CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND PROTECTION OF VALUE SYSTEM THROUGH TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN
BY ABDUL WAHEED RANA
Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan
2004
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CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND PROTECTION OF VALUE SYSTEM THROUGH TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN
BY
ABDUL WAHEED RANA
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the
Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan Taxila Institute of Asian Civilization
Supervisor: Professor Ahmed Hassan Dani Professor emeritus
2004
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CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND PROTECTION OF VALUE SYSTEM THROUGH TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN
BY
ABDUL WAHEED RANA
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Dedicated
To
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad Where I first learnt the meanings of love and dreams
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First, I intend to acknowledge every single individual who came across me during the course of my research. Without having any intention to leave out, there are scores of people whose names and generosities would remain unrecorded but definitely not unacknowledged. I apologize to all of them.
I am greatly indebted to my teacher and mentor Professor Ahmed Hassan Dani who encouraged me to pursue this Ph.D program and with profound patience went through the manuscripts and provided time to debate many of the issues concerning my topic. Professor Dani’s critical reactions as supervisor on most part of this research helped me reshape many of the ideas I had kept with me for long.
This dissertation would not have been possible without the active, un-exhaustive and patient support of my friend Dr. Anwar Iqbal of Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad who is the only cause behind my doing this research. I would like to thank him for being with me through the difficult times and making this tedious job fun at times. I must admit and register that Dr. Anwar was the one who not only persuaded me to attempt a Ph.D venture but was instrumental through and through in providing academic logistic and moral help.
I am profusely thankful to my friends in Pakistan Television Corporation who during the last three years have been sparing time to discuss academic and professional issues with me besides providing rich and invaluable data which I would not have been able to collect otherwise. Among those, I owe special thanks to Malik Mazhar Hussain Director Finance PTV and Mr. Akhtar Mehmood Dad Director Engineering PTV for their persistent cooperation and love. My deepest thanks are due to media professionals, journalists, Writers and Intellectuals for their willingness to discuss with me the issues of media operation in-depth. I have been fortunate to have the friendship and support of a large number of media men who made my research authentic and current.
I will remain indebted forever to my teachers at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad where I developed my first and perhaps the last love for Anthropology. I have no hesitation to declare that Anthropology has been a beacon which showed me the path to life. All my endeavors in research and academicia are the offshoots of my association with this rich discipline. A long-standing obligation is due to my teachers at university of Ottawa Canada and university of Oslo Norway who inculcated in me an inquisitive heart for research.
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I owe a very special thanks to my wife Shahida who has been a permanent support for me. She provided me all that mental comfort at home which was needed during this research. I owe special thanks to my children Adnan, Sarah and Nauman who unknowingly have been keen always to see their father pursue a Ph.D. They have also been my key informants as well as critics on various TV programs.
I am also thankful to a large number of respondents in urban and rural settings of Pakistan whose ideas have been the primary ingredient of my research. Their names are imprinted in my memory but to mention them all needs many pages. My colleagues in Planning Commission have been a great support and help to me; during these tiring years they allowed me to concentrate on my Ph.D activities with open heart. I am especially thankful to former chief of mass media Mr. Imdad Ahmed Mian and my colleagues in the planning commission for their continuous support and invaluable professional guidance during this period.
My special thanks are for Dr. Hafeez-ur-Rehman, Chairman Department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University, where I have studied and now teaching media for the last two years. The Vice Chancellor Mr. U. A. G. Esani with great kindness allowed me to participate in their research project on Cable TV, sponsored by Higher Education Commission, as research associate and to use the project data in my dissertation. Without this facility I would perhaps not have been able to finance field research throughout Pakistan.
I reserve great appreciation for Mr. Irfan Khan Malik for his professional computer and typing skills. He typed the manuscript a number of times, prepared tables and did programming for statistical data. The dissertation in present shape is the result of his untiring efforts.
I, at this stage, am unfortunate of not having my best friend - my father, alive. He had always wished me a success and mental satisfaction but is not with me to see how satisfied I am after accomplishing this task. I believe he can see me remembering him from the heavens.
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CONTENTS
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 01
MASS COMMUNICATION AND PEOPLE 02 TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN 03 RATIONALE OF RESEARCH 07 QUESTION ADDRESSED THROUGH THE RESEARCH 09 HYPOTHESIS 09 LOCALE OF THE STUDY 10 METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 10 Sample Selection 11 Sample Design 12 Statistical Data 12 In-depth Interviews 13 Focus Group Discussion 14 Case Studies 15 Source of Data 16 Stages of Research 17 The Operational Tools 18
Chapter 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 19
SURVEY OF LITERATURE 19 WHAT IS A CULTURE? 20 DEFINING MASS COMMUNICATION 23 INTERDEPENDENCE OF CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION 25 CULTURAL COMMUNICATION 25 MASS MEDIA AND CULTURE – THE RELATIONSHIP 29 THE BEGINNING OF MASS MEDIA 30 BROADCASTING 32 HISTORY OF TELEVISION 34 TELEVISION THEORY: READING THE TEXT 39 THE WORKS OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS ON CULTURE AND TELEVISION 42 RAYMOND WILLIAMS AND TELEVISION 46 STUART HALL, MASS COMMUNICATION, HEGEMONY AND IDEOLOGY 48 FREEDOM VERSUS CONTROL 52 THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 56 The Broadcasting Model 56
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NEW DRIVING FORCES: TECHNOLOGY AND MONEY AS BIG PLAYERS 57 THE THESIS OF CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 59 THE DEPENDENCY PARADIGM 62
Chapter 3
TELEVISION – THE REGIONAL BACKGROUND 70
THE WORLD SCENARIO 70 MEDIA SCENARIO IN SOUTH ASIA 74 A REGIONAL VIEW 79 The Electronic Media in India 79 The Electronic Media in Bangladesh 83 Television in Sri Lanka 85 The Media in Nepal 88
DEVELOPMENT OF PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN PAKISTAN 91 Brief Early History 91 Developments Since 1945 94 Press 94 Radio Broadcasting 99 Television 101 Objectives of PTV 106
CABLE TV IN PAKISTAN 112 The Satellite Invasion 112 The Distribution in Pakistan 115 Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) 116
Chapter 4
AUDIENCE REACTION ON STATE TELEVISION (PTV) 122
Availability of Channels 123
THE VIEWING INDEX (VI) 123 AREA OF PERFORMANCE 125 News (Khabranama) 125 PTV – GEO Comparison in News Credibility 129 Current Affairs 132 Sports Programs 134 Drama 137 Music Programs 139 Watching of Religious Programs 141 Science Programs 142 8
English Programs (Drama and Feature Film) 142 Attitude towards Restrictions 145 Social Problems and Their projection on TV 146 Impacts of Television Programs 149
Chapter 5
DIMENSIONS OF IMPACT 150
TELEVISION IN PAKISTANI SOCIETY 150 The Arrival 150 Television Discourse in Pakistan 152 The Effects of Television Programs 157 Tele-Visual Texts 161 The Historical Perspective of TV Programming 163
FOUR ETHNOGRAPHIC CASE STUDIES 170 Case Study – 1 171 Case Study – 2 175 Case Study – 3 179 Case Study – 4 182
PROFESSIONAL VIEW ON PTV PROGRAMS 186 The Culture of Modernity 186 Television Creating a Modern Nations 187 He Heydays 189 Viewers Speak Out 193 PTV News and Current Affairs 197
ROLE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT 207
Chapter 6
THE ARRIVAL OF SATELLITE TV 214
PAKISTAN ENTERS SATELLITE ERA 215 CABLE CHANNELS AND THE ENGLISH SPEAKING ARISTOCRACY 221 THE BIRTH OF A NEW CULTURE 223 SATELLITE SOAP OPERA 227 THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LANGUAGE 229 THE NEW FASHION TRENDS 231 CHILDREN THE VICTIMS 235 WOMEN IN CABLE CAGE 239 ARE AUDIENCE CONSERVATIVE? 243
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Chapter 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 252 Conclusion 260
BIBLIOGRAPHY 268
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
The words culture, communication and mass Media have been in use for the last two decades so frequently that their conceptual understanding has almost diminished and lost validity. Television on top of that is yet another phenomenon which has occupied our daily life very strongly. It is the largest carrier of culture and has the monopoly over our thought patterns, beliefs and social relationship in the society. Under this scenario, any serious effort to study the intellectually fashionable currents of culture and associated issues, which have sprung from media explosion across the globe, becomes difficult and cumbersome. A small prelude is essentially required before describing the scope of the study.
We are living in a ‘mediated society’ where many of our thought patterns, and values are shaped by the media, which produces versions of events and issues in their own style and under their own social, cultural and political agenda. The influence of media is strong both on individual and society. It reaches a large number of people but in different ways. Media messages are designed for large number of people but the impact and consumption is different because the people are different and their political, social, cultural, and educational background are different. At the same time, like culture, media products or texts are shared; they are popular and thus become part of our common culture. Media in general and television in particular is the largest producer of popular culture which is also creating electronic communities worldwide who share at least a mentionable number of universal cultural traits.
For some, media is yet a threat to local cultures and beliefs. The texts and contents of modern mass media is challenging the generations old customs, traditions and religious beliefs, which are sacred and not
11 compromise-able. The custodians of cultures in Press, academics and intellectual circles are continuously involved in the debate on; how to create safety valves around the cultural frontiers of their societies. Governments in their own political agendas put this mission on top of other cultural priorities. The religious, social and cultural opposition is thus increasing with same zeal as the media itself is strengthening and expanding.
MASS COMMUNICATION AND PEOPLE
In Pakistan, television broadcasting has established an intrinsic relation with the public. On the one hand State television lack research on the audience to uncover its viewing tastes and preferences, while on the other, both public and private means of organizing television feed back on a global, national and regional issues, through drama and entertainment, and the political information necessary for the functioning of democracy is absent. The notion of a specifically nationally defined public service is being undermined by less professional state television. The conception of public service broadcasting, coined in UK by BBC in 1920s, was originally based on the principles of universality and equality of access, as well as the desire to educate the populace while binding them together in a nationally imagined community through a blend of information, education and entertainment. It is a common saying that the Pakistanis were a family with the wrong people in charge. The Pakistanis, it seemed, were bound together by their inability to adopt other cultures, denial of artistic expressions and hatred of new thoughts. It is unlikely that any serious attempt could be made today to claim that the nation has a culture in common. The migration of peoples to other continents and the influence of a global culture has shattered national cohesion, although it remains part of a wider nostalgia. But it also gives rise to pessimism, as the market driven multi- channel universe is likely to be based upon low production costs and a conglomerate dominance of news and entertainment. Public service's most recent response is the potential development of more regional programming 12
(PTV National channel for example). The decentralization of programme pro- duction and content away from the national center has both pluralist and democratic pretensions. There are also profound dangers if regional broadcasting becomes merely a reaction to globalising processes and only offers a platform for local forms of parochialism. One of the principal features of public service broadcasting is that it allows the nation to enter into conversation with itself. Cable, Satellite Television with more specialist channels would not only fail to provide a plurality of 'quality programming' but could further atomize the audience.
At global level, a policy of 'Television without Frontiers' has been adopted along with certain minimal forms of regulation in respect to pornography, violence and racism (Siune and Treutzschler, 1992). This enables nation states to curb the transmission of offensive material. As yet there has been no concerted attempt to regulate the concentration of cross- media, multiple ownership world-wide. Surprisingly, Pakistan has allowed cross-media ownership in the year 2003. This still leaves us with the problem of Pakistan. The most pressing issue here is that culturally and politically Pakistan is very difficult to define. The State itself has recently been struggling to assert a cultural identity of its own in the face of fragmentation and the influx of American culture. Indeed the most important cultural issue facing Pakistan is the current explosion of tensions and terrorism witnessed the deeper entrenchment of terrorism and hatred. These are obviously not problems that can be solved by Mass Media Policy alone. Although it forms the backcloth of any attempt to rethink its importance in a national context.
TELEVISION IN PAKISTAN
For most of us, television has become the center of our communication lives. Its content entertains us, informs us and angers us. Yet television content is increasingly the only communication experience
13 that members of modern society have in common. Indeed, it might be argued that we spend more time communicating about mass-media content, particularly television, than about almost any other topic except, perhaps, ourselves and our relationships with others. Television and other mass media indicate two significant influences for our communication behavior.
First, television and the other mass media increasingly provide a common point of reference, a common orientation to a vicarious world frequently more attractive and typically more exciting than our own. We may not have much else to talk about with our neighbor, but we surely can talk about the cricket that we saw on television the night before, a scene in our favorite serial, the commentary on the evening newscast. This realization of the importance of media in our lives has another consequence: we witness more people and institutions adept at manipulating the media, gaining exposure, and engaging in controversy in order to take advantage of the status that media recognition confers.
Second, however, and perhaps of greater importance, the latter half of the twentieth century is witnessing the emergence of the vicarious lifestyle. Communication behavior in which interaction between cultures and people occurs via television, or via the newspaper, without any chance for our participation in or verification of that mediated reality has become more common. We have become dependent upon the media to inform us of other realities. But, the increasing sophistication of the media has made the man obsolete as a storage medium. We become increasingly knowledgeable about the world and yet less in touch with its feel, smell, and presence. We might speculate that a whole generation of children raised on "Sesame Street" learn a style of image-processing and information-processing. This has made them familiar with pattern, recognition snatching the ability of content recognition. Perhaps recent declines in verbal and quantitative
14 general knowledge suggest the need for a new concept of "literacy" and a new model for evaluating human ability.
In Pakistan people value television very high and associate themselves with its discourses very keenly. It has multiple historical social and economic reasons: the foremost being absence of any other leisure time activity for youth, women and low income groups with decrease in economic opportunities changing lifestyles, less out of home entertainment opportunities, and tradition of staying at home with family under the four walls. The dependence on television has enormously increased and deteriorating law and order situation has compelled people to stay at home in many parts of the country including small villages. The picture tube has replaced traditional autaq in Sindh, Chopal in Punjab, bethak in NWFP and Baluchistan and small tea shops and Thara (a sitting place in front of shops and houses) in urban centers. In the words of Hall (1994), a new public sphere has emerged in the form of television. Pakistani society during the last thirty years has gradually undergone an aesthetic transformation replacing all other entertainments with a singular choice for TV. Radio due to its orthodoxy in content and form, centralized broadcasting and acuate lack of professionalism is no more a leisure time activity. Cinema with all its promiscuity and old styled theatrical presentation with no charming faces and impulse touching music, has shrunk to an unlimited audience mostly laborers and out of home bachelors. Parks and public places are not there to offer a fresh breath to entertainment starved populace. Family gatherings and visiting friend and relatives is again an old story. In this scenario the entire responsibility of entertaining, involving, informing and refreshing a melancholous population rests on a small box we call TV. In such complex situation the role and responsibility of Television and Television producers and media managers has increased manifold and the expectation level has equally expanded enormously. Everybody wants TV to behave like a leader, a reformist, a friend and above all a catharsis chamber. With multiplicity of
15 ethnic, religious, economic and social differences television is expected to meet the demands of a variety of stubborn population groups, which have their own totem and taboos not reconciling with each other.
State in one hand is strong custodian of electronic media operations; it provides finances, employs media managers and producers, formulate policies, impose regulations and expect wide publicity of its developing programmes and political activities. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is responsible for keeping the media on track: no deviance is permissible what so ever.
On the other, the print media overwhelmingly in private sector, enjoys greater freedom. The number of newspapers in Urdu and English languages has increased with state of the art publishing industry. Satellite broadcasters have entered into the arena of competition with their all necessary information and entertainment cosmetics and contents. International broadcasters are there to challenge the news aired by state TV, spontaneously providing people access to live coverage of happenings inside and around the globe.
This too is not the whole story. The penetration of satellite broadcasters through cable is limited to urban centers with a tiny outreach of only less then 20% population. The rural areas and those living in scattered localities in urban areas where cable has not reached are still dependent on PTV broadcasts. But the impact is indirectly reaching them through socialization with others. The impact is also reflected on print media which is available but to literates only. This is a very complex and intricate situation which has covert and overt dimensions. It also elaborates the difficulty in conducting a research on television broadcasting in relation to cultural needs of the people.
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RATIONALE OF RESEARCH
Since the introduction of television in Pakistan in 1964, no concrete empirical research has been undertaken on television as a cultural industry and powerful medium of information. Television has been used and misused and enjoyed tremendously but its operations have never been institutionalized culturally. The emphasis so far has been on the infrastructure development and expansion, setting aside its cultural role. The potential, power and out-reach of this vast medium needs a thorough evaluation on intellectual, academic and scientific grounds.
Television as a cultural industry and tremendous source of information has affected the lives of Pakistani people in diverse ways. In a society with low rate of literacy and per capital income, under-development in various fields, absence of organization, in-stable political system and very high population growth rate, the Mass Media and Television in particular has to take on the responsibility of an entertainer, educator and mediator (awareness raising among cross cultural groups). TV has always been under heated debate over its role and has been a victim of severe criticism from various segments of the society. In Pakistani cultural system where the values and tradition have a strong role in social conduct, the television has been stoned harshly. It has been vulnerable to social change and incapable to meet the needs of multi-ethnic and linguistic groups. These are some extreme beliefs held by the people regarding television in Pakistan:
Television is responsible for creating economic depression, violence and obscenity in the society. It has cultural biases and disrespect for the value system. Television is a panacea of development and has the primary duty to project the government policies and programmes. It has to adopt a middle of the road approach to satisfy a cross cultural and economic groups. It needs to be liberal and non-partisan
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so as to make itself capable of surviving in a highly competitive global media environment.
In Pakistan, the true role of television has yet to be defined. Since television occupies a regular place as family member in most Pakistani households in urban centers and a sizeable households in rural and semi- rural areas, its role cannot be undermined. It has to be studied in true perspective within the ambit of religion, ethnicity, lifestyle and value system. The most pressing question such as the role of television in the protection of value system, creation of cultural harmony, providing information, education and entertainment, are therefore still unanswered.
My research has focused on the TV discourses in totality with their cultural significance. The study is not a purely media research nor is a study of culture in the crudest sense. Broadly two areas of investigation have been focused i.e. the television as a medium, its mode of working in Pakistan, its impact on the society in terms of people‘s perception as well as its role in satisfying people’s cultural needs and the expectations and demands of the society from it’s discourses. The areas of investigation are broad and complex. Television has been studied as an institution mainly owned and controlled by the state, its historical background in relation to worldwide developments and also under the regional scenario, has been recorded in addition to the type of programs it provides to the audience. The arrival of satellite TV is an additional area of investigation, without which the impact of National (Public Sector) broadcaster is hard to understand. This also provides answers to the questions like; why national TV fails to satisfy a diverse population and enjoys low credibility, what it lacks in terms of content and technological outreach and what makes satellite TV more popular and successful despite a large criticism from within the society and strong opposition from the self- styled custodians of religious, cultural and political morals.
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QUESTION ADDRESSED THROUGH THE RESEARCH
I listed the following questions before designing the research tools and operational methodology:
1. What are the existing mass media patterns in Pakistan? 2. What are the cultural needs of Pakistani people in terms of communication? 3. What is the scope of TV broadcasting and its impact on people? 4. Does TV understands the cultural needs of people? 5. Who dominates TV contents? 6. What are the effects of TV programmes and "newsocracy" on people (various groups)? 7. Is TV an exhibitor of Pakistani life? 8. Are values of TV always the values of society (Pakistani society)? 9. Is TV an efficient and effective carrier of cultural traits, values and social aspirations? 10. Does TV need redirection and who and how should it be done? 11. What cultural traits and values need protection and why they are sacred? 12. How international satellite channels are affecting Pakistani culture? 13. How state (national) TV is responding to this effect? 14. why satellite TV is enjoying greater popularity and credibility despite strong opposition
HYPOTHESIS
A suggestive set of hypothesis was developed on pre-conceived knowledge of the subject which was partly based on general observations and common beliefs held by the people in one hand and on the basis of preliminary secondary data on the other. These hypothesis were put to test in the research:
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1. TV has replaced the role of cultural institutions in the society. People shape their ethics from TV messages. 2. A free and financially independent television is a better option for Pakistan for promoting nationalism, cohesion and accelerating development as compared to a controlled TV. Television cannot act as a panacea of social and economic development. 3. People rate state television very low as a credible medium and the following are the main causes of TV’s low credibility:- i) Government’s financial and administrative control. ii) Religious intolerance in the society. iii) Bureaucratic involvement in the operation and administration of media (Television). iv) Non compromising attitude of ruling class towards their own ideas and ideologies. v) Confusion over the state and government bifurcation. Both are considered by the politicians in the government as synonyms. vi) Non professionalism in TV production and presentation. vii) Media Manager’s incorrect perception. They expect credibility without being truthful and fair. viii) Lack of balance between entertainment and information. ix) Availability of international Channels and Internet has exposed the unfair attitude of national TV.
LOCALE OF THE STUDY
The entire country (Pakistan) was the Locale.
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH
The research is an extension in the comparatively less attended area of Anthropology of Media focusing on television as an institution in a ‘society in transition’. It is in fact not a purely media study nor is the attempt to record the cultural traits of a society at a given period of time, as all or most 20
Anthropologists do; it is a blend of both. I have tried to document the role played by TV (with emphasis on state controlled TV) in Pakistan. I dare to call it a study on Anthropology of Television in Pakistan. I applied partly anthropological and partly survey method for data collection, but the main emphasis and thrust was on in-depth non-formal research techniques. A number of sources were used; some for direct data collection and some for in-depth qualitative research.
Sample Selection
The main tool was cross-sectional sampling of the population at a single point in time. This covered a broad sample of people of different ages, educational and income levels, officials of Government, community leaders and NGOs. Since a wide sample of population, variant geographically was to be studied, partly a survey method was employed as well. This sampling method needs some elaboration. i) First, the target population comprises only those who watch TV. ii) Secondly, the entire population (all categories). iii) Thirdly, the people directly involved in TV operations and cultural activities.
In 3rd case the specific type of people directly involve in any capacity, such as professors, officials etc., were covered but representative cross- sectional sample had to be developed for an empirical generalization. In second case, the target population to be addressed by policy planners was investigated. This was widely a representative sample, based on the selection of various groups and institutions.
Such classification can be made and studied on purely anthropological parameters. The tools were formal and informal but not necessarily each information was gathered through direct methods.
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The targeted population was selected through stratified sampling technique. The entire population was the sample frame while the broad classification was on the basis of gender within which quota was allotted to rural and urban segments. I was conscious of the fact that it would be unfair if a uniform category of respondents is interviewed through structured and unstructured tools. It was established in the very beginning that all representative groups of Pakistani society are covered. No quota was initially allotted to the target population on the basis of their income level, education level and age. However, for in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, different segments of society were selected very carefully.
A multi-pronged approach was applied to collect the data under the principle of strictly self-censored ethical neutrality by:
1) Avoiding value judgment to conduct value-free research 2) Applying categorical and normative style 3) Staying away from reactive research techniques
Sampling design
Statistical Data The research had two broader parts: one was the collection of statistical data through structured questionnaire and the other were qualitative in-depth research*. The in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and case studies was the second part of the research which went simultaneously with first part.
* The collection of statistical data in all the four provinces and rural and urban areas was not possible and usually is not preferred in self sponsored Ph.D researches. But this was made possible through the courteousy of department of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad who involved me in one of their research project on impact of Satellite TV in Pakistan. The project took off during the 2nd year of my Ph. D program. I was associated with it as research fellow. During this research the relevant information was added to the scope on my request with permission to use it exclusively in my Ph.D thesis in addition to using some of the unpublished statistics. This was a great opportunity which practically enabled me to visit the country and interview people at various places. For this purpose three questionnaires were prepared for three different target groups and results are part of this thesis as Chapter No. 4. 22
Table – A Sampling Design (General Public) Gender Classification on the basis of Age N = 1000 Male (600) Female (400) AGE Total Rural (N=250) Urban (N=350) Rural (N=175) Urban (N=25) 15 – 20 36 52 15 31 134 21 – 25 35 58 32 53 178 26 – 30 52 61 41 39 193 31 – 40 53 59 33 57 202 41 – 50 45 50 21 37 153 51 + 29 70 33 08 140 Total 250 350 175 225 1000
Table – B Distribution of Sample Population on the Basis of Education and Sex N = 1000 Male Female Total Illiterate 68 47 115 Non-Matric 98 77 175 Matric /FA 158 72 230 Graduate 148 102 250 Post Graduate 107 93 200 Ph. D 21 9 30 Total 600 400 1000
In-depth Interviews
I held in-depth interviews and organized focus group discussions with following categories of population: i) PTV personnel ii) Satellite Broadcasters based in Pakistan iii) Official bodies involved in TV operations iv) Private sector TV production houses v) General public. (Women + Children + Teenagers)
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vi) Cultural, economic, social and religious groups vii) Foreign broadcasters viii) Cable operators ix) Cultural bodies x) Writers on culture xi) Artists xii) Students at school to university level xiii) Individuals xiv) Individual Families xv) Human Rights and women activists
The interviews were held with a very select group of people who have a reputation of being highly informed and very well conversant with their specialized fields and professions. These individuals were requested to educate the researcher, instead of informing him in conventional ways. The interviews spread over several hours and sometime were repeated after a span of few months. In some cases the professionals associated with official media put a condition of anonymity because of their official positions, which has been respected. However the names of such professionals have been mentioned without directly referring to the information provided by them.
Focus Group Discussions
Focus group discussions were held At Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi Islamabad, Peshawar, Quetta and same small semi-urban towns. I would invite people from various sections of society to discuss one particular issue concerning my topic. I would myself open the discussion and conduct the debate very cautiously staying away from value judgment and avoiding suggestive questions. I had managed very carefully that the Focus Groups should comprise of the most relevant people; for example on TV drama I invited middle class people and housewives and girls, while for satellite music shows students of urban areas were preferred. Similarly,
24 experts and professionals were invited for discussions on policy and writers and intellectuals were most suitable for analysis on impact. The outcome of these discussions was reported in writing although I also had the recording facility. This has formed the most valuable part of my study which is reflective of true sentiments of the participants. The discussions with expert groups were more interesting and worthwhile because of the singular fact that the discussions were heated and open with greater chance to verify and cross check the dissenting views. The outcome of these discussions was not recorded statistically as the replies were analytical, not a straight yes or no. The Focus Group Discussions were largely representative and open in view of the fact that participants were speaking to their hearts and were persuaded and prompted by the fellow participants as well.
Case Studies
In the beginning, the idea of preparing case studies looked too complex and cumbersome but lately it proved to be the most successful technique of in-depth data collection, due to the fact that I was in a more comfortable position to compare reactions of my respondents with their general bahaviour and thinking. It also made easier for me to see how people connect television discourses with their personal lives and then ultimately to see the impact of programs over their worldly bahaviours and thought patters. The case studies also helped in analyzing the responses in relation to their lifestyles. It was a bit difficult in the beginning to select vocal, friendly and reactive people. It was again hard task to probe individuals on certain issues in front of other family members to speak their hearts. Individual private discussions with family members seemed too difficult at the out set but lately became easier as the acquaintance developed. Instead of selecting families randomly, I went for contacting those having frank relations with me. I picked the cases of my personal acquaintance which include my relatives, old friends, colleagues, office workers and families known to me for quite some time. This facilitated in 25 staying with them in their households for longer and even during odd times. At the start of the research, there was a shyness among the families which reduced gradually and diminished ultimately. My stay with families for case studies is the most rewarding part of the research because they provided a deep insight and detailed and frank reactions on TV programmes. In addition, it is the most precious qualitative data which is the foundation of my research. In case studies a true participant observation technique was applied.
Sources of Data
Primary
The primary data was collected through formal and non-formal ways. The official documents and literature produced on relevant areas was collected in the beginning and then it was updated, revised and cross checked through primarys sources. The primary data comprises:
i) Current structure of TV ii) Policy making mechanism iii) Who is the primary decision-maker? iv) Role of Government v) Role of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vi) Data on cultural practices, perceptions on value system through (a) literature (b) participant observation (c) structured questionnaire vii) Data on program types and priorities set by various channels viii) Audio & video archives of PTV
Secondary
1) Works done on TV 2) Libraries 3) Internet 26
4) Official material 5) Newspaper articles, comments, critiques
Stages of Research
The Research was conducted in three stages:
Stage-I
Information compilation on present structure of PTV and other broadcasters
During this phase the ground work was prepared for the research. The information on the history and operating structure was gathered from PTV, cable operators and Satellite Broadcasters. Separate and small profiles were prepared on TV channels and stations.
Stage-II The In-depth Study
The actual in-depth study started during this phase when the preliminary information gathered earlier was verified, cross checked and registered.
Stage-III Analysis and dissertation writing
In this phase, the information collected was computerized, cleaned, cross checked and analyzed. The actual writing of dissertation started then.
Unit of analysis
Unit of analysis was individuals. The sample frame, however, was the entire population. Basically, it was a non- probability sample, based partially on quota sampling. By this, it is meant that it was decided which strata of the community may be relevant for the study. Then I set a quota for each stratum that is to some extent proportionate to its representation in 27 the entire population. For example, number of group or sub-group were selected on the basis of their representation in the community.
The Operational Tools Profiles of the Target Groups/Institutions/Channels
The profiles of the target groups and TV channels were prepared for initiating the actual field work and in-depth study.
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Chapter 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
SURVEY OF LITERATURE
The effects of communication on culture and social structure are many and diverse. They may be short term and long term. They may operate on opinions, values, information, skills and behaviour. The question of the impact of mass media of communication brings about heated debate because all societies including Pakistani society are affected by its power. This debate is focused on as to how the culture should be protected by state institutions and how to create safety valves around the technological threats and intrusion of foreign cultural traits into local cultures. In Pakistan where the rate of literacy is disparately low and culture and religion are highly sensitive areas, media of communication must have a well-defined role. We still need to single out the threats posed to our culture by the ever expanding electronic media -TV in particular, what are our communication needs and what do we mean by safeguarding our culture and value system? An in-depth analysis is required on these areas. Although a lot has been written and discussed in generalistic way, no academically supported strong research on the relationship, interdependence, impact and role of culture and mass media on people's lives has been undertaken so far. Television, claimed by many as a cultural carrier, should be looked into under a variety of notions and dimensions. It is an intrinsic interplay of a bunch of characters and components which define the cultural role of television or the role of culture in shaping the discourses of television. A number of factors ranging from value system, political configuration of society, power and control, ownership, structure of media in the society, competition, media policy and regulations, position of a particular media in global setting, different media models, recent changes in global media
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environment and media economics to the question of cultural identity, need to be understood theoretically before touching upon the communication aspects of television in Pakistan.
WHAT IS A CULTURE?
In anthropological literature culture has been defined as the way of life of a people. It consists of conventional patterns of thought and behaviour, including values, beliefs, rules of conduct, political organization, economic activity and the like, which are passed on from one generation to the next by learning -and not by biological inheritance. The concept of culture is an idea of single importance, for it provides a set of principles for explaining and understanding human behaviour. It is one of the distinguishing elements of modern social thought, and may be one of the most important achievements of modern social science, and in particular of anthropology.
The term culture has been an important part of the anthropologists vocabulary since about the mid-1800s, yet the meaning of the term underwent an important change at around the turn of this century. The nineteenth-century usage, which characterized the works of such Victorian anthropologists as Sir Edward B. Tyior and Lewis Henry Morgan, viewed culture or civilization as the conscious creation of rational minds for the purpose of improving the lives of society's members. For example, moral values were thought to have been invented to promote human happiness. Past experiences with laziness, thriftlessness, unchastity, and the like, prompted the establishment of Victorian values about sex, work, and 'proper' behaviour in general. Similarly, the parliamentary form of government, monogamy, capitalism, modem clothing styles, and so on, were thought to have arisen as a result of rational reflections upon human experiences and needs.
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The modern concept of culture emerged at about the turn of the century, and it did so largely in opposition to the Victorian concept. A number of people contributed to these changes, perhaps the most significant being Franz Boas, a German scientist who emigrated to the United States in the 1880s and eventually became the dean of American anthropology. A main thrust of these writers was that culture is governed by its own principles and not by the raw intellect, and that the differences among peoples do not reflect differences in levels of intelligence. With the development of the modern culture concept it was now seen to be largely constituted by culture. It was now understood that people acquire the ideas, beliefs, values, and the like, of their society, and that these cultural features provide the basic materials by which they think and perceive. Most social scientists today employ some variation of the modem culture concept in their research, and while they agree about the essential features of culture, they still disagree fundamentally about how culture works, the factors governing it, and the full extent of its influence on behaviour, thought and perception.
It is no accident that anthropologists were the first social scientists to develop clearly the concept of "culture" but there is still some confusion on technical use of the term "culture" and a more popular usage. Culture in its broadest sense is a cultivated behavior, that is, the totality of man's learned, accumulated experience which is socially transmitted, or more briefly, behavior acquired through social learning. This seems simple and matter of fact enough. Actually there are numerous problems connected with the scientific use or "operation" of this term, as with so many other scientific concepts. Some widely accepted classical definitions are summarized below:
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i. That complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. — Tylor (1871) ii. The sum total of the knowledge, attitudes and habitual behavior patterns shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society. — Linton (1940)
iii .[All the] historically created designs for living, explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and non-rational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for the behavior of men. —Kluckhohn and Kelly (1945)
iv. The mass of learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values—and the behavior they induce. —Kroeber (1948)
v. The man-made part of the environment. —Herskovits (1955)
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) have uncovered over one hundred and sixty different definitions of the term "culture" by anthropologists and others.
Dr. Mohammad Yousuf Abbasi in his book "Pakistani Culture" has pointed to a difficulty, which arose from the delimitation of culture and civilization. He says, ‘there is a subtle difference, civilization comprehends the ways of living and portrays the stages in the steady march of man from the Paleolithic age, embracing different phases of development, to the modern age of automation. Material progress is a fascinating study of the interaction of man and his environment and his struggle for the fulfillment of his material needs exemplified by agriculture, trade, industry and towns etc. But culture pertains to the ways of thinking enshrined in religion, philosophy, sciences and fine arts. Hence, culture reflects a different area of
32 emphasis. Since civilization and culture are so inseparably intertwined together, no definite and foolproof definition may be possible.” (Abbasi 1992)
Referring to Polish Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1944), satisfaction of organic and basic needs of a man and of the race is a minimum set of conditions imposed on each culture. They are solved by the construction of a new, secondary, or artificial environment. Cultural traditions have to be transmitted from one generation to the next. Methods and mechanism of communication, sharing of ideas and interaction must exist in every culture. The material aspect of culture has to be renewed and maintained in working order. All the primary problems of human beings are solved by artifacts, organizations and by the development of knowledge. The basic needs and their cultural satisfactions are tied together in all societies. In nutshell, the analysis in which we attempt to define the relation between cultural performance and human needs - basic or derived may be termed functional. Malinowski proposed that culture and its effects should be studied through a methodological system.
DEFINING MASS COMMUNICATION
The broadest definition of communication was provided by Peterson and Jensen (1991) who said, "It is a process by which a person influences another and influenced by him". They elaborate, "Communication is the carrier of social process. It makes interactions between human kinds possible and enables man to become and remain social being".
If communication is considered in its broader sense, it is a collective activity and its main functions are information, socialization, motivation, debate and discussion, education, entertainment, integration and cultural promotion. The communication functions are linked to people's needs, both material and non-material. People want to add aspiration toward human growth
33 to the satisfaction of material needs. Self-reliance, cultural identity, freedom, independence, respects for human dignity and participation in the re-shaping of environment are non-material aspirations which man seeks through communication.
The term 'mass communication', which was coined at the end of the 1930s, has too many connotations to allow a simple agreed definition. The word mass is itself value laden and controversial, and the term 'communication' still has no agreed definition. Nevertheless, there is sufficient commonality in widely held common sense' perceptions to provide a working definition and a general characterization. The term 'mass' denotes great volume, range or extent (of people or production), while 'communication' refers to the giving and taking of meaning, the transmission and reception of messages. One early definition (Janowitz, 1968) reads as follows: "mass communications comprise the institutions and techniques by which specialized groups employ technological devices (press, radio, films, etc.) to disseminate symbolic content to large, heterogeneous and widely dispersed audiences'. In this and similar definitions, the word 'communication.' is really equated with 'transmission', as viewed by the sender, rather than in the fuller meaning of the term, which includes the notions of response, sharing and interaction. The process of ‘mass communication’ is not synonymous with the "mass media' (the organized technologies which make mass communication possible). There are other uses of the same technologies and other kinds of relationships mediated through the same networks.
Everyday experience with mass communication is extremely varied. It is voluntary and usually shaped by culture and by the requirements of one's social environment. The notion of mass communication experience is abstract and hypothetical. On occasions, it does seem to be a reality, the causes are more likely to be found in particular conditions of social life than
34 in the media technology or contents. The diversity of technology-mediated communication relationship is increasing as a result of new technology and new applications. The general implication of these remarks is that mass communication was, from the beginning, more of and than a reality. The term stands for a condition and a process, which is theoretical, possible but rarely found in any pure form.
INTERDEPENDENCE OF CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION
The Interdependence of culture and communication is even more pronounced. The term culture is used to mean all that man has added to nature. Communication between people is a major component of way of life in all cultures. The media of communication are cultural instruments, which serve to promote or influence attitude, to motivate, to foster the spread of behaviour patterns and to bring about social integration. They play a major role in implementing cultural policies and bringing about cultural harmony.
CULTURAL COMMUNICATION
The cultural communication refers to the process of communication, which satisfies cultural needs of people i.e. right to speak, share and exchange ideas. Broadly, it covers intellectual interaction through spoken and written word to entertainment and information. Cultural communication in one hand is a process of dissemination of ideas and a definite assurance to get feedback within a society and with outside world. The assimilation, diffusion, borrowing, influence and social control are all offshoots of cultural communication. The cultural experts, anthropologists in particular, are still entangled with the question: our media (Television in particular) is flourishing which culture, a highbrow, middlebrow or lowbrow? Cultural communication is a complex human practice that encompasses two interrelated aspects of social life. The first aspect is culturally distinctive ways of communicating—the use of particular means 35 and meanings of communication that can be found in particular times, places, and social milieus. In this sense, cultural communication is com- municative conduct that is infused with the particulars of cultures. The second aspect is the role of communication in performing the cultural, or communal, function—the workings of communication in constituting the communal life of a community and in providing individuals the opportunity to participate, identify and negotiate that life. In this sense, cultural communication is the work that people do in coming to terms with the communicative demands of their life worlds. When people use the term cultural communication, what do they mean? I begin with a consideration of three early, undefined uses of the term, and then turn to a later, pro- grammatic use of it, to provide a basis for establishing a working definition of cultural communication.
An early use of cultural communication in anthropology suggests a reference to communication as a process through which cultural difference is expressed and constructed. Schwartz (1980) used the title Socialization as Cultural Communication: Development of a Theme in the Work of Margaret Mead, for an edited collection of works by the anthropologist Margaret Mead. Hanson (1982) makes a similar use of the term in his edited volume of essay dedicated to the memory of Gregory Bateson; Studies in Symbolism and Cultural Communication. The theme that both of these collections develop is that humans grow up not to be just any human, but rather, through a process of communication, become socialized into a particularly cultural version of a human being. Schwartz and Hanson, and by implication Mead and Bateson, think of cultural communication in terms of differences in conduct across societies and of the mediating role of communication in socializing individuals into a particular cultural way.
In "The Problem of Speech Genres," first published in Russia in 1953, the Russian literary scholar Bakhtin (1953/1986) used an expression that
36 was later translated as "cultural communication." In that essay, Bakhtin refers to "highly developed and organized cultural communication (primarily written), complex cultural communication, complexly organized cultural communication (scientific and artistic), and cultural communication. He juxtaposes "cultural communication" in apparent contrast to "active speech communication" and to "various primary (simple) genres that have taken form in unmediated communication." He also integrates secondary and primary genres into one inter animating system of communicative practices.
In this usage, cultural communication refers to those speech genres of a society that manifest its public, relatively permanent, widely distributed forms and ways of communicating, but ways and forms that are interde- pendent with the everyday speech habits of individuals in that society.
Writing in the field of communication studies, in an essay about communication systems, Cushman and Craig (1976) articulated the basic functions, typical structures, and typical processes of cultural, social- organizational, and interpersonal communication systems. For cultural communication systems, Cushman and Craig proposed that consensus about institution is the basic function. The basic structures of cultural communication are, to Cushman and Craig, networks (nation, culture, class, subculture, region, community, and family) and codes (Language, dialect, and accent). Typical processes are diffusion, especially via mass media, and customs and rituals. In this usage, cultural communication refers to a process of activity in which individuals in a society act so as to produce and regulate shared understandings about social life that will serve as a warrant for shared meaning and coordinated activity among the members of that society. Each of these early uses of cultural communication emphases a particular aspect of cultural communication, but they all have two features in common as well. First, each is concerned with the distinctiveness of communication in particular societies and cultures. Second, each treats communication as a site and resource for establishing, sustaining, and
37 negotiating a community’s sense of membership and identification with a community.
The three early uses of cultural communication mentioned above can be seen, in retrospect, as having set the stage for an explicit formulation of cultural communication as a programmatic enterprise in the field of communication. Cultural communication, as a named field of study, was proposed by Philipsen in an essay titled “the prospect for cultural communication,” which was first circulated in 1981 but not published until 1987. At the time of the writing of the prospect for cultural communication, there were (in the communication studies discipline) several important lines of research and pedagogy that treated communication from a cultural standpoint. The ethnography of communication was a call for and realization of a program of descriptive comparative study of cultural ways of speaking (see Hymes, 1962; Philipsen, 1975; Murray 1993).
Philipsen (1981, 1987) proposed cultural communication as a distinctive approach to the study of culturally situated communication, Cultural communication, as proposed by Philipsen, brought together two important strands of earlier research on culture and communication. These two strands are (1) differences across groups in terms of communicative practices and (2) the role of communication as a resource in managing discursively the individual communal dialectics.
I have discussed cultural communication, first, by interpreting what the term cultural communication means. I have proposed that cultural communication refers to that communicative conduct that is infused with cultural particulars of the means and meanings of communicative conduct. Furthermore, I have proposed that cultural communication refers to the activity, through which a community and the people construct, enact, and negotiate a communal sense of communicative conduct. Thus, the term 38 refers to a structural aspect of all communicative conducts. And it refers to a functional aspect of communicative conduct as well. It is a resource through which communities and the individuals come to terms with their cultures.
Although the research conducted under the name of cultural communication does not argue against universals in communicative conduct, it does provide substantial evidence of the universality of cultural particulars. These particulars can be observed at two levels. One is the particular communicative means that are deployed in a particular milieu. The second level is the meanings of these means to those who use and experience them. The empirical record documents considerable variety across and within communal conversations in what those means are and in what significance they have for those who partake of them.
MASS MEDIA AND CULTURE – THE RELATIONSHIP
The term 'mass media' is shorthand to describe means of communication that operate on a large scale, reaching and involving virtually everyone in a society to a greater or lesser degree. It refers to a number of media that are now long-established and familiar, such as newspapers, magazines, film, radio, television and the phonograph (recorded music). It has an uncertain frontier with a number of new kinds of media that differ mainly in being more individual, diversified and interactive and of which the Internet is the leading example. Despite the rapid and continuing growth of these 'new media' there is little sign that the "mass media' are actually declining, according to any criterion. Rather, they are being supplemented, extended and also challenged to adapt to the newcomers to the scene. While this review does consider the emerging theory for new media, it focuses on the ongoing phenomenon of 'mass communication', whose significance stems from the very fact of its near
39 universality of reach, great popularity and public character. The mass media are now regarded as an integral part of “Cultural industries”.
These features have consequences for the political organization and cultural life of contemporary societies. In respect of politics, the mass media have gradually become: an essential element in the process of democratic politics by providing an arena and channel for debate, for making candidates for office widely known and for distributing diverse information and opinion. It has also a means of exercising power by virtue of the relatively privileged access that politicians and agents of government can generally claim from the media as a legitimate right. In respect of culture, the mass media constitute a primary source of definitions and images of social reality and expression of shared identity. Mass Media are the largest focus of leisure time interest, providing the shared cultural environment for more people than any other single institution. In addition, the media are steadily increasing in economic significance, as media industries grow, diversify and consolidate their power in the market.
If these claims are accepted, it is not difficult to understand the great attention, which the mass media have attracted since their early days. The conduct of democratic (or undemocratic) politics, depends more and more on mass media, and there are few significant social issues, which are addressed without some consideration of the role of the mass media, whether for good or ill. The most fundamental questions of society concerning the distribution and exercise of power, the management of problems and the processes of integration and change are the newer domains of mass media. This is especially true of the messages carried by the public means of communication, whether in the form of information, opinion, stories or entertainment.
THE BEGINNING OF MASS MEDIA
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The term 'mass media' refers to the organized means for communicating openly and at a distance to many receivers within a short span of time. These criteria are relative, since the earliest forms of mass media (the printed book or pamphlet) were limited to the minority of a society that happened to be literate and relatively close to the place of publication. There has been a continuous line of development of technologies since the earliest forms of media (rock paintings) to the latest digital forms that have expanded the capacity, speed and efficiency of transmission.
I have distinguished already between a process of mass communication and the actual media that make it possible. It is important to underline that the idea of communicating publicly over time and at distance is much older than are the mass media now. This process was integral to the organization of early societies, carried out especially within religious, political and educational institutions. Even the element of large- scale (mass) dissemination of ideas was present at an early point in time, in the sharing of political and religious awareness and obligations. By the early Middle Ages, the Church had elaborate and effective means in place to ensure transmission to everyone without exception. This can be called mass communication, although it was largely independent of mass media. Nevertheless, it means that the connection was easy to make between the two. It was certainly made by authorities of church and state that reacted with alarm at the potential loss of control represented by printing, and it was also made by authors seeking to disseminate new ideas. The bitter propaganda struggles of the Reformation and Counter-reformation, during the 16th century are evidence enough. It was the historical moment when the link between the technology for mass communication irrevocably acquired a particular social and cultural definition.
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In recounting the history of mass media, we deal with three main elements that produce distinctive configurations of application and of significance in the wider life of society. These are:
certain communicative purposes, needs, or uses, for instance informing, entertaining, cultural expression, education. technologies for communicating publicly to many at a distance; forms of social organization that provide the skills and frameworks for deploying the technologies within the wider social context.
In practice, the way communication technologies are used depends very much on the circumstances of the time and place. It is hard to predict after the event why some developments have been of revolutionary significance. It is hard to assign any unique or essential attribute to any of the separate mass media that we identify. The combinations of the above elements that actually occur are usually dependent on intangible features of the social and cultural climate. Even so, it seems clear that a certain measure of freedom of thought, expression and action has been a necessary condition for the rise of print and other media. In general, the more open the society, the more inclination there has been to develop communication technology to its fullest potential. More closed or repressive regimes either limit development or set strict boundaries to the use of technology. Each medium dealt with can be identified in respect of its technology and material form, typical formats and genres, perceived uses and its institutional setting.
