Voices of Central and Eastern Europe

Perceptions of democracy & governance in 10 EU countries

www.globsec.org Countries surveyed Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Czechia Slovakia

Austria Romania

Hungary

Bulgaria Contents

6 Introduction 8 Key findings 10 Democracy & Governance “Democracy 12 State of democracy in CEE 13 Support for liberal democracy cannot succeed 14 Satisfaction with the system of governance 22 Life statisfaction and insecurities unless those 34 Practical implications who express 36 Media their choice 38 Trust and freedom 40 Who influences the media? are prepared to 42 Practical implications choose wisely.“ 44 Conspiracies & (Franklin D. Roosevelt) Misinformation 46 Who believes in conspiracies? 50 Misinformation narratives 52 Practical implications

54 Methodology 56 Credits Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

5 Introduction „ Introduction Introduction

Liberal democracies are messy, chaotic skilled workers tend to cluster in urban three decades ago, there is no way to and often disorganized affairs. What a areas, has led to the marginalization of rural address these questions once and for all, contrast they represent with dictatorships and small-town communities, breeding as society is in constant flux. What might whose façades, no matter how squalid frustration and anger—across the whole be of concern for worry, however, is the or rotten, are always painted immaculate region from Poland or Lithuania. The situation when the level-playing field of white. Electoral cycles bring discontinuity imitation growth model, where Central pluralist political systems gives way to the while different views clash. Promises of European countries transformed their distorted hybrid model where free media or candidates running for office rarely match economies to match Western precepts, has free elections are by name only. In general, their tangible achievements as public reached its limits. The West (the United citizens of the region seem to be aware of officials. Emotions run high, making some States especially) is less of a role model, this risk, and this sentiment in itself is the citizens disillusioned with the political with democracy and capitalism in obvious bulwark against authoritarian tendencies. class. As GLOBSEC’s 2020 public opinion need of an overhaul. Let us hope that, as the result of eternal polls show, citizens of Central and Eastern navel-gazing and reforming institutions, Europe are not oblivious to the deficiencies There are still significant mental barriers the liberal democracy will come out ever and failures of their political systems. With between East and West in Europe. stronger. the notable exception of Austria, the liberal Western liberal values are contested in democratic experiment has lasted 30 more conservative parts of societies. years – it is a long enough period to raise Anti-establishment backlash coupled levels of prosperity and quality of life, but with vulnerability to populism seems to be Jakub Wiśniewski hardly sufficient to address long-standing stronger in the former Soviet bloc. There are Vice-President, GLOBSEC inequalities or social pathologies. To the always those who undertake cynical wall- utter disappointment of many, progress building, manipulate crowds, and exploit has not been linear; in some countries, anxieties, fears, or stereotypes such as corruption or political favouritism has labelling Muslims as terrorists or accusing resurfaced after periods of improvement. immigrants of stealing jobs, in order to Populists have wooed swathes of societies solidify their grip on power. These are hardly by peddling short-lived hopes of shortcuts problems unique to Central Europe but are to justice or prosperity. more of a challenge than in the traditional West. What happens in social and economic life affects the political process very much. In short, in 2020 the reader will find the Whether people can satisfy their basic liberal democracies of the region still works housing or medical needs, say, or whether in progress, sometimes experiencing major incomes are fairly and evenly distributed setbacks, more often simply grappling with has profound consequences on the everyday questions any healthy democracy quality of the political debate. Central and has to address: how to secure the freedom Eastern Europe is still markedly poorer of speech without tolerating misinformation and less resilient in terms of economic and slander? What are healthy checks shocks than its western neighbours – with to the overweening executive branch of the notable exception of Austria. There governments? How to make politicians remains a risk of the middle-income trap accountable and keep their citizens for the region’s economies. Emigration engaged in the political process? Contrary has sapped the region’s growth potential. to what many people expected at the

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices The agglomeration effect, where well-paid outset of the political transformation over Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

6 7 8 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe Key findings findings Key system. governance with theircurrent more satisfied respondents are quality indexes, in democracy higher rankings In countrieswith leader. over anautocratic liberal democracy would choose the respondents more than50%of 5 of10countries, the region. Only in straightforward in democracy isnot Support forliberal dissatisfied. system than their governance satisfied with Czechs are more Estonians and Only Austrians, society. are favoured in political elites with contacts to believe that those in theregion average, 70% incomes –on elites andhigher contacts to for thosewith favouritism and systemic income inequality recognition of There isastrong financial benefits. other socialand freedoms for their democratic and wouldtrade liberal democracy strong leaderover likely to prefer a narratives are very disinformation theories and in conspiracy Those whobelieve average believe so. – only28%on to the“West” under threat due their valuesare the narrative that does notbelieve CEE respondents The majority of articulated. the narratives agreed with of respondents around ahalf average, region. On prone inthe misinformation- theory- and most conspiracy Bulgaria are the Slovakia and influence. completely free of media israther or believe that more than70% and Slovakia, Czechia, Romania time, inAustria, But at thesame trust themedia. intheregion 44% On average, only

9 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe Key findings Chapter I: Democracy Chapter I: Democracy Chapter Democracy &

GovernanceChapter I

In countries with higher rankings necessarily the countries with highest life satisfaction might not be strongly in democracy quality indexes, degrees of satisfaction with the current influenced by the perceived quality of This chapter provides an overview of the respondents are more satisfied with system of governance; the democracy; their current governance system than in satisfaction and support for democracy countries on lower ranks; The overwhelming majority of those There is a strong realisation of income satisfied with how democracy works inequality and a systemic favouritism of and current governance systems among However, expressing higher support in their country, as well as those those with contacts to elites and higher respondents in Central and Eastern Europe for liberal democracy over autocratic supporting liberal democracy, are income – those with the contacts to leaders does not correlate with generally satisfied with their life. elites and higher income are perceived (CEE). Along with other findings, their satisfaction with the current But also, in some countries, a high as favoured by the society two to governance system – countries with percentage of those satisfied with their three times more often than those at it shows that: most respondents preferring liberal life are not satisfied with the state of the receiving end of populist anti- democracy over autocracy are not their democracy, which suggests that campaigns, i.e. minorities or refugees. Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

10 11 Democracy Democracy 1.1 State of Support for 1.2 democracy in CEE liberal democracy

In the 1990s, many of the surveyed The support for liberal democracy7 varies for example, this might mean that the countries did not enjoy smooth 1 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2019, greatly across the region. While in some citizens will not let the system fall into an https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index democratisation processes right after the The Economist countries, there is an overarching support autocratic spiral because, deep in their fall of the communist regime and struggled 2 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020, https:// Intelligence Unit’s for democracy with free elections and hearts, they have strong support for key freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2020/dropping- 5 on their paths towards stronger institutions democratic-facade Democracy Index 2019 multiparty systems, in Bulgaria, more people democratic values. and protection of rights and freedoms. would prefer a regime with authoritarian 3 Estonia ranks the highest from surveyed CEE countries A tradition lacking in strong and established included in the Civil Service Effectiveness Index 2019, https:// tendencies. The results suggest that the 7 Defined as a “democracy based on the recognition of institutions can increase vulnerability to www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/about/partnerships/international-civil- quality of democracy in the country has no service-effectiveness-index-2019 Full democracy individual rights and freedoms, in which decisions from anti-democratic tendencies. Austria 8.29 links with the support for liberal democracy. direct or representative processes prevail in many policy 4 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020, https:// areas” in Collins Dictionary: https://www.collinsdictionary. freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2020 com/dictionary/english/liberal-democracy or “a democratic Existing indexes prove that a lack of strong In some countries, a high support for liberal system of government in which individual rights and freedoms 5 Flawed democracies are officially recognized and protected, and the exercise of democratic processes and institutions The Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2019, democracy persists despite the decline in https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index Estonia 7.90 political power is limited by the rule of law.” in Lexico: https:// is still present in most of the younger international ratings. As further elaborated www.lexico.com/definition/liberal_democracy 6 Freedom House, Democracy Scores, 2020, https:// Czechia 7.69 democracies. Austria is the only country in the next section, in Poland and Hungary, freedomhouse.org/countries/nations-transit/ Lithuania 7.50 considered as a “full democracy” by the scores?sort=desc&order=Democracy%20Score Latvia 7.49 Economist Intelligence Unit index1. The Slovakia 7.17 Baltic countries with Czechia generally Bulgaria 7.03 score higher in civil liberties and political Hungary 6.63 culture, while Hungary and Poland have Which of the following forms of government is, Poland 6.62 been experiencing declines in democracy Existing indexes Romania 6.49 according to you, better for your country? ratings in the past years. In 2020, prove that a deterioration of democratic principles Having liberal democracy with regular Having a strong and decisive leader who does culminated with Freedom House removing lack of strong elections and multiparty system. not have to bother with parliament or elections. Hungary from a list of democracies, moving democratic Freedom House’s it to a group of “hybrid regimes”.2 processes and Democracy Scores 92% 6 As the indexes show and our research institutions is still 2020 proves, democratic dynamics are present in most different from country to country. Austria 81% is clearly different from the rest of the of Central and Consolidated democracies studied countries in terms of solid and Eastern Europe. Estonia 6.07 well-established democratic processes, Latvia 5.79 being constantly ranked among the Lithuania 5.64 66% 65% top democracies in the world. From the Czechia 5.64 60% younger democracies, Estonia has been Slovakia 5.29 winning the charts, especially due to good governance and institutions, which function 50% 49% 49% Semi-consolidated democracies both effectively and efficiently as much 45% Poland 4.93 43% of the administration has been moved to Bulgaria 4.54 e-government.3 On the other hand, Poland 38% Romania 4.43 35% 35% has been criticised for a lack of judicial 34% independence and a respect for rights and Hybrid regimes 26% 27% freedoms, while Hungary’s decline is mostly 24% linked to higher corruption and a lack of Hungary 3.96 civil liberties and electoral justice.4 17% 12% 7%

