ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS 25 FMR 37 Community-led stabilisation in Siris Hartkorn

Non-state armed groups are often considered to lack legitimacy as in order to create an environment potential counterparts in building security institutions but when they are in where development can take place. fact in control, this point of view has to be reviewed. Experience from working in South Galkayo supports the argument Somalia has for many years been of the duty bearers towards the that the approach to stabilisation in known as the classic example of a population, including IDPs. And Somalia needs to explore community- failed state and illustrates clearly when these administrations are driven processes rather than how difficult it can be to restore state viewed as legitimate among the large-scale and highly politicised institutions after their total collapse. population, they become important stabilisation efforts that have so far Prolonged civil war, famine and potential partners. In the town proven counter-productive. Building poverty have caused a humanitarian of South Galkayo, some 450 km safety at the community level needs crisis with large flows of IDPs and an north of Mogadishu, an NSAG to follow humanitarian principles: estimated 3.2 million people in need called Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa is placing the need of the population of humanitarian assistance.1 Yet while in control. Here, in contrast to its at the centre, while not promoting increasing numbers of the population experience of trying to facilitate a political agenda. This may even are in urgent need mean engaging of assistance, access with NSAGs by international in cases where agencies to provide they have some Pete Muller Pete relief has become legitimacy within more difficult the population as a result of and prove willing pressure from to adhere to non-state armed international groups (NSAGs). standards of humanitarian law. Since the fall of Siad Barre’s regime South Galkayo is the in 1991 various capital of self-appointed State, a self-declared administrations administration have attempted to founded by clan seize power – and elders and the declare autonomy NSAG Ahlu- – in different parts Sunna Wal-Jamaa of the country. Most following the defeat well known, though of the Mogadishu not internationally warlords in 2006. recognised, is Somaliland to the safe return for IDPs to Mogadishu, The town of Galkayo is situated on northwest. As humanitarian space the Danish Demining Group (DDG) the border of and south- has been shrinking in south-central has had a positive experience not central Somalia and is split north Somalia, agencies have reorganised only of obtaining access but also and south under the Puntland and their operations to run from the of engaging in partnership with Galmudug State administrations relatively stable areas of Somaliland both the communities and the respectively. Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa and, to some extent, Puntland in self-appointed administration. is the overall security provider in the north. Yet south-central Somalia South Galkayo and has managed remains the region where most of A pragmatic approach to improve security in the area the IDPs and population in acute Engaging with NSAGs in building administrated by Galmudug State. need are situated and, while the institutions to ensure civilian Compared to other regions in difficulties for humanitarian agencies security can be controversial but south-central Somalia, the area in negotiating access with NSAGs can also be necessary in cases like under the control of Galmudug in the capital city Mogadishu are Somalia where no central state power State has enjoyed relative stability well known, it is not representative exists or is likely to do so in the near since 2006 and has attracted people for all of south-central Somalia. future. The prolonged civil war and displaced by conflict from other high levels of insecurity in Somalia regions. While the relationship Where NSAGs form local have created an urgent need for between the host communities in administrations, they become one initiatives to reduce armed violence South Galkayo and the IDPs has 26 ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS FMR 37

Here DDG seeks to strengthen the communities’ capacity to manage conflict and find peaceful settlements to disputes, e.g. through conflict management education. As IDPs are new-comers to the communities, they often become vulnerable when there is conflict; strengthening the relationship between IDPs and the host communities by involving both groups in the community safety process, and thereby creating common ownership, is therefore of high importance.

Crimes of rape, theft, assault and robbery are also of great concern within the two communities. Such crime can not only affect the safety of the population but can Pete Muller Pete also be potentially destabilising – for example, by sparking revenge previously been good (mainly due international agencies which receive killings and conflict between clans, to clan loyalties), the risk of tension funding from Western governments. families or north/south population.3 is now increasing as the growing This is partly due to the make-up Traditional leaders lack the tools to number of IDPs puts pressure on the of the NSAG, which is funded on address these new criminal trends; communities’ limited resources. clan structures rather than religious what is needed is an effective police discourse, and partly because force that the communities trust Galkayo is of great strategic Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa works in to solve crime and settle disputes. importance as it represents one of alliance with the Transitional Federal Galmudug State has recently trained the few pockets of relative stability Government. DDG is working 325 police officers to be employed in Somalia, from and in which with Galmudug State to address in South Galkayo but with 38% of international organisations can all aspects of armed violence and households reporting that they operate. Yet most organisations settle bring together members of different would still go to clan leaders in North Galkayo under the Puntland communities to identify and develop concerning a crime, rather than to administration, a move that has solutions to their safety and security the police, the relationship between fuelled a feeling of marginalisation in needs, through development and police and the communities clearly South Galkayo. DDG is one of the few implementation of a community needs to be strengthened. DDG has organisations that have explored the safety plan. Such community helped establish community-based possibility of access in South Galkayo safety projects aim not only to policing committees, which function by starting up community safety improve the immediate security as a link between the two. DDG is programmes in two communities situation but also to strengthen also engaged in discussions with there, Dalsan and Alanley, in 2010. the target communities’ capacity Galmudug State to identify other to resist being drawn into conflict ways of supporting the building Community safety is a bottom-up and to improve any individual of formal security institutions, approach to stabilisation where or group behaviour which might such as training the police force the communities themselves have contribute to triggering conflict. in human rights principles. strong ownership of the process. External as well as internal Community safety There are many challenges associated dynamics of crime, armed violence More than 50% of the households with providing capacity building and clan conflict combined with in DDG’s two target communities and assistance for a police force that the very limited resources within report owning at least one firearm, is institutionally anchored within the communities make stability in and accidents related to small arms an NSAG rather than a recognised South Galkayo very fragile and there and light weapons (SALW) remain government and this has to be done is an urgent need for sustainable among the highest security concerns with certain considerations in mind. security solutions. Galmudug in the two communities. DDG’s In the context of Galmudug State, State is pursuing statebuilding programme involves installing the main challenges are the lack of goals in their region but lacks the safe storage devices2 for small arms capacity within the administration capacity and resources to create and light weapons and clearing and the difficulty of stepping security and development without unexploded ordnance, and by outside clan structures in order to external assistance – and is therefore providing education on the risks of build independent, accountable actively seeking partnerships mines and training in firearm safety state institutions. DDG’s decision with international organisations. behaviour. Another big security to engage in partnership with In contrast to al-Shabaab, Ahlu- concern in Dalsan and Alanley Galmudug State was possible because Sunna Wal-Jamaa does not oppose is communal and clan conflict. of the high level of legitimacy ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS 27 FMR 37

