PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 2

August 2005 No.3

SUMMARY

The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was the first Lessons From legislative attempt to compre- hensively address the issue of The Immigration unauthorized immigration. Reform and The bill included sanctions against employers for the hiring of undocumented migrants, more Control Act of robust border enforcement, and an expansive legalization program that 1986 was unprecedented.

IRCA resulted from a number of Betsy Cooper political compromises, and balanced Kevin O’Neil the need for stronger immigration enforcement with legalization of a I. Introduction:The Political Context large portion of the unauthorized population. The United States has struggled with the issue of unauthorized immigration and immigration reform before. The 1986 Although the concepts behind the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was the product legislation were sound, there were of that struggle, and provides valuable lessons as immigration a number of problems with its reform options are considered today. IRCA was the first and design and implementation in each most comprehensive legislation in United States immigration of its major goals: employer policy to take on the issue of unauthorized migration, utilizing accountability, broader enforcement both legalization programs to regularize migrants already in that prevented illegal entries, and legalization of a large population of the country and stronger enforcement mechanisms to prevent unauthorized migrants. new entries.

While the context of American The debate that led to IRCA lasted over a decade, with forms immigration has changed of the eventual bill by Congressman Mazzoli and Senator substantially since 1986, the Simpson proposed in the Congress as early as 1982. The incentives for immigration to the reform that was eventually passed was the product of four sets United States remain the same. of political compromises. Those compromises were: Thus, many lessons from the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control A link between stronger enforcement of immigration Act remain powerful in today’s law, both at the border and inside the country, and environment. legalization of the unauthorized immigrant population. PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 3

Demand for a law that would sanction employ- A compromise between a “generous” ers for hiring unauthorized immigrants had legalization and a “restrictive” one. The existed since Senator Paul Douglas first pro- Select Commission on Immigration and posed sanctions legislation in the early 1950s. Refugee Policy (SCIRP), appointed by However, these proposals became politically President Carter, recommended legalization as viable only when they first became linked with the way to deal with what was then seen as a a legalization program in 1975. This link creat- large unauthorized immigrant population. ed the possibility of compromise between However, legalization was attacked on the strongly opposed political interests. President grounds that it would encourage further unau- Carter’s Domestic Council Committee on thorized immigration and that it would unfairly Illegal Aliens added improvements in border reward those who had broken the law. Debate enforcement to the debate, eventually resulting on this point centered on three issues: timing (whether legalization would be simultaneous in IRCA legislation that its sponsors described with or follow changes in enforcement); eligi- as a “three-legged stool” of employer sanc- bility (who would be eligible for legalization); tions, border enforcement, and legalization and process (whether legalized immigrants opportunities. would receive permanent resident status direct- ly or after passing through a temporary, inter- A balance between strong enforcement mediate status). IRCA embodied compromises and the rights of employers and workers. on each of these issues. A law preventing employers from hiring unau- thorized workers (“employer sanctions”) was Accommodation of the interests of thought to be key to controlling future unautho- agricultural producers. Agricultural produc- rized immigration, but risked placing too much ers were a key constituency necessary to enact responsibility for enforcing immigration law on immigration reform. However, the traditional employers by asking them in effect to serve as method of meeting demand for agricultural junior immigration inspectors. Employer sanc- labor – temporary workers – was anathema to tions also created the risk that employers, fear- many supporters of the IRCA bill. Thus, pro- ing they might inadvertently hire an unautho- posals to replace the H-2 temporary agricultur- rized worker, would discriminate against US al worker visa program with a larger and less citizens, permanent residents, and other legal regulated guestworker program failed. As a workers of apparent foreign origin. The final result, Congress met the interests of both grow- legislation created a version of employer sanc- ers and farmworkers’ rights advocates within tions that tried to accommodate these concerns. the legalization program by creating special While it rejected the notion of a national iden- legalization categories for agricultural workers. tification card, it introduced a form of verifica- tion of legal status for determining eligibility II. Major Elements of IRCA for public benefits (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlement – SAVE). The In its final form, the bill contained employer sanctions provisions in IRCA were the following: also notable for invoking the largest expansion of federal regulatory authority since the enact- Employer sanctions. Called the “keystone” ment of the Occupational Safety and Health of the bill, employer sanctions made three Act in 1980, as well as for the fact that the types of activity illegal: 1) the knowing hiring law’s civil and criminal penalties extended to of persons not authorized to work in the United individuals as well as firms. States; 2) the continued employment of persons

2 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 4

Policy Brief

not authorized to work (though persons previ- As a result, a false document industry has ously employed were not subject to these grown to subvert the law’s documentation restrictions); and 3) the hiring of an individual requirement. It must also be said that employer without verifying or correctly documenting the sanctions have never been aggressively person’s identity and eligibility to work legally enforced and criminal prosecutions of employer in the United States (the so-called “paperwork sanctions violations have rarely been carried requirements”). out successfully.

