Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule STEPHAN HAGGARD University of California at San Diego ROBERT R
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American Political Science Review Page 1 of 22 August 2012 doi:10.1017/S0003055412000287 Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule STEPHAN HAGGARD University of California at San Diego ROBERT R. KAUFMAN Rutgers University ecent work by Carles Boix and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson has focused on the role of inequality and distributive conflict in transitions to and from democratic rule. We assess these R claims through causal process observation, using an original qualitative dataset on democratic transitions and reversions during the “third wave” from 1980 to 2000. We show that distributive conflict, a key causal mechanism in these theories, is present in just over half of all transition cases. Against theoretical expectations, a substantial number of these transitions occur in countries with high levels of inequality. Less than a third of all reversions are driven by distributive conflicts between elites and masses. We suggest a variety of alternative causal pathways to both transitions and reversions. re inequality and distributive conflicts a driving wider the income disparities in society, the more elites force in the transition to democratic rule? Are have to fear from the transition to democratic rule and Aunequal democracies more likely to revert to the greater the incentives to repress challenges from authoritarianism? These questions have a long pedi- below. Given this potential indeterminacy, theoretical gree in in the analysis of the transition to democratic models have hinged on a variety of other parameters, rule in Europe (Lipset 1960; Marshall 1963; Moore such as the cost of repression or the mobility of assets. 1966), and have been raised again in newer compar- Even with these refinements, attempts to demon- ative historical work on democratization (Collier 1999; strate the relationship between inequality and regime Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). More type have yielded only mixed results. In cross-section, recently, an influential line of theory has attempted there is a relationship between income distribution and to ground the politics of inequality on rationalist as- the level of democracy: Ceteris paribus, more equal so- sumptions about citizens’ preferences over institutions cieties are more democratic. Yet the causal relationship (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; 2001; 2006; Boix 2003; between inequality and either transitions to democratic 2008; Przeworski 2009). These distributive conflict ap- rule or reversions from it is much less robust. proaches conceptualize authoritarian rule as an insti- We focus on regime change during the “third wave” tutional means through which unequal class or group of democratic transitions from 1980–2000. This period relations are sustained by limiting the franchise and the was marked by the spread of democracy to a wide range ability of social groups to organize. The rise and fall of of developing and postsocialist countries. These in- democratic rule thus reflect deeper conflicts between cluded not only middle-income nations in Latin Amer- elites and masses over the distribution of wealth and ica, Eastern Europe, and East and Southeast Asia but income. also a substantial number of lower income countries, in- Despite its logic, there are several theoretical and cluding in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Al- empirical reasons to question the expectations of these though democratic transitions outnumber reversions new distributive conflict models. Socioeconomic in- from democratic rule, the period also saw a number of equality plays a central role in these models, but has transitions to authoritarian rule. cross-cutting effects. The more unequal a society, the Not only does this temporal focus on the third wave greater the incentives for disadvantaged groups to capture a wide-ranging sample of regime changes but it press for more open and competitive politics. Yet the also overlaps with important changes in international context. During the Cold War era, both right- and left- Stephan Haggard is Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Pro- wing dictators could exploit great power rivalries to win fessor, Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Stud- support from external patrons. During the 1980s and ies, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La 1990s, the decline and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Jolla, CA 92093 ([email protected]). Union created a much more permissive international Robert R. Kaufman is Professor, Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, 89 George Street, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 environment for democratic rule (Boix 2011). ([email protected]). Using an extremely generous definition of “distribu- The authors thank Carles Boix, Michael Bratton, T.J. Cheng, tive conflict” transitions, we find that between 55% and Ruth Collier, Javier Corrales, Ellen Commisso, Sharon Crasnow, 58% of the democratic transitions during this period Anna Grzymala-Busse, Allan Hicken, Jan Kubik, James Long, Ir- fan Noorudin, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Celeste Raymond, Andrew conformed—even very loosely—to the causal mecha- Schrank, and Nic VanDewalle for comments on earlier drafts, includ- nisms specified in the distributive conflict models. Thus, ing on the construction of the dataset. We received useful feedback even with an expansive definition of distributive con- from a presentation at the Watson Institute, Brown University, and flict, more than 40% did not conform at all. Moreover, comments from Ronald Rogowski and anonymous reviewers of the a substantial number of the distributive conflict tran- APSR. Particular thanks as well to Christian Houle for making his dataset available. We also thank Vincent Greco, Terence Teo, and sitions occurred under conditions of high inequality, Steve Weymouth for research assistance. a result that is at odds with the expectations of the 1 Inequality and Regime Change August 2012 theory. Approximately 30% of all transitions occurred is limited, permitting more intensive treatment of the in countries that ranked in the top tercile in terms of in- relevant cases and thus more robust inference. equality, and a substantial majority of these transitions We begin in the first section by reviewing distribu- resulted from distributive conflict; this finding is robust tive conflict models of regime change, focusing on the to alternative measures of inequality. These findings do contributions by Boix (2003; 2008), Acemoglu and not necessarily overturn distributive conflict theories, Robinson (2000; 2001; 2006), and Przeworski (2009). but suggest that they are underspecified with respect The next section discusses methodological issues. The to scope conditions and only operate under very par- remainder of the article is structured around a con- ticular circumstances. sideration of transitions to democracy and reversions Given the substantial incidence of nondistributive to authoritarian rule. Our causal process observations conflict transitions, we find several alternative causal show not only that transitions occur across cases with pathways to democratic rule. External actors were de- very different levels of inequality—as the null findings cisive in some cases. In many cases, however, other do- in econometric models already attest—but also that a mestic causal factors induced incumbents to relinquish large number of democratic transitions and reversions power in the absence of strong challenges from below. occur in the absence of significant redistributive conflict Elite incumbents were sometimes challenged by elite altogether. outgroups or defectors from the ruling coalition who The returns from this exercise are both substan- saw gains from democratic openings. In other cases, tive and methodological. First, the findings cast doubt elite incumbents ceded power in the absence of mass on the prevalence of the core causal mechanisms at pressure because they believed they could control the work in the underlying model, including the relation- design of democratic institutions in ways that protected ship between inequality and particular types of elite their material interests. and mass behavior. In the conclusion, we raise ques- An even smaller percentage of reversions—less than tions about alternative approaches and suggest several a third—conformed to the elite-mass dynamics postu- ways in which the theory might be modified: There lated in the theory, and once again, we found little rela- may be other channels through which inequality can tionship between the incidence of these transitions and destabilize democratic rule, and there might be other socioeconomic inequality. However, we did find several economic and institutional factors that condition the alternative causal mechanisms. In several cases, incum- capacity of low-income groups to engage in collective bent democratic governments were overthrown not by action. Second, our methodological contribution raises socioeconomic elites seeking to block redistribution, important questions about the validity of reduced-form but by authoritarian populist leaders promising more panel designs, including with respect to the coding of redistribution. Even more commonly, however, rever- regime type itself. More positively, it suggests a fruitful sions were driven by conflicts that either cut across class way of combining quantitative and qualitative methods lines or arose from purely intra-elite conflicts, particu- that focuses attention on alternative transition paths larly conflicts in which factions of the military staged rather