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Austria Hungary Poland Estonia Czechia Romania Slovakia Lithuania Latvia Bulgaria Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

12 13 What variables contributed ? Democracy to the Index? Democracy 1.3 Satisfaction 1.3 Questions included Satisfaction with how democracy works into the Satisfaction with the system Countries with with the System of Examination of specific questions shows Governance Index: that the respondents in all 10 countries the most satisfied realise the deficiencies of the system they respondents are live in. Without the two extremes - Bulgaria of governance scoring higher 1. and Austria, the average level of satisfaction with how the democracy works is just 40%. in democracy In (my country), everyone has a Index of Satisfaction with the System of quality indexes. chance to succeed in life Governance (based on 11 questions) 2. The needs of people like me are well taken into account by the political system in (my country) 82 75 Respondents satisfied with how Austria 3. democracy works in their country In general, most people in my 50 country can be trusted Austria 86% 25 4. 22 Trust in the government Czechia Estonia 47% 0 4 5. -1.5 -2 Poland Trust in president Czechia -11.5 Lithuania -12 Hungary -18 47% Slovakia Latvia -25 6. Poland -32 Hungary Trust in courts and judiciary 45% Romania -46 -50 Bulgaria Estonia 7. Trust in standard mainstream 42% media -75 Slovakia 38% 8. Trust in political parties Satisfaction with governance systems varies the way the system works in their country On the contrary, when comparing the across the region. Based on 11 questions, and are an outlier in comparison to others. index results with the support for liberal Latvia we comprised a unique index showing On the other side of the spectrum are democracy over autocratic leaders, there 36% 9. an overall satisfaction with the system Bulgarians, and, to lesser extent, Romanians. seems to be no correlation. Poles, for Trust in police of governance in each country. It was All in all, only in Austria, Estonia and example, seem to be rather dissatisfied with Lithuania assembled based on factor analysis Czechia, there is a tendency to be more the governance system but maintain strong 32% - a country with a score of 100 would mean satisfied with the governance system support for liberal democracy. a respondents’ full satisfaction with the than dissatisfied. When compared to the 10. system she/he lives in; a -100 score would international indexes of the quality of Romania Trust in armed forces 8 8 For more information about the index, please see indicate complete dissatisfaction. democracy, we can observe similarities Methodology on p. 52 30% – countries with the most satisfied 11. The results support the dynamics respondents are also scoring higher in Bulgaria mentioned in the previous section - democracy quality indexes. Satisfaction with how democracy 18% works in (my country)

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Austrians are also the most satisfied with Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

14 15 have also been the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, which increased Who is favoured by the system?

Democracy peoples’ trust in governments in many Democracy countries around the world.12 A different way of looking at the – 31%. This question is one of the few where The findings are closely linked to another 1.3 1.3 satisfaction with the system is the feeling Austrians did not stand out as an outlier factor – feeling that some groups of the An outlier in the trust in courts and of powerlessness. If the citizens do not feel compared to the rest of the region. society are favoured over others as can be judiciary is Slovakia with only 22%. The that the system in which they live provides seen on the graph on page no. 16. low perception of judicial independence them a possibility to shape and influence it, Who, according to respondents, holds continues to be Slovakia’s serious the democracy has a difficulty to thrive. On the power then? The increasing income 14 World Bank Group, Understanding Changes in 72% challenge, and the country’s performance average, 49% of CEE respondents agreed inequality gap and the cumulation of wealth Inequality in the EU, 2017, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/ in this area remains at the bottom of EU with the statement that who holds the among the rich is recognised across the en/319381520461242480/EU-IG-Report-Understanding- changes-in-Inequality.pdf of Central 13 14 member states. power in the government does not matter region. On average, 67% of respondents as nothing will change. The strongest level across the region think oligarchs and Security forces: Trust in CEE countries’ of powerlessness was observed among financial groups have strong control over and Eastern security forces is high. On average, 71% and Bulgarians – 59%, the lowest among Poles governments in their countries. 73% of respondents trust in police and the armed forces, respectively.

European Feeling of inclusion in the system Those who agree that who holds the power in the respondents Another important variable is a feeling of being taken into consideration by the government does not matter, since nothing will change. political system. If responding positively to the statement, “The needs of people 59% 55% 56% do not trust like me are well taken into account by the 52% 54% 49% 49% political system in (my country)”, they may 43% 44% feel that the challenges and issues they political face are discussed and being resolved 31% by representatives on a political level – whether this is local, regional or state level of government – and tend to treat the parties, system as working and justified. Except for Austria where 73% of respondents agree with having their needs taken into account, this perception is relatively strong in Poland Austria Estonia Lithuania Czechia Romania Latvia Hungary Slovakia Bulgaria 53% distrust Czechia and Poland as well. 43% of Czechs and 42% of Poles feel that their needs are being taken care of on the political level. Otherwise, the same attitudes are only held governments. by around a fourth of the CEE respondents, ranging from 16% in Latvia to 35% in Those who agree that oligarchs and financial groups Slovakia. have strong control over the government in their country. the institutions can be also reflected in Trust 9 Wilson Center, Are Political Parties in Trouble?, 2018, https:// its 12th rank in the Corruption Perception www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/are-political-parties- 84% 85% Another variable Index 2019 (CPI), the highest ranking trouble or Democratic Audit, What explains mainstream party 79% Political parties: decline across Europe?, 2019 https://www.democraticaudit. 77% 77% contributing to the satisfaction with from the region.10 Stronger degree of trust com/2019/03/12/what-explains-mainstream-party-decline- across-europe/ one’s own system is trust in democratic towards the institutions was also observed 64% 10 59% institutions. Generally, the trust in political in Estonia (69% trust courts and judiciary), Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 56% parties, government, as well as courts and which ranks 18th in the CPI11, and Czechia 2019, Austria: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/ results/aut 48% judiciary, is low. On average, 72% in CEE where the government enjoys trust among 11 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 39% distrust political parties, which is in line 50% of the population. On the other side of 2019, Estonia: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/ with the trend of growing decline in voting the spectrum is Romania, where only 23% results/est

9 for traditional parties. The trust in political of Romanians trust their government and 12 Edelman, 2020 Edelman Trust Barometer Spring update, parties is relatively low in Austria too – 50%. 42% trust their president. Romania as well https://www.edelman.com/news/trust-2020-spring-update- press-release th as Hungary rank 70 , the second to worst Key institutions: The abovementioned is among CEE countries, in the CPI 2019. 13 European Commission, 2020 European Semester: Assessment of progress on structural reforms, prevention in stark contrast to key state institutions and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and in Austria enjoying the trust among more Nevertheless, a significant factor results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices than 80% of respondents. The quality of contributing to the degree of trust could TXT/?qid=1584543810241&uri=CELEX%3A52020SC0524 Hungary Estonia Poland Romania Czechia Bulgaria Lithuania Latvia Austria Slovakia Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

16 17 Particular group(s) in our society Which group(s) are favoured

Democracy are favoured over others in your society, according to your opinion? Democracy 1.3 1.3 Agree Average from CEE of those who believe that the following groups are favoured in their society:

People with contacts to political elites 86% 70% 84% 84% 83% People who earn more 81% 59%

People from the capital 77% 48% 75% People living in a particular region or regions in my country 39%

Minorities 69% 68% 25%

Migrants 23% 62% On average, 77% think that particular groups of a society are favoured over others. Our data suggest that the dissatisfaction with inequality is, in fact, On average, much more important for societies than the 77% think that system’s alleged “free-riders”, i.e. migrants (or refugees) and minorities, who are often particular groups the target of attacks and demonisation for of a society are the sole purpose of scoring political points favoured over and coverage of more serious systemic problems. others.

