newly-emerging key political “threat” in these accounts is autocracy over the last 200 years is that the economic groups who fear expropriation of not that the poor will expropriate the rich impoverished rural masses comprise more their wealth and property by the incumbent but that the incumbent elite - through than a majority of the population. It is worth autocratic elite, and who thus have powerful their control of the state - will expropriate noting that since Moore, scholars have incentives to organize and mobilize in everyone else. )is view echoes Lockean debated whether the working class should defense of their interests and wealth. themes from Enlightenment liberalism also be included as a relevant actor in the about the symbiotic relationship between study of regime change, in addition to the )is dynamic - of elite competition, democracy and property, and suggests bourgeoisie.6 No qualitative scholar has ever rather than con(ict between rich and that liberalization of an autocratic suggested that those below the organized poor - is quite common historically.7 regime occurs when new outsider groups working class on the income distribution What causes elite competition to emerge? emerge who demand political power represent a credible threat to elite interests. Redistributivist approaches suggest that commensurate with their growing inequality results from dividing the gains economic in(uence. )is imbalance Given this, and given that in the real world from growth in a single-sector economy. of power is a recipe for contestation the median voter is almost always a member We suggest that income inequality results over the nature of the political regime. of the poor underclass, redistributivist from the distribution of resources both arguments tend to exaggerate the within and between two di'erent sectors Our approach to understanding elite political relevance of the median voter. In of a growing economy - a stagnant interests implies that the Meltzer-Richard developing autocracies, it is safer to assume agricultural sector and a growing industrial model o'ers a misleading and limited that the poor majority - Marx’s famous sector, for example. )is allows us to notion of what the state ‘does.’ Acemoglu “potatoes in a sack” - is politically inert, explain why di'erent types of inequality and Robinson, for example, emphasize that rather than a potential threat to those who have distinct political consequences. autocratic elites cannot credibly commit to control the coercive power of the state. redistribute income because when threats by As Simon Kuznets famously explained the masses to revolt die down the elite have Gaining proper understanding of how decades ago,8 income inequality tends to incentives to revert to zero redistribution. di'erent class structures correspond to increase with the onset of industrialization, Yet all redistributivist analyses constrain di'erent Gini coe+cients returns us to because both urban labor and especially elites to follow the Meltzer-Richard model the question of “who matters” for regime urban bourgeois groups bene*t. Our two- of redistribution - a (at tax and a uniform change, and why income inequality is sector model of endogenous political subsidy applied to all citizens, although there positively related to democratization. Our change derives from classic ‘dual sector’ is little reason to believe that elites should approach (ips the redistributive theoretical models of economic growth, in which be so constrained, either theoretically or approach on its head in terms of who new economic groups appropriate most historically. What is to stop autocratic elites matters and why. If the median voter is of the gains from industrialization. )ese from taxing others but not themselves, or poor and the poor are politically inert, then models help understand why rising income from spending money on ‘club goods’ the poor cannot represent a potential threat inequality does not mean that an existing rather than universal bene*ts, for example? to autocratic elites in a hypothetical future elite is simply growing richer at everyone )e redistributivist approach precludes a democracy. Instead, a more theoretically else’s expense, but instead signals the predatory state that expropriates income fruitful approach begins with the idea that emergence of new, rival economic groups. from rising elites and the masses - and yet the principal threat to incumbent autocratic Why do rising elites press for 9. Douglass North and Barry Weingast, democratization? Our argument extends “Constitutions and Commitment,” Journal of 5. Branco Milanovic, Peter Lindert, and Je'rey the logic of North and Weingast and Economic History 49 (December 1989): 803-832; Williamson, “Pre-Industrial Inequality,” "e Robert Bates and Donald Lien, “A Note on Taxation, Economic Journal 121 (March 2011): 255–272; Adam other neo-institutionalist theories of the Development, and Representative Government,” Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History Politics and Society 14 (March 1985): 53-70; of Electoral Socialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: Press, 1986), 35. 7. Collier, Paths toward Democracy; Stephan Haggard University of California Press, 1988); Mancur Olson, and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” 6. Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of American Political Science Review 87 (September and Democracy (New York: Beacon, 1966); Dietrich Democratic Rule,” American Political Science Review 1993): 567-576. On classical “dual“ models, see Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John D. 106 (August 2012): 495–516. W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” "e Manchester (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Ruth 8. Simon Kuznets, “Economic Growth and Income School 22 (May 1954): 139-191; John R. Harris and Collier, Paths toward Democracy: "e Working Class Inequality,” American Economic Review 45 (March Michael P. Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment and and Elites in Western Europe and South America (New 1955): 1–28. Development: A Two-Sector Analysis,” American York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Economic Review 60 (March 1970): 126–142. 9 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

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the threat to life, liberty and property is Figure 1: Inequality, Democracy and Public Spending central to the nature of autocratic regimes.

In short, once we understand that in a developing autocracy high Ginis indicate the presence of sizable rising middle (and working) classes, we can better understand the relationship between economic growth, income inequality, and regime change. Democracy is not about redistribution - it is about taxation without representation, a con(ict between rival economic elites for control over the expropriative and coercive authority of the State. )e most propitious ‘structural’ conditions for democracy in a developing society are when land inequality is low but income inequality is high. Democracy is less likely to emerge when both land and income inequality are low, even less likely when both are high, and least likely when land inequality is high and income inequality is low. As these conditions change, the relative power of rural and urban interests change.

)e empirical analyses in our 2010 democracy should produce higher levels shows the e'ect of democratization (using paper, and several additional tests in our of redistributive spending. By contrast, our the Boix-Rosato index) on redistributive forthcoming book, con*rm our predictions. approach implies that a triumphant rising spending (measured as a change in % We *nd no evidence that income inequality economic elite would not redistribute to of GDP at 10-year intervals) at various retards democratization, either in a dataset the poor. After democratization this new levels of inequality. Clearly, spending covering 1820 to 1992 or in a di'erent elite might increase taxes on the old elite only increases after a regime change dataset from 1950 to 2004. We also *nd to help pay for public spending, but only when income inequality is low – and no evidence for the inverted-U relationship on club goods - services that primarily bene#t redistributive spending actually declines between inequality and democratization their own economic class. If we are correct that at high levels of income inequality. )ese that Acemoglu and Robinson suggest. high income inequality re(ects the power *ndings are precisely the opposite of what Instead, we *nd a strong positive of this rising elite, then the combination redistributivist theories would predict. correlation between income inequality and of inequality and democracy should democratization, even as land inequality be correlated with lower universalistic Our approach also generates predictions exhibits the expected negative e'ect. Our redistributive spending to the poor than in about citizens’ preferences for redistribution *ndings suggest that the study of regime a democracy with low income inequality. and democracy under autocracy. )e change and “endogenous” democratization” redistributivist approach predicts that the would pro*t from a more nuanced Figure 1, taken from our book manuscript, rich want low redistribution, worry more understanding of both inequality and the demonstrates this pattern vividly. Building about redistribution when inequality is socioeconomic structure of competing elites. on work by Lindert,10 we collected original high, and tend to oppose democracy, largely data on redistributive spending for 62 because of its redistributive implications. In our forthcoming book we also explore countries between 1880 and 1930. Figure 1 We agree that richer citizens support our theory’s indirect implications. 10. Peter Lindert, Growing Public: Social Spending low redistribution to the poor. However, Redistributivist approaches presume and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century given our *ndings about the relationship (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University that the combination of inequality and Press, 2004). between inequality and public spending

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Table 1: Probability of Believing Democracy is Very Desirable Low Income Medium Income High Income Taken together, our empirical *ndings about 1) the conditions that foster regime change; Anti-Redistribution 0.56 0.60 0.64 2) the relationship between inequality, Ambivalent 0.54 0.55 0.56 regime type and public spending; and 3) the Pro-Redistribution 0.52 0.50 0.48 preferences of citizens under autocracy all present a serious theoretical and empirical challenge to redistributivist models.

under democracy, our argument implies expectation. We analyzed 31 samples of Inequality does not signify that autocratic that wealthier citizens will be relatively less individuals across 23 autocracies covered elites fear the downtrodden masses. It concerned about redistribution to the poor by the World Values Survey, which asks instead signals the growth of new economic where income inequality is high, because people about their preferences over actors – rising elites who demand political inequality proxies for the presence of a democracy and redistribution. Table 1 power commensurate with their wealth. We politically and economically stronger middle explores how citizens answer a question suggest that our argument - which focuses class, who prefer to shift public spending about whether a democracy would be on fear of the expropriative threat of those towards itself and away from the poor. a good way to govern the country. We who control the state versus fear of the are interested in the combined e'ects of redistributive threat from the poor - o'ers a Our model makes a similar prediction income and attitudes about redistribution better approach to the comparative study of about preferences for democracy. Under to the poor. Redistributivist approaches regime change and its contemporary e'ort autocracy, we expect relatively wealthier expect high income / anti-redistribution to understand the complicated interplay citizens - save for the relatively few individuals to be least supportive of between growth, inequality, and the politics members of the incumbent elite - to democracy, yet we *nd precisely the reverse. of democratization across time and space. strongly prefer democratization, since As per our elite-competition model, members of this group face greater risks of richer citizens - indeed those who least losses from expropriation under autocracy, favor redistribution to the poor - actually Ben Ansell is professor of comparative relative to the poor. Table 1, again drawn most strongly support democratization. democratic institutions and international from our book manuscript, con*rms this relations and professorial fellow at

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BOIX, CONTINUED (continued from page 2)

Table 1: Economic Inequality and Unconditional Political Transitions Table 2 examines the correlates of democratic Annual probability of transitions and democratic stability using a Transition to democracy Democratic breakdown Index of knowledge distribution data set that spans from 1850 to 2000. Models 0-0.2 0.53 8.74 are estimated via standard pooled OLS 0.2-0.4 1.75 5.29 regression and have the following structure: 0.4-0.6 3.09 1.00 D D I C 0.6-0.8 3.94 0.40 it t-10 i,t-10 t-10 i,t-10 t-10 i,t-k t i it

0.8-1 0.00 0.70 where Dit is either the continuous Polity Proportion of family farms IV index (normalized between 0 and 1) 0-0.2 1.15 4.83 0.2-0.4 1.76 2.67 or the Boix-Miller-Rosato dichotomous 0.4-0.6 0.88 1.63 index of democracy, I corresponds to the 0.6-0.8 1.94 0.46 di'erent economic inequality measures, 0.8-1 3.13 0.23 C are a stack of control variables, i is a country speci*c e'ect, t is a period-speci*c cases since the emergence of contemporary correlates of income and wealth inequality: constant, and it is an error term. In Columns democracy in the 19th century to generate the distribution of agricultural property (the 1 and 3, which examine the covariates of credible results. Most of the signi*cant area of family farms as a percentage of the total transitions to democracy, the value of the (at least until the late 20th century) and area of holdings) and the extension of skilled dependent variable is the maximum value lasting political change occurred during the or educated workers. Both variables track of democracy at either time t or time t-1: democratization wave that started with the economic inequality relatively well. For the this e'ectively restricts the analysis to liberal revolutions of 1848 and concluded period after 1950, the correlation coe+cient those cases in which there has been an right after World War One. Using post- between the Gini index of economic increase in democracy. In Column 2 and 4, 1960 data (while adding country *xed inequality (excluding socialist economies) which estimate the impact of inequality on e'ects) only risks misestimating the true and the percentage of family farms is -0.66. transitions3 away from democracy, the value e'ects of economic and social change For countries with a per capita income below of the dependent variable is the minimum on political development since there $2,000 the correlation coe+cient is -0.75. value of democracy at either time t or time was little within-country variance from )e coe+cient of correlation of the index t-1: this limits the analysis to those cases in 1960 well into the early 1990s. Empirical of education and the Gini index is -0.59.2 which there has been a decline in the level analyses of democratization are similar to To test the impact of inequality, we of democracy. )e standard estimations empirical growth theory in one important should not compute di'erent types of of political transitions employ nonlinear regard: employing postwar data sets may (redistributive versus non-redistributive) models to determine the e'ects of income. be good enough to estimate convergence transitions (cf. Haggard and Kaufman 2012) However, I here use linear models because e'ects (among economies that have without looking at the overall underlying nonlinear models do not generate consistent moved beyond the take-o' stage) but it distribution of cases (where transitions may estimators in the presence of *xed e'ects. is not adequate to determine the sources or may not occur). Hence, Table 1 reports of initial divergence across countries. the probability of democratic transitions and )e indices of family farms, human capital democratic breakdowns for di'erent levels and non-agrarian employment have Finding the appropriate data to tests the (estimated as actual transitions over total been normalized from 0 to 1. All models 1 e' ects of inequality is di+cult because country-years in each category) after 1850. include the log of per capita income, systematic income inequality data start late Higher levels of human capital equality which is systematically introduced on all in time. An alternative is to employ two are associated with a higher probability democratization models. Controlling for of transiting to democracy (except for the per capita income allows us to estimate (August 2012): 495–516; Carles Boix and Susan highest values) and a lower likelihood of the non-income or development e'ect of Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” World Politics democratic breakdowns. Land equality 55 ( July 2003): 517-49; Carles Boix, “Democracy, 3. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, Development and the International System,” only has a democratic stabilization e'ect. “Modernization: )eories and Facts,” World Politics American Political Science Review 105 (November 2. Tatu Vanhanen, Democratization and Power 49 ( January 1997): 155-183; Boix and Stokes, 2011): 809-828. See accompanying papers in this Resources, 1850-2000, 2003, Available at http:// “Endogenous Democratization;” David L. Epstein, issue and Haggard and Kaufman, “Inequality and www.fsd.uta.*/en/data/catalogue/FSD1216/; Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Regime Change,” for a more exhaustive list of recent Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, “A New Data Sharyn O’Halloran, “Democratic Transitions,” empirical tests of RMD. Set Measuring Income Inequality,” "e World Bank American Journal of Political Science 50 ( July 2006): Economic Review 10 (September 1996): 565-591. 551–69. 12 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

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Table 2: Inequality and Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns, 1850-2000 other words, in an agrarian economy the Polity IV Index Dichotomous Index of Democracy probability of a democratic breakdown ------Transition to Breakdown of Transition to Breakdown of falls to 0 as one moves from concentrated Democracy Democracy Democracy Democracy land ownership (as in countries such as (1) (2) (3) (4) Russia before the Stolypin reforms and the

Democracy t-10 0.591*** 0.735*** 0.552*** 0.695*** Soviet Revolution, Spain for most of the (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) (0.045) 20th century, and most Latin American

Log GDP per capita t-10 0.059 0.036 0.044 0.052 nations) to the highly fragmented property (0.039) (0.032) (0.049) (0.037) systems (as in countries such as Norway, the Proportion of Family -0.071 0.117*** -0.189* 0.157*** United States, and Canada, where family Farms t-10 (0.077) (0.045) (0.103) (0.052) farms represented three- to four-*fths of Index of Human Capital t-10 0.314** -0.107 0.462*** 0.000 (0.136) (0.231) (0.129) (0.128) all land) at the turn of the 20th century.

