SAJ Musa,152 33 and that Bockarie only presented a plan he had made with the Accused to advance towards in late November/early December 1998,1 5234 which resulted in Superman acting upon the orders of Bockarie and attacking Makeni, the Trial Chamber need not make findings with regard to the reasons Superman joined SAl Musa, and whether after Superman fought with Bockarie he broke away from the RUF . In the Trial Chamber's view this issue does not affect its assessment ofthe role ofthe Accused.

6764. After SAl Musa arrived in Colonel Eddie Town in November 1998, he ordered his troops to stop all communications with Bockarie, and those forces remained under the command of SAl Musa, outside of Bockarie's control, until SAl Musa's deatht5235 on 23 December 1998.15236 Some witnesses suggested in their testimony that Bockarie and Gullit conspired to kill SAJ Musa.15237 In the Trial Chamber's view, the significant consequence of Musa's death, whatever its cause, was the resumption of communications between Gullit and Bockarie.1 5238 Following his first conversation with Gullit after the death of SAl Musa, Bockarie and Gullit coordinated in their efforts to capture Freetown,1 523 9 resulting in Bockarie exercising effecti ve command and control over Gullit in early 1999 .1 5240 The attack on Freetown, and the force's retreat and subsequent re-attacks, were conducted under the command and control of Bockarie.15241 While some divisions erupted between the RUF and the AFRC after Gullit's retreat from Freetown, the AFRC and the RUF still coordinated and made collaborative efforts to re-attack Freetown.15242

6765 . After the retreat from Freetown Gullit left Newton for Makeni to meet Superman, while Bazzy, an AFRC member, remained in Newton.1 5243 In approximately May 1999,

15233 Military Operati ons: Operation Fitti-Fatta.

15234 Military Operations : The Freet own Invas ion, The Plan.

15235 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, para. 470 ("In Rosos, SAl Musa and his group remained outside of Bockaries control; this continued until SAl Musa 's death at Benguema"); Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-I-T- 370, Decision on Judi cial No tice, 23 March 2009 , Annex A,Fact II ("up on his arrival in 'Colonel Eddie Town ' in Nove mber 1998, SAJ Musa assumed command. He emphasised his disenchantment with the RUF and stresse d that it was vital that his troops arrive in Freet own before the RUF" ). 15236 Prosecutor v Taylor, SCS L-03- I-T-370, Decision on Judicial Notice, 23 March 2009, Annex A, Fact 13. 15237 Military Operations:The Freetown Invasi on, Plan .

1523 8 Military Operations : The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.

15239 Military Operations : The Freetown Invasion, The Implementat ion of the Plan.

15240 Military Operations : The Freet own Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.

1524 1 Military Operations: The Freet own Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan.

15242 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation ofthe Plan.

15243 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008, pp. 8444- 8446 (10 STF members and 10 former NPFL lighters remained in Newton with Bazzy's force at the West Side) .

2356 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~ 18 May 2012 Bazzy formed the and became their leader. The West Side Boys included a mixed group of AFRC, RUF and former NPFL fighters.15244 Bockarie and Bazzy continued to cooperate duriunng rm'1'itary operations.. 15245

6766. In the meantime,Superman and Gibril Massquoi engaged In infighting with with Bockarie and , which resulted in the death of Boston Flomo (a.k.a. RUF Rambo)

Superman' s forces taking over Makeni, at around late March/early April 1999.15246

15244 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 84 10-84 11; Tran script 24 April 2008, pp. 8447­ 8460 ; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8653-8658. 15245 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008 , pp. 84 14-84 15 (at around April/May 1999, Bazzy communicated with Bockarie and requested anununition. Subsequently, ammunition sent by Bockarie was sent to Bazzy in order to prevent ECOMOG from crossi ng over to Masiaka), 8456-8460, 8470- 847 1, 8475-8477 (Bazzy would contact Bockari e and inform him of military operations. Bazzy informed Bockarie of the operation in Port Loko in June 1999 in which Bazzy's forces captured two Malian troops. Bockarie then conveyed on the international media that if Malian troops do not withdraw from , his forces would exec ute the two captured conunanders . Bazzy also informed Bockarie on attacks his forces carried out in JunelJul y 1999 on Gberi Junct ion, Makolo and Mile 38. Bazzy would also comm unicate via the radio with Issa Sesay and Morr is Kallon). On Bazzy refusing to take commands from the RUF see TF 1-371, Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2969 (the witness agreed that Bazzy would not take conunands from ) and Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 20 I0, pp. 4441 8-44419 (Bazzy said in a message to Sankoh that he would not take comm ands from anyone other than ). 15246 Issa Sesay, Transcri pt 12 July 20 10, pp. 14200-14205, 14217-14219; TFI -371, Transcri pt I February 2008, pp. 2872-2878 (The witness agreed that Superma n attac ked Issa Sesay and Rambo in Makeni and in the process Rambo was killed. He also agreed that this was "serious dissension within the RUF", stating that Superma n and Massaquoi were challenging Bockarie. This happened after the seco nd retreat from Freetown in 1999. Superma n and Gibril were not taking conunands from Bockarie until at least 26 September 1999. At some point in time, Bockarie took control over it); Transcript 4 February 2008, p. 2974; Exhibit D-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute report to the Leader of the Revolution, RUF/SL, from Major General Sam Bockarie", pp. 8­ 10, ERN 9665-9 667 ("Superman failed to move to Gberi Brid ge and instead attacked Makeni late at night with the aim of killing Brigadier Issa and Rambo . The home of Ramb o was attack ed by Superman. The attack caught Rambo off guard as he was fast asleep. He was captured, shot many times and it was reported that he was even stabbed to ensure that he did not survive the attac k. .. After killing Rambo, they attacked the home of Brigadier Issa.. . Brigadier Issa was able to esca pe through a door from his bedroom. ..After Makeni had been captured and raised by Superman and his troops he called a meeting at the town hall and confidently told the people that he was acting in compliance with instructions received from the leader and that he had taken effective command of the RUF and that I, Major General Sam Bockarie, was no longer high command of the RUF, and that he, Brigadier Superman, was takin g over from Brigadier Issa in Makeni... Ti ll this day Superman and Gibril are contrary to my command and continued to flaunt the direct command of the Leader. They still do not submit all reports to me for my necessary information"); Exhibit D-0 84, "S ierra Leone, Defence Headquarters, Salute Report, from Brigadier Issa H. Sesay Battlefield Commander RUF/SL to the Leader of the Revolution, 27 September 1999", pp. 11-13,ERN 7766-7768 (" ...1 was attacked again by Gibril.. . Superman took the opportunity of calling a meeting at the Town Hall where he... informed the meeting that he had received instructions from the Leader to take full command of the RUF and to arrest and exec ute both Gene ral Mosquito and 1, Brig. Issa... He incited SLA soldiers to go against RUF command and, together with Gibril, sought to sabotage the progress of the movement thus delaying the release of the leader. Superman killed Rambo in co ld blood and made several attempts on my life in a bid to eliminate the RUF high conunand left on the gro und by the leader"); Exhibit P-067, "RUF People's Army- Situation Report to Foday Sanko h from the Black Guard Commander", ERN 9680-968 1 ("... Superman and his men put on stiff resistance and even opened fire and launched some RPG bombs , therefore scatter the whole group and kill some men and went to the extent of advancing to Makeni and attacked the residence of the battlefield comm ander and vandalized the whole compound and took everything in the compound including the materials for operations and enough foreign currency and diamonds. He even extended in raising the compound of some other senior officers... After some

2357 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 6767. Subsequently, matters relating to the Lome peace accord brought to tension between the AFRC and the RUF. Whil e the RUF signed the Lome peace Accord ,1 5247 in August 1999, members ofthe West Side Boys kidnapped UN peacekeepers due to the perception by the AFRC that they had been sidelined and excluded from the Lome process and that their combatants would not be reintegrated into the Sierra Leonean army.15248 On 28 September 1999, Koroma and Sankoh participated in two days of peace talks in that were mediated by the Accused. As a result of the negotiations, the AFRC was included within the power-sharing governrnent, with Koroma appointed as the Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation ofPeace ("CCp,,).15249

6768 . Either prior to or following the signing ofthe Lome peace accord, Bazzy ofthe West Side Boys also arrested RUF commanders Superman and Mike Lamin, who formed part ofa squad who came from Makeni to the Freetown area. 15250

6769 . At around October 1999 fighting again broke out in Makeni, involving lssa Sesay, Superman and Brigadier Mani from the AFRC. 111is resulted in Sesay taking over command of Makeni. During this infighting, RUF fighter Senegalese was killed. 15251

days, he came for the second time and attack Makeni and killed Colonel Rambo , arrested some security personnels [sic], tire some people but they missed to kill the battle field commander and chase him all the way to Makali and missed him for the second time ... According to Superman, he has vowed to not ever take command from the high command... In conclusion, Sir, we are hereby suggesting that the issue of Superman should immedi ately be put under control before he tried to mislead some our struggle brothers"); Exhibit 0-085, "RUF­ Sierra Leone (People's Arm y of Sierra Leone) OPS. Segbwema, Brief Comprehensive Report on All Salient Activities that Took Place in the Absence of'the Leader from the 24th Maech, 1996 to the 31st August 1999, From Major Francis M. Nusa Distrcit I.O. U. Commander Kailahun, to CpI. Foday Saybana Sankoh RUF/SL, 3 I Augu st 1999", ERN 9767 (" ...This problem escalated to a point that Brigadier Superman either all by hims elfor through 'someone' killed Colonel Boston Flomo by shooting him") . 15247 Agreed Fact and Law, Fact 32.

15248 Peace Process: Release of UN Peacekeepers and Others (1999). See also Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 24 April 2008 , pp. 8477- 8480, 8481- 8485 ; Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8559 , 8633- 8634 ; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 22 May 2008 p. 10567; Transcript 3 June 2008 pp. 10822-10823; Issa Sesay, Transcript 13 July 20 10, pp. 44391-44 392; Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44396-44397; Isaac Mongor, T. 31 March 2008, pp. 6 I78-6 I80 (the West Side Boys were loyal to Johnny Paul Koroma and had become antagonistic to the RUF at the time that the peace accord was signed since they believed that nothing in the Peace Accord concerned them and because they wanted to be reinstated into the army but this was not included in the peace accord). 15249 Context, Civil War in Sierra Leone (1999-2002).

15250 Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 25 April 2008, pp. 8615- 8620 ; Transcript 28 April 2008, pp. 8652­ 8653 , 8659-8660; TFI-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2455-2456; Transcript 3 I January 2008, pp. 2792 ­ 2794. 15251 Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 20 10, pp. 44432,44435-44436 (Sankoh ordered Sesay throu gh Bockarie to move from Buedu to Makeni in October 1999. The day Sesay arrived in Makeni, Superman, Isaac Mong or, and Gibril Massaquoi came from Lunsar to attack the AFRC in Makeni, and then returned to Lunsar. Sesay then took over command of Makeni in October 1999); TFI-174, Transcript 27 January 2009, p .23659; Transcript 28 January 2009, p. 23730; OCT-062, Transcript 26 April 2010, pp. 39878-39879.

2358 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May2012 6770. Bockarie left Sierra Leone in December 1999,1 5252 and a reconciliation meeting was convened on 7 April 2000, in which RUF commander Mike Lamin "regrettably confessed to the gathering that General Mosquito [Bockarie] was responsible for most ofthe frictions that took place between the RUF and the SLA".15253 SYB Rogers said at the meeting that Johnny Paul Koroma and SAJ Musa did not work as a team, and that senior military officers had betrayed the cause. He suggested that senior commanders be informed of this meeting and be included in a committee that would iron out their differences "for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone in general and the accomplishment of the mission we had assigned ourselves when we took up am1s".15254 In his closing remarks at the meeting, the Chairman for the meeting, Idrissa Kamara (a.k.a. Leatherboot), informed the attendees that "resolutions will be prepared from the minutes for onward transmission to the two leaders who will close this ugly chapter after holding talks with senior commanders and other key players in the whole reconciliation process".15255 Despite these attempts at reconciliation, members of the AFRC and the RUF kept struggling, as exemplified by the arrest of Isaac Mongor by members ofthe AFRC working for Kabbah's goverrunent in May 2000 .15256

6771. In conclusion, the picture that emerges shows that during the Junta period , the AFRC and the RUF, while having separate command structures, were united in goverrunent, in the executive body of the state, with Johnny Paul Koroma as head of state. After the Intervention, Bockarie took charge of the combined AFRC/RUF forces, except for troops in the north headed by SAJ Musa. While communications may have continued between the forces in the north and the forces under Bockarie's command, they did not coordinate military operations until the death of SAJ Musa during his advance towards Freetown in late December 1998. Following Musa's death, Bockarie assumed command over Gullit. His command over Gullit continued throughout the attack on Freetown in early January 1999.

