Enhancing Security to Restore Credibility: Safeguarding Elections in the Philippines, 2008 – 2010

Michael Scharff Innovations for Successful Societies

ENHANCING SECURITY TO RESTORE CREDIBILITY: SAFEGUARDING ELECTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 2008 – 2010

SYNOPSIS Citizens of the Philippines braced for renewed election violence in 2010, as bitter political feuds and longstanding family rivalries simmered. Candidate-hired private militias and other armed political groups threatened to disrupt presidential and local voting, as they had in 2004. The job of building safety, trust and credibility into the electoral process fell to Jose A.R. Melo, a former associate justice of the Supreme Court who took over as head of the Commission on Elections in 2008, after a series of scandals that culminated in the resignation of the panel’s chairman. Appointed by the nation’s president, Melo recognized the urgent need to restore trust and credibility to the electoral process. While working to automate the balloting process, Melo sought a broader approach to reducing electoral violence. In conjunction with the police and army, Melo devised and implemented stricter rules regarding weapons and security personnel, and he organized a network of security centers that enforced the new rules. The May 2010 elections experienced less violence than the previous presidential and local elections in 2004, although questions arose over the susceptibility of the security forces to political coercion.

Michael Scharff drafted this case study on the basis of interviews conducted in Manila and Iloilo, Philippines, in March 2011.

INTRODUCTION conversations that suggested collusion between When he was appointed in May 2008 as an election commissioner, Virgilio Garcillano, chairman of the Philippines Commission on and President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The Elections (Comelec), 75-year-old Jose A.R. conversations had taken place the previous Melo, a former associate justice of the year during the counting phase of the Supreme Court, knew he had to restore the presidential election. On the tapes, a woman, public’s trust in the panel. believed to be Arroyo, asked a poll official, The commission’s credibility had suffered believed to be Garcillano, to add a million two significant blows during the prior three votes to her count, giving her the winning edge years. In 2005, the National Bureau of in the contest. Although no collusion was ever Investigation, a unit of the Justice proven, the incident, dubbed the “Hello, Department, released wiretapped phone Garci” scandal (after the opening line of the

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conversation), sowed deep public mistrust in feuds, often caused by political conflicts and the commission and raised questions about the land disputes, produced recurring cycles of legitimacy of Arroyo’s presidency. offense and retaliation. The feuds often Two years later, the commission’s erupted in areas where weak government reputation suffered further when then- created a perceived lack of justice and security. chairman Benjamin Abelos resigned amid Elections provided a platform for retribution accusations that he had used his influence as against a rival clan’s candidate or supporters. an election commissioner to offer a Dutch A decades-old insurgency by communist company $10 million to withdraw as a bidder guerrillas, known as the New People’s Army, for a contract to build a national broadband in parts of the country added to the worries of network, in order to clear the way for a election officials who wanted to reduce Chinese company. violence. In 2008, there were an estimated The familial nature of Philippine politics 5,700 communist rebels in the country, was one of several factors that fueled fierce according to a Philippine army general quoted rivalries and bred persistent violence during by ABS-CBN News on 20 March of that year. each electoral cycle. Nearly all elected Communist fighters were known for extorting officials, from the president to village-level large sums of money from candidates councilors, came from families with extensive campaigning in communist-controlled areas in political histories. A sense of entitlement had exchange for promises of safety. The fighters developed because members of the same family often killed candidates who refused to pay had held positions, both elected and what were known locally as “permit to appointed, for generations. An entrenched campaign” fees. patronage system, in which politicians doled Another tumultuous election cycle out gifts and favors in exchange for votes, appeared to be taking shape in late 2009, produced staunch supporters who were willing when officials from Comelec, the Philippine to resort to unscrupulous tactics, including National Police and the Armed Forces of the violence, to ensure their benefactors remained Philippines met to try to devise ways to reduce in power. the violence. The constitution granted Corruption in the armed forces and Comelec the power to deputize national police international arms-smuggling operations meant and the armed forces personnel for election- that handguns and other firearms could be related duties, and to draft resolutions that bought easily on the black market. Moreover, became law without legislative approval. loose licensing requirements made it easy for Although cooperation between Comelec, citizens to carry guns legally. Many politicians the national police and the army had been created their own private armies by organizing weak and sometimes contentious in previous and arming their supporters. “What you have elections, these new consultations, guided by in the Philippines are private armies acting on Melo, produced tangible results. Conditions behalf of the political dynasties,” said Chyn were ripe for the talks to succeed: Comelec San Juan, a senior program officer with the was eager to restore its credibility, and the International Foundation for Electoral generals in the armed forces, unsure of who Systems, an elections technical-assistance would be elected president, wanted to be group. perceived as neutral by all political parties. Characteristics of Philippine culture The talks produced new regulations that acted to sustain the violence through repeated tightened previous restrictions on carrying electoral cycles. Since the early 1900s, clan guns and employing private security people