The preference of people living in particular regions was dominant especially in Estonia and Lithuania, where 61% and 47% think so accordingly. These perceptions correlate with the belief that people living in the capital are favoured and have more privileges in the society, which can be explained by the economic power of the capitals in both countries.15

15 OECD, Regions and Cities and a Glance 2018 – LITHUANIA https://www.oecd.org/regional/LITHUANIA-Regions-and- Cities-2018.pdf and - ESTONIA https://www.oecd.org/cfe/ ESTONIA-Regions-and-Cities-2018.pdf Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Romania Poland Austria Lithuania Hungary Estonia Latvia Bulgaria Czechia Slovakia Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

18 19 Estonia Hungary Poland Democracy Country insights Democracy 1.3 „ 1.3 “Since 1991, Estonia has achieved “Many warning signs have been “Strong liberal democracy support remarkable progress. While it is still raised concerning the state is a legacy of the communist era, The following quotes represent data interpretation perceived as a nation in democratic capture of democratic institutions but also of the recent years where from the partner organisations in the project. transition, it leads the ranking in Hungary. Yet, the support of the country has been led, albeit of young democracies across the ruling political parties among from the back seat, by a strong the international indexes. Many Hungarians remains strong and its leader - Jarosław Kaczyński. Estonians perceive the country as voters generally trust the system, Satisfaction with the state of dynamic, with small differences which still has regular elections democracy in Poland shows the between societal groups, which and multiparty representation high level of polarisation which suggest a pursuit of equality (albeit not on an equal footing). If has marred the country for over a Austria Bulgaria in many areas. Such attitudes there was such choice, supporters decade. The recent deterioration combined with a national character of current ruling parties might in the rule-of-law — especially with of being modest, high appreciation prefer the Prime Minister’s vision of regards to the independence of “As an outlier, Austria is perceived “In Bulgaria, the lack of inherent of hard-work, wide-spread “illiberal” or “Christian” democracy. the judiciary — resonates among by its citizens as socially and and consolidated democratic secularity and strong self-belief, But if given the choice between Poles who start to raise questions economically strong with high living attitudes rather leads to a support the idea that everyone has democracy and dictatorship, most about the state of democracy. standards. This high esteem for perception that shortfalls in a chance to succeed in life. Also, Hungarians will prefer democracy.” Many, however, realise that the democracy is common to nearly all Bulgarian democratic system can its unprecedented e-governance (Political Capital Institute) power to change the course of population groups and its reliable be fixed through authoritarian system made Estonia a digitally the country is in their hands. 66% Slovakia public administration system, measures. Such reflexes can be innovative state, in which citizens of Polish respondents, the most system of reconciliation of interests partially explained culturally – can easily communicate with across all countries, think that and strong social partnership is given the legacy of authoritarian “The killings of investigative public institutions and take part in it matters who holds the power reflected in the positive ranking in rule, but mostly empirically – the journalist, Ján Kuciak, and his decision-making processes online.” in the government.” (Political the Satisfaction with the System of Bulgarians have not been able fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, and (International Centre for Defence Accountability Foundation) Governance Index as well as other to experience the benefits that a Lithuania their investigation have uncovered and Security) international indexes. democratic system should ensure, multiple cases of corruption and including the rule-of-law and an hidden ties between politicians, “Over the past decade, the concept In recent years, however, the equitable allocation of public mafia, oligarchs, members of the of “the two Lithuanians” - elites FPÖ [Freedom Party of Austria] goods. According to Eurostat, police and other civil servants, versus common citizens - has has regularly called for more Bulgaria has the highest income including prosecutors and judges. emerged. The concept is nurtured direct democracy, since it would inequality in the EU16.” (Centre for This state capture by oligarchs and by a narrative focusing either on “better represent the interests the Study of Democracy) financial groups is reflected by low the “elite” being in a privileged of the people” than elected trust of Slovaks in these democratic position and gaining wealth at the parliamentarians that are blamed institutions. While the cleansing expense of the “common citizens” as representatives of the elites. In of the system was launched, only or on the “common citizens” being addition, an “illiberal system” as good governance and time will decisive in voting for “populist” or practiced in Hungary has already restore the trust of Slovaks in these Latvia “inept” governments and receiving Romania been cited as a role model by FPÖ institutions.“ (GLOBSEC) Czechia meagre, short term benefits to representatives. However, turning be pacified. This weaves its way away from the multi-party system “Latvia belongs to the more “Romania scores the second to last through a variety of issues, ranging and free elections is not an option “Strong and enrooted belief in dissatisfied group of countries in in GLOBSEC’s Satisfaction with the from distrust to dissatisfaction for Austrians - even if discontent democratic principles and high the Satisfaction with the System System of Governance Index. While with democracy, with entire groups with daily politics often is high.” socio-economic benefits and of Governance Index. Decreasing only 33% are satisfied with the feeling like they have lost from (Austrian Society for European stability are reflected in a positive voter turnout reflects the strong way how democracy works in their the democratic transition, being Politics) ranking in the Satisfaction with perception among the public that country, Romanians are not giving the System of Governance Index. the needs of the people are not concerned by growing inequality up on democracy. Since two most However, past corruption scandals taken into consideration by the and social issues.” (Eastern Europe established political parties failed of leading political representatives political system. 76% of Latvian Studies Centre) to create an effective government, and long-term problems of respondents believe so, which is many Romanians started to vote for leading political parties to form the highest percentage among a democratic anti-establishment a strong coalition government CEE countries. Such perceptions party rather than for any anti- reflect distrust of Czechs towards provide a fruitful ground for democratic populist forces. Still, if the political parties and leads populist rhetoric, a new wave the democratic anti-establishment to preference for new-looking of which has hit Latvia in 2018 party fails to represent them, this alternatives in newly established parliamentary elections too.” could pose a significant threat to popular movements.“ (The Prague (Centre for East European Policy the political climate.” (GlobalFocus Security Studies Institute) Studies) Centre) Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

20 16 Eurostat, Income Inequality in EU Member States, 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20190718-1 21 Democracy On average, Democracy 1.4 Life satisfaction 1.4 and insecurities 91% of those The happier people, who are the greater support for liberal democracy? satisfied with If they take all circumstances into account, they are satisfied how democracy

with their life with how democracy works in their country

100% works in their 96% country are 90%

86% 84% 82% satisfied with 78% 75% 77% 77% 76% their life. 70%

The data shows that overall life-satisfaction

is a factor linked to both the satisfaction 17 Weitseng Chen, ed., The Beijing Consensus? How China Has 57% with how democracy functions and Changed Western Ideas of Law and Economic Development, Cambridge University Press, 2017, https://academic.oup.com/ the support for liberal democracy. An icon/article-abstract/17/1/375/5485947?redirectedFrom=f 50% overarching majority of those who are ulltext satisfied with how their democracy 47% 47% functions, as well as those who support 45% liberal democracy, are satisfied with their 42% life in every surveyed country. But, as On average, 83% 38% the graph shows, while life-satisfaction 36% correlates with democracy-satisfaction, it of those who 32% is generally twice as high as democracy support liberal 30% satisfaction everywhere but in Austria. In democracy are 25% other words, large numbers of people are dissatisfied with how democracy works also satisfied with but still satisfied with life. The difference their life. thus suggests there are other determining 18% factors contributing to life-satisfaction, possibly economic growth and social standards. Among others, it might represent a challenge for democratic leaders in countering the so-called „China model“ or „Beijing Consensus“ of having an 0% undemocratic regime at the expense of 17

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Austria Poland Czechia Estonia Latvia Hungary Romania Slovakia Lithuania Bulgaria economic growth. Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

22 23 Who would trade their

Democracy freedoms for other benefits? Democracy 1.4 1.4 Those who would trade some of their rights and freedoms (for example freedom to travel, to associate or free speech) for:

better financial situation greater security in their country the preservation of their country’s traditional values 69% 66%

60% 58% 57% 54% 52% 52% 50% 50% 50% 48% 46% 46% 45% 44% 42% 41% 40% 38% 37% 36% 36% 35% 34% 31% 30% 29%

25% 24%

18% 17%

0%

Austria Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia

The willingness to trade basic democratic On the other hand, the willingness to trade and freedoms, especially in countries stronger among older generations in most a so-called small country complex could rights and freedoms for other financial, freedoms can also be explained by rising where people had been taught to live in countries. Those who spent most of their also be observed. 68% of Slovaks and 60% security or cultural benefits in some CEE insecurity over the stability of both people’s restrictive environments for decades. This lives under the un-free regimes might, on of Bulgarians agreed that their country has countries suggests vulnerability towards financial situation and a changing world trend should be watched with a particular one hand, not have had an opportunity to always been oppressed and was never able In 4 countries, anti-democratic voices, both domestic order. Globalisation, increasing income caution, especially during and after the fully embrace and enjoy the advantages to control its path. the absolute and foreign. Actors with political ambitions gaps, restructuring of geopolitical power COVID-19 pandemic’s causing insecurity of the democratic freedoms; on the other who argue that their “order” and “strong dynamics, a 24/7 news cycle, as well as and instability.18 hand, they are often struggling to make majority would 18 Eurofound, Living, working and COVID-19: First findings – hand” are a path towards greater prosperity the use of social media full of unreliable ends meet. The pensions in most of CEE are April 2020, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/ trade their rights and safety are further nourishing these information, may all contribute to rising Moreover, the willingness to give up key lower than in Western European countries.19 report/2020/living-working-and-covid-19-first-findings- attitudes while demonising international insecurities and thus influence the ladder freedoms can also suggest that the overall april-2020 and freedoms for cooperation, spreading fear of the unknown of priorities of every individual. In other understanding of what these democratic The highest degree of insecurity has been 19 Eurostat, Pensions benefits, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/ greater security. eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Pensions_ and persuading their audiences that their words, the greater the feeling of financial guarantees mean is uneven. The socio- overall identified in Slovakia, Bulgaria, benefits,_2016_(%25,_relative_to_GDP)_AE2019.png inconvenient situation is linked to their life instability and insecurity, the greater may demographic data suggests that the as well as Czechia, the lowest in Austria.