15252 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFR C, Sam Bockarie . 15253 Exhibit P-134A , "Minutes of the Family Reunion Aimed at Reconciling Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh and Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma Held at the Office of the Deputy Minist er of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations - New England on 7 April 2000", p. 6, ERN 82 12. 15254 Exhibit P-134A, "Minutes of the Famil y Reunion Aimed at Reconcilin g Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh and Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma Held at the Office of the Deputy Minister of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations - New England on 7 April 2000", p. 12, ERN 8218. 15255 Exhibit P-134A,"Minutes of the Family Reunion Aimed at Reconciling Chairman Foday Saybana Sankoh and Chairman Johnny Paul Korom a Held at the Office of the Deputy Minister of Labour, Social Security and Industrial Relations - New England on 7 April 2000", p. 12, ERN 82 18. 15256 Isaac Mongor ,Transcript 31 March 2008 , pp. 6 180-6 182, 6241-6242 .

2359 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18May 2012 6772. Fracture erupted with the start of the Lome peace negotiations, due to the AFRC feeling marginalized. This led to the kidnapping ofUN peacekeepers by the West Side Boys, and to the involvement of the Accused in mediating between the two factions. Infighting continued, and after Bockarie's departure from Sierra Leone attempts at reconciliation resumed, although they were unsuccessful.

Summary ofFindings

6773. The Trial Chamber has found that-

(i) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that before he left Sierra Leone on a political tour, and following his arrest in in March 1997, Sankoh instructed Bockarie to take orders from the Accused.

(ii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused accepted and supported the Junta government, and told the AFRC/RUF that he would encourage ECOWAS members to do so as well. He also encouraged the AFRC and RUF to work together

(iii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in about March 1998 the Accused promoted Sam Bockarie to the post of Chief of Defence Staff for the AFRC/RUF alliance with the rank of Brigadier General.

(iv) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Taylor promoted Sam Bockarie to the post of two-star general after the Freetown Intervention.

(v) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the instruction given by the Accused to Sam Bockarie to leave Sierra Leone for in December 1999 was a 'diplomatic deceit' to cover clandestine actions.

(vi) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that at a meeting that took place in the Executive Mansion in Monrovia on 26 July 2000 with ECOWAS Heads of State present, the Accused proposed that Sam

2360 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 Bockarie take over as Interim Leader of the RUF and Issa Sesay rejected this proposal.

(vii) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that when lssa Sesay was appointed Interim Leader of the RUF, it was with the direction from Sankoh that he should take instruction from the Accused.

(viii) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in 1999, the Accused ordered Bockarie to send AFRC/RUF forces to assist him in his tight against Mosquito Spray and the LURD forces that had attacked his forces, and that during the fighting, the AFRC/RUF forces operated under the overall command ofthe Accused's Liberian subordinates.

(ix) The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that III 2000 and 2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces, and that the RUF forces sent in response to these requests fought alongside AFL forces in Liberia and Guinea under the command ofthe Accused 's subordinates.

(x) The Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused instructed Bockarie and his subordinates to fight for his allies in Cote d'Ivoire.

Conclusion

6774. At the outset, the Trial Chamber recalls that evidence in the record shows that Taylor was referred as "Pa",15257 the "father",15258 "Papay",15259 "godfather",15260 or "Chief',15261 by

15257 Isaac Mongor, Transcript II March 2008, p. 5720 ("T he big Pa was Mr Taylor and he was the big one"); Transcript 3 1 March 2008, p. 6226 ("the Pa, that is Mr Tay lor"); Mohamed Kabbah,Transcript 15 September 2008 , p. 16175 (RUF members used to call Taylor "Father" or " Pa" ); Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16328 (referring to Taylor as "Dad" or the "Papay" or "Father" or "the Old Man" or "the President"); Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, p. 9395 (Taylor was called "President Taylor" or "Pa Taylor"); Transcript 9 May 2008, p. 9432 (referring to the Accused as "Pa Ta ylor"); Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008, p. 20 119 (referring to the Accused as "the Pa") ; TF 1-567, Transcript 7 July 2008, p. 13039 ("Pa Charles Taylor"); TFI ­ 367, Transcript 2 1 August 2008, p. 14300 ("at the time we used to call Charles Tay lor Father or Chief [...] In Monrovia, Liberia, we hadn't anybod y whom we called "C hief' or "Pa" apart from Charles Taylor. He was the only person who was our Papa and out everything"). 15258 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 9 January 2008, p. 866 ("the journalists were asking him, 'Who is your father that you are referring to?' and he said, 'Charles Taylor!"): Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 925-926 ("Mr Taylor is the father and is the son") ; Mohamed Kabbah, Transcript 15 September 2008, p. 16175 (referring to Taylor as "Th e father"); Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16328 (referring to Taylor as "Dad" or the "Papay" or "Father" or "the Old Man" or "the President") ; Perry Kamara, Transcript 7 February 2008, p. 33 17 ("Mr Taylor we knew him as Father"); Albert Saidu, Transcript 5 June 2008, p. 11072 ("we called Charles

2361 Case No .: SCSL-03 -01-T 18 May 2012 RUF members. These references are clearly indicative ofthe respect that RUF members had for the Accused. However this deference per se is insufficient to establish that Taylor had de f acto authorit y over the RUF. The Trial Chamber recalls that these nicknames were commonly used in Africa to qualify leaders. On several occasions, witnesses used similar

appellations to mention other leaders.15262

Taylor the Father. That was how we used to ca l1 him by code, the Father"), p. 11083 (we used to call Charles Taylor the Father"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 3 1 March 2008 , p. 6227 ("M osquito used to say that Charles Taylor was his father"); TF 1-371, Transcript, 29 Janu ary 2008 , p. 2457 (CS) ("s o they took him as a father"), pp . 25 10-2513 (CS) ("The relationship with Sam Bockarie and Taylor was that of a father and son relationship and Sam Bockarie took Mr Taylor as a father"); TFI-567, Tra nscript 7 July 2008 , pp. 19039-13040 ("Issa Sesay he told me Charles Taylor was our big revoluti onary father") ; TF I-367, Transcript 2 1 August 2008, p. 14300 (" Sam Bockarie said - at the time we used to call Charles Taylor Father or Chief). 15259 Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transcript 2 December 2008, p. 2 1433 ("the Papay, that is Mr Tay lor"), p. 2 1435 ( referr ing to the Accused as "Papay Taylor"), p. 21512 ("he told me it was the Papay who gave it to him and by that he was referring to Charles Taylor"); Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 2 1543 (witness said that when he said "the Papay" he referred to "CIC Taylor"); Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, p. 13357 ("we used to refer to Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor as Papay, or the old man"): Transcript 10 July 2008 , p. 13391 ("at that time when he said ' Papay in Libe ria' he was referring to Charles Ghankay Taylor"), p. 13418 (referring to Charles Taylor as "the Papay"); TF I-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12898 ("the Papay, that is Charles Taylor") p. 12906 ("that is was the Papay, Charles Taylor"); Mohamed Kabba h, Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 16328 ("They all knew that Sam Bockarie meant Charles Taylor when he used the terms like Dad or the Papay"). 15260 Varmuyan Sherif, Transcript 10 January 2008, pp. 925-926 ('Taylor was referred to as father or "the godfa ther"); Samuel Kargbo, Transcri pt 2 1 May 2008 , p. 10452 ("C harles Taylor was the Godfather for RUF"; Tra nscr ipt 22 May 2008, pp. 10512-105 13 "C harles Taylor, who was their godfather"; See also Exhibit P-277 (confi dential), ERN 18113 ("the fact is that President Taylor has been the Godfather"). 15261 TF I-367, Transcript 2 1 August 2008, p. 14300 ("we used to call Charles Taylor "Chief ' [...] In Monrovia, Liberi a we hadn 't anybody whom we called Chief or Pa apart from Charles Taylor"); Dauda Aruna Fornie, Transc ript II December 2008, p. 22258 ("Taylor was "the commander in chief' of the RUF"); TFI-51 6, Transcript 8 April 2008, p. 6883 ("that was common with the senior officers of the RUF referring to Charl es Taylor as the chief'); See also Exhibit P-065 ("CI CCharles Ghankay Taylor").

15°6°- - Seefi or example Isaac Mongor, Transcnpt. II March 2008, p. 5720 ("I referred to Johnn y Paul as 'Pa' [...] whe n I said "big Pa", I was referring to Mr Taylor"); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008 p. 3 161 (Perry Kamara calls SYB Rogers "Pa Rogers"); DCT-008, Transcri pt 30 Augus t 2010 p. 47482-47483 (DCT-008 calls SYB Rogers "Pa Rogers"); Dennis Koker, Transcri pt 15 January 2008, p. 1228 (Koke r refers to the top comma nders "Pa Kosia" and EBS Bangura as "Pa Bangura"); Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, p. 1966 (Keita refers to a police officer called "Pa Mo rrie"); Transcript 24 January 2008, p. 2 135 (Keita refers to Benjamin Yeaten as "the Chief '); Witness TFI -371, Transcript I February 2008 , p. 294 1 (CS) (the witness refers to Mus a Cisse as "Pa Musa"), p. 2944 (CS) (the witness refers to "Pa Rogers"); Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, p. 3 112 (Kamara refers to "Pa Kallen"): Suwandi Camara, Transc ript II February 2008, p. 35 18 (the witness refers to "General Pa Jean"); Witness TFI -I OI, Transcript 14 February 2008, p. 3909 (the witness refers to "P a Kabba h"), pp. 39 15-39 16 (the witness refers to "Pa Bobodin"); Witness TFI-1 30, Transcript 20 February 2008, p. 4300 (witness refers to Sellu Ensah as "C hief Sellu") ; Witness TFI-362, Tra nscri pt 27 February 2008, p. 4809 (CS) (the witness refers to an eight year old girl as "Zero Zero Pa Morlai"), p. 4842 (CS) (the witness refers to Foday Saybana Sankoh as "Pa Sankoh"); Mus tapha Mansaray, Transcript 5 March 2008, p. 5354 (Ma nsaray refers to "Pa Kosia"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 Marc h 2008, p. 5661 (Mongor refers to Foday Sankoh as "Pa Morlai"); Transcript 31 March 2008, p. 6204 (Mongor refers to a child who is almost ten years as "O ld Pa Harris"); Alim amy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, p. 8346 (Bobson Sesay refers to "Pa Kabbah"); Issa Sesay, Transcript 29 July 20 10, p. 4496 5 (PS) (Sesay refers to "C hief Buduka"); Transcript 26 August 20 10, p. 47233 (Sesay refers to "the late Paramount Chief Bai Yorsoh and the honourable Paramount Chief Bai Kurr"); Witness DCT-008, Transcript 24 August 20 I0, p. 47036 (witness testified that "in, Liberia, every high-ranking officer was referred to as 'chief by his subordinates"); See also

2362 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T .- 18 May 20 12 6775. The Trial Chamber has considered the leadership and command structure of the RUF, and the role of the Accused, if any, in relation to that structure. An analysis of the evidence on record in its entirety demonstrates that the nature ofthe relationship between the Accused and the RUF, and later the AFRC/RUF, evolved over time. The Trial Chamber has found that Foday Sankoh and the Accused met in the late 1980s in Libya, where a number of West African revoluti onaries were trained.1 5263 Sankoh and the Accused pursued parallel goals and aspir ations, but not in a chain of command.