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during elections. Moreover, Comelec, the A year later, the national police issued far national police and the army agreed to create lower numbers showing about a million and operate a network of command posts, licensed firearms and half a million others. known as Joint Security Control Centers The prevalence of private armies (JSCCs), that would coordinate all election- contributed significantly to high levels of related security efforts. The JSCCs bolstered electoral violence. Historically, the national coordination between the three agencies, government had done little to disrupt or particularly in the enforcement of regulations disband the private armies. National-level on the carrying of weapons and use of security politicians often turned a blind eye and in personnel. some cases encouraged the formation of armed This case sheds light on how, in a society groups throughout the country. At election with a history of electoral violence, election time, national-level politicians knew they and security officials seized on opportunities could call upon their local party candidates, produced by changing circumstances to create and the candidates’ private armies, to round an effective mechanism for coordinating the up votes. enforcement of new and stricter rules. The country’s defense secretary estimated that in 2010 there were 132 private armies THE CHALLENGE with about 10,000 total members.2 Because Melo’s extensive career in the justice the government wanted to be seen as taking a system had earned him a reputation for being strong stance against illegal activities, its fair and politically neutral. Before serving on figures likely grossly underestimated the the Supreme Court, he had been a judge at number of private armies as well as the the Court of Appeals, and before that he had number of loose and unaccounted guns. worked for the Office of the Solicitor General. Figuring out how to get the national His law degree was from Manuel L. Quezon police and armed forces to work in harmony University in Manila. After retiring from the with Comelec posed a stern challenge. Supreme Court in 2002, he served on an Historically, the police and armed forces independent presidential commission functioned as separate entities during elections established to explore extrajudicial killings of and often squabbled over roles and journalists and political activists. responsibilities. Dennis Ausan, the regional Looking ahead to the 2010 elections, Comelec official for Region 6 (one of the Melo and his counterparts from the armed Philippines’ 16 administrative regions), forces and the national police had to figure out recalled, “In the past, there was no clear-cut a way to reduce violence and, once they delineation of forces in the field, especially in decided on an approach, they had to remote areas. The Comelec field personnel coordinate and execute the strategy. Because would call the national police to take care of firearms played a role in most violent something, and they would say, ‘No, it’s within incidents, any approach almost certainly had the armed forces’ area of responsibility,’ and to address the gun issue. But a lack of reliable vice versa.” data meant that it would be difficult to set The armed forces and national police had targets and measure results. The last major worked together in past elections. A independent survey of guns in the Philippines, presidential order in 2006 directed the published in 2007, revealed an estimated 3.9 national police to assist the armed forces with million licensed and unlicensed guns held by internal security operations. Although the civilians, or about 41 guns per 1,000 people.1 armed forces had issued guidelines specifying