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices in democracy. be one’s willingness to give up basic rights tendency to trade freedoms tends to be Among Slovaks and Bulgarians, Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

24 25 Insecurities: distant “West” Democracy Democracy

1.4 Do you personally think any of the following groups 1.4 or countries threaten your identity and values or not? Yes, they do 53% Western societies and their way of living European Union United States of America 50% 50%

45% 43%

36% 35% 34% 33% 31% 30% 29% 28% 27% 26% 25% 25% 25% 24% 23% 23% 23% 23% 22% 22% 21% 21% 19% 17% 17% 16%

12%

0%

Austria Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia

Blaming international organisations and nature of a society.22 This link can also be broadly recognised Czech Euroscepticism institutions for all the wrong happening demonstrated by the correlation between is demonstrated by the 45% of respondents today and in the past has become the new those who feel threatened by Western feeling threatened by the European Union. trend also across the democratic world, societies and those who would trade their Slovaks are usually a regional 20 primarily among the nationalistic populists. freedoms for the preservation of traditional 20 Marcel Fratzscher, Populism, Protectionism and Paralysis, outlier in the perception of the The demonisation of the so-called “West”, values. Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, 2020, https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2020/ however, becomes yet a bit easier in CEE, number/1/article/populism-protectionism-and-paralysis. US. In our last year’s research, due to the region’s central position, as well as The results, however, suggest that these html#footnote-001 GLOBSEC Trends 2019, 41% of the fact that the majority of society does not narratives are not influencing public 21 GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends 2019, https:// feel it is a part of the West.21 attitudes so strongly, except for Slovakia www.globsec.org/publications/globsec-trends-2019/ Slovak respondents perceived and Bulgaria, where the anti-West and 22 An illustration of the anti-liberalism campaign can be the US as a threat to the country. The West and liberal values are often anti-US narratives play a significant part found in GLOBSEC’s research on Slovak Parliamentary Election 2020: https://www.globsec.org/publications/slovak- parliamentary-election-2020/ Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices portrayed as antagonistic to the “true” of political discourse. In addition, the Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

26 27 28 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 1.4 Democracy „ uploads/2017/05/GLOBSEC-Trends2019.pdf 2019, https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ Russia the same way.Russia thesame the country, while26%perceived perceived the USasathreat to 2019 year’s research, information campaigns.Inourlast populist rhetoric andmalign been nourishedbynationalistic On theotherhand,theyhave also a historical andcultural context. pro-Russian sentiments basedon on onehand,linked to stronger 24 23 than theirneighbours. having stronger anti-USsentiments Slovaks have beenknownfor one-region-different-perspectives publications/globsec-trends-2018-central-europe- GLOBSEC Trends 2018,https://www.globsec.org/ globsec-trends-2019/; GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2019, https://www.globsec.org/publications/ pdf; GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends content/uploads/2020/01/Youth-Trends-2020. Trends 2020,https://www.globsec.org/wp- GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Youth , 41%ofSlovakrespondents Slovakia GLOBSEC Trends Country insights 23 22 Theseare, 25 EU. member state competences to the not favour theideaofgivingmore country andCzechsgenerally do narrative isgenerally strong inthe EU membership, the“EUdictate” in supportsince2017fortheir been showingagradual increase the region. Whileourresearch has the mostEurosceptic countryin Czechia hasbeentraditionally Ibid. 25 Czechia Politics) (Austrian Society forEuropean since DonaldTrump took office.” States hassuffered significantly general, theimageofUnited is alsoviewedwithscepticism.In Anglicisms intheGermanlanguage The multitude ofAmericanisms/ especially amongolderpeople. than asathreat to localtraditions, by someaslessofanenrichment streaming etc., services, isviewed commercial UScinema,TVseries, the omnipresence offast food, popular inAustria.Nevertheless, everyday culture wasandis US’s globalambitions.American especially withregard to the has alwaysbeenpresent – scepticism or“anti-Americanism“ the left-wingpoliticalspectrum, to theUSandSovietUnion.In neutral countryinequidistance part oftheWest, butalsoasa Austria alwaysregarded itself as in history. Inthepost-warperiod US beingathreat ispartlyrooted perceptionIn Austria,“the ofthe here aswell. the Ottoman Empire -playsarole Russia helpingto free Bulgariafrom but commonreligion andhistory - instilled negative viewsoftheUS, of thecommunistperiodthat and theideologicalconditioning remnants ofSovietpropaganda These trends mightindicate the despite beingaNATO member. values are notinlinewiththeUS, claimed that theircountry’s Trends 2019 division oftheworld.In the bi-polarUSvs.SovietUnion CEE are stillstrongly influencedby sentiments; themindsofmanyin linked to stronger pro-Russian perception oftheUSissimilarly Bulgaria’s rather negative Austria Bulgaria , 68% ofBulgarians , 68% GLOBSEC 29 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 1.4 Democracy Insecurities: minorities Democracy Democracy

1.4 Those who believe the following Those who believe the following 1.4 groups of society are favoured over others: groups threaten their identity and values: Migrants Minorities Migrants LGBT+

72% 72%

56% 55%

52% 50% 50% 48% 46% 45% 45% 43% 42% 41% 39% 39% 36% 36% 35%

30% 29% 28% 27% 25% 25% 25% 23% 22% 21% 19% 17% 16% 14% 14% 13% 13% 12% 10% 9% 7% 7%

4%

0%

Austria Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Austria Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia

The feeling of insecurity from other groups towards migrants is extremely high, despite the unknown in the more traditional and As a result, this minority is constantly it is also the only surveyed country directly 27 GLOBSEC Policy Institute, Migration politics and policies in Central Europe, 2017, https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ in society translates into lower tolerance the fact the country has not been hit by homogeneous societies such as Slovakia or accused of exploiting the social benefits affected by the wave of immigration in uploads/2017/08/migration_politics_and_policies_in_central_ and thus greater difficulties in creating a any massive migration waves in the past Bulgaria. On the other hand, the campaigns system and a lack of willingness to the recent refugee crisis.31 It is, therefore, europe_web.pdf

just and equitable democracy respecting years. The refugee crisis was used as a tool have been nourishing these feelings and participate in the workforce. paradoxical to find other CEE countries with 28 Pál Tamás, Central European Roma Policy: National and upholding the rights and freedoms of to spread insecurity in several political thus contribute to a more closed and less no negative experience from the waves of Minority Elites, National States and the EU, p.163 – 175, The 26 Roma – A Minority in Europe, https://books.openedition.org/ all. Overall, the attitudes towards minorities campaigns in the late 2010’s. tolerant society. More to the north, the largest national migration to be more insecure than Austria. ceup/1420?lang=en are influenced by local historical and minority within Poland are Ukrainians 29 Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Lithuania, National political contexts and demographics, as Sharp anti-immigrant campaigns waged Ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, Czechia, traveling for work, while in Lithuania, Poles Minorities, 2019, https://lrkm.lrv.lt/en/activities/national- the passages below demonstrate. However, by key political actors to spread fear Hungary, Romania and Slovakia are and Russians both constitute approximately 26 Reuters, Migration drops near zero in Czech Republic but minorities sways election campaign, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/ 29 the role of contemporary political rhetoric and strengthen their own image as the mostly represented by Roma, often faced 6% of the population. In Latvia and article/us-czech-election-president-migration/migration- 30 Migration Policy Institute, Austria: A Country of should also be recognised. “saviours” or “protectors” of the people with social exclusion from the society Estonia, the largest national minority drops-near-zero-in-czech-republic-but-sways-election- Immigration?, 2003, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ campaign-idUSKBN1FC25N; GLOBSEC Policy Institute, The austria-country-immigration could be found in many countries across and stigmatisation due to the decades remains the Russian-speaking population. Czech Republic: Migration trends and political dynamics, Czechia, for example, is generally the region.27 On one hand, the fear of of ignorance to solve the integration Austria is the country with the most https://www.globsec.org/publications/czech-republic- 31 World Bank, Refugee population by country or territory of migration-trends-political-dynamics/ asylum, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG considered an open and liberal society, migrants present in the states with no real challenge by the Communist regimes and a complex ethnic demographics, largely as is confirmed by high tolerance towards experience with large migration waves subsequent lack of strategic approach from affected by the migration wave from the 28 30

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices LGBT+ people. Yet, the feeling of insecurity should be also understood as a fear of the governments since the 1990s. former-Yugoslavia as well as Turkey, while Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

