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Simplifying Our Brand and Our Message

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Simplifying Our Brand and Our Message Information Security – Theory vs. Reality 0368-4474-01, Winter 2011 Lecture 13: Conditional Access and Digital Right Management Guest Lecturer: Itsik Mantin 1 CA/DRM Security Itsik Mantin NDS Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Outline • Introduction – About NDS – Cryptography and security – Content Delivery Systems • CA/DRM Systems • On Smart Card Security • On STB Security • Content Protection Standards • Meeting Reality • Epilog Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. DRM and CA @ Wikipedia Digital Rights Management • A class of access control technologies that are used by hardware manufacturers, publishers, copyright holders and individuals with the intent to limit the use of digital content and devices after sale Conditional Access • The protection of content by requiring certain criteria to be met before granting access to this content. The term is commonly used in relation to digital television systems, most notably satellite television. Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Conditional Access Program Content Satellite dish Access ECM Generator Criteria of ECM (ECMG) the Program Traffic Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Cryptography Terms • Block cipher: AES, DES, TDES, … • Authentication protocols: Fiat-Shamir • Mode of operation: ECB, CBC, CTR, … • Padding • Stream Cipher: RC4, A51/2… • Entropy • Hash functions: SHA-1, MD5, SHA-2, … • Key management • Symmetric signatures: HMAC, CMAC • Key derivation • Digital Signatures: RSA, El-Gamal • Certificates • Key exchange protocols: Diffie- • Public-key infrastructure Hellman Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Distinctions to Understand • Cryptography – Encryption vs. Authentication – Randomness vs. pseudo-randomness – Symmetric-key encryption vs. asymmetric-key encryption – Symmetric-key authentication vs. asymmetric-key authentication • Security – Global/universal key vs. unique key – Software security vs. hardware security – “Regular mode” vs. privileged mode – What can happen vs. what is supposed to happen – Device security vs. end-to-end security Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Cryptography and Security • Cryptography: – Message confidentiality: Only the intended recipient(s) can read the message – Message integrity: Recipient can verify that sender’s message has not been altered – Message non-repudiation: Sender cannot deny generation of the message – Entity authentication: People and machines can authenticate the identity of an entity • Security = Policy Enforcement Conditions Entity Resource Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Cryptography and Security • Security vs. cryptography is similar to … – … Restauranting vs. Cooking • The heart of restauranting is cooking, but you need more… Still, a good restaurant will always rely on a good chef Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Audio Video Items Channels NDS Business E-Magazines E-books Satellite Cellular Digital Closed IP Internet Terrestrial Cables Subscription Pay per view/listen/read Ad-based Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. • Who am I? DRM Flow • What am I entitled to? • What is this piece of content? • Hmmmmm… Client Activation Service enabling • Device keys • Service keys • Device license • Service terms Content provisioning License provisioning • Get content • Get content keys • Get content terms Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Outline • Introduction • CA/DRM Systems • On Securing Smart Cards • On Securing STBs • On Securing DRM Software • Content Protection Standards • Meeting Reality • Epilog Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. The CA/DRM Security Paradox Crypto-privacy: encrypt a message between Alice and Bob. They trust each other but do not trust Eve. The DRM problem: Bob is the potential enemy!!! Alice (sender) Bob (recipient) Client Client Cloning and Reverse Service Engineering Eve Abuse Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. 14 The CA/DRM Security Paradox 1. Bob’s the enemy Digital fortress for: 2. Broadcast 1. Entitlement resolution 3. One-way 2. Key management Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Security Architecture Flow Threat Analysis • Put security “goals” Security Design • Obtaining these goals (PRIORITIZATION!!!) Security analysis • Figure out what threats remain applicable Security maintenance • Monitoring • Security updates • Security responses Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Classes of Threats Service attack Content attack Hardware attack Unauthorized usage of Getting the service Content stealing hardware (e.g., STB, iPhone, without paying PS3) Content consumption not Distribution (e.g., black Who cares? according to usage “rules” market DVDs) Operator Content provider Device vendor Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. The Hacking Model • One-time process • May take significant effort (and $$$) • Research: Reverse engineering the device and security analysis • Development: designing methods and tools for attacking a single R&D device • Per-device effort • Invest a moderate effort in attacking a single device Production • Distribution over the Internet or technical agents Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. The Weakest Link From where will the Hacker Get in? Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Threats vs. Hacks Threat Hack • What does the attacker want to • How would the attacker achieve achieve? (land a UAV in hostile his goal? (flood frequencies for land) DoS + forge headquarters) • Motivation (billions of dollars) • Required resources (technical skills, data, time, money) • Attacker’s profile (powerful government) • Likelihood • Potential Damage • Easiness Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. The Global Hack Threat A downloadable program that allows: 1. Unlimited view 2. Getting the content 3. For good! Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. General Security Principles NO Single point of failure Layered security architecture (“Security Fences”) • Security component with minimal • Prevent cloning function (aka kernel) • But also detect cloning • “Assume” hacks for the rest Think as an attacker Dynamics No game over • Moving target • Renewability: recovery procedures • Differentiate (anti domino effect) Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Layered Security Belt and suspenders Multiple, diversified defenses Force adversary to master several disciplines Examples Secrets dispersed between system components Combine math tricks with engineering tricks Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Security Kernel Anti- Tamper- Security Reverse- Resistance Engineering Performance Footprint Hardware Overhead Overhead $$$$$ Applicable for small non-critical-path components Used for sensitive functions Key processing Business rules processing Logging Content processing Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Keeping the hacker busy • Differentiate between systems: prevent domino-effect • Make the system a moving target: – Change algorithms – Change flows (time, memory) • Minimize the attacker’s ROI (Return on Investment) Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Never Lose • Recovery procedures • Renewable security Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Be Prepared Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. More Security Principles DecryptCw(BR, ECW) DecryptCw(BR, ECW) { { If CheckBR(BR) == True If CheckBR(BR) == True { { KLoadCWEKey() KLoadCWEKey() CWDec(K, ECW) TK Hash(BR, K) } CWDec(TK, ECW) } } } Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Use Whatever You've Got Book Selling over Pay-TV over Satellite Security Mechanisms Internet: 1. Bob’s the enemy 1. Bob’s still the enemy 1. Bob’s still the enemy 2. Broadcast 2. Per-client encryption 2. Unicast 3. One-way 3. Online authentication 3. Two-way 4. Large consumable 4. Fingerprinting 4. Smaller consumable We would not to secure ourselves out of business! Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Outline • Introduction • CA/DRM Systems • On Securing Smart Cards – Smart Card Security – Coping with Fault Analysis • On Securing STBs • On Securing DRM Software • Content Protection Standards • Meeting Reality • Epilog Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Service Attacks Smart Cards Pirate registration to • Pirate cloned cards (green cards, blue cards) the service More time • Block service cancellation messages More entitlements • Change entitlements to “Premium” NDS cards CA are too Battlefield hard to is now the hack STB Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Outline • Introduction • CA/DRM Systems • On Securing Smart Cards – Smart Card Security – Coping with Fault Analysis • On Securing STBs • On Securing DRM Software • Content Protection Standards • Meeting Reality • Epilog Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. The Fault Model Execution fault • Skipping one or more instructions Limited control on the exact line (can be overcome through iterative process) • Replacing one or more instructions Limited control on which instructions are put instead • Changing some control data A status variable or the address of a JMP/ Branch Data fault • Change volatile/non-volatile memory (registers, RAM, EEPROM) Confidential ©NDS Ltd 2011. All rights reserved. Attack Tree Fault Attacks Crypto Data Exec. Exec. Faults Faults Bypass “Better” Attack Control Crypto Security Code Crypto Data Keys Mech. Regions Algo. Side- Break Read- Hybrid Channel Access through- FA/PA Crypto Control Write Attacks Attacks Confidential
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