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when and how the national police should act the way for Melo’s strategy to curb private in its supporting role, no coordinating armies. mechanism existed. National police The uncertain political situation commanders in provinces, for example, had no encouraged leaders of the armed forces to work way of knowing whether they should obey with Comelec in creating and implementing a orders that came from the armed forces. security plan. Term limits prevented the The Philippines’ entrenched system of incumbent president, Arroyo, from running patronage presented a high hurdle for any again in 2010. Although she endorsed Bayani nationwide strategy that required local Fernando as her successor, Fernando’s party cooperation. For example, governors later in 2009 chose another candidate. After appointed the province heads of police, who that, Arroyo did not endorse a presidential appointed city and town police chiefs who candidate. In the absence of a clear front- were endorsed by their local mayors. This runner who had the support of the incumbent, arm-in-arm arrangement increased the generals of the armed forces—who had risen to likelihood that local police might turn a blind their ranks with the nod of the president— eye to infractions by incumbent officials, were eager to hedge their bets. “They wanted including the use of private armies. to be seen as fair to all candidates,” noted Ramon Casiple of the Institute for Political FRAMING A RESPONSE and Electoral Reform, a non-governmental When Melo joined Comelec in 2008, he organization, and head of the national election- had pledged publicly to “conduct the elections monitoring group Election Watch 2010. to such an extent that the results of the next Melo’s choice for a key aide helped to presidential election will not be questioned.” bolster his relations with the military. Not Melo recalled that in the lead-up to the 2010 long after his appointment, Melo hired elections, “It was my opinion that we could not Edgardo Gurrea, a retired general, to serve as afford another presidency of doubtful his chief of staff. Gurrea had a strong rapport legitimacy.” He understood that violence and with the top army officers, and Melo voter intimidation would undermine any calculated that Gurrea could play a pivotal public support earned by government efforts to role in efforts to coordinate joint efforts by the automate the voting process. Melo thought armed forces and Comelec. that reducing violence significantly was the By late 2009, Melo began talking with best way to foster confidence in the electoral senior officials at the armed forces and the process and to boost Comelec’s credibility. national police about the need to address the A single calamitous event in November so-called “three Gs” of Filipino politics: “goons, 2009 thrust the issue of private armies into the guns and gold.” This common expression public spotlight and galvanized public opinion helped shape the official response to electoral behind moves to quell electoral violence. violence. Given the limited time before the Armed supporters of an incumbent governor May 2010 election, Melo and his counterparts on the southern island of Mindanao seized a at the armed forces and the national police convoy of activists and journalists who were on decided that only the first two Gs were their way to register a competing candidate for practical targets for their anti-violence governor and killed 57 unarmed civilians. The campaign. Efforts to look into politicians’ worst single instance of electoral violence in financial resources were shelved because any Philippines history, the incident helped pave such action required congressional approval,

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which would take too much time. communist strongholds, and generals wanted In late 2009, the Comelec commissioners, to avoid other violent confrontations in any along with their counterparts from the armed effort whose goal was to reduce violence. forces and the national police, examined past The three agencies also decided to avoid efforts. Although Comelec had instituted a unconventional approaches such as mobilizing gun ban for previous elections, the ban had peace committees or holding peace forums. allowed individuals to apply for exemptions Such strategies had been tried, with varying that were routinely approved. Moreover, degrees of success, by other countries that armed security personnel were not required to attempted to reduce the divisiveness of wear uniforms or other identifying clothing, competitive processes. Officials believed non- and there were numerous complaints that governmental organizations were better plainclothes security officers were doubling as positioned to handle these functions. Indeed, private army members. Commissioners also Filipino election monitoring groups like Vote discovered a past resolution that called for the Peace and Bantay-Eleksyon attempted peace establishment of joint checkpoints, but few forums. In some instances candidates agreed rules existed to govern the operations. to eschew violent acts, but participation in the Collectively, Comelec, the national police, forums was generally weak. and the armed forces decided to implement a total gun ban during a five-month period GETTING DOWN TO WORK around the elections and to limit the number After the initial review in late 2009, of security personnel that candidates could Comelec convened a technical working group have. Checkpoints on roads throughout the to draft new rules and revise existing ones. Philippines would serve as the primary The working group consisted of a senior official enforcement mechanism, and clear rules would from the armed forces, a general from the govern the conduct of those who staffed the national police, and three senior Comelec checkpoints. Coordinated efforts would officers. originate from a series of command posts called Joint Security Control Centers (JSCC). “The A gun ban and limits on security personnel JSCCs came about because of the generally The working group published the agreed-upon feeling that if we can coordinate resolution that called for a total gun ban and better, we can reduce violence,” said Lucenito restrictions on the number of security Tagle, a Comelec commissioner. personnel a candidate could employ. Because The JSCCs also were meant to bolster it was an arm of Comelec, the working group public confidence in the effort to reduce had the power to put rules into effect without electoral violence. The image of national legislative approval. The gun ban would police and the armed forces working together become effective on 10 January 2010, which conveyed the gravity of the matter. marked the start of the campaign period, and Bowing to practicality, Melo and his continue until 9 June, 30 days after the counterparts decided against taking on private election. Private citizens were not allowed to armies or trying to track down unlicensed carry firearms, and all previously issued guns. The armed forces traditionally handled permits to carry guns were suspended during internal security threats, while the national the five-month period. Firearms could be police focused on law and order. The armed carried only by personnel from certain law forces were occupied with operations against enforcement agencies, such as the armed