Proportion of Population -0.256 0.187 0.065 0.300 In Non-Agrarian Sector t-10 (0.242) (0.199) (0.347) (0.274) International factors matter to explain democratic transitions. )e dummy variable Soviet Occupation -0.263*** -0.028 -0.321*** -0.028 (0.056) (0.035) (0.082) (0.040) “Soviet occupation” is statistically signi*cant

International Order -0.015 0.013 -0.000 0.049** and it is associated with a reduction of (0.028) (0.023) (0.039) (0.025) 0.32 points in the movement toward more

Allied with US 0.162*** 0.012 0.229*** 0.054 democratic institutions. An alliance with (0.065) (0.024) (0.087) (0.049) the USA boosts democratic transitions Alliance with US * Cold War -0.202*** -0.047** -0.181* -0.082* but only after the end of the Cold War. (0.067) (0.022) (0.096) (0.044) )e international system seems to a'ect Observations 806 806 852 852 the stability of democracies too: a more Countries 132 132 137 137 R-squared 0.81 0.87 0.75 0.83 pro-democratic environment reduces the Fixed-effects OLS regressions with country dummies, time dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. occurrence of democratic breakdowns. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05;*p<0.10; standard errors in parentheses )ese *nding may explain why models

that estimate the e'ect of inequality in our inequality measures. )e model adds that per capita income, as employed in the postwar period only get mixed results. four variables measuring the international the modernization literature in postwar system: an annual one coding the samples, behaves mostly as a proxy for Rationality and Material Interests international system as anti-democratic, other more fundamental factors. Generally RMD assume (1) rational, (2) self-interested neutral or pro-democratic;4 a dummy speaking, the level of inequality matters actors mostly motivated by (3) material specifying whether the country was an ally for democratization. However, it is worth payo's. Questioning the assumption of of the USA or not; an interaction between1 noting that the causes of democratic rationality (de*ned as instrumentally-driven

alliance with the USA and Cold war; and transitions and of democratic breakdowns action to achieve certain goals) has been a dummy specifying whether the country is are partly di'erent. Democratic transitions quite common since, at least, the work of under the control of the Soviet Union or not. are more likely to occur in countries with Green and Shapiro (1994). Other than higher levels of human capital (Columns 1 going back to detailed historical narratives, Notice, in the *rst place, that the coe+cient and 3). Given that the dependent variable the alternative they suggest to replace the of per capita income remains positive ranges from 0 to 1, the e'ect is very rationality assumption is unclear. In my but it declines in size and loses statistical substantive. In turn, democratic breakdowns opinion, a fruitful way ahead may consist of signi*cance in all models. )is implies are mostly conditioned by the distribution applying the satis*cing rules of behavior that of assets in the agrarian world. A higher Bendor et al. (2011) use to model elections.

4. See Carles Boix, “Political Order and Inequality,” proportion of family farms reduces the Unpublished manuscript, 2013, for a discussion of probability that a democratic country will Most of the critiques to RMD are directed this classi*cation. )e international system had an revert to authoritarian rule. (A positive to the decision to de*ne the payo's of the “anti-democratic” e'ect on domestic politics till 1848, from 1933 to 1942 and from 1948 to 1990. It was coe+cient means that an authoritarian game in economic terms. Material payo's “neutral” between 1849 and 1918 and from 1943 to regime is less likely to take place.) In play a key role in a wide range of situations – 1947. It was pro-democratic otherwise.

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as attested, for example, by a large literature must confront political-cum-distributive grouped into a set of discrete (normally on economic voting and on the class basis pressure from below” to the point that if two) representative types for the sake of of political alignments. Still, they are not the “the repression of these challenges appears simplicity. )e distribution of income, which exclusive cause of political action. Ethnic too costly (…) the elites make institutional may vary from complete equality to extreme identity, religious preferences, political compromises as a result” (Haggard and inequality, is then related to a political status, etc. also matter.5 What is central to Kaufman 2012, p. 497). )is rather reductive equilibrium. Hence, expressions such as RMD and to the “democracy as equilibrium” interpretation of RMD is mistaken. “under conditions of equality elites have little literature is the impact of heterogeneous to fear from democratization” (Ansell and preferences and capabilities on the ways )e model in Boix (2003) departs Samuels 2010, p. 1547) do not make much in which individuals decide to govern from Przeworski’s seminal treatment of sense: under conditions of equality, there themselves. Again, this means that non- democracy as an equilibrium7 extending are no (economic) elites properly speaking. economic heterogeneity is equally susceptible it in two ways: it applies the idea of to be brought into democratization theory. “equilibrium” to all political regimes and it Moreover, in Boix (2003) the initial model links the actors’ payo's to speci*c material characterizes society as having two groups. Political Actors conditions. To examine its implications, But it contains a section with three actors, Critiques of RMD complain that social the model contains a game sequence with de*ned by di'erent levels of income and classes are treated as ‘objective’ phenomena di'erent paths and outcomes (e.g., once by di'erent levels of asset speci*city, rather than outcomes of social and political the ruling group widens the franchise, the and predictions about partial democracy mobilization. In other words, RMD unenfranchised group accepts the reform). (collinear to income or based on cross-class disregard both the literature on collection Nonetheless, the fundamental value of the alliances). Limited democracy takes place action and a rich historiographical tradition model is its comparative statistic in terms when the middle class (or the industrial on the formation of the working class.6 of the robustness of each outcome (e.g., that bourgeoisie, once we de*ned wealthier I *nd this critique partly misplaced. In democracy and low inequality are compatible strata by their type of asset) grows richer. Boix (2003, pp. 27-30, 44-46) I indicate under most conditions) and much less In turn, universal su'rage takes place as the explicitly that both the level of organization about the particular mechanisms through lower strata get closer to the middle strata and the extent of class (or, more precisely, which transitions take place. Transitions (pp. 47-57). In that sense, the models in group) consciousness matter – and that, from authoritarian rule can occur as a result Ansell and Samuels (2010) and Boix (2003) because they a'ect the costs of each side, of military defeat (Argentina 1983), the are extremely similar.8 Ansell and Samuels’ they a'ect the probabilities of di'erent death of a dictator (Spain 1975), a peaceful results on the growing probability of partial regime outcomes. It is, however, true that revolution (Portugal 1975), a “mismanaged” democracy as the process of industrialization I treat those factors as exogenous variables. referendum (Chile 1989) or the collapse of takes o' go in the same direction. No model can endogenize everything. the occupying power (the Baltic countries in 1991). Whether democracy emerges )is similarity implies that, as Haggard Political Process and survives has to be set in the context and Kaufman (2012) acknowledge, class- RMD are also depicted as painting a of the broad economic and organizational based and sector-based models are not very narrow account of social con(ict parameters of the model. )us, Haggard and incompatible with each other. Instead, “as a function of a small but monolithic Kaufman (2012) is extremely informative sector-based models (or what Ansell and elite’s fear of the impoverished multitude” as a study of transitional paths and is very Samuels de*ne as “intra-elite” con(ict) are an (Ansell and Samuels 2010, p. 1544) and of valuable as a call to develop models that extension of the general model of democracy political transitions as events where “elites integrate the process of transition itself. as equilibrium. Sectoral (intra-elite) con(ict 5. Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. But their work is less convincing as a will take place when wealthy sectors are Siegel, and Michael M. Ting, A Behavioral "eory critique of the theoretical core of RMD. di'erentiated by income and type of assets of Elections (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (non-*xed versus *xed) and when non- (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 50. )e depiction of RMD as a clash between wealthy strata are not mobilized. If the latter the “elite” and the “masses” is also reductive are mobilized, political con(ict may be cross- 6. Mancur Olson, "e Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the "eory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: in a second sense. )e economy in Boix class (a sector of the wealthy and all or part Harvard University Press, 1965); Edward Palmer (2003) is thought of as a distribution of of the non-wealthy allied against the other, )ompson, "e Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1963); Ira Katznelson individuals (heterogeneous in incomes) 8. A minor point is that income inequality is in part and Aristide R. Zolberg, Working-Class Formation: 7. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: based on land rents and therefore does not capture Ninteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and well the inequality generated by capital returns and United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University labor wages. Hence, Ansell and Samuels should have 1986). Press, 1991). used *xed vs. non-*xed assets inequality. 14 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013 Boix

mainly depending on asset speci*city) or RMD. RMD endogenize the tax rate to in which total economic resources are class-based (as in the initial two-class model). the distribution of income and predict stagnant and power is concentrated in the that taxes will not be high in unequal hands of an elite minority who use it to Underlying Tax Model societies because net payers will block them. maximize their political rents.” Political )e choice of the median voter tax model liberalization then shifts the distribution developed by Romer (1975) and Meltzer Ansell and Samuels (2010) point out that of income. (What they do not endogenize, and Richards (1981) has been rather RMD assume tax rates will never be lower however, is the power ratio itself.) An controversial.9 )e model is much more than 0. )is assumption can be relaxed. In their alternative to this linear relationship (exible that some concede: one can amend formal exploration of the democratization between political power and income is to it in multiple ways to introduce public of 19th-century Britain, Justman and consider a model where the distribution of goods spending, non-distortionary taxes, Gradstein (1999) allow the rich to tax the income is the joint product of economic individuals having di'erent beliefs about poor (when the latter are disenfranchised).10 technologies and political institutions. )is the e'ects of taxes, etc. )e fact that the )is may make the model too simplistic is what I attempt to do in Boix (2013).11 model is empirically wrong – in terms of in the following sense: both assets and predicting that taxes would be higher in income become wholly determined by the Carles Boix is the Robert Garrett more unequal societies – is what justi*es power ratio (between classes). As Justman Professor of Politics and Public A!airs

9. )e initial two-class model was used by Boix, and Gradstein (p. 111) write, “preindustrial in the Department of Politics and the Democracy and Redistribution, and Carles Boix, levels of inequality reflect an equilibrium Woodrow Wilson School of Public and “Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in 10. Moshe Justman and Mark Gradstein, “)e International A!airs at Princeton University. the Contemporary World,” World Politics 60 (April Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the 2008): 390-437; Allan Meltzer and Scott Richard, “A Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Rational )eory of the Size of Government,” Journal Britain,” Explorations in Economic History 36 (April of Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927. 1999): 109-127. 11. Boix, “Political Order and Inequality.”

15 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013 Acemoglu et. al

ACEMOGLU ET. AL, CONTINUED (continued from page 2)

rich versus poor, but for example based have to deal with complicated issues of regression. )e empirical work of Acemoglu on ethnic, religious or regional cleavages, identi*cation. For example, autocracies et al. showed that some of the most famous it was not necessarily true that increasing which were unequal no doubt di'er in empirical results in the literature, such inequality, in the sense of a higher Gini many others ways from autocracies which as the correlation between income per- coe+cient, would exacerbate con(ict are equal, and to test causal hypotheses capita and democratic consolidation, were between groups. It might just result in about the impact of inequality on regime not robust to controlling for omitted increased redistribution within groups. transition it is necessary to control in variables. )is paper went even further More generally, though there is now some way for these omitted variables. than *xed e'ects models by providing a full convincing econometric evidence for the It is also necessary to control properly identi*cation strategy using instrumental importance of the central mechanisms of for common trends in(uencing the variables, an exercise that con*rmed the Acemoglu and Robinson’s early work,2 still, variables to avoid the problem of ‘spurious basic *xed e'ects *ndings. )is project as emphasized by Haggard and Kaufman regression’. Since democracy tends to also revealed that there was no robust (2012), there may be di'erent mechanisms move in waves and many other variables relationship between inequality and either that lead to democratization and these can such as GDP per-capita are correlated the creation or consolidation of democracy. have di'erent comparative statics from across countries, this is a potent issue here. those presented in Acemoglu and Robinson Other studies have since found di'erent (2000, 2001). For instance, in Lizzeri and Since this early work a great deal of research things, but to do so they have deviated Persico (2004) democratization can occur has gone into investigating empirically from the econometric approach of because political competition with a limited the factors that lead to democratization Acemoglu et al in signi*cant ways. For franchise leads to clientelistic outcomes that and democratic consolidation. In largely example, Esptein et al. (2006) presented are ine+cient for at least a sub-set of the unpublished work which accompanied evidence that was consistent with the elite.3 Extending voting rights can induce Acemoglu et al. (2008, 2009),5 the authors inverted-U shape hypothesis of Acemoglu more e+cient non-clientelistic competition found no robust evidence that inequality and Robinson (2001). Houle (2009) found over public goods that is favored by these in(uences either democratizations or that while inequality has no impact on elites. Depending on the decision structure democratic consolidation. )e innovation of democratization, higher inequality reduces within elites, democratization can occur this empirical work is that it adopted for the the probability that a democracy will stay for very di'erent reasons than those *rst time standard panel data econometric democratic. Yet neither paper made any developed by Acemoglu and Robinson.4 techniques to control for omitted variables attempt to control for omitted variable with country *xed e'ects and common bias, for example using country *xed )ese theoretical extensions of the basic trends with time e'ects. )e importance e'ects. )erefore, it is quite likely that these model suggested that it was unlikely that of the *xed e'ects methodology is that it *ndings are driven by omitted variables and the simple comparative statics of inequality focuses on the ‘within variation’ and asks, thus do not represent causal relationships suggested by the early work would be in this context: as a country becomes more between inequality and regime transition. found in the data. Moreover, even if one or less unequal, does that induce changes Freeman and Quinn (2012) moved beyond found these in a convincing way one would in the extent to which it is democratic? By studies of the average e'ect of inequality 2. See for instance in Toke S. Aidt and Peter S. focusing on this variation one mitigates on regime transitions investigating whether Jensen, “Workers of the World Unite! Franchise the biases than come from examining or not there are heterogeneous e'ects Extension and the )reat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938,” http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/faculty/aidt/ the cross-sectional (between) variation of inequality that depend on the extent papers/web/workers/workers.pdf, 2012. that is mired in unobservable di'erences of globalization.6 )ey do claim to *nd between countries. )e importance of robust e'ects of inequality on the change 3. Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic the inclusion of time e'ects is that they in the polity score, the sign of which is Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule,” control for common trends amongst the American Political Science Review 106 (August 6. David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, 2012): 495-516; Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola variables mitigating the danger of spurious Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Democratic Persico, “Why Did the Elites Extend the Su'rage? Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an 5. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James 50 ( July 2006): 551–69; Christian Houle, Application to Britain’s Age of Reform,’’ Quarterly A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, “Income and “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Journal of Economics 119 (2004): 707-765. Democracy”, American Economic Review 98 ( June Harms Consolidation but Does Not A'ect 2008): 808-842; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Democratization,” World Politics 61(October 4. See also Humberto Llavador and Robert J. Oxoby, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, “Reevaluating 2009): 589–622; John R. Freeman and Dennis P. “Partisan Competition, Growth, and the Franchise,” the Modernization Hypothesis,” Journal of Monetary Quinn, “)e Economic Origins of Democracy Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (2005): 1155- Economics 56 (November 2009): 1043-1058. See, Reconsidered,” American Political Science Review 106 1192. however, Table 5 in this essay. (February 2012): 58–80.

