REPORT ON THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA IN THE YEAR 2001
IZVJEŠ ĆE O STANJU LJUDSKIH PRAVA U BIH ZA 2001. GODINU.
Presented by the Justice and Peace Commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Published by the German Commission for Justice and Peace on behalf of the European Conference of Justice and Peace Commissions.
Predočeno od bosansko-hercegova čke komisije Justitia et Pax. Iizdano po nalogu europske konferencije Justitia et Pax komisije od njema čke komisije Justitia et Pax.
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Schriftenreihe Gerechtigkeit und Frieden der Deutschen Kommission Justitia et Pax DOK 46 Schriftenreihe Gerechtigkeit und Frieden Published by the German Commission for Justice and Peace Izdava č: Njema čka komisija Justitia et Pax
Editor/ Urednik: Gertrud Casel ______
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REPORT ON THE STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA IN THE YEAR 2001. Presented by the Justice and Peace Commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Published by the German Commission for Justice and Peace on behalf of the European Conference of Justice and Peace Commissions
IZVJEŠ ĆE O STANJU LJUDSKIH PRAVA U BIH 2001. GODINU. Predočeno od bosansko- hercegova čke komisije Justitia et Pax. Izdano po nalogu europske konferencije Justitia et Pax komisije od njema čke komisije Justitia et Pax
Schriftenreihe Gerechtigkeit und Frieden Dokumentation 46
ISBN 3-932535-66-9
Bonn, 2002 ______
Available at / Izru čenje: Justitia et Pax, Kaiser-Friedrich-Str. 9, D - 53113 Bonn, Phone +49-228-103217 - Fax +49-228-103318 - Internet: www.justitia-et-pax.de E-Mail: [email protected]
2 Prologue
Preface 5
Report on the State of Human Rigths in Bosnia & Herzegovina in the year 2001 9
Proslov
Predgovor 7
Izvješ će o stanju ljudskih prava u BIH ZA 2001. Godnu 67
3 4 Preface
One year after the attacks of September 11, the international public still pays desultory attention to the various violent incidents which dominate the daily headlines, from the operation in Afghanistan, to violence in Israel and Palestine, to the attacks on Bali island, to the hostage tragedy in Moscow - which directed international attention for a short period to the Chechen war - through to the impending war in Iraq, to name just a few examples.
Meanwhile the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is more and more slipping out of the focal point of international attention. Such superficially violence-focused interest is sending a disturbing message, a fact that was also well “understood” in Kosovo in 1998/99.
The consolidation of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of great importance for the entire region and is not least a political symbol for the international community’s way of thinking. As it is very likely that the international community of states will continue their commitment in Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years, the necessary processes must be observed with unbroken attention and accompanied by critical debate.
The Justice and Peace Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina has prepared this document as a contribution to the required dialogue on the present situation and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are particularly grateful to those who have raised their voice for their region and thereby challenged our ways of thinking and acting. This report was preceded by numerous conversations and discussions on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the level of the European Conference for Justice and Peace. It was revealed in this dialogue that every country perceives the conflict in its own way and that this diversity must be addressed as a central issue of European policies. However, in order to be effective, the required European conflict management must involve a permanent dialogue with local representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For, it is not the international community of states that - despite their valuable commitment - are able to guarantee peace in the region in the long-term, but only the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina themselves.
Bishop Prof. Dr. Reinhard Marx President of the German Commission for Justice and Peace
5 6 Predgovor
Me ñunarodna pažnja se i godinu dana nakon napada od 11. rujna, kao i do sada, upravlja na doti čno aktualne nasilne doga ñaje, koji vladaju javnim natpisima. Da li je to djelovanje u Afganistanu, nasilje u Izraelu i Palestini, napadi na Baliju, tala čka drama u Moskvi, koja je čečenskom ratu za kratko vrijeme donijela me ñunarodnu pažnju, ili prijete ći rat u Iraku samo su neki od primjera.
Situacija u Bosni i Hercegovini pri tome sve više izmi če vidokrugu me ñunarodne javnosti. Poruka, koja dolazi od takvih površnih interesa fiksiranih nasiljem, je uznemiravaju ća. Ona najzad ni 1998/99 nije «shva ćena» ni na Kosovu.
Konsolidacija mirovinskih procesa u Bosni i Hercegovini ima veliko zna čenje za čitavu regiju i najzad nije samo politi čki simbol za razmišljanje me ñunarodne zajednice. Ako se uz to još promisli, da će me ñunarodna zajednica država još dugo godina biti angažirana u Bosni i Hercegovini, tako je neposredno vidljivo, da je još uvijek potrebna velika mjera stalne pažnje i kriti čne debate, koja prakti čki prati potrebne procese.
Sa predloženom publikacijom, koju je uradila komisija Justitia et Pax Bosna i Hercegovina, se treba dati doprinos potrebnim razgovorima o sadašnjosti i budu ćnosti Bosne i Hercegovine. Pri tome smo posebno zahvalni, da se javi glas iz regije i time da izazov našim na činima mišljenja i djelovanja. Predloženom izvješ ću su prethodili mnogobrojni razgovori i diskusije u okviru europske konferencije Justitia et Pax o situaciji u Bosni i Hercegovini. Pri tome je došlo na vidjelo, da baš razli čitosti pojedinih nacionalnih shva ćanja konflikata moraju biti tematizirani kao problematika europske politike. Ali potrebno rješavanje konflikta Europe ne bi dovelo do ni čega, ako ne bi bilo vezano sa stalnim razgovorima zastupnika sa pu čanstvom Bosne i Hercegovine. Jer dugoro čno gledano – bez obzira na sav njihov u činak – me ñunarodna zajednica država ne će biti nositelj mira u regiji, ve ć to samo može biti pu čanstvo Bosne i Hercegovine.
Biskup Prof. Dr. Reinhard Marx Predsjedavaju ći njema čke komisije Justitia et Pax
7 8 A COMMISSION “JUSTITIA ET PAX” ET “JUSTITIA COMMISSION BISHOPS CONFERENCE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVIN AND BOSNIA OF CONFERENCE BISHOPS
9 10 Contents
In Place of an Introduction 13
1. Task Priorities for 2001 as seen by the International Community: Solving Human Rights Problems in BiH. 15
2. The Situation of Human Rights in BiH in the Year 2001 24
2.1. The social picture 24
2.2. Administrative chaos in Bosnia and Herzegovina 25
2.3. Problems within the judicial system 28
2.4. The silence of the administration 29
2.5. Implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, or, the violation of the right to return 31
2.6. The violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of religious conviction and freedom of religious profession 32
2.7. Education 34
2.8. The status of the public media 35
3. The Political Crisis in BiH 36
4. The Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina 46
5. A Special Report The Restitution of Property Seized during Communist Rule 50
6. Sources 65
11 12 In Place of an Introduction
All men are the creation of God and for that reason they are all equal before God. God loves them all in a manner that is peculiar to Him, and He wishes to redeem them all. (Cf. 1 Timothy 2,4)
By virtue of one’s human dignity, all men are equally entitled to fundamental Human Rights as defined in various Universal Charters and Declarations. The Catholic Church has recognized the advancement and protection of Human Rights as an integral part of its mission to announce the Kingdom of God among men. This is precisely the sense for the existence and activities of more than 30 European Commissions for Peace and Justice (Justitia et Pax) , among which can be found the Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BK BiH), as a full-fledged member. As with all the others, our Commission has as its goal the promotion of Justice and Peace according to the principles espoused in the Gospels and in the social teaching of the Church.
In that spirit and with that goal in mind, our Commission has prepared this Report on the status of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the year 2001. Conscious of our limited possibilities, we offer you our view of the status of the social, legal, judicial, educational and media spheres. We call attention to the priorities of the International Community whose Representatives have the last word on all that happens in BiH. We also call attention to our vision of the political crisis in 2001, and a glance at the role and activities of SFOR in BiH as the index of the by-passing of, or the abnegation of Human Rights. And along with the serious nature of other topics such as that of the Constitutive Peoples, solutions to problems with the Constitution in BiH, and others, in this year’s Report, we focus on the problem of restitution in BiH as an extremely important question. Through these views, we wish to inform our domestic public, and that of the world, as to some acute problems regarding fundamental Human Rights.
Grateful to all those who toil at promoting fundamental Human Rights in this long-suffering nation, we urge even greater efforts to that end: This is the primary goal of our Report.
13
14 1. Task Priorities for 2001 as seen by the International Community: Solving Human Rights Problems in BiH.
Following the practice set heretofore, the Representatives of the International Community in BiH have set task priorities in the field of Human Rights for the year 2001. We feel it necessary at the outset of this Report to present the goals of the International Community so that we might better take note of definite problems that torment this nation from their perspective. 1 Those goals are:
1.1. The return of refugees and displaced persons
• The coordination of laws dealing with Return of Property (Laws with respect to dwellings, Privatization Laws, and laws ignoring the Return of Property) must be coordinated, amended, and implemented to create a consistent and non- discriminatory system for Return of Property.
• The support of the RRTF (The Working Committee for Return and Reconstruction) and the PLIP (Plan for the Implementation of Laws Governing Return of Property) which is well functioning. Representatives of these organizations are working in the field so as to oversee and guarantee a coordinated approach and the politics of implementing the Return of Property law, and so as to coordinate funding and a strategy of return.
• The establishment of a functioning system of information exchange between the Housing Authorities and the OMI’s on repossessions so as to prevent multiple occupancy.
• The Enforcement of all CRPC (Commission for the Return of Property to the refugees and those who are displaced) decisions in harmony with the laws governing the implementation of CRPC decisions.
• The urgent conclusion of the process of issuing decisions on and the eviction of multiple occupants.
• The issuance of decisions in chronological order.
• The identification, guarantee, and budgetary provisions for alternative accommodations on the part of local authorities.