BROADCASTING
Radio and television have, respectively, a seventy-plus- and a forty- plus-year history as mass media, and both grew out of pre-existing technologies, telephone, telegraph, moving and still photography, and sound recording. Despite their obvious differences, now wide in content and use,
42 radio and television can be treated together. Radio seems to have been a technology looking for a use, rather than a response to a demand for a new kind of service or content, and much the same is true of television. According to Williams (1975: 25), "Unlike all previous communications technologies, radio and television were systems primarily designed for transmission and reception as abstract processes, with little or no definition of preceding content'. Both came to borrow from existing media, and most of the popular content forms of both are derivatives from film, music, stories, news and sport.
A distinctive feature of radio and television has been their high degree of regulation, control or licensing by public authority - initially out of technical necessity, later from a mixture of democratic choice, state self- interest, economic convenience and sheer institutional custom. A second and related feature of radio and television media has been their center- periphery pattern of distribution and the association of national television with political life and the power centers of society. Because of this closeness to power, radio and television have hardly anywhere acquired, as of right, the same freedom that the press enjoys, to express views and act with political independence.
Television has been continuously evolving, and it would be difficult to summarize its features in terms of communicative purposes and effects. Initially the main genre innovation of television stemmed from its capacity to transmit many pictures and sound live and thus act as a 'window on the world' in real time. Even studio productions were live broadcasts before the days of efficient video recording. This capacity of simultaneity has been retained for some kinds of content, including sporting events, some news casting, and certain kinds of show. What Dayan and Katz (1992) characterize as "media events' are often likely to have significant live
43 coverage. Most TV content is not live, although it often aims to create an illusion of ongoing reality.
The status of television as the most 'massive' of the media in terms of reach, time spent and popularity has barely changed over the years and it adds all the time to its global audience. Despite the fact that it has been denied an openly political role and is primarily considered a medium of entertainment, it is believed by many that television has a vital role in modern politics. It is considered to be the main source of news and information for most people and as the main channel of communication between politicians and citizens, especially at election times. In this informally allocated role as source of public information, television has generally remained credible and trusted. Another role is that of educator - for children at school and adults at home. It is also the largest single channel of advertising in nearly all countries, and this has helped to confirm its mass entertainment function. So far, many predictions that mass television would fragment into many different channels, along the model of the magazine, have not been realized, despite the proliferation of channels on cable and satellite. It even seems as if for many people the appeal of television lies in the very fact that it is a medium for everyone.
HISTORY OF TELEVISION
The night of April 23, 1896 was a milestone in the history as it was the evidence of Thomas Edison's latest invention, the Vitascope, a machine which actually projected moving pictures onto a screen large enough for everybody in the theatre to view them at once. People were fascinated with the illusion of motion. The earliest films were only snippets of action; people watched them because of their novelty effects. Later on, novelty films were replaced by narrative films that told a story. With the popularity of narrative films, moviemaking became dominated by big business and movie stars. Later on money came into the movie making business and people started
44 investing in it. Silent films like Charlie Chaplin vanished quickly after the coming of sound.
In the 1920s, the film industry continued its move towards consolidation and growth. After the World War, the prosperity boom exploded in Hollywood with more force than in any other business sector. The filmmakers believed that the more they spend the more profit they are likely to earn. So the concept of investment became popular. The costs of film started soaring with each passing day. Between 1914 and 1924, there was 1500 percent increase in the cost of a feature film. Costumes, props, set designs, salaries of actors and best sellers all contributed to the mushrooming costs of films. By the 1930s the industry had improved the technical resources for reproducing sound; the camera and microphone could be moved together and more effective relation between picture and sound emerged. The production of sound films cost the Hollywood industry millions of dollars in investment in new equipment, new technicians, and new creative talent. The improvement in the sound quality and the camera techniques gave further boast to the film industry.
The twenty years from the 1930 to 1950 were studio years, with MGM, 20th century Fox, ARKO, Warner Brothers, Paramount, Universal, Columbia, and United Artists dominating the industry. Different studios left their imprint on the films of the period as certain film products took on a distinct personality. For example, during this period the Warner Brothers became best known for their gangster films; 20th Century Fox for its historical adventure films; and MGM for its lavish, star-studded musicals. Since music was easier and cheaper to put on film than dialogue, musical films quickly became popular among Hollywood producers and directors. As the 1930s wore on, films blending romance with light comedy arising from the situation became increasingly popular. However at the end of this
45 decade, the potential of suspense and mystery dramas was exploited by a notable British director, Alfred Hitchcock.
When the 2nd World War broke out, it did not take Hollywood long to turn out a number of patriotic films. Although several focused on fighting overseas, the most successful films were those portraying the lifestyles and cultural values that the United States was trying to preserve. In that era of Depression, the financial backing and diverse holding of studio system helped the film industry to survive. During the 1940s going to a movie was just a part of American life. In fact all time peak for film going was 1946, when average weekly attendance reached over 90 million.
Introduction of Sound
During the 1920s, when the film industry was experimenting with the addition of sound to pictures, some inventors were busy working on ways to add pictures to sound. The two people with the early development of early television, Philo Fransworth and Vladimir Zworykin, could not have been two different individuals. However, Fransworth's hard work paid off in 1930 when he got a patent for his TV system. Television might have gotten off a faster start, but the Depression slowed down its growth as well as that of the film industry.
Improvement in the Picture Quality
Picture quality on the early television system was poor, but the technical development during the 1930s indicated that improvement was possible. NBC, owned by RCA, gave a public demonstration of Television at the 1939 New York World Fair with regular two-hour broadcasts. After the fair opened, RCA had TV sets with 5-inch picture tubes on display in departmental stores. However, filmmakers did not take the new invention seriously. Just like radio in infancy, early TV was looked upon as a toy something that would never amount to much. Because of the adverse affects
46 of the 2nd World War, TV faced times of uncertainty. The FCC put a freeze on new TV stations, and most efforts were redirected away from TV to radar. When peace returned in 1945, however, the new technology developed during the war was soon applied to the television industry New picture tubes required drastically less light to perform; microwaves and coaxial cables were used to link stations into networks and big screen television sets were being manufactured in large quantities. In 1945, there were 8 stations on the air and by the end of 1950, there were 98. Only 8000 homes had TV in 1946 and ten years later, almost 35 million households had TV sets.
Introduction of Color Television
Another technological break through took place in 1950 with the introduction of color television. In 1960, three networks were broadcasting about two to three hours of color programming per day. NBC and the CBS were two networks that usually dominated the TV ratings while ABC trailed behind. In the early days of TV, most network prime-time programs were produced by advertising agencies that retained control over their content. Later on the networks began to assert control over programming. June 25, 1951 was a milestone in the history of television when on this very day, the Columbia Broadcasting System made the first commercial color broadcast.
Cable TV
Cable television first came into existence in Mahoney City. Pennsylvania, in 1948 or Astoria, Oregon, in 1949 as Community Antenna Television (CATV) as a means of improving the reception of broadcast signals in poor reception areas (Crandall & Furchtgott-Roth, 1996). Enormous antennas brought in signals for geographic areas which could not receive good reception. It made economic sense to build a single huge antenna to serve many television viewers, the signals being distributed by wire from the antenna to viewers' homes (Lubar. 1993). Since the middle of the
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1960s when cable television got into telecommunication business as an alternative to the three existing commercial networks, cable television has become a major competitor to the networks claiming viewer's attention, and time (Beckcr, Dunwoodv & Ratacli. 1993). As a consequence, it has changed the pattern of the audience's television consuming behavior.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s cable became a true multi- channel medium with basic and premium services provided via satellites, thus making cable attractive to urban areas in addition to rural areas with bad reception. In 1975 cable operators began to receive programming from communication satellites, Increasing the number of viewing options, the communication satellite delivered the broadcast signals to further geographic areas and led to the creation of advertiser-supported cable networks such as the Cable News Network (CNN), Super Stations, and ESPN in 1979 (Bradury, 1990). By 1991 there were more than 10,000 cable systems, and with approximately 60 million homes receiving cable services, the cable television business had become a $20 billion-a-year industry (Lubar, 1993).
Evolution of the Television Industry:
Television is now in the second half-century of existence and one thing and many changes have been accrued since the time of its existence. In the first place, the word itself has changed its meaning. It was not so long that "television" meant the few program choices that were available on a rather bulky piece of furniture that sat in the corner of the living room. These days, the television set has become smaller, more mobile, and is likely to be in several rooms of the house. Furthermore, the television set might not even be hooked up to what used to be called "television". Instead the wires from the back of the set might lead to a computer keyboard, videogame, VCR or video camera.
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The change in television programming has been equally dramatic. Instead of having to choose among shows offered by a few networks and possibly one or two independent or public broadcasting stations, today's viewer is faced with the plethora of choices: many networks and independent stations, public stations, cable systems that provides more channels of TV, pay services that provides recently released theatrical movies and other special events, home made video tapes, videogames, and special interactive programs that allow the viewer to become part of the action.
TELEVISION THEORY: READING THE TEXT
This new global economy of meaning has become an important topic in the anthropological study of commodities and consumerism. Goods are also re-contextualized and reinterpreted at their locus of consumption (Friedman 1990; Lofgren 1990; McCracken 1988; Arnould and Wilk 1984; Wilk 1990; Belk 1988). I think we need to apply these same critical insights to the study of television in the Third World. Just as a McDonald's hamburger means something very different in Moscow from what it means in London, so the drama of Dallas has been found to convey very different meanings to Israelis, Algerians, and Italians (Katz and Liebes 1984, 1986; Silj et al. 1988). Australian aborigines interpret television dramas in ways that would be unintelligible to those who produced the drama in the first place (Michaels 1988). Fiske (1986) argues that even in the countries where they are produced, television programs are open texts subject to a variety of interpretations. The very popularity of television rests on polysemy and ambiguity, on the ability of different groups to find different things in the same program.
Existing studies of the television audience have some very important ramifications for our understanding of the global traffic in objects and meanings of the process whereby the global becomes localized. One finding 49 is that the message of television is interpreted and absorbed socially, rather than individually. Television messages are mediated in the social context of talk about television. For example, violent programs do not make children prone to or inured to violence when their parents and friends talk about television violence with disapproval [Drummond and Paterson 1988]. Studies consistently find that conversation is an essential part of television watching; the meaning of the program acquires cultural and social relevance through interpretive discourse (Katz and Liebes 1984, 1986; Lee and Cho 1990; Miller 1990).
In asking about the impact of television on families around the world, Lull (1988) finds the most universal change is that television creates a new genre of "television talk" within existing family interaction.
But what does this genre of talk do to the messages from the box? Most theorists agree that television talk allows viewers to negotiate different poses, or distances in relation to the program. The various classifications of these poses can be combined into a set of three (based on works by Hall 1981; Livingstone 1990; Morley 1980, 1988; Ang 1985; and Katz and Liebes 1984, 1986):
1. A viewer who is dominated, places no distance between himself and the program, identifying closely with the characters and situation in a completely uncritical way (Hall 1981). Katz and Liebes (1984, 1986) focus on the emotional fix of the viewer on the program, while Ang (1985) sees an element of fantasy that Livingstone (1990) would call "romantic." The viewer confuses the program with reality, relating to the characters as real people, sometimes as even more real than the mundane. This implies that dominated viewers uncritically absorb and internalize the hegemonic messages from the box, accepting and integrating them into their lives.
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2. At the other extreme is Hall's (1981) oppositional stance, where the viewer has a critical distance from the program that allows judgment about truth, the motives of its producers, and the impact of the medium itself. The position has been labeled "ironic" (Ang 1985), "cynical" (Livingstone 1990), and "moralistic" (Katz and Liebes 1984, 1986). Viewers perceive a message in the box and reject it, or they extract a meaning from the program that was not intentionally coded there, for example that Dallas is about the evils of patriarchy, or of capitalism. 3. In between there is a negotiated position, where the viewer does not dispute the meaning of the program, but interprets and adapts it in light of his own experience and interest. This "pragmatic" (Katz and Liebes 1984) and "realistic" (Ang 1985) position allows the viewers to relate the events in the program to their own lives. They accept the program as a fantasy, but one that resonates and reflects;they are willing to identify with some things and reject others in a creative process of engaged participation. The way they use and reintegrate meanings has been likened to "poaching" [Silj et al. 1988]. If these three options cover a real range of relationships to television, how can they be mapped onto the local and global audience? Most tempting are transpositions onto social or geographical maps. A proponent of cultural imperialism can argue that viewers in the metropole have critical distance while those on the periphery are dominated and deceived. Some studies in Britain have argued that for specific program categories, gender is the best predictor of reading; women are dominated by soap opera, while men are more distanced (Morley 1988). Katz and Liebes (1984, 1986) found cultural differences that explain viewers' readings of Dallas; Israeli Arabs were moralistic and distanced, while Moroccan Jews were pragmatic, and American Jews were engaged (Silj 1988).
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Another tempting map links types of reading to social rank; the educated upper classes are capable of critical distance, while the poor have a direct and uncritical relationship to the program that leads to their domination (Fachel and Oliven 1988; Ang 1985; Leal 1990). This hypothesis can be supported by several studies, including Kottak's in Brazil, that find greater criticism of television at higher income and educational levels as well as with longer length of exposure to the medium [Kottak 1990: 140-2]). The idea that the poor are dominated while the rich and educated have critical distance is a folk model of television consumption that is often heard in Pakistan. Middle and upper class people are worried about the effects of television on the gullible poor, whose close, uncritical involvement was going to lead to dire cultural effects. The commonly voiced fear was that the poor were taking television "too literally," that they mistook entertainment for reality. Even many of the poor and uneducated people, I interviewed, said that their neighbors and children were taking television too seriously, were believing what they saw and were emotionally affected. Government officials see themselves as stuck between critical elite who want the media controlled, and an engaged, dominated populace interested only in more entertainment.
THE WORKS OF RAYMOND WILLIAMS ON CULTURE AND TELEVISION
The work of Raymond Williams remains one of the richest sources of cultural criticism available within British Marxism. His writings contain substantial contributions to literary and cultural criticism and political theory, as well as mass communications. In this, Williams is part of a wider change evident within Left thinking in postwar society. Along with other writers on the New Left, Williams is aware that the economism evident within Marxist thought inadequately accounts for the growth in the importance of democratic and commercial cultures. In addition, artistic practice severed from the social conditions of its production and reception by traditional criticism, was thought to contain a certain critical imma- 52 nence. These concerns prompted a lifelong project that would seek to form an understanding of ordinary and aesthetic cultures, and in turn their relationship with social institutions.
His first major work, Culture and Society (1961), probably remains his best known. The term 'culture', within Williams's presentation, is discussed by a historically sequenced collection of writers ranging from Burke to Orwell. Williams aims to argue, by critically tracing through a predomi- nantly Romantic tradition around 'culture', that the term potentially retains both immanent and critical uses. Williams in effect merges what might be called an anthropological and an artistic definition of culture. For Williams, 'culture' signified the dual meaning of a 'way of life' (Williams, 1961: 137) and notions of human perfection that provide a critical court of appeal (Williams, 1961: 65-84). Williams writes:
“A culture has two aspects; the known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and tested. We use the ward culture in these two senses; to mean a whole way of life -the common meanings; to mean the arts and learning - the special process of discovery and creative effort”. (Williams, 1988: 4)
Williams’s book, The Long Revolution (1965), develops a more insti- tutionally grounded approach to cultural transformations, while retaining some of his earlier leanings. The Long Revolution refers to the slow historical unfolding of three interrelated changes taking place in the economic, political and cultural spheres since the industrial revolution. The gradual broadening of access to the education system, along with the growth of the reading public, the popular press, and the use of standard English, provides the backcloth for a culture in common. The dialectic of The Long Revolution is constituted through the contradiction between the forces of production 53 that had been liberated by capitalism and the communicative nature of human beings. The social reproduction of dominating social relations between capital and labour prevents cultural forms from being utilized in an emancipatory fashion. The realization of the essentially learning and creative nature of the people could only be captured through a socialist transformation of society (William, 1965: 118). The problem Williams faced was that the labour movement, whom he had identified as the central agency for change, had become incorporated into the capitalist system.
Williams offers an ideal type of free communication when he writes:
“A good society depends upon the free availability of facts and opinions, and on the growth of vision and consciousness – the articulation of what men have actually seen and known and felt. Any restriction of the freedom of individual contribution is actually a restriction of the resources of society. (Williams, 1962; 124-5)”
Williams outlines four brief models against which this ideal type is to be tested: (1) authoritarian, (2) paternal, (3) commercial and (4) democratic.
An authoritarian communicative institution simply transmits the instructions of ruling groups. Williams has in mind the mass communication systems of actually existing socialism’. The transmission of electronically coded messages and the print media were largely centrally controlled by the state, which tightly restricted the expression of dissent within civil society. Any radical democratic politics worth the name, Williams insisted, would have to protect the free circulation of information from state surveillance.
Paternal social structures, on the other hand, are oriented around the desire to protect and guide, rather than the assertion of the right to rule. For example, the BBC was build upon the ideal of the maintenance of high 54 standards, which largely reflected the ethos and taste of England’s dominant social groups. Lord Reith, the first Director General of the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), defended this approach by arguing that a more democratic media would inevitably lead to lower standards. According to Williams, the Reithian public service model had an inbuilt tendency to view the people as masses (Williams, 1962: 108). The expression the masses are used to signify a way of thinking about the people that denies their cultural plurality. Reith’s view of public service sought to educate the people into a rich, high culture away from homogeneous Americanized popular culture.
Commercial cultural industries offer a certain amount of freedom in that a plurality of cultural forms can be bought and sold in the market place. But, as Williams, (1980) makes clear in an essay on capitalism and advertising, commercial systems often obscure the distinction between human wants for goods and services and the need for democratic self government. Advertising is able to play this particular ideological trick by offering magical solutions to the more authentic problems of death, loneliness, frustration, the need for identity and respect’ (Williams, 1980: 190). In addition, commercial structures promote a further illusion in that certain exclusions are built into capitalistic methods of cultural distribution. That is, commercial forms of cultural dissemination inevitably exclude works unlikely to sell quickly and reap a profitable return.
The democratic model of cultural production has much in common with the commercial system outlined above, given its emphasis upon free communication. However, according to Williams, certain rights of free communication should be insulated and protected from the dominance of capital in the market place. Williams proposes that the media of mass communications be taken out of the control of commercial and paternal institutions, such as those underwritten by capital and the state, and both
55 democratized and decentralized. Once institutionally separate from the government and the market this would provide cultural contributors with the social context for free expression. The utopia of free communication, Williams believed, would undoubtedly promote stronger community relations and bonds. The reform of the national system of communication would also allow a democratic public forum for the presentation of previously excluded experiences and perspectives.
Williams’s writing can be described as democratic realism not only because of his commitment to the institutional changes outlined in the long revolution, but also because of his defense of a realist aesthetic. However, Williams does not argue that the society should be represented as though it were a reflection in a mirror (Jameson, 1977). For Williams, artistic practices do not reflect reality, but actively produce it through material and symbolic forms.
RAYMOND WILLIAMS AND TELEVISION
For Williams, the primary question is how did television come to inhabit a central part of our cultural lives? This cannot be adequately answered through a technological paradigm. For instance, one unsatisfactory response to Williams’s question would be to concentrate on the scientific research that invented television. This way of viewing technology abstracts the spread of television from social needs, purposes and practices. In Williams account the growth of mass television can be said to be over determined by the economy, the state and what he calls mobile privatism (Williams, 1974). Of the multiplicity of causes analyzed by Williams the most crucial remains private capital, whose interests dominate the development of communication technology. The cultural form of television, had to be adapted for a market that was shaped by a home based consumerism. In other words, television technology had to fit the needs of 56 the private conditions of reception, while being small enough to be easily transportable. The first television sets were often enclosed within pieces of furniture designed to fit comfortably into people’s front rooms. This condition, which Williams often referred to as mobile privatism was to some extent was counterbalanced by the state’s policy of public broadcasting. The steering mechanisms shaping the development of television in Britain (although the same could not be said of the USA) were both public and private. While the commercialization of television meant that it would be consumed in private, its public regulation provided the state with a means to promote its own legitimacy. The idea of public service broadcasting, which can be either paternal or democratic, grew out of a state defined national culture. However, since the 1950s the most important development within broadcasting systems has been the expansion of American communications. There has been a transformation from national and state controlled broadcasting to global and commercial forms of television. This situation has created a world market in film, television and video. Williams argues that the development of culturally emergent satellite and cable systems should be viewed dialectically. The capitalist world market in cultural production, which has eroded the dominance of the British state, will, through the dumping of cheap television, prohibit the making of local products. Alternatively, a more socialized approach to new communicative systems could seek to undermine the dominance of large scale capital and nation states, through more local forms of control. Public service broadcasting, while maintaining links to the national and the international, would thereby become progressively localized and democratized.
Williams addresses the experience of watching television by looking at the distribution of television programmes across networks and what he calls television flow. A content analysis of commercial and public television reveals that the latter provides programs of a more social and educative nature. But, what both types of television have in common is that
57 programming is organized into a sequential flow in an attempt to capture an audience for an evening’s entertainment. Ien Ang describes flow as ‘a coming and going of programs without their individuality leaving any specifically deep impression’ (Ang, 1985: 22). This phenomenon is best captured through the experience of passively watching television rather than critically engaging with a specific program. That television has become a medium of privatized relaxation is a missed opportunity. Instead, Williams proposes that the opening up of the channels of communication could provide a critical forum for a more robust form of public discourse.
Much of the audience research reviewed by Williams was based on assumptions. This research paradigm, at the time of writing, had become dominated by the search for scientifically isolated effects. Also, the oversimplified models of cause and effect, assumes that the institutional organization of television is not worth studying. While Williams thought that audience research could be further developed, these issues did not have the political importance in the social organization of mass communication (Williams, 1974: 123).
STUART HALL, MASS COMMUNICATION, HEGEMONY AND IDEOLOGY
Stuart Hall is best known as a founder member of the Birmingham Center for Cultural Studies and for his writing on Thatcherism (Harris, 1992; Turner, 1991). Like Williams, despite belonging to a younger generation, Hall was a prominent figure in the re-emergence of the British Left in the 1960s and 1970s. His theoretical writing is closely bound up with the themes of culture, ideology and identity. While he offers a sophisticated reinterpretation of some of the central thinkers within post-structuralism, his main intellectual touchstone remains Antonio Gramsci. In mass communication research, Hall's specific contribution has been to link ideologically coded cultural forms to the decoding strategies of the audience. He has carried this through while simultaneously attending to the shifting
58 political context of media signs and messages. For Hall the ideologically coded text remains the primary level of determination. His most recent writing has displayed an increasing awareness of the discursive openness of the popular codes. Hall represents a more sophisticated level of analysis, despite focus on the theme of ideology. His over-concentration on the theme of ideology means that other determinant levels, such as the ownership and control of the mass media, drop out of the analysis. While Williams forges a fruitful dialectic between communicative structures and democratic theory, Hall has little of substance to contribute in this respect.
Hall (1982) characterizes American media analysis of the 1940s and the 1950s as belonging to the 'effects' school. The aim of this research was to establish the measurable impact of the media of mass communication on human behaviour, and its conclusion was that the media is often relatively harmless, reinforcing the norms and values held by a pluralist society. The rediscovery of ideology in media studies, however, has reintroduced a notion of power and more critically addressed the construction of the real. The most important intellectual and theoretical resource in the turn to ideology is structuralism. Of particular importance here is the work of Louis Althusser, whose writing on ideology profoundly shaped the dominant form of cultural studies in Britain, although it did meet with spirited resistance in some quarters (Thompson, 1978). Althusser's influence can be traced across a wide range of cultural and political studies, including literature, film, psychoanalysis and political theory (Elliott, 1987). His critical concern is to investigate the means by which capitalist society reproduces dominant institutional relationships. The production and reproduction of ideology provides the key to this question. In his famous essay on the subject, Althusser (1984) makes the distinction between Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) and Repressive State Apparatuses (RSAs). Both RSAs and ISAs are social practices that have an ideological function. They are distinguishable in that RSAs (military, police) operate mainly through force,
59 where as the ISAs (media, education) ensure the ideological dominance of the ruling class. The production of ideology, in Althusser's formulation, has perhaps two distinctive characteristics. First, while ideology was tied to an institutional analysis, it could not be conceived of as the inversion or reflection of the real. Rather ideology, in Althusser's memorable words, 'represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence' (1984: 36). Secondly, ideology not only constitutes our symbolic relation with the real, but converts human beings into subjects. Ideology lets individuals mistakenly recognize themselves as self-determining agents, whereas in fact subjects are formed through linguistic and psychic processes. Althusser's emphasis upon the formation of the self through ideological discourses had a formative impact on Hall. For Hall, structuralism opens up two main fields of research for mass communication: (1) an analysis of dominant discourses that exclude other alternative explanations; and (2) an analysis of how the media institutions themselves serve to offer only a limited range of meanings. Let us take each of these levels of analysis in turn.
Hall (1977) argues that the mass media form the main ideological institution of contemporary capitalism. This can be asserted as the communication system provides the main symbolic realm through which the manufacture of the dominant consensus is forged. The media of mass communication, according to Hall, operate through the production of hegemonic codes that cement the social together.
Hall's (1988b) later writing becomes increasingly aware of the charges of functionalism that have been leveled at Althusser. In Althusser's original thesis, as we saw, the ISAs, transmit ideological forms of misrecognition of the real relations of domination. In this way, Althusser argues, ideology binds individuals to the social structure- Hence the mystifying effects of ideology ensure the reproduction of class society. For Hall, Althusser’s
60 emphasis on ideology as materialized in concrete practices and rituals remains a definite advance. His own analysis of Thatcherism is an investi- gation of the various discursive strategies employed by the popular press, television interviews and right-wing think-tanks. In contrast to the attention he grants to mediated messages, Hall has comparatively little to say about institutions of mass communication. In his complex consideration of Thatcherism he offers only the most limited discussion of the structurating impact of the state and capital. In fact Hall often goes so far as to suggest that what is far more significant than this relation is the limited framework of interpretations within which journalists operate (Hall, 1972a: 10). What is apparent is that the intersection of the cultural context of Journalism and the semiotic content of media messages remains determinant for Hall (1972a, 1975; Hall el al, 1978). Hall's level of expertise is in the interpretation of media messages, which eventually leads him to open up questions of audience response neglected by Williams.
In the production of media messages Hall makes a basic distinction between encoders and decoders. He identifies a radical break between the frameworks of knowledge, relations of production and technical infrastructure that facilitate the encoding and decoding of meaning structures- The encoding of a media text is dependent upon certain professional norms and procedures, institutional relations and technical equipment (television cameras, videotapes, microphones, tape recorders, etc.). Once the message has been symbolically encoded it is open to the reading strategies employed by the audience. The reception of the audience is dependent upon cultural and political dispositions, their relationship to wider frameworks of power and access to mass-produced technology (radio, television, video recorder, compact disc player, etc.). There are three main ways in which a symbolically coded text can be
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read. A dominant hegemonic reading interprets the text in terms of the preferred meaning suggested by the message.
In the course of examining the views of Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall, I have essentially set out an argument for two main areas of inquiry. First I have argued that mass communications research should articulate a political economy of the cultural industries. I have also argued that the concepts of hegemony and ideology remain essential for an understanding of the information age. While the writings of Stuart Hall are important contributions to the ideology debate. Common to the writings of Williams, and Hall is a certain tendency to overstate the incorporating power of ideology.
FREEDOM VERSUS CONTROL
Relations between media and society usually have both a political dimension and a normative or social-cultural aspect. Central to the political dimension is the question of freedom and control.
The various new media some using cable or telecommunications networks for distribution, still await clear definitions of their appropriate degree of political freedom. Freedom from control may be claimed on the grounds of privacy or the fact that these are not media of indiscriminate mass distribution but directed to specific users. They are so-called 'common-carriers' that generally lack control over their content. They also increasingly share the same communicative tasks as media with established editorial autonomy. The question remains in dispute for a number of reasons, among them the need for regulation for technical reasons or to prevent abuse of monopoly power.
The normative dimension of control operates according to the same general principles, although sometimes with different consequences for particular media. For instance, film, which has generally escaped direct 62 political control, has often been subject to control of its content, on grounds of its potential moral impact on the young and impressionable (especially in matters of violence, crime or sex). The widespread restrictions applied to television in matters of culture and morals stem from the same tacit assumptions. These are that media that are very popular and have a potentially strong emotional impact on many people need to be supervised in 'the public interest'. Supervision includes positive support for 'desirable' cultural communication objectives as well as for restrictions on the undesirable. The more communication activities can be defined as either educational or 'serious' in purpose or, alternatively, as artistic and creative, the more freedom from normative restrictions can usually be claimed. There are complex reasons for this, but it is also a fact that 'art' and content of higher moral seriousness do not usually reach large numbers and are seen as marginal to power relations.
The degree of control of media by state or society may depend on the feasibility of applying it. The most regulated media have typically been those whose distribution is most easily supervised, such as centralized national radio or television broadcasting or cinema distribution. Television, despite the many changes and extensions relating to production, transmission and reception, remains primarily a medium of entertainment (Morley, 1986), even if the family is less likely to be viewing together. It is still a focus of public interest and a shared experience in societies. It has both a domestic and a collective character that seems to endure. Television is typically shared, domestic and public.
For understanding of media structure the question of ownership and how the powers of ownership are exercised is fundamental. The belief that ownership ultimately determines the nature of media is not just a Marxist theory but virtually a common-sense axiom summed up in Altschull's (1984) 63
'second law of Journalism': 'the contents of the media always reflect the interests of those who finance them'. Not surprisingly, there are several different forms of ownership of different media, and the powers of ownership can be exercised in different ways.
As implied by Altschull's remark, it is not just ownership that counts, it is a wider question of who actually pays for the media product. Although there are media whose owners do personally pay for the privilege of influencing content, most owners just want profit, and most media are financed from different sources. These include a range of private investors (among them other media companies), advertisers, consumers, various public or private subsidy-givers, and governments. It follows that the line of influence from ownership is often indirect and complex - and it is rarely the only line of influence.
Most media belong to one of three categories of ownership: commercial companies, private non-profit bodies and the public sector. However, within each of these three there are significant divisions. For media ownership it will be relevant whether a company is public or private, a large media chain or conglomerate or a small independent. It may also matter whether or not a media enterprise is owned by a so-called 'media tycoon' or 'mogul', typified as wanting to take a personal interest in editorial policy (Tunstall and Palmer, 1991). Non-profit bodies can be neutral trusts, designed to safeguard independence of operations, or bodies with a special cultural or social task such as political parties, churches, etc. Public ownership also comes in many different forms ranging from direct state administration to elaborate and diversified constructions designed to maximize independence of decision-making about content.
The role of public policy (in effect, politics) in relation to media change is ambiguous, sometimes seeking to hold back or firmly manage change, sometimes to encourage it for economic or ideological reasons. The history 64 of broadcasting in Western Europe since about 1980 is illustrative of this (McQuail and Siune, 1998). Until that point in time, for half a century the development of radio and television had been kept firmly in the hands of national governments and under conditions of legal monopoly. The broadcast media were deemed too important to society to be left to the marketplace, and the intrinsically monopolistic character of broadcasting was thought to need strong public control to protect consumers. These political arrangements were fundamentally undermined by four main kinds of change which were largely outside the control of European national governments. Technological advances in the means of transmission (satellite and cable) made the original justification of monopoly (shortage of airwaves and channels) obsolete and made it physically very difficult to maintain the system of national monopoly. There arose powerful economic arguments for opening up the market to encourage industrial development of new communication technology. Moves towards European integration, political as well as economic, also implied trans-border freedom of communication and worked against tight national control. Fourthly, the public service character of the 'old order' of broadcasting was inconsistent with a rising tide of free-market ideology.
The results can be seen in the ending of public broadcasting monopolies in Europe, the opening of frontiers to transnational television, the multiplication of television channels and the appearance of strong commercial competition for the public television and radio channels. Broadcast institutions have been radically adapted, and a new phase of (still limited) competition is under way, with further change to be expected, as the financial basis of public television is further undermined. In Central and Eastern Europe, for different reasons, there have been parallel movements from public to commercial arrangements.
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The European case is illustrative both of the continuing strength and of the ultimate limits of public policy for managing media change. Richer societies with the will to do so can keep their media under national and public control, but only so far as technology and the wider political environment allow. The economically dependent countries of the Third World are much more exposed to external forces outside their control.
Salvaggio (1985) developed a model in which he compared four different types of society in relation to their communication policy goals and potential for implementation. The four types are: competitive, free-market; public utility (the mixed or social-market economies of Western Europe); communist (as in China or the former Soviet Union); and Third World (most developing countries). Salvaggio argues that the same general factors govern policy in all four types of society, but that each society will have a more or less constant guideline of its own (the Ideology of the society, such as 'development' or 'free enterprise'), while at least one other variable factor will exert a dominant influence on what is done to promote or control change. In the case of free-market societies, this will be economic forces', and in the case of developing countries, it is external forces outside the control of the national society.
THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS
For reasons that have been explained, mass media institutions carry a heavy weight of rules, regulation and scrutiny. The shape and rationale of media regulation can only be sketched here. The simplest way of describing media regulation is in terms of three basic models (Pool, 1983), which apply, approximately and respectively, to the newspaper press, to radio and television broadcasting and to telecommunication. Here I take only the broadcasting model.
The Broadcasting Model
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Radio and television broadcasting have been subject to high levels of restriction and direction, often involving direct public ownership. The initial reasons for regulation of broadcasting were mainly technical or to ensure the fair allocation of scarce resources and control of monopoly. However, regulation became deeply institutionalized, at least until the 1980s when new technologies and a new climate of opinion reversed the trend.
The general concept of public service lies at the core of the broadcasting model, although there are several variants, as well as weaker, as in the USA or stronger forms, as in Europe. Public service broadcasting in a fully developed form (such as in Britain) generally has several main features, supported by policy and regulation. The broadcasting model can involve many different kinds of regulation. Usually, there are specific media laws to regulate the industry and often some form of public service bureaucracy to implement the law. Quite often, the services of production and distribution may be undertaken by private enterprise concerns, operating concessions from the government and following some legally enforceable supervisory guidelines.
The decline in strength of the broadcasting model has been marked by increasing tendencies towards 'privatization' and 'commercialization' of broadcasting, especially in Europe (McQuail and Siune, 1998). This has involved, most notably, the transfer of media channels and operation from public to private ownership, increased levels of financing from advertising and the franchising of new commercial competitors for public broadcasting channels. Despite its relative decline, however, the broadcasting model shows no sign of being abandoned, for reasons related to the presumed communicative power of audiovisual media and broader public interest concerns.
NEW DRIVING FORCES: TECHNOLOGY AND MONEY AS BIG PLAYERS
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Technology has given a powerful push to the globalization of television. The arrival of television satellites in the late 1970s broke the principle of national sovereignty of broadcasting space and made it difficult and ultimately impossible to offer effective resistance to television transmission from outside the national territory. But the extent to which satellites reach global audiences directly is often exaggerated. There are other means of diffusion that work in the same direction - for instance by connecting cable systems and simply by physically transporting cassettes. But the main route is by exports channelled through nationally based media.
While technology has been a necessary condition of extensive globalization, and the truly global medium of the Internet illustrates this most clearly, the most immediate and enduring driving forces behind globalization have been economic. Television was established on the model of radio broadcasting, as a continuous service at least during the evening, later during the day and ultimately on a continuous basis. The cost of filling broadcasting time with original or domestic material has always strained the capacity of production organizations, even in wealthy countries. It is virtually impossible without great repetition or extensive importing. This pressure has operated on public systems as well as commercial organizations, but more especially on the latter.
The expansion of television since the 1980s, made possible by new efficient and low-cost transmission technologies, has been driven by commercial motives and has fuelled demand for imports. It has also stimulated new audio visual production industries in many countries that look, in their turn, for new markets. The main beneficiary and the main exporter has been the United States, which has a large and surplus production of popular entertainment and an entree into many markets secured by the cultural familiarity of its products mainly as a result of
68 decades of American films. The English language is an added advantage but not decisive, since most TV exports have always been dubbed or subtitled when transmitted.
An important component of international mass communication is advertising, linked to the globalization of many product markets and reflecting the international character of many advertising agencies and the dominance of the market by a small number of firms. One outcome is the appearance of the same advertising message in different countries, but there is also an indirect internationalizing effect on the media that carry the advertising. Advertising also often carries images of other countries and parts of the world, usually in a way that reinforces stereotypes, albeit mainly positive ones.
THE THESIS OF CULTURAL IMPERIALISM
Most of the issues surrounding global mass communication have a direct or indirect connection with the thesis of 'cultural imperialism', or the more limited notion of 'media imperialism'. Both concepts imply a deliberate attempt to dominate, invade or subvert the 'cultural space' of others and suggest a degree of coercion in the relationship. It is certainly a very unequal relationship in terms of power. It also implies some kind of overall cultural or ideological pattern in what is transmitted, which has often been interpreted in terms of 'Western values', especially those of individualism, secularism, materialism. It has a political as well as a cultural content, however, in the first case essentially a submission to the global project of American capitalism (Schiller, 1969). In the case of relations with Latin America noted already, the idea of an American 'imperialist' project for the hemisphere, certainly in the 1960s and 1970s was not fanciful (Dorfman and Mattelart, 1975). Critical theorists have not always agreed on whether it was the economic aims of global market control or the cultural and political aims of 'Westernization' that took precedence, although the two aspects are
69 obviously connected. The (critical) political economy theorists emphasize the economic dynamics of global media markets that work blindly to shape the flows of media commodities. Not surprisingly, such dynamics favour the free market model and in general promote capitalism.
The critics of global media imperialism have generally been countered by a mixed set of supporters of the free market or just pragmatists who see the imbalance of flow as a normal feature of the media market. In their view it has benefits for all and is not necessarily problematic (e.g. Pool, 1974; Noam, 1991; Hoskins and Mirus, 1988). It may even be temporary or reversed under some circumstances. Biltereyst (1995) has described these as two dominant and opposed paradigms under the heading of dependency and free-flow. In his view both paradigms rest on somewhat weak grounds empirically. The critical dependency model is based very largely on evidence of quantity of flow and some limited interpretation of ideological tendencies of content. There is little or no research on the posited effects. The free-flow theorists tend to assume minimal effects on the grounds that the audience is voluntary, and they make large assumptions about the cultural neutrality and ideological innocence of the globally traded content. It is also quite possible to view the ongoing globalization of media as having no ultimate goal or purpose and no real effect. It is simply an unplanned outcome of current political, cultural and technological changes.
The cultural imperialism thesis has been largely abandoned in the more recent tendency to frame many of the same issues in terms of 'globalization' (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1996; Golding and Harris, 1998: 4). There has been a strong challenge to the critique of popular mass media and its general cultural pessimism. This has also affected thinking about the effects of global cultural exchange, although perhaps not about the global flow of news. Certainly, we quite often encounter positive, even celebratory views of the global inclusiveness brought about by mass media.
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The shared symbolic space can be extended, and the constraints of place and time that are associated with nationally compartmentalized media systems can be evaded. Globalization of culture can even look good compared with the ethnocentrism, nationalism and even xenophobia that has characterized some national media systems. The new era of international peace ('New World Order') that was supposed to have been ushered in by the end of the Cold War could be thought to require a significant presence of internationalist media (Ferguson, 1992).
The negative bias of the theory literature concerning international media flows may be viewed as a reflection of an earlier tradition in media research that dealt with mass media primarily in terms of problems for society. But it was also the result of the mixing of several lines of critique relating to national identity and integrity, global capitalism and Third World dependency (Tomlinson, 1991). Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996) suggests that the 'cultural imperialism' model 'was based on a situation of comparative global media scarcity, limited global media players and embryonic media systems in much of the Third World'. These conditions have changed in some degree, and in any case the situation is much more complex than it was twenty or more years ago.
Most of the propositions arising from the media imperialism thesis also tend to frame global mass communication as a process of cause and effect, as if the media were 'transmitting' ideas, meaning, cultural forms from place to place, sender to receiver. To that extent, the critics use much the same language as the original 'theorists of development'. There is a general consensus that this 'transportation' model of how media work is not very appropriate outside certain cases of planned communication. If nothing else, we need to take much more account of the active participation of the audience in shaping any 'meaning' that is taken from mass media (Liebes and Katz, 1990).
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This revised and more positive perspective on globalization rests on the observation that the international flow of media generally responds to demand, and has to be understood in terms of the wants and needs of receivers and not Just the actual or supposed motives of the suppliers. This fact does not in itself invalidate the media imperialist critique, given the constraints in the global media market. Nor does the 'new revisionism' satisfy many critics who see only a new ideology or mythology in the contemporary euphoria about the global (Ferguson, 1992). Many features of the world media situation attest to the even more powerful grip of the capitalist apparatus and ethos on media nearly everywhere, with no place to hide (not even a Soviet Union).
THE DEPENDENCY PARADIGM
It is a well- and long-established fact that a few countries, with the USA most prominent, do dominate the global trade in news and entertainment. The other countries are often dependent not only for the supply of media content, but in economic terms as well. According to dependency theorists, a necessary condition for throwing off dependent relations is to have some self-sufficiency in the realm of information, ideas and culture. Mowlana (1985) has analysed all forms of international communication and proposed a model in which two dimensions are the most important determinants of the degree of dependence or autonomy. These are the technology axis (hardware versus software) and the communication axis (production versus distribution). The main features of the model are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1
Communication hardware
Production Distribution stage stage
1 source 2. Message 3. Distribution 4. Destination
Communication software
International communication dependency (Mowlana, 1985): each stage of the mass communication process can be identified as having hardware and a software aspect of potential dependency.
The model represents a now familiar sequence from sender (1) to receiver (2), mediated by a technologically based production (3) and distribution (4) system. In international communication, contrary to the typical national media situation the four stages of origination, production, distribution and reception can be (and often are) spatially, organizationally and culturally separated from each other. Media products from one country are typically imported and incorporated into a quite different distribution system and reach audiences for which they were not originally intended. Quite commonly, especially in respect of film and television, the entire origination and production of products occurs in one country and the distribution in another. This is how the 'North' is often related to the 'South' in media terms.
This typically extended and discontinuous process is cross-cut by the technology axis, which reminds us that each stage is dependent on two kinds of expertise (and also of property), one relating to hardware, the other
73 to software. Production hardware includes cameras, studios, printing plants, computers, etc. Production software includes not only actual content items but also performance rights, management, professional norms and routine operating practices of media organizations (know-how). Distribution hardware refers to transmitters, satellite links, transportation, home receivers, recorders, etc. Distribution software includes publicity, management, marketing and research. Both production and distribution stages are affected by 'extra-' as well as 'intra'-media variables - on the production side by circumstances of ownership and the cultural and social context, and on the distribution side by the economics of the particular media market.
The model thus portrays conditions of multiple dependency in the flow of communication from more to less developed countries. The latter are often dependent in respect of all four main types of hardware and software, and each may be controlled by the originating country. Self-sufficiency in media terms is virtually impossible, but there can be extreme degrees of insufficiency, and it is never possible to truly 'catchup'. As Golding (1977) first pointed out, the potential influence that goes with media dependency is not confined to cultural or ideological messages in content, it is also embedded in professional standards and practices, including journalistic ethics and news values.
Galtung (in Mowlana, 1985) has explained the global media pattern in terms of a 'centre-periphery' model, according to which the world nations can be classified as either central and dominant or peripheral and dependent, with a predominant flow from the former towards the latter. Certain larger, more 'central' countries originate news and other media content and distribute it to their own 'satellites'. In general, it is the United States and the larger countries of Western Europe (France, Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain) that are more 'central' and have media satellites in tow.
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But China and Japan have their own 'satellites' and the Arab world its own small galaxy. The former Soviet Union was another 'central' media power whose influence has been dissipated. The particular configuration changes with time and differs somewhat from medium to medium (press, television, music, film). A feature of this model is that there is only limited flow between the peripheral countries themselves, although there are regional and language-based patterns of exchange, which are probably growing rather than diminishing in significance.
The limited interchange at the periphery has been held to increase dependency by preventing the development of any common cause or collective action in relation to richer countries. The centre-periphery model does not rest on the idea of there being one single centre, and the complexities of media development and opening of opportunities for intercommunication undermine the view that there is a rigid and well- organized system of domination in the relations between states. However, the project for the development of a global telecommunications and media infrastructure that will connect individuals everywhere suggests that we may be entering a new phase where the older dependency models are inadequate to the task (Baldwin et al., 1996; Sussman, 1997).
In the emerging and still unclear 'system' of global communication flows, it is probable that the nation state will be less significant as a unit of analysis. It is more difficult to assign information and culture to a country of origin. Multinational production and marketing in the control of large corporations and multilateral media flows will establish their own patterns of dominance and dependency.
The televising of news has accelerated the cross-cultural appeal of news by telling the story in pictures to which can be added words in any language or with any 'angle5. Television news film agencies followed in the footsteps of the print news agencies. The picture may well tell a story but 75 the words pin down the intended meaning. Television news film, like print news, has been based on the principle of journalistic 'objectivity' that is designed to guarantee the reliability and credibility of accounts of events. In some ways it is easier to export purely verbal news because of the greater ambiguity of pictures. While earlier international 'foreign' news concentrated on politics, war, diplomacy and trade, there has been an enormous expansion of the scope for international news, with particular reference to sport, the world of media and entertainment, finance, tourism, fashion and much more.
The original debate about the unbalanced global flow of news echoed the terms of the dependency debate as discussed above. One of the earliest empirical studies of news imbalance (Schramm, 1964) showed that the news media in all 'developing' countries were heavy importers of news, while news audiences in developed countries were largely supplied with home-produced news, even when it was about foreign events. It was argued that the lack of autonomy in news production limited national cultural development (especially, for example, in new nations, often ex-colonies) and limited their full independence and sovereignty.
The fundamental reasons for news dependency were thought to lie in insufficient resources plus the ease of supply of the surplus news product of richer countries, mainly by way of international news agencies. At the same time the countries that were self-sufficient in news could be seen as restricted in their own view of the world. Not only was the supply of news reaching audiences in the developed world very selective and incomplete, it also involved seeing the rest of the work only through the perspective of domestic concerns.