As a result of concerns about the burden it Border enforcement. Following IRCA’s would put on employers, the law reserved the enactment, there was a 50 percent increase in largest penalties for “knowing” (as opposed to Border Patrol staffing, contributing to a surge in technical) violations. While employers were apprehensions of unauthorized aliens along the required to sign a form attesting that they US-Mexico border. Additional funding was also examined employment documents to determine used to support efforts to expeditiously remove the applicant’s eligibility, employers were also criminal aliens. However, these increases fol- required to accept any document that “reason- lowing IRCA were small ably appears on its face to be genuine,” sub- compared to increases in Nearly 2.7 million stantially reducing the Border Patrol funding and people received per- Employer sanctions have burden of verification. staffing beginning in 1994 manent residency in An amendment to the not become an effective and thereafter. the United States as IRCA bill, designed to tool for enforcement a result of IRCA protect legal workers Legalization of unautho- from any discrimination engendered by rized immigrants. Although IRCA’s political employer sanctions, penalized employers for origins lay in the desire to better enforce immi- conducting overly aggressive scrutiny of work- gration law, it was the law’s legalization provi- ers’ legal status on the basis of their nationali- sions that would have the larger and more ty or national origin. Of the $123 million enduring effect. In total, over 3 million people increase in the Immigration and Naturalization applied for temporary residency, and nearly 2.7 Service budget allocation from 1986 to 1987, million people received permanent residency in $33.7 million was dedicated to enforcing the United States as a result of IRCA. IRCA employer sanctions. remains the largest immigrant legalization process conducted in history, and the lessons of Employer sanctions have not become an effec- its legalization programs are relevant today. tive tool for enforcement. In part, this may be a result of the compromises made to implement them without overburdening employers or pro- III. Legalization:An Overview moting discrimination. It may also be a result of the framers’ decision not to adopt a national IRCA created two sets of criteria for qualifying identity card. As a result, employers had no for legalization. The first was the product of a reliable, quick way to verify the authenticity of long political debate over how generous of a the documents used to prove identity and work general amnesty should be offered; and the sec- authorization. They simply had to maintain a ond was the result of a last-minute agreement record (I-9 form) demonstrating that they had on agricultural workers. Proponents of legaliza- asked for and examined specific documents tion originally envisioned the program granting from a list of over two dozen defined in the permanent residency directly. In the end, a implementing regulations. two-tier process was enacted. Applicants had to qualify first for temporary, then for permanent

3 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 5

status, and were ineligible for public benefits were required to be temporary residents and until they gained permanent status. work in perishable agriculture for at least 90 • General Legalization Program. days in each of the following three years to Unauthorized immigrants who were in con- gain permanent residency, and an additional tinuous residence since January 1, 1982 two years to gain citizenship. The RAW pro- were eligible for temporary legal status. gram has never been used. It is contingent Applicants had to pay a $185 filing fee (to upon the Departments of Labor and pay for the costs of administering the pro- Agriculture determining a labor shortage in gram) and demonstrate that they were of perishable agriculture. “good moral character” (no criminal record) and that they would not become public • Other Programs. Two other legalization charges. Temporary residency lasted 18 programs with limited terms were also enact- months, after which the legalized immigrants ed. Section 429 of the 1952 Immigration and became eligible for permanent residency Nationality Act, (the “registry”), which (i.e., “green cards”). In this stage, immi- allows long-term unauthorized immigrants grants had to show proof of English language present before a certain date to petition to competency and knowledge of American adjust their status to permanent residency, civics, requirements otherwise met for natu- was updated by nearly 30 years to January 1, ralization. Approximately 1.75 million peo- 1972. It affected nearly 60,000 people. A ple applied for legalization through the pro- limited program to allow certain Cuban and gram and about 94 percent of applications Haitian “special entrants” who arrived in the were approved for temporary residency. United States before 1982 was also enacted to correct the imbalance in treatment • Special Agricultural Worker Program. between natives of the two countries. The Special Agricultural Worker (SAW) pro- gram provided permanent residency to aliens IV. Key Lessons from IRCA who could demonstrate they had 60 days of seasonal agricultural work experience in Many of the lessons from IRCA provide guid- qualifying crops from May 1985 to May ance for any future legalization program. 1986. SAW applicants could apply for per- manent residency status without meeting the Scope:Who Was Included civics and language requirement for appli- and Excluded? cants to the general legalization program, and the program was funded through appro- A substantial percentage of unauthorized priated funds, not applicant fees. Nearly 1.3 migrants were eligible and able to legalize. million people applied for the SAW program, However, IRCA left out some groups and its far more than the 250,000 who were project- implementation was uneven. ed to do so. • Legalization led to mixed-status • Replenishment Agricultural Worker families. Those who arrived in the five Program. To help counter the effects of the years between the January 1, 1982 cut-off SAW program, which growers feared would date for the general legalization and the lead to the exit of many newly legalized law’s 1987 implementation were ineligible workers from the agricultural industry, for the program. Many of these people were Congress created a Replenishment the immediate relatives of people who did Agricultural Worker (RAW) program. RAWs qualify for legalization. The INS originally