30 31 Democracy Country Insights Democracy 1.3 „ 1.3 Hungary Poland The following quotes represent data interpretation from the partner organisations in the project. 68% would not trade their 79% think that the EU does rights and freedoms for not pose a threat to their the preservation of their identity and values. traditional values. Austria Only 25% think that LGBT+ 52% think migrants are a community poses a threat threat to their values and to their values and identity. 42% think migrants are a threat to their values and identity. “The high degree of tolerance for LGBT+ is somewhat identity. “The Hungarian government’s main message regarding surprising, as Poland is generally regarded as a more migration is built on the claim that migrants are not allowed conservative society. The first explanation can be linked to enter Hungary. The majority thus has no reason to believe to a realisation that the government and church strongly However, only 28% agree they are favoured by the system. Nevertheless, more than a influence and control the media. While distrusting the that the migrants are half believes that migrants threaten them, which is a result government, Poles also distrust the narratives they push favoured over others. of almost-constant anti-immigration government campaign forward [see more in Chapter no.2].Another explanation spread in the media and public engagements since early can be linked to Poles‘ tendency to focus on personal 2015. Migration is only discussed in the context of a threat to development and on the wellbeing of their nuclear families “Since December 2017, Austrian government policy has been national security, economic prosperity, cultural values, public and small businesses. Even though they feel as a part characterised by a migration-sceptical stance, regardless of health and safety of individuals in general.” (Political Capital of a bigger nation, they are very much attached to their the Greens’ participation in the government since January Institute) freedoms and refuse others limiting them even for the sake 2020. Asylum seekers are less referred to as “refugees” in of preservation of conservative values. This attitude could the political discourse, but primarily as “economic migrants”, be most easily described as ‘let me and others be’.” (Political with visible impact on public opinion. Austrians’ attitude Accountability Foundation) toward refugees and migrants is also influenced by tabloid media, the FPÖ and right-wing social media platforms that regularly spread reports of an alleged preference for asylum seekers. For example, when it comes to social benefits, Romania housing or claims that asylum seekers would receive free mobile phones.” (Austrian Society for European Politics) 77% are satisfied with their Estonia life 60% believe most people in 25% think that migrants are their country can be trusted. a threat to their values and identity. 74% do not believe that minorities are favoured over “Compared to other countries in the region, quite a low others. percentage of Romanians feel threatened by others. With a large number of Romanians working abroad (4 million 32 “The high level of trust among Estonians might be linked to according to a recent estimate), at least one study shows the size of the population. Estonians often joke that in such that their families remaining in Romania tend to be more small country (half of population lives in Tallinn, the capital) tolerant towards outsiders. Hungarian or Roma minorities everyone knows everyone, so there is not much space for are the largest and the most likely to face discrimination and mistakes. The high degree of trust can be also demonstrated hostility in Romania but migrants are not an issue of public by many volunteer movements and organisations, debate, possibly since Romania is out of the way of migration particularly popular and trusted in Estonia.” (International routes and the political representatives generally have other Centre for Defence and Security) contentious issues to debate.” (GlobalFocus Centre) Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

32 32 Sandu, Lumile sociale ale migratiei romanesti in strainatate, Polirom, 2010 33 The growing trends of distancing from liberal democracy

Democracy and rising narratives building upon nationalism, tradition Democracy 1.5 1.5 or religion have not avoided the CEE region. However, the data suggest two crucial tendencies suggesting the course for the years to come. Practical implications

Second, democracy as a system is generally supported and thus will probably stay with us. A high support for liberal democracy, even in countries with declining democratic standards, is a sign that democracy is a cherished system after decades of occupation and totalitarian regimes. The high dissatisfaction with the system and a willingness to exchange some freedoms for other benefits, however, poses a serious threat and challenge for the upcoming years. Citizens are aware and sensitive to income inequality and oligarchic influences over various aspects of the state. While there might be First, there are countries with lower or declining qualities of democracy where the satisfaction with life and tendencies to believe the narratives of a threat coming system is high. This indicates that more illiberal models with strong leadership guaranteeing some from various “alien” groups, those with contact to political economic growth or social benefits will not vanish. On the contrary, as long as the citizens will be enjoying elites are seen as favoured by 70% of the region. In the financial benefits while maintaining the basic rights of participative democracy, the EU and NATO should search for alternatives to state capture, many might vote be getting ready for another long-term cleavage among its members, and as the data show, it should not be for anti-establishment political actors in a hopeless call for defined by geography. The Liberal vs. not-so-liberal conflict might, however, intensify the challenges of closer change of the system. Democratic leaders should try to cooperation in the institutions founded on common values, including the rule-of-law, equality and solidarity. overcome these tendencies by opening the discussions on In efforts to maintain the EU or NATO as united blocs, we risk having even more pragmatism and compromises reforms and strive for greater inclusion into it of those who omitting the question of values. feel the most distant and dissatisfied. Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

34 35 Democracy Democracy Chapter II: Media Chapter II: Media Chapter

This chapter provides an overview of the trust in media and perceptions of CEE respondents towards media independence. Among other findings, it shows that:

On average, the majority of CEE as an element undermining media respondents do not trust the standard independence; mainstream media; In some counties, mainstream media are However, the standard media is also perceived to be under full control of the rather perceived as free; government and, thus, are perceived as channels of state and political MediaChapter II Strong influence by governments and influence. oligarchs was commonly recognised Voices of Central and Eastern Europe Europe and Eastern and Eastern of Central of Central Voices Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

36 37 38 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 2.1 Media 0% 25% 50% 75% Trust inmediaandperceptions ofbeingfree-of-influence main communication channelbetween exchange ofinformation asthe served when mediaasaplatform fortheopen crucial duringtheCOVID-19 pandemic, public interest. Thisbecameespecially institutions andreport onmatters of democracy, theyscrutinisepublic Performing therole ofwatchdogs of an important partofdemocratic society. Media andinvestigative journalismare Trust andfreedom Austria 80% 45% Those whotruststandard mainstream media Bulgaria 37% 38% Czechia 38% 77% Hungary 44% in average trustfrom countries. surveyed trusted institutions inthe world, with49% Barometer, mediastillbelongto theleast According to the2020EdelmanTrust a continuoustrend around theworld. by populistandpolarisingrhetoric, is However, adistrustinmedia,nurtured lockdown. governments andpopulations under the 46% 33 Estonia Those whothinkthat mediaare rather orcompletely free 48% 64% 58% Latvia 59% Lithuanua 34

44% 37% trust innewsoverall. Digital NewsReport2020 findings reflect alsotheReuters Institute’s trust thestandard mainstream media.The of 10countries,mostrespondents donot by theabsolute majority, whilein7out media perceived asatrustworthyinstitution trust standard media.OnlyinLatvia is where the majority ofrespondents donot Similar trends applyfortheCEEregion, Poland 39% 33% Romania 35

45% 73% detecting the Slovakia 46% 79% media. mainstream the standard do nottrust respondents countries, most In 7outof10 36 35 34 33 Index, https://rsf.org/en/ranking assessment ofmediafreedom. CEE thusseemto have arelatively healthy relatively goodextent. Therespondents in Index oftheReporters withoutBorders to a countries inthe of mediafreedom reflect the ranking of freedom intheircountry. Theperceptions believe inrelative orcomplete media Slovakia, more than70% ofrespondents cases ofAustria,Czechia,Romaniaand media israther orcompletely free. Inthe respondents claimthat theirstandard out of10countries,alarge majority of Paradoxically, despite thedistrust,in6 findings-2020/ www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2020/overview-key- findings-2020/ www.digitalnewsreport.org/survey/2020/overview-key- Single%20Spread%20without%20Crops.pdf Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Executive%20Summary_ edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-01/2020%20 Edelman,2020EdelmanTrust Barometer, https://www. Reuters Institute, Digital NewsReport2020,http:// Reporters WithoutBorders, 2020World Press Freedom Reuters Institute, Digital NewsReport2020,http:// 2020 World Press Freedom Bulgaria Hungary Poland Romania Czechia Slovakia Lithuania Latvia Austria Estonia Freedom Index 2020 World Press Country number 2020 36 Ranking 40 48 89 62 33 28 22 111 18 14 39 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 2.1 Media 40 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 2.2 Media mentioned actors influencingtheworkof In 7outof10countries,themostfrequently perceived mediabiasare alsovisibleinCEE. Slovakia Romania Poland Lithuana Latvia Hungary Estonia Czechia Bulgaria Austria Who doyoubelieve influencesthemediainyourcountry? equally andfairly. that theinterests mediaserve ofeveryone Only 32%respondents world-widethink the media? Who influences Government 37 Suchattitudes of Oligarchs andstrong financialgroups journalism intheregion. deteriorating conditionsofindependent Reporters withoutBorders, reflecting the tendencies have beenalsovoicedby government andoligarchs. Suchinterfering media andits independencewere boththe 24% 27% 27% 28% 30% 32% 38 36% 39% 46% 46% 47% 47% 47% 48% 48% 54% 55% 57% 62% 64% ownership. with state propaganda andcomplete media of countrieshaving decadesofexperience sensitively intheregion withthemajority regulatory bodies,itcanbeperceived leadership ofthepublicbroadcaster and media andpoliticalappointments to the and its redistribution amongselected the formofoverhaulpublicfunding governmental influencecanbe exerted in recognised amongthecitizens.While quality ofdemocracy, countries voicedbyexperts assessingthe deteriorating democratic standards inthese and Poland, whichindicates that the influence isstrongly perceived inHungary independence. Thegovernmental oligarchic influenceimpactmedia believe bothgovernmentaswell On average 43%ofCEErespondents 40 39 38 37 and nolongerpoliticallyneutral. as supportiveofthecurrent government increasingly perceive theCatholic Church station andRadioMaryja.Observers also priests, Father Rydzyk, that includesaTV media companyownedbyoneofPoland’s primarily, butnotexclusively, byaprivate The church’s mediainfluenceis represented outlier amongCEEcountriesinthisrespect. over themediaintheircountry. Poland isan Catholic Church hasastrong influence Our data showsthat 42%ofPoles thinkthe of thechurch inPoland Strong influence https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index or theEconomistIntelligence Unit,Democracy Index 2019, freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2020 church-and-state-are-a-popular-combination org/2019/10/12/768537341/as-an-election-nears-in-poland- and State are aPopular Combination, 2019,https://www.npr. en/2020-rsf-index-europes-journalists-face-growing-dangers journalists face growing dangers, 2020,https://rsf.org/ Single%20Spread%20without%20Crops.pdf Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Executive%20Summary_ edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-01/2020%20 Edelman,2020EdelmanTrust Barometer, https://www. Reporters WithoutBorders, 2020RSFIndex: Europe’s Freedom House,Nations inTransit 2020,https:// RobSchmitz,NPR,AsanElectionNears inPoland, Church 39 are onceagain 40 independence. impacts media influence oligarchic believe that respondents 43% ofCEE On average, country. media intheir influences the government believe that Hungarians 64% of 41 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 2.2 Media Media Media 2.3 Practical 2.3 implications