The debate over news imbalance that raged for much of the 1970s did not bring the contesting parties much closer together, since they were separated by quite different interests and commitments. One of the parties 76 was the news industry itself, generally opposed to anything that might hinder the press or the news market from continuing to operate as always, in the name of press freedom. There is evidence to suggest that this self- interest colored reporting of the issue in the UNESCO context (Giffard, 1989). Another party consisted of the news-dependent countries who wanted at the very least to change the terms of international news reporting by establishing some normative guidelines (the 1978 UNESCO Mass Media Declaration). They also claimed some rights to control reporting within their own frontiers in the national interest and in the name of equity. The Cold War provided two parties. One was the Soviet bloc claiming the right to keep its news space clear of unwanted foreign influence, in the name of sovereignty. Another was the American or Western bloc that wanted unlimited 'free flow', safe in the knowledge that this would work in its own political and commercial interest. The goal of a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) that would replace the inequity of the free market in news was eventually abandoned in the aftermath of UNESCO's defeat. The McBride Report (1980) that made recommendations for implementing the new principles was largely ignored. According to Hamelink (1998), the failure of the McBride Committee was at least partly due to its inadequate understanding of social reality.
Along the way, however, much light was shed by research and by the public debate on the actual structure of news flow and the underlying dynamics of the global news industry. It was repeatedly confirmed that news (whether press or TV) in more developed countries did not typically give a great deal of space to foreign news (except in specialist or elite publications). Foreign news was largely devoted to events in other countries that were large, nearby and rich, or connected by language and culture. It was also narrowly focused on the interests of the receiving country. Most foreign news could often be accounted for by attention to a small number of ongoing crises (e.g. conflict in the Middle East or in South East Asia) of
77 relevance to the developed world. Large areas of the physical world were found to be systematically absent or miniscule on the implied 'map' of the world represented by the universe of news event locations (e.g. Gerbner and Marvanyi, 1977; Womack, 1981). In particular, developing countries were only likely to enter the news frame of developed countries when some events there were threatening to the economic or strategic interests of the 'great powers'. Alternatively, news was made when problems and disasters reached a scale so as to interest audiences in distant and safer lands.
These findings suggest that international news communication in action is less likely to be an independent cause of change than some theories of mass communication imply. It is more likely to reflect the world as it is and to reinforce rather than change existing global relationships. This conclusion diminishes the claim that media are themselves a potent force for globalization. However, we should keep in mind that most studies of news have concentrated on 'serious' (i.e. political and economic) content and hard news. Less attention has been given to areas that may be quantitatively and in other ways more significant, in particular material about sport, music, entertainment, gossip and other human interest matters, which may easily find itself into the 'news'.
I conclude by saying that Global mass communication is a reality, and during the second half of the century there has almost certainly been a steady strengthening of the conditions that allow the media audience to receive information and cultural content from other countries and parts of the world. The main conditions are: the existence of a free market in media products; the existence and respect for an effective 'right to information', thus political freedom and freedom of speech; the technologies that can offer fast, capacious and low-cost channels of transmission across borders and large distances. Nevertheless, the real chances for global sending or receiving and the probability of it taking place depend on more mundane
78 matters, especially those relating to the national media system and its degree of connectedness to other systems.
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Chapter 3 TELEVISION – THE REGIONAL BACKGROUND
THE WORLD SCENARIO
Television as medium of mass-communication had existed in the developed world and even some developing countries much before it was ushered into Pakistan in 1964. Broadcasting is a major component of mass media in most countries. Because of their technological similarities, radio and television are often run on similar lines, frequently by the same people. In the United ‘States, for example, the major television networks developed out of the major radio networks. They are still involved in radio but diversification of that medium has muted their pre-eminence. Both radio and television in the US are regulated by the federal Communications Commission under the same broadcasting statutes.
Three important developments have taken place during the last two decades, which are the demise of communism, the increasing integration of world markets and very rapid advances in communications technology. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, free trade and the free flow of information became the dominant philosophies of the late twentieth century, with the United States the chief protagonist of both. Economic barriers broken, state control of the public sector was rolled back and liberalization opened up world trade on market terms. Most states, in some cases with reluctance, put their signatures to plans to dismantle protectionist barriers as outlined in the negotiations to set up the World Trade Organization in 1995.
The end of communism speeded up the process of economic globalization, by the 1980s, many multinational companies had become global economic forces. The balance of power between nation states and transnational interests had begun to shift. In this process, improved
80 communications played a commanding role. The pace of progress in telecommunications, satellite and computer technology changed the nature of international communication and opened up new commercial opportunities. The Internet has proved its potential for personal communication; its relationship with electronic media are still unfolding. The convergence of these technologies is advancing.
For the world media, these advances have brought new opportunities for the projection of a global presence. Television could not go global until the commercial development of satellite communications removed its previous dependence on terrestrial transmissions. Since the late 1980s, however, television has developed into a global industry and a key factor in the integration of world markets. Within a very short period, there has been a consolidation of television interests in terms of production and distribution the markets where their services were previously unknown, are now under their domain.
Herman and McChesney (1997) have charted the growth of media consortia into multi-billion dollar enterprises with global ambitions.2 They have also shown how the same process is evident in the growing concentration of ownership of advertising and market research companies. Improved communications have made it possible for the same television programmes to be watched at the same time all over the globe and for the same advertisements to project global brands. To this extent, technology, the media and advertising are collaborators in the growing globalization of trade. Page & Crawley have given an interesting account of this process.
By the late 1990s, a number of multi-billion dollar companies, most of them American in origin, had come to dominate the global media. The largest of these was Time Warner, publisher of Time magazine, owner of Warner Brothers film studios and Home Box Office, the largest cable network in the world. In 1996, Time Warner purchased Turner broadcasting, 81 owner of CNN, which had nearly 100 million subscribers, and the Cartoon Network. In early 2000, Time Warner joined forces with America On-line in what was described as the world's 'biggest-ever' company merger. It brought together the world's leading Internet Company with one of the world's leading content providers in a union aimed at exploiting the rapid convergence of communication technologies. At a combined value of US$ 335 billion, the category of Media Company acquired a new dimension.
After Time Warner, the next largest conglomerate was Disney, which had earlier transformed its structure and purpose to face similar challenges. Previously primarily a content provider, Disney's purchase in 1995 of the ABC TV and radio network made it a media giant in its own right. That network included two ESPN sports channels, providing 24-hour sports in twenty-one languages to 165 countries. Sony, well known as one of the world's leading hardware companies, acquired formidable television expertise when it bought the American news provider CBS. Its plans to exploit the Sony brand in global television included the launch of new services for India. Viacom, which owns Paramount film studios, MTV, the RCA record label, Macmillan, the publisher, and Blockbuster, the world's largest video chain, was also in the top league with a market capitalization of US$ 37.2 billion.
Finally, as far as Asia is concerned, there was Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, which had a controlling interest in Star TV. From his origins in Australia, Murdoch extended his media empire first to the UK, then to the USA, and next to Asia. Over 80 percent of News Corporation's revenues came from the USA and Europe, but it had invested heavily in the Chinese and Indian markets. Other global companies were also trying to exploit the growing prosperity of Asian markets. Time Warner, Disney and Viacom all hoped that Asia would contribute over 40 per cent of corporate profits by
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2000, though the East Asian economic crisis of 1997 made that unrealistic (Page & Crawley 2001).
TIMELINE OF MEDIA DEVELOPMENT
Year Media – Related Event 100 Papermaking develops in China and Spreads Through Asia and the Arab world by the year 600 700 Arabs carry Chinese techniques for papermaking to the west 1000 Movable type made of Clay is used in China 1400 Movable metal types is developed in Asia 1450 Gutenberg perfects movable metal type and hand press in Germany; the Bible is printed, 1456 1600 First “Newspapers” appear in Germany, France, and Belgium 1702 London’s Daily Courant is first daily newspaper 1833 Mass-circulation media begin with the first “penny press” newspapers, The New York Sun 1837 Telegraph is first demonstrated 1839 A practical method of photography is developed by Daguerre 1844 Samuel Morse sets up telegraph link between Washington and Baltimore 1876 First Telephone message sent by Alexander Graham Bell 1877 Edison Develops first phonograph 1879 Edison patents the electric light 1884 Eastman perfects the roll film 1895 Motion pictures are invented, and the first films are shown to the public Radio messages are transmitted by Marconi 1903 Great Train Robbery becomes model for storytelling with film. 1920 First Regularly scheduled radio broadcasting, by KDKA in Pittsburgh 1927 The Jazz Singer is first feature-length film with synchronized speech. 1933 TV is demonstrated by RCA 1937 First digital computer is created from telephone parts 1941 First Commercial TV is broadcast 1946 Fist mainframe computer is invented at the university of Pennsylvania.
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Year Media – Related Event 1947 First transistor is developed by Bell Labs as alternative to vacuum tubes 1948 Long-playing (LP) records, which rotate at 33 ⅓ rpm, are introduced. 1949 Network TV begins in the United States 1956 Videotape recording (VTR) is invented 1957 Sputnik, World’s first communication satellite, is launched by the Soviet Union 1961 San Diego cable operator is first to import television signals from another city (Los Angeles) for distribution to subscribers 1969 First nodes of the computer internet are created in Pentagon plan to establish a decentralized communications systems that can withstand nuclear attack. 1970 Early (and expensive) videocassette recorder (VCRs) are introduced. 1971 Invention of the microprocessor 1975 First microcomputer is marketed Fiber optics transmission begins HBO begins transmitting programming to cable TV Systems by Satellite. 1977 Qube, the first interactive cable system, begins in Columbus, Ohio 200,000 VCRs sold; more affordable machines enter the market and sales boom. 1990 World Wide Web (www) started as simple user interface for wide variety of data types. 1997 Digital video discs (DVD) first introduced. 1998 Digital television broadcasting begins. Source: David Croteau and William Hoynes, eds., Media Society: Industries, Images and Audiences, 2nd, Edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000.
MEDIA SCENARIO IN SOUTH ASIA
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc introduced diplomatic and economic changes in South Asian region. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh conversion to a program of economic liberalization, which accelerated considerably after 1991, was a reflection of these new realities. Economic reforms introduced at that time opened up a very large new market for foreign capital and consumer goods, which quickly attracted multinational interest. As a result, foreign trade and investment increased
84 substantially over the next few years. All this seemed highly improbable in the 1970s and 1980s, when India's close relationship with the Soviet Union set the tone for many of its foreign and economic policies.
Satellite television played a role in alerting international business to the size and potential of the Indian market, which is now seen as one of the most promising in the world. Star TV, the first in the field with a range of different programs, initially targeted the Pacific-rim economies, and then spread to whole region. Efforts to attract audiences by broadcasting English-language programming from the United States, Britain and elsewhere initially led to accusations of a 'cultural invasion'. But before long, commercial attention was focused on the middle class, with Zee TV emerging very quickly as the most popular and profitable channel. By the mid-1990s, international channels targeting the South Asia market were competing both in the North and the South with flourishing channels run by Indian entrepreneurs.
The nature of the new satellite media makes earlier notions of western cultural domination look very oversimplified. Schiller's view, expressed first in the late 1960s, that the media would spread American lifestyles around the world and that a homogeneous globalized culture would gradually replace other local and regional cultures plainly does not fit the facts. Barriers of language and the political and economic empowerment of a growing middle class over the past thirty years have stood in the way of such a scenario. Even in former British colonies, the English speaking elite, though still influential in the professions, is no longer politically or economically dominant. (Schiller 1969)
The satellite revolution enables the international media to speak to the English-knowing middle class in one language and the greater middle class in others. The program preferences of these audiences may not overlap very much—though there are some indications that the overlap is 85 increasing—but the fact that these audiences watch programs in different languages does not prevent them from being targeted with similar products and lifestyles. For the advertiser, whether national or multinational, the language is a means to reach the audience. To this extent, the development of programs in Hindi by Star TV or of popular soap operas by Zee TV is assisting the integration of India into the global consumer economy.
Advertising agencies have the most demonstrable claim to be the midwives of satellite television. Television advertising has helped to create whole new markets in South Asia, both for new products and for the re- branding of a range of consumer goods. But while advertisers have been targeting the market, they have created audiences across South Asia in general and in the Gulf as well. The westernized middle class in Colombo or Karachi now watch the same English-language programs on CNN or BBC, Star News or Cartoon Network. Pakistanis watch programs made for India, particularly the Hindi entertainment channels. Tamils in Sri Lanka have access to satellite channels in their language aimed at South India. Bengali satellite channels have audiences in both Bangladesh and West Bengal. Much of this communication is still one way—from India outwards—but it has already affected the nature of relationships between states and peoples.
As far as the media penetration is concerned, no country in South Asia has reached a daily newspaper circulation rate of 10 copies per 100 people that UNESCO recommended in 1962 as a minimum goal. Only two countries in Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia, had reached that goal. All countries in East Asia, except China and Mongolia, have exceeded that target. A basic standard of five radio receivers per 100 people had been set by UNESCO in 1962. Every country in Asia, except Bhutan and Nepal, has achieved this target. Radio penetration was highest in Sri Lanka in South Asia, Singapore in Southeast Asia, and South Korea in East Asia. Sri Lanka has the highest TV penetration in South Asia, Brunei in Southeast Asia, and
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Japan in East Asia. All Asian countries, except Bangladesh, Bhutan, Laos, Myanmar, and Nepal, have exceeded the UNESCO minimum standard of two TV receivers per 100 people. Table 1 Asia: Demographic and Media Indicators
Demographic Indicator Media indicators per 100 peoples GNP Popul- Adult Urban Tertia Daily Radio2 TV3 Main Internet per ation literacy Popu- ry News- recei- recei- Tele- hosts4 Country capita (in rate1 lation Enroll- paper vers vers phone per in million) % ment circu- lines3 10,000 US$ as % lation January of age group 1998 1998 1998 1998 1995 1996 1996 1997 1998 1999
South Asia Maldives 1167 0.3 92.6 32 1.8 12.2 3.9 6.58 4.00 Sri Lanka 827 19.0 89.3 23 5.1 2.9 21.0 9.2 2.84 0.29 Pakistan 492 136.8 37.8 35 3.4 2.1 9.2 6.5 1.85 0.22 Bhutan 450 0.8 42.2 7 0.2 1.9 1.9 1.04 0.58 India 436 989.2 52.1 28 6.4 3.1 10.5 6.9 1.85 0.78 Bangladesh 289 130.0 38.1 20 6.1 0.9 5.0 0.7 0.26 0.00 Nepal 225 23.4 27.5 14 4.8 1.1 3.7 0.4 0.77 0.07
Southeast Asia Singapore 21828 3.2 93.1 100 33.7 32.4 73.9 29.2 54.29 259.84 Brunei 20400 0.3 89.2 67 6.6 6.9 30.0 41.7 24.68 38.98 Malaysia 3092 22.7 93.7 56 11.0 16.3 43.2 16.6 19.49 30.21 Thailand 1850 62.1 93.8 36 20.1 6.5 20.4 23.4 8.02 7.25 Philippines 907 74.7 94.0 57 27.9 8.2 15.9 10.6 2.87 3.00 Indonesia 460 207.7 84.4 38 11.3 2.3 15.5 9.7 2.70 1.97 Myanmar 765 48.8 82.0 27 5.7 1.0 8.9 0.7 0.48 0.00 Laos 258 5.3 56.6 22 1.6 0.4 13.9 0.4 0.55 0.00 Cambodia 270 10.9 37.8 22 1.6 0.1 12.7 12.3 0.18 0.06 Vietnam 310 79.4 91.9 21 4.1 0.4 10.6 18.0 2.07 0.00
East Asia Japan 33340 126.5 100.0 79 41.4 58.0 95.7 70.6 47.86 133.64 Hong Kong 24716 6.8 92.2 95 25.7 80.0 69.5 41.2 56.08 356.67 Macau 16054 0.4 74.8 94 27.8 44.0 35.2 28.9 40.91 3.41 Taiwan 12040 22.0 93.2 58 46.0 40.1 32.7 49.96 142.75 Korea (S) 6810 46.9 97.4 84 52.0 39.4 103.7 34.2 44.40 60.47 Korea (n)* 900 22.9 N/A 61 20.0 14.7 11.5 4.82 0.00 China 783 1268.7 81.5 35 5.7 4.2 19.5 27.0 5.62 0.84 Mongolia 396 2.5 95.0 62 17.0 2.7 13.9 5.9 3.66 0.08
World 5,180 5,820 78.0 46 Source: 1. Asia Week (The Bottom Line), December 17, 1999 http://www.pathfinder.com/asiawek/99/1217/bottom.html 2. UNESCO, 1999, Statistical year book, World Development Indicators, 1999 www.world.bank.org 3. ITU Telecommunication Indicators http://www.itu.int/ti/industryoverview/index.htm 4. Network Wizards http://www.nw.com/zine/WWW/dist- bynum.html. ITU, 1999 * APT yearbook, 1998, 1999.
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Table 2 Structural View of Asia
Share of Asia’s Portion Per capita GNP Press Restriction of World trade 1996 (%) (US$) 1996 score 1998 Center Japan 29.3 40940 19
Semi-periphery 1 Hong Kong 13.5 24290 N/A China 10.4 750 81 Korea (S) 9.5 10610 28 Singapore 9.5 30550 66 Taiwan 8.1 [12240] 25
Semi-Periphery 2 Malaysia 5.5 4370 66 Thailand 4.3 2960 30 Indonesia 3.4 1080 53 India 2.4 380 37 Philippines 1.8 1160 30
Periphery Pakistan 0.7 480 60 Vietnam 0.4 290 71 Sri Lanka 0.3 740 58 Bangladesh 0.2 260 59 Brunei 0.2 [17556] 74 Macau 0.1 [17542] N/A Nepal 0.1 210 59 Myanmar 0.0 [765] 97 Mongolia 0.0 590 30 Cambodia 0.0 300 62 Laos 0.0 400 66 Maldives 0.0 1080 66 Bhutan 0.0 390 80 Korea (N) [0.0] [900] 100 100 Source: WTO, 1997; World Bank, 1998; Sussman, 1999.
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A REGIONAL VIEW
Electronic Media in India
Television was first launched in India in the late 1950s and, though it did not become a mass medium until the 1980s. India, the first to introduce the new medium, put development first and entertainment last. Indian Prime Minister Nehru was against the introduction of television because he felt that it was a luxury, which would only be enjoyed by the middle class. In Nehru’s view, radio was more appropriate for India’s stage of development.
When Indian television began in 1959, on an experimental basis in the Delhi region, the programmes reflected India’s development priorities. The first systematic television service, funded by UNESCO, was principally aimed at the rural areas around Delhi and was designed to increase understanding of the responsibilities of citizenship, Later, there were experiments in educational TV, with sets being provided for secondary schools in the Delhi area. These early ventures were the subject of much analysis, but the broadcasts did not catch on and the government did not increase its investment. India acquired a second TV station in Bombay. Indian television in its infancy was managed by All India Radio, which may have been an impediment to its natural development.
India went through the 1971 war with the sensitive border areas of Punjab and Kashmir within range of Pakistan’s stations at Rawalpindi and Lahore and with no means of counter-attack. As a. result, Mrs. Gandhi began to take television more seriously. The Bombay station opened in 1972, followed the next year by stations at Amritsar and Srinagar, to counter Pakistani propaganda in those strategically important regions. In Kashmir, community sets were provided by the government to hundreds of villages to support this project.
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By this stage, both Pakistani Prime Minister Mr. Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi were embarking on new and more populist policies. Both saw television as an important new means of communication with the masses and set in train significant television building programmes. In Pakistan, shortly after Bhutto assumed charge as president, he made Aslam Azhar managing director of television and asked him to put up two new television stations—in Peshawar and Quetta. Mr. Azhar told that this would probably take twelve to fourteen months; Bhutto apparently replied: ‘I am not asking you to build me a couple of nuclear reactors; all I want is two television stations. I’m giving you three months!’ In India, after the expansion provoked by the war, the next spurt came with Mrs. Gandhi’s declaration of the Emergency. The Calcutta, Madras and Lucknow stations all opened within six months in 1975 and the following year television was finally separated from All India Radio and given its own director general. In 1976, to make TV more popular, the government reduced excise duties on cheaper sets, and local manufacture began to take off. In 1969, when the first Indian television factory opened at Kanpur, only 1250 sets were manufactured, but by 1977, forty manufacturers were producing nearly a quarter of a million sets a year. (Page + Crawley, 2001)
Despite this rapid development under Mrs. Gandhi, Indian TV remained an urban phenomenon confined to the well to do. It did not become a mass medium until the 1980s, when Rajiv Gandhi’s interest in technology provoked a quantum leap in all communications, whether TV, telephones or computers. In the case of TV, the fillip came with the Asian Games held in Delhi in 1982, which Indira Gandhi saw as an opportunity for India to showcase its achievements to the wider world. A decision was made to go for colour TV, new equipment was imported, and an early phase of economic liberalisation saw duties reduced on a wide range of electronic imports. Changes were also made in the manufacturing regime. From the 1960s, as a matter of policy, many Indian TV sets had been made by small
90 factories, but from the early 1980s, in the run up to the Asian Games, multinationals and large Indian consortia were allowed into the field and import restrictions on colour TV components were relaxed. By 1986, India was producing over 3 million sets a year, including 700,000 colour sets.
This change in manufacturing practice was accompanied by a massive transmitter-building programme. From eighteen television transmitters in 1979, the number rose to forty in 1982 and 176 in 1985, by which stage 81 per cent of the urban population and 50 per cent of the rural population were covered (Page + Crawley 2001). By the mid-1980s, India had become a television society and due to the development of indigenous satellite technology, Doordarshan became capable of broadcasting national programmes for the first time. This paved the way for the creation of a national market for television advertising, which brought powerful new commercial influences to bear on the production of programmes. As the Congress and its Hindu nationalist rival, the Bharatiya Janata Party, battled it out for the votes of the burgeoning middle class in north India, television became a vehicle not just for a new consumerism but also for a broader political appeal to Hindu values. The broadcasting on Doordarshan of major television serials based on the great Hindu epics—the Ramayana and the Mahabharata—drew millions of Hindu Indians to television for the first time and signalled its appropriation for a new kind of popular culture. Before the arrival of satellite competition, Doordarshan had already staked out the ground for future commercial competition.
All India Radio had grown, by 1997, into a major network of almost 200 radio stations and 389 transmitters covering about 90 percent of the area of the country and 97 percent of the population." The 1999 UNESCO statistical yearbook estimated that India had 116 million radio receivers in 1997—a density of 12 sets per 100 people.
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The public TV broadcasting network, Doordarshan, has 19 channels with programs produced from about 40 different centers. Its more than 900 transmitters of varying power cover about 70 percent of the geographical area and about 87 percent of the population. The 1999 ITU Yearbook of statistics gives the following data on India for 1997: 66 million TV receivers, 63 million TV households, and 18 million cable-TV subscribers. UNESCO's Statistical yearbook for 1999 says that India had 63 million TV receivers in 1997, a density of 6.5 per 100 people.
In India both cable and satellite channels emerged in the mid 1980s.
Murdoch's Satellite Television Asia Region (STAR TV) network, CNN, BBC, Discovery, TNT/Cartoon, and MTV, among others, have entered the Country on their own or with the help of local partners (McDowell, 1997; Xavier & Eashwer, 1998).
Twenty-four hour broadcasting of news, sports, business, music, movies, and cartoons is no longer the exception. Programs of Zee TV (1993), and Indian-owned news and entertainment channel, are among the top 10 in India. The other channels include ABNi, Asianet, ATN, Cable, CNBC, Channel V, Eenadu TV, ESPN, Gemini TV, Home TV, Music Asia, National Geographic, Punjabi World, RaJ TV, Sony TV, Star Movies, Star Plus, Star Sports, Star News, Surya TV, Sun TV, TVI, Udaya TV, and Vijay TV, (Via Media, 1999, http://www.mudra.com/wnew_con,htm).
Competition, particularly in southern India, has lately emerged from such channels as Sun TV, Raj TV, and Vijay TV, which televise in Tamil; Eenadu and Gemini TV in Telugu; Udaya in Kannada; and Asia net in Malayalam. National and international media companies also collaborate to produce programming in India (Sharma, 1998).
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The government's latest telecom policy allows media companies (with at least 80 percent of Indian equity) direct satellite uplink of their programs instead of making them go through the current government monopoly, Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd (VSNL).
Cable television entered as a closed circuit television in skyscraper apartments in the middle- and lower middle-class localities, which were wired to central control rooms. Video players transmitted Indian and foreign films and programs taped abroad. Cable networks expanded to 10 million in 2000. National surveys show that the number of households with cable and satellite TV expanded from zero households in 1990 (before the introduction of Cable TV) to almost 35 percent of the TV households by 2000 (Balasubramanian, 2000). Most large villages have cable connections.
Given the popularity and growth of local and satellite TV channels, major media conglomerates have diversified into program production, supplying programs to both public and private channels. The more prominent producers include Times Television (TTV), Hindustan Television from the Hindustan Times group, Television Bazar from the Ananda Bazar group, Eenadu Television (ETV) from the Ushodaya group. Plus Channel, Durga Khote Productions, United Television (UTV), and Cinevista Communications.
The Electronic Media in Bangladesh
In the creation of Bangladesh, radio played a more influential role than television. In March 1971, there was a period of more than two weeks when both television and radio were virtually free and the staff was making programmes in support of the Awami League. But on 25 March, the army took over Dhaka TV and radio stations and it was then left to radio outside Dhaka to support the cause of the Awami League. A Chittagong radio station, known as Swadin Bangia Beiar Kendro (Independent Bangla Radio
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Station), became a symbol of separatists movement. It later moved its operations to Calcutta, where it was run by former staff from the Chittagong and’ Rajshahi stations, with support from Indian broadcasters.
Once Bangladesh was created, media management reverted to the practices of earlier times. One of the first acts of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s government was to end television’s status as a public corporation under direct political control. When Sheikh Mujib responded to growing economic and political opposition in 1974 by declaring the country a one party state, radio and television became mouthpieces of his new authoritarianism.
During the military regimes of General Zia ur Rahman and General Ershad, the two leaders skilfully used the media, particularly television, to project their own personalities and the role of the army in national life, whether in digging canals or rescuing the victims of perennial floods. This reinforced the process of centralization and politicization of the media, which had begun earlier. In fact, for much of the 1980s, Bangladesh seemed very much a mirror image of Pakistan, the state from which it had broken away. These were not the circumstances for establishing new media conventions and it was only after 1991, when the country returned to democracy, that the future of the electronic media became a subject for political debate.
What the emergence of Bangladesh did bring, however, was important new cultural policies. During the Pakistan period, the Dhaka station of Radio Pakistan was perceived as ‘His Master’s Voice’. It projected Urdu as the national language and the Bengali language it used was laced with Urdu words. Mr. Jinnah’s efforts to enforce Urdu in East Pakistan, in which Radio Pakistan played its part, illustrated at an early stage for the Bengalis the problem of unequal access which was a feature of rule from West Pakistan. As one commentator puts it: "There was a sense that they were imposing their culture on us’. This was particularly the case after the 1965 war when 94 the poetry and music of Rabindranath Tagore were banned on Radio Pakistan. This provoked an outcry and helped to fuel the development of Bengali linguistic nationalism.
After 1971, the Urdu-speaking elite within Bangladesh, which had been influential in cementing ties with West Pakistan, was finally eclipsed. The Bengali-speaking middle class assumed a dominant role and the electronic media became vehicles for a renaissance of Bengali language and literature. Tagore’s poetry and songs were once more heard on the airwaves.
Television in Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka was not the market leader in television as it had been in commercial radio. In the 1960s, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake thought it would do more harm than good. His successor, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who headed a left wing coalition for much of the 1970s, attempted to find refuge from Sri Lanka’s growing economic problems in a siege economy. In her days, the atmosphere was hostile to international business and to technical innovation. With the election of J.R. Jayawardene in 1977, Sri Lanka reversed these policies, attempting to model itself on Singapore’s successful open economy. Under Jayawardene, Sri Lanka became the first South Asian country to introduce economic liberalisation, which involved rolling back state control, promoting competition -as the engine of growth and encouraging foreign investment. This new approach also resulted in increased competition in the media. In 1979, Jayawardene, who had long been an advocate of television, sanctioned an experiment by the private sector and in 1982, with Japanese aid and technical assistance, established a public broadcasting system.
The man chosen to set up Rupavahini was M.J. Perera, who had also been the first Sri Lankan director general of radio. Perera appointed a number of radio professionals to key posts and followed many radio
95 precedents. As on radio, there were news bulletins in English, Sinhala and Tamil, all based on a central text, televised at different times during the evening. Maintaining a strict balance of other programs was more difficult. The cost of television and the existence of only one channel meant that there were fewer Tamil programs on television than on radio. Sinhala programmes tended to dominate the schedules, with Sinhala drama a particular favourite. The other problem was that the television signal was not received well in the north of the island, which may have increased the sense of alienation among the Jaffna Tamils.
The coincidence of the launching of TV and the outbreak of Sri Lanka’s prolonged Tamil insurgency in Jaffna makes the country a test case for the role of the media in conflict situations. In 1983, the killing of seventeen soldiers in a landmine explosion was followed by a politically directed pogrom against Tamils in Colombo. Prime Minister Fremadasa’s television broadcast after these events came so close to defending communal victimisation that M.J. Perera refused to repeat it and was ultimately supported by President Jayawardene in that action. The incident illustrated the rapid politicization of the media under the pressure of war and insurgency. In 1988 and 1989, during the JVP insurgency in the south, radio and television were taken over by officers of the armed forces and the stations run like barracks under siege to maintain an essential service.
The retirement of Jayawardene and the election of President Premadasa brought what M.J. Ferera calls ‘the worst period of politicisation’. Jayawardene monitored-TV and radio closely but he very rarely intervened. Premadasa, on the other hand, saw television as a vehicle for his own glorification. According to M.J.Perera: ‘He used to go round the country making speeches and all that had to be broadcast on the radio and TV... so much so that I gave up listening to the news—’ One measure of this greater control was the opening of an office for the minister of information,
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AJ, Ranasinghe, in the Rupavahini building. The minister made regular visits, ‘...giving orders to the chairman and others—and appointed his own people to various jobs..., It was a very sad period.’ (Gunaratne 2000)
Despite the political crisis in the country, economic liberalization continued and within strict limits brought growing competition in the media field. The first private television company, ITN, which was set up in 1979 by the president’s nephew Shan Wickreme-singhe, folded after only a few months and was taken over by the government and run as a second channel. But by 1992, television had attracted sufficient advertising for another channel to be set up. A license was given to the Maharaja group, which was run by Colombo Tamil businessmen close to President Fremadasa. The Maharajas had no previous media experience, but with technical assistance from Singapore and elsewhere, Maharaja TV soon became commercially viable. This encouragement of private sector television, though slow and halting at first, marked Sri Lanka out from other South Asian countries, which had retained control in government hands. By the mid-1990s, the country had proved that television could be pluralized successfully even in a small country with a limited advertising market.
The government-run SLRC and ITN dominate television broadcasting in the country. Six ministerial appointees constitute the SLRC, including one representing the SLBC and another representing the National Film Corporation. SLRC started a second channel in mid-1999to tap into the TV advertising market.
The government relaxed its television monopoly in 1992. Since then four private companies have introduced six television channels—MTV and MTV News vision, Swarnavahini, ETV, TNL and Dynavision, the country's first stereo TV broadcast station- (Sirasa TV, which replaced the MTV channel in June 1998, became the first nationwide private sector TV channel. It planned to televise 18 hours a day. MTV itself replaced the MTV 97
Newsvision channel to concentrate primarily on greater Colombo and Kandy.) In 1999, the Sri Lanka Telecommunications Authority allowed two other private TV services: Comet Cable TV run "by Ruhuna 2001 Multi- vision, a subsidiary of Vancouver-based Rystar; and Channel 9, the country's first direct-to-home pay TV service, operated by TV and Radio (Pvt) Ltd, a joint Sri Lanka-Australia venture in late 1999, it planned to introduce digital television linked to satellite communication for the benefit of expatriate Sri Lankans (Sunday Observer, August 8, 1999).
The Media in Nepal
Nepal was slow to introduce both radio and television. The successful diplomacy of the Ranas had protected Nepal from the direct impact of British colonialism but left it with a lot of catching up to do once its leaders chose to tread the same path of development as its neighbours. Under the Ranas, it was not permitted to own a radio until 1945 and Radio Nepal was only set up in 1951 once Rana rule had been brought to an end. Modern communications were introduced at the same time as a fledgling democracy, but as democracy faltered and King Mahendra reasserted the powers of a restored monarchy, radio became the voice of his government.
Radio offered a chance to link up different communities and to spread the message of development. But the Nepalese monarchy proved wary of technical innovation; even as late as the 1980s large areas of the country, particularly in the west, were outside the range of radio transmitters. Radio did play a part in promoting Nepali as the country’s national language. King Mahendra believed that the Nepali language was the key to national integration; so much so that for nearly forty years Radio Nepal did not broadcast any other language, despite the extraordinary linguistic plurality of the country. As a result, many Nepalis spent much of their time listening to All India Radio in Hindi and other languages.
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Nepalese TV started in 1985, much later than in India or Pakistan. According to Neer Shah, the first general manager, the project was viewed with hostility in official circles and was not properly planned or funded. It was only after the first experimental broadcast during King Birendra’s visit to Australia that the palace began to realise that television could be a powerful means of projecting the government and the monarchy. The objective was ‘to promote national integrity, Nepali arts, culture and education’, which had become more urgent because of the rapid development of Indian TV. By the mid-1980s, Doordarshan had begun to attract Nepali audiences even in Kathmandu and there was talk of a ‘cultural invasion from India’. Despite the huge costs involved for a small and relatively poor country, the new medium had become a necessary tool in the battle for cultural influence within Nepal itself. In this sense, Nepal had already experienced something very similar to the satellite revolution before it started. (Rao + Koirala, 2000)
In the media, as in much else in Nepal, it was the ‘People’s Movement’ of 1990 which ushered in the most radical change. After many years in the wilderness, the Nepali Congress and its communist allies forced the king to surrender his absolute powers and to introduce a form of parliamentary democracy. One plank of their joint program was the liberalization of the media. After these changes, Radio Nepal became, for a time, more critical of government, more open-to different viewpoints and to public access, more investigative, more satirical and more entertaining. Within a few years, it reverted to the prevalent South Asian model of ‘party in power’ control. But the liberalization of politics and economics did have important repercussions. The state monopoly ended and state radio and television were step by step forced to compete with the private sector.
The government owned and operated the broadcast media—one radio station and one TV station—until 1997. Radio Nepal, which the government
99 established as a department under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, never had a legal framework. In the 1980s, the government turned Radio Nepal into a semi-autonomous body called the Broadcasting Development Service in an attempt to give it credibility. Even so, no official charter regulated broadcasting. Radio Nepal operates as a semi-autonomous broadcasting authority with its own board of directors and its own sources of income. It has the authority to broadcast both commercial and public service programs. However, it is the government which appoints its director and members of the governing board. The board chairman is the secretary to the Ministry of Information and Communication. Recently, the government granted licenses to six other groups to operate FM stations. With the exception of the Madan Pokhara community radio and the Kathmandu Municipality radio, all the rest are commercial stations.
A board of directors and a a general manager appointed by the government run Nepal Television (NTV), as in the case of Radio Nepal. The chairman is a political appointee representing the ruling party. Nepal Television broadcasts for about four hours every evening and for a few hours on Saturday afternoons. It also broadcasts for a few hours in the morning. Although some say that Nepal Television has become bolder in reporting the government's shortcomings or any misuse by it, it still functions as the mouthpiece of the government and the parties in power. The government has given permission to private companies to establish networks or to buy air-time from Nepal Television. Currently, Image Channel, a private company, broadcasts one-and-a-half hours in the morning. Two cable companies are also in operation—Space-time Network, which uses cables to serve a network of several thousand customers in Kathmandu and several other towns; and Shangri-la Channel, which uses a broadcast network to supply satellite channels to its clients in the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal Television claims to reach about 40 percent of the population in the capital, the main cities and the southern plains of the Terai- It covers an estimated
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28 percent of the geographical area. Nepal being a mountainous country, the reach of television is very limited. In recent months, the government has been considering the use of communication satellites to make Nepal Television accessible to the entire population. However, considering the high level of poverty, only very few can afford a TV receiver. Another obstacle is that only 15 percent of the population has electricity (Rao& Koirala,2000).
DEVELOPMENT OF PRESS AND BROADCASTING IN PAKISTAN
Brief Early History
The origin of the Pakistani press, Al Mujahid (1982) points out, was "enmeshed in sub-continental journalism" (p. 481) that began in 1780 when James Augustus Hicky published the Bengal Gazette. Al Mujahid identified three principal strands of the press in colonial India—the Anglo-Indian press, the nationalist press, and the Muslim press. The press and persecution went hand in hand during British rule. Thus, Niazi (1986) traces the genesis of Pakistan's intolerance of the press to the colonial period.2
The Anglo-Indian papers adopted a pattern similar to that of British newspapers and developed into the most professional, financially stable, and influential segment of the Indian press- Their influence continued until the independence of India and Pakistan, The harsh attitude of the British East India Company towards the first newspaper, the Bengal Gazette, set the example for the future. When the newspaper attacked officials of the Company, including the governor-general and his wife, the authorities retaliated, first by denying postal services to the paper and, later, by imprisoning Hicky and seizing his paper (Ali, 1969; Shamsuddin, 1986),
2 For more details on the development of the Pakistan mass media, see AL-Mujahid, 1978, 1982, 1991, and 1994; and Khurshid, 1971. 101
The nationalist press, mostly Hindu-owned, emerged in the 1820s in several vernacular languages. The first vernacular paper, started in 1822, was the Persian-Urdu Jaam-e-Jahan Numah published under the supervision of the East India Company by editor Lala Suda Sukh and printer William Hope King (Shamsuddin, 1986). In the early 20th century, the Hindu-owned press became closely aligned with the Indian National Congress and came to be called the "nationalist" press, which stood for independence from British rule and for a united India.
The subcontinent's Muslim press, which marks the origin of the Pakistani press, emerged in 1836, with the publication of Maulvi Muhammed Baqar's Urdu Akhbar, It began as a literary paper in Delhi, but as relations between the local population and the British deteriorated, it became political and highly critical of British rule. The number of Muslim- owned papers grew rapidly until the uprising of 1857, when the Muslim press came out openly against the British occupation of India.
The British authorities closed all but two Muslim-owned publications, hanged Baqar, and treated the other editors harshly (Haider, 1990)- After the uprising, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan tried to promote a reconciliation between Muslims and the British rulers. In 1866, he founded the Scientific Society Magazine, a bilingual publication in Urdu and English. In 1870, he started the Urdu Tehzibul Akhlaq on the pattern of the “The Toiler” and “The Spectator”. These publications set a new standard of independent and critical thinking among Muslims.
The turning point for Indian Muslims was the creation of the All India Muslim League in 1906 for the promotion of Muslim interests. This awakening was also reflected in a number of Muslim papers started during the first quarter of the 20th century. By 1925, the Muslim press comprised 220 papers in nine languages, including Urdu (120), English (18), and
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Bengali (14) (Kurian, 1982). Most of these papers had a precarious existence because of poor circulation and meager revenues, but a few became influential among Muslims. These included Maulana Hasrat Mohani's Urdu- e-Moalla\ Maulana Abu) Kalam Azad's Al-Hilal and Al-Balagh, Maulana Mohammed All's Comrade in English and Hamdard in Urdu; and Maulana Zafar Ali Khan's Zamindar. Leading political figures edited them and they served as a means of communicating with the people and the government. They faced many hardships, including imprisonment and heavy fines, because they fearlessly criticized British policies inimical to Muslim interests.
When the Muslims began their struggle for a separate homeland, they faced the hostility of both the Hindu owned nationalist press and the British-owned press. Therefore, in the late 1930s and the 1940s, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, then president of the Muslim League, and later the first governor general of Pakistan, encouraged the establishment of newspapers to project the aspirations of Indian Muslims.
Jinnah helped establish the English weekly Dawn in late 1930s. It became a daily in 1942. By the mid-1940s, Muslim papers appeared in every province of India. The most influential Muslim papers included Azad, The Star of India, and Morning News of Calcutta; Manshoor and Anjam of Delhi; Nawa-e- Waqt, The Pakistan Times, and Eastern Times of Lahore; The Weekly Observer of Allahabad; Sind Times of Karachi; New Life of Patna; and Khyber Mail of Peshawar. Many provincial governments controlled by nationalists opposed the demand for Pakistan and confiscated a number of Muslim newspapers, including the Star, New Life, and Zamindar (Kurian, 1982).
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Table 3 PAKISTAN AT A GLANCE
Province Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Capital Total Islamabad Population 73.621 30.440 20.920 6.566 0.805 132.352* (Million) (55.62)** (23.00) (15.81) (4.96) (0.61) (100) Area 205.345 140.914 107.741 347.190 796.069 (Sq KM) (25.8) (17.7) (11.8) (43.6) (0.1) (100) Capital National Lahore Karachi Peshawar Quetta ---- Capital * The total population in 2004 stood at 149.03 million ** Percentage Share in parentheses Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2003-2004.
Table 4 CULTURAL CONFIGURATION OF SOCIETY
Language Spoken Literacy rate (%) Province Male Female Total Punjab Punjabi, Urdu, Saraiki 55.6 31.2 43.8 Sindh Sindi, Urdu, Saraiki 53.8 32.0 43.6 NWFP Pushto, Hindko 48.7 15.1 32.1 Balochistan Pushto, Brahui, 33.3 11.8 30.7 Punjabi Islamabad Urdu, English, and all 79.8 58.3 70.2 regional languages Total ---- 53.4 28.5 41.5
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2003 – 2004
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Developments Since 1945
Press
The press was weak in those areas of India that became Pakistan. Not a single daily was published in East Pakistan (Khurshid, 1971) or Balochistan at the time of independence.* The NWFP had two daily papers, but they were financially unstable. Lahore was the most prominent newspaper center of Pakistan, followed by Karachi. However, even in these cities, a majority of journalists and publishers were Hindus or Sikhs who had migrated to India after the creation of Pakistan (Shamsuddin, 1986).
Those Muslim newspapers that moved from India to Pakistan filled the void only partially. Dawn shifted to Karachi after its Delhi offices were burnt in August 1947. Jang and Anjam, the leading Urdu papers of Delhi, also relocated to Karachi. The Bengali daily Azad and the English Morning News transferred their operations from Calcutta to Dhaka in East Pakistan. In 1953, Morning News also started publishing from Karachi. Many newspapers that moved to Pakistan, including Anjam, could not survive the drastic change in the political, economic and competitive environment. However, some papers including Dawn, Jang, and Nawa-e-Waqt have not only survived but have developed into the country's major media groups (Al- Mujahid, 1991).
The post-independence period (1947-58): The newly independent Pakistan inherited a number of laws for controlling and regulating the press. Some of the more important laws relating to the press (Al – Mujahid, 1991; Pakistan, 1959) in force at the time of independence included:
The Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 The Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931
* However, two dailies—the Daily Purbo Pakistan and the Paigam—began publication in East Pakistan in 1947. 105
The States (Protection Against Disaffection) Act, 1922 The Foreign Relations Act, 1932 The Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1932 The States (Protection) Act, 1934 The Post Office Act, 1898 The Official Secrets Act, 1923 The Telegraph Act, 1885, and The Sea Customs Act, 1885.
Because of the hostility between Pakistan and India, which led to a war in Kashmir in 1949, the early governments believed that a completely free press could threaten the country's security. The authorities in Pakistan, therefore, not only retained the colonial laws, but also added further constraints on the press. In 1949, they re-imposed the Public Safety Act, which the British had enacted during World War II, for one year and renamed it Public Safety Ordinance. The other restrictive law, enacted in 1952, was the Security of Pakistan Act. This law curtailed the right of professional secrecy and opened the possibility of press censorship (Al – Mujahid, 1991). During the first seven years of Pakistan's existence, the government banned 33 newspapers in Punjab alone: 15 for one year, 9 for six months, and the rest for lesser periods. Another 15 had to furnish heavy security deposits (Napoli.1991).
In spite of restrictions on press freedom, rapid growth occurred in both the number and the circulation of newspapers and magazines. Between 1947 and 1958, the number of periodicals nearly doubled from 556 to 1,106; and the number of dailies increased threefold from 34 to 103. The increase in circulation was even more dramatic. During the seven years beginning 1947, the circulation of daily papers increased from 125,000 to 716,000 (Shamsuddin, 1986). With the exception of the period just after the
106 first imposition of martial law in 1958, and more recently in the mid-1990s, the growth of the Pakistani press has continued.
The authoritarian period (1958-85): The strongest, most sustained and most damaging attacks on press freedom occurred during the rule of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, who came to power in 195 8. The Ayub regime set the pattern of press censorship and imposed the system of legally binding "press advice," which gave government officials the power to dictate what could or could not be published. Gunaratne (1970) points out that Ayub was "not the man responsible for initiating obnoxious press laws.... He started out as a dictator amply taking advantage of the precedents established by the so-called democratic governments that preceded him" (p. 41). The restrictive press environment of this period caused the number of dailies to decline from 102 in 1959 to 74 in 1960, and that of weeklies and biweeklies from 379 in 1958 to 260 in 1969 (Khurshid, 1971).
In 1959, the government took over Lahore's Progressive Papers Ltd, publishers of the leading English newspaper Pakistan Times and the Urdu daily Imroze. The government then took over (in 1961), the Associated Press of Pakistan, one of the two news agencies in the country. In 1964, the government created the National Press Trust, which took over the PPL papers and acquired Morning News, as well as several other newspapers.
The Ayub government was also responsible for the imposition of the infamous Press and Publication (Amendment) Ordinance of 1963, The PPO, which Niazi (1986) describes as "the blackest of the black laws" (p. 98), gave the government absolute powers to grant or deny permission for new publications and to prohibit reporting on a wide range of subjects. The second war with India, in 1965, led to the declaration of a state of emergency and the imposition of the draconian Defense of Pakistan Rules (DPR). The emergency and the DPR remained in force for 20 years, and
107 successive governments used them to ban papers, seize printing presses, and jail journalists,
In 1969, when Ayub was forced to resign because of countrywide civil unrest, he handed over power to the Army Chief Gen. Yahya Khan, who also imposed martial law and became president. Yahya Khan imposed press censorship during the civil war in East Pakistan, keeping the people of the western wing ignorant of the scale of atrocities being committed there.
After the secession of East Pakistan in December 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power as the president and chief martial law administrator. Despite his liberal rhetoric, Bhutto, who subsequently assumed the position of prime minister, continued the repressive policies against the press, including censorship, "press advice," banning of papers and use of threats, physical assaults, and arrests of journalists. He brought the NPT papers under his direct control; and his regime also engaged in extra-legal actions against journalists and media organizations, including the forcible transfer of Pakistan Press International, the country's independent news agency, to a member of the ruling Pakistan People's Party. Bhutto initiated large-scale nationalization of heavy industries, banking, and insurance, which gave the government control over a large proportion of the country's advertising expenditures. The Bhutto government routinely used the allocation of advertising and newsprint quotas as tools to punish uncooperative newspapers and magazines and to reward the compliant ones.
Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq removed Bhutto from power in July 1977 following widespread civil unrest over the rigging of the elections. However, Zia-ul-Haq continued past practices against the press and went a step further when, in 1978, four journalists were whipped for their opposition to the government.
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The post-martial law period (1985-present): The transformation towards a freer political environment began at the end of 1985 with the withdrawal of martial law and the state of emergency. The Defense of Pakistan Rules lapsed automatically. Following the death of Zia-ul-Haq, the caretaker government repealed the PPO in 1988. This was another positive development. Earlier, in April 1984, the Shariat Court had ruled in Tamseel Javed vs. the Federation of Pakistan that some sections of the PPO were repugnant to Islam. The court asserted that Islam laid "great emphasis on freedom of expression and human dignity" and not only gave "people the right of dissent but [also made] it obligatory on them to protest against tyranny, injustice and oppression" (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 780). The court recommended changes in the procedures for issuing declarations, fixing a time limit for pending applications and ruled that appeals be allowed against refusal. The Zia-ul-Haq government appealed against the judgement (Bhatti, 1993). However, the caretaker government, instead of pursuing the appeal, decided to repeal the PPO and introduce a milder Registration of Printing Presses and Publications Ordinance (RPPPO) in 1988. The RPPPO continued to be promulgated as an ordinance until it lapsed in 1997. Both the PPO and the RPPPO had their legal effect through promulgation and not through the legislative process.
In 1990, the government of Benazir Bhutto ended its monopoly over the import and distribution of newsprint. A sustained struggle by journalists and pressure from national and international media organizations have paved the way for a gradual return to democracy and a freer press in Pakistan.
Radio Broadcasting
Peshawar was the first city in areas now comprising Pakistan to have a radio station. Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, who had gone to London to participate in the round table negotiations among the Muslims, Hindus, and 109 the British, made the request for a radio station to Marconi, inventor of the radio- Marconi, who also sent 30 receiving sets to Sardar Qayyum, personally designed the, transmitter. In 1936, Peshawar became the second city in India, after Delhi, to have a radio station. In 1942, the Peshawar radio station shifted to a new building with a 10-kilo watt transmitter ((Page & Crawley, 2001). Two years after the Peshawar station went on air, on December 26, 1938, a 5kW station started operating from the YMCA building in Lahore. The colonial government used radio as a propaganda organ with little emphasis on entertainment. With the start of World War II, the propaganda role of radio was magnified, as there was great interest in news about the war. Gradually, however, drama, music, and literary programs began to be broadcast.
At the time of partition in 1947, India and Pakistan divided the assets of All India Radio, and Pakistan inherited three low-powered radio stations at Lahore, Dhaka, and Peshawar. A year later, Karachi, the then federal capital, acquired a medium wave transmitter station, which added two 50kW transmitters soon afterwards (Al Mujahid, 1978; Siddiqui, 1991). In August 1949, Radio Pakistan formally inaugurated five external services from Karachi. Rawalpindi came on the air in 1950. Within a decade, Hyderabad and Quetta also had radio stations. In 1974, Pakistan set up its first earth satellite station at Deh Mandro, north of Karachi (Al Mujahid, 1978).
Until recently, the government had a monopoly over radio broadcasting—the only true mass medium in Pakistan because of the country's low literacy rate. In 1995, however, the Benazir Bhutto government allowed the introduction of private sector FM broadcasting in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. The private FM service, identified as FM100, broadcasts popular music and listener call-in programs (Akif & Siddiqui, 1998). Gilani (1998) says that the private FM channel has an
110 audience of roughly four million adults. Allegations exist that the exclusive permits to establish these stations were awarded to a close friend of the Bhutto family (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 124).
Television
In October 1963, the government took the decision to establish a general-purpose television service with the participation of private capital under the general supervision of the government. Subsequently, the government signed an agreement with Japan's Nippon Electronic Co., allowing it to operate two pilot stations in Pakistan. The first of these stations went on air in Lahore on November 26,1964.
A formal code of television policy was formulated to achieve the following objectives; — Instruction and enlightenment; — Enrichment of knowledge and information; — Wholesome entertainment, and — Promotion of national outlook and integration.
In 1965, after the experimental phase, the government set up a private limited company named Television Promoters Co., which later became a fully government-owned public limited company called Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd in 1997 (Akif & Siddiqui, 1998).
Pakistan TV established television centers in Karachi and Rawalpindi/Islamabad in 1967, and in Peshawar and Quetta in 1974. It began satellite transmission in December 1972, and started using the national microwave link in 1975. PTV transmission switched over from black and white to color in December 1976. In November 1992, with a grant from Japan, PTV established an additional channel, PTV-2, mainly to 111 televise educational programs. In January 1994, it began beaming its programs through Asia Sat, the first pan-Asian commercial satellite system, to 38 countries, and started another satellite channel called PTV World in 1998, to enable overseas Pakistanis in Asia to see its news and entertainment programs. It also started Prime TV to transmit PTV programs for Pakistanis living in Europe (The News International, November, 1998, p. 8). In February 1999, PTV launched the Mid-East Channel for the large number of Pakistanis living in the Middle East (The Nation, February 26, 1999).
In 1989, the first Benazir Bhutto government authorized Shalimar Recording Co. Ltd, in which the government held 54 percent shares, to establish the country's second TV channel under the name People's Television Network—later changed to Shalimar Television Network (STN). The new channel had sought to establish transmitting stations in 22 cities (Tahir, 1996). STN started its transmission in 12 cities: Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Peshawar, Quetta, Larkana, Bahawalpur, Multan, and Hyderabad and Sialkot. The "monopolistic contract" required STN to transmit the PTV news bulletins (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 121) PTV in 1999 hired STN Transmitters and planned to convert the channel into a news and current affairs channel. But due to change in government in October, 1999 the plan was put in abeyance and the STN as a channel was opened to private sector entertainment programs. The educational channel was subsequently used partially as news and current affairs channel. Currently PTV-1 is general purpose Channel, PTV-2 (ETV) established with Japanese grant is working as news and current affairs channel under the umbrella of PTV World and STN is working as channel-3, sill with an undecided future. Currently, PTV has taken charge of all educational programming, violating the initial agreement singed with Japanese government for grant. In 1996, the second Bhutto government granted a license to Shaheen Pay TV, a private company with 50 percent foreign equity, to establish the country's
112 first pay-TV channel using the "wireless" MMDS technology. Allegations have surfaced that this permit also belonged to the same party that received the exclusive permit to run the FM stations though under a different corporate identity (Jabbar & Isa, 1997, p. 124).
Table No. 5 PTV INFRASTRUCTURE
S. No. PTV – 1 PTV – 2 Total 1. No. of Production Studios 13 1 14 2. No. of Live/Transmission Studios 6 1 7 3. No. of Rebroadcast Stations 47 29 76 4. No. of Transmitters 2 1 3 5. Population Coverage (%age) 88.34 78.24 -- 6. Area Coverage (%age) 39.25 33.76 -- 7. Total TV License Holders (Million) 1.84 -- 1.84 8. Total No. of TV Sets (Licensed & 3.7 -- 3.7 Un-Licensed) 9. Total Staff 5352 330 5682 10. No. of Program Producers 169 19 188 11. No. of News Producer 86 0 86 12. Total PTV Assets 4063.561 858.401 4921.96 (Million Rs.) 13. No. of News Readers 43 --- 43
14. Income from Licence fee (2002-03) 577.228 --- 577.228 (Million Rs.)
15. Income from Ads. 1870.321 283.258 2153.579 (Million Rs.)
16. Total Annual Income 2664.730 325.506 2990.236 (Million Rs.)
17. Annual Budget (Non-development) 2872.888 345.112 3218.00 (Million Rs.) 18. Annual Profit (Net) (Loses) 140.650 - 28.657 111.993 19. Govt. Share in PTV (%age) 100 100 100
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S. No. PTV – 1 PTV – 2 Total 20. Mini out broadcast Vans 8 --- 8 Source: PTV Headquarters, Islamabad
Table 6 Population and Area Coverage in Chronological Order (PTV – 1) Population Base Area Base Year Percentage covered Year Percentage covered 1964 9.32 1964 1.00 1967 14.98 1967 2.29 1969 27.08 1969 7.64 1973 47.54 1973 16.01 1974 47.92 1974 16.33 1975 47.92 1975 18.07 1977 65.66 1977 24.03 1978 68.83 1978 27.60 1979 72.49 1979 30.19 1980 77.55 1980 31.35 1981 77.92 1981 31.92 1982 80.72 1982 32.34 1983 80.72 1983 34.24 1984 80.74 1984 34.24 1985 81.77 1985 34.61 1986 81.98 1986 34.62 1987 82.20 1987 34.64 1988 85.79 1988 35.47 1989 85.90 1989 35.50 1990 86.00 1990 36.00 1991 86.00 1991 36.30 1992 86.00 1992 37.54
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Population Base Area Base Year Percentage covered Year Percentage covered 1993 86.00 1993 37.90 1994 86.44 1994 38 1995 86.44 1995 38 1996 86.44 1996 38 To date 92.00 To date 45
In Pakistan, a conscious decision was made at the very outset not to make radio Pakistan the midwife of television on the grounds that it ‘did not have either the expertise or the potential to manage it’. Instead, a tender was floated and the Nippon Electric Company of Japan was asked to set up two experimental stations at Lahore and Dhaka and was given three months to show that the experiment would work. Through their local associates, they gave the program responsibility at Lahore to Aslam Azhar, who later became the director general of PTV. He was completely new to television himself; he had made his name in amateur theatre in Karachi. But under his leadership, the early days of TV in Pakistan acquired some of the same excitement and creativity as the early days of radio. He recognized that it was no good looking to radio as a model; he took some talented radio people but he recruited others from the performing arts and photography In those early days, live TV performances alternated with imported BBC documentaries and comedies and it was the spirit of the theatre which dominated, as different acts prepared to go live while the film sequences ran. It was this early experience which led to Pakistan TV’s excellence in the field of drama. Aslam Azhar says he ‘resisted consciously from day one getting in anyone from the film industry because the state of the film Industry was deplorable to put it very politely...and the result was that our cultural level was far higher than the film industry had ever achieved or has
115 achieved....’ In India, where the film industry was much more commercially successful, such a deliberate act of policy would have been more difficult to pursue, though in Aslam Azhar’s opinion ‘Indian cinema has set a very bad example for Indian television’.
As Pakistan television grew, with new stations established at Islamabad and Karachi and microwave links to provide coordinated national coverage, Pakistan’s military ruler, Field Marshal Ayub Khan, was excited over its potential as ‘a major instrument of national integration’. Aslam Azhar had not been aware of any government objectives in setting up television; he had a free hand to develop it according to his own understanding and will.
But there was definitely a clear political purpose. In 1968, Aslam Azhar was asked to develop programs to celebrate Ayub’s ‘decade of development’. It was the first instance of television being used in South Asia for propaganda purposes and it backfired badly. According to Aslam Azhar, it filled people with disgust at government control of the medium and contributed to Ayub’s growing unpopularity,
Pakistan Television also provided the first TV election coverage in South Asia after Ayub’s demise, when General Yahya Khan held Pakistan’s first and probably fairest national elections. Aslam Azhar describes that period as ‘our finest hour in current affairs’. But the ensuing crisis in East Pakistan, which led to the emergence of Bangladesh, brought a re- imposition of the old controls. These also continued under the new Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who maintained emergency rule for several years.
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OBJECTIVES of PTV
Former Director of PTV news Burhanuddin Hasan narrates an interesting story, how TV was launched in Pakistan. Here are extracts from his accounts:
“One day before the inauguration of the first pilot TV station at Lahore, Altaf Gauhar explained the aims and objects of the national television. He said television would provide a major breakthrough and help solve educational and social problems and weld the people into a strong unified and enlightened nation inspired by a common outlook on life. Television however, would not be used for political purposes or transmit political programs. The Information Secretary further said that introduction of television in Pakistan had been conceived by government as a means of promoting moral values, civic consciousness, pride and faith in the nation, and an appreciation of the cultural heritage based on the ideology of Pakistan”. (Hasan 2000)
On 26 November 1964, on inaugurating TV in Pakistan, President Ayub in his message said:
"The introduction of television in the country is a significant event. It provides yet another medium for enlarging the area of knowledge and understanding of our people and for promoting in them an awareness of social and civic values essential to good citizenship. I trust that with the passage of time, as more television stations are set up, the range of this new medium would cover a wider field enabling more and more people to benefit from its educative and instructional potentialities. First there is immediate need for national integration, and the other is the need for developing our country in every sphere and in every walk of life. Our national objectives are national integration and the building up of our country. I maintain that
117 every activity that takes place in Pakistan must help in the implementation of our national objectives, so that we reach our goal in the shortest possible time. Television is the surest and the most effective means of reaching the people. Not only does one reach the people through their sense of hearing but also, much more effectively, through their sense of seeing. And the combination of these two immeasurably helps in the process of fresh thinking and understanding of problems. Government came to the conclusion that although television is an expensive hobby, it is far more important that we do all we can to stimulate the interest of the people and make them conscious of the requirements of a new life. Hence we embarked on this project. Take countries like the United States and Japan where any major policy matter can be explained to the whole population in a matter of minutes and seconds! That brings about national integration, national cohesion, national understanding and national support for national aims and objectives. I hope that we, too, shall be in that happy position in due course of time. The agenda set for TV as the time of this introduction and the current state of TV in Pakistan, need no deep evaluation” (Hasan 2000).
Table 7 Estimated Mass Media Penetration in Pakistan Radio receivers TV receivers Daily newspapers Number Per 100 Number Per 100 Number Circula’n Per 100 (000s) people (‘000s) People (‘000s) people
1980 5500 6.4 938 1.1 106 1032 1.2 1985 8500 8.4 1304 1.3 118 1149 1.1 1990 10650 8.9 1989 1.7 398 1826 1.5 (2900)* (2.6)* 1995 12500 9.2 2680 2.0 223 2800 2.1 (6500)* (5.0)* 1996 12900 9.2 3000 2.1 264 ------
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(7600)* (5.7)* 1997 13500 9.4 3100 2.2 271** 1499** 1.1** (9000)* (6.5)* 1998 15500 ---- (12500)* (8.8)* 303** ------
2002 16000 9.4 (15000) 9.4 370 1530 1.2 Source: UNESCO, 1999, * ITU, 2001; ** WAN, 1998, 1999, 2003.
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Table 8 TV Viewership by Age and Educational Attainment in Cities (Pakistan) N = 375 Channel Age Group (%) Educational Qualification SSC/HSC Post- 15-19 25-34 35-44 45+ Illiterates Graduate Graduate PTV 72.9 65.0 66.0 58.0 41.0 77.0 79.4 Geo 26.8 25.0 24.0 21.0 11.6 30.8 36.1 Star Plus 9.1 8.2 5.8 5.2 0.4 11.3 20.5 Star 10.8 8.6 6.4 4.9 0.5 13.6 19.2 Sports ESPN 4.8 3.7 2.5 1.8 0.2 5.5 8.8 CNN 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.7 1.9 BBC 2.3 3.0 2.5 2.8 0.1 4.1 10.5 Discovery 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.6 0.2 7.4 12.3 Cartoon 3.9 2.4 1.7 1.1 0.1 3.7 5.1 Network ARY 23.9 21.0 18.0 15.0 5.3 28.7 39.4 ZEE 18.3 15 12.0 9.9 3.9 20.3 27.3 MTV 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.1 1.8 2.9 Channel V 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.6 0.1 2.4 4.1 Note: SSC/HSE in Pakistan is the secondary school level and junior college level. ** The statistics are out of 1000 sample population in rural and urban areas.
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Table 9
TV Viewership by Occupation in Cities (Pakistan) N = 375 Officer/ Petty Shop Clerical/ No Channel Skilled Unskilled Student Executive Traders Owner Salaried Work PTV 74.8 53.8 70.5 79.0 64.1 48.9 80.8 63.2 Geo 34.8 17.0 24.2 32.8 23.7 15.8 33.2 23.0 Star Plus 22.3 3.9 9.7 13.3 5.4 2.1 14.1 5.2 Star Sports 21.4 4.9 13.3 14.7 8.1 2.9 12.4 4.8 ESPN 9.9 2.2 5.7 6.3 3.0 1.0 7.7 1.7 CNN 2.4 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 1.0 5.0 BBC 21.2 3.7 4.0 5.7 1.6 0.5 4.7 1.8 Discovery 14.1 1.9 5.2 7.9 3.5 1.5 8.4 3.3 Cartoon 5.2 1.1 2.5 3.3 1.4 0.4 5.4 1.8 Network ARY 22.5 8.7 18.7 19.0 9.7 5.8 24.2 12.8 Zee 40.2 13.7 28.2 28.1 15.0 8.0 40.2 17.7 MTV 3.4 0.4 1.6 1.7 0.9 0.3 7.7 0.6 Channel V 4.4 0.6 2.1 2.1 0.8 0.4 4.0 0.8
Table 9-A TV Channels of Pakistan Television Corporation 1. PTV General Purpose 2. PTV World News and Current Affairs 3. STN Undecided 4. PTV Regional Regional Programs (on Cable only) 5. AJK TV For Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Recently the information Minister of Pakistan Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad announced the Pakistan government’s decision to launch some twenty-five new Television Channels and at least 100 radio stations. In a speech at a seminar concerning development of electronic media in Pakistan, he said the authorities had curtailed the license fee from 5 million to 2.5 million while the fee for cable operators had been reduced to 10 thousands from 50 thousands. The government would give a grant worth 2 billion to help improve the progress of Pakistan Television. According to a press report, Rasheed said the government had already extended some 650 million
121 rupees to PTV to help improve the quality of its programs, saying about 13 channels were in the pipeline. Although the government would accept all the demands of cable operators, he said, however it would not allow them to air Indian channels, adding that "we don't want Indian channels to unleash vulgarity and obscenity through their programmes rather government would only permit those channels to operate producing such programmes which could be jointly viewed by all members of the family." (News, September, 09, 2003)
In Asia an estimated 70-80% countries which are mainly the under developed countries, have cable TV network. Special mention can be given to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, where dramatic changes have been observed in the last 10-15 with reference to cable TV operation. Almost a decade earlier, the cable business was an illegal one in these countries, and first of all India took the lead and regulated this business. After India, Bangladesh and Pakistan took steps in this regard to regulate their cable business. But the important part of this change was that India since be- ginning had adopted this approach that they wanted to give such facilities to the people that more and more people could be involved in this business. However, unfortunately in Pakistan people are not given the facilities. At the time of regularization of the business, all those people were involved in this business who were already running this business illegally. Their professional approach, their vocational background, their technical expertise and other such important things were not taken into con- sideration. Due to this reason a lot of complexities were created for the government and after some time the problem aggravated to the point where it seemed difficult, if not impossible, to solve these problems in a more streamlined manner. The cable operation in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal in particular and in India in general is working on highly non-professional grounds. The operators and their agents are running the cable business like they have been renting out VCRs to the people in the
122 recent past. One major reason as described by the Director of Engineering PTV, Akhtar Dad, is lack of initial training facilities for the people who intend to run the business and absence of proper infrastructure for laying of cables in these countries.
Table 10 Urban Penetration of TV/ Cable TV in South Asia Radio Radio C & S TV Homes TV Sets Country Sets Sets Homes (in millions) Per 1000 (in millions) Per 1000 (in millions) India 63.20 67.00 111.00 120.00 18.40 Pakistan 9.00 68.00 6.00 50.00 0.80 Bangladesh 1.50 13.46 4.30 38.67 0.38 Sri Lanka 2.25 125.00 0.5+ -- Nepal 0.10 5.42 2.2+ NA - 110.00 0.07 Total 76.05 --- 124.00 --- 19.65 + Licensed sets only Sources: India: Doordarshan Audience Research Unit (1998) Pakistan: Gallup Pakistan (PAS 97) Bangladesh: National Media Survey OMQ (1998). Sri Lanka: SRL Fact File (1998). Nepal: ORG-MARG MSA Project Estimates; Asian communication Handbook (1998). Nepal: ORG – MARG MSA Project Estimates; Asian Communication Handbook (1998). (Also for India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka).
CABLE TV IN PAKISTAN
The satellite Invasion
Satellite channels first landed in Pakistan in 1992 and an era of direct satellite transmission began. The viewers now have access through their dish receivers to over 50 international channels. Of these, ten to twelve Indian channels are watched by Pakistani viewers of all ages. PTV, which was expected to chart its own course of excellence to face the fierce competition from Indian channels has unfortunately itself fallen into their mould. The majority of programs on PTV are crude copies of the trivial film based material dished out by the Indian channels. Even the Urdu language
123 has been unnecessarily polluted with English words like in India. PTV is also following the Indian pattern of over-commercializing TV for monetary gains much to the detriment of their ethical and cultural values and the basic agenda set for PTV.
Commenting on the performance of India's state-owned TV Doordarshan, prominent Indian journalist Kuldip Nayyer says, "The real problem is that populism has the better of ethical considerations. It is sad to see that Doordarshan is going the same way. The entire setup has touched a sordid level in the name of popular response. The Indian information minister's statement that the government is losing money, shows that he is counting the rupees and not bothering about the standard which the public-funded media should have. He should know that commercialization cannot replace social obligations. Nearly 80 per cent of Indians, flung far and wide, depend solely on Doordarshan. They seek information and look for such programs which identify their cultural ethos. There is no channel to speak to them in their mother tongue. What they get is either propaganda or pontification." (Dawn July, 05, 2003)
A Pakistani intellectual Dr. Eqbal Ahmad has a similar comment to offer about PTV;
"Despite promises, no government has taken even the first step towards allowing a modicum of autonomy to the electronic media. Dish endowed viewers switch to foreign, especially Indian, channels. The burden of providing information and perspective on problems facing the state and society falls on the press. It is quite lively but given the low rate of functional literacy it reaches less than 10 percent of the population. One would think that the officials will be satisfied with this state of affairs, entirely in their favour. But no, the democratic spirit has not grown even to this degree." (Ahmed 2002)
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In its 1998 report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has, among other matters, recorded at some length the government's antipathy to the press. The minister of information promptly questioned its accuracy, and, by so doing, helped publicize the report. In its reply the HRCP communiqué said:
"Information Minister Mushahid Hussain's criticism of the report was extensively covered by the electronic media he controls. On the other hand, the same media had not considered the report itself worth a word of mention before that. As always the audience of radio and television get to know of any criticism of the government only from the response the government gives to it". (Nation May 07, 1998)
The privately owned Indian Channels STAR and ZTV which have gained their freedom to report news more professionally and discuss political social and economic issues freely with obvious bias have put PTV in the dock. It is simulating their low and trivial programming patterns, but not their freedom of expression and their democratic right to criticize the government's performance. Now that TV viewers in Pakistan have not only Indian channels but also BBC and CNN available to them, why in all fairness should they bother to watch PTV news bulletins which carry no news barring monopolistic and self-serving propaganda of the government in power.” (Sahir Saood, Ummat, Oct 15, 2002)
A recent survey carried out by Freedom House, a New York based monitor of civil and political rights worldwide, has rated the measure of the extent to which freedom of expression has been protected in each of the seven SAARC countries. According to the survey which rates countries on a sliding scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the most free and 100 the least free, India scored 48, Pakistan 60, Bangladesh 49, Sri Lanka 46, Nepal 52, Bhutan 62 and the Maldives 68. None of these countries qualified as free. 125
Five, i.e. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal were characterized as partly free, while the remaining two fell in the category of not free. (Freedom House Survey 1999)
The Distribution in Pakistan
Estimates of the number of people watching television in Pakistan have until recently been largely informed guesswork. Although Pakistan, unlike India, retains a system of licensing for television sets, the number of licenses is not even an approximate guide to the number of households with sets or the number of viewers who have access to them, so official statistics are little help. The number of television licenses is only 1.84 million, whereas on the basis of surveys up to 1999 the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International estimates between 8 and 10 million sets.
The overall reach of television is considerably lower than in India. But access to satellite TV, which Gallup estimates at 13 per cent of the adult population or 8.5 million adults, is on par with the Indian experience. Because of Pakistan's geographical location, dishes are smaller and cheaper than further south—in India and Sri Lanka— and affordable by a wider section of the population.
According to Ijaz Gilani of Gallup, in terms of actual numbers, viewing is 'about the same in rural and urban Pakistan', A greater proportion of urban Pakistanis watch satellite TV. Moreover, by early 1999, the growth rate in urban areas appeared to be slowing down, while in rural areas the novelty of satellite had not yet worn off and the number of dishes was still increasing."
It is in Pakistan's largest metropolitan city, Karachi, that satellite television is viewed most intensively. Karachi is the only Pakistani city with developed cable systems, which can compare with those in India. Some of
126 these were set up in the 1970s, Since the arrival of satellite, however, cable systems have spread to most of the lower middle class and working class areas. The cabling of more prosperous, suburbs has lagged behind poorer localities and has been developed by larger commercial concerns. Apartment buildings in Karachi's Clifton, Defense, Gulshan and other areas are now receiving cable television. But most of these services are operated without official sanction and no figures are forthcoming.
Cable television in Pakistan is notionally subject to strict controls, but until early 2000, when the government began to address the issue of licensing cable operators, there was no separate cable law or regulatory authority; cable operators lived in the some kind of legal limbo. By 2000, cable systems had begun to spread to Lahore and Islamabad but not on a scale to rival the appeal of direct transmissions. Until that time, the only legal satellite TV distribution system in Pakistan was a pay-TV system run by Javaid Pasha's Shaheen Pay TV Company. The pay TV system used a microwave system similar to that installed in Kathmandu. It gives excellent quality, but only fewer channels were available. Now the system has been upgraded and a good number of international channels are available through shaheen pay TV(renamed as Sun TV), but in addition to an expensive decoder, there is a charge for the service as well.
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) (A Review of PEMRA Rules and Regulations)
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was established in March 2002 with a multi-purpose strategy to regulate electronic media by inducting private sector, provide quality information and entertainment to the people of Pakistan, access to common citizen to mass media and ensure accountability and transparency in the country.
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Through an Ordinance, the Authority has been mandated to improve the standards of information, education and entertainment, enlarging the choice available to the people of Pakistan in the media for news, current affairs, religious knowledge, art, culture, science, technology, economic development, social sector concerns, music, sports, drama and other subjects of public and national interest.
By book the regulations of PEMRA reveals that the major objective of these rules is to encourage those private TV channels, radio operators and cable operators to broadcast quality programs without hurting anybody's sentiments, promote brotherhood, harmony, national spirit and education. In another development, the country has allowed cross media ownership in 2003. The Information Minister Sheikh Rasheed has announced to withdraw a restrict on those applicants for TV channel which are already operating cable TV or publishing a newspaper or magazine or advertising agency. According to a PEMRA official, the draft for the amendment in existing rules and regulations of the Authority specifically Rule 23 (b) which discourages monopolies in the media has been sent to the Cabinet Division for taking necessary action. He said that PEMRA has received no complaints regarding any rule or regulation from any quarter except Rule 23 (b).
By June 2003, PEMRA received 16 applications for private TV channels, while it had already granted licenses to more than 950 cable TV operators and issued 28 licenses for radio stations all over Pakistan, four of them in Karachi. As much as 263 cable TV operators are working in Karachi alone. It is interesting to note that about seven of the applicants for private TV channels are already either operating cable TV or publishing newspapers and magazines.
PEMRA is consisted of nine members and a chairman. Out of nine members, one is a senior official of federal government while five are eminent citizens chosen from different fields including films, media, law, 128 human rights and social service. Two members of PEMRA are women while Secretary, Ministry of Information and Media Development, Secretary, Interior Division and Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) are the ex-officio members.
Under the procedure, the Authority will process each application in accordance with prescribed criteria and shall hold public hearings either in the relevant provincial capital or in Islamabad, if deemed necessary before granting or refusing the license. To check the quality and nature of the program being broadcast by the private radio station, TV channels and cable TV network, PEMRA has incorporated the creation of Councils of Complaints to take complaints from general public against any aspect of the programs. These councils may recommend to the Authority appropriate ac- tion of censure, fine against a broadcast or CTV station or licensee for violation of the codes of program content and advertisements as approved by the Authority as may be prescribed.
The PEMRA on such recommendations can prohibit or suspend and seize any broadcaster or CTV operator from broadcasting or re-broadcasting any particular program which in its opinion is likely to create hatred among the people or is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order or likely to disturb public peace and tranquility or endangers national security or is pornographic or is offensive to commonly accepted standards of decency. The Authority can also take such measures or steps for closing down or sealing the premises where the illegal operation is being carried out or can impose a fine. The person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Authority on the ground can within thirty days of the receipt of such decision or order, appeal to the High Court in the manner prescribed by the High Court, for filing the first appeal before the Court against an interlocutory order of a Civil Court.
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Table No 10-A TIME SLOTS ALLOCATED FOR VARIOUS PROGRAMMES BY PTV PTV (Yearly basis) PARTICULARS Hours %AGE Announcement 1880 5.19% Commercial 1441 3.98% Drama 861 2.38% Music 693 1.91% Religious 3099 8.55% Local Sports 2267 6.26% Off- Sports 4401 12.14% Documentary 102 0.28% Features 588 1.62% Stage Show 667 1.84% Festivals 49 0.14% Anniversaries 61 0.17% Literary Programs 208 0.58% News 2676 7.39% Current Affairs 6520 17.99% Local Purchased Program 00 0.00% Repeat 4933 13.61% Children 335 0.92% Youth 04 0.01% Women 1132 2.85% PTV-World/PTV-2 1302 3.59% Time Sale 3116 8.60% Total 36247 100. %
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Annexure – 1
PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION, ISLAMABAD GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Name Pakistan Television Corporation
2. Registered Office Islamabad, A public company limited by Share 3. Legal Status (unquoted)
4. Date of incorporation June 27, 1967
5. Location of assets Five production centers at Peshawar, Islamabad (including head office), Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta and a Number of transmitting stations across the country.
6. Authorized Capital Rs. Two Thousand million; divided equal into “A” & “B” Class shares
(Rs. In million) 7. Paid up capital A class shares Rs. 173.940 A class bonus shares Rs. 643.705 A class shares Rs. 711.705 Deposit for B Class Shares. Rs. 62.737
8. Owner ship Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Information and broadcasting.
9. Board of Directors:
Secretary Information and Chairman Managing Director Director General PBC/Director PTV Deputy Managing Director Director Education Television Finance Director Director Admn. & Personnel/Sale Director PTV Academy Director Progammes Director International Relations Director Sports Director Engineering Director News
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Annexure – 2 Major Dates in Television Broadcasting in Pakistan A chronology
1964 Television service in Monochrome started at Lahore and Dacca. 1967 TV Center at Karachi commissioned. 1968 Permanent Lahore TV Center commissioned. 1972 First transmission through Satellite from Karachi TV Center. 1973 National Micro Network commissioned. 1974 Quetta/Peshawar Pilot Centers commissioned. 1976 Colour transmission started. 1982 Permanent Peshawar TV Center commissioned. 1985 Permanent Quetta TV Center commissioned. 1987 Federal TV Center at Islamabad commissioned. 1989 First Private Channel (PTN) now called STN was introduced. 1992 Educational Television- PTV Channel-2, was inaugurated. 1996 BBC television was introduced through STAR by STN 1996 Regional broadcasts started in four areas 1997 PTV + STN + PTV-2 (PTV World) under Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. 2003 PTV National (The regional channels was introduced on satellite through cable) 2004 Inauguration of Azad Jammu and Kashmir TV (AJKTV)
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CHAPTER 4
AUDIENCE REACTION ON STATE TELEVISION (PTV)
There are many ways of looking at television viewing behaviour and monitoring the types of expectations from this medium. We may track the number of people who are watching? When are they watching, and who is watching? However, the people studying TV’s impact are interested in knowing more about peoples' actual reactions to the performances they have seen. For all T.V. programs, especially for a service based on public service goals of providing entertainment and education, there is a constant endeavor to devise ways and means of going beyond numbers, and actually determining whether the people are "moved" by a particular T.V. experience or not. Qualitative rating and experience measures are attempts to gauge peoples' opinion, attitudes and reactions to a particular program and expectations from the programs they watch.
The percentage of target population is not a dependable indicator of the representative sample. Though the sample size was quite small, it was representative in the broader sense of coverage by different sections of the society. Thus the focus was qualitative analysis. The trends reflected by a carefully selected 1000 respondents could be applied to the whole country at large though cautiously. These opinions were crosschecked through a number of panel discussions held with media managers, professionals, writers, critics and general audience. They were further verified by a strict comparison with newspaper writings and views expressed by the people on various fora, including national media seminars organized by intellectual non-governmental bodies. The reaction of audience covers only the state TV (called PTV), Programmes; it includes all the channels of PTV.
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Availability of Channels
Availability of channels is another area which determines the reason for variation in preferences. As stated earlier, cable is available to a small portion of the society, and the same is true to dish. The target population enjoying a single channel was 40.0 percent. The people having access to two channels constituted 35.0 percent, and the percentage of those to whom a three-channel facility was available was only 25.0 (Table 11). The respondents with cable facility were 20 percent.
Table – 11 Availability of TV channels to Target Population (Country Wide)
Number of channels Frequency Percent 1 400 40.0 2 350 35.0 3 250 25.0 50 through cable 200* 20.00 Total 1000 100
THE VIEWING INDEX (VI)
Table 12 lists the viewing indices (Vls) for various T.V. program types over one quarter of a year. The Vls are not absolute and all time measures of preferences but rather relative scales of reactions to programs in terms of people's average level of enjoyment. Similarly, there is no direct correlation of Vls with the size of the audience. Usually programs with higher audience have higher Vls, although many programs with small absolute numbers watching have recorded among the highest Vls. In the same manner, one program in another quarter may gain considerably.
* Not included in the total because of overlapping of PTV channels and cable at the same time. 134
Table – 12 Type of programs liked most (Country Wide)
Programs Frequency Percent No Choice 28 2.8 Drama 455 45.5 Current Affairs 64 6.4 News 155 15.5 Sports 273 27.3 Music 18 1.8 Children Show 4 0.4 Religious Programs 3 0.3 Total 1000 100
By and large, Urdu drama is ranked the highest by 45.5 percent audience. Sports stands second (27.3%), followed by news 15.5 percent. It is interesting to note that music programs are enjoyed only by 1.8 percent of the respondents. Children shows and religious programs stand at the bottom with a very slight margin. It may be kept in mind that Table 12 does not reflect the watching percentage, but comparative preference, for various types of programs. City-wise option for various programs varies greatly, mainly because of different educational and socio-cultural levels. The Cities with higher literacy level have shown greater inclination towards the news. In Karachi and Islamabad 48.1 and 46.4 percent of the respondents, respectively, prefer drama, while in Lahore and Peshawar the ratio is much higher (more than 50 percent). Only 21.6 percent Karachites and 15.1 percent respondents in Islamabad like the news. In Lahore and Peshawar, this trend is around 10 percent. However, in small towns the news is liked by 17.9 percent respondents, for the obvious reason that there exist very few other sources of information. An interesting aspect is that among all groups interviewed the most potential TV viewers are the salaried classes, students and children under 15. Businessmen and professional groups stand at the lowest. A sizeable clientele for morning shows comes from the
135 educated classes and females. Similarly, late-night presentations are also watched by the educated and salaried classes.
AREAS OF PERFORMANCE
Aside from special preference for various programs by different groups, drama stands unanimously as the top choice of all the groups. As shown in Table (12) earlier, 455 respondents termed drama as the most liked program. Sports, as usual, comes second, liked by 273 respondents. News was selected by 155 respondents, which is a choice by compulsion, as discussed earlier. Religious and children's programs get the lowest share (0.4 and 03 percent, respectively). Music gets a slightly better response (1.8 percent) and current affairs a little better (6.4 percent). There are a number of program areas which generally do not draw large audience, but where PTV make a commitment to provide quality programs.
News (Khabarnama)
PTV's news programs are produced in four main locations, beamed across the country through the Central News Bureau at Islamabad. At 9 p.m. sharp all T.V. stations are connected to national network for an half- hour Khabarnama.
Table-13 Satisfied with Khabarnama (Country wide)
Response s Frequency Percent No Opinion 17 1.7 Yes 392 39.2 No 591 59.1 Total 1000 100
The level of satisfaction with Khabarnama, however, shows a very discouraging picture. The percentage of population satisfied with Khabarnama is only 39.2%. This shows that a large majority of 59.1 percent
136 respondents is not happy with what they are shown. It is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between the most satisfied and unsatisfied groups, but the trends definitely are correlated with age, occupation, and education. There was a mixed trend of satisfaction towards Khabarnama among different age groups as shown in Table 14
Table-14 Satisfied With Khabarnama by Age Group
Yes No AGE Row Total Percent % % Less then 15 25.0 75.0 28 2.8 15-19 42.9 57.1 84 8.4 23-24 33.1 66.9 257 25.7 25-29 41.4 58.6 285 28.5 30-34 51.8 48.2 141 14.1 34-39 42.1 57.9 76 7.6 40-44 41.0 59.0 61 6.1 45-50 53.6 50.0 28 2.6 More than 50 45.0 60.0 40 4.2 Total 40.9 59.1 1000 100
But many young audience were relatively more unhappy with Khabarnama. Interestingly, teachers and housewives largely expressed their satisfaction over Khabarnama, whereas the business class and salaried people were found quite unhappy. Similarly, students who account for 17.7 percent of the total respondents, were dissatisfied with T.V. broadcasts in Khabarnama. Educational level is the only prominent yardstick which points to a clear change in trend with the increase in the level of education (Table 15)
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Table 15 Satisfied with Khabarnama by Educational level
Missing Yes No Row Percent Educational Level Total % % %
Missing 30.0 20.0 50 10 1 Informal 0 52.6 47.4 19 1.9 Primary 1.9 48.1 50.0 43 4.3 Matric 2.3 41.9 55.8 160 16 FA 1.1 42.0 56.9 181 18.1 BA 1.3 42.3 58.2 371 37.1 MA 1.6 27.7 70.7 184 18.4 Others 0 9.4 90.6 32 3.2 Total 1.7 39.2 59.1 1000 100
Out of 184 respondents, having post graduate degrees, only 27.7 percent were satisfied with Khabarnama. Whereas people with a B.A. degree account for 42.3 percent, 48 percent were having a high school education, and 48.1 percent with primary education. This shows a very vivid trend of increase in dissatisfaction with the increase in educational level. Similarly, the people up to an income level of Rs. 25,000 per month show an increasing trend towards dissatisfaction (Table 16).
Table 16 Satisfied with Khabarnama by Income Group
No Response Yes No Row Percent Income Total % % %
No Income 3.7 34.8 61.6 164 16.4 3000 – 7000 0.6 44.5 54.9 355 35.5 8000 – 15000 1.3 38.9 59.7 303 30.3 16000 – 25000 2.1 27.9 70.0 140 14 25,000 + 5.3 52.6 42.1 38 3.8 Total 1.7 39.2 59.1 1000 100
This trend suddenly moves upward when the income level crosses the limit of Rs. 25,000 plus. This very small segment of the overall population is
138 happy with the Khabarnama, partly because of their indifferent attitude towards the common national problems.
Table-17 Main Reason for Liking Khabarnama
Reasons Frequency Percent Did not mention 613 61.3 Knowledge 2.4 20.4 Informative 162 16.2 News caster 17 1.7 Others 4 0.4 Total 1000 100
Table 17 shows the main reasons of liking Khabarnama. The vast majority of 61.3 percent respondents could not mention the reason as to why they liked Khabarnama. A small proportion of 20.4 percent respondents liked it for being knowledgeable, and 16.2 percent for information seeking. Only 1.7 percent are attracted towards Khabarnama by the newscaster.
Table 18 Main Reason for NOT liking Khabarnama
Reasons Frequency Percent Concentrated on few issues 270 27.0 Does no cover opposition 200 20.0 Too much government Projection 250 25.0 Black out International coverage 50 5.0 Lack of National events 60 6.0 Repetition of same events 84 8.4 Disinformation 65 6.5 Repetition of News 80 8.0 Total 1000 100
Table 18 shows that a good number of those who do not like Khabarnama (59.1 percent) attribute the main reason of their
139 dissatisfaction to the lack of opposition's coverage, concentration on few issues, and too much projection of the government. The other reason, including repetition of news and lack of national and international coverage, are also mentioned by a sizeable proportion. The reason of dissatisfaction were largely shared by all segments of the society.
PTV- GEO comparison in news credibility
PTV night-time Khabarnama is profusely watched by all sections of T.V viewers. In the absence of any other news show, Khabarnama was the unchallenged monopoly area of PTV. The other prominent news broadcaster in the arena is the GEO which is available through cable and covers only a small population in cities. The timings of GEO News at present are the same. Though GEO is a genuine competitor of Khabarnama, but due to its limited coverage, watching is very small. It however, has affected Khabarnama in many other ways, which will be discussed in the chapter 5 and 6. Still, the GEO with all its great limitations is regarded as more credible than the PTV. This reaction is also shared by those who never watch GEO at all, but consider it reliable after the failure of their expectations from PTV Khabarnama.
Table-19 Preference in Credibility by Education (who is credible?) Percentage Educational Level None PTV GEO No Opinion 0.5 0.2 0.3 Informal 0.2 62.0 48.0 Primary 1.9 61.0 49.0 Matric 4.2 41.0 59.0 F.A 4.1 32.0 68.0 B.A 10.4 29.0 71.0 M.A 5.6 19.0 81.0 Others 0.9 23.0 67.0 Total 6.7 40.1 53.2
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The ratio of preferring GEO in credibility remains below 10 percent, till the level of high-school education but gets a rise after college education level where the credibility of GEO goes much above the PTV Khabarnama. The penetration of GEO city wise also shows a similar trend. Respondents in Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Karachi (the cities with higher literacy level) give a better credibility level to GEO as compared to the people in Lahore, Peshawar and semi-urban areas (table 20).
Table-20 Preference in Credibility by Cities percentage City None PTV GEO Rawalpindi/Islamabad 5.1 24 64 Lahore 1.8 37 63 Karachi 0.1 31 69 Peshawar 14.2 57 43 Semi Urban/Rural 6.6 62 38 Total 6.7 40.1 53.2
Respondents in Peshawar give least marks to GEO, partly because it has an unfamiliar style. However, a sizeable population preferred it. The main reasons of liking the GEO are given in Table 21, which shows that the primary justification was still not provided by the respondents.
Table-21 Reason for Liking GEO in the Country (First Preference)
Reasons Frequency Percent Did Not Mention 8 0.4 International Coverage 43 21.5 Documentaries 22 11.0 Whole Day Broadcast 19 9.5 Variety 51 25.5 Unbiased 57 28.5 Total 200 100
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Those who could give a reason, liked it for international coverage, variety of news and documentaries.
Table-22 Preference of PTV over GEO by the Readers of English Newspaper
Response Frequency Percent Yes 48 35.2 No 88 64.7 Total 136 100
Table-23 Preference of PTV over GEO by the Readers of Urdu Newspaper
Response Frequency Percent PTV 52 26.00 GEO 148 74.00 Total 200 100
Out of 190 respondents who read English newspapers, 35.2 percent preferred PTV over GEO, whereas among 200 Urdu newspaper readers, only 26 percent preferred PTV Khabarnama. This shows a better trend of liking the PTV, by the readers of English newspapers. The reason can be attributed to the fact that English newspapers give more coverage to international news and are less sensational. Thus the readers are comparatively more exposed to the world outside and like sobriety. Additionally this group of respondents can understand English news of PTV more comfortably. The margin between the two groups is not very wide, which implies that a good number of Urdu newspaper readers are educated, and also read an English newspaper as a secondary newspaper reading habit. However, in nut shell both categories ranked GEO much higher than PTV.
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Current Affairs
The share of Current Affairs Programs in the overall broadcasting hours is not more than 6.79 percent. The programs are shown usually after 10 p.m. or, occasionally, at 7:15 p.m. On the credibility scale they stand, however, at the bottom. Only 21.9 percent audience mentioned that they watched these programs (Table 26).
Table-24 Frequency of Watching Current Affairs Programs in the Country
Response Frequency Percent Yes 219 21.9 No 781 78.1 Total 1000 100
Salaried people, teachers and advocates are the best clients of current affairs programs, businessmen and housewives are the least interested groups (Table 25).
Table-25 Watch Current Affairs Programs by Occupation
Occupational Level Yes No Business Man 2.6 16.0 Private Employee 2.0 8.0 Govt. Employee 8.8 25.3 Student 3.4 14.2 Doctors/ Advocate 0.8 1.7 Teacher 2.0 5.5 Unemployed 0.4 1.6 House wife 0.6 5.2 Total 20.6 78.1
Like other-news oriented programs current affairs has a predominantly masculine audience (Table 26).
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Table-26 Watch Current Affairs Programs by Sex (Percent) Sex Yes No Female 18.0 60.3 Male 2.6 17.1 Total 20.6 78.1 Table 27 shows that the viewership is the maximum at higher level educational background, giving 32 percent share to postgraduates. The general consensus was that current affairs programs are not watched by a majority of all groups. Not a single group gave more weight to a "yes".
Table-27 Watch Current Affairs Programs by Education
Educational Level Yes No Informal 0.2 -- Primary 0.1 4.2 Metric 1.0 11.9 F.A 2.7 15.2 B.A 9.1 28.2 M.A 5.2 12.9 Others 0.6 2.6 Total 20.6 78.1
The reasons for disliking the current affairs program are given in Table 28. Only two prominent reasons were given as boring and not suiting the watching time.
Table-28 Reason for not Watching Current Affairs
Reasons Frequency Percent Did not mention 343 34.3 Time factor 239 23.9 Boring 418 41.8 Total 1000 100
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Sports Programs
Penetration of sports programs was 61.5 percent which brings the total to 79.9 percent, if 18.4 percent occasional viewing of national sports events is also included (Table 29).
Table-29 Frequency of Watching Sports Program in the Country
Reasons Frequency Percent Yes 615 61.5 No 201 20.1 Only when National teams are playing 184 18.4 Total 1000 100
The share of sports programs in the total broadcasting hours is 10 percent. This includes national as well as international sports events. The international competitions are shown generally at late hours in the night. However, the national news bulletins give appropriate time to sports activities inside and outside the country. The number of respondents who watch sports program is quite high, but it does not reflect a concentrated and regular viewing. The number of viewers over the various quarters vary depending upon the type of sports events shown on T.V. The maximum clients of sports programs are from age groups 15-34 years.
Table-30 Watch Sports Programs by Age
Only When National Yes No Row AGE Teams Play Percent Total % % % Less than 15 87.4 12.6 - 28 2.8 15-19 63.1 15.5 21.4 84 8.4 20-24 64.2 19.5 16.3 257 25.7 25-29 64.9 15.1 20.0 285 28.5 30-34 70.9 13.5 15.6 141 14.1
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Only When National Yes No Row AGE Teams Play Percent Total % % % 35-39 55.3 21.1 23.7 76 7.6 40-44 59.0 29.5 11.5 61 6.1 45-50 46.2 23.1 30.8 26 2.6 More than 50 27.6 62.9 9.5 42 4.2 Total 62.1 19.5 18.4 1000 100
It decreases after 35 and goes to lowest after the age of 50. Those who never watch sports programs are in minority in all age groups.
