C:\Working Papers\10940.Wpd
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The World Economy in Crisis the Return of Keynesianism?
The World Economy in Crisis The Return of Keynesianism? 30 – 31 October 2009 13th Conference of the Research Network Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policies (RNM) How to Prevent and Solve a Classic Sovereign Debt Crisis: Beyond the debate CAC vs. SRDM. Claire Barraud∗, University of Grenoble, France. Abstract: The International Lender of Last Resort (ILLR), in the IMF’s body, and the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) of Anne Krueger have been given up, despite the seniority of the former and the successful design of the latter. Instead, the Collective Action Clauses (CACs) have been chosen as the only way to settle a sovereign debt crisis, in spite of their weakness to only govern restructurings. The purpose of a sovereign debt crisis settlement is not to reach a restructuring agreement only respecting creditors’ rights, but to find an outcome to the crisis satisfying creditors’ rights and the rehabilitation of the sovereign debtor. Globally, a classic sovereign debt crisis has multiple ins and outs and merits so a global and hybrid mechanism designed step by step, according to existing proposals. Instead of an ILLR, an International Lender of First Resort (ILFR) could distinguish among possible natures and causes of the crisis to bring settlement around the right process. Then only, in case of solvency crisis, CACs could be privileged. But lastly, if CACs fail to reach a reasonable agreement, an arbitration forum, as the one of the SDRM, would be in charge of forcing a decision satisfying all involved parties. ∗Graduate Student. [email protected]. 1. Introduction. Sovereign defaults do exist since sovereign have right to borrow. -
Mismeasurement of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution: the Role
Mismeasurement of the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution: The Role of Limited Stock Market Participation∗ Muhammet Fatih Guvenen† First version: June 2000 This version: May 2001 Abstract In this paper, we reconcile two opposing views about the elasticity of intertempo- ral substitution (EIS), a parameter that plays a key role in macroeconomic analysis. On the one hand, empirical studies using aggregate consumption data typically find that the EIS is close to zero (Hall 1988). On the other hand, calibrated macroeco- nomic models designed to match growth and business cycle facts typically require that the EIS be close to one. We show that this apparent contradiction arises from ignoring two kinds of heterogeneity across individuals. First, a large fraction of households in the U.S. do not participate in stock markets. Second, a variety of microeconomic studies using individual-level data conclude that an individual’s EIS increases with his wealth. We analyze a dynamic economy which incorporates both kinds of heterogeneity. We find that limited participation creates substantial wealth inequality matching that in U.S. data. Consequently, the dynamic behav- ior of output and investment is almost entirely determined by the preferences of the wealthy minority of households. At the same time, since consumption is much more evenly distributed across households than is wealth, estimation using aggregate consumption uncovers the low EIS of the majority of households (i.e., the poor). Our model also matches a number of cross-sectional features of the U.S. data that are otherwise difficult to explain. Finally, using simulated data generated by our heterogeneous-agent model, we show that the econometric methods used by Hall and others produce biased estimates of the average EIS across individuals. -
Why Mutual Funds “Underperform”
Why Mutual Funds \Underperform" Vincent Glode¤ Carnegie Mellon University August 28, 2008 Abstract I derive a rational model that reproduces the negative risk-adjusted perfor- mance of actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds, the funds' systematically better performance in bad states of the economy than in good states, and the relatively high fees that poorly performing funds charge. The model focuses on the optimal active management policies of a skilled fund manager facing ratio- nal investors. Since funds perform well in bad states, mutual fund investing can be rationalized despite the measurement of negative unconditional performance. Using data on U.S. funds, I document novel empirical evidence consistent with the model's predictions. JEL classi¯cation: G23; G12; G11. Keywords: Mutual Fund, Performance, Pricing Kernel, Business Cycle. ¤Doctoral Candidate, Carnegie Mellon University, [email protected]. I am particularly indebted to my advisor Rick Green and my dissertation committee members Burton Holli¯eld, Shimon Kogan, and Pierre Liang for their guidance and support. I also thank Marcin Kacperczyk and Amit Seru for assistance with the