CREST SECURITY REVIEW SPRING 2017

MARK YOUNGMAN

The decision by the (IS) group to proclaim a ‘caliphate’ in June LESSONS FROM THE DECLINE 2014 was a watershed moment in the history of , but it was far from the first attempt at jihadist state-building. Examining the reasons for the failure of one such project, the Emirate (IK) in ’s , and OF THE NORTH CAUCASUS the demise of the regional insurgency under the banners of both IK and IS can help us better understand the relationship between a group’s ideology and its INSURGENCY composition and operating environment.

In October 2007, veteran Chechen field commissions to rehabilitate insurgents decapitation can produce mixed results, commander Dokka Umarov announced and increased engagement with Salafi a conclusion supported by evidence from the establishment of the Caucasus communities. Extremist ideologies the North Caucasus: whereas violence Emirate (IK), finalising the victory always seek to tap into and shape existing declined sharply with the loss of some of the North Caucasus insurgency’s grievances, and addressing some of these leaders, it increased significantly with the Islamist wing over nationalist-separatists grievances undermined the insurgency’s loss of others. in its historic Chechen core. This support base and recruitment potential. self-proclaimed jihadist state united However, the blurring of enemy Second, the security services increased insurgent groups across the region, hierarchies and the decline of the the pressure on the insurgency prior and albeit without controlling any territory. insurgency both appear to begin with the subsequent to the . Yet, in December 2014, the IK started to loss of key indigenous ideologists. It was While this signalled the end of the soft fracture, and a combination of deaths and these people who were able to translate measures – and is arguably one of the defections meant that, by late 2015, it had global narratives to local audiences, and reasons why the long-term foundations largely ceased to exist as a functioning to give the IK a distinct identity. for stability have not been laid – increased organisation. While their messages continued to security measures made it much more resonate posthumously, without The Syrian conflict undoubtedly difficult for the insurgency to operate. them the IK struggled to respond to accelerated the decline of the IK. In both cases, changes in the IK’s changing circumstances. Reflecting divisions in Syria – among operating environment had a significant both North Caucasian groups and in Pledging allegiance to IS has not impact on its appeal. the broader jihadist community – the revitalised the North Caucasus IK found itself split between the Islamic A further explanation for the failure of the insurgency. By late 2016, the IS affiliate, State (IS) and its opponents. While the IK lies in the reasons for its proclamation Caucasus Wilayah, found itself in much IK’s senior leadership sided with al-Qaeda, and subsequent ideological evolution. the same degraded state as the IK a year many commanders and rank-and-file The insurgency needed an ideology that earlier. Caucasus Wilayah leaders sought rebels favoured IS. could appeal to both the broader North to redirect the emotional appeal of the Caucasus region and the next generation caliphate back into the insurgency, but As a result, the IK experienced large-scale of insurgents. Over time, that ideology largely appear to have been unsuccessful. defections, and IS formalised its advance shifted from a clear hierarchy of enemies into the region in July 2015 with the The decline of the North Caucasus to a blurred focus displaying an increasing establishment of the Caucasus Wilayah insurgency, and the failure of IS to interest in international affairs. (IS/CW) as an official province of its translate support for its ideology into caliphate. The IK’s already precarious With each shift, the leadership sought to significant mobilisation on behalf position was further undermined by expand the insurgency’s support base – of a branch of its claimed caliphate, security service operations that killed first from to the broader region, demonstrate the importance of viewing many of its remaining leaders. then to Russia’s Muslims, and then to ideological appeal not in isolation, but as the global jihadist community – because The downward trend in violence continually interacting with operational its original support base was no longer in the North Caucasus, however, circumstances. And the lack of indigenous sufficient. Ideological change was heavily predates the large-scale involvement ideologists on the ground constitutes a influenced by practical considerations. of North Caucasians in Syria, with two major obstacle to an insurgency’s ability to contradictory processes contributing The final reason for the IK’s demise rejuvenate itself. Mark Youngman is an ESRC-funded to the IK’s initial decline. First, the was that, by 2011, it had lost many doctoral researcher at the University authorities from 2010 onwards pursued of its indigenous ideological leaders. of Birmingham. several soft policies, including local Existing research shows that leadership 20 21