6776. Following the training in Libya, the Accused supported the creation of the RUF , providing a training camp and other forms of supp ort in the early 1990s .1 5264 NPFL forces also played a significant role in the invasion of Sierra Leone in March 1991, with RUF troops working und er the command of NPFL officers.'5265 In June 1991, the Accused met with Foday Sankoh and officiall y endorsed NPFL participation in the Sierra Leonean conflict. At that point, support for the RUF was enhanced. The Accused and the RUF had a comm on enem y in ULIMa and the Sierra Leonean Government, and it was in their mutual interest to fight them together.15266

6777. While the evidence show s that RUF troops were integrated in the NPFL command structure for military operations during the invasion of Sierra Leone,1 5267 it fails to demonstrate that NPFL and RUF forces were treat ed as one single body under the command of the Accused.1 5268To the contrary, the evidence clearly shows that during their training in Camp Naama, RUF and NPFL troops were separated in two different areas.1 5269 Moreover, by mid-1992, the relationship between NPF L and RUF forces deteriorated. Following Operation Top Final in 1992 and the withdrawal of NPFL troops from Sierra Leone , contacts and cooperation between the Accused and Sankoh continued, but to a lesser extent.15270

Exhibit D-008 where there is reference to "Pa Musa" and "Big Brother"). 15163 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989. 15264 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama. 15265 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion ofSierra Leone. 15266 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996) : The Invasion ofSierra Leone. 15167 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone. 15268 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion ofSierra Leone. 15269 Pre-Indictment Period ( 1988-1996): Camp Naama .

15270 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.

2363 / Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T .: 18 May 20 12 6778. With regard to the RUF command structure, the evidence demonstrates that Sankoh was, as early as August 1990, the leader and commander in chiefof the RUF.1 5271 During his leadership Sankoh gave orders which were followed, 15272 had the power to punishl5273 and the power to promotel5274 RUF members. Sankoh also represented the RUF in external relations and peace talks .1 5275

6779. Following Operation Top Final III 1992 and the withdrawal of NPFL troops from Sierra Leone, contacts and cooperation between the Accused and Sankoh continued, but to a lesser extent. The Accused continued to provide low-level support to the RUF as it continued fighting in Sierra Leone, while he was himself fighting in Liberia.15276 In 1993, the Accused asked Sankoh to send troops to help him fight ULIMa. 15277 He advised Sankoh prior to and following the RUF attack on Sierra Rutile, and he advised Sankoh to send an External Delegation to Cote d'Ivoire. 15278

6780. On 24 March 1996, Foday Sankoh travelled to Cote d'Ivoire for peace talks with the Sierra Leonean Government, which then continued in . After six months of negotiations, the Abidjan Peace Accord was signed on 30 November 1996. 15279 In March

15271 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama.

15272 Orders from Sankoh which were followed : Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged RUF Assistance to Fight ULIMO in Liberia; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996):Sierra Rutile; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Operation Stop Election (1996);Peace Process: External Delegation in Cote d'Ivoire; Leadership and Commande Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF, Foday Sankoh.; See also TFI-371, Transcript 25 January 2008, pp. 2251-2252 (In 1995 Sankoh ordered TFI-371 to go to Camp Lion training base); Exhibit P-277, p. 24 (RUF Structure Command - powers of the Leader) 15273 See for example TF 1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 232 16-23222 (TFI-1 68 testified that in October 1992, Sankoh ordered his arrest and his detention); TF I-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23225-23226 (After three weeks of detention, Sankoh ordered TFI -168's release and assigned him to Jojoima in Kailahun District); Exhibit P-277, p. 24 (RUF Structure Command - powers of the Leader). 15274 See for example TF I-168, Transcript 21 January 2009, pp. 23228-23230 (In February 1993, Sankoh promoted TFI-168 and assigned him to be a training commander); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5689-5690; Transcript 2 April 2008, pp. 6429-6436, 6438-6440. (In 1995, during a meeting in Vogoda Mongor was promoted to Major by Sankoh; Mike Lamin, Mohamed Tarawalli, Superman, Sam Bockarie aka Mosquito, Peter Vandi, Emmanuel Williams aka Rocky CO were also promoted by Sankoh during this meeting); Fayia Musa, Transcript 13 April 20 10, pp. 38863-38864 (Fayia Musa was made Agri-Officer by Foday Sankoh); Karmoh Kanneh, Transcript 8 May 2008, pp. 9353-9359 (After the Abidjan Peace Accord, Sankoh promoted Kanneh to Captain and Bockarie to Colonel); Exhibit P-277 (confidential), p. 24 (RUF Structure Command ­ powers of the Leader) 15275 See Peace Process: External Delegation in Cote d'Ivoire; Peace Process: Abidjan; Peace Process: Lome. 15276 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Attack on Kono (November 1992-January 1993). 15277 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged RUF Assistance to Fight ULI1vl0 in Liberia. 15278 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Sierra Rutile; Peace Process: External Delegation in Cote d'Ivoire; Peace Process: Abidjan . 15279 Context ; Peace Process: Abidjan.

2364 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 1997, returning to Sierra Leone from Cote d'ivoire, Sankoh was detained by Nigerian authorities tor possession of arms and ammunition and kept under house arrest.1 5280 Following his arrest , he instructed Sam Bockarie to take orders from the Accused. The evidence shows, however, that even after his arrest, Sankoh remained the recognised leader of the RUF. 1528\ While in detention, Sankoh used the NPFL communications network, as well as his own, to continue to communicate with the RUF.15282

6781. While much evidence was adduced relating to the trade of arms and diamonds between Bockarie and the Accused, the evidence does not establish that Bockarie took orders from the Accused. The instructions given to Bockarie by the Accused were given with the inherent authority the Accused had by virtue of his position. Bockarie was deferential to the Accused and generally followed his instruction. However, the Trial Chamber considers that the role Sankoh envisioned for the Accused while he was in detention was that the Accused would guide Bockarie, and that Bockarie should look to his guidance, not that the Accused should take over Sankoh's role as the leader ofthe RUF with effective control over its actions .

6782. Following the coup in Sierra Leone on 25 May 1997, AFRC forces led by Johnny Paul Koromal5283 invited the RUF into a governing alliance.15284 Foday Sankoh responded positively to this invitationl528 5 and instructed his RUF forces to join and work with the

15280 Context; Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998,A Year of Atrocities Against Civilians, Amnesty Internati onal Report", p. 2; Fayia Musa, Transcript 15 April 20 10, p. 39098; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 20 10, p. 43737. 15281 Exhibit P-057, Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997 - 00009769 - 0000977 1; Exhibit P-085B, Unofficial Transcript - Audio CD - Radio Broadcast of Sam Bockarie on the BBC World Service's Focus on Africa (referring to Sankoh as Leader of the RUF). 15282 Operational Support: Communications, Sankoh's Communication While Detained. 15283 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Junta Period; Context; Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Facts 17-18; Decision on Judicial Notice, Annex A, Fact 0 ; Prosecutor v Taylor, SCSL-03-I-T-765, Decision on Defence Application for Judicial Notice of Adjudicated Facts from the AFRC Trial Judgement pursuant to Rule 94(B) , 23 March 2009 [Decision on Judicial Notice of AFRC Adjudicated Facts], Annex A, Fact 1. 15284 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUF/AFRC, Junta Period; Context; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 1 May 2008, pp. 10440-10441 ; Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46540­ 46541. 15285 Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 30; Exhibit P-131, "AFRC - Secret Minute s of the First Meeting of the AFRC Held at the Conference Hall, Defence Headquarters, 19 July 1997"; Exhibit 0-009, "RUF Defence Headquarters, Salute Report to the Leader of the Revolution, from Major General Sam Bockarie; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2010", pp. 5699-5703; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 2010, pp. 43818-43829, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46541-4 6542.

2365 ,--- Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 Junta.15286 The Accused accepted and supported the Junta government, and he encouraged the AFRC and RUF to work together.

6783. Sometime around March 1998, Sam Bockarie was promoted. The Prosecution alleged that this promotion was made by the Accused directly, or through a joint decision between himself and Johnny Paul Koroma. Bockarie had just returned from Monrovia. The Trial Chamber has found that the Accused may well have been consulted by Koroma, or talked directly with Bockarie about the promotion while he was in Monrovia, but not that Bockarie was promoted by the Accused. Like Sankoh, Koroma turned to the Accused for advice and support, and the Trial Chamber accepts that he would have consulted the Accused. Nevertheless, the Accused was not part ofthe command structure.

6784. In the Trial Chamber's view, such influence is insufficient to establish that the Accused had effective control over the AFRC/RUF. The evidence indicates that the relationship between the Accused and the AFRC/RUF was mainly based on common economic, political and military interests. In drawing this conclusion, the Trial Chamber notes that the advice and instruction of the Accused to the AFRC/RUF mainly focused on directing their attention to the diamondiferous area of Kono in order to ensure the continuation oftrade, diamonds in exchange for arms and ammunition. 15287

6785. The evidence shows that the nature of the relationship between the Accused and the RUF/AFRC continued to evolve after the attack on Freetown in January 1999. Tensions between AFRC and RUF leaders increased after the Freetown attack. 15288 The evidence also indicates that, at this time, divisions within the RUF itself appeared over political and military strategy. The RUF leadership was divided between those who wanted to continue the armed struggle and those in favour of a political solution to the conflict. On 7 January 1999, with the attack on Freetown ongoing, President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh agreed to a ceasefire which was announced over the radio, but was disregarded by the AFRC and RUF fighters. Further peace talks were facilitated by the Accused and the other members of the

15286 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUFfAFRC, Junta Period; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 21 May 2008 pp. 10441-10442; Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 17 April 2008, pp. 7872­ 7873; Jabaty Jaward, Transcript 9 July 2008, pp. 13338-13339; Perry Kamara, Transcript 5 February 2008, pp. 3086-3087; Foday Lansana, Transcript 21 February 2008, pp. 4491-4492; Issa Sesay, Transcript 18 August 2010, pp. 46540-4654; See also Defence Final Trial Brief, para. 581. 15287 Military Operations.

15288 Leadership and Command Structure: Analysis ofthe AFRCfRUF Alliance.

2366 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Committee of Five and, on 18 May 1999, another ceasefire agreement was signed In Lome .1 5289 This ceasefire agreement, however, failed to bring about the end of hostilities.1 5290

6786. On 7 July 1999, the Lome Peace Accord was signed by President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh.15291 The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF agreed to the immediate release of Sankoh, the transformation of the RUF into a political party that would become part of the Government of Sierra Leone and amnesty for all warring factions, including RUF members. 15292 Sankoh received a formal position within the Sierra Leonean Government as Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, a position with the status of Vice-President of Sierra Leone. 15293

6787 . During this period, the Accused used his influence with both Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh to bring the AFRC and RUF leaders together to reduce tension between the RUF and the AFRC following the Lome Peace Accord, and he helped to facilitate the release of the UN peacekeepers and others kidnapped by the West Side Boys, who were discontent with the apparent exclusion of the AFRC from the peace process.15294 However, the Trial Chamber has found that at the same time he was involved in the peace negotiations in Lome, the Accused was also engaged in arms transactions with the RUF .1 5295

6788. Despite the Lome accords, due in part to the division between RUF and AFRC leaders and within the RUF, the disarmament process in Sierra Leone took time to

15289 Peace Process: Lome; Context; See also Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successful Peace Talks in Lome, 1999", pp. 3, 9, II . 15290 Peace Process: Lome; Context ; Exhibit P-264, "Radio Log-Book 0008636-0008726", pp. 8653, 8656, 8658, 8660, 8662, 8665, 8668A, 8672; Exhibit D-022, "S ierra Leone News Archives, September 1999, Sierra Leone Web, 30 September 1999"; Exhibit D-206, "O utgoing Code Cable, Urgent Issues, President Taylor's Request for Teleconference with the Secretary General, to Riza for Secretary General, United Nations, New York, from Downes-Thomas, RSG, UNOL, Monrovia, 6 August 1999;" Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 12 August 2009, pp. 26668-26669; Issa Sesay, Transcript 12 July 20 10, pp. 44201-44203; Corinne Dutka, Transcript 22 January 2008, p. 1930; Isaac Monger, Transcript 31 March 2008, pp. 6178-6 180. 1529 1 Peace Process: Lome; Context ; Exhibit D-224, "Letter to the President of Sierra Leone, Dr Alhaji , from Foday Saybana Sankoh, 29 October 1999", para. 3;Stephen Ellis, Transcript 17 January 2008, pp. 1482-1483. 15292 Peace Process: Lome; Context; Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWASReport on Successful Peace Talks in Lome, 1999", pp. 35-36 . 15293 Peace Process: Lome; Context; Exhibit D-199, "Special ECOWAS Report on Successful Peace Talks in Lome, 1999", pp. 35-36. 15294 Peace Process: Release of UN Peacekeepers and Others (1999). 15295 Anus and Ammuniti on; Peace Process: Lome Peace Accords.