1 See: “Ljudska prava u Bosni i Herzeg ovini, prioriteti za 2001 godinu,” (“Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzeg ovina, priorities for the year 2001”), Recommendations of the Administrative Committee for organizations dealing with the question of Human Rights, the Working Committee for the protection of Human Rights, (5 February, 2001).
15 • The implementation of all deadlines and decisions as defined by law—even when the local authorities fail to provide alternative accommodations.
• The guarantee of transparency in the procedures to re-validate contracts as regards unclaimed apartments.
• The fashioning of a project to insure quality of administration in the field of the Administrative and financial sectors in cooperation with The Organization for European Security and Cooperation’s Department of Democratization, is to be initiated. Its goal is to assure responsibility on the part of the local authorities who are charged with resolving property questions, with a guarantee of budgetary provisions to cover alternative accommodations, and greater efficacy of implementation of Property Laws.
• The implementation of preventive measures assuring that local police authorities, particularly in contentious return areas are pressured to implement operational plans to increase police presence so as to guard against possible violence related to the process of return. Priority is to be given to monitoring and implementation of such plans.
• The intervention of Public Prosecutors is to be sought so as to assure the implementation of investigative measures as regards serious violations of the law.
• The focusing of attention on instances wherein local officials attempt to limit legal sanctions against perpetrators of crimes by means of initiating misdemeanor offence proceedings against them instead of criminal proceedings.
• The prosecution and subsequent punishment of temporary occupants of apartments who loot the contents of those apartments.
• The systematic gathering of information on incidents of Return-Related Violence (RRV), inasmuch as they have a negative impact on the return process. This statistical material should be expanded and made use of when dealing with the inadequate implementation of the law by Law Enforcement officials.
• The increased monitoring in the field of measures taken by local police authorities in connection with RRV’s and Property Law violations, including those of looting. When the official results of re-registration are published, a regional overview of displaced persons, as well as a listing of refugees from problematic areas as regards the questions of Sustainable Return, and the Return of Property is to be elaborated.
• The increased dismissal of obstructionists and ineffective policemen, as well as the withdrawal of certification for work as a police officer, and the issuance of judgements against those who disrespect the rules governing police work. Maximum use of the
16 Prosecutor’s office in disciplinary matters, including improper use of property, and the use of disciplinary commissions, with oversight by the International Community.
• The reporting of improper behavior on the part of individual public prosecutors and judges to appropriate bodies for verification.
• The guarantee that information will be gathered through the Center for Legal Aid which functions under the auspices of UNHCR and the office of the ombudsman.
• The promotion of the exchange of information with the Ministries of the various Entities of BiH, and among them.
• The execution of the financial audits of selected enterprises chosen to serve as an example so as to evaluate their personnel policies, and so as to determine if any discriminatory documents exist. To insure this, the following activities are necessary: 1) The guarantee of hiring professional auditors (with the help of OHR’s Fraud Office), or the identification of implementing agencies within the International Community. 2) To receive audit-control authority from the appropriate authorities and enterprises. 3) To oversee this project. 4) To evaluate results.
• The inclusion of benefactors and the Office of Economics of the OHR in discussions concerning the viability of investments prior to investing in them, so as to insure that just principles are in place assuring the employment of Returnees.
• The promulgation of the stand of the International Community, and its expectations as regards employment of Returnees - for example, announcements in the press.
• The oversight of the work of the commission for the implementation of the corresponding articles, namely, Article 143 of the Federal Statutes, and Article 152 of the Statues of the Republika Srpska.
• The assessment of the implementation of the agreement concerning reciprocal rights and obligations as regards pensions and disability insurance, and its effect on the payment of pensions across Entity lines within the Federation.
• The analysis of the existing legal framework and the elaboration of policies in conjunction with the Department of Economics so as to assure the payment of pensions to individuals in their place of residence.
• The cooperation with the Department of Economics of the OHR so as to establish the necessary mechanisms for fund transfers to be used for pensions across the boundaries of the various Entities. • The re-assessment of the existing legal framework, and the development of a strategy by which Health Insurance coverage will be assured regardless of one’s place of residence, be it in an Entity or a Canton, or the location of the Pension Fund.
17 • The establishment of the necessary mechanisms for the transfer of funds from the Agency of Health wherein one pays his premium to any other health agency within BiH.
• The guarantee that Counties apply the provisions of the law governing Health Care uniformly.
• The joint monitoring of school textbook revision and the implementation of the inter- entity Education Agreement of May 10, 2001.
• The collection of information regarding minority pupils and teachers throughout the year 2001.
• The increased stress of Education within the policy structures of OHR.
• The adoption of a modern legal framework governing primary and secondary education based on the standards of the European Union.
• The promotion of a modern legal framework governing higher education.
• The support of a modernization of the present system and a rationale based on the Bologna Declaration, making use of regional development opportunities provided for by the Stability Pact as well as by the EU instruments for development and cooperation.
1.2. Reform of the judiciary and law enforcement
• The unacceptable delays within all phases of the legal system require legislative reform as relates to initial police investigation, through the filing of charges, and the appearance in court. This needs to be addressed by a revision of the Criminal Codes and criminal procedures within the RS and the Federation. The failure of the legal system to expeditiously dispatch cases has a direct impact on return-related violations. This will require a coherent and consolidated approach to the issue and judicial reform should be a priority. Such reform should include reformation of court procedures, the promotion of uniform procedural court guidelines, statutes, strengthening the role of the Public Prosecutor, reducing the role and function of the Investigative Judge. The training of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers should take place by means of the Council of Europe, the domestic Committee on Training, and the IJC.
• The acceleration of reform of the Courts as regards criminal and civil procedures based on the conclusions and recommendations contained in JSAP’s final report. This is to be accomplished by means of the efforts of the IJC. Particular attention is
18 to be paid to improving the performance of Judges and Prosecutors, to the reduction of delays, and inefficiencies within the judicial system.
• The establishment of Training Institutes so as to provide, among other things, practical training for incoming and sitting Judges and Prosecutors, as well as comprehensive, continuing legal education for lawyers. From the Human rights standpoint, the Training Institutes should provide training in judicial administration and case management in order to improve judicial efficiency, as well as to reduce delays within the judicial system.
• The fostering of the de-politicization of the Police by supporting the creation of the office of Police Commissioner within each Ministry of the Interior.
• The pressuring of local police authorities to unify ethnically divided Police Administrations.
• The pressuring of Local Authorities to improve and strengthen internal control mechanisms.
• The pressuring of local Police officials in the Federation and in the RS to reform and improve arrest and custody procedures.
• The continued cooperation with local police officials in the Federation and in the RS to reform and improve arrest and custody procedures.
• The provision of training in Judicial Administration and Case Management in order to effect Court efficiencies, and to reduce the delays and inefficiency within the Judicial system should be provided by Judicial Training Institutes so as to assure Human Rights.
• The support of the International Community of the initiatives of the Council of Europe, the Domestic Training Board, the UNMIBH, and the Independent Judicial Commission, for training seminars for Judges, Prosecutors, and Police. Training sessions should be specifically focused on the issue of return-related investigations and proceedings.
1.3. Increasing domestic capacities for human rights institutions
• The drafting of legislation to support the merger of the Human Rights Chamber and that of the BiH Constitutional Court based on the Report adopted by the Venice Commission of the year 2000.
19 • The advancement of cooperation between the agents and local authorities by way of appropriate funding, as well as political support and sustainable integration of agents within the structures of the government of BiH.
• The assurance of adequate funding on the part of the State for institutions foreseen by Annex 6 and 7, in the minimum amount of 600,000 DM for each Institution, that is, for the Ombudsmen in BiH, the Human Rights Chamber, and the CRPC. This is in accord with the requirements of the Council of Europe for accession, and by the “road map” of the European Union, as well as the payment of outstanding balances.
• The assurance of adequate funding of Entity Ombudsmen Institutions by integrating a budget for the Institutions in the 2001 budget of the respective Entities. The acceptance of a minimum structure and outline of the institutions in a Memorandum of Understanding with OSCE.
• The support of the reappointment of RS Ombudsmen who are currently in office, and the appointment of qualified candidates in the Federation.
• The assurance of translation and publication of GFAP (Dayton) in the official Gazettes of BiH, in particular with respect to the Human Rights Agreement, (Annex 6), and the status of Human Rights Instruments in BiH, (Annex 4).
• The realization of 90% implementation rates for decisions of the Human Rights Chamber and the BiH Ombudsman, including active monitoring of the implementation process by OHR and OSCE along with the Agents of the three governments, through regular contact and meetings with those Agents.
• The continued assistance of other International Organizations in the implementation process, in particular that of UNMIBH, and IJC.
• The Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees is to chair Property Implementation meetings along with the participation of the International Community and the Entity Ministries Responsible for implementation.
• The Return Process role of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees will need to be strengthened during 2001. MHRR can play an important role in facilitating the exchange of information among Entities on the return of displaced persons and the implementation of Property Law. Talks will also be held about a Protocol between OHR, UNHCR, the Ministries for Human Rights and Refugees, and Entity Ministries, concerning Return and Reconstruction Priorities for 2001.
• The promotion of involvement of the local Legal Aid Centers that are currently supported by UNHCR, and by domestic Non-Governmental Organizations in all monitoring and reform activities so as to make them sustainable in the long term. The provision of training and funding is necessary as well.
20 • The passing of laws governing Associations and Foundations by BiH, as well as two similar laws in the Federation and RS. The legislative process still very much depends on the local Parliaments.
• The monitoring of the legal framework of general laws which are not expected to cover all legal problems and restrictions facing NGO’s. This relates, in particular, to financial aspects such as taxation and customs, inasmuch as these have great impact on the sustainability of non-governmental organizations in BiH.
• The application of pressure on local authorities to open shelters and to protect victims, so that such victims might witness against those who traffic in human beings.
