Readings for Lecture -1

The Ministry of External Affairs () (MEA), also known as the Foreign Ministry, is the government agency responsible for the conduct of foreign relations of India. With the world's third largest military expenditure, fourth largest armed force, fifth largest by GDP nominal rates and third largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity, India is a prominent , a nuclear power, an emerging global power and a potential . India assumes a growing international influence and a prominent voice in global affairs.

As a former British colony, India is a member of the and continues to maintain relationships with other Commonwealth countries. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1947, however, India is now classified as a newly industrialised country and has cultivated an extensive network of foreign relations with other states. As a member state of BRICS - a repertoire of emerging major that also encompasses , , and , India also exerts a salient influence as the founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. In recent decades, India has pursued a more expansive foreign policy that encompasses the neighborhood first policy embodied by SAARC as well as the to forge more extensive economic and strategic relationships with other East Asian countries. Moreover, India was one of the founding members of several international organisations—the , the Asian Development Bank, New Development BRICS Bank, and G- 20, widely considered the main economic locus of emerging and developed nations.

India has also played an important and influential role in other international organisations like East Summit, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund (IMF), G8+5 and IBSA Dialogue Forum. India is also a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Regionally, India is a part of SAARC and BIMSTEC. India has taken part in several UN peacekeeping missions, and as of June 2020, is the fifth-largest troop contributor. India is currently seeking a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, along with the other G4 nations.

India wields enormous influence in global affairs and can be classified as an emerging superpower.

Reframing India’s foreign policy priorities

Apart from an ideational restructuring, prudent plans, achievable objectives and a line of continuity are a must The year 2021 should see a cementing of the many trends that had their genesis in 2020. Leadership change in the is perhaps the most awaited change, but is unlikely to bring about a major power shift in the international arena. Even before

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the changeover, and despite the promise of a Biden presidency to invigorate the U.S.- Europe axis, Europe has turned its back on the U.S. and revived its China links, by ‘concluding in principle the negotiations for an EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment’. In one swift move, Europe has thus shattered all hope that China would remain ostracised in 2021. Many countries will now find themselves scrambling for cover. India which has greatly curtailed its relations with China since April 2020, (in the wake of Chinese aggression in Eastern Ladakh) will find itself ‘out on a limb’, with many countries likely to seek closer economic relations with China now.

A stronger China The year 2021, hence, begins on a triumphal note for China and China’s Supreme Leader, Xi Jinping. China is about the only major country which had a positive rate of growth at the end of 2020, and its economy is poised to grow even faster in 2021. Militarily, China has further strengthened itself, and now seeks to dominate the Indo- Pacific Ocean with its announcement of the launch of its third in 2021. Simultaneously, it is seeking to strengthen its military coordination with Russia. Consequent on all this, and notwithstanding Chinese intransigence in several matters including its heavy-handed actions in Hong Kong and Uighur, China’s position across Asia is, if anything, stronger than in 2020. News emanating from China is that President Xi will further cement his position, both as Party leader and as President during 2021, despite internecine tensions within the Communist Party of China. China is, hence, unlikely to concede any ground to its opponents across the world in 2021, a fact that India will need to reckon with. It cannot expect any Chinese concessions in Eastern Ladakh, until India ‘makes amends’.

Economy first for Europe The new year will be dominated by strong authoritarian leaders like Xi Jinping in China, Vladimir Putin in Russia, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. International politics may not be very different from that in 2020, but any hope that the Compact of Democracy would emerge stronger will need to be eschewed. Europe, minus Britain following Brexit, and the retirement of ’s , could become even less relevant in world affairs. The China-EU Investment Treaty which saw Europe capitulating to China’s brandishments is an indication that Europe values its economy more than its politics.

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Major changes are afoot in Eurasia and West Asia which could lead to significant shifts. Russia is beginning to display greater interest in the affairs of countries on its periphery and, together with strengthening ties with China and reaching an entente with Turkey, this seems to signal reduced interest in countries such as India. In West Asia, the Abraham Accords, leading to a realignment of forces in the Arab world, have sharpened the division between the Saudi Bloc and Iran-Turkey. Despite the hype surrounding the Abraham Accords, the situation, however, remains fluid and has not reduced the risk of a confrontation between Iran and Israel. This does pose problems for India, since both have relations with it. Meanwhile, China demonstrates a willingness to play a much larger role in the region, including contemplating a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Iran. Saudi Arabia could find the going difficult in 2021, with a Biden Administration taking charge in Washington. The healing of wounds among the Sunni Arab states in the region should be viewed as a pyrrhic victory at best for Saudi Arabia. One by- product of this could be a sharpening of hostilities between the Sunni and Shia camps. Given the strategic flux in the region, Iran could well be tempted to use its nuclear capability to enhance its position, confident that the West may be unwilling to challenge it at this juncture.