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conditional on measures of globalization. variable bias. In particular, their procedure armed actors, violence, lobbying, and Yet, their preferred speci*cation does meant that they could not examine other means of capturing the party not include time e'ects to account for the more interesting ‘within variation’ system) in order to continue to control the common trending factors, an omission through examining whether or not when political process. If so, we would not see which Acemoglu et. al. (2009) showed is a country democratized, or the reverse, an impact of democratization on public highly signi*cant in this context, given public policies moved in speci*c directions. policy, redistribution and inequality. that democracy tends to trend at the world level. )eir paper also uses software In Acemoglu et al. (2013) we examine the 2. Directors Law. Consistent with to interpolate missing inequality data, a impact of democratization on public policies Stigler’s ‘Director’s Law’ (1970), procedure that tends to arti*cially lower and inequality using the most appealing democracy may transfer political power the standard errors of their estimations, econometric model - a cross-national to the middle class rather than the which also pushes them towards *nding panel data with country *xed e'ects and poor. If so, redistribution may increase signi*cant e'ects. )e omission of time time e'ects.8 Our study uses a theoretical and inequality may be curtailed only e'ects is a common feature of papers that framework that recognizes that the simple if the middle class is in favor of such claim to *nd signi*cant e'ects of measures predictions of Meltzer and Richard (1981) redistribution. For example, Aidt et on inequality on measures of democracy.7 and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001), al.(2009) showed that local franchise that democratization decreases inequality expansion in 19th century Britain We believe therefore that the basic though may be in(uenced by mechanisms this from elites to the middle class often unfortunately largely unpublished *ndings research did not consider. )is happens reduced expenditure on local public of the Acemoglu, et. al. (2008, 2009) for some of the same reasons we discussed goods since the middle class bore the project, that there is no robust causal above when we argued that the impact brunt of property taxes that *nanced relationship between inequality and regime of inequality on democratization is them. In their model an expansion of transition, remain substantially unaltered. likely more complex than the initial voting rights from the elite, by reducing models allowed for, but in addition public good provision and taxes on the )is analysis still leaves open one interesting we make several speci*c arguments. middle class, can increase inequality.9 empirical question latent in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001) and indeed 1. Captured Democracy. Even though 3. Inequality-Increasing Market in Meltzer and Richard (1981). Does democracy clearly changes the Opportunities. Autocracy may exclude democratization tend to reduce inequality? distribution of de jure power in society a large fraction of the population from A seminal paper by Rodrik (1999) claimed (as argued, for instance, in Acemoglu and productive occupations (e.g., skilled that it did and that the share of wages in Robinson, 2006), policy outcomes and occupations) and entrepreneurship national income was systematically higher inequality depend not just on the de jure (including lucrative contracts), as in democracies. But a prior question would but also on the de facto distribution of Apartheid South Africa or the former be: does democratization have in reality power. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) Soviet Union did both internally the type of impact on public policy that argue that, under certain circumstances, and in Eastern Europe after 1945. it does in these models? One much cited those who see their de jure power eroded To the extent that there is signi*cant paper, by Gil, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin by democratization may su+ciently heterogeneity within this population, (2004) claimed in fact that there was no increase their investments in de facto the freedom to take part in economic signi*cant relationship between measures power (e.g., via control of local law activities on a more level playing *eld of democracy, such as the Polity score, and enforcement, mobilization of non-state with the previous elite may actually

public policy variables such as the size of 8. Allan M. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, “A increase inequality within the excluded government tax revenues relative to GDP, Rational )eory of the Size of Government,” Journal or repressed group and the entire society. or the amount of social spending relative of Political Economy 89 (October 1981): 914-927; It may also lead changes in public policy Dani Rodrik, “Democracies Pay Higher Wages,” to GDP. Yet their paper used averaged Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999): 707-738; 9. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, data to examine the pure cross-sectional Ricard Gil, Casey B. Mulligan, and Xavier Sala-i- “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions,” Martin (2004) “Do Democracies Have Di'erent American Economic Review 98 (March 2008): 267- relationships in the data. )is setup creates Public Policies than Nondemocracies?” Journal of 293; George J. Stigler, “Director’s Law of Public severe concerns both about measurement Economic Perspectives 18 (Winter 2004): 51-74; Income Redistribution,” Journal of Law and Economics error (from the averaging) and omitted Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, 13 (April 1970): 1-10; Toke S. Aidt, Martin J. and James A. Robinson, “Democracy, Inequality and Daunton, and Jaysri Dutta, “)e Retrenchment 7.For example Ben Ansell and David Samuels, Public Policy,” forthcoming in Anthony B. Atkinson Hypothesis and the Extension of the Franchise “Inequality and Democratization: A Contractarian and François Bourguignon, eds., "e Handbook of in England and Wales,” "e Economic Journal 120 Approach,” Comparative Political Studies 43(December Income Distribution (Amsterdam, North-Holland, (September 2010): 990-1020. 2010): 1543–74. 2013).

17 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013 Acemoglu et. al

Figure 1. Change in taxes as a percentage of GDP between 1975 and 2000, against the change in the Freedom House democracy index in the same period.

in democracy that also a'ect policy and redistribution. To get a feel for these results, Figure 1 plots the change in the raw Freedom House score between 1975 and 2000 (since this is clearer than our 0-1 measure of democracy) against the change in tax revenues as a percentage of GDP on the vertical axis. )is *gure is useful since it represents a simple way of looking at the ‘within variation’ (at least in the absence of any covariates). )e *gure shows that there is a clearly visible positive slope indicating the estimated relationship consistent with the hypothesis that as countries become democratic, they expand their tax revenues. Figure 2 presents an ‘event-study’ picture which shows the dynamics of taxation around democracy. Here we take the last to diverge from those predicted by the government revenues as a percentage of democratization event of each country and simple models of democratization. GDP). )e long-run e'ect of democracy, average them. )is *gure is conditional In the paper we develop a new consistent in our preferred speci*cation, is about on the lagged dependent variable, country de*nition of democratization based on a 5% point increase in tax revenues as a *xed e'ects and time e'ect. It shows the Freedom House and Polity indices, building fraction of GDP. )ese patterns are robust dynamics of tax revenues as a percentage of on the work by Papaioannou and to a variety of di'erent estimates and GDP around the democratization, which we Siourounis (2008).10 One of the problems controls for immediate determinants of normalize so that its pre-democracy average of the raw indices is the signi*cant democracy such as social unrest, war, and is zero. )is clearly shows that there is a measurement error, which creates spurious the stock of education, yet there may still sustained positive increase in tax revenues movements in democracy when none exist unobserved determinants of changes after a democratization whose magnitude exists in reality. We attempt to minimize the in(uence of such measurement error Figure 2. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP around a democratization. by using the information from both the Freedom House and Polity datasets and focusing only on democratization (and reversals) that are not fully reversed within a year. )is leads to a 0-1 measure of democracy for 170 countries annually from 1960 to 2010. We also pay special attention to modeling the dynamics of our outcomes of interest, taxes as a percentage of GDP and various measures of inequality.

Our empirical investigation uncovers a number of interesting patterns. First, we *nd a robust and quantitatively large e'ect of democracy on tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (and also on total 10. Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, “Democratisation and Growth,” )e Economic Journal 118 (October 2008): 1520-1551.

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data we use every *ve years, the standard Figure 3. Change in the Gini coe#cient for net income between 1975 and approach with a dynamic panel, his main 2000, against the change in the Freedom House democracy index in the same period. *nding disappears. It also disappears even with his own speci*cation when we use the more complete and updated version of the data on wages (which he did not have available at the time he wrote). )ird, we *nd an e'ect of democracy on secondary schooling investments and the extent of structural transformation (e.g., an impact on the non-agricultural share of employment and the non-agricultural share of output). How could it be that democracy leads to higher taxes and more education and possibly structural change but has no impact on inequality? )is is an issue that requires a great deal more research than in Acemoglu et al. (2013), but all three of the above mechanisms could be at play. )e fact that policy clearly changes after democratization seems less consistent with ideas about captured democracy, though it could be that while elites cannot stop taxation, they increases over time (eventually reaching he averaged the data, and second, that he can manipulate how it is spent. )e *ndings 5%). By 15 years after a democratization used an old version of the World Bank do seem more consistent with Director’s the standard error bands exclude zero. data on wages. If instead of averaging the Law and Stigler’s claim that democracy

Second, however, and contrary to Rodrik Figure 4. Gini coe#cient for net income around a democratization. (1999), we *nd no robust e'ect of democracy on any measure of inequality. Even though some selected speci*cations do show a small, marginally signi*cant e'ect, these are not robust. )is may re(ect the poorer quality of inequality data. But we also suspect it may be related to the more complex theoretical relationships between democracy and inequality pointed out above. )e absence of a relationship between the changes in democracy (Freedom House) and the change in the Gini coe+cient 1975-200 is evident from Figure 3. Figure 4 is an analogous event-study *gure. It shows that after a democratization there does seem to be a fall in inequality but it is not statistically distinguishable from zero.

Revisiting Rodrik’s *ndings we show that while his results do still hold with our measure of democracy (signi*cant at the 7% level), they are driven by several important things. First of all, the fact that

19 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013 Acemoglu et. al

favors the middle class and therefore does Daron Acemoglu is Elizabeth and James of Government at Harvard University not generate the type of pro-poor or pro- Killian Professor of Economics at the and a faculty associate at the Institute median voter policies hypothesized by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Suresh for Quantitative Social Science and the early theoretical work. It could also be Naidu is assistant professor of economics Weatherhead Center for International A!airs. the case that inequality increasing market and public a!airs at Columbia University. opportunities are at work with taxation Pascual Restrepo is a research assistant at the and redistribution taking place but their Universidad de los Andes in Bogota, Colombia. e'ect on inequality being swamped. James Robinson is David Florence Professor

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Houle

HOULE, CONTINUED (continued from page 3)

than 7,000 observations. )is accounts are at least three reasons why inequality to respond to changes in inequality by for nearly all countries during the period is unlikely to have a substantial e'ect on adopting democracy. Even if inequality were under study, and the dataset is (basically) democratization through the mechanisms to a'ect the likelihood of democratization, complete. Once I use di'erent measures described by previous redistributive its e'ect should be weak. I thus expect of inequality, account for endogeneity theories. First, these mechanisms rest inequality to bear little relationship and impute missing observations my on the assumption that democratization to the probability of democratization. hypothesis is supported empirically: follows a single path, in which democracy inequality reduces the likelihood that is initially demanded by the population but Do arguments linking inequality to democracy endures but is unrelated to eventually conceded by the ruling elite, i.e. consolidation su'er from the same the likelihood of democratization itself. it is driven from below. However, in reality, problems as those linking inequality to democratization is often driven from above, democratization? No. Transitions away from THEORY for example through intra-elite competition. democracy di'er in at least two fundamental In this note, I will focus on two theories )ere is thus a large group of transitions ways from transitions to democracy. First, about how inequality – more precisely, for which these theories do not apply. they involve di'erent groups of actors. interclass inequality – a'ects regime While democratizations may be initiated changes. Both rest on a redistributive Second, even for transitions from below, by the elite or the masses, democratic approach, meaning that the e'ect of their predictions are unlikely to hold. breakdowns are almost always caused by inequality is driven by its e'ect on Contrary to what most scholars have the elite or the military, not the masses. preferences over redistribution among claimed, inequality actually has two di'erent social classes. First, Boix, among opposite, potentially o'setting, e'ects Second, and most importantly, transitions others, argues that inequality harms both on democratization. On the one hand, to and away from democracies involve democratization and consolidation. )e inequality makes democracy more costly di'erent processes. On the one hand, intuition is that when inequality increases, for the elites by increasing redistribution. democratization from below is an the ruling elite is less likely to concede On the other hand, inequality increases interactive process between the elite and democracy, because it fears redistribution the demand for regime change from the the masses, in which the former respond under democracy. Similarly, the elite is more population by increasing potential gains to the demands of the latter. On the other likely to stage coups in unequal democracies, from redistribution or expropriation. hand, democratic breakdown is a unilateral because it wants to prevent redistribution. )e overall e'ect is thus ambiguous. process, in which one group (usually the Acemoglu and Robinson do account elite or the military) directly seizes power Second, Acemoglu and Robinson agree that for both e'ects. However, their *ndings without necessarily having the approval of inequality harms consolidation but argue depend on speci*c assumptions about the other groups. In the words of Acemoglu that inequality relates to democratization discontinuity of the e'ect of inequality and Robinson, “the move from democracy through an inverted U-shaped relationship. on the cost of maintaining an autocracy.3 to dictatorship is almost never consensual.”4 In equal autocracies, the population does not demand democracy because it has )ird, the population faces a collective )e asymmetry between the two little to gain in terms of redistribution. At action problem when mobilizing to transition processes has key implications intermediate levels of inequality, however, replace an autocracy by a democracy, for the relationship between inequality the population has incentives to demand since democracy is a public good. Existing and consolidation. First of all, since democracy. At the same time, the ruling theories expect inequality to a'ect most democratic breakdowns follow elites are unwilling to use repression, because democratization by determining the a single path in which the military/ redistribution is relatively cheap; and so likelihood of the population rising against elite unilaterally seize power, theories they democratize. But when inequality is the regime. But, if the masses are unable trying to explain them – contrary to high, the elites opt for repression, because to mobilize, the elites have no incentive those concerned with democratization the cost of redistribution is too high. 3. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution – can be applied to almost all cases. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic 4. Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 225. I argue that inequality harms consolidation Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: )e masses can be involved during transitions away but has no e'ect on democratization. )ere Cambridge University Press, 2006). See Houle, from democracy, notably by responding negatively (or “Inequality and Democracy,” for more detail on the positively) to coups. However, their consentment is procedures. assumptions made in Acemoglu and Robinson. not necessary for a democratic breakdown to occur.

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Houle

In addition, whereas inequality has two interclass inequality, and is conceptually variables as in my previous work: GDP opposite e'ects on democratization, it similar to the surplus-value of Karl Marx. per capita, growth, an oil exporter dummy only has a negative e'ect on consolidation. variable, the proportion of the population )e two e'ects of inequality on I use an extension of the capital share that is Muslim, Protestant or Catholic, democratization are caused by the fact that dataset assembled by Ortega and Rodriguez ethnic and religious fractionalization, democracy is demanded by the population that I presented in Houle.5 I imputed the the number of past transitions, a dummy but, in the end, conceded by the elite. By missing values for nearly all countries. variable for countries that did not exist contrast, democratic breakdowns result For each missing observation, twenty-*ve prior to 1946, a dummy for former from the direct seizure of power by the values are predicted. )is enables me to British colonies, and the proportion of elite. Because the agreement of the masses account for the level of uncertainty of each countries worldwide that are democracies.7 is not required, the e'ect of inequality on imputed observation during the estimation its willingness to concede dictatorship process. )ree types of evidence are used EMPIRICAL RESULTS has little impact. Inequality mainly a'ects to impute missing observations: previous I test the relationship between inequality democratic breakdowns by increasing inequality levels of the same country; levels and democracy using dynamic probit the cost of redistribution to the elite. of inequality of neighboring countries models. )ese models estimate the )erefore, one should expect that when during the same year; and other indicators probability of countries with a certain inequality increases the elite are more of inequality for the same country-year regime (in the current period) transiting likely to wage coups against democracies. (e.g., Gini coe+cients). )e intuition for to a new regime in the next period. One using the inequality level of neighbors is advantage with this estimation technique is Finally, collective action problems do not that the level of inequality of a country that it enables us to distinguish between the signi*cantly reduce the capacity of the depends mostly on its factor endowments. e'ect of inequality on democratization and elite to mobilize, since the elite form a on consolidation. Column 1 of Table 1 tests much smaller group than the population. Because countries that are neighbors are the hypothesis of a negative monotonic Moreover, installing a new authoritarian likely to share similar factor endowments relationship, advanced notably by Boix, using regime provides speci*c bene*ts to those they also have similar levels of inequality. capital shares. It shows that higher capital that take part in the coup. Contrary to Moreover, neighbors are likely to share shares are actually associated with larger transitions to democracy, transitions away similar colonial experiences or to have been probability of democratization, though the from democracy do not pose a severe a'ected by the same historical events (e.g., relationship is not statistically signi*cant. collective action problem for the group the establishment of communist regimes initiating the process. )erefore, I expect in Eastern Europe).6 Most countries that Table 1: Dynamic Probit Estimations of inequality to have a strong negative remain missing after the multiple imputation the E'ect of Inequality on the Probability e'ect on the survival of democracies. are Islands (mostly Paci*c Islands). of Transitions to and away from Democracy

DATA )e second measure of inequality used is the Model 2 of Table 1 estimates the non- )e unit of analysis is the country-year. income Gini coe+cients of the Estimation linear model of Acemoglu and Robinson )e main dataset contains more than 7,000 of the Household Inequality and Inequity by adding capital share squared. )e observations and covers 183 countries (EHII) constructed by the University predictions of Acemoglu and Robinson, between 1960 and 2008. To determine of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP). according to which the relationship is whether a country is democratic or )e dataset includes more than 3,500 inverted U-shaped, would be supported if autocratic, I use the regime type dataset of observations on 147 countries between the coe+cient on capital share is positive and Cheibub et al., which extends the dataset 1963 and 2002. I use the same control the one on capital share squared negative.8 of Przeworski et al until 2006. I use two As shown in model 2, both coe+cients turn 5. Jose A. Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. main measures of inequality. First, I use Vreeland, “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited,” out to have the opposite sign, although the capital share of the value added in Public Choice 143 (April 2010): 67-101; Przeworski 7. University of Texas Inequality Project, Estimated et al., Democracy and Development; Daniel Ortega and Household Income Inequality (EHII) Dataset, production. )is gives the proportion of Francisco Rodriguez. “Are Capital Shares Higher in Available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html; the value created within speci*c *rms than Poor Countries? Evidence from Industrial Surveys,” Houle, “Inequality and Democracy.” Control variables Unpublished (Corporación Andina de Fomento are taken from Przeworski et al., Democracy and accrues to the owners of these speci*c *rms, (CAF) and IESA, and Wesleyan University, 2006); Development, and Cheibub et al., “Democracy and as opposed to the laborers. Low capital Houle, “Does Inequality Harm.” Dictatorship.” shares indicate low levels of inequality. 6. See Houle, “Does Inequality Harm,” for more 8. Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and )e capital share is thus a measure of detail. Robinson, Economic Origins.