• The extension of assistance to Government Ministries and to non-governmental bodies in the areas of responsibility designated to them under the National Plan of Action.
• The application of pressure on domestic authorities so that they might speed criminal charges against those who traffic in human beings.
• The providing of information by local authorities on all missing persons in keeping with their obligations under the Dayton Peace Accords, (Annex 7, Article V). Authorities must ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to the Missing Persons Commission, and to the Courts, so as to continue the Inter-Entity Exhumation Program.
1.4. Personal integrity of officials
• The submission to measures of verification of those policemen who fail to respect Property Laws.
• The resolute implementation of IPTF policies tied to Registration and Non- Compliance, and the intent of ensuring that policemen with unsuitable backgrounds, or those who display unsuitable behavior, are not permitted to work as policemen.
• The application of pressure on local police authorities to initiate internal disciplinary proceedings against policemen who receive non-compliance reports from the IPTF.
• The monitoring of activities, with the oversight of the IJC, of the Commissions and Councils charged with the obligation to conduct professional reviews of sitting Judges and Prosecutors in order to determine their fitness to hold office.
• The long-term regulation of the professionalism of Judges and Prosecutors by means of the codification of appointments and of disciplinary procedures as contained in the RuleBook governing Commissions and Councils. Also, the shaping of authority for
21 these commissions and councils. These two procedures are significant to the long- term development of standards of independence and professionalism in the judicial system, and these procedures should embrace standards contained in professional codes of ethics as passed in 2000.
• The providing of assistance, by way of the IJC, to the Commissions and Councils as regards the interpreting of laws, without political pressure, regulating Judges and Prosecutors, so as to establish their authority in regulating questions which arise concerning Judges and Prosecutors. The suggestion of changes to, or the addition of necessary additions to regulatory measures so as to assure the application of ethical and professional standards.
• The implementation of verification measures for Judges who violate Property Laws.
• The removal of Officials who constantly obstruct this process, either by means of PIK, or else by the authority of the High Commissioner.
• The drafting of laws to suspend Officials who obstruct the implementation of Property Laws.
• The prosecution and fining of Officials who fail to observe the Law or who obstruct its application.
1.5. Respect for international treaty obligations on the part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
• The assurance of respect for the fundamental principles governing International Refugee Laws, including repatriation and access to a given territory. The term “repatriation” ( refoulement in the original), is a term which designates the return to a country or territory where a person has fear for his safety. The term also applies in situations where there is great likelihood that the returnee will be trapped indirectly, as, for example, at the border itself.
• The assurance of Right of Asylum to refugees who seek it.
• Ensuring asylum seekers access to procedures in BiH by developing mechanisms to identify and refer potential asylum seekers and refugees to the UNHCR.
• The comprehensive training of workers in the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Border Patrol Service, the local Police, the Judiciary, and all other structures so as to acquaint them with laws governing refugees.
• The elaboration of all articles associated with Immigration Law and the Law of Asylum, and all other necessary points of guidance in cooperation with the Ministries.
22 • The fostering of permanent solutions regarding Refugees from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia.
• The cooperation of the International Community with the Ministry for Human Rights on starting the process of formulating a report that is to be presented to the various Bodies governed by these Treaties. The guarantee of technical help in achieving this process. Fourteen reports to all six treaty bodies are overdue at present. The greatest attention is to be given to the reports which are to be presented to the Committee for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and to the Committee for Human Rights. The same degree of attention is to be given to the elaboration of the Central Document which is to be presented to the appropriate bodies established on the basis of the Treaty on Human Rights.
• The improvement of the status of national minorities in BiH, including the Roma, in accord with the framework of the Convention on the Protection of National Minorities. This is to be accomplished by way of implementing the framework of the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the beginning of the year 2001.
23 2. The Situation of Human Rights in BiH in the Year 2001
2.1. The social picture
Long-suffering and impoverished by war, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina has no prospect for even an average economic existence, even though six long years have elapsed from the end of the war conflict. In the over-all picture of the socio-economic relations, the majority of the population fails to see any exit from the poverty facing them, and they seek avenues of escape from their homeland. According to unofficial statistics based on causes as recorded in polls taken in September 2001, about 60% of the young people expressed the desire to leave BiH. The loss of professional cadres is worrisome. Both young and middle-aged who are educated find no prospects for employment of any sort, and if they are employed, they are unable to meet their most basic needs with their salaries. Hence, if they do not wish to turn to crime, 2 they are forced to seek their fortune elsewhere. At the same time, more than one million citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were forced to flee to other lands during the war are losing hope that there will be, anytime soon, a basis for their prompt return.
The rate of unemployment is steadily increasing in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the close of the year, the rate has already surpassed 40%, while the unemployed receive, for all practical purposes, no aid from the state. The condition in the Republika Srpska is even worse. The lack of any possibility of employment is surely the greatest ordeal for the citizens, and thereby, the nation of Bosnia and Herzegovina at this moment. This problem is, to a large extent, the result of the political solution to divide the country. Though it served to end the war, it did not establish a peace with a human face. The social status in BiH is a convincing confirmation that the absence of war is not a guarantee for the longed-for peace.
Of the 412,000 or so currently employed in the Bosno-Herzegovinian Federation, more than 42,000 are temporarily laid off due to lack of work, or as a consequence of “technological over-staffing,” which employers seem unable to solve. During this time, those workers-in- waiting have no income, or else, they receive little more than a symbolic monthly income ranging somewhere between 10 and 30 DM. According to official statistics from the Federal Bureau of Statistics for BiH, the average pay for the month of October was 458 DM, while the average cost of living for a family of four, for the same period, was 440 DM.
The governmental machinery demonstrates a pronounced inability to deal with the ever- wider black market, and “off-the-books” employment which deprives the workers of health benefits, pension payments, and social security. While traffic in illegal goods of dubious origin is evermore widespread across Bosnia and Herzegovina, the state coffers suffer, and
2 Based on official statistics of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, the rate of crime in the BiH Federation rose by 8.7%.
24 the authorities in charge are unable to fulfil their basic duties toward citizens. For example, the average pension in the Bosno-Herzegovinian Federation at the close of the year 2001 was at 169 DM. In recent months the average pension within Republika Srpska was 50 DM, hence, it is not uncommon to see pensioners on the streets of our cities digging in garbage containers. This is their “reward” for many decades of drudgery-filled work. Begging has become a common sight. Administrative bodies no longer pay much attention to it. How distant and hollow sounding is the phrase “right to work” to the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina!
2.2. Administrative chaos in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Upon ending the awful war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Accords defined the composition of the new nation. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a nation of three constitutive peoples and is divided into two entities which are difficult to reconcile. One of the entities, namely Republika Srpska, has a centralized structure and is a mono-national administrative “nation", while the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a federal structure and is a conglomerate of two nationalities, divided into ten Parishes or Cantons. The territorial units of the Cantons are comprised of counties that are a significant segment of the national administration. Above and beyond this, there is to be found in BiH the District of Br čko, which in many ways is to be seen as a third entity.
From the point of view of international law, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a united, internationally recognized nation. However, according to its own legal norms it is in essence divided into two loosely connected parts. The District of Br čko was to become the paradigm of sorts for tying together this divided country. Thus far, it has not succeeded in doing so. Legal ties that should maintain the integrity of this internationally recognized entity leave one with the impression that they are at best tentative. As regards the geopolitical and geo- strategic significance of the area the country occupies, and the non-coordinated relations it has with world powers, it is a fact, one which does not astound - even though it is true - that our nation is de facto an undeclared Protectorate of the International Community.
The irreconcilable political options in play - radicalized during the war - resulted in an accord that created a composite legal construct in BiH. The composite organizational construct of Bosnia and Herzegovina unavoidably manifested itself as a mottled construct, and by this very fact, resulted in an uncoordinated legal system. This small nation has thirteen constitutions and one statute! A simple glance at the legal statutes in force speaks volumes as to the condition of legal norms in BiH, that are the result of the Dayton Accords. We are speaking of the following legal statutes:
1. The legal system based on Annex 4 of the general framework for The Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton’s Constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina). One must not dismiss from mind that the constitution is the result of a compromise, and
25 the wish of the International Community to establish peace at all costs. As such, this legal system was unable to maintain the principles for a just solution, for it is the result of the conditions that came to be as the result of the war. It is an incontrovertible fact that with this constitutional solution the results of force and aggression by act of war were given legal status.
2. The legal system for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the Washington Accords from 1994, and confirmed by the Dayton Accords. Here we have before us a Legislature empowered by the Federation, along with the Legislatures of ten Parishes, that is, ten Cantons that have great legislative powers. Every Canton, as based on the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has its own constitution, legislative body, government, and Ministers with Portfolio - except for the Minister of External Affairs and the Minister of Defense - and its own President of the Canton.
3. The legal system of the Republika Srpska has been legitimized by virtue of the Dayton Accords, and came into being by the exclusive wish to have one people.
4. The District of Br čko, along with its constitutive and functional statutes, came into being as the result of a political compromise because of the strategic significance of this region of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5. The legal system of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated April 6, 1992, through the signing of the Dayton Accords partially continues to be in force on the basis of the Constitutional decision about the continuity of BiH. It is based on the wartime Legislature found in the area under the control of the Bosno-Muslim People.
6. The legal structure of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, whose activities are recognized by the Washington Accords, and which have remained applicable by virtue of the assumption of Legal Decisions in the Cantons having a Croatian majority.
7. The Legal Norms have their origin through the use of the authority granted by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The High Representative (Wofgang Petritsch) manifests himself as arbiter, and makes decisions with the force of Law through his use of the authority granted under Annex 10 of the Dayton Accords. Despite the preponderance of good will, there is an insufficient sensibility on the part of OHR in carrying out its legislative functions, and despite the understatement of those legal decisions, they contribute to the chaos of norms. A particular problem presents itself in the myopic view held by the legislators of the OHR. They lack insight into the traditional Continental-European Legal System, and they incorporate legal norms on the basis of the Anglo-Saxon type. This also contributes to the confusion in legal norms.