4 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 6

Policy Brief

held that legalized migrants should wait until Implementing IRCA receiving permanent residency and then apply to sponsor family members for immi- IRCA authorized the US government to make gration through normal channels. Because life-changing decisions for nearly 3 million this policy left a large number of families in a people in just a few years. The extraordinary mixed legal-illegal status, the INS eventually challenge of this mass bureaucratic administra- provided “indefinite voluntary departure,” tion of justice led the INS to create a temporary, allowing many families to stay together in a parallel structure of local offices, processing semi-legal status. Immigration advocates crit- facilities, and staff separate from INS district icized the implementation of this policy, offices. The local Legalization Office staff inter- known as “family fairness,” as being too arbi- trary and unevenly applied. viewed the applicant and forwarded the appli- cation to Regional Processing Facilities for • There were “dropouts” from the review. Denied applicants could appeal to the two-tiered system. Through 2001, up to Legalization Appeals Unit. In addition, the INS 12 percent of applicants for temporary status designated a number of private and religious did not go on to receive permanent residen- organizations as Qualified Designated Entities cy. These percentages are even higher for (QDEs). The organizations assisted immigrants the SAW program, though it is unclear how in applying for legalization and in return were many were denied temporary status to begin promised a $15 reimbursement by the INS for with, how many reverted to unauthorized every completed application. status, and how many returned to their country of origin. • The timing and structure of funding for legalization was a challenge. Because the • There was no plan for those who did general legalization program was to be self- not qualify. Some estimates report that the funded through application fees, the INS unauthorized population only fell by about could not request an appropriation from half from 1986 (3.1 million) to 1988 (1.9 Congress. It funded the start-up costs of the million). With the failure of border and sanc- program by borrowing against its normal tions enforcement to reduce incentives for budget. Although application fees generated unauthorized migration, those who did not more revenue than was needed to administer legalize became the nucleus of the unautho- the program, fewer applications were rized population today. received than expected early in the applica- tion process. This led the INS to scale down • Outreach was not universally effective. its legislative staff midway, only to be over- The national publicity effort on the legaliza- tion program was late in reaching its zenith whelmed by a surge of applications at the end and some constituencies, particularly non- of the application period. In contrast, the Hispanic immigrants, were disadvantaged. SAW program was funded through an alloca- A contract planned for local publicity never tion of tax dollars and also collected applica- materialized. As a result, outreach was often tion fees. The program’s higher-than-expected done on an ad hoc basis with the help of com- participation meant that the government col- munity organizations with other responsibili- lected $107 million more from the program ties. Even this effort was delayed by the ini- than it had allocated to administer it, almost tial reluctance of many immigrant organiza- all of which was used for purposes unrelated tions to collaborate too closely with the INS. to the SAW program.