data as well as Fernando Anjos, Jonathan Berk, Jeremy Bertomeu, Michael Brennan, David Chapman, Susan Christo®ersen, Gene Fama, Jean-Fran»coisGuimond, Jennifer Huang, Richard Lowery, Spencer Mar- tin, Francisco Palomino, Bryan Routledge, Laura Starks, Jason Wei, Stan Zin, and seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, Universit¶eLaval, the Bank of Canada/University of Toronto Workshop on Port- folio Management, the 2007 Financial Management Association (FMA) meeting, and the 2008 Econometric Society meeting for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge ¯nancial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the William Larimer Mellon fund, the Center for Financial Markets, and the American Association of Individual Investors through the \Best Paper in Investments" award received at the 2007 FMA meeting. -
External Habit and the Cyclicality of Expected Returns
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. External Habit and the Cyclicality of Expected Stock Returns Thomas D. Tallarini, Jr. and Harold H. Zhang 2005-27 NOTE: Staff working papers in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS) are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. References in publications to the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (other than acknowledgement) should be cleared with the author(s) to protect the tentative character of these papers. External Habit and the Cyclicality of Expected Stock Returns∗ Thomas D. Tallarini, Jr.† Harold H. Zhang‡ May 2005 Abstract We estimate an equilibrium asset pricing model in which agents’ preferences have an unobserved external habit using the efficient method of moments (EMM). Given the estimated structural parameters we examine the cyclical behavior of expected stock returns in the model. We find that the estimated structural parameters imply coun- tercyclical expected stock returns as documented in existing empirical studies. The model, however, is still rejected at the one percent level. Detailed examination of the moment conditions in our estimation indicates that the model performs reasonably well in matching the mean of returns, but it fails to capture the higher order moments. JEL Classification: G12 Keywords: external habit, expected returns, asset pricing, Efficient Method of Mo- ments ∗We thank Ronald Gallant and George Tauchen for providing us the EMM code, John Campbell, John Cochrane, Dave DeJong, Wayne Ferson, Rene Garcia, Lars Hansen, Paul Harrison, John Heaton, Ming Liu, Adrian Pagan, Amir Yaron, Stan Zin, and the seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments. -
The Tax-Foundation Theory of Fiat Money
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Goldberg, Dror Working Paper The tax-foundation theory of fiat money Working Paper, No. 2009-05 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University Suggested Citation: Goldberg, Dror (2009) : The tax-foundation theory of fiat money, Working Paper, No. 2009-05, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96068 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu The Tax-Foundation Theory of Fiat Money Dror Goldberg Department of Economics Bar Ilan University Abstract A government can promote the use of an object as the general medium of exchange by accepting it in tax payments. -
Equilibrium Commodity Prices with Irreversible Investment and Non-Linear Technology
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES EQUILIBRIUM COMMODITY PRICES WITH IRREVERSIBLE INVESTMENT AND NON-LINEAR TECHNOLOGY Jaime Casassus Pierre Collin-Dufresne Bryan R. Routledge Working Paper 11864 http://www.nber.org/papers/w11864 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 December 2005 We thank Luis Alvarez, Duane Seppi, Chester Spatt, Stan Zin, seminar participants at UC Berkeley, Carnegie Mellon University, the University of Madison-Wisconsin, the Q-group meeting in Key West 2005, the University of Utah, University of Southern California, and the 2003 LACEA Meeting. Correspondence: Jaime Casassus, Escuela de Ingeniería de la Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Av. Vicuna Mackenna 4860, Santiago, Chile. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. ©2005 by Jaime Casassus, Pierre Collin-Dufresne and Bryan R. Routledge. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Equilibrium Commodity Prices with Irreversible Investment and Non-Linear Technology Jaime Casassus, Pierre Collin-Dufresne and Bryan R. Routledge NBER Working Paper No. 11864 December 2005 JEL No. C0, G12, G13, D51, D81, E2 ABSTRACT We model equilibrium spot and futures oil prices in a general equilibrium production economy. In our model production of the consumption good requires two inputs: the consumption good and a commodity, e.g., Oil. Oil is produced by wells whose flow rate is costly to adjust. Investment in new Oil wells is costly and irreversible. -
Etd-Tamu-2003B-2003061617-Ball-1.Pdf (621.6Kb)