26 8. The Legal System of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), as well as that of the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH), which, as a federal unit of the failed nation, also had its own Legislature. These Legal Statutes, in the main, remained in force by assuming the entire burden of legal judgements along with eventual, though often meaningless, changes. The Legislative Bodies, because ofinertia, assumed the task of making legal judgements which were incompatible with fundamental democratic principles.
9. The assumption of obligations under International Treaties signed by the former SFRJ. Within this legal cauldron, which is beyond the law and the Constitution, it is interesting to mention that during the course of talks, the Dayton Constitution, was strengthened by Annex 1 ( Supplemental Accord on Human Rights which is to be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina) , by a series of standards which apply to the realization of Human Rights, and which proceed from the acceptance of a series of expressly cited international conventions:
• The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, from the year 1948. • The Geneva Convention, the Geneva Protocols, I - II, from 1977 and I - IV, for the protection of victims of war, from the year 1948, • The Convention relating to the status of Refugees from 1951, and the Protocol from 1966. • The Convention on the nationality of married women from 1957. • The Convention from 1961, governing the reduction in number of persons not having citizenship, • The International Convention on the elimination of all types of racial discrimination, from the year 1965. • The International Accord on political and citizenship rights, from 1966, and the Optional Protocol from the years 1966, and 1968. • The International Accord from 1968 on economic, social, and cultural rights. • The International Convention on the elimination of all types of discrimination against women, from the year 1979. • The Convention against torture, inhumane, or degrading treatment and punishment, from the year 1984. • The European Convention against torture, inhumane, or degrading treatment, and punishment, from 1987. • The Convention on the Rights of Children, from 1989. • The Convention on the Rights of Temporary Workers in Foreign Lands, and the members of their families, from 1990. • The European Charter for regional languages, and minority languages, from 1992. • The General Convention for the protection of national minorities.
27 As is obvious, it would be difficult to find a means wherein all the above listed regulations might be coordinated into an effective and harmonized legal system. The complexity of the Bosno-Herzegovinian legal system, the complexity of an immature Executive, and the presence of discrimination contribute to a government of chaos rather than to a government of Rights.
2.3. Problems within the judicial system
The work of the Courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina also fails to contribute to a government of Rights. Because of the sluggishness of the Courts, Justice seems to be unattainable. Even though a large number of Judges emigrated from BiH, the remaining number of Judges is not below the European average. In the meanwhile, their unprofessional behavior toward citizens and the cases before them, as well as the lack of material and technical readiness, and the instability of the legal system itself, contributes to the accumulation of unresolved cases to be found on the file-shelves of the Courts. We can take as an example the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the Courts in the Capital City of BiH: County Court I, in Sarajevo in 2000 had 231,146 cases before it, of which 45,242 cases were carried over from the previous year. In 2001, 63,504, that is, just short of 30% of unresolved cases were carried over. Meanwhile, it is a startling statistic that 62% of the cases dealing with business matters remained unresolved, while some 60% of the litigation remained unresolved. 3 Of the 7,687 cases accepted by the Courts in 2000, 4,483 cases remain unresolved - a 58% rate of inefficiency, while the efficiency in resolving cases for the year 2000 was at about 50%. The lack of effectiveness in resolving the number of cases recorded in the Department dealing with questions of Contract (KPU), is staggering: of the 33,885 cases from the year 2000, the number of unresolved cases or those carried over, is 24,733, or 73% of the cases. Thus, for example, the simple recording of Deeds of Ownership requires a wait of twelve to fourteen months.
Of the 95,294 cases pending before County Court II in Sarajevo in 2000, more than one-third were carried over into 2001 - that is, about 62% unresolved Commercial Law cases, some 60% of Criminal cases, and some 56% of Contract disputes.
The Canton Court in Sarajevo carried over into the year 2001 some 33,754 cases it was to have resolved in 2000. This is just short of 20% of the cases. Here too, one observes a delay in resolving first-stage litigation (of 76 cases, only 26 were resolved), as well as administrative cases (965 unresolved cases out of 1,689 cases pending before the court).
The High Representative offered his Decision of March 13, 2001 4 which was aimed at increasing the effectiveness and independence of the Courts. He ordered that an
3 Litigation, according to the Law on Litigation, should be resolved hastily! 4 The Decision was published in “The Official Newspapers of the FBiH,” No. 14/01, and in the “Official Gazette of the Republika Srpska. ”
28 International Justice Commission (IJC) be formed. This Commission was given a mandate, by virtue of this order, to address and coordinate measures of reform for the justice system of BiH. The commission was also to undertake measures that would contribute to the establishment of a government of law. Judge Rakel Surlien, of Norway, was placed at the head of this Commission. Fifteen international, and eleven local officials were directly charged with carrying out court reform and monitoring the judicial system. The Independent Judicial Commission was given the authority to intervene in Court and Prosecutorial Commissions. It was also authorized to call for the suspension of cases so as to have them await a decision by the High Representative. The High Representative thusly combines and assumes the legislative and executive privilege as well as the prerogative of judicial authority. Prior to the formation of the IJC, the reforms of the judicial system were undertaken within the framework of the UN Mission to BiH. Commissions were formed at the Entity level, and at the Canton level within the Federation of BiH. They were given the task of evaluating the judicial system (JSAP), and evaluating the work of Judges and Prosecutors. The fundamental direction of these commissions was identical to that of the IJC.
The material wellbeing of Judges in the Federation of BiH was greatly improved with the passage of the law governing the functions of the Court and Prosecutor. It resulted in judicial salaries ranging between two and three DM, depending on their judicial rank. Despite this, the state of justice did not improve in 2001. 5 This condition within the judicial system convinces the citizens that it is impossible to protect or achieve their rights by recourse to courts.
2.4. The silence of the administration
In analyzing the functioning, or lack thereof, of all segments of authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one cannot circumvent the silence of the Administration as an obstacle to the realization of the law guaranteeing Rights. We will reveal the present status by means of the work of administrative and legal bodies, as relates to requests on the part of citizens for the return of occupied property. One need not dismiss from mind that as a relic inherited from the former socialists in BiH, Tenant Rights were carried over as a specific right of sorts to sub-letting, similar to the right of ownership. These rights consist of a lifetime right to make use of an apartment that is owned by the State. The right of ownership could be transferred only to members of one’s own family as co-owners of Tenant Rights. Presently, an entire set of laws are in force through which Rights are to be implemented by means of decisions as found in Annex 7, of the Dayton Accords. The return of Refugees, and persons displaced because of the war is tied to these decisions. Despite the fact that six years have elapsed since the end of the war, official statistics show that by the end of October 2001, only 44% of confiscated property in BiH was returned to its rightful owners. In the Republika Srpska, the figure is at 22%. For those residing in the District of Br čko, the figure stands at just 9%. Beyond all that has been stated above, politicians in power look to their own interest under
5 Statistical data for the Court System for 2001 are not formulated at present.
29 the banner of fighting for the good of the people or the party and this is but one of the causes preventing the return of property. Another cause is the silence of the Administration. This silence, in fact, is in the service of those in power, for it is they who have influence on who will, or will not be employed at the County, Canton, or State Administrative levels. The responsible Administrative Bodies are, according to Administrative Law (Official newspapers of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina , No 2/98 and 48/99), obligated to resolve cases within 30 days from the date they were filed. At a maximum, no less than two months are to elapse if a special investigation is required. In the meanwhile, it is not uncommon for the responsible body not to have resolved the case even after four or five years from the time of filing. Often, this is the case despite the fact that no real obstacles or contentious issues stand in the way. The law, it is true, grants the litigant the possibility to file for a delay as though the request was refused, or the possibility of filing an administrative complaint before the appropriate court was denied. This adds to the cost for the litigants, which they often cannot meet. When there is administrative silence, or when one is forced to accept long-termed measures, the only possible recourse remaining is the lodging of a request for an investigation, or the eventual filing of cause against the very body responsible for resolving the issue. These requests are filed with the Ministry of Justice at the Federal level asking for federal inspection. The fact that this body is inundated with requests on the part of the citizenry, is a clear indication of the lack of respect for lawfulness in BiH. (The large number of requests has a significant impact on the work of this body and reduces its effectiveness.) The fact that those responsible to further causes before the court are delinquent is of little help, nor does the fact that rather rigorous fines are foreseen for such inaction within the timeframe prescribed by law. Meanwhile, just the mention of the possibility of an investigative inspection often presses these “delinquent” officers of the Court to faster resolution of cases.
The lack of confidence in the Court system on the part of the citizenry is fully understandable. This very fact causes citizen trepidation at the thought of bringing a cause of action before administrative bodies. These obstacles, subjective in nature, come about regularly when particular rights need to be realized in a territory comprised of a predominantly different nationality. It is not unusual that cases are formally and legally resolved in favor of those having pre-war vested property rights, or with owners of the usurped real estate, however, these individuals are not able to realize their rights established validly and by way of discharged administrative acts. The executive procedure from this jurisdiction is, in the main, taken at the request of the party whose cause is to be adjudicated, after the responsible body offers the decision by which the resolution is permitted. Even though they are responsible to make a decision to approve a resolution within fifteen (15) days from the time the action is initiated, the responsible bodies often reject moving the cause forward. They justify their action by stating they have no possibility of assuring the necessary accommodations for illegal apartment dwellers. This approach to the problem has become universal and the majority nationality not only tolerates it, but, in fact, considers it to be normal. This speaks volumes as to the post-war spirit in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
30 The fact that parties to a cause may not participate in the action before the day determined by registration on the so-called “Waiting List,” demonstrates the kind of power legal norms have in BiH. The practice of this sort of “accommodation” on the part of the responsible bodies offers the complainant the possibility of approaching the person responsible to further the legal action only after forty or more days of waiting. They are thereby given the chance to uncover essential facts to the case, or to eventually become informed by the necessary relevant proofs, only after the legal time frame for the action has expired. It is clear that there are definite political trends emanating from the centers of power, and given to the responsible bodies, all with the goal of preserving the status quo.