A high recognition of the influences over the media among the respondents in the region suggests that the increasing distrust towards the media might be linked to citizens’ (sometimes legitimate) concerns about government or oligarchic influence over the information broadcasted. It might be a reason why some look for supposedly “alternative sources” run by self-declared independent “journalists” or individuals with no journalistic experience or standards. Often inclined toward providing a distorted picture of reality and alternative explanations of world events, a regular consumption of such sources poses a danger to an informed society and can represent a path towards strong anti-systemic to radicalised views.41

Legitimate concerns over media influence should receive more attention and be tackled on both national and international levels. Anti-monopoly laws, stricter regulations and transparency requirements enforced by the EU could support media independence. Stricter rules on who can be called a journalist and independent medium need to be set and actively implemented. Such content should be appropriately marked by social media platforms as relevant and verified and prioritized by algorithms to increase its reach, such measures are also advocated by the European Commission.42 Furthermore, good investigative journalism takes time and requires financial and personal costs. Thus, more independent funding should be provided to media pursuing quality journalism and cross-national platforms. Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

41 The New York Times, The Rabbit Hole Podcast, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/podcasts/rabbit-hole-internet-youtube-virus.html 42 42 Financial Times, Brussels to launch far-reaching overhaul of online content rules, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/42d66452-5066-4ab8-8650-8b6c9f41c899 43 Democracy This chapter provides an overview Democracy of the factors behind the current thinking about conspiracies and misinformation, together with the Chapter III: Conspiracies & Misinformation III: Conspiracies Chapter most popular narratives in each & Misinformation III: Conspiracies Chapter country. It shows that those who believe in conspiracy theories:

Are very likely to trade their rights and Are likely to believe that the media is not free; freedoms for other benefits; Are likely to be dissatisfied with the system Are very likely to support autocratic leaders they live in; over liberal democracies; Are likely to be dissatisfied with their own life. Conspiracies &

MisinformationChapter III Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

44 45 Foreign interference & control Who believes Those who agree that world affairs are not decided by elected leaders but by secret groups aiming to establish a totalitarian Conspiracies & Misinformation Conspiracies Conspiracies & Misinformation Conspiracies in conspiracies? world order. 3.1 3.1 A logistic regression analysis identified five values-based or financial benefits; and 2) The data, however, show that one’s key factors contributing to people’s being preferring an autocratic leader to liberal tendency to believe in certain narratives prone to believe in conspiracy theories democracy are significantly more prone is also linked to historical and political and misinformation: willingness to trade to believe in conspiracies. The latter three context, with some conspiracies being freedoms for other benefits (p. 22-23); factors’ link to susceptibility is less strong particularly popular also among less 60% support for an autocratic leader; distrust but still significant, which means that those conspiracy-prone countries or groups of in the media; dissatisfaction with the who are dissatisfied with how the system society. Slovakia system; and dissatisfaction with life. The works in their own country, dissatisfied with two factors contribute significantly to one’s their own life and believing that media in susceptibility to conspiracy theories. This their country are not free, are also more 52% 51% means that those people: 1) willing to trade prone to believe in conspiracy theories. their rights and freedoms for more security, Bulgaria 50% Romania

43% 42% Degree of belief in conspiracy 41% Latvia 43 Lithuania theories and misinformation narratives Poland 37%

56% Estonia

29% 29% 50% 48% Czechia Hungary 25%

22%

39% Austria

35% 34%

29% 28% 25% 25%

20% 0% 17% On average, 41% of CEE think that world affairs are not decided by elected leaders 43 The percentage scores represent an average of an agreement of 3-4 conspiracy statements. The respondents but by secret groups aiming to establish were asked around 5-6 conspiracy statements, of which The majority of a totalitarian world order. Stories about three were identical for all the countries covered and the rest country-specific and selected by the analysts from given Slovaks believe secret societies are entangled in the world’s countries. The statements with the lowest and highest % history. The secretive and mysterious were excluded from the average to remove narratives that in 5 out of 6 might be strongly influenced by recent political context or conspiracy and character of these groups can be attractive by the analysts’ miscalculation of the dominant narratives. for human imagination to run wild about Specific questions used for the average are included in the Methodology on the page 54. misinformation potential plans and plots, on the other 0% narratives polled. hand, they are also distant and vague

Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Lithuania Austria Latvia Estonia Czechia Poland Hungary Romania Bulgaria Slovakia enough to be blamed for anything. Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

46 47 Those who agree that Jews have too much power and secretly control governments and institutions around the world. 49% in Hungary and 56% in Czechia believe the anti-government protests in the past years were orchestrated and financially 51% supported by George Soros. 49% Conspiracies & Misinformation Conspiracies & Misinformation Conspiracies In some countries, anti-Semitism has been A specific example of a popular use of respondents from our research believe that 3.1 revived, with one of the most popular the “Soros narrative” are anti-government George Soros was behind the protests. 3.1 targets of smear campaigns by populist and protests of the past years in Czechia, On average, 53% of Czechs, Hungarians 39% authoritarian actors are conspiracy theories Hungary and Slovakia. Even in Czechia, and Slovaks believe that anti-government 38% about the Hungarian-born, American where the “big” anti-Semitic conspiracy protests in the past years were orchestrated billionaire and philanthropist, George Soros. is not popular, more than a half of and financially supported by George Soros. 34% 32% 29% 25% Protests in 1989-1990 21% The legacy of 1989-1990 protests, marking the turning point both in the end of the 45% in Romania 32% of Czechs 16% bi-polar world and in a path towards CEE democratisation, strongly resonate in the region. For many, these years are a symbol of change, freedom and hope. However, believe that the protests agree that the Velvet hopes and aspirations for greater prosperity in 1989 that led to the fall Revolution in 1989 was did not materialise for all parts of society. of Communist rule were not a result of mass While the states economically grow and some regions and groups thrive, others orchestrated and paid by protests but was planned are found on the other side of the wealth Western powers. in advance by the secret distribution gap, often disappointed with and cynical towards democratisation.45 One services. of the results of such disillusionment may Austria Bulgaria Czechia Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia be the inclination to undermine the protests and their consequent establishment of 10% of democratic systems in CEE countries. A sad legacy of the past centuries’ However, in 6 out of 10 CEE countries, exploitation of these narratives by malign Lithuanians 48% of Poles demonisation and blaming of Jews still a quarter to a third of the population, did domestic and foreign political actors. The questions asked in specific countries and 21% of 44 persists in many societies. The anti- not have a clear opinion on whether to cannot be used for a comparative analysis, Latvians Semitic conspiracy theory about Jews believe this conspiracy theory – 35% of In some countries, anti-Semitism has been as they were drafted by local researchers agree that ”Solidarity” having too much power and secretly Lithuanians, 30% of Czechs and Bulgarians revived, with one of the most popular reflecting the country-specific contexts. made a deal with the controlling governments and institutions and 25% of Estonians. The findings indicate targets of smear campaigns by populist and Nonetheless, the results hint that the 1989 agree that the movement around the world resonates with around a that latent anti-Semitism and unresolved authoritarian actors are conspiracy theories conspiracy theories tend to be popular in communists during the half of population in Slovakia and Hungary, historical grievances are still present in the about the Hungarian-born, American Central and Eastern Europe, as opposed to towards independence roundtable negotiations and with around a third in Bulgaria, Poland, region, while, in many countries, significant billionaire and philanthropist, George Soros. the Baltics. But again, large parts did not in 1990 was orchestrated of 1989, and Poland is still Romania and Lithuania. On the other hand, parts of the “unsure” population could respond, or did not know how to respond 74% of Austrians and 59% of Estonians say a be swayed either way. More pro-active by the US for the sole ruled by the people who 44 to these questions, which may signify clear no to such conspiracy thinking. narrative-building should be done by Human Rights Watch, The Alarming Rise of Anti-Semitism in Europe, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/04/ uncertainty as well as a lack of public purpose to cement its were in power during the democratic actors to counter possible alarming-rise-anti-semitism-europe discussion around the issue. dominance in the region socialist regime. also, 39% of Lithuanians and 27% of Latvians