2367 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 q-btf6f)

eventuate.1 5296 Bockarie defied orders from Sankoh to disarm and, on 14 December 1999, resigned from the RUF and went to Liberia, amidst violent clashes between RUF fighters loyal to Foday Sankoh and RUF fighters loyal to him. He was told to leave Sierra Leone by the Accused, but the Trial Chamber has found that in summoning Bockarie to Liberia, the Accused relied on the authority of ECOWAS and sought the help of President Obasanjo, organizing a meeting at Roberts International Airport between Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie, President Obasanjo and himself, as a result of which a decision was made that Bockarie would not return to Sierra Leone until the disarmament process had been completed.

6789. In May 2000, the RUF captured between 400 and 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in the area between Lunsar and Makeni in Sierra Leone.15297 The UNAMSIL peacekeepers were taken to Liberia and released after having been held hostage for approximately three weeks. 15298 While the Accused had significant influence over the RUF decision to release the peacekeepers, the evidence does not establish that he ordered their release. Rather the Accused in his meeting with Sesay promised him assistance, and although the evidence was insufficient to establish that arms and ammunition were provided in exchange for an agreement to release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers, the Trial Chamber has found that in May 2000 Sesay made a trip to Liberia in which he did obtain arms and ammunition from the Accused. This evidence further indicates a continuing trade relationship between the RUF

152% See also TFI-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, pp. 2448-2450 (CS); Stephen Ellis, Transcript 18 January 2008 p. 1595-1596 ; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 10 September 2009, pp. 28556-28557; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32562-32566; Exhibit 0-077, "Letter to Charles Ghankay Taylor from President Alhaji Dr Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, 27 October 1999"; Exhibit 0-441 B, "Witness Statement ofOluyemi Adeniji (Issa Sesay), Freetown/Nairobi (Telephone), 2 March 2008"; Exhibit 0-441 E, "Witness Statement of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (Issa Sesay), Juba Hill,12 May 2008". 15297 Peace Process: Release of UNANISIL Peacekeepers (2000); Context; Admitted Facts and Law, Agreed Fact 36; see also Transcript 14 July 20 lO, pp. 44505-44513; Abu Keita, Transcript 23 January 2008, pp. 2030-2032. 15298 Peace Process : Release of UNANISIL Peacekeepers (2000); Context; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 20 10, pp. 44515 , 44538-44539; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3269-3270; Exhibit 0-245, "Press Release, Secretary General Acknowledges Liberian President's Role in Peacekeepers Release, SG/SM7396, Secretary General , Department of Public Information, New York, 15 May 2000"; Exhibit 0-246, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State for Presidential Affairs, Liberia , 16 May 2000" ; Exhibit 0-244, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State tor Presidential Affairs , Liberia, 13 May 2000"; Exhibit 0-247, "Press release by the President of Liberia, Ministry of State tor Presidential Affairs , Liberia, 22 May 2000"; Exhibit 0-250, "Fax- Letter, from the President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, to the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Oluyemi Adeniji , Government Statement, 23 May 2000"; Exhibit 0-253, " Letter from President of Liberia, Oankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor to President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr AhmadTejan Kabbah, 5 June 2000"; Stephen Ellis, Transcript 17 January 2008, p. 1482; Exhibit 0-243, "Letter from General lssa Sesay, RUF Field Commander, to the President of Liberia, Oankpannah Dr Charles Ghankay Taylor, 11 May 2000".

2368 ~ Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18May 2012 and the Accused, diamonds for arms and ammunition, rather than the existence of a

supenor. Isub or dmate' relatiations hirp. 15299.

6790. Following Sankoh's arrest by the Government of Sierra Leone in May 2000,15300 his detention created a power vacuum within the RUF and threatened to stall the peace negotiations. At a meeting on 26 July 2000 at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia between the ECOWAS heads of state, including the Accused, and an RUF delegation led by Issa Sesay, the suggestion was made that Issa Sesay should become the Interim Leader of the RUF. Sesay would not accept the appointment without it first being approved by the RUF and Foday Sankoh. A meeting of RUF commanders was held, and a letter was also delivered to Foday Sankoh by President Obasanjo seeking Sankoh's consent to the appointment. At a follow up meeting in August 2000, Sesay was confirmed as the RUF Interim Leader. Presidents Obasanjo and Konare both met with Sankoh in Freetown, without the Accused present, indicating that this process was undertaken by ECOWAS heads of state collectively, rather than the Accused unilaterally. Moreover, Sesay's refusal to accept the role of Interim Leader without consulting Sankoh indicates Sankoh's continuing authority and effective control over the RUF, even while in detention.

6791. While participating in ECOWAS efforts to promote peace m Sierra Leone, the Accused privately advised Issa Sesay upon his appointment as RUF Interim Leader to say that he would disarm but "not do it in reality". The Accused had called on the AFRC/RUF to assist him in fighting outside Sierra Leone, ordering Bockarie in 1999 to send AFRCIRUF forces to assist him in his fight against Mosquito Spray and the LURD forces that had attacked his forces. In 2000 and 2001 the Accused instructed Issa Sesay to send RUF forces.

6792. The RUF forces sent in response to these requests fought alongside AFL forces in Liberia and Guinea under the command of the Accused's subordinates. However, in the Trial Chamber's view, this evidence is not inconsistent with its view that the Accused wielded significant influence over the RUF forces without having command and control over them. In their combined operations outside Sierra Leone in 1999-2001 the RUF had an interest in fighting and repelling a common enemy that was cutting the supply line between

15299 Peace Process: Release ofUNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000). 15300 Peace Process: Release of UNAMSIL Peacekeepers (2000); Context; Issa Sesay, Transcript 14 July 2010, pp. 44504-44505; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, p. 3269; Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31656; TFI-338, Transcript I September 2008, p. 15106.

2369 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T .. 18 May2012 Liberia and Sierra Leone. 111e combined operations in Liberia and Guinea were facilitated by a coordinated command structure specific to these military operations, which all took place outside of Sierra Leone .1 5301 111is was never the case for military operations conducted in the Sierra Leonean territory during the Indictment period.

6793. In conclusion, the Trial Chamber finds that the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF's interests were intrinsically linked to the interests of the Accused, and their relationship was defined by a synergy and complementarity ofthese interests. The Accused provided ongoing advice and guidance to the RUF leadership and had significant influence over the RUF and AFRC, but he did not have effective control over them, and the relationship cannot be defined within the framework ofa superior-subordinate command structure.

15301 Leadership and Command Structure: Accused Relationship with the RUFfAFRC, Operations Outside Sierra Leone.

2370 Case No.: SCSL-03-0l-T 18 May 2012 J. The War Strategy of the RUF/AFRC

6794. At the outset, the Trial Chamber recalls that war IS not per se a cnme under the Special Court Statute. The Trial Chamber finds however, that over time the RUF's war strategy evolved from a traditional military strategy, to a strategy of guerrilla tactics based on a campaign ofterror against the civilian population.

6795. The evidence shows that from the very beginning of their struggle, Sankoh's forces abducted civilians, including children, in order to find new recruits to increase their forces.15302 However, the record also indicates that Sankoh's initial goal was not to terrorise the civilian population but to fight the Sierra Leonean Government he considered corrupt. 15303 While in Camp Naama, the evidence indicates that RUF soldiers were taught basic Geneva Convention regulations on the treatment of civilians. 15304 Moreover, Sankoh and the RUF troops strongly reacted to the crimes committed during the invasion of Sierra

Leone b y LibI enan . forces. 15305

15302 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone. 15303 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Alleged Meeting in Libya around 1989; Pre-Indictment Period (1988­ 1996): Camp Naama. 15304 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Camp Naama; citing TFI-371, Transcript 24 January 2008, pp. 2203­ 2204 (Sankoh asked Mike Lamin to teach ideology and provided him with brochures on basic Geneva Convention regulations on how to treat civilians and respect them during the conflict); TF 1-168, Transcript 21 January 2009 p. 23181-23182 (During the invasion of Sierra Leone civilians were "not treated fme. They were not treated nicely, as opposed to our basic ideology that we were taught at the base. In fact, it was surprising to me to see things happening that way"); TFI-168, Transcript 23 January 2009, pp. 23395-23396 (TFI-168 received instruction to give good treatment to civilians in order to make them support the revolution); Martin George, Transcript 21 April 2010, pp. 39612-39614 (George testified that Mike Lamin, a Sierra Leonean instructor, taught all the recruits how to take care of civilians during missions). John Vincent, Transcript 25 March 2010, pp. 37998-37999 (the ideology class taught the trainees to take good care of civilians and to attack only military installations); DCT-292, Transcript I June 2010, pp. 41708-41709, 41714 (The ideology training in Camp Naama included: ensuring that a person who surrenders is unharmed and handed them over to the nearest senior officer for screening; a prohibition against raping; the correct treatment of captured civilians - soldiers needed to gather the civilians in one place and guard them. Another element of the ideology was that whenever a town is captured, any material captured, including arms, ammunition, clothing, and food had to be kept under the supervision of the commander. These materials then had to be shared among the civilians and the fighters); Sam Kolleh, Transcript I November 20 10, pp. 48374 (Ideology training included advice on how to treat civilians and prisoners but not on how to terrorize them. According to Kolleh, terrorism was not the ideology of the RUF); DCT-025, Transcript 12 March 2010 pp. 37248-37250 (ideological training included care of civilians, women and children); See also TFI-371, Transcript 30 January 2008, pp. 2633-2634 (TFI-371 never heard any direct order to indiscriminately kill civilians, or a direct order to amputate or mutilate civilians. It was not the policy at the formation of the RUF in 1991 to terrorise civilians); But see in contrast Issa Sesay, Transcript 5 July 20 I0, p. 4360 I (Sesay testified that while at Camp Naama, Sankoh criticized Isaac Mongor for teaching the trainees that once they captured a town they should divide the civilians into two groups and kill one of them in order to obtain the loyalty of the other group). 15305 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): The Invasion of Sierra Leone.

2371 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 6796. However, following military and political defeats,1 5306 surviving m difficult conditions in the Jungles of Sierra Leone,1 5307 the military and political strategy of the RUF changed. As of 1994, Sankoh and RUF officers decided that it was time to leave the jungle and make contact with the international community.15308 In that context, and in order to obtain the international community's attention, in late 1994, early 1995, Sankoh ordered his Deputy Commander CO Mohamed Tarawalli to attack the international mining company Sierra Rutil e in Bonthe District during which western expatriates workers were captured.1 5309 In 1996, disgruntled by the decision of the National Forum to hold elections before peace, Sankoh ordered his RUF troops to conduct "Operation Stop Election" by terrorising civilians .1 531 0 During the operation, RUF troops attacked and burnt polling stations in all major towns and killed or amputated the hands or fingers of any civilian perceived to participate in the elections. The Trial Chamber notes that the attack was named

"Operation Stop Election".1531 I In the Trial Chamber' s view this operation marked a clear change in the RUF 's strategy. After Operation Stop Election, and during the remainder of the civil war in Sierra Leone, the RUF and later the AFRC/RUF continued to deliberately use terror against the Sierra Leonean population as a primary modus operandi of their political and military strategy.

6797. In the Trial Chamber' s view, the names chosen by the AFRC/RUF for their main operations are clearly indicative of a modus operandi based on a campaign of terror against civilians. During "Operation Pay Yourself', around February 1998, AFRC/RUF troops systematically looted and killed civilians.1531 2 "Operation Spare No Soul" was described by one witness as an operation during which "humans, ants, goats, all should be killed". 15313 Finally, the name "Operation No Living Thing", was used on several occasions by the AFRC/RUF soldiers to describe their missi ons during which they systematically committed

15306 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996). 15307 Context.