22 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013 Houle

Table 1: Dynamic Probit Estimations of the Effect of Inequality on the Probability of Transitions to and away from Democracy Transition to Democracy Transition to Autocracy

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Cap. Shares .009 -.062 .04 .018 .102

(.006) (.05) (.032) (.008)** (.014)***

Cap. Shares sq. .0005

(.0004)

Gini -.007 .102 .06

(.015) (.1) (.02)***

Gini sq. -.001

(.001)

GDP pc .004 .015 .023 .019 -.165 -.492 -.464 -.066

(.06) (.06) (.095) (.093) (.115) (.107)*** (.189)** (.279)

Growth -.01 -.01 -.015 -.016 -.017 -.02 -.037 -.01

(.004)*** (.004)*** (.006)*** (.006)*** (.007)*** (.008)** (.013)*** (.012)

Oil -.5 -.539 -.675 -.659 -.145 .126 .112 -.402

(.25)** (.242)** (.384)* (.369)* (.425) (.313) (.407) (.358)

Muslim -.002 -.002 -.005 -.005 -.002 -.0009 -.005 -.003

(.002) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)

Protestant .0006 .0005 -.003 -.004 .01 -.0007 -.0009 .015

(.003) (.004) (.006) (.006) (.009) (.004) (.006) (.008)*

Catholic .002 .002 -.001 -.001 -.006 -.003 -.001 -.001

(.002) (.002) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.003) (.005) (.004)

Ethnic fract. -.0006 -.0003 -.002 -.002 -.003 -.004 -.009 .005

(.002) (.002) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.005)* (.007)

Religious fract. .002 .002 .007 .006 .013 -.001 -.004 .02

(.003) (.003) (.006) (.006) (.009) (.004) (.007) (.011)*

# Past Break. .277 .276 .258 .257 .046 .178 .142 -.145

(.053)*** (.054)*** (.106)** (.104)** (.154) (.065)*** (.099) (.118)

New Country -.151 -.127 -.198 -.218 -.405 .167 .293 .666

(.136) (.138) (.215) (.207) (.229)* (.2) (.307) (.504)

Former British -.058 -.061 -.022 -.02 -.042 -.687 -1.185 -.09

(.132) (.131) (.189) (.188) (.186) (.246)*** (.371)*** (.354)

23 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013 Houle

both are statistically insigni*cant. A Wald It is possible that inequality in neighboring variable strategy as in model 5. Once test demonstrates that the two coe+cients states a'ect the regimes of neighbors, which again, results suggest that inequality also fail to reach joint signi*cance. in turn in(uences the domestic political harms the consolidation of democracy. Columns 3 and 4 redo models 1 and 2 regime. If that were the case, the instruments but with the Gini coe+cients instead of would not be exogenous. )erefore, in order CONCLUSION capital shares. Results are unchanged. to account for this potential mechanism I )is note has argued that inequality does control for the proportion of neighbors that not a'ect democratization but harms One potential problem with the analysis are democratic instead of controlling for consolidation of democracies. )ese presented thus far is that it does not the proportion of democracies worldwide results suggest that the factors that a'ect account for endogeneity, particularly as in the previous regressions. Results, the establishment of democracies may be reverse causation. In fact, in inequality reported in column 5, are unchanged. very di'erent from those that a'ect their theories of democratization, inequality consolidation. In fact, the empirical analysis a'ects regime transition precisely because Column 6 estimates the e'ect of inequality presented above *nds that many factors it a'ects the incentives of di'erent social on the likelihood that a democracy breaks other than inequality also seem to a'ect classes to control redistributive policies, and down and transitions to autocracy. Positive these two transition processes di'erently. thus change the inequality level. Moreover, coe+cients signify that the associated Of course, this idea is not completely country-speci*c factors could a'ect both the independent variables increase the new. Already, O’Donnell and Schmitter, likelihood of regime change and inequality; probability of backsliding to dictatorship. among others, argued that “political and hence creating omitted variable bias. As expected, inequality increases the social processes are neither symmetric likelihood that a democracy breaks nor reversible. What brings down a Column 5 reproduces model 1 but using down and the relationship is statistically democracy is not the inverse of those an instrumental variable approach. It uses signi*cant at the *ve percent level.9 factors that bring down an authoritarian the level of inequality of neighboring As shown in model 7, these results regime.”10 However, such insights have yet countries as an instrument for the domestic are unchanged when inequality is to be fully integrated in the empirical and level of inequality. As I argued in Houle, instead measured with Gini indexes. theoretical literatures on regime changes. inequality tends to be clustered across Column 8 uses the same instrumental neighbors, notably because they share 9. See Houle, “Does Inequality Harm,” regarding Christian Houle is assistant professor of column 5. )e results are unchanged when imputed factor endowments. Basic tests show that capital shares are also included. Regressions political science at Michigan State University. the inequality level of neighbors is indeed using instrumental variables are run separately a strong instrument for domestic inequality for democratization and consolidation, which explains the lower number of observations (e.g., levels (F-statistic of 17.84). Since Houle only autocracies are included in column 5). )is is uses the inequality level of neighbors to done in order to limit the number of instruments needed and does not a'ect the validity of the results. impute missing values, I only use the non- )e results presented in column 6 are robust to the imputed capital shares in the estimation use of only non-imputed observations (see Houle, reported in column 5 (and column 8). “Inequality and Democracy”). Moreover, the results 10. Guillermo A. O’Donnell and Philippe C. are unchanged when the regressions only cover the Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: period from 1960 to 2000. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).

24 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

Juan Linz Obituary

LINZ OBITUARY, CONTINUED (continued from page 3)

Lazarsfeld, Robert Lynd, and Kingsley Studies (1973-1974), President of the come across Linz early in his own graduate Davis. Linz formed an especially close World Association of Public Opinion career at Columbia and to have the immense relationship with Seymour Martin Lipset, Research (1974-1976), and was a member intellectual and personal reward of working under whose supervision he would write of the Executive Committee of the ISA as a co-author with Linz for thirty-*ve years a nine-hundred-plus page dissertation (1974-1982) as well as its Scienti*c on books and articles. Je' Miley was Linz’ consisting of a systematic dissection of "e Committee (1974-1978). He was also second to last PhD and asked to help in the Social Bases of West German Politics. Even active in the International Political Science selection, translation, and introductions to before o+cially *nishing the dissertation, Association and the American Political the sections of the seven volumes of Linz’s Linz would also compile a “propositional Science Association, and served for many selected works. inventory” and co-author with Lipset a years on the Scienti*c Committee for the two-volume manuscript "e Social Bases of Center for Advanced Social Studies at the Linz’s impact as a teacher stretched well Political Diversity in Western Democracies in Instituto Juan March in Madrid. beyond his o+cial students; those who his capacity as Lipset’s research assistant. It considered themselves such numbered was never published but widely recognized When he died, Linz was Sterling Professor many, many more. He and his wife Rocío by Lipset and others, as a main source for Emeritus of Political and Social Sciences de Terán were famous among students Lipset’s own seminal work, Political Man. at Yale. He was much decorated, having for their extreme generosity in terms of received many of his profession’s most time and attention, and especially for the A grant from the SSRC’s Committee coveted prizes. He was elected member of hospitality with which the couple opened in Comparative Politics allowed Linz to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences the doors and spare bedroom, of their home return to Spain in the Spring of 1958 to in 1976. He was awarded honorary doctoral in Hamden, Connecticut to so many. carry out *eld research for a study of the degrees from *ve universities; the University Franco regime, an experience which led to of Granada (1976), Georgetown University Two excellent sources on Linz’s thought and the publication of Linz’s *rst classic article, (1987), the Autonomous University of writings are his sixty page interview with “An Authoritarian Regime: )e Case Madrid (1992), the Phillips-Universität of Richard Snyder in Munch and Snyder’s, of Spain.” )roughout his career, Spain Marburg (1992), the University of Oslo Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative would command his attention as a crucial (2000), and the University of the Basque Politics, and the 50 page intellectual case in comparative perspective. Linz did Country (2002)]. In 1987, he was the biography, done with Linz’s collaboration, more than any other Spanish scholar of his recipient of Spain’s most prestigious Premio by José Ramón Montero and Je' Miley in generation to put his country at the very Príncipe de Asturias; and in 1996, he won their just published seven volume selected center of international debates in the social the University of Uppsala’s Johan Skytte works of Linz, published in Spanish as Juan sciences, especially those in comparative Prize, perhaps the closest thing in Political J. Linz. Obras Escogidas by the Centro de politics about regime types, breakdowns, Science to a Nobel Prize. Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales in and transitions, as well as nationalism, all Madrid. the while challenging prevalent stereotypes From the start of his career through the and “terrible simpli*cations.” In the process, very end of his life, Linz was a devoted Linz was an irreplaceable mentor and a he directed and conducted a plethora of and beloved teacher. He supervised 65 close friend to innumerable senior and pioneering survey research. dissertations on 31 di'erent countries junior scholars throughout the world. He spanning the entire globe. Several of will be sorely missed, and will certainly not Linz was an enthusiastic and in(uential his students were political scientists and be forgotten. participant in a host of professional sociologists who would soon become social scienti*c associations. He was a eminent in their *elds, such as Richard Alfred Stepan, Columbia University and Je! founding member of the International Hamilton, Kenneth Erickson, Arturo Miley, Cambridge University Sociological Association’s Committee of Valenzuela, Ezra Suleiman, Jan Gross, John Political Sociology (CPS), alongside Lipset, Stephens, Robert Fishman, Houchang Raymond Aron, Shmuel Esienstadt, and Chehabi, and Miguel Centeno. )e authors Stein Rokkan, among others. He served of this obituary both have the honor to as President of the CPS (1971-79), as count ourselves among this “Linzian” family. President of the Council for European Alfred Stepan had the good fortune to *rst

25 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

SECTION NEWS

2014 APSA Annual Meeting: Chris outcomes that objectively make them drawing on data from both the U.S. and Reenock (Florida State University), our materially worse o'. Speci*cally, she focuses South Africa. section’s program chair for the 2014 annual on three major puzzles in political science meeting, will soon begin reviewing all the and comparative politics: In South Africa she is able to show that where paper and panel proposals submitted by the social status concerns have been triggered December 15 deadline. We look forward to First, why do democracies sometimes fail to citizens are more likely to oppose Pareto learning of his decisions next spring, and to meet the needs of their citizens, even when improving provision of low-income housing, seeing many of you at the 2014 meeting in there are Pareto-improving opportunities and as a result, such housing is undersupplied Washington, DC. that states could readily pursue? while resources for constructing low-income housing go unused. Comparative Democratization Section Second, why do citizens sometimes vote for Welcomes New O#cers: Jan Teorell redistribution schemes that are in con(ict Drawing on attitudinal and demographic became the section’s new president and with their material interests? survey data from both countries, she Monika Nalepa the new treasurer at the demonstrates that, consistent with her theory, section’s business meeting in Chicago. Many Finally, why do certain citizens choose to social status concerns shape respondents’ thanks to Steph Haggard and Amaney participate in protests and other forms of attitudes towards redistribution. In South Jamal for serving as president and treasurer political collective action when they could Africa, where inequality among neighboring (respectively) for the last two years! free-ride? co-ethnics has dramatically increased the correlation between within-group status and Comparative Democratization Section Dr. McClendon argues that individuals care support for distribution is large and negative. Award Winners: about more than simply maximizing their Juan Linz Dissertation Award: Gwyneth material well-being. Speci*cally, they care In the U.S. case, where status concerns are H. McClendon (Yale University) for her deeply about their relative status vis-à-vis salient the degree to which the median voter dissertation “)e Politics of Envy and others within their same or similar group is economically distant from rich group Esteem in Two Democracies.” (for example, neighbors or co-ethnics). members while also close to poor group Envy, spite, and the desire for esteem can be members correlates with the median voter’s !is year’s award committee included powerful motivations for behavior. High- support for anti-redistribution policies. Allen Hicken (University of Michigan) within groups status has distinct value, and in (chair), Daniel Gingerich (University of certain contexts, citizens will pursue it, even Finally, using a *eld experiment she *nds Virginia), and Nic Cheeseman (Oxford at the expense of their material interests. evidence that the promise of in-group University). esteem induced higher rates of attendance at )e dissertation takes great care to de*ne, a rally for gay marriage in New Jersey. Committee Remarks on the Award both intuitively and formally, what is meant Winners: by within-group status concerns, and to In short, the committee agreed that Dr. “)is year the committee for Juan Linz distinguish this concept (theoretically and McClendon’s dissertation represents some Dissertation Award consisted of Nic empirically) from similar concepts, such of the best work being done in comparative Cheeseman, Daniel Gingerich, and as relative deprivation, status anxiety, and politics. It combines novel theorizing with Allen Hicken. We received and reviewed last-place aversion. It builds a theory of the clever and e'ective use of multiple a substantial number of outstanding how within group-status concerns might empirical strategies. )is work is sure to dissertations, many of which are worthy of in(uence political behavior. Speci*cally, help reshape how we think about citizen recognition. However, the committee agreed certain contextual triggers (for example, preferences over public policy and political that this year the Linz Award should go to high levels of within-group inequality) participation.” Gwyneth H. McClendon for her dissertation raise the salience of within-group status “)e Politics of Envy and Esteem in Two concerns. Within group status concerns can, Best Book Award: Milan Svolik (University Democracies.” depending on the context, encourage greater of Illinois) was award the best book award for participation, or lead citizens to favor a "e Politics of Authoritarian Rule (Cambridge Dr. McClendon’s dissertation draws “leveling down” of assets and incomes within University Press). on insights from social psychology and neighborhoods and among group members. behavioral economics to explain why, under !is year’s award committee included certain circumstances, individuals prefer Dr. McClendon evaluates her argument by David Samuels (University of Minnesota)