45 Brzezinski, Salach and Wroński, Wealth inequality in do not know whether to agree or disagree Central and Eastern Europe: evidence from joined household with such statement. 54% of Slovaks believe that protests against the government survey and rich lists’ data, Working Paper no 9/2019 (294), University of Warsaw, 2019, https://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/ in Slovakia, which resulted in changes in the government and files/3015/6034/4619/WNE_WP294.pdf other crucial institutions in the country, were controlled and paid from abroad. Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

48 49 50 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 3.2 Conspiracies & Misinformation narratives Misinformation other hand,often linked to USinfluence. The perceptions aboutNATO are, onthe or misinformation demonisingtheEU. greater tendency to believe inotherplots narratives mightfurthercontribute to a influence it.Theconstant repetition ofsuch do withoutthecountryhaving powerto Brussels dictates to theircountrywhat to 52% oftherespondents inCEEagree that The pollingdata showsthat, onaverage, labels inthediscourse. “Brussels dictate” beingcommonlyused powers, with“officials inBrussels”ora organisations canbeportrayed asdistant In addition,representatives ofthe from politicalactors’ ownwrongdoings. used asascapegoat to divert attention International organisations are often EU &NATO agree ornot. of respondents couldnotdecidewhetherto among theBalts butinBulgaria,where 25% on theEUorNATO was not significant undecisive approach towards thenarratives Compared to 1989 conspiracy theories,the NATO narratives isthusnotsurprising. to conspiracy thinking, the belief in the anti- pro-Russian attitudes andtheproneness with thestrongest anti-USsentiments, compared to 92% ofPoles. voted to stay inareferendum in2019, respondents inbothcountrieswouldhave Bulgaria. For comparison,only56%of NATO sentiments are inSlovakiaand since 2017that showstheweakest pro- correlates withour research conducted and SlovakiathanintheBalticstates. This belief inanti-NATO narratives inBulgaria The data showmuchhigherdegrees of and prosperity. alliances that are vital to theCEE’s security and endangertheverybasesof to thescepticismtowards themembership and anti-EU/NATO narratives contribute justified, thesimplification ofconspiracies While theseattitudes are to acertain extent 46 49 Combined 47

48

Trends2019.pdf www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GLOBSEC- 47 46 power to influenceit. to dowithout themhaving dictates theircountrywhat think that “Brussels” US occupation. Slovakia wouldmeanthe believe that NATO basesin regional energy hub. country oftherole ofa industry andstripthe Bulgaria’s nuclearenergy always schemedto destroy think that theEUhas European-Elections-in-the-V4.pdf 2019, https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ From disinformation campaignsto narrative amplification, GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends 2017, https:// GLOBSEC Policy Institute, European Elections intheV4: Bulgarians 55% of 65% ofSlovaks 33% ofCzechs Europe subordinate. American schemeto keep believe NATO isan provoke andirritate Russia. presence inEstonia isto purpose ofNATO’s believe that theonly occupation. states are underNATO believe that theBaltic 49 48 Trends-2016.pdf www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/GLOBSEC- Trends2019.pdf www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/GLOBSEC- GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends 2019,https:// GLOBSEC Policy Institute, GLOBSEC Trends 2016,https:// Bulgarians 50% of Estonians 30% of Latvians and 26% Lithuanians 13% of experience withthe SovietUnioninthe20 and Poland dueto theirbadhistorical pertaining particularlyto theBaltics key factor isthenegative imageofRussia enjoy popularity intheBalticcountries.A historical events, theydonotseemto misinformation narratives questioning When itcomesto pro-Russian The caseofAustria Russia-related narratives decades. country hasbeenexperiencing inrecent strongly linked to themigration waves the among allnarratives tested inthecountryis The onlynarrative resonating inAustria in thedestructionofNazism. order to underminetheRussian/USSRrole falsify anddistort thecountry’s history in historians conspires against Russiato believe that anetworkofWestern polled allacross theanalysedCEEregion. also inotherCEEcountries,theywere not century. Whilesimilarnarratives are present 26% ofLatvians Islamisation. slow andsecret undergoing a society is the Austrian 42% agree that th

“fight againstpoliticalIslam”inparticular. the subjectofIslamingeneral andthe discussion increasingly concentrated on In thepastyears, thegeneral political themselves asmoderate. that amajority ofMuslimsinAustriasee in publicdiscussiondespite thefact „Islamic“ and„Islamist“are often confused with anIslamistbackground, theterms Not leastbecauseoftheterrorist attacks by politiciansto lure themasfuture voters. theory are afraid that Muslimsare preferred Supporters oftheIslamisation conspiracy the numberofasylumseekers israther low. proportion ofpeopleMuslimfaith and prevalent inrural regions, where the “Worries ofIslamisation are alsoparticularly it joinedtheUSSRwillinglyandlegally. There wasnoSovietoccupation ofmycountry; 22% Latvia then-President Kaczyński andotherelites. Tusk madeadealwithRussiato killthe staged andthat theformerPMDonald believe that theSmolenskplanecrash was 22% ofPoles Lithuania 12% European Politics) public opinion.”(AustrianSociety for and hadvisibleconsequencesonAustrian one ofthemosturgent domestic‘problems’ of thetopic of‘Islam’inthepublicdebate as Islam. Allthisledto anoverrepresentation to representatives ofaradical political that was generally considered to be referred introduction ofprotective custody –amove In recent months, theÖVP urged the the publicsector hasbeenconsidered. an extension ofthisbanto teachers orto forgirlsinelementaryheadscarves school, Austrian Parliament passedabanon a “symbolic policy”.InAutumn 2019,the tried to demonstrate strength bypursuing efforts inflamedtheissueandpoliticians Debates onfailed long-term integration Estonia 22% 51 Voices of Central and Eastern Europe 3.2 Conspiracies & Misinformation Practical Conspiracies & Misinformation Conspiracies & Misinformation Conspiracies 3.3 implications 3.3 A misleading narrative or a conspiracy theory has fertile ground to become widely popular if there is no viable alternative in the discourse or if there is a degree of uncertainty surrounding it, i.e., if those on the receiving end lack key information. Thus, in addition to historical context, the popularity of specific narratives in specific countries is often linked to the nurturing of the topic by political leaders or to a lack of governments’ strategic communication. If the former applies, democracy needs its key components – free media and strong civil society to hold politicians accountable and provide factual information to the public.

In order to prevent any attempts to suppress these Susceptibility to conspiratorial thinking is based on looking for alternatives and culprits to explain specific components, greater international support, both financial events.50 The “villain” is usually made up by a group of people, which is intangible enough for the believers and declarative, is required. Active and long-term strategic to blame them. This is thus usually an ethnic group, representatives of a country or nation that is distant communication can address and pre-bunk the prevalent ideologically or geographically, or a group on the other end of the ideological, social or financial spectrum of conspiracy or misinformation narratives in society, but the society. more coordination and proactive measures on both the state and non-state levels are needed to fill the void. That The data shows that dissatisfaction and the feeling of insecurity greatly contribute to the population’s first requires robust research into societal attitudes and proneness to conspiracy theories and misinformation narratives. It is rather natural that groups who do not feel the identification of key vulnerabilities. Once strategic an integral part of society and do not feel treated fairly in life would look for alternatives. While for some, it is an political messaging is established, further research alternative system of governance, for others, it is an alternative culprit “secretly” responsible for wrongdoings, should be conducted on potential underrepresentation and, in the worst-case scenario, both. While pushes for changes in the system of governance can eventually of key issues in the education system to establish a solid lead to a stronger public debate about reforms, the justification of one’s dissatisfaction through imaginary knowledge base more resilient to conspiracy theories and plots and culprits dangerously leads to greater passivity. If a person believes that the events shaping the misinformation. world and people’s lives are governed differently than “the majority believes”, their willingness to participate in the system decreases significantly.51 Their satisfaction and empowerment, on the other hand, comes from the belief that they are a part of the “special” group aware of the truth. This tendency is dangerous for any democracy, which requires the society to play an active role to work. Disillusioned and passive society is hampering participatory democracy and its key building blocks. Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