5 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 7

• The QDE program was helpful but and became unauthorized did not always imperfect. The QDEs played an important qualify. The courts gave the latter group the administrative guidance and outreach role, broadest opportunity possible to qualify for particularly at the local level, that the INS legalization. However, the court battles were simply could not fill alone. However, some an expensive, protracted way to fine-tune QDEs were little more than legalization the program. entrepreneurs determined to collect the reimbursement fee while providing little true Fraud, Documentation, and assistance. Other legitimate QDEs suffered Security Requirements financially because applicants sought their advice and services, but filed their applica- Legalization participants were required to pro- tions directly with the INS. duce documentation demonstrating their eligi- bility and to undergo security checks to make • Immigration backlogs increased follow- sure that they were not excludable under any ing IRCA. Before the legalization program other provision of US law. Participants in the began, there was already a backlog for bene- general legalization program were required to fits applications in the INS. That backlog show three forms of evidence: proof of identity, substantially increased because INS proof of residence, and proof of sufficient resources were partially diverted by IRCA. financial resources to avoid becoming a public Additionally, the number of people receiving charge. Affidavits from the applicant or third permanent residency through IRCA created parties were often relied on, and a “preponder- an increase in applications for family reunifi- ance of the evidence” standard was used to cation immigration for which the INS’s determine eligibility. Participants in the SAW resources were inadequate. program were required to prove that they had worked in the agricultural industry for the Legal Issues and Challenges qualifying length of time, usually by presenting an affidavit of support from their former The INS had broad flexibility in establishing employer, after which the burden of proof lay the regulations for implementing IRCA, and it on the INS to disprove the claim. won praise for a collaborative rulemaking process. In general, it used its administrative • Affidavits were a useful but problematic discretion in favor of the applicant. However, form of documentation. When consider- on a few issues, e.g., the definition of “continu- ing a population that, by its very nature, is ous presence,” it insisted on a strict interpreta- “unauthorized,” sworn affidavits were an tion of the statute. In such cases where litiga- almost indispensable part of the documenta- tion ensued, the government generally lost. tion process. A number of class action law- suits led the INS to broadly accept such affi- • Legal challenges to IRCA tended to davits with minimal known instances of mis- expand the legalization and make it use. However, applications for SAW legaliza- more consistent. IRCA contained a num- tion were suspected to have contained many ber of internal inconsistencies: for example, falsified affidavits, and the INS had little immigrants who had entered the country investigative capacity to disprove them. illegally by the 1982 cutoff date were auto- matically eligible for legalization, while • Security checks were only part of the those who entered legally before that date initial process. Before going to the

6 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 8

Policy Brief

Regional Processing Facilities, every applica- do so). As no English and civics require- tion for temporary residency was cross-checked ments were imposed on SAW applicants, against a number of criminal database watch- they had an easier path to legalization. At lists. Security checks were not systematically the same time, the availability of education run during the second-tier application for per- courses also (at least anecdotally) created manent resident status. demand for further English and civics instruction among the legalizing population. Integration Measures and the Impact on States and Localities • There were problems with disbursement of funds to states. Federal reporting The general legalization program required that requirements led to significant delays for applicants complete an English/civics class or state disbursements, and, in turn, to the pass a test in those subjects to gain permanent funding for providers. These problems were residency. As permanent residents they would exacerbated as many applicants waited until be exempt from the English/civics test require- the end of the eligibility States were responsible ment of the naturalization application process. period before applying for providing the courses The SAW program did not have an for permanent residen- English/civics requirement. cy, delaying the stream needed to qualify for of money for states. permanent residency States were responsible for providing the cours- es needed to qualify for permanent residency. IV. Conclusion: They also absorbed the public assistance and The Relevance of IRCA public health services costs of the legalizing population. (Legalized immigrants were barred Clearly there are lessons to be learned from from federal public benefits for five years. It IRCA, but changes in the economic, social, was anticipated that the burden would fall on and political context must be taken into the states to provide benefits.) To reimburse account. What are some of the differences, states for these anticipated costs, IRCA provid- similarities, and their implications for ed $1 billion per fiscal year for four years future reform? under the State Legalization Impact Assistance Grant (SLIAG) program. States were also eligi- Differences Between 1986 and Today ble to receive funds from the application fees for the second tier (permanent residency) of • Larger and better-known undocument- the legalization process. ed population. The science of estimating the unauthorized population has improved, • The value of IRCA’s English and civics giving policymakers a better idea of the size requirement was uneven. Applicants for and scope of potential legalization. The num- permanent residency under the general ber of unauthorized immigrants is now esti- legalization program were required to meet mated to be at least 10 million persons and an English and civics requirement, the first growing – over three times the size of the in the history of US immigration policy. estimated unauthorized population in 1986. Applicants could fulfill the requirement in a number of ways, including by attending 40 • Population has spread out. The unautho- hours of instruction in an INS approved rized population is now much more dispersed course of study; they did not have to pass a across the nation and is no longer as concen- uniform test (though they had the option to trated in urban areas.