Salaried people and students are more inclined towards sports programs (Table 31). Businessmen and housewives are attracted only when the national teams are playing.
Table-31 Watch Sports Programs by Occupation
Only national Occupational Yes NO events Row Total Percent Status % % % Un employed 55.6 44.4 0.0 9 0.9 Business Man 58.2 15.9 25.9 189 18.9 Private Employee 74.5 13.7 11.8 102 10.2 Govt. Employee 64.9 18.7 16.4 342 34.2 Student 62.1 15.3 22.6 177 17.7 Doctors/ Advocate 50.0 34.6 15.4 26 2.6 Teacher 57.1 31.2 11.7 77 7.7 Unemployed 85.0 5.0 10.0 20 2 House wife 41.4 37.9 20.7 58 5.8 Total 62.1 19.5 18.4 1000 100
Table 32 also indicates that ratio of female audience increases, substantially when national teams are playing.
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Table-32 Watch Sports Programs by Sex N = 1000 Sex Yes No Only national events Male 52.9 12.7 13.3 Female 5.2 81.8 13
Table-33 Watch Sports Programs by Education
Only national Yes No Educational Level events Percentage % % % Informal 0.8 0.3 0.1 1.2 Primary 1.5 1.4 1.4 4.3 Metric 9.3 3.8 2.9 16.0 FA 10.8 4.0 3.2 18.1 BA 25.0 6.3 6.3 37.8 MA 11.9 3.3 3.2 18.4 Others 1.9 0.2 1.1 3.2 Total 61.5 19.5 18.4 100
Data in Table 33 show that sports programs are more liked by educated people and the interest increases as the level of education goes up. The less educated groups are only attracted on special events particularly cricket matches. The main reason indicated by the respondents for liking sports programs was national sports (Table 34).
Table-34 Reason for Watching Sports Programs (First Option)
Sports Programs Frequency Percentage Missing 395 39.5 National Sports 324 32.4 International Sports 211 21.1 Wrestling 68 6.8 Others 2 0.2 Total 1000 100
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The other main reason for watching sports programs was international sports, watched by 21.1 percent respondents. American wrestling programs were described as another reason for watching sports programs by 6.8 percent of the people. 39.5 percent respondents did not elaborate any specific reason for liking sports programs.
Drama
Television in Pakistan takes pride and exhibits high professional excellence in drama production. It attracts maximum viewership in this one single area. TV drama has gained remarkable appreciation not only inside the country, but also across the border, in countries where Urdu language is understood and has bagged considerable admiration. As shown in Table (12) 45.5 percent of the respondents rate drama as their most favorite program on television, which is much higher a percentage than any other single program. This percentage is in terms of rating, not the viewership, which should be much more. This also is reflected through Tables 35 and 38, which show that maximum viewership (58.1 percent) on television is at 8-9:30 p.m., which is PTV's "Drama hour" and news hour.
Table 35 Time for Watching T.V
Time Frequency Percent No response 15 1.5 Morning 125 12.5 4.00 to 6.00 P.M 13 1.3 6.00 to 8.00 P.M 155 15.5 8.00 to 9.30 P.M 581 58.1 9.30 to 11.00 P.M 89 8.9 Full Time 22 2.2 Total 1000 100
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Table-36 Time for Watching T.V by Age
No 4-6 6-8 8-9.30 9.30- Full Morning Row AGE Response P.M PM PM 11 PM Time Percent Total % % % % % % % Less than 15 7.9 5.3 26.3 5.3 47.4 7.9 0.0 38 3.8 15-19 0.0 12.5 1.3 17.5 57.5 10.0 1.3 80 8 20-24 0.0 11.1 1.6 13.4 61.7 8.7 3.6 253 25.3 25-29 1.4 14.1 0.0 13.4 60.4 8.8 1.8 283 28.3 30-34 5.0 9.2 0.0 18.4 56.7 7.1 3.5 141 14.1 35-39 0.0 17.1 0.0 10.5 65.8 5.3 1.3 76 7.6 40-44 1.6 14.8 0.0 27.9 39.3 16.4 0.0 61 6.1 45-50 0.0 15.4 3.8 11.5 61.5 7.7 0.0 26 2.6 More than 50 0.0 14.3 2.4 21.4 47.6 11.9 2.4 42 4.2 Total 1.5 12.5 1.7 15.1 58.1 8.9 2.2 1000 100
Again this trend is strengthened through Table 36 which says that 62 percent viewers believe that TV drama portrays main social problems more than other programs. The supportive arguments in favor of drama reflect that the people like this program and know more about it. Since, maximum entertainment is available in drama, naturally it is valued accordingly. The viewership of drama as reflected in Tables 36 and 37 does not vary greatly in terms of age and sex. Table 37 Time for Watching TV by Sex No Male Female Row Time response Percent Total % % % Don't Watch 16.7 66.7 16.7 18 1.8 Morning 0.0 71.2 28.8 125 12.5 4:00 to 6:00 0.0 61.5 38.5 13 1.3 6:00 to 8:00 0.6 70.3 29.0 155 15.5 8:00 to 9:30 0.5 82.0 17.5 578 57.8 9:30 to 11:00 4.5 89.9 5.6 89 8.9 Full Time 0.0 90.9 9.1 22 2.2 Total 1.1 79.2 19.7 1000 100
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Music program
Music on PTV is not the most popular type of programming for the population as a whole. Of 1000 respondents, only 18 described music as their first choice. These music lovers are predominantly under the age of 34. People over 40 did not mention music as their first priority (Table 38).
Table 38 Type of Programs Liked Most by Age
<15 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-50 50> Occupation % % % % % % % % % Don’t Watch 14.3 7.1 0.0 39.3 25.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 10.7 Sports 1.5 9.9 28.1 30.8 15.4 4.8 5.5 2.6 1.3 Current Affairs 1.6 0.0 31.3 26.6 10.9 7.8 6.3 3.1 12.5 News 4.5 1.9 15.5 27.1 16.8 9.7 9.7 3.9 11.0 Drama 3.3 11.4 28.6 24.5 10.3 11.4 5.5 2.2 2.9 Music 0.0 11.1 33.3 33.3 16.7 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 Children show 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Religious prog. 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 Column 2.8 8.4 25.7 28.5 14.1 7.6 6.1 2.6 4.2
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Generally, the music programs, though staying at a lower priority, are watched widely, if broadcast at or close to Prime Time. The response towards music program was negative. More than 50 percent respondents were not happy with the music programs. The most unhappy groups were above 45, with a graduate or post graduate degree. The most satisfied segment was the age group between 15 to 24 and students having an under-graduate educational level (Table 39 and 40).
Table-39 Happy with Music Programs by Age
Yes No AGE Row Total Percent % % Less than 15 32.1 67.9 28 2.8 15-19 46.4 53.6 84 8.4 20-24 45.1 54.9 257 25.7 25-29 41.8 58.2 285 28.5 30-34 48.2 51.8 141 14.1 35-39 43.4 56.6 76 7.6 40-44 32.8 67.2 61 4.2 45-50 30.8 69.2 26 2.6 More than 50 42.9 57.1 42 6.1 Total 43.0 57.0 1000 100
Table-40 Happy with Music Programs by Education
Yes No AGE Row Total Percent % % Informal 81.8 18.2 22 2.2 Primary 39.5 60.5 43 4.3 Matriculate 49.1 50.9 160 16 F.A 53.0 47.0 181 18.1 B.A 38.6 61.4 378 37.8 M.A 43.5 56.5 184 18.4 Others 6.3 93.8 32 3.2 Total 43 57 1000 100
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Watching of Religious Programs
Religious programs are watched more during special religious days and months. Those who watch sometime were 11 percent and regular watchers were only 7 percent. Those were however 21 percent who do not watch religious programs at all.
Table-41 Frequency of Watching Religious Programs in the Country
Response Frequency Percent Don’t Watch 210 21.0 Only watch during Ramzan or Muharram 510 51.0 Regularly Watch 70 7.0 Watch sometime 110 11.0 Total 1000 100
One main reason described for watching the religious programs by a fairly broad sample of the population was that they were informative and knowledgeable. A sizeable number of respondents called it a religious duty to watch religious programs as "They talk about God, Prophet and the Holy Book". To them switching to another channel while a religious program was on air is " a sin " and reflects that "One is avoiding religion".
Table – 42 Reasons of not watching Religious Programs Regularly
Frequency Reason Number Percent They are controversial 109 15.1 They address non issues 140 19.4 They confuse on simple things 218 30.2 Presenters are typical maulvis (clerics) 132 18.3 Do not educate on day to day affairs 121 16.8 Total 720 100
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Science programs
Science programs are the most neglected production area of PTV. These programs are mostly imported from the USA and the UK, and sent on air at odd hours, mostly at late night and on holidays, in morning time. In recent years, television has made a slight change in these programs by telecasting them with Urdu dubbing. This has increased viewership to some extent. Still 22.8 percent respondents did not know whether there was a science program on television. A good number of 325 (32.5) respondent did not watch them.
In routine, the potential viewers of science programs are in age groups below 30, the viewership decreases as the age limit grows (table 42).
Table 43 Like science Programs by Age
Watch Don’t Don’t Row AGE Watch Percent sometime Watch Know Total Less then 15 10.7 35.7 35.7 17.9 28 2.8 15-19 2.4 53.6 34.5 9.5 84 8.4 20-24 2.3 48.6 31.9 17.1 257 25.7 25-29 2.8 38.6 30.9 27.7 285 28.5 30-34 5.0 39.7 31.2 24.1 141 14.1 35-39 1.3 35.5 28.9 34.2 76 7.6 40-44 6.6 39.3 34.4 19.7 61 6.1 45-50 0.0 26.9 50.0 23.1 26 2.6 More than 50 4.8 23.8 38.1 33.3 42 4.2 Total 3.3 41.4 32.5 22.8 1000 100
There is a direct connection of watching science programs with educational level. The viewers are slightly more, however, at intermediate education background because of the reasons that they comprise mostly youngsters and students.
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English Programs (Drama and Feature Film)
Though the foreign content on PTV has decreased a great deal over the years, GEO has maintained a balance between its own imported English programs and local Urdu productions. The number of viewers attracted towards English programs is still very high. These programs occupy main areas of entertainment, feature films and drama. The viewers of these programs account for 48.3 percent. The bulk of these viewers came from age group 15 - 29, and clientele goes to lowest at age 50 and above (Table 44).
Table-44 Watch English Film /Drama by Age Group
Yes NO Row Age Percent % % Total Less than 15 70.0 30.0 28 2.8 15-19 61.9 38.1 84 8.4 20-24 77.8 22.2 257 25.7 25-29 66.7 33.3 285 28.5 30-34 63.8 36.2 141 14.1 35-39 60.5 39.5 76 7.6 40-44 41.5 58.5 61 6.1 45-50 36.2 63.8 26 2.6 More than 50 32.7 67.3 42 4.2 Total 48.3 51.7 1000 100
Table-45 Watch English Films/Dramas by Education
Yes No Education Row Total Percent % % No response 50.0 50.0 10 1 Informal 25.0 75.0 12 1.2 Primary 37.2 62.8 43 4.3 Matriculate 57.5 42.5 160 16 F.A 57.5 42.5 181 18.1 B.A 74.3 25.7 378 37.8 M.A 71.2 28.8 184 18.4 Others 81.3 18.8 32 3.2 Total 48.3 51.7 1000 100
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Table 46, describes the main reasons of watching these programs as entertainment (41.2 percent) and other attractions usually associated with English Drama and films like action, suspense and good presentation. Table-46 Reasons for Liking English Drama/Films
Frequency Frequency Percent Did Not Mention 364 36.4 Entertainment 412 41.2 Presentation 52 5.2 Information 23 2.3 Acting 47 4.7 Suspense 67 6.7 Action 35 3.5 Total 1000 100
Commercials
Commercial presentation is the pride area of television and advertisers in general. With all restrictions on women and fashion, magnificent commercials were prepared using children as the obvious substitute for women during Zia period. They stood at the equal popularity level of regular TV programs and some are awaited anxiously. Their music was loved by a large number of people. Table 47 shows that even today 52 percent respondents like commercials for the two main reasons; information on general commodities and good presentation.
Table-47 Reasons for Liking Commercials on PTV
Reasons Frequency Percent Missing 19 1.9 No 249 45.9 Provide Good Information 296 29.6 Presentation 226 22.6 Total 1000 100
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The potential clientele is again below the age 30. They find commercials a better substitute for over-restricted programs like drama and music. Table-48 Reasons for Liking Commercials by Age
Provide good No Presentation Row Age information Percent Total % % % Less than 15 35.7 50.0 14.3 28 2.8 15-19 44.0 28.6 27.4 84 8.4 20-24 40.9 29.2 30.0 257 25.7 25-29 46.7 29.8 23.5 285 28.5 30-34 56.7 22.0 21.3 141 14.1 35-39 60.5 35.5 3.9 76 7.6 40-44 37.7 36.1 26.2 61 6.1 45 50 57.7 26.9 15.4 26 2.6 More than 50 69.0 26.2 4.8 42 4.2 Total 47.8 29.6 22.6 1000 100
Attitude towards Restrictions
In some circles televisions is regarded as the most orthodox medium in Pakistan. It is believed that the restrictions, particularly on women and fashion, are an offshoot of government's policies imposed from time to time during the last 25 years since 1980s. The latest one is “Dupatta Policy” (veiling of head by the women). It is alleged that imposition of this restriction introduced under a verdict of the Islamic ideology council is a step towards Islamizing the media. The reaction on overall restrictions on television in terms of exposing women and exhibiting latest fashions beyond certain limits were most interesting. Those who appreciated restrictions on television account for 38.4 percent. They gave a straight reply in support of censorship on general programs watched with families inside households. The only group giving a negative reaction were students and women under 30.
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Teachers and government employees support restrictions with a moderate majority, but housewives want more restricted media. The relationship of educational level with appreciation of restriction on T.V. is reflected in Table 49. Table-49 Appreciate Restrictions on TV by Education
No Yes Row Educational Level Percent % % Total Missing 50.0 50.0 10 1.0 In formal 75.0 25.0 12 1.2 Primary 65.1 34.9 43 4.3 Matriculate 66.9 33.1 160 16 F.A 65.2 34.8 181 18.1 B.A 60.1 39.9 378 37.8 M.A 58.7 41.3 184 18.4 Others 50.0 50.0 32 3.2 Total 61.6 38.4 1000 100
Table-50 Appreciate Restrictions on TV by SEX
No Yes Sex Row Total Percent % % No response 54.5 45.5 11 1.1 Male 33.0 67.0 792 79.2 Female 59.9 40.1 197 19.7 Total 61.6 38.4 1000 100
Naturally the male segment of the society (Table 50 above) is more in support of restrictions for obvious reasons. The reaction towards restrictions between the two gender groups was sharply different.
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Social Problems and Their Projection on T.V
Table 51 shows a consensus among respondents that Health, illiteracy Corruption and unemployment are the most crucial problems of the society. Table-51 Main Social Problems of the Country Indicated by the Respondents
Social Problems Frequency Percent Did Not Mention 27 2.7 Health 200 20.0 Illiteracy 227 22.7 Unemployment 287 28.7 Poverty 67 6.7 Political Unrest 57 5.7 Corruption 44 4.4 Population 91 9.1 Total 1000 100
The other problems indicated were poverty, political unrest and population, In terms of projection of social problems, the response was greatly negative, 76 percent respondents were of the view that these problems were either never projected on television, or projected a little and half-heartedly. Table-52 Does PTV Project Social Problems (Age wise)
Yes No A little Row AGE Percent % % % Total Less than 15 14.3 42.9 42.9 28 2.8 15-19 34.5 31.0 34.5 84 8.4 20-24 28.0 32.7 39.3 257 25.7 25-29 23.5 34.4 42.1 285 28.5 3034 21.3 39.7 39.0 141 14.1 3539 19.7 35.5 44.7 76 7.6 40-44 21.3 42.6 36.1 61 6.1 45-50 11.5 57.7 30.8 26 2.6 More than 50 16.7 35.7 47.6 42 4.2
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Total 24.0 35.9 40.1 1000 100
Tables 52 above shows that as the age increases the response towards projection of social problems on TV become further negative. It is lowest at age below 19 and highest after 40-44. A cross tabulation of all categories reflects that there is an agreement that TV had failed in projecting their genuine problems. Table 53 show that the people with higher educational level are more disappointed with TV than other groups.
Table-53 Projection of Social Problems by T.V (Educational Level)
Educational Yes No A Little Row Percent Level % % % Total Missing 40.0 20.0 40.0 10 1.0 Informal 25.0 16.7 58.3 12 1.2 Primary 11.6 44.2 44.2 43 4.3 Matriculate 21.9 29.4 48.8 160 16.0 F.A 28.7 34.8 36.5 181 18.1 B.A 25.9 37.0 37.0 378 37.8 M.A 19.6 40.8 39.7 184 18.4 Others 21.9 34.4 43.8 32 3.2 Total 24.0 35.9 40.1 1000 100
Same is true of people with primary education. Respondents with middle educational level were slightly more of the view that TV projected their problems a little. Table-54 Program in which Social Problems are reflected
Response Frequency Percent Drama 620 62.0 News 60 6.0 Documentaries 20 2.0 Discussions 100 10.0 Others 200 20.0 Total 1000 100
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Table 54, shows that 62 percent respondents described drama as portraying and highlighting social problems more than the other programs. Discussions came number 2 and news number 3.
Impacts of Television Programs
The respondents portrayed clear opinion on the negative impact of Television mentioning an increased trend of overspending, fashions, children's education and psychological complexes associated with television programs (Table 55) Table-55 Impacts of TV Programs indicated by the Respondents
Positive Impact Frequency Percent Provide Some Entertainment 688 68.8 Women Education 53 5.3 Children’s Education 50 5.0 Children Outlook 60 6.0 More Information About Society 140 14.0 Others 9 0.9 Total 1000 100
Negative Impact Frequency Percent Overspending 297 29.7 Psychological Complex 99 99.9 Brings Fashion Trends 150 15.0 Children poor school performance 103 10-3 Negative impact on youth 137 13.7 Others 214 21.4 Total 1000 100
On the positive impacts of television, 68.8 percent could only say that it provided some entertainment: 14 percent were of the view that television provided information on the society and a small percentages of 5 and 6 percent described TV programs as having positive impacts on women and children's education.
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Chapter 5
DIMENSIONS OF IMPACT
TELEVISION IN PAKISTANI SOCIETY
In this chapter I will discuss that the connection between TV and society is less direct, and that television cannot be understood without studying the peoples reaction towards its contents. Recent work in communications and mass media studies tells us that we cannot understand television as a medium without considering this discourse. Watching television and talking about television are inseparable parts of a single activity. Accordingly, the viewing experience should be seen as a social activity. I have applied an anthropological approach to look at discourse about television to understand the place of the medium in social process at a local scale. Television transforms social discourse, which is important for its psychological influence, informational content, and its dis- placement of other forms of social interaction. I have discussed that TV has changed social discourse in Pakistan. The method applied to register the views was a usual ‘Participant Observation’ technique.
The Arrival
Television was a medium held strictly in the hands of the governments of Pakistan for several years before private broadcasting began. During this time there was no hue and cry or alarm raised about its impact. It started only when private entrepreneurs began to rebroadcast pirated satellite signals in December of 1989 and newspapers and magazines announced the beginnings of ‘Television Mania’ and ‘The Cultural Invasion’. One writer said ‘The 'tube' has hit Pakistan like a heady wine’ (Qasmi Ahmad Nadeem, Jang 22 November, 1992).
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Controversy followed, as Pakistan debated both the cultural and political ramifications of the medium. The government cautiously tried to regulate the new industry, under pressure from the political and religious groups. The government took stronger steps to control television, and began to raise alarms about its cultural impact. The then Minister of Information proclaimed that television was more dangerous than an invading army of India. There has been no such restriction, and today there are at least one thousand cable networks and four private sector channels mostly providing US, Indian and European programming direct from satellites.
Shortly after the television invasion, another invasion began, this time of media scholars and experts. Most of their work followed a diffusionary paradigm, portraying Pakistan as a victim of cultural imperialism and the neocolonial world information order. They studied the impact of the new medium on politics, social organization, psychology, consumption patterns and migration.
By the year 1995, much of the initial furor had died down, and the media scholars had moved on to newer pastures. But the local debate about television continued; everyone had an opinion about television. I should mention that my fieldwork was not focused specifically on television, it was the structure and relationship that people enjoy with TV. It has now become clear that in four decades of broadcasting, television has become important in the ways Pakistanis define themselves and their relationships to each other and to the outside world.
This part is based mostly on conversations and interviews, on some survey responses, and on printed discussion of television in newspapers, magazines, and government publications. Rather than joining in the debate about television's direct impact on the country, I would like to examine the social and political consequences of the debate itself.
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Television Discourse in Pakistan
In Pakistan, in the context of the family, dominated and negotiated distances seem to be most common. In the small café, barbershop and the workplace, negotiation and critical distance appear in conversation about television. I collected ethnographic data on these areas; and moralistic and cultural issues were the focus.
To describe this type of debate, I will start with the print media, based on 12 months of clippings from five weekly newspapers. Pakistani newspapers represent different constituencies. In general, papers supporting the conservative, pro-American Muslim League and Liberal pro- American Pakistan Peoples Party and a group of independent papers are uncritical of television, and stress its positive educational value and its role in promoting free political debate and democracy. These newspapers see television primarily as a source of information, and if Americanization and Indianization results, that is not seen as such a bad thing. They express some mild misgivings about depictions of drugs and violence, but see this as a matter for parents to control, or for self-censorship by broadcasters.
In contrast a newspaper controlled by the right-wing Jamaat-e- Islami is much more critical of television. Jasarat reflects the position that foreign television is a danger to national culture and identity that must be controlled. Television increases foreign domination of the economy by developing tastes for foreign goods, and by promoting a vision of the ‘good life’ in material terms, making Pakistanis dissatisfied with their country and culture. Television seduces Pakistanis into ‘an alien way of life.’ On the positive side, television makes Pakistanis more politically sophisticated and, by showing people how poor they are: it makes them want better. Government organs frequently call for more local television production, and more educational television to further the development process, but little practical action has resulted.
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The one politically semi-independent newspaper, Nawa- e- waqt and its English version the Nation tends to be right of the center and strongly critical. It has been openly and vocally critical of television for the last five years. The commentary in Nawa- e- waqt comes from both middle- and working-class sources. Middle-class commentators try for objective balance, arguing for both positive and negative effects of television. The positive include making Pakistanis more educated and sophisticated, especially about the outside world, and providing positive models of family life of health, democracy, art, and patriotism.
The editor of nawa- e- waqt, Majeed Nizami- a veteran Journalist with pro-Islamic thoughts, told that by exposing viewers to a wider and more sophisticated world, television had helped Pakistanis to feel more confident, less isolated and backward. They have become more sophisticated consumers, less likely to be cheated. Because Pakistanis see the problems of the USA on television the drugs and violence, they know better what to expect if they migrate. (Nizami, 2003)
But the negative influences are even stronger. In various columns television has been blamed for rampant Americanism and Indianism in fashion, music, speech, and even body language. Pakistan is losing its culture as television undercuts local institutions and communications. This ‘cultural colonialism’ and consumerism lead to greater frustration, less appreciation for education, and the glorification of drugs, sex, and violence. Television shows ‘people all dressed up in silk lounging on luxurious furniture in air conditioned comfort, driving expensive cars on smooth highways and dining the nights away in expensive restaurants frequented by movie actors, drug dons and the beautiful people’ (Nation , 5/4/2002). Several feminist columnists add that television is leading to greater child neglect and a lower social position for women. It is invoked as the
163 culprit in discussions of poor school performance by children, low participation in local sporting events, and increasing crime and gang membership. Television is also blamed for increasing racism, sex, adultery, and youthful promiscuity. An editorial claims, ‘ Cable Television has become a cancer for our children who are not in school, because they are not sophisticated enough to filter out the filth and enjoy that which is entertaining. With American television and its emphasis on sex and violence replacing the sports programs in Pakistani Cities, the outlet for the excess energies of our delinquent young has become involvement in what sex and violence they can find or create, hence the youth are roaming the streets.’ In the editor's view, West has become decadent and Pakistanis want to copy that decadence, a situation he finds both comic and tragic. In a macabre exchange, the USA gave television entertainment, but took ownership of the country's land and resources. (News, 10/2/2002)
Letters to the editor, and the columns by a working-class commentator, give few positive opinions about television. Instead, they focus on the effects of television on children, especially the decline in studying and poor school performance. They accuse the parents of being so involved in television, they don't have time for their children anymore. This focus on youth extends to the activities of a working-class ‘concerned parents’ group, who blame television for ‘disrespect, destructiveness, rebelliousness, and lawlessness’ (Jang 12/3/2002).
Jamal Haider also makes some more subtle points about television influence on Pakistan. ‘Because people are so concerned with the imaginary world of soap operas’, he says, ‘they have lost their work ethic, their concern for local issues, and the social conscience that once made them help their poor and homeless neighbors. ‘Most of you align yourselves with Days of Our Lives and filthy Santa Barbara... living in another world. They forget that our street people are their problems’ (Jang 27-7-2003). ‘We must stop
164 believing what we hear on television. Soap Operas are filthy - you should be reading a good book. They keep your brains filled with filth so you cannot think about anything else. Children follow in your footsteps instead of going to school’ (Jang 12/8/2003).
Television thus becomes a cultural and historical watershed, allowing people to create a new and mythical past when children respected their parents, and social justice and good morals were the rule. Television has given Pakistanis a temporal fix, a spot to mark the beginning of modernity and the passing of the old.
Interviews with Pakistanis found a similar range of positive and negative commentary. Some people stressed the destructive influences of television. An Imam of Mosque (priest) in capital city Islamabad told that television was the primary cause of immorality in his locality: ‘it filled children's heads with ‘filth,’ made them disrespectful, and led to rampant sex, drugs, crime, loud music, and organized crime’. ‘Worst of all’, he said, ‘children lost their capacity to dream, to imagine a future for themselves - all they could see ahead was the image of America on the screen’. One could hear this same sermon in Mosques all over the country almost every Friday. Television is a malign force, allied with other kinds of evils that are hastening the coming of Qiamat- the Day of Judgment.
Meanwhile, some of those same youth who are becoming so degenerate told that television had made them more aware of the dangers of drugs and crime, more conscious of the poverty and social decay of the West. They argued that for most people, television was harmless entertainment that kept them off the streets and out of trouble. Preaching about the dangers of television belonged in Mosques, along with moral condemnations of the other things that most people do - fornicate, drink, and get into trouble.
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In two surveys of working-class television viewers, a similar differences of opinion about the positive and negative effects of television was found. The following represent the range of effects:
Table – 56 Effects of Television Percentage Lower Middle Working Middle POSITIVE Class Class Class N=132 N=98 N=102 People know more about the world today; 70 43 39 there is better access to preachers and 23 47 51 religious programs; You learn a lot from watching; 60 41 32 It is entertaining and fun, something to do 68 35 31 with friends; It is a good alternative to going out, which 57 43 39 can cause trouble; news tells you what is going on in the 77 51 38 world;
NEGATIVE children watch instead of studying; 70 80 81 shows are often dumb and uninteresting; 59 49 83 Programs are too ‘wordly’ (instead of 42 31 51 Islamic); you do not know what to believe in the 59 42 57 advertisements; children learn the wrong things. 63 52 69 * The answers provide multiple choices
While the working class tends to criticize the moral content of programs and the direct effect of viewing on their children, the middle class
166 is more likely to see negative social and cultural effects. They speak of cultural dependence and American imperialism, of consumerism, street violence, and disrespect to moral values. The middle class has had television longer and, unlike the poor, for whom viewing is a social event, they now complain that television decreases social interaction and isolates people (as Kottak 1990: 145 found in Brazil).
To summarize, a profound ambivalence about television was found at every level of society, in every context. This ambivalence allows a space for moral issues to enter.
Rightist politicians and journalists tend to be more critical, while those of the left are much less so. Middle-class critics tend to focus on national and cultural issues, while working-class people were more concerned about their children and community. The middle class blames more problems on television, but they also saw more benefits. Everyone seemed capable of both engaged enjoyment of the medium and critical distance, though lower middle class people spoke more frequently and enthusiastically about the pleasures of watching. And more importantly, everyone seemed to agree on what television was doing to Pakistan - changing the country profoundly; the disagreement was merely over whether this was a good or a bad thing.
The Effects of Television programs
My next question was, has the debate about television changed Pakistani society? Television discourse has certainly changed some aspects of political behavior. Politicians are wary of making statements about the medium these days because television is seen as a populist issue. Being perceived as ‘anti-television’ now means being an Orthodox. So their positions during the 2002 campaigns were limited to accusations of censorship and bias, and pious statements about the need to improve
167 television and make it better serve national interests. Television is now part of a long-standing debate about Pakistan's economic and cultural relationship with the World, and about the dangers or attractions of cultural imperialism. The issue is not one-sided, since many people admire the influx of new cultural traits.
The debate about country’s autonomy and dependence has its roots in the anti-US nationalist movement of post 9-11 scenario (which was led by the present religious opposition parties). Pro- and anti-television arguments are based on the political positions taken by the religious and ruling factions during that time. The religious parties built their political power on a coalition between the leftist Peoples Party and Islamist Parties of right wing – an alliance that was formed to overthrow military rule. One issue was that the educated middle class regarded television as a danger to their political and cultural power, and sought to control it. The poor wanted television and so resisted that control.
Among the rural and urban poor and working classes, in mosques and to a lesser extent among educators, television has become part of a general moral discourse that existed long before the television invasion. Television takes its place as one of the many external factors that are corrupting and destroying Pakistani families, explaining cultural changes that many perceive as destructive. Television enters moral discourse because its message contradicts or supports ethical positions about what is right, and about what ‘should be.’ It opens up options that explicitly and implicitly challenge the moral order. It also enters moral discourse because it is conveniently exogenous, and could therefore be kept out. Television provides an explanation for the source of evil, and is classified with existing sources of evil like the West, the devil, money, sex, and drugs.
While television could be seen as merely adding new fuel to old fires, the new linkage between these old discourses about morality and politics is 168 important. Television brings political and moral issues together in a new and powerful way, widening the field of discourse and involving people from different factions, classes, and ethnic groups in a common debate. Where religion was once concerned mostly with the individual and the community, it now speaks to issues of Pakistani cultural identity and influence from the West. The table below provides reactions quantified after informal lengthy discussions with opinion leaders.
Table – 57
Cause Against Is Destructive Political Moral and Evil Instability Values Politicians in Opposition 7 2 - (N=11) Religious Leaders in Politics 8 7 2 (N=9) Religious Leaders in Mosque 2 6 4 (N=7) Educators (N=13) 5 8 -
In blurring the distinction between political and religious discourse, television has imbued political debate with a new moral content, and has taken traditionally moral issues and secularized them. In the process it has taken many issues that were once seen as Pakistani, local and even familial, and moved them into a global context. The problems of youth, social welfare, ethnicity, and gender roles, for example, are now cast in a global context, Now that television has presented Pakistanis with an objectified ‘other,’ the problem of defining the self has a new dimension. There is now more and visible standard of comparison.
In a real sense, many of the differences have faded away. Pakistan is still a multiethnic and multilingual country with great disparities in wealth and education. But television has proven a unifying force in two ways. At the level of content, all Pakistanis with television now share access to some
169 of the same sources of news and entertainment, even if those sources are CNN and BBC, Star or National Geographic. Now all Pakistanis have a common conversation about Cricket, International football, car races and Hard Talk and Larry King live. At a second level, television has engaged Pakistanis in a common debate about the impact of television on the country, and in the process has made everyone aware of ‘the local and the global’ as a matter of concern.
The concept of unity should not be overemphasized irrationally. The country remains highly factionalized and divided in terms of their internal affairs ranging from politics, entertainment, and human and civil rights to religion. But television discourse has also changed existing social divisions and factionalism. For example, religious organizations, which used to have a very close relationship with political conservatives, now find themselves sharing important common ground with the leftist parties. Both are concerned about the danger of foreign influence. The religious schools (madrissas) and the nationalists have a new shared agenda; the control of foreign influence. The old nationalist program of building local cultural institutions now finds a much broader constituency.
Another important effect of television discourse among these new coalitions is that it changes the terms of the debate about local and foreign. Instead of being concerned about political autonomy from the US, or about local economic development, debate is now carried out in cultural and religious terms, which are now used synonymously. In Pakistan after television, people talk about ‘culture’ constantly, in ways that were not possible before. Television has made Pakistanis focus on the autonomy of local culture - on music, cooking, and language - rather than on political or economic autonomy. Forty years ago when Pakistanis spoke about Britain, they talked about the Empire, about wealth and power. Today when they talk about America, they talk about culture and fashion. So while Pakistanis
170 make different moral judgments about what is good and bad on television, they share a common language when they debate those moral issues.
One of the most lasting effects of television in Pakistan, then, is a particular form of what Miller (1987) has called ‘objectification’ .The intimate awareness of otherness, presented by the image of America on television, has led Pakistanis to objectify a new concept of culture. Once culture was color, ethnicity, and class. Today Pakistanis have recast the concept of culture in other terms, beyond immediate division of society. It has not only enlarged the concept itself but also submerged older notions.
Television has become a social, cultural, and political issue that is integrating with ongoing discourse, and is being used by existing groups to further their own positions and agendas. In the process, ‘television talk’ subtly transforms that discourse. It creates new coalitions of common interest. Most importantly, television affects the ideas about time and cultural distance. This powerful medium has created a new identity of Pakistani culture. Paradoxically, television imperialism may do more to create a national culture and national consciousness in Pakistan than hundred years of independence struggle and fifty-six years of independence itself.
Tele-visual Texts
Recent trends in anthropology reflect an increasing acknowledgment of the significance of mass media to processes of identity formation. In the following case studies I have analyzed the ways in which men and women in Islamabad actively engage with and interpret Pakistan television, and I explore the place of their interpretations in national and gendered subjects. Given the tendency of some scholars to depict audiences of mass media as passive consumers and, in the case of women who live in the ‘Third World’
171 as helpless victims of a totalizing patriarchal ‘system,’ I have tried to probe into the matter empirically.
However, in the analysis that follows, I have ethnographically examined viewers' variable and active interpretations of tele-visual texts. I have highlighted the fact that meaning is unstable and is frequently contested by viewers, rather than positioned by any single text. The questions addressed here are, what is the place of television in the construction of viewers as national and gendered subjects? How do audiences, historically and spatially are located in the texts produced by a hegemonic state apparatus such as PTV? By examining viewers' active interaction with television's texts, we can envision popular culture as a site of struggle and not simply of domination. The analysis of television enables us to situate viewers in particular socio historical contexts, to demonstrate that subject positions vary according to the conjunctures in which viewers are interpreted, and to show how class, community, gender, age, and household position mediate people's interactions with televisual texts. I have focused here on the ways in which viewers interpret specific themes and images. I am concerned with relationships between the narratives of television and those that viewers knit of themselves, between popular culture and the viewers' perceptions of themselves as Pakistani men and women. Thus I have analyzed the manner in which men and women living in Islamabad interpret serials on Pakistan television, in particular those reflecting and reconstructing discourses of gender and nationhood. This constellation of discourses is of crucial significance because Pakistan as a state has attempted to use television to construct a pan-Pakistan culture. In particular, I have examined the consequences of the state's projects of national integration and development for the constitution of notions of ‘Pakistani Nationalism’.
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The Historical Perspective of T.V. Programming
In this section I outline the contexts in which television's discourses were produced and received by the people. The historical and political specificity of television as a medium of mass communication and implications of the state's programming policies for the production of culture in post-independence Pakistan are the central issues. I have sociologically located the core of Pakistan television's target audience, the expanding middle class, and attempt to describe the immediate context in which the viewers interpreted their favorite serials: the city and neighborhoods in which they lived, their class positions, and the household politics that framed their understandings.
Television neither simply ‘reflects’ nor ‘reinforces’ discourses: it is, in and of itself, a ‘cultural form’ and must be analyzed as part of a larger discursive field. Outlining the history of television in Pakistan enables us to better understand the politics of representation underlying constructions of gender and nationhood in a post-independence context. Pakistan television (officially and popularly known as PTV) is state-owned and state-controlled. It was first introduced in 1964 as an experimental service for the city of Lahore and the immediate vicinity of Lahore. The only station was the Lahore (Center), which broadcast programs for a couple of hours a day on one channel. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (under whose aegis television continues to function) next began expanding the reach of television to Dacca, Karachi, Peshawar, Islamabad and Quetta. Concurrently, transmission times were lengthened, and the telecasting of entertainment programs increased. But for the most part television was, and continues to be, primarily geared to what the Pakistan nation-state clearly sees as a major objective of mass media: the project of nation building (Hasan, 2000). Thus, the major themes , as proclaimed by PTV in most television programs today include communal harmony and national integration (as in serials such as Aik muhabbat so Afsanay and so on), 173 national development (exemplified by the countless public information spots promoting family planning or public health education), the reconstruction of Pakistan Movement themes (as with serials like special plays on National days), but the need to improve the status of women is a recent phenomenon.
The cricket World Cup 1987, when teams from different nations assembled in Lahore for the event, functioned as a major public relations exercise for Pakistan, both within and outside the country. This marked a turning point in the history of Pakistan television. The country wanted to capitalize on the pomp and pageantry of the Games; to enable wide reception, it relaxed import restrictions not just on television sets for individuals but, more important, on television technology kits for manufacturers. Television sets appeared in countless homes across the country, and the skylines of Pakistani cities were soon filled with the antennas. The setting up of low-power transmitters in various parts of the country to relay programs beamed from metropolitan centers by satellite dramatically increased both the reach of television and the hours of transmission. Today, over 90 percent of the population is ‘covered’ by television. Further, whereas audiences in the early years could watch television for two hours in the evening, audiences in many parts of the country can now watch at least three channels round the clock
Until the advent of commercial sponsorship in 1990, most programs were produced by employees of government-owned television centers. Media critics, producers, and indeed television officials often contended that the introduction of private production and sponsorship promoted artistic ‘freedom’ and generated the financial resources required for the production of entertainment serials. At the same time, public discourse on television repeatedly emphasized that a poor country like Pakistan could not afford the luxury of ‘pure’ entertainment, that what it needed, instead, were
174 programs such as soap operas harnessed to the (modernist) project of national development (see, for example, Government of Pakistan 1988). The first Managing Director of PTV, Aslam Azhar, disclosed in a lengthy interview ‘In keeping with the Pakistan government's Pro-Islamic, Anti-Israel and strong pro- America stance, the source of Pakistan soaps was not the United States or Europe but indigenous writings and themes which entertained as well as educated people about the benefits of family planning, education, and the Islamic and Pakistani Values. From this paradigm of ‘social change through entertainment’ was born the new, hybridized form of the Pakistan television serials.
Today, despite the fact that many serials are privately produced, state-appointed selection and screening committees play a powerful role in the formulation of television's discourses. Discourses about nation building and national integration are directly incorporated into and, in fact, underlie the structuring of transmissions (Hasan, 2000). Prime-time segments (from 7.00 to 11:00 every evening) are all part of what is known as the ‘National Program.’ The National Program is beamed by satellite to small towns, district headquarters, and villages with electricity. About 90 percent of its programs are in Urdu; the remainder are in English and regional languages. Variations exist only where regional protests have been loud. For example, in provinces, there is regional news for a very short duration and music and drama is only at 5.30 to 6.00 pm and attempt to increase this time have failed, a relatively large number of serials and music and discussion in regional languages are now shown on PTV National- a new regional satellite channel introduced in June 2003 by the government. Very few entertainment programs (a maximum of two or three per week) are imported. Some local programs produced in metropolitan centers are in regional languages. But all programs are seen during prime time - when people are home from work - and an overwhelming majority of the serials are part of the National Program and in Urdu. A politician sitting on
175 opposition benches in the Parliament said ‘The National Program is a major component of the effort to construct a pan-Pakistan ‘national culture,’ and at present, when relations between the government, politicians and civil society are particularly turbulent, it is part of an attempt to exert hegemonic control over media’.
In this part I have focused on tele-serials shown during prime time - that is, as part of the National Program - from July 2002 through October 2003. PTV Urdu soap operas speak the ‘meta-language’ of the popular Urdu film (evident, for instance, in the types of sets, dialogue, costumes, and music used) while they resemble western soaps in terms of audience engagement and narrative structure: multiple plots, the deferment of narra- tive closure, and the build-up of suspense. Further, like the audiences of American soaps, those of Pakistani serials deeply identify with characters on the screen; unlike their more distant (although still passionate) attachment to film heroes and heroines. However, because most serials are telecast in the evenings rather than the afternoons, they are targeted not exclusively at women or at people who stay at home but at families. The family, then, is the basic viewing unit, a fact evident from the design of advertisements and confirmed by the observations and by what was inferred from conversations with television officials and the directors of serials.
The Serials have ranged in genre from the Patriotic (Aziz Bhatti, Rashid Minhas,) and the epic
Tipu Sultan to the comic Do Kunwaray. Many serials, such as ,Mohabbatain,Mhandi and Bulandian, resemble the Urdu film genre known as ‘the social’ in their use of melodrama and social realism.
Most serials on Pakistan television have explicit ‘social messages,’ with themes related to family planning, national integration, and the status of women woven into the narratives. And at any given moment, more than
176 half of the eight to ten serials shown per week during prime time deal explicitly or implicitly with Social and Nationalistic themes. Although the social messages woven into the narratives have varied according to political contingencies (such as particular national crises or the needs of a ruling party), an astonishing number continue to deal centrally with women's issues. More important, even where gender is not an overt theme, it features prominently as a critical subtext. In nationalist serials the nationalist narrative is reinforced by its appropriation of discourses on gender.
From 2002 to 2003, I conducted numerous interviews with viewers living in two sectors of capital city Islamabad: F/6 and G/6. Talking with urban women in multi- class localities enabled me to see how reactions to nationalist discourses were mediated by the ways people negotiate and construct their identities in such contexts. Moreover, Islamabad was a particularly appropriate setting for the study of nationalism: the presence of the state is more overwhelming there than in any other Pakistani city. The state is a major employer in Islamabad. The city's landscape is dotted with government buildings, government housing colonies, ministerial bungalows, and other reminders of the nation-state. And, like Washington, DC, Islamabad does not belong to a regional state; it therefore has no regional roots of its own and its population is composed largely of migrants. People from ‘Old Lahore’ characterize themselves as laid-back, courteous, and cultured in comparison with the allegedly brash, rude, aggressive residents of Islamabad. Old Lahore, they say, has ‘tradition’; Islamabad is a place where everything is in disarray. Islamabad's identity ultimately issues from its role as the capital of the country. For all these reasons, it has the ambience of a ‘national’ city.
Nationalism has been characterized as a middle-class phenomenon and the relationship between ‘middle-classiness’ and nationalism is a fundamental one. Personal observations and conversations with PTV
177 officials and media critics have led me to conclude that the middle and lower middle classes form the core of the target audience for Pakistan television. The past three decades have witnessed a dramatic expansion of the Pakistan’s middle classes: they now constitute over 20 percent of the population. This demographic change has created an enormous market for consumer goods. The new middle classes that once invested in bicycles, motor cycles, and refrigerators now want to buy color television sets.
As mentioned above, the relaxation of restrictions on the import of television technology around the time of the Cricket World CUP 1987, promoted an enormous rise in the production and purchase of television sets. This change in policy reflected a major shift in the allocation of financial and technical resources. Programming priorities changed accordingly, from the dissemination of development information to enter- tainment (although sustained efforts are still made to weave social messages into serials). The expansion of television thus indicated the power of the growing middle classes, a power also evidenced by the launching of color television in 1982, the introduction of advertisements and commercial sponsorship (whereby private companies finance the production of entertainment programs), and the subsequent establishment of a second channel in 1989.
The interpretations provided by the lower middle and upwardly mobile working classes are also significant because of those groups' comparatively fluid location in the society. The people felt they were struggling to cross the threshold of ‘middle-classness.’ They were acutely aware of their vulnerable position, and financial insecurity was a major part of their discursive consciousness.
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The Ethnography of Viewership
Karachi Company is a lower-middle-class government ‘colony’ that houses Naib Qasids (office attendants) junior clerks and stenographers occupying the lowest rungs of the state bureaucracy. Each flat in Karachi Company consists of two 8' by 10' rooms, and an even tinier kitchen and bathroom and latrine. Like many other government colonies, Karachi Company, was forced to coexist with middle-class neighborhoods. Much poorer than their middle-class neighbors, they all sublet tiny rooms. Non of them were upwardly mobile and many of the older generation were employed as household help in adjacent upper’ middle-class neighborhoods and selling fruits on the road side, most of the younger men and women as office attendants or clerks in government offices and private shops and offices. Unlike upper-middle-class viewing groups, these lower-middle-class and working-class viewing groups, just a generation away from poverty, were fairly homogeneous in terms of class composition.
The family watches television together, sometime including the children of neighbors too. A number of houses have now cable connections, most of the serials were telecast on PTV channels as part of the National Program. Age and gender influenced people's preferences- Women particularly enjoyed the serials, and even though the men also watched the serials with great relish. They told me that they made it a point to watch the news. Indeed, watching the news was considered an adult, usually male activity. Most schoolchildren I met would try to watch as many television programs as the demands of homework and the reprimand of parents would permit. Parents often tried to keep away their children, particularly their young daughters, from watching Indian Movies: they made sure the youngsters were asleep before the late-night film, usually an Indian one with relatively explicit ‘love scenes’.
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In general, gender, household position, and age were the crucial factors influencing viewers' styles of interaction with what they watched. Power relations within families were sometimes reflected in how people arranged themselves around the television set: the older generation (usually men but sometimes older women as well) would be seated on the few chairs; the children would squat on the floor. Very seldom did I see women, especially daughters-in-law, sitting with the rest of the family: not only was it considered inappropriate for them to sit with the men (particularly in Pakistani families with rural background) but more important, they were the ones responsible for the housework. The men of the household were usually the most avid viewers because they could afford not to be distracted by household tasks, which kept the women busy in the evenings when dinner was being prepared and served or on Sunday mornings when the house had to be cleaned, clothes washed. While the men and children kept up a running commentary on the show, the women were usually silent, instead discussing it among themselves the next day.
Most women I worked with did not have the luxury of sitting ‘glued to the television set’; the following analyses are therefore predicated on the premise that notions of ‘viewing’ have to encompass more than the visual act of watching television. Further, the cultural and political significance of viewing has to be seen in terms of its restructuring of social relations within the family.