India isolated At the start of 2021, India seems the odd man missing as far as these developments are concerned. No breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations has, or is likely to occur, and the confrontation between Indian and Chinese armed forces is expected to continue. India currently plays no significant role in West Asia. India-Iran relations today lack warmth. In Afghanistan, India has been marginalised as far as the peace process is concerned. While India’s charges against of sponsoring terror have had some impact globally, it has further aggravated tensions between the two neighbours, and in the process, also helped Pakistan to cement its relations with China. While hostility between India and Nepal appears to have reduced lately, relations continue to be strained. Through a series of diplomatic visits, India has made valiant efforts to improve relations with some of its neighbours such as Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, but as of now worthwhile results are not evident. One key takeaway is that as India-China relations deteriorate, India’s neighbours are not averse to taking sides, increasing India’s isolation.

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Whether India’s perceived marginalisation from global mainstream events as we enter 2021 signifies a sharp drop-off in its foreign policy capabilities is, no doubt, debatable. India’s foreign policy objectives are to widen its , enhance its role across nations, and make its presence felt as an in an increasingly disruptive global system. It is a moot point though whether any of these objectives has been achieved. Today, India’s voice and counsel are seldom sought, or listened to. This is a far cry from what used to happen previously. India will serve as the president of the powerful UN Security Council for the month of August, 2021, but if it is to make a real impact, it must be seen to possess substantial weight to shape policies, more so in its traditional areas of influence.

Diplomacy and perceptions Many explanations could be available for this state of affairs. Admittedly, our diplomats conduct their activities with a high degree of competence, but they are possibly hampered by other factors. One, could be the kind of policy choices the country has adopted in the recent period, which have possibly altered the perception of India in certain quarters. There is again a perception that India’s closeness to the U.S. has resulted in the weakening of its links with traditional friends such as Russia and Iran, impacting the country’s image. Perhaps the most relevant explanation could be the shifting balance of power in the region in which India is situated, notably the rise of China, and the enlarging conflict between the two biggest powers in Asia, compelling many nations to pick sides in the conflict.

A less obvious, but perhaps more relevant aspect, could also be that India’s foreign policy suffers from an ideational vacuum. It is not the sharp decline in the economy, problems caused on account of the pandemic, or the growing polarisation in values across nations and societies, but more possibly India’s inability or failure in the ideational realm that lies at the root of our foreign policy inadequacies.

More misses than hits Currently, India remains isolated from two important supranational bodies of which it used to be a founding member, viz., the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Efforts to whip up enthusiasm for newer institutions such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), have hardly been successful. India has opted out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (a majority of

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Asian countries are members), and failed to take advantage of the RIC, or the Russia, India and China grouping, even as relations with Russia and China have deteriorated. On the other hand, India’s foreign policy imperatives, across Asia and in particular, today seem to be a mixture of misplaced confidence, sometimes verging on hubris (as in the case of Nepal), a lack of understanding of the sensitivities of neighbours such as Bangladesh and long-time friends (such as Vietnam and Iran), and according excessive importance to the policy needs and pressures of nations such as the U.S. There is possibly a misplaced perception in much of Asia that the India of today is not unwilling to sacrifice its strategic autonomy under U.S. pressure. As part of the ideational restructuring of India’s foreign policy, what is urgently required, apart from competent statecraft, is the adoption of prudent policies, pursuit of realistically achievable objectives, and, above all, a demonstration of continuity of policy, irrespective of changes in the nature of the Administration. These may be time consuming, but are a surer recipe for success in attaining foreign policy objectives.

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India's Foreign Policy Strategy Is Increasingly Resembling That of China

Even as aligns with the Quad to pressure Beijing, the BJP's assertiveness beyond India's boundaries and its conflation of regime interest with national interest mirror that of the Communist Party of China.

Flag of Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, BJP's flag. Photo: Reuters/PTI Illustration: The Wire

Even as India targets China in its alignment with the other democracies in the Quad, it is worth reflecting on how closely the temper and, to an extent the practice, of Indian foreign policy appears to be aligned with those of Chinese foreign policy. China’s assertiveness beyond its boundaries derives in large measure from the nature of the Communist Party of China (CPC) as a political party that does not believe in sharing power at home, from its conflation of regime interest with the national interest.

For Indians, this should not be so hard to understand. The BJP’s calls for a Congress- mukt Bharat or attempts to undermine even allied parties in states where they are strong is of a piece with the CPC’s belief that it is the only political party that can make China strong again. If anything, the BJP’s plans – while harder to execute – are all the more audacious for this reason. But the point here is that such ambitions often escape domestic bounds.