7 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 9

• Application backlog bas grown. IRCA enforcement has not been able to deter rising itself created a backlog of benefits applica- levels of unauthorized immigration to the US. tions, but a relatively small backlog existed before then. In contrast, a 1.5 million case • Have security concerns shifted public backlog currently exists. attitudes? Today’s public may be more accepting of possible enforcement tools such • Changed structure of immigration as uniform identification cards or biometric administration. The creation of the identification. Fear of sanctions-related Department of Homeland Security divided discrimination may be less intense than for the first time the former INS’s enforce- it was in 1986. ment functions (Customs and Border Protection for the border; Immigration and • International cooperation is a more Customs Enforcement for the interior) and realistic possibility. Since 1986, the administrative functions (Citizenship and United States has signed a major free trade Immigration Services). While this division agreement with Mexico and the two countries of enforcement and benefits functions may have built a far more stable and substantive allow each agency to focus on its separate record of cooperation. Bilateral relationships function, the lack of common leadership have also deepened with many other coun- may lead them to work at cross purposes tries whose nationals are heavily represented with one another. in the unauthorized population. This creates the possibility of cooperation with source • The wages of unskilled workers have country governments on issues such as docu- fallen behind. The earnings of low-skilled mentation and border enforcement. workers have generally grown more slowly relative to the wages of other workers since Similarities and Prospects 1986. Because unauthorized workers tend to for the Future be less skilled, legalized workers in the future may face greater challenges in the • Unauthorized immigration is still driv- labor market than did those legalized by en by employment. Despite IRCA’s IRCA, unless they are able to obtain more employer sanctions statute, demand for education and training. unauthorized immigrant workers remains a central factor in unauthorized immigration. • The agricultural sector is no longer the Over 90 percent of unauthorized males major employer of undocumented are employed. migrants. While a high percentage of agri- cultural workers continue to be unauthorized, • A comprehensive approach is still unauthorized workers today are employed in necessary. A new immigration reform pack- low-skilled fields other than agriculture. In age would need to address the two primary fact, only a small share of all unauthorized issues that IRCA tried to resolve: the unau- workers are employed in agriculture. thorized population and the ongoing demand for and supply of unauthorized workers. • Border enforcement alone has been However, consideration should now be given proven an inadequate enforcement to a more expansive set of issues, such as strategy. In 1986, border enforcement was increases in demand for family reunification arguably inadequate. Since then, despite new immigration, along with tools such as tempo- strategies and increased resources, border rary worker programs.

8 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 10

Policy Brief

Additional Readings List of Members as of August 2005

Fix, Michael, Ed. The Paper Curtain: Co-Chairs: Employer Sanctions’ Implementation, Impact, Spencer Abraham, Distinguished Visiting and Reform. Washington: The RAND Fellow, Hoover Institution; former Secretary of Corporation and the Urban Institute, 1991. Energy and Senator (R) from Michigan

Fix, Michael, and Paul T. Hill. Enforcing Lee Hamilton, President and Director, Employer Sanctions: Challenges and Strategies. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Washington: The RAND Corporation and the Scholars. Former Vice Chair, 9/11 Urban Institute, 1990. Commission and Member of Congress (D) from Indiana Gonzales Baker, Susan. The Cautious Welcome: Director: The Legalization Programs of the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Washington: Doris Meissner, Senior Fellow, Migration The RAND Corporation and the Urban Policy Institute; former Commissioner, Institute, 1990. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Juffras, Jason. Impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act on the Immigration Members: and Naturalization Service. Washington: T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dean of the Law The RAND Corporation and the Urban Center and Executive Vice President for Law Institute, 1990. Center Affairs, Georgetown University; former General Counsel, United States Immigration Kerwin, Don, and Charles Wheeler. The Case and Naturalization Service (INS) for Legalization, Lessons from 1986, Recommendations for the Future. New York: Howard Berman, (D) Member of Congress, Center for Migration Studies, 2004. California