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forces, the national police, guards of the bogged down in debates over specific line National Bureau of Prisons, Customs Security items, the commissioners worked carefully to and Enforcement, Port Police, and avoid particulars. Because the gun ban was a investigative agents of the Bureau of politically sensitive issue, for instance, the Immigration. When carrying guns, law commissioners did not specify that funds enforcement personnel were required to wear would be used to implement the ban. their uniforms and identification tags that listed their names and the serial numbers of Publicizing the resolutions their firearms. Soon after releasing the resolution The resolution also called for all banning the carrying of guns and limiting candidates for mayor, governor, congressman, security personnel, Comelec published a senator and president to use only national revised copy of the resolution governing the police personnel as guards. Candidates who conduct of checkpoints. To raise public felt their lives were in danger could request awareness of both resolutions, Comelec security details. The national police initially advertised in two national newspapers and hesitated to agree to such a significant increase published the full resolutions. Comelec in its election duties because of the manpower capitalized on the Education and Information requirements. But top national police officials Department’s distribution networks and sent acquiesced when Comelec agreed to set limits copies of the resolutions to all elections officers on the number of national police personnel and to police stations and army bases guarding each candidate. Mayors were throughout the country. allowed two national police officers; governors, At the same time, the armed forces and congressmen and senators could have five; and national police distributed a “joint letter presidential candidates could have as many as directive” that spelled out the details of the 20. Although candidates for vice mayor and new JSCCs. The directive contained copies of local councilor were not eligible for national both resolutions. To ensure awareness across police details, they were allowed to hire two all ranks, a general in the armed forces ordered guards from private security companies. To platoon leaders to send text messages to his make the idea slightly more palatable to personal mobile phone confirming that they candidates who were being forced to give up had received the directive, that they would trusted private guards, candidates were disseminate it to their subordinates, and that allowed to hand-pick national police officers they agreed to abide by the rules. The and agents to protect them. directive became effective on 10 January, the The technical working group also had to start of the election period. decide on the structure of the JSCCs that the three agencies had agreed to establish for the Implementing the resolutions election. Melo and the heads of the armed Regional and municipal JSCCs jointly forces and the national police comprised the decided on the number and location of national JSCC in Manila, while each of the 16 checkpoints needed to enforce the election regional JSCCs was composed of the top rules. For example, in Iloilo, a city of 248,000 regional officials of each agency. Municipal registered voters on Panay Island, city election JSCCs had similar structures. chief G. Bert Arbis worked with the heads of Melo and his commissioners next went to the armed forces and national police to Congress for approval of its election budget. formulate a plan for the city’s checkpoints. Because budget deliberations could become The negotiators decided to locate most of the