CAPITAL MOBILITY AND SUDDEN STOPS: CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY OPTIONS A Dissertation by CHRISTOPHER PATRICK BALL Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY August 2003 Major Subject: Economics CAPITAL MOBILITY AND SUDDEN STOPS: CONSEQUENCES AND POLICY OPTIONS A Dissertation by CHRISTOPHER PATRICK BALL Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment to the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved as to style and content by: ____________________________ ____________________________ Leonardo Auernheimer Raymond Battalio (Chair of Committee) (Member) ____________________________ ____________________________ Henry Tam Harold Love (Member) (Member) ____________________________ Leonardo Auernheimer (Head of Department) August 2003 Major Subject: Economics iii ABSTRACT Capital Mobility and Sudden Stops: Consequences and Policy Options. (August 2003) Christopher Patrick Ball, B.A., University of Alabama in Huntsville Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Leonardo Auernheimer This dissertation attempts in three essays to contribute to the growing body of research on the problems associated with sudden stops of capital inflows, known to have been at the heart of many recent emerging market crises. It does this by developing basic models that can incorporate sudden stops and hopefully make policy relevant recommendations. The first essay develops a simple three date representative agent model of a small open endowment economy without money. It allows sudden stops to occur at date two and asks whether individuals in such a shock-prone world are still better off borrowing than in autarky. Unambiguously, this chapter shows that individuals are better off borrowing than in autarky and provides a tractable core model on which the later chapters build. -
No. 37 Terri Parrish
Editors: Maryann Semer Fall 2004, No. 37 Terri Parrish This edition covers events and publications involving economists at Northwestern for the period of September 1, 2003 through August 31, 2004. Additional copies are available from the editor in Room 350, Andersen Hall. APPOINTMENTS, HONORS, AND GRANTS RON BRAEUTIGAM has been appointed Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences. Ron was also selected to the Associated Student Government Faculty/Administrator Honor Roll for 2004. LOUIS CAIN completed his term as President of the Illinois Economics Association in October 2003 and continued as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Cliometric Society. In January 2004, he was appointed an assistant editor of Macmillan’s The History of World Trade Since 1450. EDDIE DEKEL’s NSF grant “Assessment via Contests: (1) Persistence in Occupation Choice; (2) Over/Underconfidence and Interaction Levels,” was renewed for the period July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2004. Dekel continues to serve as Editor of Econometrica. JEFF ELY was awarded a Research Fellowship for the years 2003-2004 from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. In addition, the NSF extended funding for his project “CAREER: Economic Theory at Northwestern” for the year 2004. Jeff was named to the editorial boards of Journal of Economic Theory and BE Press Journal of Theoretical Economics. ROBERT J. GORDON has been reappointed as a Senior Member of the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, as a member of the economic advisory panels of the Congressional Budget Office and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and as a research affiliate of OFCE in Paris. -
Fields219 Project Evaluation.Pdf (1.713Mb)
Project Evaluation CONSULTING ASSISTANCE ON ECONOMIC REFORM AID Project #940-0001 August 1993 ........... ,..o. ...... ..... Presentedto: AID, Bureau for Private Enterprise, Office of Small, Micro and Informal Enterprise ContractorTeam: Management Systems International (lead contractor) Abt Associates Inc. Development Associates, Inc. United States Agency for International Development Bureau for Research and Development TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. INTRODUCTION ............................................ 1 A. Project Description .......................................... 1 B. Evaluation Statement of Work and Methodology ..................... 2 II. PROJECT MANAGEMENT .................................... 4 A. Project Funding ............................................ 4 B. AID Project Management ..................................... 5 C. T-he CAER Contract Consortium ................................ 5 D. Project Management: Core Funding (Non-Administrative) ............... 7 E. Project M anagement: Buy-Ins .................................. 9 F. Project Administration: Financial Management and Contract Monitoring ..... 12 G. Overall Management Quality ................................... 13 H. Conclusions ............................................... 16 III. PROJECT PERFORMANCE .................................... 18 A. Task Orders (Core Funded) .................................... 18 B. Buy-in Activities .......................................... 20 C. Evidence of Project Impact ................................... 25 D. Dissem -