15308 Peace Process: External Delegation in Cote d'I voire; Pre-Indictment Period (1988-1996): Sierra Rutile.

15309 Pre-Indictment Period (I988-1996): Sierra Rutile; TF 1-567, Transcript 2 July 2008, p. 12876; Perry Kamara, Transcript 4 February 2008, pp. 3053-3054; Charles Ngebeh, Transcript 12 April 20 I0, p. 386 53; Martin George, Transcript 22 April 20 10, pp. 397 12-397 16; Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 20 10, p. 43747. 15310 Pre-Indictment Period (1988-199 6): Operation Stop Election (1996); Context.

15311 Issa Sesay, Transcript 6 July 20 10, p. 43746; Transcript 17 August 20 10, p. 46494; Isaac Mongor, Transcript 10 March 2008, pp. 5697-5698; Samuel Kargbo, Transcript 2 1 May 2008, pp. 10422-10423; Augustine Mallah, Transcript 12 November 2008 , pp. 20107-20 108; TFI-375. Transcript 23 June 20 10. p. 12483. 153/2 Factual and Legal Findings on Alleged Crimes, Count II (Pillage) .

15313 TF I- 143. Transcript 5 May 2008, pp. 9013-9018.

2372 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T .: ,JM. 18 May 20 12 widespread atrocities against civiliansl5314 in Sierra Leone including murders, rape, sexual slavery, looting, abductions, forced labour, conscription and use of child soldiers, amputations and other forms ofphysical violence and acts ofterror.

6798. Moreover, evidence on the record indicates that during the attack of Freetown in early 1999, as Gullit was facing increasing pressure from ECOMOG, Bockarie ordered the AFRC/RUF to make the area "fearful". 15315

6799. In the Trial Chamber's VIew, the cnmes committed by the AFRC/RUF were inextricably linked to how the RUF and AFRC achieved their political and military objectives. In particular, under the leadership of Sam Bockarie, the RUF and AFRC pursued a policy of committing crimes in order to achieve military gains at any civilian cost, and also politically in order to attract the attention ofthe international community and to highten their negotiating stance with the Sierra Leonean Government. 15316 That their operations were given titles such as "Operation No Living Thing" and "Operation Spare No Soul" made explicit the intent of the RUF and AFRC to wage a campaign of terror against civilians as part oftheir war strategy.

15314 Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 1, ERN 91 ("A deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF "Operation no living thing" - has emerged since April 1998") 15315 Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Implementation of the Plan, citing Alimamy Bobson Sesay, Transcript 23 April 2008, pp. 8328-8329 (Bockarie ordered to start burning strategic positions in Freetown and to capture civilians) ; Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3234-3235 (Bockarie ordered to "make Freetown more fearful than before"); Perry Kamara, Transcript 6 February 2008, pp. 3241-3242 (Bockarie ordered again to "make the area fearful"); Dauda Arona Fornie, Transcript 3 December 2008, p. 21590 ("Mosquito was giving direct instructions to to cause a lot of mayhem in the city. [...] Mosquito said if it is possible to chop off anybody's arm, [...] He said Gullit and others should raise alarm to the level of the international community so that they can come in"); Isaac Mongor, Transcript 11 March 2008, p. 5825 (Bockarie ordered the AFRC/RUF to start a campaign ofdestruction) 15316 See Military Operations: The Freetown Invasion, The Plan; Pre-Indictment Period: Operation Stop Election (1996).

2373 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T / 18 May 2012 K. Knowledge of the Accused

Submissions ofthe Parties

6800. The Prosecution submits that Taylor was well aware of the notorious reputation of the RUF and their violent tactics against civilians which included the commission of all the crimes charged in the Indictment. 15317 Indeed, Taylor was a well-informed leader who kept abreast of the media, and who, as President of Liberia, involved in the political and diplomatic negotiations between ECOWAS and the RUF, received information from the UN and its agencies. 15318 The Prosecution further contends that Taylor had direct communications with RUF and was thus privy to the situation in Sierra Leone, that his subordinates in Sierra Leone informed him ofthe RUF's activities and crimes. 15319

6801. The Defence does not dispute that some of the Prosecution's evidence shows that Taylor was on notice generally of some of the crimes that the RUF had already committed, including the campaign waged against civilians in Sierra Leone after the intervention. 15320 However this evidence does not establish that Taylor was aware of every crime charged in the Indictment. There was no organised structure with reporting and monitoring mechanisms which would have kept Taylor informed of all the RUF's activities. Moreover, as Head of State of Liberia, Taylor was geographically removed from the theatre of crimes. 15321

Evidence

Prosecution Witness Stephen Smith

6802. Witness Stephen Smith, a journalist covering the war in Liberia,15322 testified that Charles Taylor followed media reports on Liberia and neighbouring countries very closely. Smith knows this from discussions between himself and Taylor about certain reports

15317 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 22-23, 421-424. 15318 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 23, 425, 427, 429-432. 15319 Prosecution Final Trial Brief, paras 426-428, 431. 15320 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 503, 1257, 1333. 15321 Defence Final Trial Brief, paras 566, 1152, 1257, 1333, 1349-1350. 15322 Stephen Smith, Transcript 22 September 2008, pp. 16772-16773, 16781.

2374 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 between 1990 and 1993 or 1994. Smith testified that this awareness continued in the years thereafter. 15323 Moreover, the brutality ofthe AFRC/RUF regime was widely reported. 15324

Prosecution Witness TFI-371

6803 . Witness TFI-371, a senior member of the RUF ,1 5325 testified that during the Junta and also in 1998 and 1999, information about RUF actions was conveyed to Charles Taylor in three main ways. Firstly, by satellite telephone; secondly, by VHF radio; and finally, by runners.153 26

Prosecution Witness TF 1-150

6804. Witness TF I-ISO, a Human Rights officer in Sierra Leone in 1998,15327 testified that when he arrived in Sierra Leone in May 1998, he received multiple reports of attacks by rebel elements on civilians and was also able to trace patterns of attacks during the preceding months. According to Witness TF I-ISO the pattern of the rebels' attacks was the instilling of terror, either for its own sake, or to ensure that the community fled and were displaced. In describing the pattern, Witness TF 1-150 referred to an arc of violence which appeared to have spread rapidly through the early months of 1998 from the East through the North and down the West of Sierra Leone. During these attacks rebels committed terrorisation, mutilations, looting, killing, sexual abuse and abduction.I 5328

Prosecution Witness

6805 . Witness Moses Blah, Inspector General of the NPFL from 1990 to 1997,1 5329 Liberian Ambassador of Libya and Tunisia following Taylor's election to 2000,1 5330 and Vice-President of Liberia from 2000 to 2003 ,15331 testified that he read in newspapers and

15323 Stephen Smith, Transcript 23 September 2008, pp. 16967-16968. 15324 Stephen Smith, Transcript 23 September 2008, pp. 16971-16972. 15325 TFI-37I, Transcript 29 January 2008. pp. 2555-2556 (CS). 15326 TFI-371, Transcript 29 January 2008, p. 2452 (CS). 15327 Witness TFI-150, Transcript 18 February 2008, p. 4006. 15328 Witness TF 1-150, Transcript 18 February 2008, pp. 4019-4022. 15329 Moses Blah, Transcript 15 May 2008, pp. 9943-9945. 15330 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884.

15331 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9882-9884; Blah became President of Liberia for 60 days from II August to II October 2003: Moses Blah, Transcript 16 May 2008, p. 10065.

2375 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 heard on the radio that cnmes committed by the retreating junta after the ECOMOG intervention in 1998. However, it did not mean that this information was true. 15332

6806. Blah was unaware of a military operation called "Spare No Soul" or "No Living Thing".15333 He knew nothing about Liberian involvement in the Freetown invasion in 1999 and never discussed with Taylor about it.15334 Blah never heard Charles Taylor giving instructions to Foday Sankoh or to senior RUF commanders as to what to do in Sierra

Leone.15335 Bl a hnever di iscusse d WItwi h Tay 1 or t he e I.InVaSIOn 0 f Freetown, 15336 nor did1 he participate in any meeting to discuss secret operations by the Government of Liberia between 1997 and 2000.15337

The Accused

6807. The Accused testified that, before 1997 he had limited information and was not in a position to know precisely the crimes taking place in Sierra Leone as he was not elected President of Liberia yet. Therefore, he was not aware that, during the "Operation Stop Election", RUF troops committed atrocities including amputations ofcivilians. \5338

6808. Upon becoming President, the Accused received a daily briefing from his national security advisor which would include press and intelligence reports.15339 Furthermore, the Accuse dwou ld rea d pnncipa. . 1 newspapers, \5340 watche dregu 1ar 1 y CNN an dmore rare 1 y would listen to BBC broadcast. \534\

6809. The Accused testified that in 1997, there were news reports of "problems" in Sierra Leone.\5342 After being elected, the Accused was concerned about peace and stability in

15332 Moses Blah, Transcript 21 May 2008, pp. 10382-10384. 15333 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, pp. 10231-10231. 15334 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, p. 10231. 15335 Moses Blah, Transcript 19 May 2008, p. 10232. 15336 Moses Blah, Transcript 20 May 2008, p. 10368. 15337 Moses Blah, Transcript 14 May 2008, pp. 9962-9967.

15338 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32375-32379.

15339 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24333; Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28265­ 28268; Transcript 16 November 2009, p. 31713; Transcript 14 January 2010, p. 33382; Transcript 18 January 20 I0, p. 33441; Transcript 26 January 2010, pp. 34130-34133. 15340 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28268-28270; Transcript 26 January 20 I0, pp. 34130-34131. 15341 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, pp. 28265-28267; Transcript 3 November 2009, p. 31053; Transcript 14 January 20 I0, pp. 33382-33384; 33429. 15342 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32378.

2376 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T ) 18 May 2012 Sierra Leone and therefore kept abreast ofthe situation there. \5343 However, the Accused did not try to find precisely who was committing these atrocities, as he was not running Sierra Leone. \5344

6810. The Accused stated that, following the Intervention, there were reports of atrocities "all over the place" being committed by "all sides". \5345 The Accused read reports of these atrocities prepared by ECOMOG. \5346

6811. The Accused testified that by April 1998 if "someone was providing support to the AFRC/RUF [...] they would be supporting a group engaged in a campaign of atrocities against the civilian population of Sierra Leone". \5347 Indeed, in May 1998 there were news reports of a "horrific campaign being waged against the civilian population in Sierra Leone." \5348

6812. Despite issuing a joint communique dated July 1998 with President Kabbah in which the Accused "strongly condemned the continuing rebel activities in Sierra Leone, as well as the horrendous atrocities that had been committed there", \5349 and despite the fact that by August 1998, "RUF's crimes were notorious",15350 the Accused denied that he had sufficient knowledge of the specifics crimes committed by RUF. \535\ Thus, the Accused knew that crimes were committed in Sierra Leone while Sam Bockarie was in charge ofthe rebels\5352 including looting in February 1998\5353 or terrorism ofthe Sierra Leonean population in May 1998,\5354 but he was unaware that the RUF used child soldiers and abducted women as sex slaves. The UN only reported on these matters following the January 1999 Freetown

15343 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33406-33407.

15344 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32378-32379, pp. 32385-32387; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32576-32577; Transcript 14 January 2010, pp. 33386-33388 15345 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32379-32380. 15346 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32388. 15347 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32395.

15348 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 8 September 2009, p. 28274; Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33403. 15349 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32439. 15350 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32439.

15351 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 11 August 2009, pp. 26467-26471; Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32472; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33405-33406, 32316, 33468, 33480. 15352 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, p. 32573; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33403­ 33404. 15353 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32388-32389. 15354 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33409-33410.

2377 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T -J,J-- 18 May 2012 invasion.15355 The Accused never concluded that the RUF constituted a terrorist .. 15356 orgarusation.