26 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

Section News

(chair), Rachel Beatty Riedl (Northwestern rule. )is is a framework that will be built Committee Remarks on the Award University), James Melton (University upon for years to come by scholars who seek Winner: College London). to identify alternative ways in which dictators “)e committee unanimously decided address the dilemmas of authoritarian to award the best article prize to Robert Committee Remarks on the Award power-sharing and authoritarian control Woodberry for his article “)e Missionary Winner: *rst identi*ed by Svolik.” Roots of Liberal Democracy”. In this article, “Political science has witnessed a proliferation which came out in the May 2012 issue of scholarship on authoritarian regimes Michael Coppedge (University of Notre of the American Political Science Review, over the past 10-15 years. Rather than Dame) was awarded an honorable mention Woodberry argues that conversionary simply categorizing all non-democracies as for Democratization and Research Methods Protestants were a crucial catalyst that totalitarian, where the dictator is supreme (Cambridge University Press). initiated the spread of the civic liberties and leader with unquestionable control over the associations that ultimately resulted in the elites and masses, we have come to appreciate Committee Remarks on the Honorable emergence of liberal democracy. the heterogeneity between dictatorships and Mention: to understand that even a dictator’s power “)is book provides a critical overview A brief version of Woodberry’s theoretical depends on a coalition of supporters. )e of the evolution of the scholarly study argument goes as follows: conversionary literature upon which these realizations of regime change, with a focus on the Protestants wanted ordinary people to be i) are based has greatly expanded both our interplay between di'erent theories and able to read the Bible and ii) actively involved knowledge and interest in authoritarian di'erent methodologies, highlighting the in their church. Yet in their attempts to politics. Missing from the extant literature, epistemological challenges that scholars spread their faith, conversionary Protestants though, is a theory that uni*es and enhances - both qualitative and quantitative - face were in e'ect facilitating the spread of mass all that we have learned; a theory that lays when attempting to make sense of this education, mass printing, and civil society. the groundwork for future scholarship on complex phenomenon. In addition to )ese byproducts of religious activism in the politics of authoritarian rule. providing a most robust and yet precise turn led to the emergence of actors and conceptualization, Coppedge does more conditions favorable to democracy: civic Svolik’s book provides such a theory. He than merely summarize the democratization associations, political parties, religious argues that dictators face two dilemmas: literature. By putting the question of regime liberties, and mass political participation. 1) authoritarian power-sharing and 2) transition in dialogue with methodologies authoritarian control. )e former is about he adjudicates between the theoretical and Hence, according to Woodberry, democracy managing their relationship with the ruling empirical evaluations of democracy’s causes. was not the autonomous triumph of modern elite, and the latter is about managing their In doing so, he has provided a public good forms of political organization and activity relationship with the masses. In explaining that will be an invaluable resource for all – like political parties, labor movements, these problems and the solutions used students of democratization, and will surely and mass education. Rather, these modern by dictators to address them, Svolik’s be assigned in most graduate seminars (and political actors were the byproduct of a work engulfs much of the literature on upper-division undergraduate courses) for very traditional activity, namely, religious authoritarian rule. He addresses how best years to come.” conversion and competition. to conceptualize authoritarian regimes, why some dictatorships are more durable than Best Article Award: Robert Woodberry )ese arguments alone amount to an others, why we sometimes dictators are able (National University of Singapore) won the important and novel challenge to the to personalize their rule, and how dictators best article award for his American Political standard versions of the modernization use political institutions, parties and Science Review piece, “)e Missionary Roots theory. Yet, Woodberry’s article is also repression to prolong their rule. )ese topics of Liberal Democracy.” exceptional in the way it combines historical are addressed with both rigorous (formal) and statistical research in order to evaluate theory and innovative empirical methods, !is year’s award committee included this theoretical proposition. which sometimes utilizes data collected Milan Svolik (University of Illinois) (Chair), speci*cally for this book. Ultimately, though, Svend-Erik Skaaning (Aarhus University), First, Woodberry shows that there is a the most important contribution of this and Leonardo R. Arriola (University of strong association between Protestantism book is the dynamic theoretical framework it California, Berkeley). and democracy across a number of historical establishes for understanding authoritarian and geographical contexts: in Western

27 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

Section News

Europe, in settler colonies, in Eastern project identi*es a compelling research years, living in and near refugee camps in Europe after the fall of communism, and in question -- namely, what explains variation Lebanon in order to make sense of variation the rest of the contemporary world. )en he in the degree of development and level in the reorganization of Palestinian militant presents historical evidence of conversionary of public goods provision across slums in organizations in the decades since 1980. Her protestants’ involvement in the spread of India? To answer it, Auerbach has employed central question -- what explains the di'erent mass printing, mass education, civil society, a mixed-methods approach that has ways in which militant organizations recover and the rule of law – and thus highlights the involved extensive ethnographic *eldwork and reorganize after defeat? -- advances speci*c mechanisms by which conversionary over 15 months, a host of interviews literatures on war, on organizational theory protestants fostered conditions favorable to with political leaders, gang members, and and change, and on social networks. Under the emergence of democracy. And *nally, squatter settlement residents, the collection di+cult and dangerous circumstances, using original data on Protestant missionary of about 3,000 documents from community Parkinson won and kept the trust of her involvement around the world, Professor meetings, election campaigns and leadership research subjects. She integrated herself Woodberry demonstrates that the historic correspondence, an original survey of just fully into daily life and collected impressive prevalence of Protestant missionaries under two thousand households across archival and oral history data from both explains about half the variation in 80 slums, a database of party workers women and male o+cers. )e committee democracy outside of Europe – even after characteristics, and the creation of satellite- believes that the depth, integrity, and careful controlling for most standard covariates imaging maps. His *eldwork e'orts are design of her project will make a very and after accounting for endogeneity by an impressive in their sheer breadth, depth, important contribution to political science.” instrumental variable analysis. and creativity. He has collected rich data on often-overlooked communities and Best Paper Award: Kunle Owolabi To summarize, it is the combination of political activities. His innovative approach (Villanova) won the best paper award for a new approach to a classic, important has also thus far led to intriguing and his work on “Literacy and Democracy After question and the nuanced use of di'erent novel results. For instance, Auerbach *nds, Slavery?” kinds of methods and evidence when contrary to much extant research, that evaluating his theoretical claims that led ethnic heterogeneity can have a positive !is year’s award committee included us to award this year’s best article prize to impact on public goods provision, at least Zachary Elkins (University of Texas Robert Woodberry.” when it leads to competitive and dense at Austin) (Chair), Daniel Ziblatt patronage networks. His dissertation project (Harvard University), and Joseph Wright Best Fieldwork Award: Adam Auerbach promises to make a key contribution to (Pennsylvania State University). won the best *eldwork prize for his political science literatures on economic dissertation project, “Cooperation in development, ethnic diversity, public goods Committee Remarks on the Award Uncertainty: Migration, Ethnicity, and provision, clientelism, political competition, Winner: Community Governance in India’s Urban and research design.” “We—the selection committee—agreed Slums.” unanimously in our decision. We found Sarah Parkinson was also awarded an Owolabi’s paper to be a highly original !is year’s award committee included honorable mention for her work on treatment of a fascinating research question. Leonard Wantchekon (Princeton “Reinventing the Resistance: Order and Owolabi notes a puzzling di'erence in University) (chair), Oeindrila Dube (New Violence among Palestinians in Lebanon.” literacy rates between two sets of countries York University), Gwyneth McClendon characterized two di'erent patterns of (Yale University). Committee Remarks on the Honorable colonization: those in which colonizers Mention: “)e committee is also pleased imported non-indigenous laborers to Committee Remarks on the Award to award Sarah Parkinson’s dissertation, colonies (largely in the Americas) and those Winners “)is year’s committee is pleased to “Reinventing the Resistance: Order and in which colonizers dominated indigenous have selected Adam Auerbach’s dissertation Violence Among Palestinians in Lebanon,” populations (largely in Africa and Asia). project, “Cooperation in Uncertainty: an Honorable Mention. Parkinson went Paradoxically, those societies characterized Migration, Ethnicity, and Community above and beyond the depth and personal by forced settlement (the *rst mode) exhbit Governance in India’s Urban Slums,” for risk typically undertaken for dissertation much higher literacy rates in the post- the Comparative Democratization’s Best *eldwork and with striking results. She colonial era than do those characterized by Fieldwork Prize. Auerbach’s dissertation spent over 19 months, over the course of 5 occupation (the second mode).

28 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

Section News

Owolabi’s explanation for this paradox is NEWS FROM MEMBERS Service in Qatar to work on his book compelling. He suggests that the process Naazneen Barma, assistant professor manuscript that examines the success and associated with the abolition of slavery in of National Security A'airs, Naval failure of alliances between Islamists and colonies of forced settlement led to some Postgraduate School, has been awarded leftists in Tunisia, Morocco, and Mauritania. surprising bene*ts with respect to citizenship a grant from the 2013 Minerva Research and education. By contrast, societies of Initiative, along with co-PIs Jessica Piombo Maxwell Cameron, director of the Centre occupation maintained strict administrative and Naomi Levy. )e research project for the Study of Democratic Institutions, codes for indigenous populations that is entitled “Public Service Provision as University of British Columbia, published essentially denied them fundamental Peace-building: How Do Autonomous Strong Constitutions: Social-Cognitive citizenship rights until the post-World War E'orts Compare to Internationally Aided Origins of the Separation of Powers (Oxford II era. )is deprivation in membership and Interventions?” and comprises comparative University Press, 2013). )e book is the *rst status in the community had a remarkable case study work in Cambodia, Laos, and social scienti*c theory of the separation impact on educational outcomes. Owolabi Uganda on the relationship between peace- of powers based on language and social tests his theory convincingly with a careful building and state-building. cognition. Visit http://strongconstitutions. statistical analysis. )e result is a highly com for more information. intriguing historical paper, which we expect Michael Bernhard, Raymond and will be published in the next several years in Miriam Ehrlich Chair in Political Science, Paul J. Carnegie, senior lecturer in political a top journal. University of Florida, and Ruchan Kaya science, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, published “Are Elections Mechanisms of published “Can an Indonesian Model Work We congratulate Kunle Owolabi heartily Authoritarian Stability or Democratization? in the Middle East?” in the Summer 2013 and wish him the best of luck in his future Evidence from Postcommunist Eurasia” in Middle East Quarterly. Recognizing that work in this area.” the September 2013 Perspectives on Politics, earlier concerns over an Islamist ascendancy in which the authors test whether elections after the fall of Indonesian President Autocracies of the World Dataset Now have functioned as a mechanism of change Suharto proved largely unfounded, Carnegie Available: or of neo-authoritarian stability in the asks how this development was possible in On October 18, 2013, Beatriz Magaloni, postcommunist world. Bernhard’s coedited the world’s most populous Muslim country Jonathan Chu, and Eric Min at Stanford book (with Jan Kubik), Twenty Years after and asks if it can serve as a template for the University released the *rst edition of Communism: "e Politics of Memory and ongoing transitions in the Middle East. the Autocracies of the World (AoW) Commemoration, is under contract with Carnegie was recently in Pontianak in West 1950-2012 dataset. Among a variety of Oxford University Press and is expected to Kalimantan, Indonesia in late June, where he attributes, the data tracks regime types for be published in October 2014. was conducting *eld research on the politics all countries from 1950-2012 with more of decentralization reform in the country’s speci*c sub-categories (monarchy, single Archie Brown, Emeritus Professor of provinces. party, hegemonic, military) for all autocratic Politics, Oxford University, published the country-years. Building on top of extant chapter on “Communism” in Michael Dinissa S. Duvanova, assistant professor regime classi*cation datasets, the AoW Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc of political science, University of Bu'alo, o'ers at least three unique contributions: Stears (eds.), "e Oxford Handbook of Political SUNY, published Building Business in removing all hybrid classi*cations; Ideologies in 2013. Brown’s own more recent Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe, correcting classi*cation errors and omissions book, "e Rise and Fall of Communism (Ecco, and Eurasia: Collective Goods, Selective in other datasets; and including two new 2011), has been translated in nine di'erent Incentives, and Predatory States (Cambridge measurements of personalist rule that apply countries, most recently Israel and Russia. University Press), in which the author shows to all autocratic governments. Further details that postcommunist business associations on these changes and other useful covariates Matt Buehler, alumnus of the University function as substitutes for state and private (such as regime duration) can be found in of Texas-Austin (2013), will begin a mechanisms for good governance. Please the dataset’s codebook. Both the data and tenure track position at the University of write to the author at duvanova@bu'alo. codebook will soon be housed by Stanford’s Tennessee’s Department of Political Science edu for a discount code if you would like to Center on Democracy, Development, and in Fall 2014. )is year, he is participating purchase the book. Rule of Law (CDDRL). Both resources are in a post-doctoral fellowship at the Center also currently available for free download at for International and Regional Studies at Todd Eisenstadt, professor of government, http://ericmin.com/aow-data. Georgetown University’s School of Foreign American University, and Karleen West of

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West Virginia University have received a Erica Frantz, assistant professor of political elections, the mass media, and state three-year grant from the National Science science, Bridgewater State University, and institutions) that their rulers face. A copy of Foundation’s Law and Social Sciences Natasha Ezrow published Failed States the article is available by request by writing Division for their work on “Collaborative and Institutional Decay: Understanding to [email protected]. Research: Identifying the Conditions Instability and Poverty in the Developing Under Which Indigenous Communities World (Bloomsbury Publishing), in which Debra Javeline, associate professor of Engage in Legal Mobilization.” Using a the author explains how and why di'erent political science, University of Notre Dame, survey conducted with Ecuadorian partners, types of institutions deteriorate and Jessica J. Hellmann, Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Eisenstadt and West are studying poor, illustrates the impact that institutional decay and Gregory Shufeldt, published “Expert rural, indigenous communities in that has on political instability and poverty using Opinion on Climate Change and )reats to country - and in a comparative framework examples from all over the world. Biodiversity” in the August 2013 Bioscience. - to understand how they overcome )e authors suggest policymakers consult socioeconomic and geographic barriers to Vladimir Gel’man, professor of political environmental biologists on emerging and launch new forms of social movements science and sociology, European University controversial issues such as climate change relying on Western science and international at St. Petersburg, published (in Russian) and use transparent, standardized metrics of collaboration. Lz ognya da v polymya: Rossiiskaya Politika expertise when deciding which scientists to Posle SSSR (Out of the Frying Pan, into the consult. Bonnie N. Field, associate professor, Fire: Russian Politics after the USSR), which Bentley University and visiting scholar at analyzes why more than two decades after Harshan Kumarasingham, senior research Harvard’s Center for European Studies, the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth published “Resolute Leaders and ‘Cardboard politics has not brought the country closer Studies, University of London, recently Deputies’: Parliamentary Party Unity in the to political freedom. Gel’man’s article, published several articles: “Constrained New Spanish Democracy” in the September “Cracks in the Wall: Challenges to Electoral Parliamentarism in the New Zealand 2013 South European Society and Politics, Authoritarianism in Russia” appears in Regime” (with John Power), which appeared which puts forward a leadership-centered the March-April 2013 Problems of Post- in the April 2013 Commonwealth & explanation of parliamentary party unity in Communism. Comparative Politics; “Exporting Executive new democracies. She also published Politics Accountability: Westminster Legacies and Society in Contemporary Spain: From Agustina Giraudy, assistant professor of Executive Power” in the July 2013 Zapatero to Rajoy (Palgrave 2013), co-edited at American University’s School of Parliamentary A!airs; and “‘)e Jewel of with Alfonso Botti (University of Modena International Service, published “Varieties the East yet Has Its Flaws: )e Deceptive and Reggio Emilia). )e book o'ers a of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes: Tranquility Surrounding Sri Lankan comprehensive and nuanced analysis of Evidence from Argentina and Mexico” in Independence,” published by the Heidelberg contemporary Spain. Focusing on the second the March 2013 Studies in Comparative Papers in South Asian and Comparative term of Socialist Prime Minister José Luis International Development. Recognizing the Politics’ Working Papers series in June 2013. Rodríguez Zapatero, the dramatic defeat shortcomings of subnational undemocratic of the Socialists in the 2011 elections and regimes literature, the author calls for Todd Landman, executive dean, faculty the alternation of power to the conservative a separation between two orthogonal of social sciences, University of Essex, Popular Party, it underscores Spain’s deep dimensions: the access to and the exercise of published Human Rights and Democracy: "e economic and political crisis. state power. Precarious Triumph of Ideals (Bloomsbury Academic Press), in which the author Julie Fisher Melton published Importing Henry Hale, associate professor of political traces how state and non-state actors have Democracy: "e Role of NGOs in South science and international a'airs, )e George created social, political, and legal institutions Africa, Tajikistan, and Argentina. Published Washington University, Nikolay Petrov, and that seek to constrain the worst forms of by the Kettering Foundation in 2013, Maria Lipman published “)ree Dilemmas human behavior and embraced the ideas of the book examines the roles of NGOs in of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia democracy and human rights in new ways. democratization by conducting hundreds from Putin to Putin” in the September 2013 of interviews in several countries across the Post-Soviet A!airs. )e authors investigate Sta"an I. Lindberg, association professor world. how hybrid regimes supply governance by of political science at the University of examining a series of dilemmas (involving Gothenburg and the University of Florida,