What role did the viewers' intense engagement with television play in their constitution as national and gendered subjects? Was the primary question behind studying the viewing habits and style of Karachi Company.
FOUR ETHNOGRAPHIC CASE STUDIES
Discussions with viewers helped to obtain a glimpse of their engagement with the ideologies of nationalism and gender inscribed in
180 everyday discourses on ‘appropriate behavior’ for Pakistani women: on women’s place in the family, their relationship with men, and, most powerfully, their duties to the nation.
Case Study- 1
Notions of Pakistani Womanhood
Ashraf and his wife, Saira, came from Skardu. Ashraf worked as a junior clerk with an army intelligence organization. Tall and broad- shouldered, he had a bushy, somewhat theatrical, military moustache. He loved to talk and was one of the warmest- most articulate person. Like many Pakistanis raised in the North, Ashraf spoke very filmi Urdu (a somewhat melodramatic Language imbibed from Urdu films). He often made rude comments about his wife in her presence, but I was told that he spent days and nights nursing her when she was sick (which was quite often). Saira was tall and skinny. She was usually silent when her husband was present but when she was alone with my female co-researcher, she would talk. Ashraf's favorite serial was Tipu Sultan: he felt it showed ‘real story’ of a man who died for his country. Hence, he said, viewers could see what ‘real patriotism’ and sacrifice were all about. He continued: ‘Young people who see this program can know that instead of wasting their energies, they can do things that will prove they are worthy of the wombs of their mothers.’
One morning soon after a repeat telecast of old epic drama Wafa Kay Putlay (creatures of loyalty) had ended, I asked Ashraf what he thought of the heroine's courage in persuading her reluctant husband to go to the battlefront on the morning after their wedding night. Ashraf had been impressed by her. ‘But,’ he went on to say, ‘Pakistani women are not all like that. If all women were like that, no one would be able to look disrespectfully at Pakistan [koi bhi aankh utha kar nahi dekh sakta}.’ His statements reveal an imperceptible slide from ‘mother’ to ‘motherland’:
181 women are ‘subjectified’ as mothers and held responsible for inspiring their children to safeguard Pakistan's honor’. At the same time, Pakistan is feminized as the mother has been made the object of protectionist discourse.
How did these notions affect Ashraf's behavior toward his wife? I found that he seemed to apply similar standards to her. In one episode of wafa kay putlay the mother of the hero, Abdul Hamid, persuades his father to get him married by saying, ‘Put a ring through the bull's nose. That will prevent him from roaming around.’ I had been deeply offended by this metaphor and, while the episode was still on, asked both Ashraf and Saira (Saira was sitting quietly after serving us tea) what they thought of it ? Ashraf replied that he agreed with Hamid's mother: ‘Women these days cling to their husbands' feet and don't allow them to go anywhere. My wife even stops me from going by bus these days, let alone allows me to go to war.’
I silently turned to Saira, willing her to reply. She did not contradict her husband directly. Instead she pointed out that Hamid's wife, despite all her fears, had run after him to bid him farewell. ‘When he was so keen to go, what could she do? She had to submit to his wishes,’ she replied, her voice heavy with resignation. But both Abdul Hamid's mother and Ashraf saw women (more specifically wives) as sources of constraint. Ashraf seemed to feel that men had to curb their ‘courageous’ impulses because of women's cowardly fears for their safety. In both cases, women were conceived as obstacles to masculine heroism.
Ashraf felt that plays like Tipu Sultan and wafa kay putlay might have a beneficial effect on women because after watching it, they might also become ‘brave’ {bahadur} and encourage their husbands to fight and sacrifice for the country. ‘Don't you think there are already women who are brave, women who themselves do brave things?’ 1 persisted. He replied that
182 there were, how they are very rare. He gave an example of a soldier's wife in Rawalpindi whose husband had died in Siachin. When the government organized a function to honor him and presented her with a cheque, she returned it, saying that her husband’s sacrifice for his country was compensation enough for her. And what was more, he continued, she had insisted that her husband may not be called as dead (marhoom). According to Ashraf, she had said, ‘My husband is not dead, he is a martyr [shaheed].’ Ashraf was so moved by this sentiment that he repeated the sentence at least three times. Then, after keeping quiet for a few seconds, he shook his head and said, ‘Pakistani women are great.’
I asked him if he blamed women for worrying about their husbands and sons going to war? When he replied that he would be proud to admit his son into the army, 1 turned to his wife and asked her what she thought of that. She smiled and put her son's head against her chest (he was sitting between his parents on the bed), and started to stroke his hair. For a minute she was silent. Then after pausing a while, she turned to me and said: ‘He is my only child. How can I put him in the army?’
Ashraf burst out laughing. ‘See!’ he said ‘See how cowardly [buzdil] she is! If all mothers start getting scared like this, who will protect Pakistan?’
I felt horrible that I had exposed Saira to her husband. It was all right for men, whose position in society was relatively secure, to be ‘brave,’ but how could he blame women, who were so socially vulnerable. Referring particularly to the plight of women whose husbands die in war, 1 asked if their fear was unfounded given the low status of widows in Pakistani society. He replied that while it was true that widows had a hard time in Pakistan, if one conducted herself ‘properly’ {sahi tarah), even criminals {goondas} would fold their hands and call her ‘sister’ (Behen).
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I then asked him what he thought of television's depiction of Pakistani women in general. His answer was off-track. He said that one day, while going somewhere by bus, he had seen a girl wearing a ‘very short’ shirt and low neck. Some men were teasing her. ‘Now, how can you blame boys for teasing her?’ he asked, continuing; ‘being modern is all right, but there are some rules [taqazay] in this culture. This is not the way Pakistan women should dress.... Look at what happens with foreign women. They divorce five, six times. What is the meaning of marriage then? What happens to the children, to the family, then? If there is no family, where is society? Pakistani women have different rules’.
He insisted that the most important ‘duty’ (farz) of a Pakistan woman to her country was to protect her family and ‘see that it never falls apart.’ ‘But what happens if the man is bad, if he ill-treats her?, I asked. ‘Should she still stay with him? Everything is in the wife's hands,’ he replied. ‘If she wants, she can save him, she can put him on the right path [sahi raaste par]. It is her responsibility to do so.’
In Ashraf's view, clearly, women's place in the nation is analogous to their place in the family: it is their duty to protect and to sacrifice for the family. But in this scheme women do more than play a supporting role: it falls to them to protect the integrity of family and nation and to do so by inspiring and, if necessary, inciting their men to fight for the motherland. And women alone have the strength to do so. Indeed, this is why only heroic sons can be ‘worthy of the wombs’ of their mother and motherland.
The conception of Pakistan Womanhood in terms of heroic motherhood is evident both in Ashraf's discourse and in that of epic serials, which dwells on the motive of women inspiring their sons to fight for the motherland. Leaders during war with India spoke of how the motherland was threatened by the enemy (attackers), but Ashraf and many other 184 viewers appeared to have picked up a major theme of the TV message that of the motherland threatened by hostile neighbors. The purported heroism of the ideal Pakistani Woman is thus measured by her capacity to incite or inspire her children to fight for their country, and not simply by her ability to bear patriotic sons.
Case study-2
The Limits of Modernity and Liberalism
Discussions about popular female characters also revealed a fascinating convergence between discourses of gender and those of her obligations. During 1997-98, a public controversy over the portrayal of women was high. Everyone, from vegetable vendors and taxi drivers to upper-class intellectuals who usually dismissed television serials, was discussing this aspect. A leading newsmagazine ran a poll to ask which aspect of Pakistani women be shown on TV- an educated, liberal and confident person or an obedient, submissive and dependent housewife. It asked which of the two better represented ‘the modern Pakistan Woman.’ Many comparisons and contrasts were drawn between the two: one who symbolizes devotion and patience, and the other, noted for her intelligence and fiery strength. Historically, both have served as symbols of Pakistani Womanhood. For instance, modern liberal and educated urban class have appropriated both.
Conversations with women of different ages were particularly interesting because they illustrated how notions of Pakistan Womanhood were being reconstituted (rather than radically transformed) across generations. Rabia lived in satellite town Rawalpindi. Her father was a retired clerk, and her mother, Habiba, worked as a stenographer in a government department. Rabia had just got a job as a secretary in a Multi- National Company, where she felt out of place because most of the other
185 employees came from much wealthier families. This sense of alienation did nothing to strengthen her fragile self-confidence. While my conversations with all others were in Urdu, she and I spoke English heavily laced with Urdu. This was the time when a serial Hawwa kay naam ( eve)sponsored by the Human Rights project was on air . It was a story of a brave women lawyer who is married to the son of a feudal landlord and fights for poor girls who become victim of male brutality in cities and villages. She comes across a beautiful village girl who has run away from home after the death of her father because her uncle wants to snatch property and wealth she should inherit.
One Sunday morning a couple of weeks after the serial Hawwa kay naam had come to an end, Rabia and I were sitting on her veranda. Rabia talked of how, as a young woman from a poor family, she felt isolated by her wealthier colleagues. She felt she wasn't assertive enough. We soon began talking about the depiction of a Lawyer in the serial. Rabia had just started comparing the lawyer with the village girl when her mother joined our conversation. This excerpt from the exchange between Rabia and Habiba illustrates the change and continuity inherent in their notions of suffering, and strength, and it clearly shows the intimate relationship between ideologies of cultural nationalism and of gender:
Rabia: I liked Lawyer better than Village girl. Village girl was a complete washout.... Habiba: Why is that? 1 liked Village girl more. I liked her more because she did not have as much glamour. She was simple. You could see devotion more clearly in Village girl, at every step. Rabia: But why did she submit at every step. But this was not so in the case of Lawyer.... They did not show her loyal to her husband just for the sake of loyalty. In this era there is no
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absolute loyalty. There can't be as much as there was in Village girl's time. I don't know, where will this loyalty take us Pakistani women today? Aren't American women where they are today because they are more independent than we are? According to Habiba, Village girl was much stronger than Lawyer. Her strength, her loyalty came from her capacity to suffer for her family that is her duty towards her husband. But Rabia disagreed. She felt that modern times required an awareness more akin to Lawyer's rage. And Pakistani women, she seemed to say, were essentially different from American women, who were more independent. Another young woman with whom I spoke went so far as to claim that Lawyer seemed ‘less Pakistani’ than Village girl: when I tried to probe her meaning, I discovered that she felt Lawyer was ''''Westernized’ because the heroine questioned and challenged her elders on the propriety of their actions. Ideal Pakistani Womanhood is constructed in terms of values deemed fundamentally womanly, essentially Pakistani modesty, patience, and, above all, a strong sense of duty towards the family, the community, and the nation.
The convergence between cultural and gender became clearer when, several months later, Rabia compared Pakistani women with ‘foreign’ or ‘Western’ women. Rabia and 1 usually watched together. In another serial the heroine is forced into an arranged marriage. After a couple of years of trying to make a go of it, she asks her husband for a divorce so that she can reunite with her lover. This was the time when colleague Hina had joined discussion. Once, just as that episode was drawing to a close, Rabia responded with bewilderment outrage:
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Rabia: It's not possible to get a divorce that easily in Pakistan. In Pakistan a divorce means that it's a very free wheeling lady. I don't think there are many women who do that. Okay, the number has increased, but Pakistani women are still not so keen on divorce. Hina: Why is that? Rabia: I think it's because of our culture. Because marriage means it's forever; it's not as if you can get a divorce that easily. The thought doesn't come into our minds. Hina: You think this is more true of Pakistani marriages and Pakistani women? Rabia: Very much so, very much so. Rabia firmly believed that the heroine was at fault because she had not tried hard enough to save her marriage:
Rabia: I still feel she didn't try to make the marriage a success. I didn't like that. Why doesn't she make an effort to make a go of the marriage? She's got married, now she should try that the marriage stays safe. It seems to me that she was very casual about it all. That's not how it happens. Hina: What do you mean? Rabia: Well, you know, it's very unbecoming for a Pakistani woman. It was plain that she strongly disapproved of the heroine's actions because she deemed them inappropriate for Pakistani women and felt that they had no place in what she called ‘our culture.’ Rabia, like some other young women with whom I spoke, seemed to be caught between two sets of beliefs about women's independence. She felt that it was ‘unbecoming’ for Pakistan women to divorce their husbands - women's independence should never be allowed to break up an unhappy marriage. Yet in an earlier conversation she had argued that as a young woman she was better off emulating the ‘independence’ of ‘American women’. Like Ashraf, Rabia
188 invoked idealized notions of Pakistani Womanhood in comparing Pakistani and Western women.
In serials and in popular discourse in general, Pakistan Womanhood is now beginning to be conceived in terms of useful citizenship, productive labor, and selfless social activism; in short, the ideal Pakistani Woman is one whose energies are harnessed to the task of promoting social and national progress in various and multiple ways.
Case study-3
Impact of TV programs on Real Life
Shahnaz was a middle-aged Punjabi woman. She had never been to school, and said that she had learnt a lot from observing people. 1 know she thought that I, for all my ‘foreign’ education, was extremely naive about ‘what really goes on in families’, in spite - or perhaps because - of being a silent witness to her husband's and son's brutalization of her young daughter-in-law. Shahnaz felt that television was powerful because one could learn from it. When she was growing up, she said, women were not allowed to go to the cinema. Even though she had been living in Lahore, she never got to watch films until she started to see them on television. In many ways, she told me, television was her window on the rest of the world. However, she insisted, not everyone could learn from watching television:
‘One had to have a particular (Ehsas) ‘feeling’ or ‘emotion’; neither of these words quite captures the meaning of Ehsas in one's heart. One morning a couple of days after the last episode of her favorite serial, Hawwa kay naam, had been aired, I asked her what she thought of it. She replied: ‘When you read Quran, you should read it with a certain Ehsas in your heart. It's the same thing when you watch something on television.’
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But what was this Ehsas? I pressed her. Did it reside in the heart, only to surface when one watched something touching? Or was it an experience of seeing something emotional unfold on the screen? If that were the case, wouldn't everyone learn something, the same thing perhaps, from a particular serial? But Ehsas, Shahnaz replied, was not quite so simple. She explained it with reference to her experience:
‘The first time 1 watched an Urdu film nothing much happened. But then I saw a second, then a third, then a fourth. Then one day as I watched, Ehsas came to me {Ehsas aa gaya].... By then 1 too had a family. I was watching this film called Dewar Bhabhi (the story of the lady and her husbands younger brother, who in Pakistani society is considered as son or like real brother). It was all about how this young woman suffers after she gets married. It was all about how you suffer in the world. How much the bhabhi [brother's wife] suffers! I just couldn't stop crying. I thought, suppose I have to face what she is going through, what will happen?’
This encounter taught Shahnaz how to watch films and television serials. According to her, one had to surrender to the mood of what was being watched, to learn from it, one had to be part of the happening on the screen. And one had to be at a point in life where what was watched made sense personally. This mode of watching, and interacting, became clearer when Shahnaz recounted what had happened to her daughter Surayya when she saw a scene in which the village girl is publicly disrobed in the court:
‘My daughter, when she saw (what happened], cried and cried. She cried all morning. Imagine what happened to the girl! And in public, in front of her relatives! A feeling came to my daughter {Ehsas aa gaya}: What will happen to me when I get married and go to my in-laws' home? Isn't this what happens?’
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According to Shahnaz, we learn about life from the emotions {Ehsas} television's discourses arouse in us. As Shahnaz explained to me, one has to acquire the ability to learn from what is watched, and this ability comes from, among other things, frequent exposure. The film Dewar Bhahhi would not have aroused Ehsas in her had she watched it before she was married. She also insisted that not just anyone could learn: only those who, in her words, had an ability to ‘enter the soul’ of what they watched could do so.
However, it is important to emphasize that Ehsas do not emerge in a vacuum, a result of a text's ‘impact’ on an isolated viewer; we have to foreground the socio-cultural bases of these experiences. Shahnaz was socially '''habituated’ to read Quran and to watch the TV with a particular Ehsas in her heart. Her unmarried daughter's tears at Village girls disrobing reinforced a fear when she saw how other daughters-in-laws (including the one in her family) were treated. These Ehsas, these feelings and emotions, were products of the social relations in which they were embedded. In other words, emotions are ‘social practices organized by stories that we both enact and tell,’ and ‘persons are constructed in a particular cultural milieu’ of experiences, meanings, relationships, and images, all of which are socially mediated (Rosaldo 1984: 143, 138). I have shown that some experiences, ‘stories,’ and representations involve interactions between viewers, located in particular socio-cultural contexts, and the texts of television. Many emotions are themselves produced by the social practices that television's narratives mediate and create.
But are we to think that everyone who watches serials will automatically assume the subject positions created by the discourses of television? I found that even as they deeply identified with characters on television, many viewers were simultaneously able to stand back and criticize what they watched. Neither they nor I saw any contradiction
191 between these two apparently divergent modes of viewing. Viewers loved to critique the acting ability of the cast or the competence of the director. Similarly, they would often comment that, for example, a particular set was ‘stagey’ or the ‘photographer’ had done a ‘boring job’.
Case Study– 4
Redefining the Class Positions and Political Awareness
Many viewers had definite opinions about what television ‘ought to’ depict – that is, about appropriate or inappropriate subject matter. Jamil khan worked as an unskilled employee in a garment factory. An accomplished storyteller, he would narrate the sagas of serials (and of his life) in intricate detail and with great flourish. He had a stormy relationship with his wife, a junior clerk in the Education Ministry, and often said that watching television was one of the few ways in which he could calm her. But, he complained, some serials encouraged people's ‘superstitions.’ He felt that there was no place for ‘this sort of thing in serials because ‘superstition’ (Twaham parasti} was ‘wrong’. He thought television producers were sometimes very careless about how they constructed stories: ‘You know how they make serials - they pull from here, cut from there, try to patch a story together somehow.’
His thoughts on the appropriate subject matter for television were based on a theory of the relationship between reception and class, a belief that television could lead ‘certain types’ of people astray. For he went on to say:
‘People shouldn't believe everything they see on TV, but they often do.... Because people are uneducated they believe everything they hear. People should not be guided. Imagine if village men and women who live in Kachi Abadi (Slums in the shantytown some 200 yards from his house) see
192 all this! They will believe every word.... Someone has to guide them, to explain to them that this is not how things really are.’
Himself only a matriculate and precariously lower middle class, Jamil was conscious of what he clearly perceived as the privileges of his wife’s
class position, which, he felt, gave him a critical awareness that poorer people lacked. Further, Jamil, like many other men I spoke to, had definite ideas about style and plot, especially the resolution of narrative tensions and conflicts. What he disliked most were the conclusions of many serials. He insisted that they concluded too abruptly that nothing seemed to be resolved (koi faisla hi nahi hota); one never got a sense of ‘what really happened’ in the end. He speculated that perhaps most of the time they ended before ‘the original story’ (that is, the script) had concluded.
More importantly, most people I talked with were acutely conscious that the serials they watched had been selected, censored, and shaped by the state. They often commented that when terrorists threatened the integrity of the country, there would be a series of serials dealing with national harmony. One young man complained that although she enjoyed the stories, he was getting tired of the same old themes. Some people saw even more direct connections between the plots of serials and the political motivations of the ruling party. When I asked one viewer if he enjoyed watching serials, he replied that he had enjoyed them until a few years ago but that ever since Benazir and Nawaz Sharif had come to power one by one and now General Musharraf, the programs had deteriorated. ‘All they show now,’ he complained, ‘is girls and boys in love and their problems.’ The prime minister, Mir Zafar ullah Jamali was then making statements about a need to create awareness on ‘the real Pakistan,’ that is, ‘Revival of Pakistan movement spirit.’ This viewer, along with countless others who pointed out the same thing, was quite astute in grasping why audiences were suddenly
193 being subjected to a number of hastily produced serials prepared on the subject with less creativity and sincerity.
Television watching, is gradually becoming an opportunity for people to sit around and complain about the power and, very often, the ‘stupidity’, ‘they must be very stupid [bewaqoof] to think we're this gullible of the government’. However, we need to be extremely cautious about concluding that this critical awareness signifies that people are somehow ‘outside’ the reach of the state or that they simply ‘resist’ dominant discourses received through television. Viewers' responses to what they watch cannot be encompassed by categories such as ‘resistance’ and ‘submission.’ Oppositions! readings, as I hope to demonstrate, are a great deal more complex and slippery.
For instance, the viewers I interviewed would often ‘submit’ to one of the multiple discourses constituting a serial but would appropriate another to criticize the government. One of my conversations with Jamil Khan began with his recapitulation of an emotional episode of Jinnah sey Quaid, (the father of the nation). The main theme of that episode, according to not just Jamil Khan but also the others present, was the loyalty and honesty of Jinnah. Jamil Khan used the episode to contrast Jinnah with present-day politicians who betrayed their supporters. He launched into a detailed description of the joy experienced by Jinnah and his friends and likeminded people when they reunited after several years, and he pointed out that when he became Governor General, Jinnah remembered to fulfill his promises. He exclaimed: ‘Jinnah never betrayed his people (AWAM); he bridged the huge divide between himself and them.’ Jamil Khan summarized the story thus: ‘This story is about a leader and his people, about poor people and a ruler’. Jamil Khan continued: ‘Isn't that the way it should be? Not as it is in our country now. Whether it's a leader or a P.M., they're only interested in keeping their seat their treasury. The people can starve to death, but they
194 don't care. Who cares about the people? When it's time for the election, politicians come with their hands folded and say, we'll do this for you, we'll do that for you. What will you [they; that is, politicians] do [Kya karoge tum], You only come to us when you need us. Otherwise who asks about us? Now look, we have to pay Rs. 10 a kilo for onions. Imagine, how are people like us to manage? It's true that the government has increased pay scales. But it doesn't make any difference. I would be rather happy if they kept prices down.’ Thus, the people were found extremely aware of the power of state and manipulation of power through television discourses, overtly or covertly.
My objectives in this interpretation through case studies have been twofold: to analyze the place of television in the constitution of cultural, national and gendered subjects and, thus, to arrive at an understanding of how popular texts can be conceptualized. I have tried to argue that culture and gender are inherently linked. Discourses on gender seem to crystallize most clearly in discussions centered on the qualities of particular types of women, Pakistani women. Similarly, as evident in the responses of viewers to various serials like Hawwa, tipu sultan and Jinnah Say Quaid, culture is intrinsically both gendered and engendering, creating specific subject positions for men and for women. But, as we have seen, viewers interpret, appropriate, resist, and negotiate these subject positions. Discourses of culture and nationhood regulate those of gender and vice versa. I have tried to draw attention both to the multiplicity of interpretations and to the parameters within which those interpretations are made.
Hence, although television plays a critical role in the constitution of discursive practices, its cultural and political significance cannot be understood simply in terms of a clear-cut division between the hegemonic text and the passive viewer. Through viewers' interpretations, we can conceive of popular culture as a site for resistance as well as domination. And by studying the different ways in which viewers actively engage with
195 what they watch, we can break away from theories of popular culture that foreclose the process of interpretation in the production of meaning.
The viewer is positioned not simply by the text but also by a whole range of other discourses, with those of gender and culture being dominant in Pakistan television; viewers' deep emotional engagement with television, the Ehsas that a text arouses in them, enables them to discuss about themselves and their lives. For better or for worse, they learn through Ehsas about their place in the world. Rabia's apparently confused views on women's independence, Ashraf's ambivalence about women's ability to be ‘patriotic citizens,’ and Jamil Khan's ‘submission’ to and appropriation of Tipu Sultan and Jinnah sey Quaid to criticize the contemporary Pakistani politics indicate that television often offers people contradictory subject positions. Thus, there is a two-way relationship between viewers' lives and the narratives in TV serials: what people watch is mediated by and at the same time helps illuminate developments in their lives. It is important to note, how frequently viewers linked their favorite serials with their lives: it seemed to be the easiest way for many of them to discuss not just what they watched but also their own experiences. Indeed, in many of our conversations the boundaries between texts and lives often blurred so I found it hard to separate whether we were talking about a television character or about the viewer.
PROFESSIONAL VIEW ON PTV PROGRAMS
The culture of modernity
In countries like Pakistan, Egypt, India and China with major television production capabilities of their own, the more pressing question may be how the internal cultural politics of government-controlled media articulate with contested visions of modernity. An anthropologist interested in Pakistan would want to ask what sorts of differences Pakistani television actually reveals to its audiences and what difference this makes to those 196 exposed to it. What, in fact, is the relationship between television and modernity?
More than any other form of mass media, especially in a place where many remain non-literate, television brings a variety of vivid experiences of the non-local into the most local of situations – the home. So when someone like famous writer Intizar Hussain laments the decline of the Lahore’s Pak Tea House (a place where intellectuals and writers used to sit and discuss in the evening), explaining 'People used to go the Pak Tea House to listen to great writers and poets’. These events filled the role played by television serials today but he forgets that this older form of entertainment, with the imaginary non-local worlds it conjured up, was only available to men. Television gives women, the young, and the rural as much access as urban men to stories of other worlds.
In Pakistan, a concerned group of culture-industry professionals have considered these women, youths and rural people an inferior object in need of enlightenment. They consider themselves as guides to modernity and assume the responsibility of producing, through their television programs, the virtuous modern citizen. Especially in the dramatic serials, which are Pakistan's most popular television fare; they seek to 'educate' their public. Their faith in the impact of television is spurred by the debates their serials provoke among critics and other parts of the urban intelligentsia. The nationalist message is broadcast into a complex social space where the very local and the transnational both exert their power.
Television creating a modern Nation
Television producer and director Yawar Hayyat describing the beginnings of Pakistani television, noted that in a general atmosphere of national advancement, the government had a plan for using media and art to change people's views on political participation and life. Films and serials 197 of the 1970s were based on literary works in order 'to educate people, enlighten them, and draw them into the policy of the new revolution in transforming Pakistani society from a feudal, capitalist society into a liberal and modern one’. In the same breath, he added that many serials were based on novels by Pakistan's great writers 'to help the uneducated Pakistani youth in rural areas, the provinces, and in cities other than Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, (who had no concern with culture) to become acquainted with those great writers'.
This professed interest in educating and 'culturing' the poor and those outside the urban capitals was echoed by Athar Viqar Azim, one of Pakistan's foremost television directors and a senior officer in PTV, who argued that television in a developing country plagued not just by illiteracy but by cultural illiteracy should not simply entertain; it has to work to eliminate this cultural illiteracy. Linking culture and social responsibility, he defined culture, as familiarity with the news, appreciation of art and a taste for art, music, theatre. Culture is the concern of the individual, which comes from knowledge. Azim concluded that since drama was the most loved form, it had to be exploited to teach people.
The television entertainment as serious art is socially or politically uplifting in contrast with commercial entertainment. Azim distinguished between serials people enjoyed watching and those whose effects carried on long. He criticized colleagues for making pumpkinseed serials - serials that were fun to watch, like love affairs of teenagers but gave no real nourishment. He defended government policy regarding television in the 1970s claiming that it enabled television to produce a common national dream, not only inside Pakistan but in the whole South Asia. It made people enthusiastic and optimistic. He contrasted this to what had happened since the mid-1990s when private companies began producing programmes, their
198 only interest being to entertain people and their hands being tied by the necessity of selling their programmes.
This contest between the idealistic vision of television drama as the producer of a modern cultured citizen with a national consciousness and the competing tendency of Pakistan television to present 'cheap' entertainment was dramatically played out during 1993. In Pakistan, cartoons in a weekly magazine showed a government minister on the telephone noting that the best time to raise prices on goods without anyone protesting was between 8.oo and 9.oo p.m., the time the soap was being aired.
The Heydays
In the year 1985 people had been emotionally riveted by a brilliant Pakistani television serial Waris written by Amjad Islam Amjad. This was the quintessential non-pumpkin-seed serial. Called Ptv drama, it followed the fortunes and relationships of a group of characters from the traditional Lahore neighbourhood , taking them from the late 1960s, when Pakistan was under the rule of General Ayub Khan, up to the coming of another general. Although many Pakistani television serials have captured large audiences and generated discussion and affection, and the local productions are generally more popular than foreign imports, the broadcast of this unusually long and high-quality serial was a national cultural event. Its popularity was not confined to the millions who regularly followed the evening serials but extended to the intelligentsia who were provoked by its political messages. The merits of the serial were debated in newspapers and magazines and a leading intellectual, Ahmad saleem, even used it as a metaphor for 'Pakistan's real abilities'. In a brief essay in a major weekly magazine, Afro Asia, he contrasted the successful serial, with its excellent text, capable director, talented and devoted actors, and involved audience with the failures of current political activity in Pakistan, suggesting that
199 what Pakistan needed was a better political text to guide its director (the President), more respect for its citizens, and the introduction of new political actors.
With little daytime television and a state-controlled television industry until recently only minimally supported through advertising, there never developed in Pakistan an equivalent of the US daytime soap opera. Instead, since the late 1980s, the form of the evening dramatic serial (Afshan) consisting of anywhere from fifteen to thirty episodes broadcast once a week, had dominated Pakistani television entertainment. Although as television critics have noted, the strict definition of television genres is becoming increasingly problematic, serials are distinguishable from daytime or prime-time soap operas in being finite and self-contained, offering viewers some sort of dramatic resolution by the final episode. Like soap operas, however, most Pakistani serials are set in the domestic space, using limited and familiar sets; more importantly, their plots revolve around unfolding personal relationships often presented melodramatically. Much like the USA and British prime-time soaps of the 1980s (e.g. Dallas, Dynasty and East- Enders) that have deliberately sought wider audiences, Pakistani serials are believed to have women as their primary audiences while reaching out successfully to whole families including men and children.
Today’s PTV drama, more than most Pakistani serials, seems to be a hybrid product. Although its talented writers denied in print that they had given audiences a Pakistani Falcon Crest (an American prime-time soap that had aired several years earlier), there are numerous aspects of PTV drama in which the influence of such American programs can be detected. If the prime-time soap opera can be defined by its peculiar mixing of the aesthetics of melodrama, realism and light entertainment, then PTV drama fits the description. Strong on emotional drama, the serials focus on the faces and feelings of its characters and intensifies its effects through
200 dramatic music. As in other Pakistani serials tears are plentiful, if balanced by laughter and anger. Like the British soap operas (and unlike the American) that take realism more seriously, the serial is set in particular neighbourhoods and attempts to depict class differences.
What makes today PTV drama seem most like American prime-time soaps is that it consumes element of spectacle. The costumes are lavish, the sets sumptuous, and at least some of the women characters extravagantly glamorous and fashionable. The aristocratic central characters move elegantly among their villas and luxurious apartments, the key woman character elaborately made up and dressed in a different outfit for each of well over a fifteen episodes.
Though by definition serials differ from soap operas in having resolutions, some serials were unusual in deferring their resolution for so long. PTV drama allowed for the development of the kind of attachment to characters that soap-opera audiences relish. Analysts have noted that among the distinguishing features of the soap-opera genre is the centrality of strong women characters. This does not apply to PTV drama with its weak women figures in each generation. American soap operas have been characterized as a women's genre because they privilege the personal, depicting even the non-domestic work scenes in terms of personal relationships. The Pakistani serials on the contrary portrayed the personal lives of individuals, had the moral themes of loyalty, betrayal, corruption, thwarted desires and tragic errors embedded in an historical narrative that tied individual lives to Pakistani national political events. It did what no American soap would ever do: it provided an explicit social and political commentary on contemporary Pakistani life.
The question if PTV drama promoted the theme of national unity? Is still unanswered. Agha Nasir, a noted playwright and former director of PTV claims ‘with the exception of a very few truly evil characters, the characters 201 of different classes and political persuasions were shown to be basically good and patriotic. Our hearts went out to them as many were led astray, reacting to romantic and political blows. But in the end, they saw the errors of their ways, prevented by their love of Pakistan from pursuing the materialistic, immoral or corrupt paths they had taken. Even the young religious extremist (the first to be depicted in a Pakistani television serial) was sympathetically portrayed as part of a generation that had been led astray by the lack of national spirit.Ptv drama sought to teach and enlighten’.
Jalil Aali a poet and professor of Sociology in Rawalpindi says:
‘PTV drama failed to inform millions of ordinary Pakistanis about their country's modern history. Its characters do not participate in such activities as anti-social movements, the nationalization of factories during Bhutto’s era, the wars with India, political crack-downs in a police state, the so called rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the scams of the political looters. People’s lives were deeply affected by the economic liberalization of 'open door' policies, the increase in heroin addiction and drug trafficking, and the policies of state are never discussed by our TV’.
The debates in the press focused on the political perspective presented. As the headline of an article in the centre-right newspaper Jang bluntly asked, 'Do the Authors and directors of PTV drama have the right to write history from the government’s Viewpoint?' (Jang, 22 July, 2003). The serials then provided the occasion for setting the public straight. In the same newspaper, Ashfaq ahmad the leading establishment writer defended himself for not criticizing the PTV, noting that PTV drama was excellent drama, important for raising cultural standards in Pakistan.
PTV was criticized from other political perspectives as well. In the Liberal newspaper Dawn, the TV people were asked why they make the rich
202 and influential such a sympathetic characters and ignore the everyday problems of ordinary people. In Pakistan, another opposition newspaper that now presents the viewpoint of the Muslim Brotherhood, the paper's editor Zia Shahid, defended PTV’s right to free expression. He praised the new programming for depicting everyday religiosity, noting that he had earlier criticized PTV, like all television Channels, for never showing Islamic religious practices as part of daily life. Viewers speak out
Viewers were selective in their appreciation of the messages of the TV programs. They could disagree with the politics; they could marvel at and take pleasure in the defiant characters who lived as they could not. They accepted the moral stances presented only when they identified with their worlds. This was clearest in poor women's positive responses to the moral conservatism about family and a mother's role promoted by TV programs generally and PTV drama in particular.
The villagers of Central Punjab with whom I have worked are familiar with television. Every household in the village near Lahore where I have been working had a television set. Many were simple black and white sets with poor reception. Only on rare evenings would the television be silent; if there had been a death in the neighborhood or among one's kin, if someone was ill at home and receiving visitors. The most common reason for televisions to be silent was loss of electricity, something that happened for a few minutes almost every day and occasionally for long frustrating hours. And precisely because electric power in the village was so weak, children often had to do their homework by the light of the television sets.
For one thing, like their urban counterparts, villagers I knew were capable of selective readings of dramas. This was often necessary since the distance between the 'realities' dramatized in the serials and the lives lived in the village was vast. The fashionable blonde stars of TV drama in their
203 plush offices and grand mansions are most obviously far from these hardworking people in mudbrick single-storey homes with wooden doors wide enough to allow the donkeys, sheep and buffaloes to pass through into the pens inside; but the characters portrayed in Pakistani PTV drama are hardly much closer. Most Pakistani serials are set in urban locations and deal with urban, often upper class problems.
An anecdote about watching television in a relatively poor household can illustrate the gulf between local and television lives and the selective ways women interpret what they watch. One evening, Aamna, the vivacious but exhausted mother of the family, was preparing dinner with the help of her sister when the serial, Mahandi came on. Her sister had been there all day helping this overworked woman who had bread to bake and children to be watched when she went off to get fodder for the animals. The family was miserable that night -between the fever of the eldest son, the measles that had struck all four of the little girls, the three boys' end-of-year exams, the expenses and fatigue of a recent trip to a hospital in search of a cure for the chain-smoking father's asthmatic cough, and the government's announcement the previous day that the price of flour was to be raised, they wondered how they would cope. Yet the serial they watched centered on a wealthy diplomat's family and included characters like woman doctors, journalists and charming personalities with business problems.
As Aamna cooked, her sister, wrapped in the white cloak (chaddar women wear when they go visiting), shouted out a summary of the plot for her. She focused on the family dynamics that are the regular stuff of their own forms of telling life stories in the village. She also picked up the moral message of the serial about women and family - the importance of the mother's role in raising her children and the ill consequences for their children of mothers who abandon them or put themselves or their careers first.
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However, many of the 'women's issues' in this serial, (Mehndi) written and directed by one of Pakistan's few women directors, were constructed in psycho-social terms that were foreign to these women: 'psychological' problems like psychosomatic paralysis that love could heal, men unable to commit themselves to marry for fear of losing their freedom, mothers who cried because their children were not emotionally open with them, and psychiatrists treating drug addiction among the wealthy and educated. The women simply ignored in their discussions these aspects of the serial that were not part of their experience.
From my ethnographic work in the villages, I would also suggest that the villagers make elusive targets for the cultural elite's modernizing messages for a more complex reason: Although Television has created its own world, one that was for the villagers only part of their daily lives. What they experienced through television was added but did not displace whatever else already existed. They treated the television world not as a fantasy escape but as a separate sphere. Adolescents often had an encyclopedic knowledge of Pakistani films and serials and people knew a staggering amount about the private lives and previous roles of actors and actresses who starred in the serials. The young people read magazines but everyone had access to this knowledge through hours of viewing and the glorification of stars promoted by Pakistan television itself through interview programs and celebrity game shows.
In the villagers' attitudes toward the stars is a clue to the larger question of how television programs affect them. The villagers spoke 'about these stars as 'ours', somehow belonging to them as viewers, but not as 'us'. The same mix of entitlement and distance applied to the serials. They are for 'our' pleasure but they depict the lives of others who have different problems, follow different rules, and do not belong to the local moral
205 community. What these others do, then, has little bearing on what we do or how we conduct our lives.
This is not to say that television in general has not transformed social life; there are at least three areas in which careful ethnographic work might reveal significant transformations. First, in social life: there is less visiting among households in the evenings since families stay home to watch television. More important, television may have increased the number of 'experiences' shared across generation and gender. Television brings families together in the evening and makes it more likely that man and women will socialize together as they sit around the single television set in the house. The focus of attention is the evening serial but families converse with each other while waiting for it, as when the start of the serial is delayed by government ministers droning on during the televised press conferences and state addresses. Conflicts also arise, though, between generations and genders about which programs to watch, just as exposure to television differs by generation.
Second, television may have changed the nature of experience itself. Some Pakistani professionals rationalized to me viewers' pleasures using a discourse of continuity, suggesting, for example, that the serials are like 'the stories a grandmother tells her grandchildren to send them to sleep', or 'like The Thousand and One Nights where the story-teller would stop at the most exciting moment to attract the audience to listen to him the next day'.
The third area where television in general may be transforming experience is in its facilitation of new identifications and affiliations. Do the people feel part of an imagined community of citizens or consumers because they know they are watching the same programs at the same time and being offered the same goods as people across the country or globe?
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Two factors conspire to undermine the impact of TV programs. First, of course, the serials appear only as part of the flow of programming, sandwiched between films, pumpkin-seed serials, advertising, religious programmes, children's programmes, sports, news, and countless talking- head shows. More important, their messages are evaluated from within, and hence often balanced or even contradicted by the powerful everyday realities within which villagers, like poor workingwomen in Lahore suburbs, move. These realities are both resolutely local and transnational.
The people are folded into Pakistani modernity in a different way. The children who sing every morning the national anthem and memorize countless other nationalist songs from government schoolbooks may be somewhat receptive to the nationalist messages of television programs. The unity of rich and poor in national endeavors that PTV drama idealizes is undermined by their knowledge of how the wealthy buy their way out of the army and around all regulations. For urban women who are the exploited supports of a modern class system, solving the twin demands of work and respectability through 'Islamic' conjunctions.
The problem, finally, is that the kind of modernity these television programs depict as a vision for Pakistan depends on class position and the availability of certain kinds of educational and career opportunity. The 'uneducated public' at whom these serials are directed participates in the more common form of modernity in the postcolonial world: the modernity of poverty, consumer desires, underemployment, ill health and religious nationalism.
PTV News and Current Affairs
McQuail (2000) has defined news as: the main form in which current information about public events is carried by media. Its characteristics are timelessness, relevance, and reliability (truth value).
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Rayner, Wall and Kruger (2001) have defined it: News is information about contemporary happenings. It is way of attracting audience of people keen to be informed about the events taking place in the world they live.
For Television news presentation Rayner and Wall (2001) describe: there are a number of other prompts that suggest that news is important and has to be taken seriously. This includes type of signature music, the nature and status of newsreaders and the way in which the studio has been designed. It has a greater importance that use of phrases and presentation by newsreaders suggests that the world we have been shown is the only way in which it can be seen.
News construction and presentation is called the backache of PTV producers and newsmen which causes headache to audience but still PTV Khabarnama (National News Bulletin aired at 9 pm on network in Urdu language) is the most watched program. Former director News PTV Burhanudin Hasan (2000) who coined the name Khabarnama now calls it ‘most controversial and notoriously incorrigible item on PTV’. He continues saying, over 20 managing directors and several director of news and probably as many information secretaries and ministers as well as heads of states and governments failed to reform Khabarnama. He admits that it is a ‘non-news junk’. Presentation of news on PTV today seems to be just opposite of the lofty objectives laid down in the basic policy framework of the corporation (PTV). It has both historical and technical reason. First technical: the entire terrestrial network is owned by PTV as the pioneer broadcaster and no other rival broadcaster was allowed to air news bulletin until recently, in addition to the fact that satellite and private channels through cable are available to only less than 20 percent population which too in urban areas. Then historically: PTV has been a monopoly broadcaster and a blue eyed of the political and military governments for its mastery in repeating the same episodes of a singular event round the clock. With the 208 changes in governments, those who at one point of time were harsh critics of its role as ‘mouth piece of the government’ on coming to power became addicts of its tranquilizing news stories. It has been labeled for narrow casting and niche marketing by the professionals. This was a perpetual historical cycle which made PTV news the most ridiculous piece of presentation and it became a wonderful recipe for cooking political and social jokes. But before going further I would deliberate a little on the history of PTV news department first.
Television in Pakistan was started by a military government in 1964 through the professional support of radio and theatre people. Its first managing director was a non-professional bureaucrat with no experience and training of TV production. Similarly the people trained on radio news desk took their places in TV news desk. The old tradition of censorship and orthodoxy in presentation thus snailed into TV. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was the patron and off the camera director of entire happenings. It was not realized at the very beginning that TV as a new and most powerful medium of mass communication should run on professional grounds with proper training and professional approach. In news department, radio producers and news editors were put on news desk and semi literate newsreaders were placed in front of camera. This was the start of their own tradition which is continuing. Even the heads of PTV as an institution and heads of news department except some brief periods were nonprofessional blue-eyeds of the governments and the ministry of information. PTV took off with a peculiar style of its own not matching the international criteria, standards and norms in news presentation. This made the government’s job easier. These innocent people were not aware of what they were doing. During the last 40-year of its operation very few newsmen have undergone training inside and abroad. Most of them are even today not aware of modern news presentation and media operations. Excepts a few privileged ones none have undergone training in international
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media institutions. A more striking aspect of PTV news department is that a number of its key members were not even university graduates. This concern at one point was raised in the national parliament in early 90s. In the same way the crop of national newsreaders in Khabarnama has been marginally educated, some even not having a college degree.
Table – 58 Level of professionalism in PTV
Local Ability Ability Ability On Ability Formal to to to Camera Univer- to draft Training Foreign inter- Handle Handle Present- sity stories in TV Training view Camera Studio ation Degree indepen- News people in the Equip- Skill dently Production live field ments TV News Producers 10 13 Non 2 Non 3 Non 4 13 News Editorial staff 11 10 Non Non Non Non Non 7 14 News Controllers 3 5 1 1 Non Non Non 3 5 News Readers 7 -- Non Non Non Non --- Non (Khabarnama) 55
The above table shows that PTV News department at central news bureau in Islamabad desperately lacks that required skill without which modern television broadcasting is not possible. This aspect was realized and people sitting on PTV news desk confided with me that the environment and working of newsroom is not different from a typical government office. A former secretary ministry of information and broadcasting with a very grim heart told during an interview in Islamabad that despite his best efforts he could not bring about the change. ‘I was not in a position to change the
210 government policy regarding news coverage and undue publicity of the state machinery. But I tried to introduce some fresh ideas regarding style of presentation, language, accent and the coverage of international and social events. It was all-futile; I could not change the culture. It was like challenging the interests of those sitting inside’ he disclosed. He continued saying ‘the government policy and control is one aspect, it is not the end of the world. I believe that the news is not bad because it is one sided, it is unbearable due to its poor presentation’.
In a group discussion some former PTV employees and news men outburst with the disclosure that PTV is called family channel because it has the monopoly of few families. One outspoken former news editor said ‘half a dozen female newsreaders are the wives of PTV officers. They get undue bookings and special treatment’. I was told by a senior news editor on news desk one evening that one news reader is even not a matriculate, ‘he has some clandestine activities. The man performs some off camera functions, for producers and senior officials including supply of alcohol (which is prohibited in Pakistan). During my days at news desk in PTV newsroom, I was told on many occasions and it came to my personal observation that newsreaders have some special relations with top management. They could get junior producers transferred, and punished in case they object to their performance and try to correct their wrong pronunciations. I was told by a well-educated female newsreader that she had to avoid socializing with people because of bad reputation of other girls. She secretly told me that the ‘walls of the building have microphones and cameras and I am afraid’.
During a detailed interview, a former director of news admitted that selection criteria for newsreaders was not fair. But it was due to some compulsions. He said ‘the remuneration is so low that properly educated people do not come or if come do not stay long’. Another director in PTV had
211 the opposite version ‘due to their long association with submissive, semi- literate and socially weak people, the news people feel uncomfortable with properly educated, smart guys; obviously for the plain reason that a reader well conversant with current affairs and news not only is confident and enjoys self respect but at times also corrects these poor news editors and producers’. He continued telling me a joke that during a foreign visit of the prime minister when somebody asked a news reporter the name of French foreign minister he replied innocently ‘I don’t know because I am in news department of PTV’. During my stay in PTV newsroom, I observed that on most occasions outside people were booked for asking simple questions from experts or ministers on special events. When asked why can’t this be done by news people themselves, I was told that this was the policy. As such no policy was there. I saw people at higher level in news department badly embarrassed in case of emergency interviews with outsiders during a bulletin. I tried to probe the controller of news on the issue of proper training for newsmen but she could only say ‘outside training is not our policy. News desk is the biggest trainer; we all learnt here, why can’t they?’ I was surprised to know that majority of the news producers, editors and reporters had never faced a microphone or camera at all during their entire stay in the news department. They willingly had been avoiding such ventures mainly because of their internal shyness and absence of persuasion from the seniors.
I noticed and then it was verified by the people inside newsroom that a sizeable number of news producers, editors and reporters lacked basic writing skills. They joined TV news without any zeal for the profession. It was like any other job for them. One of them told me very honestly that he wanted to become an officer in some government ministry but ‘the member of parliament from my area who was the minister of information at that time, put me here’. ‘I do not enjoy this job at all. It is for the journalists not for the people like me’. When asked as to what was wrong with the job, he
212 said ‘you have to work hard without any reward. In news department you cannot oblige people. You cannot offer booking to your favorites. It is in the hands of seniors who pick girls from here and there and we have to obey both seniors and their girlfriends’. He continued sadly ‘in program side a producer can book anybody with his personal choice. They are enjoying the life’.