6813. Regarding Operation Fitti-Fatta, the Accused did not know what this term meant as he first heard about the "Fitti-Fatta Operation" when Prosecution witnesses testified about it before SCSL.15357

6814. The Accused testified that he was not aware of Sam Bockarie's statements in September and November 1998, in which Bockarie stated that he would order his troops to kill "every living thing" if anything happened to Foday Sankoh,1 5358 or that he would launch an attack on Freetown around New Year if Sankoh was not released. 15359 The Accused was also unaware of Bockarie's statement that the RUF would bombard Freetown unless President Kabbah resigned.15360

6815 . The Accused did not recei ve reports of a major RUF/AFRC offensive in Sierra Leone shortly after Sam Bockarie returned to Sierra Leone through Liberia from Burkina Faso.1 5361 He was briefed in December 1998 by ECOMOG and UN reports that atrocities, including burning civilians, were being committed in Sierra Leone, but these reports referred to the Junta not RUF and did not specify in which areas these crimes were committed.1 5362 Thus, the Accused was not aware of the capture of 11 Nigerian ECOMOG peacekeepers after the Christmas 1998 Kono attack.15363

6816. The Accused was also not aware of Bockarie's public statement dated December

1998, In which the RUF leader anno unced that RUF troops captured Waterloo and

15355 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32389-32390; Transcript 26 November 2009, p. 32574; Transcript 26 January 20 10, pp. 34122-34125. 15356 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32380. 15357 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 3 August 2009, pp. 25819-25820; Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26209; Transcript 14 September 2009, p. 28733; Transcript 15 September 2009, p. 28870; Transcript 16 September 2008, p. 29029; Transcript 25 November 2009 , p. 32485. 15358 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, p. 32473; Transcript 18 January 20 I0, p. 33430; Transcript 16 February 2010, p. 35136. 15359 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 2623 1; Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29277; Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32472-32473 ; Transcript 18 January 20 10, pp. 33430-33438. 15360 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 20 I0, pp. 33444, 33452-33454. 15361 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32506-32507. 15362 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 324 13-324 16; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33463-33466 . 15363 Charles Ghankay Tay lor, Transcript 22 September 2009, pp. 294 10-294 11.

2378 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 J-T 18 May 2012 Benguema and were no longer seeking dialogue. 15364 Similarly, at that time, the Accused did not know that RUF troops captured Makeni and killed 60 ECOMOG fighters, dragging their bodies through the streets as an example.15365 The Accused was also not aware of the UN Secretary-General's extreme concern about the latest news of rebel armed activity in Sierra Leone. 15366 If the Accused moved troops to the Sierra Leonean border in December 1998 it was to prevent spill-over. 15367

6817. The Accused was surprised by the attack on Freetown.15368 On 6 January 1999 at 10.00 am, his national security advisor informed him about the Freetown invasion. 15369 One of his security personnel also told him that he heard on BBC radio that it were Sam Bockarie's boys who attacked Freetown.15370 The Accused relied on news briefing not international media and does not recall hearing the BBC Focus on Africa report in which Issa Sesay reported that the RUF/AFRC had taken over Freetown.15371 The Accused was also not aware that AFRC Commander Gullit led troops in the invasion. 15372

6818. The Accused testified that it was only after the January 1999 Freetown invasion that it dawned on him that atrocities were occurring in Sierra Leone and that he and his colleagues intensified their efforts. 15373 Moreover, as the point President, who "led the whole Sierra Leonean situation" it was important for the Accused to know what the RUF were doing.15374 He got his information from ECOMOG reports, UN reports and received briefings on reports in Liberian and international media. The Accused did not read other reports done by the international human rights community. 15375

15364 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33449-33452, 33470-33472. 15365 Charles Ghankay Taylor, 25 November 2009, pp. 32507-32508; Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33444. 15366 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33458-3346l. 15367 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32613-32614. 15368 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, p. 26203; Transcript 30 September 2009, p. 29931; Transcript 18 January 2010, p. 33455, 33457, 33461-33462 15369 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 14 July 2009, p. 24333; Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26225-26227; Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29269; Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32614-32615; Transcript 18 January 2010, pp. 33476-33477. 15370 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 6 August 2009, pp. 26225-26227.

15371 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 26 November 2009, pp. 32614-32615. 15372 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 17 September 2009, p. 29266. 15373 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32387-32388. 15374 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32388, 32390.

15375 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 25 November 2009, pp. 32389, 32393.

2379 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 6819. In July 1999, the Accused was aware of atrocities being committed by rebels in Sierra Leone, based on ECOMOG reports; however he was unaware ofthe specifics ofthese crimes and was not briefed on a BBC broadcast giving news from Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea.1 5376 The Accused was aware of UN Security Council condemnation of the upsurge of attacks by rebels in Sierra Leone but was unaware of the BBC Focus on Africa programme which reported this condemnation.15377 The Accused did not know if the RUF continued to control diamond fields, deploy child soldiers and capture women as sex slaves from August 2000 to the end of 200 1. All he knew was that the RUF was part of the Government ofSierra Leone.153 78

Defence Witness John Vincent

6820. Witness John Vincent, a Liberian Vanguard commander,1 5379 testified that the RUF did not participate in the Freetown Invasion and there was no communication between the RUF in Makeni and SAJ Musa during the invasion. 15380 Vincent did hear that the RUF reached Masiaka in January 1999 but he was not part of that operation. The witness heard of an attack on Waterloo on the BBe. Vincent first heard that the RUF went to Hastings in Court. 15381

Contemporary documentary evidence

6821. The Trial Chamber notes that a considerable amount of contemporary documentary evidence regarding to the coverage of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone by International Organisations, Non Governmental Organisations or media as been tendered into evidence by both the Prosecution and the Defence. For purpose of clarity this contemporary evidence as been summarised below by chronological order.

15376 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 2010 , pp. 334 67-33468.

15377 Charles Ghankay Taylor, Transcript 18 January 20 I 0, pp. 33499-33500. 15378 Charles Ghankay Taylor. Transcript 26 November 2009 , pp. 32332567-32568. 15379 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 , pp. 38107, 38114-38116, 3811 8, 38137, 38145 ; Transcript 30 March 2010, pp. 38226, 38239 ; Transcript 31 March 2010, p. 38390,38408 , 38460, 38461. 15380 John Vincent, Transcript 26 March 2010 , pp. 38131-38134. 15381 John Vincent, Transcript 31 March 20 I 0, pp. 38431-38434.

2380 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T I 18 May 2012 Prosecution Exhibit P-297

6822. Exhibit P-297 is an article of Relief Web quoting a report of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs dated 4 to 5 June 1997.The UN report details the humanitari an situation in Sierra Leone at the time, which included concerns about security (killings of civilians, amputations as well as looting) and shortage ofbasic amenities. 15382

Prosecution Exhibit P-057

6823. Exhibit P-057 is a transcript of the RUF speech to the nation, dated 18 June 1997. In their speech RUF members apologised for the crimes they have committed in Sierra Leone. It states as follow:

"Fo r the past six years or so we have been living in an environment of hatred and divisiveness. We looked at our brothers and killed them in cold blood, we removed our sisters from their hiding places to undo their femininity, we slaughtered our mothers and butchered our fathers [.. .] But the atrocities [.. .] were the result of the rottenness ofa system which could not be uprooted except by brutal means".15383

Prosecution Exhibit P-298

6824. Exhibit P-298 is a letter dated 27 June 1997 from the Permanent representative of Nigeria, Chairman of the ECOWAS, to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, forwarding the final communique issued at the end of the Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS on the situation in Sierra Leone. In their communique the ECOWAS foreign Ministers deplored the bloodletting and other human losses that occurred during the coup d'etat of 25 May 1997 and warned the illegal regime against all acts of atrocities against Sierra Leonean citizens.15384

Prosecution Exhibit P-299

6825. Exhibit P-299 is a Statement by the President of the Security Council dated II July 1997. The communique indicates that the Security Council remained deeply concerned by

15382 Exhibit P-297, "S ierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 04-05 June 1997, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Paragraphs I, 2, 5 - 00004088 - 00004089 (CMS PGS 2 1395 - 2 1396)". 153&3 Exhibit P-057,"Transcript of the RUF Speech to the Nation Delivered on SLBS on 18 June 1997 ­ 00009769 - 00009771". 15384 Exhibit P-298, " Letter dated 27 June 1997 from the permanent representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the President of Security Council" pp. 1-4 (ERN 21400-2 1403).

2381/ Case No.: SCSL-03-0 1-T 18 May 20 12 the atrocities committed against Sierra Leone's citizens, foreign nationals and personnel of the ECOWAS monitoring group. 15385

Prosecution Exhibit P-300

6826. Exhibit P-300 is an article of Relief Web quoting a report of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs dated 8 to 14 July 1997. The document reports that on in a radio broadcast to Sierra Leone dated 8 July 1997, President Kabbah urged the AFRC to step down to spare the people of Sierra Leone further pain and suffering and ordered soldiers and the RUF to report the nearest ECOMOG base and declare their loyalty. 15386

Prosecution Exhibit P-301

6827. Exhibit P-301 is a Statement by the President ofthe Security Council dated 6 August 1997. The communique indicates that the Security Council The Security Council remains deeply concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone, and at the continued looting and commandeering of relief supplies of international agencies. It calls upon the military junta to cease all interference with the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of Sierra Leone. The Council condemns the continuing violence and threats of violence by the junta towards the civilian population, foreign nationals and personnel of the ECOWAS monitoring group, and calls for an end to such acts ofviolence. 15387

Defence Exhibit D-340

6828. Exhibit D-340 is the official journal of ECOWAS, dated August 1997. The journal documents the decision to extend the scope of activity and mandate of ECOMOG to cover Sierra Leone due to concerns about the worsening crisis there and to reinstate the legitimate government. The journal also documents sanctions taken against the illegal regime in Sierra Leone as well as the arms and military equipments embargo on Sierra Leone.15388

15385 Exhibit P-299, "Statement by the President of the Security Council" 11 July 1997, pp. 1-4 (CMS 21405­ 21406) 15386 Exhibit P-300, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 08-14 July 1997, UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Paragraph 7 - 00004093 (CMS PGS 21409)". 15387 Exhibit P-30 I, "Statement by the President of the Security Council" 6 August 1997, pp. 1-4 (CMS 21405­ 21406) 15388 Exhibit D-340, "Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 33, August 1997 ~ DCT 279".

2382 / Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~ 18May2012 Defence Exhibit 0-135

6829 . Exhibit 0-135 is an ECOWAS report of the Committee of Four on the situation in Sierra Leone, dated 26 August 1997. The report describes the actions taken by the Committee of Four following the coup against the government of President Kabbah on 25 May 1997 by sections of the Sierra Leonean military and the RUF, after which general mayhem ensued, and "massive looting of property, murder and rape became the order of the day". The report states that "This situation posed a special threat to peace in Liberia" for which the ECOWAS sub-region "had laboured for several years". Finally, the reports recalls that, on 11 May 1997 the Security Council expressed deep concern about the continuing crisis in Sierra Leone. 15389

Defence Exhibit 0-136

6830. Exhibit 0-136 is the final report of the sixteenth meeting of ECOW AS Chiefs of State in Abuja, Nigeria, dated 26 to 27 August 1997 in which the Liberian representative participated. The report describes the events in Sierra Leone involving the overthrow of the Kabbah Government as a serious security threat to sub-regional peace and warns that this might reverse the gains that have been made in Liberia. The coup was very blood y and was followed by massive looting and vandalisation of public and private properties and the opening of the prisons by the junta. The report further states that "The putschists invited the elements of the RUF into the city of Freetown, thereby disrupting the peace and tranquillity of that city", which have "since then, assumed and taken over the role of the national army" . ECOWAS is called on restoring the Kabbah Government and to put an end to the crisis in Sierra Leone. Sanctions are proposed to be used against the illegitimate government in

Sierra Leone.15390

Prosecution Exhibit P-069

6831. Exhibit P-069 is UN Security Council resolution 1132, dated 8 October 1997. The Security Council condemned the situation in Sierra Leone as a threat to the peace and states

15389 Exhibit D-135, "ECOWAS, Report of the Committee of Four on the Situation in Sierra Leone, 26 August 1997 - DCT 32". 15390 Exhibit D-136, "ECOWAS, Final Report, Sixteenth Meeting of ECOWASChiefs of State, Ahuja, Nigeria, 26-27 August 1997 - DCT 76 (27 pages)".

2383 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T 18 May 2012 it was "gravely concerned at the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone" and "the consequences for neighbouring countries".