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published “Mapping Accountability: Core the aftermath of the 1980 military coup Emory University, was named a Fulbright Concept and Subtypes” in the June 2013 and argues that, while important, the EU’s Nehru Scholar to India for 2013-14. She is International Review of Administrative in(uence on democracy and human rights based at IIT Bombay for the fall semester. Sciences and “Have the Cake and Eat It: )e only began to in(uence police reform after Her research on strategic communication Rational Voter in Africa” in a forthcoming 1999. in India focuses on business, government, issue of Party Politics. Lindberg and Keith and international a'airs. "e Sage Handbook Weghorst also published “What Drives Sebastian Royo, associate dean of the of Political Communication, edited by Holli the Swing Voter in Africa?” in the July College of Arts and Sciences at Su'olk Semetko and Margaret Scammell, was 2013 American Journal of Political Science. University, recently published Lessons from published in 2012. Finally, Lindberg, Pontus Strimling, Micael the Economic Crisis in Spain (Palgrave); Ehn, Kimmo Eriksson, and Bo Rothstein “Portugal in the European Union: )e Limits Dan Slater, associate professor of political published “Can E+cient Institutions Induce of Convergence” in a special issue of South science, University of Chicago, published a Cooperation Among Low Trust Agents? European Society and Politics that focused coauthored article in the September 2013 An Experimental Approach” as part of the on “Europeanisation and the Southern Perspectives on Politics with Joseph Wong, Quality of Government Institute’s Working Periphery”; and a book chapter entitled professor of political science, University of Paper series. “A ‘Ship in Trouble’ )e Spanish Banking Toronto, entitled “)e Strength to Concede: System in the Midst of the Global Financial Ruling Parties and Democratization in James Melton, Lecturer in Comparative System Crisis: )e Limits of Regulation” to Developmental Asia.” Politics, University College London, the book Market-Based Banking, Varieties of Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of Financial Capitalism and the Financial Crisis, Lahra Smith, assistant professor, Edmund International Law, Ludwig and Hilde Wolf edited by Iain Hardie and David Howarth A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Research Scholar and Professor of Political and published by Oxford University Press. Georgetown University, published Making Science, University of Chicago, and Zachary Citizens in Africa: Ethnicity, Gender, and Elkins, associate professor of government, Sanjay Ruparelia, assistant professor of National Identity in Ethiopia (Cambridge University of Texas at Austin, have launched politics, New School for Social Research, was University Press). Using data from Ethiopia a new website, Constitute, which uses recently awarded a Postdoctoral Fellowship and developing a historically informed and data from the Comparative Constitutions for Transregional Research to conduct empirically nuanced study of language policy Projects to allow national constitutions to be *eldwork for his new project, “Demanding and ethnicity and gender identities, the book served by topic. Constitute can be accessed a Right to Basic Social Welfare: Contesting analyzes the contestation over citizenship at www.constituteproject.org/#/. the Law in India and China,” by the Social that engages the state, social movements, Science Research Council. Ruparelia also and individuals in substantive ways. Yonatan Morse has taken an appointment published “India’s New Rights Agenda: as visiting assistant professor and associate Genesis, Promises, Risks” in the September Etel Solingen was recently appointed as the director of the Center for Democracy and 2013 Paci#c A!airs. )omas T. and Elizabeth C. Tierney Chair in Civil Society at Georgetown University’s Peace Studies at the University of California department of government. Morse also Ben Ross Schneider, Ford International Irvine. Solingen also served as the president published “Party Matters: )e Institutional Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts of the International Studies Association Origins of Competitiveness and Hegemony Institute of Technology, published from 2012 to 2013 under the theme “)e in Post Cold War Tanzania,” which Hierarchical Capitalism in Latin America, Politics of Transnational and Regional will appear in an upcoming issue of in which the author argues that Latin Di'usion,” highlighting a large number of Democratization. America has a distinctive, enduring form panels on comparative democratization, the of hierarchical capitalism characterized Arab Spring, and related topics. She also Leila Piran, adjunct professor at George by multinational corporations, diversi*ed published “)ree Scenes of Sovereignty and Washington University’s School of business groups, low skills, and segmented Power” in Martha Finnemore and Judith Professional Studies, published Institutional labor markets. Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: Rethinking Change in Turkey: "e Impact of EU Reforms Power in the Contemporary World (Oxford on Human Rights and Policing (Palgrave Holli A. Semetko, Asa Griggs Candler University Press). MacMillan). )e book explores the domestic Professor of Media and International reasons behind police reform in Turkey in A'airs and Professor of Political Science,

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A book written by Guillermo Trejo, Rachel Vanderhill, visiting assistant Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and associate professor of political science, professor of international relations, Honduras, countries that have relatively University of Notre Dame, entitled Wheaton College, and Michael E. Aleprete, few resources and little political will to Popular Movements in Autocracies: Religion, Jr. edited International Dimensions of implement legal norms that aim to prevent Repression, and Indigenous Collective Action Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from and sanction violence against women. In in Mexico (Cambridge University Press), Post-Soviet States (Lexington Books). )e part, she argues that transnational advocacy received an honorary mention for the edited volume explores how international networks help overcome state resistance to 2013 Charles Tilly Award for Best Book factors interact with domestic conditions to advancing institutional specialization and Published in Collective Behavior and Social explain the persistence of authoritarianism performance by providing external pressure Movements from the American Sociological throughout the region. )e selections in the and international funding to support new Association (ASA). volume cover several countries, including institution-strengthening e'orts within the Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, justice system. Maya Tudor, university lecturer in South Ossetia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, government and public policy, Oxford and the Russian Federation. )e failure Kurt Weyland, Lozano Long Professor of University, published "e Promise of Power: of democratic consolidation among post- Latin American Politics, University of Texas "e Social Origins of Democracy in India and Soviet states o'ers important lessons for at Austin, won the Mary Parker Follett Autocracy in Pakistan (Cambridge University policymakers and academics dealing with Prize of the APSA Politics and History Press), in which she suggests that the the recent wave of political transitions in the section for two of his articles: “Di'usion emergence of a stable democracy in India Middle East and Asia. Waves and European Democratization: )e and an unstable autocracy in Pakistan is Impact of Organizational Development” best explained by the historically-speci*c Michael Wahman (formerly University and “)e Arab Spring: Why the Surprising interests of the dominant social group which of Texas at Austin) started a new position Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of led each independence movement as well as Visiting Postdoctoral Fellow at London 1848?” Weyland also published “)e )reat as by the varying strength of the political School of Economic’s Department of from the Populist Left” in the June 2013 parties which were created to pursue those Government on September 1. Wahman’s Journal of Democracy’s cluster of articles on interests. Tudor also published "e Historical research is supported by a two-year grant “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift.” Inheritance of India’s Democracy (Routledge from the Swedish Research Council. Handbook on Indian Politics). During his time at LSE, he will concentrate Matthew S. Winters, assistant professor on a project studying African sub-national of political science, University of Illinois at Rollin F. Tusalem was recently promoted variation in election manipulation and Urbana-Champaign, and Rebecca Weitz- to associate professor of political science electoral behavior. Shapiro, Stanley J. Bernstein Assistant at Arkansas State University. He recently Professor of Political Science, Brown published “Bringing the Military Back In: Shannon Drysdale Walsh was awarded a University, published “Lacking Information )e Politicisation of the Military and its National Endowment for the Humanities or Condoning Corruption: When Do E'ects on Democratic Consolidation” and Summer Stipend for 2013 to support two Voters Support Corrupt Politicians?’ in the “)e Impact of Diamonds on Economic months of full-time writing and research July 2013 Comparative Politics. Using an Growth, Adverse Regime Change, and on her book project Engendering State original survey experiment, the article *nds Democratic State Building in Africa” (with Institutions: State Response to Violence little evidence of Brazilian voters accepting Minion K.C. Morrison) in upcoming issues Against Women in Latin America. )is book a tradeo' in which they support corrupt of International Political Science Review manuscript proposes a theoretical framework politicians who are otherwise providing and “)e E'ect of Political Dynasties to explain variation in the construction and public goods; instead, when voters are given on E'ective Democratic Governance: performance of specialized state institutions information about political corruption, Evidence from the Philippines” (with Je'rey that address violence against women. they express a preference for removing the Pe-Aguirre) in Asian Politics and Policy. Drysdale Walsh compares Guatemala, politician from o+ce.

32 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

NEW RESEARCH Journal of Democracy unseated by popular unrest and a negotiated look at the evidence casts doubt on the theory of transition is under way, but to many Yemenis this “democratization by elections. )e October 2013 (Vol. 24, no. 4) Journal all appears to be a change more of appearance than of Democracy features a cluster of articles of substance. II. “Confusing Categories, Shifting Targets” by on “Tracking the ‘Arab Spring,’” as well as Sta'an I. Lindberg individual case studies on democracy and V. “Libya Starts from Scratch” by Mieczysław Sta!an Lindberg replies to Matthijs Bogaards’s the quality of the state, governance, Paraguay, P. B o d u s z y ński and Duncan Pickard critique, #nding the latter’s methodology Malaysia, and elections in Africa. Qadha# is gone after subjecting his country to a problematic and arguing that the evidence brutal dictatorship for more than four decades, but for association between repeated elections and “Democracy and the Quality of the State” by the devastated institutional landscape that he left democratization remains strong. Francis Fukuyama behind bodes ill for Libya’s democratic prospects. What is the relationship between high-quality )e July 2013 (Volume 24, no. 3) issue of the state administration and democracy? A look back “)e )ird Wave: Inside the Numbers” by Journal of Democracy features clusters of articles at modern Greece and Italy, along with Germany Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning on “Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift,” and the United States, provides some insights. Is democracy threatened by a “reverse wave”? “Putin versus Civil Society,” and “Kenya’s 2013 Examining regional patterns and distinguishing Elections,” as well individual case studies on “Re(ections on ‘Governance’” by Marc F. between di!erent types of democracy gives us a Jordan, Algeria, and Bahrain. )e full text of Plattner new basis for assessing this question. selected articles and the tables of contents of “Governance,” once merely a synonym for all issues are available on the Journal’s website. government, has taken on new meanings that “Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment” tend to downplay the importance of the political. by Leiv Marsteintredet, Mariana Llanos, and “)e Durability of Revolutionary Regimes” by But can “good governance” be achieved today Detlef Nolte Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way without the protections of liberal democracy? "e phenomenon of the “interrupted presidency” Authoritarian regimes that have their origins in remains a key source of democratic instability revolutionary struggle have a much higher survival Tracking the “Arab Spring” in Latin America, as was demonstrated once rate than other brands of authoritarianism. What I. “Why the Modest Harvest?” by Jason again by the 2012 impeachment of Paraguayan accounts for their durability? Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew president Fernando Lugo. Reynolds Latin America’s Authoritarian Drift Popular uprisings have occurred only in some Research Report I. “)e )reat from the Populist Left” by Kurt Arab states and in even fewer have authoritarian “Assessing the Quality of Elections” by Weyland rulers been overthrown. What factors allow us to Pippa Norris, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran "e left-populist authoritarianism that is taking predict whether an authoritarian regime will be Martinez i Coma hold across a swatch of Latin America bears many vulnerable? Determining whether an election has met resemblances to the rightist populism that was international standards is a pressing issue for once widespread in the region. "ere are signs, II. “Egypt’s Failed Transition” by Nathan J. both practitioners and scholars. An important however, that the leftist variant will be an even Brown new study aims to systematize the assessment of bigger problem for liberal democracy. "e July 2013 military takeover has squashed electoral integrity. democratic hopes in Egypt, at least for now. How II. “Technocratic Populism in Ecuador” by did things go so wrong, and what lessons are to be “Malaysia’s Elections: A Step Backward” by Carlos de la Torre drawn from this lamentable episode? Bridget Welsh President Rafael Correa, now entering Despite losing the popular vote, Malaysia’s long- his third term, has built a curious form of III. “Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism” ruling Barisan Nasional triumphed again in populist-authoritarian regime. He champions by Steven Heydemann the country’s 2013 elections, disappointing an redistributionism and a kind of technocratic "e Assad regime has been adapting to the new emboldened opposition that had high hopes after leftism while assaulting the traditional left along challenges posed by mass uprisings through a a strong performance in 2008. with such mainstays of a liberal society as the process of “authoritarian learning,” and at least freedom of the press. some of its methods are being applied elsewhere in Exchange the region. I. “Reexamining African Elections” by III. “Chavismo After Chávez?” by Miriam Matthijs Bogaards Kornblith IV. “Yemen Changes Everything…And Do even unfree and unfair elections in sub- Can a regime built by and centered around a Nothing” by April Longley Alley Saharan Africa, if repeated often enough, populist strongman survive that strongman’s A long-ruling strongman president has been really contribute to democratization? A fresh death? A natural experiment is now unfolding in