Meissner, Doris M., and Demetrios G. Jeanne Butterfield, Executive Director, Papademetriou. The Legalization Countdown: American Immigration Lawyers Association A Third Quarter Assessment. Washington: (AILA) The Carnegie Endowment for International Oscar A. Chacón, Director of Enlaces Peace, February 1988. América, Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights North, David S. Lessons Learned from the Legalization Programs of the 1980s. Lee Culpepper, Senior Vice President of Washington: Center for Immigration Government Affairs and Public Policy, Studies, 2005. National Restaurant Association Thomas J. Donohue, President and CEO, Powers, Mary G., Ellen Percy Kraly, and United States Chamber of Commerce William Seltzer. “IRCA: Lessons of the Last US Legalization Program.” Migration Jeff Flake, (R) Member of Congress, Arizona Information Source. July 1, 2004.

9 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 11

Fernando Garcia, Executive Director, Debra W. Stewart, President of the Council Border Network for Human Rights of Graduate Schools; former Vice Chancellor and Dean of the Graduate School at North Bill Ong Hing, Professor of Law and Carolina State University Asian American Studies, University of California, Davis C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., Principal at Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti, Inc., and Adjunct Tamar Jacoby, Senior Fellow, Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Manhattan Institute Studies (CSIS); former Assistant Secretary, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Juliette Kayyem, Lecturer in Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government John Wilhelm, President, Hospitality at Harvard University; former member of the Industry of UNITE HERE National Commission on Terrorism James W. Ziglar, Managing Director and Edward Kennedy, (D) Senator, Chief Business Strategist, UBS Financial Massachusetts Services, Inc.; former Commissioner, John McCain, (R) Senator, Arizona United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Janet Murguia, President and CEO, National Council of La Raza Ex Officio:

Leon Panetta, Co-Director, Leon and Sylvia Thor Arne Aass, Director General, Panetta Institute for Public Policy, California Department of Migration, Ministry of State University at Monterey Bay; former Chief Local Government and Regional of Staff to the President; former Director; Development, Norway Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Malcolm Brown, Assistant Deputy Minister, Steven J. Rauschenberger, (R) Senator, Strategic Policy and Communications, state of Illinois; President-elect, National Citizenship and Immigration Canada Conference of State Legislatures; Deputy Jean Louis De Brower, Director Republican Leader and former chairman, Immigration and Asylum, European Illinois Senate Appropriations committee Commission Directorate General for Justice, Robert Reischauer, President, Urban Freedom and Security Institute; former Director, Congressional Geronimo Gutierrez, Undersecretary Budget Office (CBO) for North America, Ministry of Kurt L. Schmoke, Dean, Howard University Foreign Affairs, Mexico School of Law; former Mayor, Baltimore, MD Representatives of the Departments of Frank Sharry, Executive Director, National Homeland Security, State, and Labor and the Immigration Forum Domestic Policy staff of the White House

10 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 12

Policy Brief

Authors Betsy Cooper Betsy Cooper is a Research Assistant at the Migration Policy Institute, where she focuses on US and European border, homeland security, and asylum policy.A Truman Scholar, United States Presidential Scholar, and Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar, Ms. Cooper is the co-author of Secure Borders, Open Doors:Visa Procedures in the Post-September 11 Era (with Stephen Yale- Loehr and Demetrios G. Papademetriou). She has compiled best practices of European Union integration policies for the Dutch Presidency of the European Union and worked on MPI’s projects cooperating with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. She has also edited a volume for the Hellenic Immigration Policy Institute. Ms. Cooper has interned for Senators Hillary Rodham Clinton and Edward Kennedy, the latter in his immigra- tion department, and is a Principal with the Truman National Security Project. She received her B.S. with honors from Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, and will receive an M.Sc. in Forced Migration from Oxford University in 2006.

Kevin O’Neil Kevin O’Neil is an Associate Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute, where he focuses on European Asylum and Migration Policy and on the North American Borders and Migration Agenda, as well as migration and economic development. He has worked on MPI’s projects advising the Dutch Presidency of the European Union, the Norwegian Immigration Directorate, and the Italian Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare on migration management. Recently, he co-authored two studies for the European Commission: Efficient Practices for the Selection of Economic Migrants (with Demetrios G. Papademetriou) and Observations on Regularization and the Labor Market Performance of Unauthorized and Regularized Migrants (with Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Maia Jachimowicz). Other recent publications include “Immigration: Mapping the New North American Reality” in Policy Options (co-authored with Deborah Waller Meyers). His essay won Third Prize in the 2004 Shell/The Economist International Writing Competition. Mr. O’Neil received a B.A. with highest honors in eco- nomics from Swarthmore College. Prior to coming to MPI, he was a fellow of the Thomas J. Watson Foundation, studying fire departments in New Zealand, South Korea, and Chile and training firefighters in Bolivia.