6832. Article 5 ofthe UN Security Council Resolution reads as follow:

"Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply to Sierra Leone, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment.an d spare partsfi or teah fiorementione. d,wet h her or not ongmatmg....m thei err temto . ry" ;15391

Defence Exhibit 0-140

6833. Exhibit 0-140 is a communique of the fifth meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, in Abuja on 10 to 11 October 1997. The communique describes how the illegal regime in Sierra Leone continues to attack and harass ECOMOG troops and notes its concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in

Sierra Leone and the gross violations ofhuman rights by the regime. 15392

Prosecution Exhibit P-078

6834. Exhibit P-078 is an Amnesty International Report on atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone in 1998. The report acknowledges the dominant role played by, inter alia, ECOWAS and ECOMOG, in resolving the political crisis in Sierra Leone. The report also documents the human rights violations committed by the AFRC and RUF after the military coup, including killings, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and extra-judicial executions,. muti'1 ations,. rapes. 15393

6835. Page 1 ofthe report reads as follow:

"During 1998 the scale ofatrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone has reached unprecedented levels. Several thousand unarmed civilians, including many women and children, have been deliberately and arbitrarily killed and mutilated by forces of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the armed opposition Revolutionary Front (RUF) since February 1998. These atrocities are continuing [...]

"Although security has since returned to the capital, Freetown, and much of the south of the country, the scale ofhuman rights abuses committed by AFRC and RUF forces in the north and east ofthe country has escalated and taken on grotesque forms. From April 1998 reports emerged of civilians suffering mutilations such as crude amputations of their feet, hands, arms, lips or ears. Women and girls have been systematically raped.

15391 Exhibit P-069, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, 8 October 1997", p. 2. 15392 Exhibit D-140, "ECOWAS, Communique, Fifth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee ofFive on Sierra Leone, 10-11 October 1997 - DCT 39 (5 pages)". 15393 Exhibit P-078, "Sierra Leone 1998 - A year of atrocities against civilians, Amnesty International Report", pp.I-31.

Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18May2012 Hundreds of civilians, in particular children and young men and women, have been abducted by rebel forces. The violence has resulted in hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leoneans fleeing to neighboring Guinea and Liberia or becoming internally displaced within Sierra Leone. AFRC and RUF forces must respect international humanitarian law and immediately end the gross human rights abuses which they are perpetrating against unarmed civilians".

Prosecution Exhibit P-303

6836. Exhibit P-303 is a humanitarian situation report by the African Studies Centre of the University ofPennsylvania on Sierra Leone, for the period 21 January 1998 to 12 February 1998. The report expresses concern for the humanitarian situation ofcivilians in Freetown. It states that "AFRC casualties are known to be high and many civilians have been killed and Injure" d" .15394

Prosecution Exhibit P-385

6837. Exhibit P-385 is a an excerpt of an article published in the Liberian newspaper "The Daily Times", published on 20 February 1998 reporting that 52 people were burned alive as

the Junta went on rampage. 15395

Defence Exhibit 0-155

6838. Exhibit 0-155 is the UN Security Council's fourth report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Sierra Leone, dated 18 March 1998. The report describes the intervention by ECOMOG in Freetown on 13 February 1998 and the widespread looting and some reprisal killings which accompanied the junta's expulsion. The security situation in Sierra

Leone is still a source of concern and the humanitarian situation remains serious. 15396

15394 Exhibit P-303, "Sierra Leone: Humanitarian Situation Report, 98.02.17., 21 January - 12 February 1998, Paragraphs I (part), 3, 9, 16 (A)-CSMPGS-21422-21424". 15395 Exhibit P-385, "52 people burned alive as Junta goes on rampage", Daily News, dated 20 February 1998 ­ CMS 22658-22659 15396 Exhibit D-155, "UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/2449, 18 March 1998 - DCT 189 (II pages)".

2385 Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T 18 May 2012 Prosecution Exhibit P-036

6839 . Exhibit P-036 is an ECOWAS six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone, dated 23 October 1997 to 22 April 1998. The plan consists of seven points to return constitutional governance to Sierra Leone.15397

Prosecution Exhibit P-304

6840. Exhibit P-304 is a humanitarian situation report for Sierra Leone prepared by the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sierra Leone, for the period 16 April 1998 to 30 April 1998. The report documents that the fighting between ECOMOG and the RUF/Junta is creating a severe humanitarian situation. It includes summary reports on victims of the violence, including widespread mutilations and looting.15398

Prosecution Exhib it P-332

6841. Exhibit P-332 is a report by Medecins sans Frontiers, dated 1 May 1998. The report states there has been an alarming increase in the numb er of mutilations. The report also documents instances ofrapes and killings, including by being burned alive.15399

Prosecution Exhibit P-079

6842. Exhibit P-079 is a press release from Doctors without Borders / Medecins sans Frontieres, dated 5 May 1998. The press release states that the number of patients suffering from mutil ations has increased significantly within the past few weeks. Other crimes committed by various armed groups have included executions, rapes and kidnappings. 154oo

15397 Exhibit P-036. "ECOWAS six month-peace plan for Sierra Leone 23 October 1997 - 22 April 1998"'.

15398 Exhibit P-304, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 16-30 April 1998, Paragraphs I, 5 (Part) , 6 ­ CSM PGS 21428 - 21429"'. 15399 Exhibit P-332, "Medecins sans Frontiers 1998 Report: Atrocities Against Civilians in Sierra Leone, I May 1998, pages 1 to 4 - CMS PGS 23204 - 23207". 15400 Exhibit P-079, "Doctors without Borders/Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) Press Release - Mutilati on of Civilians on the increase in Sierra Leone, 5 May 1998"'.

2386 / Case No.: SCSL-03-0 I-T 18 May 20 12 Prosecution Exhibit P-070

6843. Exhibit P-070 is UN Security Council resolution 1171 (1998), dated 5 June 1998. The Security Council reiterates its condemnation of the situation in Sierra Leone and stresses the "urgency for all rebels to put an end to the atrocities". 15401

Prosecution Exhibit P-130

6844. Exhibit P-130 is the Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, dated 9 June 1998. The report condemns the actions ofthe Junta in Sierra Leone and states that they have been attacking towns and villages, terrorising local populations and extorting food from them. There have also been incidents of looting, property destruction, mutilations, rape, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions (including for purposes of sexual abuse), torture and forced labour. 15402

Prosecution Exhibit P-125

6845. Exhibit P-125 is the first page of the Liberian newspaper "Daily Times" dated 24 July 1998. An article titled "Guns, rice traded for diamonds" discuss the disclosure by RUF/AFRC members that they received guns and rice from Liberia in exchange of diamonds. The article mentions that gruesome atrocities have been perpetrated by

RUF/AFRC soldiers". 15403

Prosecution Exhibit P-081

6846. Exhibit P-081 is a document published by Amnesty International on 24 July 1998 preparing the United Nations Special Conference on Sierra Leone held in New York on 30 July 1998. Page 1 ofthe report reads as follow:

AFRC and RUF force s in the east and north of Sierra Leone are deliberately and arbitrarily killing and torturing unarmed civilians. A deliberate and systematic campaign of killing, rape and mutilation - called by the AFRC and RUF "Operation no living thing" - has emerged since April 1998.

Although the exact number of those killed in recent months is unknown, it is likely to be several thousand, many of them women and children. More than 200 people were killed during an attack on one village alone ­ Yifrn, in Koinadugu District in Northern Province - in late April 1998. Many hundreds of men, women and

15401 Exhibit P-070, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1171, 5 June 1998".

15402 Exhibit P-130, "United Nations Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Sierra Leone, S/1998/486, 9 June 1998 - 00004201 - 00004217", P. 15, para. 81, ERN 00004215. 15403 Exhibit P-125 , Daily News, 24 July 1998, "Guns, rice traded tor diamonds".

2387 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May '01' ~ children of all ages have suffered mutilation and crude amputations of their arms, legs, lips or ears, lacerations and gunshot wounds. Women and girls have been raped or suffered other forms of sexual assault. Survivors of attacks who manage to reach safety and medical assistance recount that many others from their villages were killed or fled into the bush, their fate unknown. 15404

6847. Page 3 of the report addresses the specific Issues of "children caught III the violence". It reads as follow:

Children have been particular victims of the violence and brutality in Sierra Leone. As well as being deliberately and arbitrarily killed, mutilated and maimed, thousands of children have been and continue to be abducted by AFRC and RUF forces and forced to fight. Girls and women have been systematically raped and forced into sexual slavery.

Among the more than 350,000 Sierra Leoneans who have either become refugees in neighbouring countries or internally displaced since February 1998 are hundreds ofunaccompanied children separated from their families as a result of the violence. Children are the most vulnerable to the acute hardship, disease and malnutrition faced by Sierra Leonean refugees and displaced people. During May and June 1998, 750 people, including children, were reported to have died of disease and malnutrition at Masingbi, in Tonkolili District, Northern Province, where some 15,000 displaced people have sought safety.

The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, following a visit to Sierra Leone in May 1998, challenged the international community to respond in a more vigorous and concerted way to the needs of children affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone. In June 1998 the UN Security Council, condemning the abduction, sexual abuse and recruitment and use in hostilities of children, said that it would pay serious attention to the situation of children affected by armed conflict. The needs of children in Sierra Leone are critical. Amnesty International welcomes the work of the Special Representative and endorses his call for Sierra Leone to be made one of the pilot projects for a more effective response m. t h e context 0 f post-confliret peace-bU1 ildimg. 15405

Prosecution Exhibit P-080

6848. Exhibit P-080 is the First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 12 August 1998. The report condemns the actions ofthe rebels in Sierra Leone. Such actions have included the destruction ofproperty, the use of human-shields, rapes, executions, mutilations and the taking of civilian captives. 15406

Prosecution Exhibit P-306/Defence Exhibit D-169

6849. Prosecution Exhibit P-306 and Defence Exhibit D-169 are the same document. It is the UN Security Council's second progress report of the Secretary-General on the UN

15404 Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 1, ERN00009l 15405 Exhibit P-081, "Amnesty International Report, 24 July 1998, p. 3, ERN000091

15406 Exhibit P-080, "UN Security Council- First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 August 1998 - 00012386 - 00012400", ERN 00012386.

2388 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18May2012 Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 16 October 1998. The report documents that following the arrest of Foday Sankoh, the RUF announced, on 17 August 1998, a terror campaign against the civilian population, CDF and ECOMOG if the Government failed to release Sankoh within seven days. The report indicates that President Kabbah and President Taylor are in regular contact by telephone and documents instances of attacks and human rights abuses by the rebels . The alarming humanitarian situation is noted .15407

Defence Exhibit 0-175

6850. Exhibit 0-175 is the UN Security Council's third progress report of the Secretary­ General on the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 16 December 1998. The report states that President Kabbah had agreed with President Taylor's request for cooperation on joint border patrols and that a Catholic priest , Father Mario Guerra, was kidnapped near Makeni on 17 November 1998 by elements of the AFRC. The report documents that rebel attacks in the north have persisted and intensified and that in December 1998 there were attacks on several locations. It states that there have been widespread rebel attacks on civilian populations, involving amputations, decapitations, rape, burning, destruction of homes, abduction and looting.15408

Defence Exhibit 0-177

6851. Exhibit 0-177 IS a compilation of news/press releases of ECOMOG, dated September to December 1998. The compilation includes news on ECOMOG's attempts to block the flow ofarms from Liberia to Sierra Leone.15409

Defence Exhibit 0-14I

6852. Exhibit 0-141 is a collection of Charles Taylor's Presidential papers, policies, speeches, statements and record of activities, dated 2 August 1997 to 31 December 1998. The collection includes a joint communique issued by Taylor, the Chairman of ECOWAS and the President ofSierra Leone on 2 July 1998 in which the Heads ofState of Liberia and

15407 Prosecution Exhibit P-306 and Defence Exhibit 0-169, "UN Security Council , Second Progress Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998 /960, 16 October 1998 ­ OCT 170". 15408 Exhibit 0-175, "UN Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1998/1176, 16 December 1998 - OCT 102". 15409 Exhibit 0-177, "Media Communique, A Compilation of News/Press Releases of ECOMOG, Vol. 1, No.1,