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Venezuela as a resurgent opposition and a crisis of reform is no longer enough, but key players fail to “Ahab and the White Whale: the governability converge on the would-be heirs of realize it. Contemporary Debate around the Forms of Hugo Chávez. Catholic Political Commitment in Italy” by Kenya’s 2013 Elections Alberta Giorgi Putin versus Civil Society I. “Choosing Peace over Democracy” by James I. “)e Long Struggle for Freedom” by Leon D. Long, Karuti Kanyinga, Karen E. Ferree, “Religious Parties in Chile: the Christian Aron and Clark Gibson Democratic Party and the Independent Today’s Russian protest movement in many ways In March 2013, Kenyans took to the polls in Democratic Union” by Juan Pablo Luna, resembles past civil-rights and civil-resistance what turned out to be another disputed election. Felipe Monestier, and Fernando Rosenblatt e!orts in other parts of the world, from its Why did the peace hold this time, unlike in 2007, commitment to nonviolence to its key demands—a and what are the implications for democracy in “Religion and Democratization in Northern vote that counts and equality under the law. Kenya? Ireland: Is Religion actually Ethnicity in Disguise?” by Eoin O’Malley and Dawn Walsh II. “Outlawing the Opposition” by Miriam II. “Technology Is Not Democracy” by Joel D. Lanskoy and Elspeth Suthers Barkan “Conclusion: Reassessing the Relation "e Putin regime, having faced its #rst real In an e!ort to avoid repeating the 2007 electoral between Religion, Political Actors, and challenge in the form of mass protests after the debacle, Kenya’s election commission turned to Democratization” by Luca Ozzano and 2011 Duma elections, is responding with a series technology, but its high-tech voter-registration Francesco Cavatorta of laws intended to intimidate its civil-society and vote-count processes fell short. Its experience opposition, if not stamp it out altogether. has important lessons both for emerging )e August 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 4) democracies and for international donors. Democratization features articles on democracy “Transforming the Arab World’s Protection- promotion in eastern Europe, elections in Racket Politics” by Daniel Brumberg Democratization Tanzania and Uganda, measuring democracy, "e Arab world’s old autocracies survived by regime type and the impact of democracy manipulating the sharp identity con$icts in their )e October 2013 (Vol. 20, no. 5) assistance, institutional factors and party societies. "e division and distrust that this style of Democratization is a special issue on “Religiously systems in new democracies, and the in(uence rule generated is now making it especially di%cult Oriented Parties and Democratization.” of external actors on democratization. to carry out the kind of pact-making often crucial to successful democratic transitions. “Introduction: Religiously Oriented Parties “Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy: and Democratization” by Luca Ozzano and the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood” by “Algeria versus the Arab Spring” by Frédéric Francesco Cavatorta Gwendolyn Sasse Volpi Not only did the Algerian regime survive the “)e Many Faces of the Political God: A “Elections and Landmark Policies in Tanzania “Arab Spring,” it hardly deviated from its Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties” by and Uganda” by Anne Mette Kjær and Ole normal methods of authoritarian governance— Luca Ozzano )erkildsen patronage, pseudodemocratization, and e!ective use of the security apparatus. “)e Perils of Polarization and Religious “Bringing Direct Democracy Back In: Toward Parties: )e Democratic Challenges of a )ree-Dimensional Measure of Democracy” “Bahrain’s Decade of Discontent” by Frederic Political Fragmentation in Israel and Turkey” by David Altman Wehrey by Sultan Tepe When this small island kingdom in the Gulf “Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact joined the wider Arab world’s political upheavals “Moderation through Exclusion? )e Journey of Democracy Aid on Democracy?” by Agnes in March 2011, it was a reaction to regional of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist Cornell events, but also a re$ection of internal problems to Conservative Party” by Francesco Cavatorta that had been festering for a decade. and Fabio Merone “Institutional Factors A'ecting Party Systems in New Democracies: Endogenous or “Jordan: )e Ruse of Reform” by Sean L. Yom “Re*ning the Moderation )esis. Two Exogenous Predictors?” by Mazen Hassan "e Hashemite monarchy still fails to understand Religious Parties and Indian Democracy: the the challenges that threaten Jordan’s political Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindutva “When One Might not See the Wood for the order. "e old playbook of limited, manipulated Radicalism and Coalition Politics” by Trees: the ‘Historical Turn’ in Democratization Christophe Ja'relot Studies, Critical Junctures, and Cross-Case

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Comparisons” by Jørgen Møller American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, “Violence Against Civilians in the Second no. 3, August 2013 Intifada: )e Moderating E'ect of Armed “When Can External Actors In(uence “Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High- Group Structure on Opportunistic Violence” Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in by Devorah Manekin Gatekeeper Elites” by Jakob Tolstrup War” by Sarah Elizabeth Parkinson Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 9, “Inclusive Institutions and Stability of “Quality of Government: Toward a More September 2013 Transition toward Democracy in Post-Civil Complex De*nition” by Marcus Agnafors “Vote Buying With Multiple Distributive War States” by Madhav Joshi Goods” by Michael Albertus “Quality Over Quantity: Amici In(uence “Remembering Violence: the Role of Apology and Judicial Decision Making” by Janet M. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 8, and Dialogue in Turkey’s Democratization Box-Ste'ensmeier, Dino P. Christenson, and August 2013 Process” by Mneesha Gellman Matthew P. Hitt “Competitiveness, Partisanship, and Subnational Protest in Argentina” by Moisés SELECTED JOURNAL ARTICLES ON “Empowering Women through Development Arce and Jorge Mangonnet DEMOCRACY Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan” by Andrew Beath, Fotini “When Grapevine News Meets Mass Media: )is section features selected articles on Christia, Ruben Enikolopov Di'erent Information Sources and Popular democracy that appeared in journals received Perceptions of Government Corruption in by the NED’s Democracy Resource Center, “Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Mainland China” by Jiangnan Zhu, Jie Lu, and June 1– June 1, 2013. Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi” by Tianjian Shi Cyrus Samii African A!airs, Vol. 111, no. 449, October “Attitude Variability Among Latin American 2013 “)e Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Publics: How Party System Structuration “)e Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution” by A'ects Left/Right Ideology” by Imke Rebel–Military Integration and Con(ict Mark R. Beissinger Harbers, Catherine E. de Vries, and Marco R. Dynamics in the Eastern DRC” by Maria Steenbergen Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 46, no. 3, September 2013 “Campaign Spending in Proportional “Resource Curse or Resource Disease? Oil in “Continuity and Change in Russia’s Policy Electoral Systems: Incumbents Versus Ghana” by Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus, toward Central and Eastern Europe” by Yury Challengers Revisited” by Joel W. Johnson and Wojciech Tycholiz E. Fedorov Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 7, “Continuity and Change in Senegalese Party Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 46, no. 10, July 2013 Politics: Lessons from the 2012 Elections” by October 2013 “Engendering’Politics: )e Impact of Danielle Resnick “)e Behavioral Foundations of Social Politics: Descriptive Representation on Women’s Evidence from Surveys and a Laboratory Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa” African A!airs, Vol. 111, no. 448, July 2013 Democracy” by Benjamin Barber IV, Pablo by Ti'any D. Barnes and Stephanie M. “)e Roots of Resilience: Exploring Popular Beramendi, and Erik Wibbels Burchard Support for African Traditional Authorities” by “)e Varying Political Toll of Concerns About “Catchall or Catch and Release? )e Electoral Carolyn Logan Corruption in Good Versus Bad Economic Consequences of Social Democratic Parties’ Times” by Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and March to the Middle in Western Europe” “Democratic Revolutionaries or Pocketbook Daniel Zizumbo-Colunga by Johannes Karreth, Jonathan T. Polk, and Protesters? )e Roots of the 2009–2010 Christopher S. Allen Uprisings in Niger” by Lisa Mueller “Mainstream or Niche? Vote-Seeking Incentives and the Programmatic Strategies “When Parties Meet Voters: Assessing “From Warlords to Freedom Fighters: Political of Political Parties” by )omas M. Meyer and Political Linkages )rough Partisan Networks Violence and State Formation in Umbumbulu, Markus Wagner and Distributive Expectations in Argentina South Africa” by Sarah M. Mathis and Chile” by Ernesto Calvo and Maria Victoria Murillo

35 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

New Research

“)e Calculus of Consensus Democracy: “Party System Institutionalization in Ukraine” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 51, Rethinking Patterns of Democracy Without by Olena Rybiy no. 3, September 2013 Veto Players” by Anthony J. McGann and “Second Time Around: Ex-Combatants at the Michael Latner “)e Negative Consequences of Proportional Polls in Liberia” by Johanna Söderström Representation in Ukraine” by Serhij Comparative Politics, Vol. 46, no. 1, October Vasylchenko Middle East Journal, Vol. 67, no 3, Summer 2013 2013 “)e Left and Minority Representation: East European Politics, Vol. 29, no. 2, May “Iran’s Basij: Membership in a Militant )e Labour Party, Muslim Candidates, and 2013 Islamist Organization” by Afshon Ostovar Inclusion Tradeo's” by Rafaela Dancygier “State Functions and Media Politics: Case Study on Print Media in Slovenia” by Nikolai “University under Siege: )e Case of the “Striking Concessions from Governments: Genov Professors’ Basij Organization” by Saeid )e Success of General Strikes in Western Golkar Europe, 1980–2009” by Kerstin Hamann, International Political Science Review, Vol. Alison Johnston, and John Kelly 34, no. 5, November 2013 Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 3, Fall 2013 “)e Internet: A New Route to Good “Power Sharing in Syria: Lessons from “Whither Clientelism? Good Governance and Governance” by Susan Khazaeli and Daniel Lebanon’s Taif Experience” by Stephan Rosiny Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program” by Natasha Stockemer Borges Sugiyama and Wendy Hunter “Hamas and the Arab Spring: Strategic “Why Do People Vote? Rationality or Shifts?” by Beverley Milton-Edwards “Subnational Islamization through Secular Emotion” by Ching-Hsing Wang Parties: Comparing Shari’a Politics in Two “)e Rise of Militant Sala*sm in Azerbaijan Indonesian Provinces” by Michael Buehler “A Right-to-Left Policy Switch? An Analysis and Its Regional Implications” by Emil of the Honduran Case under Manuel Zelaya” Souleimanov and Maya Ehrmann Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, no. 4, July 2013 by Clayton M. Cunha Filho, André Luiz “Regime Legacies and Levels of Democracy: Coelho, and Fidel I. Pérez Flores “Turkey Today: Headscarves and Women’s Evidence from Latin America” by Aníbal Rights” by Marvine Howe Pérez-Liñán and Scott Mainwaring “Repression, Political )reats, and Survival under Autocracy” by Abel Escribà-Folch Middle East Policy, Vol. 20, no. 2, Summer “Electing Extremists? Party Primaries and 2013 Legislative Candidates in Mexico” by Kathleen “Voting Di'erently across Electoral Arenas: “Order, Freedom and Chaos: Sovereignties in Bruhn Empirical Implications from a Decentralized Syria” by George Abu Ahmad Democracy” by Pedro Riera “Lacking Information or Condoning “Creating Democrats? Testing the Arab Corruption? When Will Voters Support International Political Science Review, Vol. Spring” by Ashley Barnes Corrupt Politicians?” by Matthew S. Winters 34, no. 4, September 2013 and Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro “Is Corruption an Enemy of Civil Society? “Transition in the Middle East: New Arab Realities and Iran” by Mahmood Sariolghalam “Political Representation in Microstates: )e )e Case of Central and Eastern Europe” by Cases of St. Kitts and Nevis, Seychelles, and Patty Zakaria Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 6, November 2013 Palau” by Wouter Veenendaal “Analysing Multiparty Competition in “Opening Pandora’s Box? Inclusive Plurality Rule Elections” by Patrick Dunleavy “Perspectives on the Power and Persistence Institutions and the Onset of Internal Con(ict and Rekha Diwakar of States in Africa and Beyond” by Erin Hern in Oil-Rich Countries” by Tim Wegenast “Have the Cake and Eat It: )e Rational Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 21, no. 3, Summer “Changing the Rules of the Game: Voter in Africa” by Sta'an I Lindberg 2013 Determinants of Successful Electoral System “Patterns of Electoral Contestation in Russian Change in Central and Eastern Europe” by Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 5, September 2013 Regional Assemblies: Between ‘Competitive’ Philipp Harfst “Political Parties, Independents and the and ‘Hegemonic’ Authoritarianism” by Petr Electoral Market in sub-Saharan Africa” by Panov and Cameron Ross John Ishiyama, Anna Batta, and Angela Sortor

36 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

New Research

“Measuring Vertical Integration in Parties By E. Scott Adler and John D. Wilkerson. Helmsman Ruler: China’s Pragmatic Version of with Multi-Level Systems Data” by Lori Cambridge University Press, 2012. 246 pp. Plato’s Ideal Political Succession System in "e )orlakson Republic. By Keith K.C. Hui. Tra'ord, 2013. Government by Dissent: Protest, Resistance, 159 pp. “Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate Democratic and Radical Democratic "ought in the Early Consolidation in Africa?” by Danielle Resnick American Republic. By Robert W.T. Martin. Korean Political and Economic Development: New York University Press, 2013. 262 pp. Crisis, Security, and Institutional Rebalancing. “Beyond Outbidding? Ethnic Party Strategies By Jongryn Mo and Barry R. Weingast. in Serbia” by Christina Isabel Zuber Immigration and the Border: Politics and Policy Harvard University Press, 2013. 218 pp. in the Latino Century. Edited by David L. Party Politics, Vol. 19, no. 4, July 2013 Leal and José E. Limón. University of Notre "e Logic and Limits of Political Reform in “)e Fate of Intra-Party Democracy: Dame Press, 2013. 488 pp. China. By Joseph Fewsmith. Cambridge Leadership Autonomy and Activist In(uence University Press, 2013. 219 pp. in the Mass Party and the Cartel Party” by Philosophy and Resistance in the Crisis: Greece New Security Challenges in Asia. Edited by Karl Loxbo and the Future of Europe. By Costas Douzinas. Michael Wills and Robert M. Hathaway. Polity, 2013. 234 pp. Woodrow Wilson Center, 2013. 273 pp. “)e Politicization of Indigenous Identities in Peru” by Christopher Raymond and Moisés Political Bubbles: Financial Crises and the Social Organizations and the Authoritarian Arce Failure of American Democracy. By Nolan State in China. By Timothy Hildebrandt. McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Cambridge University Press, 2013. 217 pp. “How )ings Fall Apart: Candidate Selection Rosenthal. Princeton University Press, 2013. and the Cohesion of Dominant Parties in 356 pp. Transforming India: Challenges to the World’s South Africa and Namibia” by Shane Mac Largest Democracy. By Sumantra Bose. Giollabhuí Politics of the American Dream: Democratic Harvard University Press, 2013. 337 pp. Inclusion in Contemporary American Political SELECTED NEW BOOKS ON Culture. By Cyril Ghosh. Palgrave Macmillan, EASTERN EUROPE AND THE DEMOCRACY 2013. 240 pp. FORMER SOVIET UNION Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES "e Substance of Representation: Congress, "rough Peace and War. Revised and Updated "e Adversary First Amendment: Free American Political Development, and Edition. By )omas de Waal. New York Expression and the Foundations of American Lawmaking. By John S. Lapinski. Princeton University Press, 2013. 387 pp. Democracy. By Martin H. Redish. Stanford University Press, 2013. 181 pp. University Press, 2013. 238 pp. Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On ASIA Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law. Edited America’s Right: Anti-Establishment Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and by Gábor Attila Tóth. Central European Conservatism from Goldwater to the Tea Party. Pakistan to the Brink and Back. By Bruce University Press, 2012. 570 pp. By Robert B. Horwitz. Polity, 2013. 279 pp. Riedel. Brookings Institution, 2013. 230 pp. Critical "inking in Slovakia After Socialism. By-Elections in British Politics, 1832–1914. Civil Society in China: "e Legal Framework By Jonathan L. Larson. University of Edited by T.G. Otte and Paul Readman. from Ancient Times to the “New Reform Era.” Rochester Press, 2013. 240 pp. Boydell, 2013. 306 pp. By Karla W. Simon. Oxford University Press, 2013. 502 pp. Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Changing Minds, If Not Hearts: Political Love with Vladimir Putin. By Ben Judah. Yale Remedies for Racial Con#ict. By James M. Conceptions of Chinese Democracy: Reading University Press, 2013. 379 pp. Glaser and Timothy J. Ryan. University of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 182 pp. Ching-kuo. By David J. Lorenzo. Johns Postcommunism from Within: Social Justice, Hopkins University Press, 2013. 257 pp. Mobilization, and Hegemony. Edited by Jan Congress: A Performance Appraisal. By Kubik and Amy Linch. New York University Andrew J. Taylor. Westview, 2013. 262 pp. Democracy and Islam in Indonesia. Edited by Press, 2013. 440 pp. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan. Columbia Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving. University Press, 2013. 252 pp.