2.5. Implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, or, the violation of the right to return
As is obvious, the national composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina contains a multitude of understated elements that affect all spheres of societal life. The huge administrative apparatus installed in BiH by the International Community is, nonetheless, unable to react to the multitude of problems facing it. Citizens find it ever more difficult to realize their Rights through the mediation of the agencies of the International Community. An entire block of laws put forth by the Office of the High Representative, that are intended to realize the Right of Return as foreseen by Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords, is little more than a barely attainable goal only on paper. The High Representative, in his attempt to reanimate the functioning of the Legal System, in keeping with the authority granted by the Dayton Accords, was forced to impose a large number of laws that were unable to be brought into harmony with regular parliamentary procedures. Despite these and similar endeavors in BiH, more than 1,300,000 exiled and displaced persons cannot return to their homes! The impression is had that the OHR, from the very start, tolerated the practice of preventing the return of those exiled from Republika Srpska. This resulted in the universal view that the Republika Srpska was “created” by Dayton exclusively for the Serbian People! The question arising is self-generated: Is the already established practice of imposing laws an effective means, if those who are supposed to carry out those laws, do not regard them as their own? On the other hand, the right to a sustainable return to his home and place of domicile is a basic right of every citizen, as well as the foundation for existence and a beacon for Democracy in BiH.
Attempts on the part of citizens to resolve their problems as regards Return by appealing to the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights are not uncommon. With the intent to prevent the detrimental practice of the nation’s Administration, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the last part of October 1999, imposed the Law on Changes and Additions to the Law on Administrative Procedures (Official Newspapers of the FBiH, No. 48/99). The changes foresaw the assured presence of the Ombudsman in all phases of the administrative process. This fact vividly demonstrates the administrative barriers faced by the citizens when they attempt to seek their Rights. Unfortunately, this institution has a
31 significant influence on the neglect seen in the flow of society in BiH, and, as a result, on the flow of the administrative process, as well. Statements made by the Ombudsman as to the violations of Human Rights, most frequently have no effect in speeding up the process. We remind one of the fact that the task assigned to the Ombudsman is much wider in scope, though we limit it herein to the problem of Return. The actions of the Ombudsman regularly end up at the level of suggestions, even though the Ombudsman has the authority to bring about proceedings. The question remains: Why has the Human Rights Chamber, whose decisions are binding, and that resolves 80% of the cases given it, failed to find its corresponding voice on this complex and important question?
As we have seen, the great difficulty in the functioning of the authorities and the Legal System in all of BiH is generated by the inadequacy of Legal Statutes, as well as by the lack of political will to bring to realization the General Framework Accords for Peace. If steps are taken toward a just resolution of the problem, and a judgement is rendered by the Constitutional Court, that all three Peoples in BiH are constitutive Peoples - across all of the territories of BiH - there will be hope that this Gordian knot will be untied. The judgement of the Constitutional Court demands that braver and more sincere steps be taken at all levels. Without such steps, it would seem that the failure to return exiled and displaced persons will, all the more convincingly, and harmfully demonstrate that the Dayton Accords cannot be the framework wherein it would ever be possible to create a Democratic BiH. The interests of the citizens and the Peoples of BiH - in fact, interests that are even wider - and a respect for fundamental Human Rights, demands that the “myth” of Dayton not become a negation of its positive achievements, nor a barrier to correction and improvement of its decisive points.
2.6. The violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of religious conviction and freedom of religious profession
In the course of the war, thousands of Sacred Structures - Churches, Mosques, Monasteries - and Faith-related objects were destroyed to their very foundations. The systematic destruction and desecration of sacral structures was not only intended as a destruction of the cultural, historical, and religious heritage of the citizens of another nationality and religious confession. Its intent was also to let it be known to those citizens that with “ethnic cleansing” the division of Peoples was complete and final, and that their return cannot and will not be. Unfortunately, across all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, historical, cultural and religious objects jaggedly continue to jut out with prominence as monuments to barbarism and irrational hatred. Political and state structures assist in renewing or rebuilding religious objects of those religious confessions or Churches, which are, in the majority, within the Entity wherein they were destroyed. Even though top Religious Leaders have created an Inter-Religion Council, they are unable to find a way as to how they can agree on preventing this type of obvious abuse of what is Holy. It is impossible to understand, on the basis of religious tolerance, the stand taken by representatives of some Churches and Religious Communities. They accede to the notion that their politicians or political parties, based on
32 self-interest, relate to them, obligingly, and to their community, while, disregarding the fact that, at the same time, they are violating the fundamental Rights of the members of another religious community. Perhaps unconsciously, they leave one with the impression that they too, accede to the violation of fundamental Religious, and therefore, Human Rights.
As is obvious from the above, a particular difficulty in achieving Human Rights can be found in the Republika Srpska. National and religious discrimination result from the very constitution of the RS, in that the Republic is defined as “The Nation of the Serbian People.” 6 This stance of the legislators reflects upon all spheres of societal life in that part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitutional Court has retracted the notion that the Republika Srpska is “The nation of the Serbian People.” However, this act did not stop the practice wherein the Serbian Orthodox Church has rights not granted to other Churches and Faith Communities and their members. By way of example of much deeper and wider problems, all one has to do is offer the occurrences which occurred in the spring of 2001 at Trebinja and Banja Luka:
At the time indicated, and in the towns mentioned, at the insistence of OHR and other representatives of the International Community, and under the jurisdiction of Republika Srpska, the symbolic start of rebuilding Mosques which had been destroyed during the war was to take place. It was meant to be a symbol of the presence of Moslems in that area. While attempting to lay the cornerstones for the Oman-pasha Mosque , in Trebinje, and the Ferhat-pasha Mosque in Banja Luka, the most ugly scenes took place. This ceremony, which was supposed to encourage, and symbolize the future return of the Bosnian Moslems in the territory of Republika Srpska, was transformed instead into a sign of protest against the Returnees, and against their Moslem identity. Along with representatives from the Moslem Religious Community, representatives of the International Community were physically attacked, as well. Wolfgang Petritsch directly blamed the authorities of the Republika Srpska for the events that took place. The strength of the protesters, and in its own way, the approval registered in the media of the Republika Srpska, clearly demonstrate the existing climate as regards the implementation of the Peace Accords in this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when it comes to basic Religious Rights.
6 Upon acceptance of Annex 4 of the Constitution of BiH, Amendment XLIV, from the year 1995 was added to the Constitution of Republika Srpska . This amendment, through Article 1, changed the constitution to read: “Republika Srpska is the nation of the Serbian People, and all its citizens.” The constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was incorporated February 28, 1992. It represented the fundamental act of the “new nation,” and was the preface to a bloody war and to genocide. Prior to the introduction of that Constitution, and up to the signing of the General Framework Accords for Peace (December 14, 1995), this constitution was changed in more than one instance - in fact with as many as 43 amendments to it. With the acceptance of the Dayton Accords, it was altered to read: The Constitution of Republika Srpska.
33 2.7. Education
Questions concerning Education within FBiH to a large extent come under the auspices of the Cantons. Unfortunately, a system of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would assure the right to all three Constitutive Peoples by way of constitutional guarantees, to an education, on the one hand, and the right to be educated in one’s mother-tongue, on the other hand, has not been adopted, as of yet. This matter, by its very nature, is very complex, yet very important. It will not be easy to resolve the matter, even with much good will or understanding. Instead, those who expose the matter to view have taken it as correct - who knows how many times until now - that the matter be resolved without so much as asking what the various Peoples think or wish.
Within the Bosno-Herzegovinian Federation, Education is under the competence of the Cantons, and, as a result, the practice of financing only those Educational Institutions that follow the programs of the “majority peoples” is arrived at by way of rough estimate. Nonetheless, it is necessary to point out that in some places, namely, Stolac, Čapljina, Prozor, and Bugojno, the schools in those places already have organized classes to meet both the Bosniac and Croatian programs. Obviously, these programs are financed by Canton funds. However, there are still many places wherein the Rights of the Bosniacs are violated by the majority Croatian population, and where identical violations against Croatians take place in predominantly Bosniac areas. It is sufficient that one call to mind the already forgotten “tent-schools” Žabljak, located in the county of Tešanj, or the maltreatment of Croatian children in Vareš. “Schools for Europe,” that were organized by the Vrhbosna Archdiocese in 1994, in Sarajevo, Zenica, Tuzla, Travnik, Konjic, and Žep če, are the first private schools with State approval, and schools having a large percentage of children from all three Peoples, and various Faiths. It is truly regrettable that this attempt to open multiethnic schools wherein efforts are made to foster the existing differences, and the necessity of the sense of community, did not meet with greater understanding and support - either on the part of the local authorities or on the part of the International authorities.
The school system in the Republika Srpska makes exclusive use of the Serbian language, and a Serbian program of education. Clearly, it is exclusively designed for Serbian children. The extent and breadth of impropriety in this jurisdiction in the social sphere were amply demonstrated at the beginning of this year in the District of Br čko. Huge demonstrations were held by Serbian high school and elementary school students to prevent the Bosniac and Croatian Returnee school children from attending the same school for afternoon classes.
All of the above points to the fact that more and varied efforts are needed in working out a plan and program for schools if there is to be peace and prosperity in BiH. The Representatives of the International Community - regardless of their goodwill - will be ineffective in this sensitive matter, if they, again, make use of the method of forcing their solution on the matter.