I observed during these days that most of the workload was shared by select few who had a better hand in writing. I observed a number of producers without any assignments.
In the sister department of current affairs the situation was more or less the same except that the presenters (anchors) were comparatively educated but still without any professional edge. The bookings were assignment based for individual programs. Out of seven producers, five had virtually no assignment in hand during two consecutive months. Small jobs like writing intro-lines were done by outsiders on payment. The anchors were again select few enjoying personal friendship of directors or the secretary and minister for information. One morning, I asked the director of current affairs ‘why the same faces are repeated for each occasion when a number of experts are available in the town?’ He gave a very intriguing reply saying ‘we have their contact numbers available and they live nearby’. When I asked about the criteria of selecting the anchors, he gave contradicting justifications, ranging from good looks, voice quality, confidence, good pronunciation and knowledge to mastery on the subject. One senior producer commented on his reply (after my meeting) ‘he is right because for interviewing a scientist, they prefer good looks and for conducting a discussion on current affairs, they look for voice quality and above all for covering a flower show they prefer knowledge of the current affairs’.
Now I will turn to the real issue which to some is the basic cause of contention and conflict. There are many repercussions of state control and 213 the ruling juntas hegemonic use of electronic media especially the television. The control of TV by the state and TV’s own internal shortfalls have interdependent consequence. First the ministry of information is un challenged pattern of state TV and uses this medium under her on whim to the delight of the prime minister and the president. The interesting fact that the minister and the secretary of ministry of information have their permanent parallel office in PTV station in Islamabad Shows that how close the government want to remain with media. The ministry dictates to TV the rule of the game and uses airtime under her free will. It happens so frequently that the Prime minister and president’s ‘official visits and addresses are shown on state TV during peak hours halting all commercials and draining out a big chunk of committed revenues. This phenomena of control has multiplier affects with chain of similar happenings even beyond the control of ministry of information. This prompts ministers sitting in other ministries to join this publicity ‘Cat Walk’. This stretches further to the members of the parliament at national level, members of provincial assemblies in the provinces where the chief ministers, governors and the ministers call the local head of TV stations for the coverage of their minor local level activities. In the end of the day the spots pile up in the central news desk and the decision of editing becomes impossible. This leaves no slot vacant for the coverage of opposition, genuine national events, international happenings and the stories of social and civic interest. The government is the singular financer of state TV operations for capital and recurring expenditures; adding to that is the political appointments in the TV at policy level. The management is least worried about fund generation, because the shortfalls are always met through national exchequer. The board of Director of Pakistan TV Comprises of sitting government servants without any participation from outside. The net result is that on one hand ruling parties demand list keeps expanding while on the other the politically appointed management is all out to express personal loyalties in a highly non-professional fashion. There was a consensus during a group discuss 214 that PTV news has bad presentation and presenters, have orthodox scripting and ending with ‘he said’ lot of verbal commentaries, less visuals and absolutely in sufficient on the spot coverage and absence of stories of human and social interest.
This complicated arrangement and one sided command of the media affairs (TV on top of it) by the government has rigged the faith and trust of the people on their own media. Isolated reactions are always voiced without buying an ear of the government but parallel to that is the reality that the system has crushed credibility of state TV. Lowering of credibility has again a snowball impact: the governments have bought in return a harsh and cruel defamation. The table–59 shows that during 57 years of independence and 40 years of the TV, all governments (military, elected or a mix of both) have used state media under their own whims. Hasan (2000) and Niazi (1999) have unanimous views over the unintelligent use of state media by the governments. Hasan calls it ‘no news junk’ and Niazi labels it with ‘media in chains’. Hasan has a strong opinion as former director of PTV news that television has borrowed less goodies from the government and returned much more evils in the form of discredit, defame and hatred among the people. He has given a long account of the methods by which state TV was misused by the successive military and non-military governments. He has a strong contention that the entire destruction was caused by the state control. Niazi has seconded his views though independently. Jabbar (2001) has the similar opinion despite the reality that he himself had enjoyed the armchair comforts in the ministry of information as minister and could do nothing except following the tradition of his predecessors. My personal observation and information do not conform to their views. I have agreement with them on the basis of my interviews and indepth discussions with a number of people that state TV has played a vitally cruel role in defaming the governments. It was a consensus opinion among all the intellectual circle and independent media professionals that
215 excessive publicity and unreasonable appearance on TV spoils and damages the image of heads of state. Still people refer to General Zia-ul-Haq as ‘the man in the box’ because of his extreme love for his own face on TV screen. The excessive publicity also damaged the image of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto inspite of his great personal charm and appeal. The successors learnt no lesson and were drowned in the same pond. I was told by a retired government officer in Islamabad that he was admirer of general Zia-ul-Haq in his initial days but ‘his repeated appearance on TV made me sick of his face and personality’. He said ‘first I started hating his persona and then his entire policies; the television exposed him’. A number of people had the opinion that when TV shows somebody so repeatedly people start disliking him and end up with acute hatred. A senior media manager during Z.A Bhutto’s period and now a consultant in a media firm was honest enough to admit ‘we could do no good to Bhutto by playing his personality on TV without limits’. With a dismal experience of three decades people have built a strong opinion that what TV shows and tells is wrong without question. A small survey carried out during the study suggested that the cable channels enjoy much higher viewership and credibility than PTV. Wherever Urdu channels are available through cable in urban areas people never switch to PTV Khabarnama and current affairs discussions; even the government ministers and the members of the parliament prefer to express their views on GEO and ARY simply because the opinion making segment of the society rarely watches PTV Khabarnama and current affairs programs. The situation is alarming for state media; in one hand its credibility is at lowest ebb while on the other the audience is taking flights to other channels.
My data and observations during the last so many years suggest clearly that still state control is not the only cause of deterioration and collapse. PTV’s internal structure, its self imposed internal policies, lack of professionalism and monopoly of unskilled disinterested staff are equally responsible for the current situation. There are areas where government
216 intervention is overwhelming but TV’s lack of professionalism has widened the gulf between audience and the media. PTV has failed on many fronts to produce good programs of general interest only because of its professional inability.
ROLE OF CIVIL AND MILITARY GOVERNMENTS
Now I will discuss democracy vs military rule and their role in shaping the broadcasting culture in Pakistan. The word democracy has been used as a misnomer to refer to good or bad broadcasting. Some professionals have tried to follow the American tradition of democratic media; the biggest exponent of which have been Marshal McLuhan during 70s and Everett Rogers in our time in late 1999 as opposed to the British school lead by Hall and Raymond Williams and the Frankfort School. In Pakistan the fashionable circles try to derive a correlation between democracy and elected governments to make a case in favour of their own intellectual consumption. They have described the role of media in relation to elected governments and non elected governments or to say military governments. They always forget in their intellectual discourses that democracy has its own definition in Pakistani context. They deliberately avoid to put forth the reality that democracy in Pakistan is not the exact antonym of military rule or dictatorship; but as a matter of fact is another system of government by the same people. It may look surprising to many thinkers that democracy and military rule are synonymous in Pakistan. I would not argue if democracy as a concept is put as an opposite to dictatorship or authoritarian rule. But in relation to the system of government in Pakistan the words have entirely different meanings in practice. Without going into political debate on the democratic practice and system of election and representation of people in the affairs of state, I would concentrate on the role of media and use of media during military governments and the elected governments which were there turn by turn. Television came to Pakistan much after the imposition of press laws which were dictatorial in nature but framed by the elected 217 governments and practiced and strengthened by the successive parliamentary and presidential rules in Pakistan. Radio broadcasting faced first centralized control in the era of so-called democracy in early 50s. Television though was introduced during the military rule but its worst use was seen in 70s when the first undisputed elections were held and Pakistan People’s Party of Z. A. Bhutto came to power. During the six years rule of Mr. Bhutto all the black press laws were protected and electronic media including television was used for personal image building of party members with worst type of defamation campaigns against the opponents. During three years period of Muslim League (Muhammad Khan Junajo) television followed the same tradition. Benazir Bhutto from 1988 to 1990 and then 1993 to 1996 used electronic media following the tradition of her father and his successors. Muhamad Nawaz Sharif from 1990 to 1993 and 1997 to 1999 used television for personal image building maintaining a complete black out of his opponents. The military rulers had been equally authoritarian and hegemonic in the use of television but the history has some grace points for them. The first and fair elections in the history of Pakistan were held in 1970 during a military rule and the media provided proper coverage to all political parties without bias. Onward 1999 Pakistan has witnessed a fresh air in the media environment when a number of private channels were allowed to operate and cable networks were licensed. Keeping aside the reality that military governments did not allow PTV to turn unbiased but equally true is the fact that during these years people have the opportunity of listening to outside voices through international broadcasters. The table-59 shows that elected and military governments have the similar track record in terms of media exploitation. It has been recorded by a scores of media writers that press freedom has been in better shape during military rules. More journalists were sent behind the bars during Liaquat Ali, Bhutto, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif period then during authoritarian rules by military. It also had been the tradition of elected governments in Pakistan to put non-professional management in TV and in 218 overall media, though military had the same attitude. This account of electronic media during various governments does not suggest that media was in better health during the period of elected governments. It also does not help imply that for a free media the country needs an elected rule. It is the attitude of ruling groups, military or civil, which makes media free. Now the question remains unanswered as to why elected governments never allowed media to operate freely and groom independently. The answer has roots in the history which tells how various civil governments were founded and what made them responsible for country’s affairs. The western philosophy of democratic media under democratic governments thus is invalid in Pakistani context both historically and genetically. The other major issue is public service broadcasting which is put parallel to public sector broadcasting in Pakistan by default. The concept of public sector broadcasting (PSB) was adopted in UK in 1920s, the most obvious example of which is British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) – founded in 1926. Theoretically the concept of PSB is to create an organization to serve the nation not to make money from the nation, financed by a license fee and is available to all. PTV has the similar mandate which promises to provide best entertainment, information, and education without running after the profit. The factual position is that PTV has been a broadcaster in public sector running on government money not making enough profit due to its internal faults. Further to that is the hard fact that onward years 1990, PTV has been running after profit still failing to provide entertainment, information and education to people. After the influx of international broadcasters in Pakistan all commercial entrepreneurs joined hands lead by advertising companies in the demand for converting PTV into a commercial organization in private sector. This extreme view was a reaction against the one sided and non-professional use of television. What these people seem unable to realize is that this extra-ordinary powerful medium must work for a greater purpose of nation building both economically and culturally. Private broadcaster should remain in the arena of competition but PTV as a 219 national public service broadcaster should safeguard the political social and cultural needs of the country. Pakistani cultural setting demands a television for all which is possible through public sector broadcasting only, as opposed to a free TV which may have dominant cultural aspects but without ethical content. This is needed in view of the fact that only a true national television can constitute modern identities because it has the capacity to organize generational experience, shared memories and articulate a common destiny. The time is still not ripe for a universal democratic media, floating on the tides of commercial market interests because market is not owned by the nation but by ‘others’. The television still respecting the commercial aspects must have financial support of the state at the time of hard choices which are too often in today’s market driven media environment.
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Table – 59 MEDIA UNDER VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS S. Media Status Period Years Category No Press Radio TV Govt. 1. Muhammad Ali Jinnah 15 Aug 1947 - 11 Sep 1948 01 Elected Free -- Controlled Govt. 2. Khwaja Nazim-ud-Din 14 Sep 1948 - 17 Oct 1951 03 Nominated Free -- Controlled Govt. 3. Malik Ghulam Muhammad 19 Oct 1951 - 05 Oct 1955 04 Nominated Free -- Controlled Govt. 4. Maj. Gen Sikandar Mirza 06 Oct 1955 - 22 Mar 1956 0.5 Military Controlled -- Controlled
PRESIDENT Govt. 1. Maj. Gen Sikandar Mirza 23 Mar 1956 - 27 Mar 1958 02 Military Censor -- Controlled 2. Gen Muhammad Ayub 27 Oct 1958 - 25 Mar 1969 10.5 Military Censor Govt. Govt. Controlled Controlled 3. Gen Muhammad Yahya Khan 25 Mar 1969 - 20 Dec 1971 02 Military Censor Govt. Govt. Controlled Controlled 4. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 20 Dec 1971 - 13 Aug 1973 02 Elected Censor Govt. Govt. Controlled Controlled 5. Ch. Fazal Ellahi 14 Aug 1973 - 16 Sep 1978 05 Elected Censor Govt. Govt. Controlled Controlled 6. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq 16 Sep 1978 - 17 Aug 1988 10 Military Censor Govt. Govt. Controlled Controlled 7. Ghulam Ishaq Khan 18 Aug 1988 – 07 Jul 1993 05 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Controlled 8. Waseem Sajjad 08 Jul 1993 - 13 Nov 1993 0.5 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Controlled 9. Sardar Farooq Laghari 13 Nov 1993 - 02 Dec 1997 04 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Control
221 S. Media Status Period Years Category No Press Radio TV Partial Freedom Govt. 10. Muhammad Rafiq Tarrar 02 Jan 1998 - 20 Jun 2001 03 Elected Free Govt. Control Controlled Partial Freedom Partially Controlled Govt. 11. Gen. Pervaz Musharaf 20 Jun 2001 - Onward Military Free Private Controlled Channels Allowed
PRIME MINISTER
Govt. 1. Liaquat Ali Khan 15 Aug 1947 - 16 Oct 1951 04 Elected Free -- Controlled Govt. 2. Kawaja Nazim-ud-Din 17 Oct 1951 - 07 Apr 1953 1.5 Elected Free -- Controlled Govt. 3. Muhammad Ali Bogra 17 Apr 1953 - 11 Aug 1955 2.5 Elected Free -- Controlled Govt. 4. Ch. Muhammad Ali 11 Aug 1955 - 12 Sep 1956 01 Elected Free -- Controlled Govt. 5. Hussain Shaeed Saharwardi 12 Sep 1956 - 18 Oct 1957 01 Elected Free -- Controlled Govt. 6. Ibrahim Ismaeel Chandragar 18 Oct 1957 - 16 Des 1957 0.5 Elected Free -- Controlled Govt. 7. Malik Feroz Khan Noon 18 Dec 1957 - 07 Oct 1958 01 Elected Censor -- Controlled 8. Noor-ul-Amin 07 Des 1971 - 20 Dec 1971 13 Days Nominated Censor Govt. Govt. Controlled Control 9. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 14 Aug 1973 - 05 Jul 1977 04 Elected Censor Govt. Govt.
222 S. Media Status Period Years Category No Press Radio TV Controlled Control 10. Muhammad Khan Junejo 23 Mar 1985 - 29 May 1988 03 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Control 11. Benazir Bhutto 02 Dec 1988 - 06 Aug 1990 02 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Control Care Govt. Govt. 12. Ghulam Mustafa Jatuai 06 Aug 1990 - 06 Nov 1990 02 Taker Free Controlled Control Nominated 13. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 06 Nov 1990 - 18 Apr 1993 2.5 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Control Care Govt. Govt. 14. Balgh Sher Mizari 18 Apr 1993 - 26 May 1993 01 Month Taker Free Controlled Control Nominated 15. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 26 May 1993 - 08 Jul 1993 02 Month Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Control Care Govt. Govt. 16. Moeen Qureshi 08 July 1993 - 19 Oct 1993 0.5 Taker Free Controlled Control Nominated 17. Benazir Bhutto 19 Oct 1993 - 05 Nov 1996 03 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Control Care Govt. Govt. 18. Malik Meraj Khalid 06 Nov 1996 - 03 Feb 1997 0.5 Taker Free Controlled Control Nominated 19. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif 17 Feb 1997 - 12 Oct 1999 2.5 Elected Free Govt. Govt. Controlled Control Partially Controlled Govt. 20. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali Nov 2002 - Onward 01 Elected Free Private Controlled Channels Allowed
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CHAPTER 6 THE ARRIVAL OF SATELLITE TV
In this chapter I would look at the kind of satellite programs available in Pakistan and public and professional reactions to them. Many of the programs, particularly English language programs, are made for global audiences and watched in Pakistan largely by the English speaking elite. My main focus, however, is on reactions to programs made specifically for Pakistani audiences, particularly on popular entertainment channels like Geo, ARY (3 channels), Indus Vision, Zee, Sony, Star, CNN, BBC and others which are watched not just in the metropolitan centers but over a much wider area. Have these programs helped to create a new Pakistani popular culture, which transcends national barriers or not?, is the question I attempt to answer?
The evidence comes from a range of different interviews, discussion groups and survey, which were carried out in the five main Pakistani cities and some small towns and villages over a twelve-month period in 2002 and 2003. The picture it paints is impressionistic, but it is sufficient to show that new electronic communities have been created and that many of the issues raised by the satellite media are shared across a cross section of population. These include the propagation of new visions of society, the growth of consumerism, the targeting of children and controversies provoked by programs and shows including movies, which offer new role models for Pakistanis.
In asking the question ‘WHO PORTRAYS PAKISTANI CULTURE?’ I attempt to probe the ideas and objectives of those making and funding the programs, whether through advertising or sponsorship. I also examine the interconnectedness of advertising and program making and its implications
1 for diversity of choices. In analyzing satellite programs which successfully appeal to the new Pakistani middle class, I explore the terms on which the global and the local meet in finding a new vision of society.
My interviews and discussions illustrate the difficulty of disentangling the influence of the satellite media from the growth of television as a mass medium. For many interviewees, the satellite media are part of a general process. The entry of Pakistan into the television age is having an impact on how people spend their leisure, how they eat their meals, how they relate to each other in families. What my interviews and discussion groups have produced, therefore, are not just reactions to particular programs or types of programs but also broader reflections on the state of the electronic media in general.
I begin the chapter with an overview of satellite television, what it offers to the urban middle class and how it differs from the programs and traditions established by PTV. The rest of the chapter looks at different aspects of the new satellite culture and its reception in all parts of Pakistan.
PAKISTAN ENTERS SATELLITE ERA
After years of state monopoly, the arrival of the satellite channels was like a breath of fresh air for Pakistan's middle class. Those with cable and satellite connections were suddenly liberated from PTV's paternalistic programming and were offered access first to a wide range of international channels and soon afterward to popular commercial programming specially made for Pakistani audiences. The first beneficiaries were the English language-knowing audiences in the large cities. Though only approximately 3 per cent of the population, they are nonetheless an economically and politically influential audience. But the main target of the popular channels has been the expanding Pakistani middle class with Urdu as its lingua franca. As I discussed in Chapter-3, the prospect of selling products to over
2 140 million consumers has been the main motivation of Pakistan's rapidly growing advertising and media industries which have attempted to tap this market with a new mix of programs. This has included more regular access to films, new kinds of tele-serials, quizzes, fashion shows, game shows, popular music, showbiz and sports.
The new popular satellite channels have been powerful agents of a new consumerism. Unlike PTV, which has traditionally propagated the political and development ideology of Pakistan, the satellite channels appeal to the viewer as a consumer in a liberalized Pakistan where personal choice has become a new ideology. With no inherited obligations to the country or to existing standards, they have questioned old social and cultural traditions, explored new fusions of east and west, and put materialism much higher up the agenda. Geo TV, in particular, has been the flag bearer of a new vision for middle class Pakistan in which money and good looks are the hallmarks of success.
One of the most sophisticated interpreters of these trends, marketing consultant Zohra Abbas, argues that liberalization of the Pakistan economy was a macro-event which involved a major transformation of Pakistani cultural attitudes. She says the move to 'freedom of choice' and a philosophy of 'survival of the fittest' constituted 'a whole new way of living' which would gradually become the new culture of Pakistan. In an article written with two British market analysts at the beginning of the satellite revolution and using a system of cultural classification developed by them, Zohra divides Pakistan since independence into three age groups—the first, those who brought independence, the second, 'the Benazir age group, and the third, 'the post-liberalization age group: tomorrow's consumer. She accepts that 'outer-directed culture', by which is meant the new world of consumer choice, changes much faster than 'inner-directed culture', which relates to the home and family and long-established beliefs. In the new
3 world, people will tap into two or more cultures and will have to cope with the contrasts and conflicts between them. But Zohra argues that the 'genetic coding of Pakistani society', which she defines as 'acceptance and adaptability, will ensure that 'Pakistan's cultural response to liberalization, and the resultant invasion of foreign culture through branded goods and services will be positive.
Translating this vision into programs which will sell new products to the Pakistani middle class has been the job of advertising agencies, who have worked closely with television companies to achieve this purpose. The culture which has emerged from this collaboration is a mixture of mutually reinforcing lifestyles and commodities, with branded goods. According to Zohra: 'Liberalization of the mind has occurred alongside liberalization, of the market.... The average consumer is now truly beginning to see what brand choice is?
Satellite programs are being watched by all sections of the urban community, from the students of elite colleges to labourers in cities like Lahore and Karachi. But urban youth are a key target group which have been offered a new image of themselves. Satellite music channels,ARY Musik, MTV and Channel V, have played an important role in putting pleasure and consumption much higher up the agenda than in the past.
A new emphasis on personal appearance is also fed by Indian and Pakistani soap operas and encouraged by a growing cosmetics industry. Sociologist Dr Iqbal Saif (2002) says, ‘TV has contributed to the culture of packaging oneself. This comes in the form of middle class girls coming into the profession as models and modeling being considered respectable’.
Many critics and artists use the term 'packaging' disapprovingly; they see it as characteristic of new trends in art and culture. Columnist Ata ul Haq Qasmi says ‘money now dominates everything’. Even our contemporary
4 architecture has to show itself. Theatre is showing this trend. Hyping everything. Sohail Ahmad a theatre director and television actor, makes the same point. ‘There was a time when ‘sponsored by’ would be tucked in the corner of the advertisement.... It was an embarrassment. Today it is a sign of success.... It is linked to the consumerist way of thinking; packaging is the most important thing.’
In keeping with the emphasis on individualism, many satellite channels have created a new environment in which audiences feel more empowered than before. They discarded PTV's serious discussion programs with politicians and intellectuals; instead, they brought the viewers into the studios and used them to call politicians and intellectuals to account. The vogue for seriousness was replaced by showmanship. But with it came a far greater sense of public participation, as evidenced in the huge popularity of musical talent shows like Gae Gee Dunya Geet Mere or political debates with studio participation like Jawabdeh and Pachas minute, both on Geo TV.
This sense that the individual viewer counts is part of the new populism of satellite TV which is having an effect throughout society. Since satellite TV ended PTV's monopoly, TV talent spotting competitions and shows encouraging audience participation have developed very large audiences all over Pakistan, particularly among the young. These influences have gone right down to the district levels in Pakistan. The principal of a college in Lahore told that 'shows like Gae Gee Dunya Geet Mere have created an urge in the minds of the young to learn music. Some students expressed desire to appear on these music shows.'
There is some evidence, however, that the promotion of consumer products is also promoting social equality. This is also the view of Dr. Anwar Iqbal who has researched the effect of television commercials. He discovered, contrary to his own expectations, that the audience's
5 relationship with commercials was helping to create 'a secular kind of world where consumption patterns were shared'. At the same time, the new vogue for branded goods has generated cottage industries all over Pakistan producing surrogate versions for those who cannot afford the real thing. Television is promoting a fake culture...', said a working class man in Karachi. 'There is no item that cannot be faked. Nobody sells genuine items. I know the hotels here sell fake Pepsi.... Most things advertised on TV are so expensive and out of reach of people like us that there are cheaper, sub-standard versions of everything available in the markets.' Another said, ‘There is a vast disparity between our leaders and people, we are given nothing, no health package, no educational facilities and yet we are talking about entering the twenty-first century. What are we going on-a donkey cart?’
Another contribution of satellite TV and its talk shows has been to promote far greater openness about issues like human rights, women's rights, questions of choice and career, sexuality and relations with others. Nigar Tariq of the Aurat Foundation says: 'There was nothing like that available when I was growing up: no opportunity to talk about what men think about women, what they want, what women want from their lives. Half the things that people invited to TV studios say is pure garbage but it does not matter; the fact is that they have a platform and an opportunity to think about these issues.' Academic Rukhsana Aslam agrees: ‘The best thing about satellite TV is that it has allowed a lot of people to express opinions.... The last two years' debates on women's issues on talk shows would have been unimaginable before satellite TV.
New ideas about sexuality have also been a key element in a new generation of TV soap operas which are one of the main battlegrounds between PTV and its satellite rivals. PTV still addresses far larger audiences than any of the satellite channels, but since it began the metro channel to
6 build a national urban audience to counter the appeal of its satellite rivals, it has been competing directly with them for advertisements aimed at the Pakistani middle class. As a result, as broadcaster Sarwat Ateeq predicted, satellite television has had a cloning effect on PTV, which ‘affects even those who only view domestic channels’.
In the pre-satellite era, PTV's own strategy for building a mass audience took a very different form. In the late 1980s, it had begun to broadcast what are known as 'spiritual'— serials which dramatize some of the great religious traditions of Pakistan. The first two of these, which were based on the great Muslim epics, the Tipu Sultan and Mohammad Bin Qasim were watched by hundreds of millions of viewers and were seen by many of them not just as entertainment but as a national-cum-religious experience. For PTV, these serials were a source of professional pride and formidable new revenues, but they also attracted considerable controversy because they were widely believed to have underplayed the great heroes. In terms of Pakistani popular culture, however, they showed the powerful role that television could play in appealing to the emerging middle class market in religious, and particularly in terms of Muslim nationalism.
The emergence of three main religious political parties in the National Parliament as dominant religio-political pressure groups and their influence at the national level and in Punjab, NWFP and Balochistan in the mid- 1980s contributed to the emergence of a more conservative cultural atmosphere. The popular satellite channels have invested heavily in religion; examples are Geo, Indus and ARY , where they are engaged in more direct competition with PTV for a mass audience. But still these Urdu satellite channels have been aiming at different audiences and offering different visions of modernity. PTV, despite its new dependence on market forces, represents a tradition of state control, paternalism, and conservative morality, whereas the popular satellite channels are pursuing an agenda
7 centered far more on personal choice and consumption. If liberalization involves major changes in outlook and philosophy, as Zohra Abbas has argued—'from isolation to interaction with the rest of the world, from ideology to rationality, from curbing consumption to stimulating demand, from obeying authority to freedom of choice, from protectionism to survival of the fittest' -the satellite channels are very much more at the cutting edge of change than PTV. For PTV, the pursuits of commercial competition have involved a crisis of identity which has still not been resolved. In many parts of Pakistan, it is losing urban audiences and finding it difficult to win them back.
CABLE CHANNELS AND THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING ARISTOCRACY
As far as Pakistan's English-speaking elites are concerned, it is often said that they have more in common with each other than with their own compatriots. English language education has always enjoyed an official patronage in the post-independence period. The professional job market has continued to value English and middle class parents have seen it as vital to their children's advancement, whether at home or abroad. In this sense, globalization is not a new thing; it is an old phenomenon which is becoming more powerful as a result of improved technology and communication.
Among the English-educated middle class, there is wide appreciation of the extension of choice which the satellite revolution has brought. Whether one is talking to intellectuals in capital cities or teachers in district towns, everyone acknowledges that their access to information and entertainment has improved. Young adults, particularly males, welcome the new access to international news and international sports coverage. There is appreciation for the professionalism of many satellite productions and for better quality documentaries and wildlife programs. But there are also concerns about the ruthless commercialism of the entertainment channels,
8 the morality implicit in some of the serials, the effect of consumerism on children and the lack of serious programming about Pakistan.
The other striking finding of my Focus Group Discussions is the dramatic decline in viewing of PTV programs in cable and satellite households. PTV features infrequently in the lists of favorite programs, not only among English-knowing middle class groups but also among Sindhi, Punjabi, Pushto and Urdu speakers. Many middle class viewers have switched to GEO, ARY, Indus, BBC and CNN for news and current affairs, to Zee or Sony for entertainment, to Star and ESPN for sports, and to Discovery for science, environment and wildlife. PTV may be holding its own, where its reach is unrivalled, but in the urban areas it is not doing well, except with the older generation and staunch religious groups.
Discussions held among English-speaking middle class groups in Karachi indicate that satellite TV has been a means of reinforcing their existing preferences. Young middle class professionals working for multinational employers in Karachi watched very little television; they worked long hours and returned home late. A majority said, they preferred reading to watching TV. What they wanted from television was news and business updates and 'something light' for relaxation. Channel preferences included Geo, Ary, Star News, Star Movies, CNN and BBC. There seemed to be no following for PTV. In many ways, this kind of group looks outside Pakistan for its role models. Asked about Pakistani culture on television, one discussant said: 'I am not interested in the past.'
Girls and boys of 12 or 13 years of age going to the elite Lahore Cathedral school showed a similar preference for international programs. They liked British comedies, sports, particularly football matches, news and the Discovery Channel. They preferred English horror movies like The X- files, saying 'PTV programs don't look real'.
9 Employees of a Pakistan bank in Lahore were contemptuous of PTV and Urdu soaps. No one with cable watched PTV; they thought the programs and presentation were too poor. One called PTV ‘the pits; a second said: ‘They just don't care.’ Mostly in their 30s, they watched cable TV for news, current affairs, sports and the occasional film. A surprising trend was witnessed and recorded in Islamabad where participants of a focus group discussion and senior government officers showed similar trends.
Among a largely professional group interviewed in Rawalpindi, Geo news was the most regularly watched program. ‘They have managed to capture the culture, I live in’, said one discussant. But another criticized Geo news—and much of satellite TV—for being centered in the West. ‘The basic orientation of TV here is not Pakistan’, he said. ‘I am watching more about the USA and UK, not about Karachi and Peshawar, and I want to know why we are obsessed with the West’.
Though these illustrations come from major cities of Punjab and Karachi metropolitan, they can be reproduced among English speaking elites in other provinces of the country. Sindh indicates a similar divide in viewing habits between elite or upper class, which follows English language programs, and the middle class which is happier with Local colour. As Ghazala Erum puts it: 'The upper class has always felt that alienation from local culture was a sign of privilege, a status symbol. In that way, there is continuity in the perception of their own culture.... Children of the elite regularly request songs on MTV and Channel V. The middle class children only watch, but they prefer Urdu channels. They also can't afford calls to Dubai. But those who get to watch ‘serious’ channels have a higher level of knowledge than their parents.'
10 THE BIRTH OF A NEW CULTURE
It is among the college and university populations of Pakistan that satellite television has made its greatest impact because this group is most affected by new trends in language, fashion or behavior. Earlier, the incorporation of elites into the international community took place in a more subtle and limited way. Now satellite television is thrusting the commercial face of Western industrial civilization into almost every metropolitan household and helping to create a new global middle class ethos which affects far larger numbers of people. 'Given certain socio-economic characteristics', said a Pakistani advertising executive, 'we are looking at the same kinds of markets. And advertisements are market driven. So the foundation of a shared culture is already laid. Earlier, the gap between the elite and the rest of the middle class was very wide. Now television is playing a part in leveling those differences, particularly among college students in metropolitan cities’. As the same executive put it, 'The children of the middle class, with their demand for Nike shoes and Docker Levis Jeans and Calvin Klein T-shirts, look much the same wherever they live’.
MTV started off on the Star platform offering Western pop music to Indian and Pakistani audiences and being widely criticized as culturally invasive. After Rupert Murdoch took over Star, MTV was dropped and replaced by Channel V, with more Indian and Pakistani VJs and more Urdu pop music. It was a program mix of Indianization and Pakistanisation, which brought immediate rewards. Channel V began to grow at 25 per cent per year, helped by the popularity of its road shows, which reached out to college students in the big Pakistani cities and made its VJs Popular figures. In late 1996, MTV, re-launched itself with a much more Indian profile, playing much more Urdu (Indian Mostly) film music. The style of presentation was the same but the content changed dramatically. What had begun as a largely western music channel appealing to students of elite colleges changed to one carrying 70 per cent Urdu popular music. According
11 to MTV, 1997 brought a doubling of turnover and an increase in penetration from 4 million to over 8 million homes in South Asia. The following year, the channel was no longer aiming at a metropolitan audience but at over a hundred cities in India and Pakistan.
A discussion group among 17- and 18-year old students from the elite Beacon House school and college in Islamabad revealed that most of them spoke English in the school (some at home too) and watched English language television programs. None of the group watched PTV and neither did their parents. VJs from the music channels were definite reference points for style and fashion in music and dress, though most of it was western. There was a strong following for English language soaps on Star World. The vulnerable and comically indecisive lawyer Ally McBeal was a particular favourite: 'I like Ally McBeal a lot. I can relate to her very well', said one. 'Some of the episodes are really silly but many of them really show the way a girl thinks', said another.
Outside the elite groups in Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi, the middle class even in same cities and other large cities like Peshawar or Faisalabad, the music channels were less popular and more controversial. In these cities, traditional values are still well respected and students displayed more resistance to western role models and morals. Among middle class Pushto-speaking students in Peshawar, the boys expressed a preference for news, sports and quizzes, while girls favoured mythological and Urdu satellite serials. However, the girls were openly enthusiastic about TV fashions. ‘That is what I am watching each time', said one young woman, '... the hairstyle, the shoes, the clothes.... I watch the music channels only for that’.
A similar University students group in Faisalabad expressed worries and some frustration at the moral values reflected in satellite programs. One participant said, 'I get an inferiority complex—when I see all these serials....
12 People are having sex at our age.... Why can't I if they can?' The group also differed over the music channels and the role of VJs. Several of them watched the music channels, but one said, 'The VJs are the most irritating souls on earth. They talk rubbish, wear stupid clothes.' Others said, 'They are copying foreign values. They are not even imitating. They are aping.'
MTV and Channel V offer young people a vision of a freer, more fashionable world, the promise of more gratification and an entertaining escape from parental and cultural pressures. Dr Anwar Iqbal-a sociologist who studied the influence of television in Pakistan found that 'there is a moral panic among parents with satellite channels, especially Channel V and MTV, Zee and Sony and even local Urdu channels, in the lower middle class, where parents say they are afraid to leave the home and go away because children will turn to these channels.'
The scale of the culture shock which the music channels have caused has also prompted some heart-searching among those involved in marketing the new visions. 'The question that worries me', said one of them, 'is that because of the high aspirations and media floating around...are we going to see class wars? ...When will the servant's son turn around and say, ‘Why the hell not me?’
Ansa Akhrtar believes it is the promise of a different kind of sexuality for the next generation that has caused anxiety. She says, 'There is nothing else that is bothering nice middle class people, including myself, more than talk of sexuality and aspirations. Behind the facade of criticizing the media for creating aspirations and for not addressing real issues is the fear that our children will have a sexuality and aspirations that I will not be able to address.'
The same music channels also have a following in the metropolitan centers of other South Asian countries; among college students in Dhaka or
13 Colombo or Katmandu, where public opposition to Western influences is more marked (Page & Crawley, 2001). According to Huma Haque (2001), a social scientist at Quaid-i-Azam University, 'preference for MTV is based on the English-medium school culture', which is already preparing the children of the professional class to absorb western influences. She says 'the germs of western preferences, individualism and materialism are already present in the youth of this class.' A discussion among students attending colleges in Islamabad produced much praise for the Urdu channels like GEO, Indus and ARY and many criticisms of PTV. These channels have good numbers, good beat, one can enjoy them.... The Pakistani programs are very dull', said Hina, a recent matriculate. In General, however, much of this enthusiasm is privately relished and expressed; it has not given rise to the same degree of public activity or display as in Karachi or Islamabad because of social pressures within the society.
In all, MTV and Channel V are more popular in the big cities than in the small towns. 'In urban areas, the culture is being taken over by something that is not Pakistani', said one student. 'TV has introduced a ‘punk’ culture. From childhood, kids have taken to wear earrings and singing pop songs. These are the negative effects of TV, said another. Most young Pakistanis deny any disloyalty to their culture or disrespect for their parents. But they acknowledge the power of the new influences. 'Pakistan TV should also go on satellite’, said one student. ‘That way other people will also know something of our country... It also means that just like Zee, Sony and MTV have a strong impact on our society, similarly Pakistan TV can promote Pakistani culture elsewhere.'
SATELLITE SOAP OPERA
Satellite TV has created its greatest ethical and cultural impacts as a result of a new series of soap operas which offered the public bolder themes, franker treatment of personal relations, and fewer happy endings. The
14 Pakistani cinema, went beyond the taboos of class and community, and redeemed relationships that would not have been condoned in traditional society. But, Pakistani cinema too failed to broaden and democratize ideas of nationhood and to play its own part in the project of building an independent country. At the same time it did little to challenge the extended family or the values it enshrined. Many soap operas on Urdu satellite television have broken this trend, modeling themselves on the sexual openness of American soap operas and offering new role models to Pakistani audiences. One major reason for this is satellite TV's more segmented audience.
The special and peculiar themes were the hallmarks of satellite television initially, but by the mid-1990s, PTV serials were also exploring similar relationships. PTV had pioneered soap opera in the late 1970s and 1980s with Afshan, Waris, Khuda ki basti, andheray Ujalay which carried a message of modernity centering on the family and clan relationship. That was the time when television intended to serve the development goals of the state. Later, in the same decade, PTV also broadcast a number of soap operas offering women new role models and exploring their rights. One of these, Kiran Kahani, about a woman's efforts to become an independent person by challenging the highhandedness of her in-laws, proved extremely popular. By contrast, satellite TV soap operas of the 2000 were tailored more to the demands of the advertisers than to those of the society.
Anwar Iqbal and Rana, who have studied the Changing discourses of Pakistani cinema and television (Anwar & Rana, Television in Pakistan, IDRC Research Monographs, 1993: updated 2002) point out that in its earlier incarnation 'serious, domesticated, educative' PTV was seen as 'a counterpoint to popular cinema', which offered 'an escape into a fantastic larger than life world'. Now, PTV is occupying similar ground to the Pakistani cinema, while satellite TV Zee is offering 'imaginary spectator
15 positions' which violate its norms. They point out that in Pakistani cinema anything but the monogamous and the heterosexual tends to be disallowed. 'If there is, for example, a love triangle, one of the characters conveniently gets killed towards the end of the film, leaving behind a monogamous, reassuring residue!' But the satellite TV soaps 'with their endless round of extramarital and pre-marital relationships, replete with children born out of wedlock, offer a sharp contrast....' With all this, they say, 'the moral landscape of urban popular culture has become far more complex and problematic, engendering resistance of various kinds. Anwar & Rana’s reference is obviously Indian channel ZEE, because the study was conducted before the arrival of GEO, ARY and Indus Vision.
THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LANGUAGE
The new satellite culture has also challenged the linguistic phenomenon of Pakistan by producing its own lingua franca which mixes English and Urdu. This new language, pioneered by Zee TV and later followed by Geo, ARY, and innumerable FM radio Stations throughout Pakistan has come to be known as ‘Unglish’ and sometimes ‘Minglish’, has caught on with the urban young all over Pakistani metropolis and has become a point of controversy with others. One of the reasons for its popularity is its complete break with the style and preoccupations of the national broadcasters. ‘TV always reflected the best and refined type of language', says Aslam Azhar, former managing Director of PTV. ‘Zee entered and changed that, the others followed. It distoted the ethics and beauty of language'.
My research in Pakistan confirm that television has produced 'a perceptible change in the usage of language'. In Pakistani urban centers, ‘higher classes' are reported to be using more Urdu and English words in everyday language. The 'educated middle classes’ are trying to retain the
16 Persian flavor of their language by using 'either pure Urdu or elite English words'.
There are both hostile and pragmatic responses to this pervasive new fashion. Mansha Yaad, a writer and Playwright in Islamabad, told me that 'the most corrupting language is of Zee and Star news. The Zee language neither contributes to Urdu nor to the English language. I am not against using English words in Urdu. But the words should not be like pieces of stone in rice.’ Others see a more relaxed approach to language as a necessary response to fast-changing times. Ejaz Hanif, a lecturer of Urdu in Islamabad, says that there were no words in this language for many new products, processes and services. TV has given those words. He says, ‘The concept of purity of language is humbug. I welcome the new trend. This language does not make a fetish whether the word is English or Urdu or Punjabi, as long as it is understood by the majority of listeners.’
Aslam Azhar, former Managing Director of television, ridicules this as 'Minglish' and sees it as part of a deterioration in standards, promoted by the Urdu satellite channels and imitated by Pakistan's commercial producers. Others are concerned that children are picking up English words from television and using them in conversation at the expense of their Urdu vocabulary. To this extent, they see satellite TV as undermining the distinctiveness of Pakistan's lingua franca.
Professor Fateh Mohammabd Malik, the Chairman of the National Language Authotrity, believes, ‘some of the changes in approach to language provoked by satellite competition have improved communication. There has been a tendency to use fewer loan words from Arabic and Persian to simplify language in order to speak more directly to viewers. Urdu in its perfect form is not only under attack from across the border; it is also changing its character within Pakistan as it is increasingly owned and spoken by Pakistan's other language groups. Professor Malik says 'No language can
17 remain pure if it is to grow. Fossilised languages cannot live. It is only insecure societies who are scared to accept new things.’ However, there are concerns that the new style is an urban phenomenon which reflects the dominance of the upper middle class English elite in the new media and a lack of seriousness in communicating with the rest of society, which does not know English. Some see the new trend as a result of sloppiness— the projection of the linguistic inadequacies of convent-educated trend setters onto the population as a whole. It is a criticism made not just of satellite TV but of many of the new FM radio channels in the big cities. According to radio producer and news editor Jamal Haider Siddiqui, ‘people with British, American or any other foreign accent gained preference over those with local accents. Entertainment and idle talk became hip over the radio while responsibility was grossly neglected. Investors who were behind these institutions seemed keen to introduce foreign cultures and commercialism through their radio programs.’
THE NEW FASHION TRENDS
Though mixtures of English and other languages have become the norm in addressing urban audiences, Urdu satellite entertainment channels have ensured their success with the wider public by exploiting the popularity of less Pakistani and more Indian commercial cinema. The cinema has always influenced style, language and behaviour and its stars continue to exercise a huge fascination over Pakistani audiences. Inter-war American cinema cliches transferred effortlessly into Lahore movies center (popularly called Lollywood) from the styles of the stunt men and women to the heavy overcoats and homberg hats of the Chicago gangsters. In the same way, it is the dress and hairstyles of Indian film stars which are still sought after at the fashion boutiques and hairdressers of urban Pakistan. The jacket worn by Salman Khan in the film Maine Pyar Kiya, the hat Aamir Khan wore in Dil Hai Ke Maanta Nahin or the saris Madhuri Dixit wore in
18 Hum Aapke Hain Kaun were all available in Karachi shops soon after the films became popular. Such enthusiasm is largely confined to 'middle Pakistan', but on occasion the upper middle class can also be affected.
Television has never had this kind of impact. Television has created no single point hero. Not a single hero or heroine has functioned as a trend setter in fashion or clothing during the past full decade. The nearest television has come to producing its own cult following is for the VJs on MTV or Channel V. But the intrusiveness of TV has had an impact at a different level. Whereas films remain in the realm of fantasy for many viewers, television projects the stars as human success stories and stimulates interest in their lifestyle, relationships, wealth, clothing and personal likes and dislikes. In this sense, stars are an important element in the commodification of everyday life.
A survey of the impact of satellite television in two big cities in Pakistan—Lahore and Karachi provided ample evidence that satellite television serials are stimulating a growing interest in personal appearance and beautification. Though many of those interviewed denied they were imitating the styles of the stars, the proprietor of famous Diplex Beauty Parlour, Musarrat Misbah in Lahore said, her clients specifically demanded hair styles from famous models as well as those of Krishman kapoor and Princess Diana. Even in a smaller town of Gujranwala, clients of Rose Beauty Parlour, requested for the style of famous movie stars and Satellite TV VJs Its proprietor, Mrs. Zeenat, believes that ‘beauty consciousness is the contribution of TV shows'. She says in Gujranwala, it has become normal practice to visit the beautician before attending any celebration and she believes TV has introduced this trend in a comparatively backward place'. In Gujranwala, fifty beauty parlours are doing comfortable business. In Lahore, there are more than 1200 beauty parlours and Karachi over 2500 and a number of these with state-of-the-art equipment.
19
Evidence from dress shops in big cities suggests that there is a roaring business in dresses popularized in Indian films, with the Karachi wholesalers dispatching them in volume once the film has become popular. These Indian movies are available to Pakistani audience through Cable TV. However, Ruby kiran of Clifton Designs in Karachi told me that whereas 'clients from the middle and lower classes mention clothes worn by actresses, higher class women—want their own exclusive designs.' She believes that TV is developing 'fashion literacy'; women are coming into the shop asking for 'hipsters' and 'tight-fit' fashions and she says sales of dresses, including evening gowns, are running at 300 a month.
Staff at FM 90- a cosmetics shop in Islamabad, reported that sales of cosmetics have increased dramatically since the early 1990s, with lipstick becoming much more fashionable. Equally marked in Lahore is the trend among the young towards T-shirts and jeans. The proprietor of Alam Collections, a general dress shop, said that ‘Lahore is changing very fast. The demand is sometimes based on costumes worn by actors and actresses; sometimes it is triggered by advertisements.... In the last two or three years... the turnover of my shop has increased many fold—thanks to TV ads and serials.’
These new fashions encouraged by TV have provoked some criticism from traditionalists. The salesperson at FM 90, selling sixty lipsticks a day, has had to justify her activities to parents who object to her chosen work, 'I told them that I am doing nothing wrong. Beautifying one's face and body has a long Pakistani tradition.... The tradition is ancient; only the products have changed.' The proprietor of Guddi Beauty Parlour, put up the same defense, 'I do not think I am corrupting the culture of Pakistan. Beautifying oneself has been a long tradition in Pakistan. Mughal dresses and queens dresses and cosmetics are a very well told story’.
20 The same programs are also having an impact among the middle class in Pakistan According to informants in Islamabad, local designers not only watch Zee's fashion programme (Khoobsurat) they also record it for future reference. Pakistani channels may also be aiding a comeback for the trousers, which went into an officially-enforced decline during the days of General Zia-ul-Haq. Pakistani fashion magazines have been featuring trousers and pants again and the wearing of pants and short shirts has become more common on festivals and social occasions. Even in smaller towns these influences are acknowledged. Professionals in Faisalabad told me, ‘TV programs are really affecting the way our women perceive themselves. I can see it in the number of beauty parlours that have come up after I began getting satellite channels here. These are things that have to be considered carefully. Women's fashion can lead to a strain in relationships for the simple reason that I can't afford the kind of fashion shown on TV.'
Film and TV influences on young men centre on Indian film stars like Shahrukh Khan and cricketers like Wasim Akram, both appear in advertising campaigns for well-known products. Both have acquired cult status with the young, not just for their professional acting and playing but also for their very noticeable wealth. For many young men from unprivileged backgrounds, cricket and films offer a means of identifying with success and the fantasy of achieving the same themselves.