37 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

New Research

Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Power and Regionalism in Latin America: "e "e Power and the People: Paths of Resistance in Balkans between Nationalism and Politics of Mercosur. By Laura Gómez-Mera. the Middle East. By Charles Tripp. Cambridge Transnationalism. By Ina Merdjanova. Oxford University of Notre Dame Press, 2013. 286 pp. University Press, 2013. 385 pp. University Press, 2013. 198 pp. Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, "e Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Restless Valley: Revolution, Murder, and Democracy, and Indigenous Rights. By Patricia Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from Intrigue in the Heart of Central Asia. By Richards. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013. Tunis to Damascus. By Adeed Dawisha. Philip Shishkin. Yale University Press, 2013. 261 pp. Norton, 2013. 288 pp. 316 pp. Speculative Fictions: Chilean Culture, Social Movements, Mobilization, and LATIN AMERICA AND THE Economics, and the Neoliberal Transition. Contestation in the Middle East and North CARIBBEAN By Alessandro Fornazzari. University of Africa. 2nd Edition. Edited by Joel Beinin Adiós Niño: "e Gangs of Guatemala City and Pittsburgh Press, 2013. 158 pp. and Frédéric Vairel. Stanford University Press, the Politics of Death. By Deborah T. Levenson. 2013. 328 pp. Duke University Press, 2013. 183 pp. Sustaining Activism: A Brazilian Women’s Movement and a Father-Daughter Tested by Zion: "e Bush Administration and Constructing Democratic Governance in Collaboration. By Je'rey W. Rubin and Emma the Israeli-Palestinian Con#ict. By Elliot Latin America. 4th Edition. Edited by Jorge Sokolo'-Rubin. Duke University Press, 2013. Abrams. Cambridge University Press, 2013. I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter. Johns 184 pp. 339 pp. Hopkins University Press, 2013. 377 pp. Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana: Race COMPARATIVE, THEORETICAL, Decentralization and Popular Democracy: and Politics in Two Plural Societies. By Ann GENERAL Governance from Below in Bolivia. By Jean- Marie Bissessar and John Ga'ar La Guerre. Accountability and Corruption: A Study into Paul Faguet. University of Michigan Press, Lexington, 2013. 202 pp. Political Institutions as Referees Between 2012. 358 pp. Principals and Agents. By Catharina Groop. Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United Åbo Akademi University Press, 2013. 344 pp. Democracy in Latin America: Between Hope States, and the Road Ahead. By Shannon K. and Despair. By Ignacio Walker, translated O’Neil. Oxford University Press, 2013. 239 pp. Arts of the Political: New Openings for the by Krystin Krause, Holly Bird, and Scott Left. By Ash Amin and Nigel )rift. Duke Mainwaring. University of Notre Dame Press, We Created Chávez: A People’s History of University Press, 2013. 239 pp. 2013. 262 pp. the Venezuelan Revolution. By George Ciccariello-Maher. Duke University Press, Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace. By Democratic Governance in Latin America: 2013. 320 pp. Ronald J. Deibert. McClelland and Stewart, A Regional Discussion. Edited by Maria- 2013. 312 pp. Teresa Nogales and Susan Zelaya-Fenner. MIDDLE EAST International Republican Institute, 2013. 124 Democracy’s Fourth Wave? Digital Media and Boundary Control: Subnational pp. the Arab Spring. By Philip N. Howard and Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. By Muzammil M. Hussain. Oxford University Edward L. Gibson. Cambridge University Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin Press, 2013. 145 pp. Press, 2012. 192 pp. America. By Stephen B. Kaplan. Cambridge University Press, 2013. 331 pp. Identity and Nation in Iraq. By Sherko Bourgeois Liberty and the Politics of Fear: Kirmanj. Lynne Rienner, 2013. 319 pp. From Absolutism to Neo-Conservatism. By Mexico’s Left: "e Paradox of the PRD. By Dag Marc Mulholland. Oxford University Press, Mossige. Lynne Rienner, 2013. 337 pp. "e Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an 2012. 400 pp. Islamist Movement. By Carrie Rosefsky Mexico’s Once and Future Revolution: Social Wickham. Princeton University Press, 2013. Captured by Evil: "e Idea of Corruption in Upheaval and the Challenge of Rule Since 384 pp. Law. By Laura S. Underku.er. Yale University the Late Nineteenth Century. By Gilbert M. Press, 2013. 334 pp. Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau. Duke University Party Politics and Social Cleavages in Turkey. Press, 2013. 252 pp. By Ergun Özbudun. Lynne Rienner, 2013. 155 pp.

38 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

New Research

Celebrity Politics: Image and Identity in Global Governance: Why? What? Whither? By Politics in the Age of Austerity. Edited by Contemporary Political Communications. By )omas G. Weiss. Polity, 2013. 225 pp. Armin Schäfer and Wolfgang Streeck. Polity, Mark Wheeler. Polity, 2013. 210 pp. 2013. 320 pp. Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing Civil Society in the Age of Monitory Democracy. When We Need It Most. By )omas Hale, "e Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co- Edited by Lars Trägårdh, Nina Witoszek, and David Held, and Kevin Young. Polity, 2013. Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. By Harris Bron Taylor. Berghahn, 2013. 350 pp. 357 pp. Mylonas. Cambridge University Press, 2012. 255 pp. Climate Governance in the Developing World. Importing Democracy: "e Role of NGOs in Edited by David Held, Charles Roger, and South Africa, Tajikistan, & Argentina. By Julie Presidentialism: Power in Comparative Eva-Maria Nag. Polity, 2013. 284 pp. Fisher. Kettering Foundation, 2013. 394 pp. Perspective. By Michael L. Mezey. Lynne Rienner, 2013. 260 pp. "e Communist Horizon. By Jodi Dean. Verso, Is Democracy a Lost Cause? Paradoxes of an 2012. 250 pp. Imperfect Invention. By Al*o Mastropaolo. Representation: Elections and Beyond. Edited Translated by Clare Tame. ECPR Press, 2012. by Jack Nagel and Rogers M. Smith. University Cruel Modernity. By Jean Franco. Duke 265 pp. of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 337 pp. University Press, 2013. 326 pp. Masters of the Word: How Media Shaped "e "ird Globalization: Can Wealthy Nations Culture and Foreign Policy: "e Neglected History from the Alphabet to the Internet. By Stay Rich in the Twenty-First Century? Factor in International Relations. By Howard William J. Bernstein. Grove, 2013. 420 pp. Edited by Dan Breznitz and John Zysman. J. Wiarda. Ashgate, 2013. 153 pp. Oxford University Press, 2013. 416 pp. Military Engagement: In#uencing Armed Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Tocqueville and the Frontiers of Democracy. Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance. By Transitions, Volume 1, Overview and Edited by Ewa Atanassow and Richard Boyd. Amel Ahmed. Cambridge University Press, Action Plan. By Dennis C. Blair. Brookings Cambridge University Press, 2013. 375 pp. 2013. 228 pp. Institution, 2013. 144 pp. Who Counts? "e Power of Participatory Democratic Statecraft: Political Realism and Military Engagement: In#uencing Armed Statistics. Edited by Jeremy Holland. Practical Popular Power. By J.S. Maloy. Cambridge Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Action, 2013. 212 pp. University Press, 2013. 236 pp. Transitions, Volume 2, Regional and Country Studies. Edited by Dennis C. Blair. Brookings Why Ancient Greece? "e Birth and Development Aid Confronts Politics: "e Institution, 2013. 392 pp. Development of Democracy. By Nicholas Almost Revolution. By )omas Carothers and Kyriazis. Psichogios, 2012. 127 pp. Diane de Gramont. Carnegie Endowment for Multilevel Citizenship. Edited by Willem International Peace, 2013. 347 pp. Maas. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate 280 pp. Elections: "eory, Practice and Implications. By "e Dialectics of Citizenship: Exploring Alberto Simpser. Cambridge University Press, Privilege, Exclusion, and Racialization. By On the People’s Terms: A Republican "eory 2013. 282 pp. Bernd Reiter. Michigan State University and Model of Democracy. By Philip Pettit. Press, 2013. 196 pp. Cambridge University Press, 2012. 338 pp. Worldly Philosopher: "e Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. By Jeremy Adelman. Princeton Deliberative Acts: Democracy, Rhetoric, and Our Political Nature: "e Evolutionary University Press, 2013. 740 pp. Rights. By Arabella Lyon. Pennsylvania State Origins of What Divides Us. By Avi Tuschman. University Press, 2013. 222 pp. Prometheus, 2013. 543 pp. Wrestling with Democracy: Voting Systems as Politics in the Twentieth-Century West. By "e Down-Deep Delight of Democracy. By Pathways to Freedom: Political and Economic Dennis Pilon. University of Toronto Press, Mark Purcell. Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 174 pp. Lessons from Democratic Transitions. Edited 2013. 392 pp. by Isobel Coleman and Terra Lawson-Remer. "e Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli Council on Foreign Relations, 2013. 256 pp. Zbig: "e Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew and the World "at He Made. By Philip Bobbit. Brzezinski. Edited by Charles Gati. Johns Grove Press, 2013. 270 pp. Hopkins University Press, 2013. 253 pp.

39 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

Editorial Committee

is the o+cial newsletter of the American Political Science Association’s Comparative Democratization section. Formerly known as CompDem, it has been published three times a year (October, January, and May) by the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies since 2003. In October 2010, the newsletter was renamed APSA-CD and APSA-CDexpanded to include substantive articles on democracy, as well as news and notes on the latest developments in the *eld. )e newsletter is now jointly produced and edited by faculty members of the University of Florida’s Department of Political Science and the International Forum.

)e current issue of APSA-CD is available here. A complete archive of past issues is also available.

To inquire about submitting an article to APSA-CD, please contact Sta'an I. Lindberg, Benjamin Smith or Melissa Aten.

Editorial Board Members Executive Editors Michael H. Bernhard is the inaugural holder of the Sta"an I. Lindberg is an associate professor of Raymond and Miriam Ehrlich Eminent Scholar political science at the University of Florida. Chair in Political Science at the University of Florida. He is also PI (with John Gerring and Michael His work centers on questions of democratization Coppedge) the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and development both globally and in the context of project; a research fellow at the Quality of Europe. Among the issues that have *gured prominently in his Government Institute, and an associate professor research agenda are the role of civil society in democratization, of political science at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden. His institutional choice in new democracies, the political economy of research focuses on state building, political clientelism, political democratic survival, and the legacy of extreme forms of parties, legislative-executive relations, women’s representation, dictatorship. voting behavior, elections, and democracy in Africa. He is the author of Democracy and Elections in Africa ( Johns Hopkins Petia Kostadinova is an assistant professor of University Press, 2006) and the editor of Democratization by political science at the University of Illinois Elections: A New Mode of Transition? ( Johns Hopkins University Chicago (UIC). Dr. Kostadinova’s main area of Press, 2009). research involves the role of citizens’ preferences, and media’s transmission of these preferences, Benjamin Smith is an associate professor of political in shaping social and economic policies in the post-communist science at the University of Florida. His research countries. A second stream of research focuses on the social and focuses on ethnic con(ict, regime change, and the economic policies of the European Union. Prof. Kostadinova’s politics of resource wealth. His *rst book, Hard research has been published in Europe and National Economic Times in the Land of Plenty: Oil Politics in Iran and Indonesia, was Transformation: "e EU After the Lisbon Decade, Mitchell Smith, published in 2007 by Cornell University Press, and his articles ed, the European Journal of Communication, the Central European have appeared in World Politics, the American Journal of Political Journal of Communication, and is forthcoming in East European Science, Studies in Comparative International Development, the Politics and Journalism & Mass Communication. Journal of International A!airs, and other journals and edited volumes. Dr. Smith is currently working on a book exploring the Bryon Moraski is an associate professor of political long-term factors that shape the success of separatist movements. science at the University of Florida. His research considers the politics of institutional choice, Members institutional development, and the in(uence of short- Kate Baldwin is an assistant professor of political term electoral incentives on long-term political trajectories. His science at the University of Florida. She studies *rst book, Elections by Design: Parties and Patronage in Russia’s state-building, clientelism, and the political economy Regions (Northern Illinois University Press, 2006) explores the of development with a regional focus on sub-Saharan origins of Russia’s sub-national legislative electoral systems. He Africa. Her current research projects seek to has published numerous book chapters and articles, including understand the political consequences of involving non-state works in "e American Journal of Political Science, Government and actors, such as traditional chiefs and non-governmental Opposition, and the Journal of Politics. He is currently completing a organizations, in the provision of goods and services. co-authored book manuscript with William Reisinger (University of Iowa) that examines the links between federal elections and gubernatorial (s)election in Russia and their in(uence on the country’s post-Soviet trajectory.

40 Vol. 11, No. 3 Comparative Democratization Oct. 2013

Editorial Committee

Conor O’Dwyer is an associate professor of political Leonardo A. Villalón is and associate professor of science at the University of Florida. His book political science at the University of Florida. His Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and research has focused on Islam and politics and on Democratic Development examines the relationship democratization in West Africa, particularly Senegal, between party-building and state-building in new democracies, Mali, and Niger. He is the author of Islamic Society and looking speci*cally at the relationship between party competition State Power in Senegal (Cambridge University Press, 1995) and co- and patronage politics in postcommunist Eastern Europe. His editor of "e African State at a Critical Juncture: Between latest research examines the European Union’s use of conditionality Disintegration and Recon#guration (Lynne Rienner, 1998) and "e to promote more liberal minorities policies in postcommunist Fate of Africa’s Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions states. Speci*cally, it examines the EU’s role in the contentious (Indiana University Press, 2005), as well as of numerous articles politics of homosexuality in postcommunist societies. Looking and book chapters on politics and religion in West Africa. beyond just policy adoption, it examines the impact of EU- sponsored minority-rights policies: do they lead to shifts in Managing Editor attitudes regarding religious di'erence, national belonging, and Melissa Aten-Becnel is the senior research and conferences o+cer minority rights? at the National Endowment for Democracy’s International Forum for Democratic Studies and associate director of the Network of Philip Williams is the director of the Center for Latin Democracy Research Institutes. She earned an M.A. from )e American Studies and a professor of political science and George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Latin American Studies at the University of Florida. He A'airs, where she focused on foreign policy and Central Europe. also co-directs the Latin American Immigrants in the New South project. His research interests include religion and Editorial Assistant politics, transnational migration, democratization, social Adam Bilinski received a B.A. in International movements, and civil-military relations. His latest book, A Place to Relations at the University of Warsaw (Poland) and Be: Brazilian, Guatemalan, and Mexican Immigrants in Florida’s M.A. in Social Sciences from the University of New Destinations, was published by Rutgers University Press in Chicago. Currently he is a PhD student in Political 2009 and his articles have appeared in numerous academic journals, Science at the University of Florida with specialization in including Comparative Politics, Latin American Perspectives, Latin comparative politics. His research interests include the problems of Studies, and the Journal of Latin American Studies. survival of democracy, electoral revolutions and democracy promotion. He is currently working on his dissertation, which evaluates how pre-democratization historical legacies (in the form of pre-democratization regime discontinuities and regime type both in independent states and colonies) conditioned the probability of survival of once-established democracies.

APSA

)e International Forum for Democratic Studies 1025 F Street, NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC 20004

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