34 2.8. The status of the public media
It is difficult to speak of freedom of the press in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Along with the political pressure applied to journalists, one has the impression that the press lacks professionalism. However, the question at hand is the freedom of the press and the media in BiH. Even though the Bosno-Herzegovinian Press abounds in non-objective and unprofessional journalists, it is obvious that the greatest problem is the fact that the majority of the media, in this manner, or that, is under the control of the political centers of power.
The Office of the High Representative, in order to establish some order in this field, established the Independent Commission for the Media, the IMC. Its task was the reconstruction of the Media. One has the impression that individual workers of the IMC (later changed to read: Regulatory Agency for the Media) attempted to establish a supra-national system for the Media. They regarded even the slightest mention of national identity as an act of nationalism, and, by extension, an act against the course of the Dayton Accords.
The beginning of spring 2001 saw the intervention of the IMC. They terminated the signal of some Media Centers and Mostar’s EROTEL. The transmission of programs from the Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia (HRT) were jammed as well. The Serbians living in the Republika Srpska, as particular to their Entity, have - by name and by content - their own far-reaching electronic Media. The Croatians in BiH, as a result of these actions, were left as the only Constitutive People without a television channel that would emit its programs using the Croatian language. 7 It is true that the former TV station BHT (Bosno- Herzegovinian TV) was transformed into the Federal TV (FTV). The intent of this transformation was to have a TV station that could be seen across all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniac and Croatian interests were to be represented even-handedly. However, that did not happen, and the likelihood that it will in the near future, is highly unlikely. The editorial policies of FTV have changed. They are less biased than the policies under BHTV. Yet, by virtue of its programming, the ethnic composition of its employees, and the manner of its reporting, Croatians, unfortunately do not see the station as their own. Insufficient representation of the Croatian Language in the programming of FTV is made conditional by the fact that the Croatian journalists, who might be employed by the station, do not speak or do not wish to speak standard Croatian.
It is indisputable that an urgent overhaul of the Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina is necessary. However, such an overhaul must be done in the spirit of tolerance and even- handedness as regards all three Constitutive Peoples. The state of the Media forces the conclusion that the International Community - which took upon itself the role of guarantor of a united and financially sustainable media system - has to take note of and stress the differences of all the Peoples and citizens of BiH.
7 With the suppression of EROTEL in BiH , only three local TV channels exist that emit programs in the Croatian Language: HTV-Mostar, Oskar-C (Mostar) and TV-KISS (Kiseljak).
35 3. The Political Crisis in BiH
Seldom has a word enjoyed such decadence and inflation of meaning as has the word “Crisis”. We make use of it for any and all occasions. As a result, the word’s original meaning of judgement, discussion, or, evaluation of a problem , is often taken lightly. The territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina has always seen greater or lesser crises as well as opposing interpretations of them. The maelstroms of war offer us the most ugly proof of complex crises. Also, war is the most unfavorable way of resolving them. The Dayton Peace Accords, agreed upon on November 21, 1995 and formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995 were designed to definitely end the war and political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the years 1991 and 1995. It succeeded in stopping the war. However, it did not succeed in removing the root-causes of the deep political crises in this area. However unjust the Accords were, they were better as an option than war. The Bosno-Herzegovinian Croatians, the smallest population of the Constitutive Peoples of this nation, accepted the Dayton Accords with great enthusiasm. They did this even though two of the Dayton Entities - The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska - as well as the legally unresolved District of Br čko, from the very start, represented potential flash-points for a new political crisis. It is for this reason that some Croatian Representatives to Dayton refused to sign the Accords. These potential flash points were becoming evermore real, as the Entities unfolded on the basis of “ethnic” principles. As these “ethnic principles” took greater hold from day to day, the Dayton construct of a unified nation paled more and more. Because of this fact, fear for their national rights in this land intensified each day on the part of the Croatians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Accords became the source of political crises, rather than a source for their solution. It is in this context that one needs to view the truly great political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the year 2001.
The political crisis of 2001 saw its culmination in the make-up of the government after the elections of November 11, 2000. Hence, the root of this year’s crisis is to be found in the past calendar year. The crisis, however, culminated in the present year. The Temporary Election Law plays the central role in this crisis for the year 2000, for at that time, no permanent election law existed. The Temporary Commission for Elections, whose mandate was affirmed by Annex 3 of the General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted - actually, more correctly, accepted - the imposition of the rules and regulations according to which the Elections of November 2000 were held. This Commission was composed of both local and foreign members. The head of the Commission was the head of the OSCE mission to BiH, Ambassador Robert L. Barry. The true, but hidden intent of the OSCE organizers of the election was to reduce the influence of the domineering national parties. They saw them as a major obstacle to political stabilization and to the democratization of the land. They thought that in this way they could assist the less nationalistic political parties from whom they anticipated greater cooperation in implementing the Dayton Accords. The changes to the rules for the election of delegates to the House of Parliament for the Federation of BiH became one of the stones that muddied the political
36 waters. The institution of the People’s House was founded with the goal of protecting the vital national interests of the Constitutive Peoples. Its counterpart does not exist in Republika Srpska. The change to the rules was made October 11, 2000 by Ambassador Barry. The change was made with the approval and the blessing of the High Representative of the International Community (OHR) 8 to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Wolfgang Petritsch. The change took place less than one month prior to the Elections, after many months of delay and under protest of two Croatian members of the Election Commission. Illustrative of our theme, the essential and central changes are:
1. That it is permissible for all members of Canton Assemblies to vote for all Canton Representatives in the Federal People’s House. The vote is to be proportional where the Candidates on all lists are designated as a Croatian, Bosniac, or otherwise. The Ethnic Quota for every Canton will assure that the number of Croatians and Bosniacs in the Federal People’s House will be at 30, while the number of the remaining will stand at 20. Further, the reallocation of the vacant seats among the Cantons will be guaranteed.
2. That a new method is introduced for the allotment of seats to the various Canton Assemblies that should point to the influence of the electorate in every Canton. In this manner, this rule is intended to make possible that the representation of every Canton to the People’s House reflects the electoral strength within that Canton. At the same time, it guarantees a minimum of representation for every Canton.
3. That the apportionment of seats is regulated on the basis of ethnic groups.
The first change in regulations by this decision tied to the procedure for the election of delegates from the Canton Assemblies was the most questionable. In fact, some Croatian political parties, centered on the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), declared it to be unconstitutional. They considered that the sovereign right of the Croatian People in BiH to elect their own Representatives to the People’s House of the Parliament was thereby violated. In harmony with earlier election laws, associations of Representatives from the Cantons chose representatives to the People’s House. The rule change foresaw that every party, party union, or an assembly of three Representatives to the Canton Assembly, may offer their own list of candidates to the Federation’s People’s House, from the ranks of Croatians, Bosniacs, or other ethnic groups. It is important to note that the rule change was relevant at the Canton level. Formerly, representatives to the People’s House were chosen at that level on the basis of strict ethnic principles. This means that the population residing in a given Canton chose candidates from their own ethnic group. According to the changed principle, candidates can be chosen independent of their nationality. Some Croatian parties saw in this a blow against their constitutive sovereignty, inasmuch as members of another nationality could recommend and elect Representatives of the Croatian People. These parties brought action against such a change in Election Rules. They demanded that the
8 It must be said that the idea and role played by the OHR and the OSCE is quite complex, and that they were not always united in their views.
37 Rules be brought into harmony with their interpretation of the Constitution, that is, that they be returned to their former standing. A second stone muddying the political waters was the altered structure for the number and national composition of the elected Representatives from the Canton Assemblies, in relation to the general elections of 1996 and 1998. The OSCE used as its criteria the number of registered voters distributed according to Cantons, and in harmony with the census of 1991. Some Croatian political parties saw this as illogical. They reasoned that some Cantons, for example, those having ten thousand Croatians, could elect the same number of Croatian Representatives as a Canton having ninety thousand Croatians. Aside from this, they pointed out the possibility of tremendous influence on the part of Bosniac Representatives in Canton Assemblies, on the election of Croatian Representatives. They maintained that 19 Croatian Representatives to the Federation’s People’s House, out of a total of 30, could be chosen by Bosniac Representatives.
As regards the election of the President and Vice-President of the Federation, the new rules make it possible for Representatives of other ethnic groups to chose either from the Bosniac Delegates’ Associations or from the Croatian Delegates’ Associations. Since the Constitution of the Federation of BiH states that this matter is regulated only by the Bosniac and Croatian Associations (B, Art. 2) the Electoral Commission was reproached for having violated the decisions of the Constitution of the Federation of BiH, with its changes to the Election Laws. Hence, they concluded, the changes are unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid.
The OSCE did not accept the insistent demands of the Croatian political parties that the changed Election Laws be revised. The relations between the two sides were sharpened and polarized. The crisis deepened by the end of the year 2000.
At a meeting held in Mostar on October 23, 2000 by several political parties, the following decisions were made:
1. The changes made to the Election Laws are unconstitutional, and, as such, they represent the process of eliminating the Croatian People in BiH as one of the Constitutive Peoples. An abrogation of the changes is demanded. At the same time, a demand is made that the right and manner of election of representatives to the People’s House be standardized. By doing so, it would allow the various ethnic associations to choose their own representatives to the People’s House of both Entities, and at the BiH Federation level, as well.
2. The decision was made to hold a Croatian National Convention in Novi Travnik on October 28, 2000. The legal and constitutional position of the Croatian People in BiH would be discussed at this meeting. Also to be discussed would be the manner of achieving equality, sovereignty and constitutive status for the Croatian People in BiH.