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The CPC, despite its beginnings and its rhetoric, is now pretty much a modern political party with a view of history and of the future that is more in tune with imperial China, than the people’s republic it claims to be. This is the same sin that it has consistently accused the Indians of with respect to the boundary dispute where it claims New Delhi has inherited the attitudes and mentality of the British Raj. While this latter claim might be debated, there should be no doubt that the BJP like the CPC, seeks to draw present-day legitimacy by harking back to an imagined past of cultural glory and territorial expanse followed by victimisation at the hands of foreigners, promising restoration of the former and restitution for the latter.

A general view shows delegates attending the closing session of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, October 24, 2017. Photo: Reuters/Jason Lee

While India does not yet have the economic and military means to turn abrasive with this attitude beyond its borders – though the Nepalese might argue otherwise, the Chinese have the means to do so both within their borders and outside. Thus, the unalloyed destruction of the culture and identities of the Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols among other ethnic minorities as well as their attempts to control all religions at home.

This is also why when Yang Jiechi, CPC Politburo member and head of the Party’s Foreign Affairs Commission Office, tells the US at Anchorage, Alaska, “We thought too well of the United States, we thought the US side will follow the necessary diplomatic protocols”, this has nothing to do with what the US did or did not do but is about highlighting China as the “great civilisation” that follows diplomatic niceties even when it has to deal with the “barbarians”. It is then natural for Yang to continue,

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“in front of the Chinese side, the United States does not have the qualification to say that it wants to speak to China from a position of strength.”

India is getting there

But India is getting there. In a broadside against foreign organisations and governments commenting about the state of democracy and civil rights in India, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar declared:

“Because you have a set of self-appointed custodians of the world, who find it very difficult to stomach that somebody in India is not looking for their approval, is not willing to play the game they want to be played…so they invent their rules, their parameters, they pass their judgments and then make out as though this is some kind of global exercise…”

Compare this to Yang’s statement or to what Xi Jinping, then Chinese Vice-President, said on a 2009 visit to in remarks to overseas Chinese:

“There are some foreigners who had eaten their fill and had nothing better to do, pointing their fingers at our affairs. China does not, first, export revolution; second, export poverty and hunger; or third, cause unnecessary trouble for you. What else is there to say?”

But it is part of the nature of political parties that claim omnipotence, as the CPC and BJP do, that insecurity and braggadocio are never far from the surface. Thus, both Chinese and Indian leaders have made strident claims about not giving up an inch of their territory, if at different times and in different contexts. Meeting with the then US secretary of defence James Mattis in Beijing in June 2018, Xi said, “Any inch of territory passed down from ancestors cannot be lost while we want nothing from others.” No direct reference has been made officially to India, but his frequent references in recent years to “preparing for and fighting wars” (beizhan dazhang) and the “strong enemy” (qiangdi) can be interpreted as being aimed at India, too.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi would also claim in a statement immediately after the Galwan incident to leaders of Indian political parties that “neither had anyone entered Indian territory nor captured any Indian posts”, which was inaccurate at least from the point of view of the fact that the Chinese were actually sitting in Aksai Chin, territory India claims. It would also be hard to take seriously from any objective assessment of accounts of what has been going on at the LAC since April/May 2020, including the attempts at disengagement.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Wuhan, Hubei province, China, April 27, 2018. Photo: China Daily via Reuters/Files

Lack of concern for positive international norms

Meanwhile, the statement in February 2021 by a minister of state and former Army chief, General V.K. Singh that “if China has transgressed 10 times, we must have done it at least 50 times” was perhaps another example, of grandstanding. But there’s a deeper implication. Even if this was a statement of fact, it was completely unnecessary to proclaim it and undercut India’s image as an upholder of international law. This lack of concern for positive international norms or indeed, for the national image abroad is actually of a piece with what the Chinese are doing. Indeed, Jaishankar’s response to India’s falling rank on various international democracy indices could well be compared to China’s wolf warrior diplomacy, where domestic interests and image-building outweigh concerns about international opprobrium.

This might be considered as a case of “look[ing] beyond dogma” but the increasing alignment of Chinese and Indian methods and approaches in their external policies appears also to be a natural corollary to the alignment of their methods and approaches domestically. And that, despite the cheering from the rafters at home, will likely complicate and undermine India’s larger foreign policy goals including those vis-à-vis China. There is much that India can learn from China but there are lessons also about what not to do. For India to copy without discernment would be a victory for the “Chinese model” pushed by the CPC

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