Many working class parents in Pakistan were clear that ‘boys were more influenced than girls' by television serials and films. One mother said, 'My kid watches TV like mad—and he cares less about his studies.... The kids are obsessed with sports programs and dramas, they copy the songs and dances. This idolizing of film stars has also brought a new interest in physical development. In Islamabad and Karachi, I discovered that health clubs had sprung up, something quite new to the culture of the town. 'The youths had seen the well built heroes of the films and wanted to imitate
21 them.' Meeting a group of young men in Rawalpindi I noticed that some had grown their hair long like Indian film star Sanjay Dutt. One boy always talked like another Indian film actor Salman Khan... He felt he is Salman khan. I could see that almost everybody was obsessed by films and serials.
The other obsession is cricket, which is now preferred to traditional games in rural areas. The owner of an Islamabad general stores said that within three months, he had sold 400 bats marketed in the name of Shahid Afridi, the well-known cricketer. According to school teachers in Rawalpindi, ‘Instead of gulli danda (a rural and semi urban sport of lower middle class) they have taken up cricket.. .the students are addicted to viewing one day cricket matches on the TV.... They know all the cricketers and their records. They know all the terms used to describe the game’.
In a lively debate on Geo, about the influence of television one man said, 'The young generation has gone astray because of over exposure to TV programs. They sing dirty songs, gesticulate in a dirty manner. Their ideals are not Quaid-i-Azam but Shahrukh Khan and Sanjay Dutt. Another reported, 'I do not agree with my friend. I find TV a good educational device. There are lots of informative programs. You will find the level of knowledge of the younger generation higher than us. It is a thousand times better to see programs on TV than to loiter around in the streets’.
CHILDREN – THE VICTIMS
The need to protect children as a vulnerable group from exposure to unsuitable programming is a responsibility which government and broadcasting authorities take seriously all over the world. Many broadcasters operate watershed policies which keep programs with adult story lines or excessive violence off the air until children are supposed to be in bed. But such policies are only partially effective, even with active parenting. Another area of concern and one which is more difficult to
22 monitor and control is the targeting of children in advertising. The exploitation of 'pester power' is becoming increasingly sophisticated and some marketing companies has now spread 'from sweets and snack foods— often linked to film or television characters aimed at the under 12s—to CDs, computer software, and even cars and holidays.
Akram Mughal and Shaukat Qureshi, who studied the impact of television advertising on children in Pakistan, present a case for real concern at the profound changes which have taken place in cultural attitudes among the television generation. According to their research, young people spend an increasing number of hours watching TV and are enthralled by it. They say TV is presenting consumerism as a way of life. Consumer non-durables are the easiest things to sell because they do not require a big investment. But advertisements for soft drinks and cosmetics boost the market for a whole range of consumer durables associated with 'modern' lifestyles.
Analyzing children's reaction to television advertisements, Qureshi and Mughal note that the push to individual consumption on a western pattern tends to undermine more traditional habits of sharing. Advertising promotes the nuclear family at the expense of the joint family. They argue that many children have begun to associate happiness with owning or possessing a toy or being indulged by their parents. During a discussion working class groups were in support of the view that parents are under pressure from their children to buy things. A group of working class women in Rawalpindi said they were influenced by advertisements, particularly for cosmetics and toiletries, with their children wanting them to try all sorts of new products. A small shopkeeper in Rawalpindi said of his son: ‘If he wants, then he wants. There is no stopping him.' One boy in this group had even demanded a mobile phone from his father’.
23 Middle class housewives in Rawalpindi raised worries that children had become addicted to TV. 'If there is an interruption', said one, 'my child insists to call up the cable guy immediately'. Another mother recounted how her boy had seen a sweet advertisement at 10 p.m. the previous evening and demanded one immediately. Akbar', she said, 'my husband had to step out and buy it so he would stop crying.' Some of this group were using TV as a means of amusing their children and paying a price for their absorption in the world of advertisements, which many of them knew by heart. A similar group in Lahore revealed that in 'many houses the television is on all day, though viewing is concentrated at particular times. In these families, the children seemed to control the remote and were 'crazy to try advertised products’.
Many parents argued that satellite television was playing a dangerous role in advertising alcohol and cigarettes. Alam Saeed, an academic psychologist who studies the impact of TV on children says, 'I as parent say ‘learn good things’, but what has been prohibited for generations is highlighted as fantastic by the media.' In a discussion in Karachi, satellite TV was blamed for the growing popularity of alcohol among young people, who were arranging drink parties when parents are away. ‘We cannot leave young boys alone in vacant houses. TV has given prestige to drinking’, was the view of this group. In Lahore, a professional said, 'In the old films, consumption of alcohol was not prestigious.' 'When the character in the film was not in a normal state of mind he used to consume alcohol, but these days—alcohol is being taken casually as if it's a cup of tea. This is a very dangerous thing...in a city like Lahore you will see so many shops selling Alcohol illegally, although it is strictly prohibited in Pakistan’.
Poor teenagers from a Christian slum area of Islamabad proved to be very familiar with satellite TV programs. Most of these teenage boys and girls worked part time or full time; some went to the local government
24 school. Several of them saw satellite TV as a strong aspirational influence. 'They show such goodies that I immediately want to acquire them', said Nazia, aged 14. 'The only question is where to get the money from...But I still love watching the advertisements and know by heart the names of all the items....' 'I like to watch movies and programs that show people rising from a low to a high position', said Anthony, aged 19. 'I wish they would show more programs like this which encourage many like us to continue our struggle.' Bashir, aged 16, said, 'I have learnt that America and England are the best places to be if you can get a job there. Then you can have access to all the things like imported jeans, shoes and of course Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut’.
Qureshi and Mughal, in their analysis of TV advertising in Pakistan, note that in middle class households children also influence their parents' decisions on the purchase of big items such as refrigerators or cars. Advertisers know this and use this in their marketing strategy for adult consumer goods. According to the director of an advertising firm in Islamabad, 'Children are exposed to advertising of products which have no connection to them, yet the parents are under mounting pressure to take their children's opinion into account when making any decision related to the purchase of goods. The advertising agencies have capitalized on this by coming up with many more advertisements directed at children’.
With the vast majority of households in Pakistan only having one TV set, it is not surprising to learn that children spend most of their time watching programs made for adults. But there is also a shortage of programs for children, both on PTV and the satellite channels. The only frequently mentioned children's programme was Ainak Wala Jin(a demon with spectacles) on PTV, with a central character modelled on Superman. The satellite channels are best known for their western cartoons, whose accessibility to Pakistan children has proved a cost effective means of
25 reaching these audiences without commissioning any regionally specific alternatives. Discussions With parents frequently highlighted this inadequate provision and there was a strong demand for more children's programs. Laborers in Rawalpindi regarded many programs shown during the day as unsuitable for children.
WOMEN IN CABLE CAGE
A great deal of the debate about satellite television has been about its influence on women. A study of viewing habits by the two Pakiatani social scientists conducted in 1992 showed that women are more 'regular' in TV viewing than men and that the lower the income group, whether male or female, the more regular is the viewing (Anwar & Rana, 1992). Women also view TV for longer periods than men and they are more likely to make time to view what they like. They are also heavier consumers of cable television than men, which means that the 'modern' story lines of the soap operas are playing to very full houses.
The story lines of satellite TV serials are of special interest because they project women in different roles from those of wife, mother and home maker. Serials like Tara or Hasratein on Zee and Umrao jan Ada on ARY and Thori see Mohabbat on Geo have dealt with issues of working women, divorce, extra-marital relationships, sexual harassment, rape and abortion in ways that were unfamiliar in the days of PTV's monopoly. With their depiction of 'the new bold woman', they have offered a variety of new role models to the urban middle class and provoked much controversy in the process.
The evidence from one discussion groups suggested such new role models have been more influential in the larger cities than elsewhere. A group of women in Lahore felt that the serials on Zee by and large painted 'an unreal and perverted picture of women'. Two working class women took
26 very strong objection to what they termed 'the misbehaviour of young women in serials'. They claimed that their day-to-day life and reality was never shown in the serials or films. To them the women shown on the screen belonged to a very small affluent section of the Pakistani society, which is not at all representative.
Among the middle class, there is a definite following for the new soap operas. Middle class home makers in Lahore expressed distaste for the new themes but admitted watching Hasratein regularly. 'we are now hooked and I want to know the end', was one reaction. Another said: 'It is a different story but such things are taking place in society today.' Middle class students in Lahore were also watching the serial, though it was clear that they did not see Savitri as a radical figure, despite her extra-marital relationship. Asked whether they found Hasratein bold, one of them replied, 'It is bold, but Savitri does not act bold. She is like a traditional wife.' 'I like Savi', said another. 'She respects everyone and teaches me to respect everyone.'
Here I will use Raymond Williams' (1974) description of culture as a series of overlapping ideologies—the residual, the dominant and the emergent—as a means of interpreting changing reactions among women of different generations to the impact of the new media. The residual ideology of self-sacrifice and self-denial, subservience to husband and family, involves a fatalistic acceptance of the woman's traditional status. In line with this interpretation, television has played a part in winning acceptability for the idea of the middle class working woman, even if the numbers have not grown substantially over the past ten years.
The serials which portray women fighting for their rights rather than exploring new personal relationships, seem to have developed a committed following across a broader social spectrum. As one working class woman in Rawalpindi put it, 'The women are strong and fight injustice—they do not
27 believe they are inferior to the men’. The discussion group also argued that the portrayal of women in teleserials had had an impact on men. As one discussant put it, ‘Men have recognized that women can be strong role models’. Cable TV is full of women who take decisions, who manage, who matter. Men are beginning to get convinced that women are capable of much more than they thought. As yet they are not threatened but the future is not certain.
The franker treatment of sexuality in the satellite TV serials (particularly on Indian channels) is another related area of debate. Zahida Hina, a writer and women rights activist in Karachi believes that the new channels 'are definitely opening up doors of sexuality'. She sees a growing consciousness of the body and greater concern with one's looks. She says, 'Now, a fully body-conscious Pakistan woman is definitely not unreal.... even in the serials, the middle aged woman is shown fit, dancing, singing...and this is not only an upper class phenomenon. Even among the lower classes, I see older women wearing brighter colored dresses.... There is a definite zeal about looks and the outer form. This is one area where everybody is touched. Bano Qudsia an intellectual and writer holds an absolutely opposite view. She feels that pre-marital sex is portrayed as a symbol of modernity, but it is insulting to women who keeps her body sacred and is conscious of men’s wicked desires; and that there is greater awareness of its ethical consequences.
Shima Kirmani, the Pakistani classical dancer and TV personality, believes that 'Pakistani women are coming into their own', but that this greater assurance is not being shown on the screen. She contrasts some American serials with the general run of Pakistani ones. 'Take fantastic programs like L. A. Law. You see women equal with men. Not just for sex or comedy. May be there is a male boss but the women have voices which are heard. A regular woman with class and taste who disagrees with her
28 husband is automatically bad. Shima is also skeptical about satellite TV's progressive credentials. She says, 'the major impact of satellite TV has been on middle class women in terms of day-to-day behavior, dressing and language. This view is also supported by famous writer and poet Fahmida Riaz. She says women are getting more visibility, issues are getting more space, but there is too much stereotypical representation of their problems. In fact she sees satellite TV as subversive of women's fight for political emancipation. She says, it is a case of 'give them visibility and kill them' and she holds that invisibility would have been preferable.
In general the women appreciated the new bold woman, though they differed considerably over how the boldness was portrayed. An underlying concern among working women themselves was that their portrayal in the serials was 'extremely negative and problematic. Many of them even felt that there was a conspiracy to malign working women and to project them as home wreckers, divorcees, incompetent parents and often failures as persons. One conclusion of these discussions was that women's worlds are not reflected adequately on television and that something needs to be done to correct the imbalance.
Professional women also voice similar concerns about the failure of the new media to play a more progressive role. Professionals in Islamabad wanted programs to show women playing a variety of roles. 'Women are shown in plays, entertainment and movies and are not much included in current affairs discussions, economic and political debates', said one participant. 'Television is not showing what our women are achieving', said another. 'Women should appear in the media in a diversity of roles, not a limited and stereotyped one', was a third opinion. According to Huma Haque of Quaid-i–Azam University, women's issues gained ground in Pakistan during the 1990s; government and non-governmental organizations gave more importance to them and they were more discussed on television. But
29 she says, teleserials and plays are still 'perpetuating the same traditional image of a weak woman living happily within four walls’. A study on the representation of women on the Pakistan Television also concluded that during prime time television 'women are represented primarily in their roles within the family and principally confined to the domestic sphere'. Its authors, Dr Seema Parvez, Asok Kumar and Yasser Noman (Parvez, Kumar & Noman, 1998) found this to be particularly true of teledramas. They say, many of them are 'rampant with gender stereotypes'. Very few critically consider issues such as oppression of women within the family or problems of domestic violence. Moreover, the few that do, such as the popular teledrama, Ajaib Khana which raised the issue of unequal marriages, fail to resolve them from a progressive angle. The authors also criticised western films for their 'culture of violence' against women and their representation as sex objects, ‘they have no positive impact’. Their report argues that there is a need for 'clear and comprehensive guidelines on gender and the media, and television needs to promote role models 'founded on achievement and not on appearance' and that there is a need for more women in television management and more training in gender issues for media staff.
ARE AUDIENCE CONSERVATIVE?
Many reflections on the impact of television in Pakistan are similar to those observed in other societies entering the television age. People comment on the role of the television set in reconstituting family space, its effect on the taking of meals, its implications for family relationships and the new problems of choice and control, which have to be negotiated. The respondents and discussants expressed nostalgia for the loss of social interaction which was a hallmark of city life in the pre-television age. Dr. Mirza Hamid Baig, a professor of literature, writer and scholar says, ‘the city used to be full of small restaurants and sitting places, whereas today 'most people are before TV sets.... The TV has replaced the tea houses’.
30
Discussions in various cities and towns confirm a decline in socializing. Family gatherings have grown less frequent as programs take priority and social interaction is often determined by what is on TV. 'I know I wouldn't want a guest when the drama is on', said one informant. 'Others won't like it when a countdown show is being shown. I think that is the biggest change in the last few years.
A common complaint of parents is that children are glued to the television set and neglect their studies, though the supposed correlation between addiction to television and poor exam results is not easy to prove. Some parents have cable TV disconnected as exams approach, though most teachers argue that television, properly used, has widened children's horizons and helped them do better. The viewing and reading habits of parents are (in most cases) more significant determining factors than the presence or absence of a television set.
In Islamabad, it was not just parents who were complaining. School children were also annoyed that parents did not bother to sit down with them when they had difficulty with their homework. They would rather watch TV than talk to their children. Some of the strongest reactions to the new consumer culture come from religious leaders who see it undermining spirituality and with it, their place in society. The Imam of Jamia Masjid in Islamabad told that 'an attempt is being made to destroy the balance of the spiritual and the material.... This is a global conspiracy and TV is a part of it’. Some Ulema (Muslim clerics) are urging their followers to avoid television entirely, though they know their advice is not generally being accepted. The Imam of the Faruquia mosque in a middle class locality of Islamabad told, 'In Islam, only devotional music is allowed; no dancing is allowed; no alcohol is allowed. All this is shown on TV. They show women without purdah on TV. This is also strongly prohibited in Islam.’ The Imam does not condemn
31 TV outright, but he urges his followers not to see serials and films 'because they are anti-Islam and corrupting’.
A well-known Aalim (Religious Scholar) Maulana Abdul Rasheed said 'the public has exceeded the limits of religion—almost to the extent that the clergy can no longer capture the people's interest and imagination. He said 'our culture has been built up over fourteen hundred years since the time of Holy prophet, and these programs are threatening all this.... I can't place these commercial objectives on top and forget all else.'
Pakistani parents of almost all backgrounds express worries about the greater incidence of sex, violence, bad language and bad behaviour on satellite television. There is concern that violence on the screen is producing copycat violence on the streets or in the classroom, that sexual gratification and promiscuity are being encouraged and that certain kinds of more explicit programs undermine family and traditional values. Parents and grandparents fear that children are losing their innocence by being exposed to unsuitable adult programs—especially the vulgarity of Indian Urdu film songs and the unnecessary violence and frankness of serials.
Family viewing of programs with bolder themes or franker treatment of sexuality is a source of embarrassment for most parents and some children. One woman in a working class group discussion in Lahore said that television had provoked children to ask all sorts of embarrassing questions, 'Small children ask questions about underclothes, the menstruation cycle, female sanitary napkins and contraceptive pills and techniques. I cannot answer them. They shouldn't show such things on the screen’.
Parents in rural settlement in Faisalabad district, were equally concerned. 'Sex and violence are things that are not openly discussed in average Punjabi Muslim families and should not be shown on television’.
32 Speculation about the impact of television is common, though most of it cannot be confirmed when specific examples are sought. The discussion groups in Lahore, some participants wanted to blame television for girls running away with men of different ethnic groups and classes, though others pointed out that such things had happened before. Others talked of girls being raped in offices and workplaces, though no one was aware of any specific examples and the police had no records of such crimes. Such examples are symptomatic of general concerns about the impact of satellite television, which is reflecting the fractured world of advanced urban societies to localities with more conservative traditions.
Discussion groups commonly expressed the view that cable TV is responsible for growing promiscuity in society. TV is seen as the immediate culprit because of its visual presence discussing sex or portraying sexuality related activities. However, as groups examined the issue in more depth, they would generally modify their verdict, accepting that no media product alone can be responsible for something as basic as sexual behaviour patterns.
Satellite television is part of a complex pattern of social change, but a number of professionals dealing with social and personal problems see it as a negative influence. Dr. Anwar Iqbal, a social Scientist from Islamabad, believes that part-time prostitution among college girls has increased, and sees consumerist pressures driven by TV as deeply corrupting. MA Hashmi, a social worker from Rawalpindi, who works for an NGO, says 'feelings of understanding, dependency and mutual trust are increasingly absent in people now and I see that as a direct result of the images on TV’.
Another worry for parents is the level of violence in Urdu films, teleserials and cartoons. One worried parent said, 'Even cartoons are no longer safe. Some of the characters have become so ridiculously violent that they are losing their suitability for children. Children are learning to kick
33 and punch and use foul language.' A teacher in Islamabad noted that 'the soft spoken and gentle romantic hero of yesterday has been replaced by the uncouth, rugged, angry young man. ‘Today, children and youth like to answer back, be rude and demonstrate aggressive behavior,’ he said.
A discussion group accepted that violence in society had its origins in economic deprivation and social breakdown and could not be blamed solely on the media, but many discussants did blame TV for a process of violence. They held that people are willing to accept a greater degree of violence because of their exposure to it on TV. Some also believed that TV did influence the behavior of marginal players; those on the verge of assault or adultery may risk it under the influence of TV.
There seems to be a class dimension to reactions to media violence. Working class women in Karachi were more divided on this question than some middle class groups from the same city. Some of them held TV responsible for an increase in violence; they believed men were copying what they saw on the screen. Others believed that TV had had a pacifying influence on men. Some media commentators also stress these differences of class perception. For the middle class, the level of violence in films is outside their normal experience, whereas for the working class it is not regarded as unusual. Shahzad Ahmad says,’ ‘When you take a clip from a TV program of violence and abusive behavior and show them, nine times out of ten they say ‘this is nothing.’ Let me tell you what happened here the other day... ‘Women in slum areas are not surprised or shocked to see it portrayed on TV. They are surprised that I am surprised’, he concluded.
Some discussants expressed concern that satellite television, which is targeting the middle class with expensive products, may be alienating working class and rural viewers and fuelling social unrest. But my research among working class families in Lahore and Rawalpindi found more evidence of prudence than of frustration and anger. These families, with a
34 purchasing power of less than Rs. 3,000 a month, all confront the dilemma that their children are constantly exposed to advertisements for goods they cannot afford to buy. They were critical of many of the programs and of the advertisements, but they followed new products closely and exhibited a high rate of sampling, whether of soaps, shampoos, biscuits or chocolates.
All the discussions show that people are worried about the impact on others, not on themselves. The middle class is concerned about other people's children and about the impact on the working class. The working class, significantly, is concerned about what it sees as the growth of corruption in the middle class. A group of Rikshaw drivers and craftsmen interviewed in Karachi blamed the parents of rich children for conniving at indecent behaviour. They said, they were afraid that their children would be affected by rich adolescents. All of them were of the opinion that 'TV is responsible for the creeping corruption in society, but they also recognised ‘some good effects’ of TV. One said, he thought the dowry system was vanishing because of media exposure. He said, ‘in my home everyone is convinced that this system is bad and outdated. I will try to marry my sons and daughters without dowry. This is the contribution of TV’.
The young are also divided over the new cultural influences, but they are less nostalgic and more open-minded. A group of students at a private University in Islamabad told, they enjoyed the new soap operas, 'including the carefree behavior of young men and women'. They did not find it culturally degrading, but they said, they would not express this view to their parents. They felt that their parents belong to the old generation and naturally would not like their views. At a discussion with students at Punjab University Lahore, some middle class students were as critical as their parents of Lollywood programs and MTV, which they characterized as 'bad and corrupting, but they showed less inclination to romanticize the past. One said: ‘I have a culture and tradition of joint families. Individualism is
35 not liked by us. Slowly young people are leaving their parents after marriage and starting to live separately. But this is due to socio-economic changes in the society and not due to TV.’ A second said, ‘I agree, but TV has helped this trend, the serials and films on TV show and glorify this trend.' A third interrupted: 'Look, things are bound to change. We have become a global village now. We are taking things from western culture. Some are bad but some are good additions. I think our society is becoming modern’.
My research suggests that most viewers are far from passive in their reactions. As well as appreciating the entertainment, they have tended to take up messages of self-improvement, self-confidence, egalitarianism and participation. They have also been critical of the shortcomings of satellite TV and its strident commercialism. Many of them, particularly outside the elites of the big cities, have shown themselves to be much more socially conservative than some of the Karachi-based market research organizations anticipated.
Similar conclusions are also being reached by many of the advertising agencies who have played an important role in shaping the new media market. A recent survey conducted for Higher Education Commission, Ministry of Education among 15-34 year olds in Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Hyderabad, Peshawar and Quetta showed that the individualism of Karachi is not reproduced across the country. The survey indicates that Cable TV has successfully widened its appeal to include the urban middle class but that it now needs to adjust its profile to accommodate their more family-oriented view of the world. Over 65 per cent of the sample said they tried to obey their elders 'even if it hurts, with Karachi scoring lowest on this question. The majority said their ideal music channel would consist of 75 per cent Urdu film and pop music and 25 per cent English music. The conservatism was balanced, however, by relatively high scores in areas where personal choice has traditionally been limited.
36 well over 60 per cent thought they should only marry someone of their choice (with Peshawar and Quetta more conservative than other centers) and 31 per cent thought couples should not meet before marriage, with females agreeing more strongly than males.
That Pakistan youth is socially more conservative than planners anticipated is the leading outcome. The problem is that in attempting to create youth attitudes borrowed from the west, many marketers are forgetting to reflect that fact which already exists in Pakistani culture.
In terms of theories of globalization, the emergence of new satellite culture has shown clearly that success in a large market like Pakistan requires a high degree of localization. The religious programs on Geo, Indus and ARY and transformation of Star TV and of the music channels is a clear proof of that. The success of Some regional channels (like Zee TV) has been copied by GEO , ARY, Indus, and to some extent by PTV. Beyond the evident success of localization, there are important questions about the form and character it has taken. New collaborations between international and national business have generated a culture which follows western-style consumerism with the popularity of Bollywood and reaches a sizeable audiences. Its success has raised questions within Pakistan about the failure of national culture. On the mass entertainment channel like PTV, it is largely Pakistani culture which is being projected in a Pakistani version of globalization. Consequently, looking at the cultural impact of the satellite revolution in neighbouring countries brings into the picture questions not simply of popular culture but also of inherited political attitudes and relationships.
It is not Pakistani culture, which is in jeopardy; the entire social and economic system is facing transformation. People are highly divided at all levels on the impact of satellite TV. An other striking feature of my research in that views expressed on the satellite programs represent only less than
37 20 percent population, while 80 percent is still out of their reach. Perhaps this powerful segment will voice their views too, but not at least in an immediate future. Thus the other striking outcome of satellite arrival can be a sharp cultural divide among rural and urban population. The reaction and response to satellite programs by rural population based on first hand social experience are still not available.
38 Chapter 7
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
I have attempted to undertake a research on the anthropology of television in Pakistan which has been extremely fascinating as well as complicated. I have tried to deal with two fragile areas of investigation i.e. culture and, television as a cultural career. Both are intertwined and in current times largely interdependent also. I have used primarily the anthropological tools to study electronic media (television) and also have investigated the role of television in shaping the cultural patterns in today’s Pakistan. I have partially used survey methods for collecting audience response through structured tools but the main emphasis has been on qualitative data which was gathered through various techniques such as in- depth interviews, case studies and focus group discussions; both the techniques have complimented each other greatly in my research. This thesis has been divided accordingly into seven chapters which deal with current theoretical concepts in media studies, historical background of mass media and television in south Asia and Pakistan, responses of 1000 people on various program types, in-depth analysis of state controlled TV in Pakistan and the impact of satellite television and the reaction of audience. I have not done content analysis of various programs broadcast by Pakistan Television and satellite channels, which is a separate area of investigation and is beyond the scope of my research. I have concentrated on broader areas by selecting different chunks of programs and have analyzed the overall role and impact of television on people’s lives and culture. I have tried to make the study most representative and current by covering every possible segment of society ranging from common people, women, youth, rural and urban population, policy makers, media managers, actors, producers and directors to politicians and religious scholars. My research is based on a set of hypotheses which assume that TV is responsible for shaping the ethics of the society and a free and financially independent
39 television is a better option in Pakistan because people rate state television very low as credible medium. This proposition was the basis of all the analysis which has led to a final conclusion.
In chapter 2, I have discussed in detail what is meant by culture in this study. The culture in the crudest form is not the point of reference but it does refer to the day-to-day living patterns and those customs, traditions, ethics and beliefs which are held by the people as most integral part of their lives; they form the cultural life line of Pakistan. These beliefs and practices are modern and valid in their own merit. I have discussed the concept of cultural communication in detail and have deliberated at length the ideology of British school led by Raymond Williams and Staurt Hall. In this chapter history and evolution of television industry have also been included. A short discussion on control mechanism has been added to elaborate the ever- favorite subjects of modern thinkers – the cultural imperialism and dependency paradigm.
In Chapter 3, I have given a detailed background of media in South Asia, with small account of television scenario in South Asian countries before giving a comprehensive picture of media and television in Pakistan. All possible aspects of state television (PTV) have been discussed in this chapter because of the obvious reason that the central thrust of my work is on PTV as the largest and monopoly TV broadcaster in Pakistan. In this chapter discussion and data on arrival of cable in Pakistan and subsequent policy changes by the government have been provided.
Chapter 4 is a statistical account of audience response on various programs types aired by PTV. In this chapter it has been clarified that PTV is a choice by compulsion to majority of the population due to the fact that cable is concentrated to 20 percent of the urban population and that too is not available to all. The data shows that a cross section of society inclusive of rural urban, rich and poor, all age groups irrespective of gender
40 differentiation are dissatisfied with PTV programs. Drama and sports are most liked program types while the national news bulletin (Khabarnama) was credited very low by all the groups. In this chapter a small comparison with the biggest cable rival GEO has been included which also shows that respondents appreciate better coverage by GEO. This survey also indicates that the majority of respondents do not appreciate restrictions on TV. It was also revealed by the target population that PTV has failed to project social problems of the society and the overall impact of TV programs on people’s lives is not positive. It has less provided information, education and entertainment and has more adverse effects on middle and lower middle class families in terms of portrayal of stranger cultures and projection of affluent classes and the establishment at large.
I have discussed in Chapter 5 through in-depth interviews that television has been the most favorite medium but highly controversial in the society from day one in terms of its alien attitude and cultural distance from the audience. In this chapter I have discussed that the connection between television and society is less direct and television cannot be understood without studying the people’s reaction towards TV Programs and watching and talking about television are inseparable parts of a single social activity. The conservative section of society including a number of intellectuals has been dissatisfied with its messages. There was however a realization that television has helped Pakistanis to feel more confident, less isolated and backward. They have become better consumers also. A section of society has been equally critical of its Americanization and also Indianization in many respects. The feminist writers and groups blame television for lowering the social position of women. Another powerful segment of society has the opinion that television is creating a new mythical world ignoring the current realities. I have discussed that effects of television program are not direct; they reach people through a multiple socio-psychological channels and are defined by various people under their own circumstance and
41 positions in the society. I have observed that most of the reactions and responses are based on individual perceptions created by economic and social positions. People interpret tele-visual texts under given conditions and they redefine their interpretations when the conditions change. However, it was an outcome of my research that a majority of viewers do also interpret their immediate environment including family members under the influence of TV texts and also expect a peculiar social behavior from their family members and friend under the dictates of TV messages. Thus TV is strongly reinforcing new cultural traits and strengthening and diminishing the older ones at the same time. This was verified by the ethnographic case studies conducted at Islamabad, where all the target families define their relationship under the shadows of TV messages - some realistic and some irrational. Individual discussions do add to this phenomena in a slightly different way when people say that TV texts have created a whimsical attitude in the society where people define the established cultural practices in a fantasy world. The data strongly suggests that the full potential of television has not been harnessed in Pakistan as it did two decades ago through the remarkable presentations during 1970s and till mid 1980s.
The people could accept moral stances presented only when they identified with their own worlds, but television has created its own world; one that was not part of common man’s daily lives; the viewers consider the television world as a separate sphere. I have concluded that the viewers treat TV programs as fantasy escape which do not depict their real life and do not belong to their morals. In this chapter I have also discussed the credibility in terms of news presentation and have found ample evidence that Television as a medium do enjoy larger credibility, but PTV stands at the lowest ebb. It has multiple reasons. PTV as a monopoly broadcaster and enjoying the largest terrestrial network in control has the largest outreach. It has a history of long government control and non-professional manpower.
42 PTV from the very beginning was used under the whims of the ruling parties - military and civil. I have elaborated in detail how PTV has functioned under various regimes and concluded that the form of government has only a partial impact on its mode of working because it was highly misused by all the governments in similar way. I have also mentioned in this chapter that PTV’s working cannot be evaluated in terms of democracy or military rules: it has to be examined under a different yardstick which I call credibility. My result is that PTV has always lacked credibility no matter what type of government was there and who was ruling? The major contributor in destroying the credibility of PTV was non-professionalism shown by its incompetent and bureaucratic manpower which has badly failed to realize the modern trends and demands. PTV’s current affairs and news have faced another blow after the arrival of satellite channels and Pakistani private cable TV broadcasters in Urdu language. PTV is now under a permanent threat from satellite channels.
I have also discussed in this chapter that PTV was a victim of elected governments hegemonic attitudes more than the dictatorial control of military rulers. I have observed during the research that credibility is chiefly dependent on not only the type of news and the element of truth in it, but also the presentation style, anchors, gate keeping arrangements and the visual presentation are equally important. PTV’s agenda setting is not the result of censorship or state control, it is a free choice, by and large, of the people taking decision within the organization. Therefore PTV, I have concluded, will remain equally incredible if run by the private sector due to it’s inherit weaknesses and structural faults.
After an examination of development of the new television market in Pakistan, the following chapter examined the cultural influence of satellite programs in Pakistan. Chapter 6 shows that satellite television has been instrumental in creating a new popular culture, which has proved both
43 attractive and controversial. The chapter looks at the implications of the popularity of entertainment channels and tests opinion among Pakistanis on the programs of these channels.
Because of the centralized character of the nation states, the satellite revolution in South Asia has been more disruptive and far reaching than in many other parts of the world. In most South Asian countries, satellite channels brought the first direct challenge to the state-controlled sector and its bureaucratic broadcasting culture. The new channels have offered better-produced and more wide-ranging international news and current affairs programs and many new entertainment programs. In some South Asian metropolitan centers, middle class audiences for national broadcasters have virtually disappeared. In this influential segment of the community, a key instrument of state cultural control has been made almost redundant.
In Pakistan the satellite media have given access to new and articulate voices. Politicians and public figures have been called to account in programs, which have broken with the deferential tradition of state broadcasters. Audience participation in debates, discussions and interviews has added a new dimension to civil society. These welcome improvements in program choice and quality have come within a framework of market economics. In its initial phase at least, the market has reinforced the dominant position of Urdu as the lingua franca of Pakistan and by its very success and attractiveness has raised questions about the future of other sub regional cultures. In no province of Pakistan, the satellite channels have landed with regional flavor and language. PTV still dominates rural areas through its new regional satellite channel-The National.
Another area in which the satellite media have had remarkable success is in linking up Pakistan across the globe. The Pakistani living in the Gulf, Europe or North America can now watch the same programs as
44 their relatives at home. Some of the private satellite channels have actively developed new market opportunities among the Pakistani Diaspora, while state broadcasters have seen the importance of registering their presence on the same screens. Part of the motive—for India and Pakistan especially—has been propagandist, to ensure that audiences in neighboring countries and their citizens abroad have access to their own culture. But there is also an international constituency for Indian films and popular dance, and Pakistani folk and classical music. The satellite television has helped to create diasporic public spheres. Satellite television has certainly played a part in the creation of a new kind of hybridity which is characteristic of contemporary metropolitan living.
The populism of satellite TV is having strong affect on the society; it ended PTV’s monopoly, promoted openness, introduced new ideas and introduced new type of programs which Pakistanis have never seen in the recent past. I have discussed at the same time those grey areas which are problematic, challenging and even threatening. Since satellite channels in the beginning addressed mainly to English speaking aristocracy and McDonald – MTV generation in urban centers; it designed programs which were culturally closer to this segments of society. Late in 1990s a number of Urdu language channels owned by Pakistani tycoons landed in the arena of competition which changed the media climate altogether. But still the society could not digest this newness which was strange and alien and still is. I have discussed that the reaction towards satellite channel programs is different in different segment of society. My income group and educational attainment level classification did not hold good in the analysis of this phenomena. I found a sharp difference of opinion and reaction among rural and urban segments of society. Most criticism surprisingly came from those who have a little or no access to cable. Similarly those who lashed out at some kind of satellite programs mostly referred to Indian Movies and music and of course to English music channels like MTV or Channel V: thus the
45 overall programming was not the frame of reference for these people. The rural segment largely had no opinion because of absence of a regular direct contact with satellite channels. It was however a common belief among the educated rural class that “this is dangerous and filthy”.
The impact on urban middle class families was immense particularly on women, children and youth. It was evident that a ray of exposure to unseen worlds has penetrated in addition to introduction of a number of culturally undesirable realities. The women had experienced new wave of independence which has lead to family disputes and maladjustments within the household. A number of new role models for youth have emerged and a new lingua franca is in the making which is a mix of English and Urdu or English and regional languages and dialects. New fashion trends and consumerism is another result of satellite broadcasts. A non-conforming children and youth generation is also attributed to satellite channels. The franker treatment of sexuality in the satellite TV serials and music shows has alarming impact on children and youth. Though small in number but highly conscious segment of society was of the opinion that it is a transitional period when society is passing through new experiences which are not as devastating as claimed by the conservative section of the society. I have concluded that a sizeable number of youth and women are not very comfortable with satellite programs. The concern is based on the fear that moral values and behavior patterns are under severe threat, which required serious efforts at national level by national TV or state TV. I have concluded that large scale welcome to satellite channels in urban centers is not a consensus view of the entire society, time has yet not come to pass a judgment because a lot is still in the pipeline. The major area of concern however is the widening gulf between rural and urban population in terms of access to media facilities and resultant social and economic disparities created in the society.
46 Conclusion
I have provided evidence for many of my claims made in the previous chapters. I have discussed at length the media-state relationship, particularly under the broader ideologies presented by Raymond Williams and Staurt Hall. Although I don’t agree with Williams model of public sector broadcasting in full, but his ideas regarding the state control and consumerism spread through television are very close to my findings. The authority structure needs a new type of understanding under a Pakistani context. The authority patterns are designed in layers which travel from state to tribe, community, ethnic group and family. At each layer authority is vested at some point and exercised under a defined code. Any break away from this defined set of relationship can destroy the entire social structure. The individual choices are governed by social and economic factors. The role of state is also interesting in this realm, which is more centered towards control than support for the citizens. The media-state relationship has similarly different set of layers in case of electronic media, particularly television. The state has a monopolistic role, which is manifested in all broadcasting activities. The public sector broadcasting, I suggest, should be understood under this authority pattern and the state and government should be treated as synonyms. In Pakistani context all references made to state-society relationship are also applicable to the government-society relationship. For Pakistanis and most third world citizens, government is not an institution created to run the affairs of the state, but is no different from state itself. The clear concept of state, therefore, is blurred in the society. Similarly the functions of state institutions like judiciary legislature, and army should be understood in this context.
Government policy towards the media in Pakistan has largely been based on a functionalist approach, in which the media are seen as a causal influence for continuity, integration and normality in society. The active engagement of audiences and their skepticism and capacity to resist as well
47 as to accept media messages underlines the autonomy of individual viewers and listeners. There was a common perception among broadcasters and policy-makers that television and radio can generate or promote desirable or undesirable social and cultural trends. It was a shared opinion that television has an influence in negotiating ideas of modernity in the country.
The peculiar circumstances also call for a re-examination of how the public interest is defined. Until recently, the concept of public service broadcasting centered on the nation state and on state-controlled media. The broadcasters in Pakistan have acted as custodians of national culture; they have also defined the cultural ethics in their own style.
By the 1980s, broadcasting, as a tool of central government, had become part of an acute crisis of centre-state relations in Pakistan. The breakaway of Pakistan’s Eastern wing to form Bangladesh was only the most dramatic example of a trend which affected almost all countries of the region. Pakistan governments were faced, over the next two decades, with insurgency in Baluchistan, an uprising in Sindh and a growing sense of alienation among the Muhajirs, who had migrated from India to become citizens of the new state after 1947. Here National broadcasters, TV on top of that, helped to increase the sense of alienation by acting as propagandists for ruling parties, by denying space to opposition politicians or critics of government policy and by neglecting regional cultures and concerns.
Efforts to use broadcasting to reinforce national identity made broadcasting a focus of attention in the tussle between the center and its regional opponents. The experience of Pakistan shows that changes of form are not necessarily significant. The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation, established in 1972 and Pakistan Television Corporation established in 1979 were running on similar lines. The new status was supposed to give more freedom to the broadcasters, but government remained very powerful, the organization became more bureaucratic and the tradition of drafting
48 senior civil servants into top jobs carried over into the new corporate existence. By the early 1990s, a number of factors had come together to challenge the viability of governments’ control of the electronic media. Among these were the emergence of a democratic consensus, the growth of a more independent press, the popularity of video, the beginnings of economic liberalization and the development of a new, extended, urban middle class in Pakistan.
The country was run as parliamentary democracy. The military regime gave way to elected government in 1988. Therefore, the absolute government control of the electronic media made less sense. There was an obvious mismatch between the practice of democracy and the continued suppression of important political news on government-controlled TV. A Pakistani commentator wrote; ‘Our democratic system is based on interplay of many parties and points of view. However, our electronic media is working largely on the pattern of one-party dictatorship, for the benefit of the shortsighted and unprincipled men in power. (Islam Ali, Muslim, 24-07- 1993).
For almost fifty-six years after Independence, Pakistan governments maintained a monopoly of the airwaves, whether radio or television, and for the most part used them for petty political purposes. They did so, despite overwhelming evidence that their news services were not credible and their audiences demanded more choice. By the 1990s, however, the middle class in particular had become a massive market, both for consumer goods and for alternative media services. The governments were locked in a centralizing mind-set, which apparently prevented them from responding creatively to these new challenges. But they were about to face a challenge from the skies, which would threaten the mind-set, the monopoly and the projection of national cultures which went with them.
49 My thesis argues that Pakistan’s television has served the upper middle classes first and others afterwards. Satellite television has more restricted audiences and strictly commercial objectives. In his analyses of media trends in towards 2000, Raymond Williams envisaged a world pulled between 'false and frenetic nationalisms and 'reckless and uncontrollable transnational-isms' (Williams 1985). His fears that the development of technology would strengthen the hands of the state and of transnational economic interests has become a much more widely shared anxiety today, though it is counterbalanced by the opportunities for personal and cultural expression of middle class through internet.
My research has pointed out two glaring facts: one, state television in Pakistan has lost its credibility due to excessive control and non- professional attitude. The other is that satellite channels have greatly affected Pakistani society both socially and culturally. The state television has failed to establish an agenda for its programming. It has created frustration, hunger for entertainment, disappointment, reaction against the governments and the state, psychological depression and social and cultural disparities. The state TV (PTV) has worked without a goal and policy for 40 years together, establishing less cultural link with the society. Most of its targets have been culturally wrong and its attitude has been partisan with undue thrust on the social portrayal of urban affluent classes. My research suggests that PTV is a major contributor in creating political frustrations among the people and have generated negative reactions towards religious and ethical values through its programs. The cause of national TV’s downfall lies in the hegemonic use of electronic media by all civil and military governments. The media managers could not set a vision for a true national TV. Onward 1990, the satellite invasion has started a process of repositioning of old standards which were once sacred to Pakistanis. It has introduced a wave of new ideas, openness and promiscuity in the society. It has come up with a wave of information on national and international
50 events providing people opportunity to verify and check the truth spontaneously. One important result of satellite revolution is the development of a lively contemporary public debate about the role of media. There is a great deal of media comment, political argument and less sociological and anthropological analysis in Pakistan. The terms of debate on issues of democratic representation, national sovereignty, civil society and cultural identity are perceived to hinge more than before on the influence of the media, with the print media still paramount but the private electronic media playing a catalytic role in some fields. The reform of the national media will depend on the development of a more active public opinion on media issues and the creation of a new relationship between media and the civil society.
This wave of change has great impact on political culture of the society. The old tradition of hiding the facts and distorting the realities is no more valid although still in practice. Urbanites being fortunate to have access to satellite TV programs have a different opinion within their own groups. People are fearful and cautious of the impact satellite channels are creating on children, youth and women. It has affected the family fabric and social relations greatly. In short a popular culture with lots of global traits is in the making. My conclusion is that this new culture is not a threat to Pakistani culture but is different from the old traditional cultural practices which are still dear to the society. The people interpret this new culture in a different way which depends on class position and social placement. The interpretations are made according to the individual or group circumstances. Pakistani society which is a complex whole of variety of social, economic and ethnic subgroups respond to various factors differently under their own conditions. The changes brought about by the historical and political process have transformed the society gradually over the years but abrupt changes introduced by satellite TV are not easy to digest. Presence of strong religious, cultural, ethnic, linguistic groups does not
51 allow the society to undergo rapid cultural transformation; there is a strong resistance. The changing role of women, children and youth is not culturally embedded–it is perceived as a direct off shoot of foreign-alien influence thrown in by the satellite TV channels. The cultural standards and morality do not accept sudden restructuring and repositioning. The authority pattern at the level of central government to provincial governments and down to family and individual levels is showing cracks under the influence of new ideas and ideologies.
I have discussed that the state control of media, particularly TV, is yet not a strange phenomenon. The mode and operation of state TV in Pakistan may be different but not unique. During the last two decades people have enjoyed a fresh air of press freedom, abundance of information and a multi- styled entertainment through various means. A conservative TV in the hands of government is therefore unacceptable to people. They, not very satisfied with cable invasion, require a powerful alternative which only the state TV can provide. Given the peculiar political structure and culture, the Pakistani society cannot afford to have a national TV in the hands of private sector promoting acute commercialism. There is always a need to have a TV with a mandate to satisfy a multi ethnic and multi linguist society with lots of religious and cultural differences. The state TV requires redesigning and remodeling which again demands strong political will and long-term vision.
I have discussed through statistical and in-depth empirical data that the terms of communication between the society and TV are not cultural. People watch television for entertainment and information seeking and for consumption of leisure time. The gulf is not between the medium and the people but between the media messages and the society. It also reflects the increasing cultural distance between the state and the people. The primary question, which led me to undertake this research, was; does TV in Pakistani society represent and negotiate with the people in cultural terms?
52 And whose culture is portrayed on TV? Stretching further, the question also involves the query; if TV is introducing a new culture? The answer is a no and yes both. State TV has not been successful in communicating with the people under the terms of their own culture. It reflects a culture which is practiced by a very few affluent urbanites ignoring a larger majority of rural people. My research reveals that the state TV has been underpinning a culture of orthodoxy and self-denial and has been instrumental in highlighting the religious and social controversies. To people, the images and characters on state TV are not “us” but “ours”- a relationship which shows familiarity without belonging. On the other hand the satellite broadcasts have developed a new set of relations with Pakistani society, creating hybridization of popular and conservative cultural norms – mixing local with global. This has come up with a complex set of new traits which are not grounded in the social fabric of the society. In this scenario, state TV has not risen to satellite challenges. It is projecting a close door policy which has proved redundant in global environment. The moral values are in jeopardy and need alteration to survive under the new global cultural agenda. A strong need for a public service TV is still there but under a new mandate and a fresh vision for future.
Thus my hypothesis that TV is responsible for shaping the ethics of the society, and a free and financially independent television is a better option in Pakistan because people rate state television very low as credible medium, is partially true to the extent that it has a strong impact on people’s lives. But a free and financially independent television as an alternate to state controlled TV cannot be a better option because the social ground is yet not ripe to experience a pure commercial activity at state and national level, which operates only under certain regulations but without a true national agenda. My data suggests that people still need a national broadcaster as parallel to private, purely commercial satellite channels for true public service in line with the Canada’s CBC, Japans’s NHK, India’s
53 Door Darshan, and to a large extent UK’s BBC, which have survived despite strong opposition within their own cultures and societies.
As I have referred to in the beginning of this section that state-society and the state-government relationship are inseparable entities. My findings suggest that the concept of public service broadcasting needs redefinition in Pakistani culture. I have also emphasized that the notion of democracy should be seen under a Pakistani socio-cultural context where the concept of free democratic choices is different. I have argued that the structure and composition of elected governments needs to be re-evaluated in historical perspective which will show that the civil and military governments have worked under the same traditions and in similar manner. Therefore I suggest that a democratic media under this scenario will still remain a far cry.
There are only two players in entire broadcasting activities in Pakistan; one is the government and the other is global satellite channels available through cable. Since television is operating in line with the government policy and government and state are inseparable in Pakistan, the state society relationship are equally weakening. People don’t identify their relations with medium but with the content or message, which is not always desirable. I conclude that the state society links are weakening due to the government control of electronic media, where people are placed at the periphery. This is perhaps a very intricate phenomenon which needs further probe at the level of political analysis and with more thrust on social currents. I have provided evidence for the presence of a complex phenomenon in the society but perhaps not provided a solution. However, I trust that some distance has been covered through this research, which may take upcoming researchers to reach certain destination.
54 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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