that Galmudug State and Ahlu- work alongside each other to engage DDG is part of the Danish Refugee Sunna Wal-Jamaa hold within the communities to take ownership of the Council. For more information about population, and their willingness to process of both improving safety and this programme, please contact discuss human rights standards and pursuing development goals. Klaus Ljoerring Pedersen (klpc@ international humanitarian law, a drc.dk), DDG Regional Director, potential that can only be explored In the Somali context this integrated Horn of Africa and Representative through partnership and dialogue. approach has been successful, for Armed Violence Reduction. fostering sustainable change in the 1. Bradbury, Mark State-building, Counterterrorism, and Integrating armed violence target communities. With UNDP Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia, September 2010, Feinstein International Center reduction and development and JPLG (UN Joint Programme on http://tinyurl.com/TuftsBradburySept2010Somalia Armed violence is one of the major Local Governance and Decentralised 2. Device for keeping the weapon locked and stored obstacles to development and Service Delivery)4 exploring a similar safely to avoid theft and accidents (see picture opposite). 3. ‘Community Safety & Security Analysis and therefore development initiatives integrated approach at the district Recommended Actions for , Somali need to be linked to reducing armed level in Puntland and Somaliland, Community Safety Framework, forthcoming 2011 at http://www.somalipeacebuilding.org The Somali violence. In an attempt to link the there seems to be an increasing Community Safety Framework is a partnership of local two processes, DDG and the Danish international recognition that armed and international NGOs, UN agencies and academic institutions seeking to advance community security in Refugee Council (DRC) have violence reduction and development the Somali regions. developed an integrated approach to need to go hand in hand. 4. UN JPLG for Somalia is a five-year joint programme Community Safety and Community of ILO, UNCDF, UNDP, UN-HABITAT and UNICEF. The partners in the Joint Programme are the Somalia Driven Recovery and Development. Siris Hartkorn ([email protected]) government institutions, Regional Councils, District In South Galkayo as well as other is Advisor to the Danish Demining Councils, Legislatures, Municipal Associations, international and local NGOs/CSOs, and the private places across Somalia, both DDG and Group, DDG, Horn of Africa (http:// sector. http://jplg.org DRC are present and, when possible, www.danishdemininggroup.dk). Al-Shabaab’s responsibility to protect civilians in Somalia Allehone Mulugeta Abebe

For 20 years armed groups have been permanent fixtures of the conflicts suicide missions; attacking and in Somalia and have been direct participants in human rights and shelling civilian areas; exacting humanitarian law violations. Now there are some international moves to extreme forms of shari’a penalties hold them to account. even for minor offences; attacking and intimidating journalists, The role of these armed groups the fledging African Union’s humanitarian workers and and the consequences of their peacekeeping mission in Somalia peacekeepers; and imposing undue actions on the welfare of civilians (AMISOM). Recently, however, restrictions on humanitarian access. have all been extraordinarily some of these actors have taken negative. Unfortunately, the some steps – albeit fragmented and The UN and other humanitarian accountability of these groups for limited in scope – to focus on the organisations run their operations civilian protection has been largely protection of civilians including from outside Somalia, mainly ignored while their notoriety has those uprooted from their homes. from Kenya, relying heavily on more to do with Western concerns nationals for the actual delivery of over terrorism, piracy and security The ongoing conflict between groups aid within Somalia. According to than the protection of civilians. such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam the former Special Representative on the one hand and the weak TFG of the Secretary General (SRSG) The occasionally contradictory and its military allies on the other on the human rights of IDPs, strategies employed by regional continues to cause the death of this approach has resulted in a actors and the international numerous civilians and to displace disproportionate exposure of community have so far concentrated hundreds of thousands of civilians local staff to danger and remains on boosting the legitimacy and from their homes and livelihoods. unsustainable in the long run. capacity of the Transitional Federal For example, in January 2010 over Government (TFG); designating 25,000 civilians were displaced by Though the autonomous regions and isolating the militants as fighting over the control of the town of Somaliland and Puntland had ‘terrorist’ groups; expanding of Beledweyne in central Somalia. been spared from some of the worst provision of humanitarian assistance violations by armed groups, they are even if that means working with While they are not the only now increasingly being infiltrated by networks and groups which violate guilty party, al-Shabaab has been members of armed groups, triggering civilians’ human rights; and particularly brazen in its use of a phenomenon of forced return of seeking to re-establish peace and civilians as human shields; recruiting IDPs by authorities who fear that stability including by supporting children and young persons; al-Shabaab forces are hiding among