50 Douglas et al., Understanding Conspiracy Theories, Advances in Political Psychology, Vol. 40(1), 2019, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/pops.12568, p.4 52 51 Butler, Koopman, and Zimbardo, The psychological impact of viewing the film “JFK”: emotions, beliefs, and political behavioral intentions. Polit. Psychol. 16, 237–257, 1995, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3791831 53 Average value of the factor scores-based indices per country Methodology Methodology Methodology Factor 1 „Satisfaction Factor 2 - Factor 3 - with the system of „Personal „Willingness to governance” satisfaction“ trade freedom“ The outcomes and findings of this report are based on public opinion poll surveys carried out in March 2020 on a representative sample of the population in ten EU member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The surveys Austria 0,82 0,75 0,70 were conducted on a sample ranging from 1,000 to 1,047 respondents using stratified multistage random sampling in the form of computer Bulgaria -0,46 -0,37 -0,20 assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) or computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). Czechia 0,04 0,01 -0,23 In all countries, the profiles of the respondents were representative of the country by gender, age, education, place of residence and size of Estonia 0,22 -0,20 -0,11 settlement. For the purpose of graphical data visualisation in this report, the results were rounded to full numbers. Hungary -0,02 -0,24 0,26 Latvia -0,12 -0,13 -0,03 To improve the readers’ experience, the responses in closed questions with a scale were generalised. For example, a question with options Lithuania -0,02 -0,34 0,07 definitely agree/ rather agree/ rather disagree /definitely disagree, was merged to agree / disagree for the purpose of data visualisation. Poland -0,18 0,27 0,09 Romania -0,32 -0,01 -0,07 The collected data were subject to factor analysis, from which three factors were identified - “satisfaction with the system of governance”, Slovakia -0,12 -0,09 -0,53 “personal satisfaction” and “willingness to trade freedom” comprised of the following variables (polled questions):

The individual value of the index per each country represents how close countries are to the “ideal type” of respondent, i.e. a value of 1 in Factor 1 means the respondent is “definitely” satisfied with their governance system. The value of -1 represents the opposite (i.e. the respondent is Polled questions and variables Factor 1 „Satisfaction Factor 2 - Factor 3 - “definitely” not satisfied with their governance). The countries’ factor scores of the „satisfaction with the system of governance“ index used on used in factor analysis with the system of „Personal „Willingness to governance” satisfaction“ trade freedom“ page no. 12 of the publication were multiplied by 100 for easier graphic visualisation.

In (country), everyone has a chance to succeed in life 0.414 Logistic regression analysis was applied to see what variables could explain conspiracy beliefs of the respondents. In case of the question The needs of people like you are well taken into account 0.541 concerning independence of media, both “rather agree” and “strongly agree” answers to the question “Do you believe that standard mainstream by the political system in (country) media in our country are completely free, rather free or unfree?” were included. In general, most people in my country can be trusted 0.438 Trust - Government 0.733 Trust - President 0.575 Logistic regression coefficients for determinants of conspiracy beliefs Trust - Courts and judiciary in your country 0.581 Trust - Standard mainstream media 0.524 Trust - Political parties 0.641 Trust - Police 0.654 Variables World Trade Center Jewish Secret groups Trust - Armed forces 0.545 conspiracy conspiracy conspiracy Satisfaction - With your life? 0.720 Satisfaction - With your financial situation? 0.707 Factor 1 „Satisfaction with the system of governance“ -0.305*** -0.0739* -0.394*** Satisfaction - With your social standing? 0.708 (0.0419) (0.0388) (0.0393) Satisfaction - With how democracy works in your 0.602 Factor 2 „Personal satisfaction“ -0.207*** -0.197*** -0.241*** country? (0.0403) (0.0382) (0.0383) Trade freedom for... : - ... better financial situation of you 0.723 Factor 3 „Willingness to trade freedom“ -0.407*** -0.565*** -0.546*** and your household? (0.0407) (0.0383) (0.0382) Trade freedom for... : - ... greater security in your country? 0.792 Preference of strong authoritarian leader 0.508*** 0.455*** 0.588*** Trade freedom for... : - ... the preservation of (your 0.780 (0.0731) (0.0695) (0.0700) country’s) traditional values? Belief that standard media not free 0.321*** 0.108 0.170** (0.0787) (0.0734) (0.0729) Country dummies (yes) (yes) (yes) Constant -0.320 -0.886*** -0.0996 (0.280) (0.262) (0.258) Since factor loadings can be interpreted as standardised regression coefficients, it is possible to interpret that, for example, the variable trust in Observations 5,522 5,772 6,007 government has a correlation of 0.733 with Factor 1. This would be considered a strong association for a factor analysis.

Factor-scored indices comprised of individual variables (please see table above) were weighted based on the portion they “contribute” to the Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 indicator. Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

54 55 Chart Degree of belief in conspiracy and misinformation narratives on page 44: Credits Methodology

The percentage scores represent an average of an agreement with conspiracy statements polled in a particular country. The respondents were asked around 5-7 conspiracy and misinformation statements, of which three were identical for all the countries covered and the rest country- specific and selected by the analysts from given countries. The statements with the lowest and highest percentage were excluded from the average to remove the narratives that might be strongly influenced by recent political context or by the analysts’ miscalculation of the dominant narratives.

Three conspiracy statements polled in all 10 countries were: 1. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 was planned and conducted by the American government, not Al-Qaeda. 2. Jews have too much power and secretly control governments and institutions around the world. 3. World affairs are not decided by elected leaders but by secret groups aiming to establish a totalitarian world order. Authors Country specific questions were the following: Dominika Hajdu Austria: Hungary: Poland: Research Fellow

- Austrian society is undergoing a slow and - The non-governmental organizations - The ”Solidarity” made a deal with the secret Islamisation. in (your country) are the secret voice of communists during the roundtable - Jörg Haider (a former leader of the FPÖ) foreign powers and interests. negotiations of 1989, and Poland is still Katarína Klingová was murdered in 2008. - The anti-government protests in the past ruled by the people who were in power in Senior Research Fellow years were orchestrated and financially the socialist regime. supported by George Soros. - The Smolensk plane crash was staged. The Bulgaria: Democracy & Resilience Programme former Prime Minister Donald Tusk made a - The EU has always schemed to destroy Latvia: deal with Russia to kill the then-President Bulgaria’s nuclear energy industry and strip Kaczyński and elites. the country of the role of a regional energy - Latvian movements towards hub. independence in 1990 were orchestrated by Romania: - The non-governmental organizations the USA for the sole purpose to cement its in (your country) are the secret voice of dominance in the region. - The protests in 1989 that led to the fall of foreign powers and interests. - Latvia and the other Baltic states are the communist rule were orchestrated and Credits - NATO is an American scheme to keep under NATO occupation. paid by Western powers. Europe subordinate. - There was no Soviet occupation of Latvia; - The non-governmental organizations Special thanks to experts and organisations Centre for East European Policy Studies, it has joined the USSR free-willingly and in (your country) are the secret voice of below for providing us with context and Latvia (www.appc.lv) legally. foreign powers and interests. Czechia: data interpretation: - A network of Western historians conspires Linas Kojala and Jurgis Vedrickas from the - The Velvet Revolution in 1989 was not the against Russia to falsify and distort the Slovakia: Susan Milford-Faber, Stefan Schaller and Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Lithuania result of mass protests but was planned in country’s history in order undermine the Paul Schmidt from the Austrian Society for (www.eesc.lt) advance by secret services. Russian/USSR role in the destruction of - NATO bases in Slovakia would mean US European Politics, Austria (www.oegfe.at) - The anti-government protests in the past Nazism. occupation. Zosia Lutkiewicz and Robert Lech from the years were orchestrated and financially - The non-governmental organizations Rumena Filipova and Ruslan Stefanov from Political Accountability Foundation, Poland supported by George Soros. in (your country) are the secret voice of Lithuania: the Center for the Study of Democracy, (www.odpowiedzialnapolityka.pl) - There is no climate change; data are foreign powers and interests. Bulgaria (www.csd.bg) intentionally falsified by the governments. - Lithuanian movements towards - The protests against the government in Andrei Tiut from the GlobalFocus Centre, independence in 1990 were orchestrated by Slovakia, which resulted in changes in the Jonáš Syrovátka from the Prague Security Romania (www.global-focus.eu) the USA for the sole purpose to cement its government and other crucial institutions in Estonia: Studies Institute, Czechia (www.pssi.cz) dominance in the region. the country, were controlled and paid from Special thanks to Brian Fabo for statistical - NATO is unwilling and/or incapable to - Lithuania and the other Baltic states are abroad. Dmitri Teperik from the International Centre analysis. defend Estonia militarily because Russia is under NATO occupation. for Defence and Security, Estonia much stronger than NATO in any way. - There was no Soviet occupation of (www.icds.ee) Collection of opinion polls in each country - The only purpose of NATO’s presence in Lithuania; it has joined the USSR free- was coordinated by FOCUS, s.r.o. Estonia is to provoke and irritate Russia. willingly and legally. Péter Krekó, Bulcsú Hunyadi, and Patrik - There was no Soviet occupation of Szicherle from the Political Capital Institute, Lithuania; it has joined the USSR free- Hungary (www.politicalcapital.hu) willingly and legally. Voices of Central and Eastern Europe and Eastern of Central Voices Europe and Eastern of Central Voices

56 57 This publication and research was supported by the National Endowment for Democracy. © GLOBSEC 2020

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