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checkpoints on major roads, where traffic was the request. In some cases, the committee heaviest. Two months later, after grenades conducted an additional check, relying on were thrown at the home of the incumbent informal channels that included conversations mayor’s brother and at the mayor’s bakery (no with non-governmental organizations and with injuries were reported in either incident), national police and armed forces intelligence officials at the regional JSCC called for an personnel located at the regional offices and emergency meeting. After listening to the bases. recommendations of the Iloilo city JSCC, the Approvals for security details were issued officials from the regional JSCC decided to in writing. The local agency providing the increase the number of checkpoints in the city. security maintained one copy of the approval, The armed forces provided additional and bodyguards were given copies to wear with personnel for checkpoint duty because the their identification tags. national police were already thinly stretched. To complete the security planning, Regional JSCCs processed all applications officials from the regional, municipal and city for security details by candidates for congress, JSCCs determined the number of security governor, mayor, vice mayor and local personnel to deploy to polling places on councilor. After they received an application, Election Day. “First, we decided whether a the JSCC heads met and developed a threat polling station was sensitive or not,” said assessment based on intelligence gathered from Colonel Tyne Bañas, who represented the police and army officers in the locale. The armed forces in the Western Visayas region at JSCC then forwarded the application with the some meetings of the regional JSCC. To threat assessment and a recommendation to determine susceptibility to violent incidents, the Committee on the Ban of Firearms and the JSCC looked to the national police’s Security Personnel at the national Comelec historical data of individual incidents of headquarters. The committee comprised a electoral violence. “We also looked at the handful of Comelec personnel who ruled on presence of fighters from the New People’s applications for security details, gun licenses Army as well as the existence of private armies and other matters. Regional JSCCs granted all maintained by the candidates,” Bañas recalled. candidates a 30-day temporary security detail The regional JSCC deployed the armed forces while their applications were being reviewed. to polling places where violent confrontations Armed forces and national police personnel were considered possible. To counter the risk served as bodyguards, and the regional JSCCs posed by communist guerrillas, the JSCC played a key role in working with the army and decided to send two soldiers for every police to determine the allocation of personnel communist fighter believed to be in the region. from each organization. Candidates for senator and president OVERCOMING OBSTACLES requested security details directly from As members of the technical working Comelec’s firearms and security committee. group were writing the resolution governing The committee referred each application to the use of security personnel, they realized the national police and armed forces at the that allowing some candidates to use private national level, and within five days both security people for protection introduced the agencies sent their threat assessment and prospect of relying on untrained and recommendation back to the committee. The undisciplined guards. Aiming to reduce rather committee could then approve, deny or modify than increase the number of such people on

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the streets, the group decided to set specific progress toward his goal of restoring trust and parameters on the use of private armed guards. credibility in the electoral process. Social First, only security companies with Weather Stations reported that 75% of accreditation from the national police’s respondents in its survey were satisfied with Security Agencies and Guards Supervision the general conduct of the elections. This was Division were eligible to provide protection. a marked improvement over the 2004 Second, only so-called “protective agents” elections, when 53% of respondents said they could serve as bodyguards, because they had were satisfied with how the elections were some training from their employers on conducted. Moreover, the polling group said protecting individuals. Protective agents that 74% of respondents were satisfied with normally served as bodyguards for private the “terms of the peace and order situation” individuals, including businessmen, celebrities during the 2010 elections, that 84% were and politicians. Most security companies in satisfied with the performance of the national the Philippines employed a mix of security police during the elections, and that 82% were guards and protective agents. Security guards, satisfied with the armed forces’ performance.3 who were commonly hired to protect Other numbers underlined the success of businesses and residences, had little formal Comelec’s efforts. The 2010 election period training. witnessed a sharp reduction from 2004 in the To standardize training, the working number of individuals killed and the number of group required that all protective agents other election-related violent incidents. undergo a 10-day “VIP training course.” A Officials reported 45 deaths and 67 election- team of trainers from the national police related violent incidents, compared with 295 headquarters in Manila traveled to each region deaths and 152 election-related violent and conducted training at regional police incidents during the 2004 elections. offices. A nationwide total of 184,202 checkpoints set With requests for security details pouring up during the election period led to the arrests in from every region of the country, Comelec’s of 2,424 individuals and the discovery of 2,113 Committee on the Ban of Firearms and firearms, according to data provided by Security Personnel was swamped with Comelec. Although the numbers on arrests paperwork. Tagle, who headed the and firearms were relatively modest, both committee, brought in eight individuals from represented a substantial increase over the both the armed forces and the national police, 2004 elections, when 1,650 people were and recruited five more from Comelec’s law arrested and 1,264 firearms were confiscated. department. Processing fees for applications Although the numbers demonstrated an helped to pay for the additional staff. The improved security situation, planners may have committee also intensified its meeting sometimes gone too far in attempting to instill schedule. Instead of meeting just once or discipline and structure on their efforts. For twice a week, the committee met every day as example, stringent regulations governing the a group to review applications and make conduct of checkpoints hindered the ability of decisions. security personnel to identify weapons. Without warrants, security personnel were not ASSESSING RESULTS permitted to search vehicles, so a weapon A poll released by a leading national hidden under a blanket, for instance, could opinion research group after the 2010 elections evade detection. The resolution on indicated that Melo had made significant checkpoints did, however, afford some options