38 3. The creation of a working committee to prepare and organize the Croatian National Convention of BiH was decided upon. Representatives of all the Croatian political parties present at the meeting, are to be members of this committee. 9
The Croatian National Convention was held on October 28, in Novi Travnik. It was celebrated as the new and highest political body of the Croatian People in BiH. A declaration of the rights and position of the Croatian People in BiH and the decision to hold a referendum on the matter were formulated and adopted. Present at the meeting in Novi Travnik were the Cardinal Archbishop of Vrhbosna, Vinko Pulji ć, along with the Provincial of the Bosnian Franciscans, Father Mijo Džolan, and a large contingent of priests from the Vrhbosna and Mostar diocese.
After a strained election campaign, during which was seen the removal of names from the list of candidates, or the withholding of a mandate without the right to a substitute as is customary in Democratic societies, the elections took place on October 11, 2001. On that same day, by decision of the Croatian National Convention, a parallel referendum was held in areas having a Croatian majority. The referendum was designed to determine the regulation of relations toward BiH. Some saw separatist tendencies in such a formulation. There was a long wait for the results of the election. The composition of legislative bodies was supposed to take place according to time constraints imposed by the constitution. Thirty days was the cut off time allotted at the Confederation level, while at the Federal level, 20 days was allotted for the official announcement to be made.
The OSCE unwittingly and indirectly diverted the electoral water flow toward the grist mill of the national parties. Their fabricated and tendentious line was cleverly taken advantage of by declaring it as an assault to the vital national interests of the very national being and identity. This is affirmed by the election slogan of the HDZ: “Freedom or Extermination” . The HDZ Party of BiH, won 5 of 10 Cantons. At the same time, it gave an ultimatum seeking the revision of the regulations governing elections, and rejected entry into the process of electing delegates. In this manner, they blocked the work of all legislative bodies at the Federal and Canton levels. Ambassador Barry, as President of the Temporary Electoral Commission, finally confirmed the composition of the People’s House Assembly, only on February 23, 2001 long after their election by a “truncated” People’s House of the Federation of BiH, and the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska. It was “truncated” because the Representatives from the Croatian National Parliament were not present. At the formation meeting of the People’s House Assembly of the Federation of BiH, only 14 (out of 30) delegates from the ranks of the Croatian People were present. Twenty-five (out of 30) delegates from the ranks of the Bosniac People were present, and 19 (out of 20) delegates from the ranks of the others were present. These delegates chose 5 Croatian delegates and 5 Bosniac delegates to the People’s House Assembly of BiH. 10
9 N. Herceg - Z. Tomi ć, p. 88. Not all of the Croatian political parties were present, regardless of their importance, or lack thereof. 10 Ibid., p. 131.
39 The newly formed Croatian National Parliament of BiH boycotted the work of the Peoples’ Parliament of BiH. It questioned the Parliament’s legality and legitimacy. It did so from the point of view of unconstitutional procedure, lack of a sufficient quorum, the unconstitutional vote of the others, and procedural violations, and its failure to act in a business-like fashion. An example of this is the fact that the President of the past assembly was to call for the seating of a new constitutive assembly. He avoided this obligation insistently. Mr. Ante Jelavi ć announced on March 1, 2001 that from that day forward, the Federation was purely Bosniac, that is, it is composed without Croatians. He declared the institutions in Bosnia to be illegal and non-legitimate. He stated he would neither participate in them, nor would he recognize their decisions. This stance made it possible that candidates were chosen for the legislative body from those who did not run for office in the election, or else, from those who did not receive majority support from the voters.
The one-sidedness of the changes to the election laws was not democratic. The changes were not the happiest solution. The Election Law was not in accordance with democracy, and, as a result, the radical forces gained even more strength. Doris Pack, the President for the Office for Southeastern Europe at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, declared it to be so on April 20, 2001. The intent of the OSCE to soften the strength of the national parties was not achieved. The Croatian Political Parties regarded the election law changes to be a quiet, unconstitutional revision of the Dayton Accords, and a blow to Croatians as a Constitutive People. It was seen as a strike against their vital interests, analogous to the right to elect representatives to significant legislative bodies, and the right to self- determination. Bishop Peri ć, offered his analysis of the situation before the American Congress on July 25, 2001. He stated that Croatians have the right to elect a Serbian as their Representative, if they choose so. However, he stated, the Croatian People cannot be represented even by a Croatian if he had been chosen by Serbs or Bosniacs, instead of Croatians.
The crisis reached its pinnacle by springtime. Major accusations could be heard from one side and the other. The Croatian National Parliament of BiH took the position that the Croatian People in BiH were reduced to second-class status, and this violated the Croatian right to equality. They gave an ultimatum asking that the Constitution and the Election Laws be changed within 15 days. The changes must guarantee the portioning of all of Bosnia and Herzegovina into regions having autonomous powers. If this is not done, they stated, they will proclaim their own Entity, with its own constitution, administration, government, legislature, judiciary, taxing bodies, etc. In other words, they would revive the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna. This, they said, was justified in that the Serbs gained their own republic in Dayton, and with the post-Dayton changes executed by the High Representative, the Bosniacs gained their own Republic. Self-administration would entail five of the ten Cantons of the Federation. These were the main demands made by the Croatian People’s Assembly held on March 3, 2001 in Mostar. By doing so, the “pax Daytoniana” would, “ad acta,” achieve the status of a museum piece. These efforts were an attempt to achieve equality on the part of the Croatians - even to the point of separation - if no other solution
40 offered itself. The OHR and the OSCE responded by suggesting they would take drastic measures, and that they would severely punish all those who sought to construct a parallel, anti-Dayton structure of government. Thus, the High Representative of the OHR, removed Mr. Ante Jelavi ć from the Presidency of BiH, and forbade him, along with six others from engaging in political and party activities. Despite this, the HDZ elected Jelavi ć as its party president.
Bishop Ratko Peri ć addressed the People’s Assembly, in Mostar. Starting with the results of the Referendum held parallel to the elections of November 11, 2000, Bishop Peri ć stated that the Croatian People in BiH have the right to defend their national being, their rights, obligations, and freedom. Bishop Peri ć further stated that the Croatians achieved their right to hold such an assembly on the basis of a plebiscite, which represented the will of the Croatian People in BiH. He advised the Assembly, as a social and political institution, that it must remain as a lasting and stable institution. Bishop Peri ć further stressed that all the Peoples of BiH are to be seen as equal. The Bishop engaged himself to seek a revision of the Washington and Dayton Accords, on the basis of the unjust division of the territory of BiH. High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch reacted to Bishop Peri ć’s address by characterizing it as “hate speech.” The Bishops’ Conference of BiH gave its support to Bishop Peri ć at their March 8, 2001 meeting in Sarajevo. They issued a statement in which they subscribed to the “principles” spoken of by Bishop Peri ć, at the assembly in Mostar on March 3. Furthermore, they expressed their dissatisfaction with the International Community’s dismissing of the political will of the Croatian People.
The Bishops of BiH maintain that the changes to the Electoral Laws, the manner of choosing members to the Presidency, and the role of the People’s House, in fact, abolish the equality of the Croatian People as relates to the other two Peoples. They called for a dialog between the International Community and the legitimate and legal representatives of the Croatian People. They distanced themselves from those who wished to take advantage of Croatian interests for their own self-serving needs. They also distanced themselves from those who sought to reduce the Croatian People in BiH to little more than a national minority. By stressing the “principles” of the Croatian People’s Assembly, they indirectly stressed the fact that they do not support all their extra-institutional measures of defense.
The electrified atmosphere passed from the political sphere to all spheres of society. It captured the mind-set of the Croatian contingent of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The connection between the political and military authorities was clearly seen. The officers, non-commissioned personnel, and the soldiers themselves refused to obey the newly appointed Minister of Defense, who was, by nationality, a Croatian. Military installations were abandoned only to be spontaneously occupied by women and demonstrators. The representative of the International Community saw in this action an attempt to revitalize the army of Herzeg-Bosna.
41 The incident involving the Herzegovinian Bank was also a drastic response on the part of OHR. With heavy-armed force, the OHR took over the Central Office of the Bank in Mostar on April 18, 2001. Some saw the Bank as the foundation of economic strength for the Croatians in BiH. Others thought the Bank was founded by the HDZ, and that all the major Croatian institutions in BiH were forced to do business with the bank. This event saw the appointment of a temporary administrator for the Bank on April 5, 2001. The representatives of the International Community in BiH have, to this date, failed to demonstrate or reveal any unlawful actions on the part of the Bank.
Conclusion
The political crisis in BiH in the year 2001 is actually a constitutional crisis. In the end, it is the product of insufficiently defined spheres by the Dayton Accords, by which BiH received its Constitution. The Dayton Accords failed to ground and formulate precisely governmental institutions and structures. It would seem that such an insufficiently defined and elaborated Constitution - badly in need of supplementation - reflected the wants and needs of the International Community. It is true that the International Community was of great value for the peace process in BiH with great financial investments and with this kind of constitutional agreement it received. But it also gained an almost unlimited control of the country without the legal and official assumption of the role of a Protectorate. The International Community justified its role in thinking that only a strong International presence, along with its experience in Democracy, could solve the intra-national conflicts within BiH, and bring stability and Democracy to the nation. This political crisis - among other proofs - demonstrates that the above mentioned thesis is no more than an illusion.
The authority of the High Representative to BiH is truly great. This crisis in BiH showed his authority as follows: 1) He forbade political action; 2) He forbade one’s right to be elected; 3) He abrogated the mandate of those legitimately elected; 4) He influenced the enactment of laws; 5) He imposed certain laws and decrees of his own will, as for example, those governing the use of the national emblem, the National Anthem, and the use of the National Flag; 6) He authorized the armed take-over of the Mostar Bank prior to any Judicial ruling; and, 7) He confiscated evidential materials, etc. The actions of the High Representative in this crisis demonstrate clearly that his Authority is greater than that granted to a Protectorate, or even to a quasi-Protectorate. In fact, in recent times, his use of such authority was expanded. It is possible for the High Representative to influence the work of the Judiciary, the Police, the Media, etc. Toward the end of 2001, Brussels authorized the High Representative to establish a parallel government of sorts in BiH.