2389 Case No.: SCSL-03-01 -T 18 May 2012 Sierra Leone "strongly condemned the continuous rebel activities in Sierra Leone as well as the horrendous atrocities that had been committed there" .1 541 0

Prosecution Exhibits P-341A and P-341B

6853. Exhibits 341A and 341B are an audio clip and its accompanying transcript, respectively, of a BBC"Focus on Africa" interview that took place on 22 December 1998 between the Kwabena Mensah, a BBC reporter and Abubakar Sesay, a forest guard for the

Waterloo district. 1541 I In the interview Mensah reported that an ECOMOG commander had confirmed that the RUF had attacked Waterloo in the early hours of the morning. Abubakar Sesay stated that during the two-hour attack the rebels killed civilians, burnt houses and looted goodS.1 541 2

Prosecution Exhibit P-279B

6854. Exhibit P-279B is a transcript of a BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 5 and 6 January 1999. The transcript states that rebels have entered Freetown. The rebels have broken into the prison. 15413

Prosecution Exhibit P-111

6855. Exhibit P-111 is a BBC news article on the ' Battle for Sierra Leone,' dated 6 January 1999. The article documents the invasion of Freetown during which the rebels stormed the main prison and burned down several buildings.1541 4

Prosecution Exhibit P-308/Defence Exhibit 0-1 78

6856. Prosecution Exhibit P-308 and Defence Exhibit 0-178 are a UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) S/1999/20, dated 7 January 1999. It reported that on 22 December 1998,

Sept- Dec 1998, Freetown, December 1998 - DCT 23". 15410 Exhibit D-141, "Presidential Papers, Policies, Speeches, Statements and Record of the Activities of the ChiefExecutive of Liberia, 2 August 1997- December 31 1998 - DCT 256 (398 pages)", p. 298, para. 3. 15411 Exhibit P-341A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December 1998"; Exhibit P-341 B, "BBC Focus on Africa Transcript, 22 December 1998". 15412 Exhibit P-341 A, "BBC Focus on Africa Clip, 22 December 1998;" Exhibit P-342B, "BB CFocus on Africa Transcript, 22 December 1998", p. 23590 . 15413 Exhibit P-279B ,"Transcript - Track Two, BBC Focus on Africa, 6 January 1999 (Audio File) - D0000517". 15414 Exhibit P-lll, "BB C News Article, World : Africa Battle for Sierra Leone, January 6, 1999".

2390 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 20 12 rebels in the Western area attacked Waterloo, resulting in heavy casualties among the civilian population,15415 and the looting and burning of property, and the displacement of around 12,000 persons that fled from Waterloo to Freetown. 15416

Prosecution Exhibit P-352B

6857. Exhibit P-352B is a transcript ofa BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 11 January 1999. The transcript states that rebels in Freetown have set fire to many buildings and are using civilians as humans-shields. 15417

Prosecution Exhibit P-351B

6858. Exhibit P-351B is a transcript ofa BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 11 January 1999. The transcript states that the RUF in Freetown have set fire to many houses and are using civilians as humans-shields. 15418

Prosecution Exhibit P-354B

6859. Exhibit P-354B is a transcript ofa BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 18 January 1999. The transcript states that the RUF in Freetown have caused widespread destruction, looting and have executed civilians. 15419

Prosecution Exhibit P-356B

6860. Exhibit P-356B, is a transcript of a BBC Focus on Africa clip, dated 22 January 1999. It includes a report by BBC correspondent Winston Ojukutu-Macaulay, who travelled with ECOMOG to Kissy. In his report, Mr Ojukutu-Macaulay stated that the "rebels have

15415 Exhibit P-308, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999", p. 21473. 15416 Exhibit P-308, "UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999", p. 21477. 15417 Exhibit P-352B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 - D0000515, 11 January 1999 - CMS PG 23619". 15418 Exhibit P-351B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000515, 11 January 1999 - CMS PGS 23616-23618". 15419 Exhibit P-354B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 2 - D0000542, 18 January 1999 - CMS PGS 23623-23624".

2391 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 reverted to their terror campaign of amputating civilians". Thus, he stated that on their way back to Freetown from Kissy, ECOMOG transported five civilians who were amputated. 15420

Prosecution Exhibit P-357S

6861. Exhibit P-357S is a transcript of a SSC Focus on Africa clip, dated 23 January 1999. The transcript states that the RUFfAFRC rebels are leaving a trail of destruction as they are being chased out of Freetown, including by burning houses and taking hostages and one Roman Catholic nun has been killed. 15421

Prosecution Exhibit P-123

6862. Exhibit P-123 is SSC news article, dated 27 January 1999. The article states that the rebels in Freetown have been following a 'scorched-earth policy' and have burned buildings and attacked and killed civilians. 15422

Prosecution Exhibit P-309

6863. Exhibit P-309 is a 'Report on Atrocities Committed Against the Sierra Leone Population' prepared by the UNHCR, dated 28 January 1999.15423 The report documents atrocities committed by Junta forces retreating from Freetown against the local population.

Defence Exhibit D-191

6864. Exhibit D-191 is the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 4 March 1999. The report documents the rebel attacks on Freetown on 6 January 1999 which resulted in between 3,000 to 5,000 deaths. ECOMOG forces managed to expel the rebels but the security situation in Freetown remains volatile. In response to allegations that they were supporting the Sierra Leonean rebels, the Liberian government issued a statement that they recognised the Kabbah Government as the legitimate government and that they did not, and would not, support any attempt to

\5420 Exhibit P-356B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa, Clip from Track 2 - D000507, 22 January 1999", p. 23628. \542\ Exhibit P-357B, "Transcript - BBC Focus on Africa Clip from track 1 - D0000508, 23 January 1999 - CMS PGS 23629-23630".

\5422 Exhibit P-123, "BBC News Article, Freetown Bears the Scars, 27 January 1999".

\5423 Exhibit P-309, "Report On Atrocities Committed Against the Sierra Leone Population, UNHCR Branch Office Conakry, 28 January 1999, Unnumbered Paras 1-3, Case # 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16 - 0004550 ­ 00004557,00004561 - 00004563, 00004557 -00004577",

2392 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 destabilise Sierra Leone or any other country. The Liberian Government also requested the Security Council to approve the deployment of United Nations monitors along with ECOMOG troops at the Liberian/Sierra Leonean border in light of repeated allegations of illegal shipments ofarms to the rebels. 15424

Prosecution Exhibit P-035

6865. Exhibit P-035 is an IRIN update on events in West Africa, dated 8 April 1999. The update documents the ECOMOG commander in Sierra Leone, Major General Felix Mujakperuo, warning the Presidents of Liberia and Burkina Faso that ECOMOG has confirmed the activities of the two countries and their leaders involved in the shipment and delivery ofarms to the RUF through the government ofa neighbouring country. 15425

Prosecution Exhibit P-037

6866. Exhibit P-037 is an agreement on a ceasefire in Sierra Leone, dated 17 April 1999 and signed 18 May 1999. The agreement is signed by Sierra Leonean President Tejan

Kabbah and RUF leader Foday Sankoh. 15426

Defence Exhibit D-OI9

6867. Exhibit D-OI9 is a BBC news article, dated 18 April 1999. The article states that the

RUF rebels have committed widespread atrocities and mutilated civilians in Freetown. 15427

Prosecution Exhibit P-312

6868. Exhibit P-312 is a humanitarian situation report on Sierra Leone prepared by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, dated 1 May 1999 to 17 May 1999. The reports documents humanitarian concerns for the Sierra Leonean civilian popuIation.· 15428

15424 Exhibit D-191, "UN Security Council, Fifth Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/237, 4 March 1999 - CMS pgs. 21594----21607 - DCT 142", pp. 1-2, 5, ERN 4266-4267,4270. 15425 Exhibit P-035, "IRIN update 438 ofevents in West Africa, 8 April 1999", ERN 00021259. 15426 Exhibit P-037, "Agreement on ceasefire in Sierra Leone - 17 April 1999, signed 18 May 1999". 15427 Exhibit D-019, "BBC News Article, 18 April 1999, World: Africa Rebel Leader Freed for Talks, 18 April 1999". 15428 Exhibit P-312, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report 1-17 May 1999, UN Office For the

2393 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Prosecution Exhibit P-313

6869. Exhibit P-313 is the sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, dated 4 June 1999. The report documents a resurgence of rebel atrocities against civilians, including summary executions, mutilations, amputations, abductions, sexual abuse and the large-scale destruction ofproperty. 15429

Prosecution Exhibit P-438

6870. Exhibit P-438 is an excerpt of a letter from the Charge d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, dated 25 January 1999. In the letter, the President of Sierra Leone states that he knows for certain offive camps in Liberia in which rebels are trained to commit atrocities in

Sierra Leone. 15430

Prosecution Exhibit P-314

6871. Exhibit P-3l4 is a humanitarian situation report on Sierra Leone prepared by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, dated 18 May 1999 to 11 June 1999. The report documents that the security situation in Sierra Leone has substantially improved following the beginning ofthe ceasefire on 24 May 1999, however there were still incidents across the country and the humanitarian situation is still a cause for concern. \543\

Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs, Unnumbered Paragraphs 2 and 3 On Page 1, Unnumbered Paragraph 3 and 4 On Page 4, Unnumbered Paragraph 3 and 4 On Page 5". 15429 Exhibit P-313, "UN Security Council, Sixth Report Of the Secretary-General On the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/645, 4 June 1999, Paragraphs 5-7, 9, 19-20,28-33,40 (Part), 48 B (Part), 63, 64 (Part), 69 - 00012323, 00012326 - 00012332", pp. 6-9, ERN 12327-12330. 15430 Exhibit P-438, "Excerpts from: United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 19 January 1999 from the Charge d' Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, S/1999/73, 25 January 1999", p. 2. 15431 Exhibit P-314, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report, 18 May - 11 June 1999, UN Office for the Coordination OfHumanitarian Affairs, first bullet point in unnumberes paragraph 4 on page 2, third bullet point in unnumbered paragraph 1".

2394/ Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T 18 May 2012 Defence Exhibit 0-347

6872. Exhibit 0-347 is the Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), dated August 1999. The journal includes a decision on the new ECOMOG mandate in Sierra Leone. 15432

Prosecution Exhibit P-315

6873. Exhibit P-315 is a humanitarian situation report on Sierra Leone prepared by UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, dated 3 October 1999 to 9 October 1999. The report states that the security situation in Sierra Leone has seen no further improvement and documents what is being done to improve the humanitarian situation.15433

Defence Exhibit 0-400

6874. Exhibit 0-400 is a summary of the meeting between Presidential Special Envoy Jesse Jackson and Charles Taylor, dated 19 May 2000. At the meeting Taylor said the UN hostages release must not be conditioned on Foday Sankoh's fate or on changes to the Lome Agreement and that Taylor does not control the RUF, nor is the Liberian Government involved in diamond smuggling or arms trafficking. 15434

Defence Exhibit 0-248

6875. Exhibit 0-248 is a final communique of the Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State Members ofthe Committee on Sierra Leone on the Lome Agreement in Abuja, dated 9 May 2000. In the communique the Heads of State express their deep concern about the latest developments in Sierra Leone, in particular condemning the RUF who have taken hostage soldiers ofthe UN mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).15435

15432 Exhibit D-347, "Official Journal of the Economic Community ofWest African States (ECOWAS), Vol. 36, August 1999 - DCT 281 (4 pp.)". 15433 Exhibit P-315, "Sierra Leone Humanitarian Situation Report: 03-09 October 1999 UN Office For the Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs, paras 1, 5 and 6 on p.1, part of unnumbered paragpraph one on p. 2, paragraph on "child protection" on p. 4 - 00004165 - 00004166". 15434 Exhibit D-400, "Unclassified: Unclassified Release in full, 19 May 2000 - ERN 0005828 to 0005842 ­ DCT 267 (15 pages) SE Jackson's May 19 meeting with Charles Taylor", pp. 2,4, ERN R0005823, R0005830 15435 Exhibit D-248, "Final Communique, Summit of ECOW AS Heads of State Members of the Committee on Sierra Leone on the Lome Peace Agreement, Abuja, 9 May 2000 - DCT 96", p. 2.

2395 Case No.: SCSL-03-01-T ~ 18 May 2012