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to carry out warrantless searches. If the REFLECTIONS occupants of the vehicle appeared to be Under the leadership of Jose A.R. Melo, nervous or suspicious, or if an occupant was a the Philippines Commission on Elections known or wanted criminal, a search was gained public stature and made solid progress permissible. toward reducing election-related violence in a The mere existence of checkpoints likely heated political context. His personal had a significant impact on violence by helping attributes, including his background as a to reduce the carrying of weapons and to curb former Supreme Court justice, played an the movements of armed supporters of important role in that success. politicians. But the checkpoints were easy to Looking back on the 2010 elections, Chyn avoid. “A common practice was to send San Juan of the International Foundation for someone on a motorbike ahead of your convoy Electoral Systems, commented, “The to check if there was a checkpoint on the credibility of Comelec increased after Melo road,” recalled Josil Jaen, a former mayor in took over. Coming from a 2004 election Iloilo province. If the person doing marred by so much controversy, he knew how reconnaissance spotted a checkpoint, the much was at stake.” armed individuals would take an alternate Retired General Edgardo Gurrea credited route. Melo’s inspired vision. “He wanted the Non-governmental groups actively backed elections to be automated and credible,” Comelec’s efforts to control abuses that arose Gurrea said. “Without his clear-cut guidance, from conflicting political loyalties. Election- we could not have done this.” monitoring groups and a vigilant media, for Comelec worked closely with the armed instance, would make sure that local security forces and the national police to draft rules and personnel enforced laws—even against elected establish an enforcement mechanism that officials who may have given the security produced measurable results. The creation of people their jobs. Some election monitoring the Joint Security Control Centers as a formal groups periodically observed checkpoints. organizing tool forced key decision makers to Other support came from the political side, as work together, promoted collective decision supporters of one candidate were more than making, and provided the platform to willing to raise the alarm against perceived determine clear lines of responsibility. “We injustices by other candidates or their welcomed the creation of the JSCCs,” said supporters. Dennis Ausan, the regional Comelec official for The greatest contribution of the JSCCs the Western Visayas. “It helped us a lot with may have been that their existence showed our networking and coordination with the Filipino voters that election administrators national police and the armed forces.” were serious about improving the electoral Commissioner Lucenito Tagle praised the process. Moreover, the JSCCs represented a deterrent effect of the checkpoints, which he significant step toward promoting greater said caused individuals to think twice about cooperation between national, regional and carrying guns. Boygee Pangilinan, a lieutenant local election and security officials. The general in the armed forces and a senior figure collaboration, evidenced in the joint planning at the national JSCC, said that in the next of security checkpoints and in the review of round of elections, attempts should be made to applications for bodyguards, helped to curtail increase the number of security personnel in electoral violence. order to further reduce incidents of election

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violence. Melo stressed the importance of leadership credibility in reform efforts such as this one. “You have to start with a leader with credibility,” he said. “The way he is doing it may be questioned, but his motives for doing so will not be questioned.”

1 Karp, Aaron. “Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms.” Small Arms Survey. Geneva: Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007. Web. 14 March 2011. 2 “Guns and Goons.” The Economist. 7 January 2010: Web. 14 March 2011. 3 “SWS: 3 out of 4 Pinoys satisfied with May polls.” ABS-CBNnews.com 28 July 2010: Web. 4 April 2011.

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