Subsidized Credit Programs: the Theory, the Record, the Alternatives
[This on-line version may differ somewhat from the original published copy in its appearance and content. To receive a published copy of this special study, contact the DISC, 1611 North Kent Street, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22209-2111. Phone 703-351-4006; fax 703-351-4039; internet [email protected]] USAID Evaluation Special Study No. 75 Subsidized Credit Programs: The Theory, the Record, the Alternatives by Juan J. Buttari June 1995 Table of Contents Acknowledgments .............................................3 Summary ...................................................4 1. Introduction ................................................6 2. Traditional Credit Policies and Their Conceptual Foundations .............7 3. Theoretical Underpinnings: A Stylized Historical Perspective ............ 10 4. The Emperical Record ....................................... 18 5. Conclusions and Operational Implications .......................... 44 Notes ..................................................... 49 Bibliography ................................................ 54 Acknowledgments THIS PAPER benefited greatly from comments by Robert Vogel. The author also gratefully acknowledges useful comments by Clarence Zuvekas, John Eriksson, James Fox, Krishna Kumar, Joseph Lieberson, Cressida McKean, and Elisabeth Rhyne. The author also wishes to thank Ross Bankson for his editorial assistance. The observations of all these colleagues enriched this work. Although the author would like to blame those colleagues for any errors or omissions, -
Margin Calls, Trading Costs, and Asset Prices in Emerging Markets: the Financial Mechanics of the ‘Sudden Stop’ Phenomenon
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MARGIN CALLS, TRADING COSTS, AND ASSET PRICES IN EMERGING MARKETS: THE FINANCIAL MECHANICS OF THE ‘SUDDEN STOP’ PHENOMENON Enrique G. Mendoza Katherine A. Smith Working Paper 9286 http://www.nber.org/papers/w9286 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 October 2002 We thank Fernando Alvarez, Cristina Arellano, Leonardo Auernheimer, Guillermo Calvo, Larry Christiano, Daniele Coen-Pirani, Jonathan Heatcote, Urban Jermann, Amartya Lahiri, Fabrizio Perri, Tony Smith, Diego Valderrama, Kirk White and Stan Zin for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. © 2002 by Enrique G. Mendoza and Katherine A. Smith. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Margin Calls, Trading Costs, and Asset Prices in Emerging Markets: The Financial Mechanics of the ‘Sudden Stop’ Phenomenon Enrique G. Mendoza and Katherine A. Smith NBER Working Paper No. 9286 October 2002 JEL No. F41, F32, E44, D52 ABSTRACT A central feature of emerging markets crises is the “Sudden Stop” phenomenon characterized by large reversals of capital inflows and current accounts, deep recessions, and collapses in asset prices. This paper proposes an open-economy asset-pricing model with financial frictions that yields predictions in line with these observations. Margin requirements and information costs distort asset trading between a small open economy and foreign securities firms. If the economy’s debt-equity ratio is low, standard productivity shocks cause normal recessions with smooth current-account adjustments. -
Identifying Taylor Rules in Macro-Finance Models
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES IDENTIFYING TAYLOR RULES IN MACRO-FINANCE MODELS David Backus Mikhail Chernov Stanley E. Zin Working Paper 19360 http://www.nber.org/papers/w19360 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 August 2013 We welcome comments, including references to related papers we inadvertently overlooked. The project started with our reading of John Cochrane's paper on the same subject and subsequent emails and conversations with him and Mark Gertler. We thank them both. We also thank Rich Clarida, Patrick Feve, Kei Kawai, Guillaume Roussellet, Ken Singleton, Gregor Smith, and Tao Zha for comments on earlier drafts, and participants in seminars at, and conference sponsored by, New York University, the Swedish House of Finance, and Toulouse. The material in Section 5.2 was suggested by an anonymous referee. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2013 by David Backus, Mikhail Chernov, and Stanley E. Zin. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Identifying Taylor Rules in Macro-Finance Models David Backus, Mikhail Chernov, and Stanley E. Zin NBER Working Paper No. 19360 August 2013, Revised April 2015 JEL No. E43,E52,G12 ABSTRACT Identification problems arise naturally in forward-looking models when agents observe more than economists.