Additional Task Force Publications Independent Task Force on Immigration Lessons from the Immigration Reform and America’s Future: The Roadmap and Control Act of 1986 By Michael Fix, Doris Meissner, and By Kevin O’Neil and Betsy Cooper Demetrios G. Papademetriou Legalization: A Comparative Perspective Restoring Common Sense and Integrity By Demetrios G. Papademetriou to the US Immigration System: A Personal Vision Additional MPI Resource By Demetrios G. Papademetriou Migration Information Source Special Issue on Unauthorized Immigrants Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics This Special Issue of MPI’s online resource By Jeffrey S. Passel, Pew Hispanic Center for reliable data and timely analysis examines employer sanctions; characteristics of unau- Twilight Statuses: A Closer Examination thorized immigrant families and workers; of the Unauthorized Population removals; and legalization programs. It is By David A. Martin, Migration Policy Institute and available at www.migrationinformation/ the University of Virginia special_unauthorized.cfm.

11 1400 16th Street NW Suite 300 Washington, DC 20036

202 266 1940 202 266 1900 (fax) www.migrationpolicy.org

www.migrationinformation.org

www.migrationpolicy.org

Future, please visit: please Future,

www.migrationinformation.org. For more information on the Independent Task Force on Immigration and America’s and Immigration on Force Task Independent the on information more For

nomto orewbst,at site, web Source Information this project. this

Manhattan Institute and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for Scholars for Center International Wilson Woodrow the and Institute Manhattan

produces the Migration the produces

icated to the analysis of the movement of people worldwide, is partnering with partnering is worldwide, people of movement the of analysis the to icated

vrmr nertdwrd MPI world. integrated more ever groups; and public policy and immigration experts. MPI, a nonpartisan think tank ded- tank think nonpartisan a MPI, experts. immigration and policy public and groups;

who are involved in shaping legislation; leaders from key business, labor and immigrant and labor business, key from leaders legislation; shaping in involved are who

ties that migration presents in an in presents migration that ties

The approximately 25 task force members include high-ranking members of Congress of members high-ranking include members force task 25 approximately The

to the challenges and opportuni- and challenges the to

Service.

demand for pragmatic responses pragmatic for demand Doris Meissner, the former Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization and Immigration the of Commissioner former the Meissner, Doris

(D-IN) serve as co-chairs, and the task force’s work is directed by MPI Senior Fellow Senior MPI by directed is work force’s task the and co-chairs, as serve (D-IN)

levels. It aims to meet the rising the meet to aims It levels.

Former Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI) and former Congressman Lee Hamilton Lee Congressman former and (R-MI) Abraham Spencer Senator Former

the local, national, and international and national, local, the

ommendations in 2006. in ommendations

migration and refugee policies at policies refugee and migration The panel’s series of reports and policy briefs will lead to a comprehensive set of rec- of set comprehensive a to lead will briefs policy and reports of series panel’s The

development, and evaluation of evaluation and development,

Integrating immigrants into American society American into immigrants Integrating ■

Labor markets and the legal immigration system immigration legal the and markets Labor The institute provides analysis, provides institute The ■

Immigration enforcement and security requirements security and enforcement Immigration

■ movement of people worldwide. people of movement

The growing unauthorized immigrant population immigrant unauthorized growing The

■

dedicated to the study of the of study the to dedicated

The task force’s work focuses on four major policy challenges: policy major four on focuses work force’s task The

partisan, non-profit think tank think non-profit partisan,

information and workable policy ideas. policy workable and information

leaders from key sectors concerned with immigration, which aims to generate sound generate to aims which immigration, with concerned sectors key from leaders MI sa needn,non- independent, an is (MPI)

Immigration and America’s Future. The task force is a bipartisan panel of prominent of panel bipartisan a is force task The Future. America’s and Immigration

The Migration Policy Institute Policy Migration The

This report was commissioned as part of MPI’s Independent Task Force on Force Task Independent MPI’s of part as commissioned was report This

MORE FROM MPI: FROM MORE PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05 2 9/6/05 10:43 AM Page 1 Page AM 10:43 9/6/05 2 PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05