The Croatians are one of three Constitutive Peoples in BiH. It is true, the newly changed Election Law applied to all three Peoples. However, the changes to the Electoral Law mostly affected the Croatian People as the least numerous population group. The changes made possible that Representatives of other Peoples have an overly dominant influence on the
42 election of Representatives of another People. It is precisely at this point that the least populous People in BiH are most affected by such changes. Practically speaking, in the end, it became possible, because of those changes, for Representatives of two other Constitutive Peoples to elect Croatian Representatives to the People’s House. Added to this, the introduction of the concept of “ others” and the status given them - contrary to the rules of the EC concerning the rights of minorities, one can rightly conclude that a “fourth” Constitutive People has been added to the mix. Through this action, the position of the Majority People within the Federation of BiH was significantly increased. The Constitutive status of the Croatians as a People was also, thereby, brought into question. The result of this was that the free and democratic expression of the majority of the Croatian electorate was nullified. The chief sense of the People’s House is the protection of the collective rights of all three Constitutive Peoples in BiH. The question seems to be justified, as to whether the People’s House is in the position to truly protect the vital interests of each Constitutive People in BiH.
The make-up and role of the Croatian People’s Parliament is, in itself, a good idea. Our thinking is that it should be outside of party lines, all Croatian, a moral voice, and an advisory body. The voice and stand of all political and party lines should be heard within it, as well as that of societal, cultural, and church representatives. This body, serving as the highest morally binding agency, should serve to protect vital Croatian interests. Formed at a time of great political crisis, and without the necessary reputation preceding it, and without a reciprocal moral and authoritative profile, the Parliament was, it would seem, politicized by various political parties. The idea for such a parliament existed even prior to the crisis. However, the leading political party, at the time, did not accept its formation. The impression was that the attempt to raise actual problems from the level of partisanship to that of an all- encompassing Croatian level, by means of creating a parliament, was, in fact, too late. Perhaps, also, because of similar political and party reasons, two members of that party, in the year 2000, were opposed to the very important decision brought by the Constitutional Court of BiH, declaring that three Peoples are Constitutive across the entire territory of BiH. Furthermore, the political scenario of this crisis was similar to some extent - naturally, under different circumstances - to that of 1992. At that time, Croatian members of the Presidency, prior to Ambassador Barry’s unjust change to the Election Laws, walked out on their positions within the Presidency, the Government, and the Parliament. At that same time, they declared Croatians who remained in their positions, as for example, those in Sarajevo, to be traitors. The most powerful Croatian political party in BiH ruled in the name of the Croatian People for ten difficult years. However, despite undeniable successes in most instances, the Party brought about catastrophic conditions for Croatians in BiH - or, at least, it did not succeed in preventing them. Instead of acknowledging their joint responsibility in the matter and wishing to spread this responsibility to others, to a large degree, it resorted to creating the Croatian National Parliament. Judging by all accounts that same Party had all the strings in its own hands and directed all the important political moves within the Croatian National Parliament.
43 After a long-lasting blockade on the part of the majority of the elected Croatian Representatives, they joined the composition of the government. Croatians who received far fewer votes filled those places that rightfully belonged to those legally and legitimately elected to them. What the first group refused to accept the second group took on with open arms. One cannot blame them for this, based on the manner of action carried out by the first group. Power is both a sweet and a dangerous temptation. Having entered into the structures of the new government, the Croatians engaged in a frontal attack against their “own” without regard as to the means. One had the impression that it was more important for them that they remain in power, than that they have concern for that which is legal or legitimate.
When all is said and done, it must be said that the Croatian People suffered great blows and harm. The Croatian Community in BiH is seen - unjustifiably - as separatist, ultra-nationalistic and chauvinistic. One must recognize that such individuals do exist, to the same degree as they exist in other ethnic groups. During this grave crisis, the Croatian People received too many “yellow and red cards,” that is negative political points both domestically and on the International political scene. The view that Croatians, as a People, are uncooperative, intolerant, and unwilling to co-exist alongside other Peoples in BiH, is a baseless characterization of them as a People. A great gap was created within the Croatian People. Because of the suffering caused by the war and because of post-war injustice inflicted upon them, the Croatian People are divided among themselves. As is often the case in such instances, some members of the International Community in BiH demonstrated and proved the case of the strength of the powerful. Even though they saw their own negligence in the matter, they lacked the courage to publicly acknowledge their faults - and even less, to correct them. It would seem that they followed the old Roman maxim: divide et impera . In this instance, it became cause a quarrel, and rule . It is as though this would serve to show - through their tough stand toward those who are weakest - at least some degree of success. The Croatian politicians showed too little political sensitivity, tact, and maturity. Too little room was left to the possibility that perhaps the others might have the same goal, but wished to achieve it in some other manner, or by other means. Some decided to engage in the political battle outside of the established institutions, while others decided to participate in the government even though they did not have an electoral mandate from the people that they represented to do so. One cannot justify the absence of political will on the part of individual Croatian politicians and parties to do everything possible to build a fair picture of BiH, despite the false and unjust framework of Dayton as regards the Croatians. On the other hand, it is necessary to underline the fact that the measures taken by the High Representative of the International Community brought the Croatian People to the point where they ceased to be a political factor in BiH. Such a state cannot lead to stabilization, prosperity, or Democracy for this Nation. It is true, the return of the soldiers to their barracks and the return of the parliamentarians to the Parliament speaks to a willingness to bridge the gap within the Croatian national body and the willingness to resolve fundamental questions within the framework of the existing institutions. However, the question remains open, as to whether the present representatives of the International Community and the domestic structures of
44 authority are willing to adequately resolve the status and question of the Croatians in BiH. Fortunately, the political crisis in BiH has abated somewhat. However, it is not resolved. Much is expected of the Constitutional Court’s willingness to rule on the constitutive status of the three Peoples across all of the territory of BiH. Presently, serious political discussions are taking place regarding this matter.
The Commission for Justice and Peace of the BiH bishops’ conference sees the future of this country as a united state in which all of the three constitutional nations are equal and in which there is a guarantee that their basic and their human rights will be respected. The BiH Commission feels that the political crisis in BiH in the year 2001 sharpened the polarization at the political and at the international level. This did not help anyone - neither any of its nations, nor the state, nor the International Community.
45 4. The Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina
4.1. The history and task of IFOR
Following the signing of the General Peace Accords in Paris on December 15, 1995 after the discussions in Dayton, a multi-national force under NATO was given a mandate to implement the military aspect of the General Peace Accords, Annex 1A. They were to be known under the acronym IFOR. Their one-year mandate began on December 20, 1995. Within the framework of their mandate, the task of IFOR covered the following:
• The separation of military forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Entities, that is, those of the Bosniacs and the Croatians, and also, the Serbian Entity in Republika Srpska. This was to be accomplished by the middle of January 1996.
• The transfer of territories between the two Entities by March 1996. (The Dayton Accords foresaw that individual territories that belonged to one Entity would be transferred to the other Entity.
• The collection of heavy arms within the Entities by June 1996.
During the course of its one-year mandate, IFOR oversaw a boundary of 1,400 km dividing the Entities. It also collected some 800 pieces of heavy arms and other ordinance. They also repaired some 60 bridges and opened some 2,500 km of roadway across all of BiH. Control of the airport in Sarajevo was also undertaken by IFOR. Because of these measures, a zone of security throughout BiH was established. This made it possible for other organizations and agencies to carry out the work in the civilian sector as foreseen by the Peace Accords. Conditions were thus created for the return of normal life in BiH. Toward the end of its one- year mandate in BiH, IFOR gave impetus to the first post-war free elections in July 1996.
The military aspect and other tasks assigned to it by the mandate of the General Peace Accords were quickly and efficiently accomplished by IFOR. Their efforts were well received by the general public. After the horrors of the war, peace arrived and had to be respected. The actions undertaken by IFOR resulted in a stabilized reintegration of the areas between the Entities as well as the removal of heavy arms so as to prevent the possibility of re- igniting the flames of war.
4.2. The transformation of IFOR into SFOR
With the peaceful holding of elections in July 1996, IFOR successfully completed the military aspect of its mandate. The political situation in BiH, however, was still unstable and unsure. Following the election of July 1996, the NATO Ministers of Defense concluded that it was
46 necessary to re-organize their forces. Their intent was to widen the security zones in BiH upon expiration of the IFOR mandate in January 1996. A plan was generated to assure security within BiH, and was adopted in Paris. The Ministers of External Affairs and the Ministers of Defense of the NATO countries concluded that it was necessary to reduce the military forces, and to organize a Stabilization Force (SFOR). The mandate of SFOR began January 20, 1996. The difference between IFOR and SFOR is apparent by their very names, namely IFOR (Implementation Forces) and SFOR (Stabilization Forces). At the start of their mandate, the forces of SFOR numbered some 32,000 troops. This number was approximately one half that of IFOR. SFOR as well as IFOR operate within strict rules as approved by Article VII of the UN. The article strictly defines the use of force by them as to self-defense. Within the framework of their mandate, the primary task of SFOR is to participate in the creation of a zone of security so as to create a sustainable peace. The special tasks specific to SFOR are as follows:
• To prevent renewed hostilities, that is, fortify the advance of peace.
• To advance a climate wherein the peace process can improve.
• To assure support to civilian organizations within a framework of possibilities.
4.3. The participation of various countries in SFOR
Continuing the enforcement of the military aspect of the Peace Accords, SFOR helped implement the circle of security assuring civilian and political reconstruction. The following organizations are responsible for carrying out the civil work of the Peace Accords: The Office of the High Representative (OHR), UNIPTF, UNHCR, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and many other state and non-state organizations.
The civilian aspects of the Peace Accords are carried out by International Organizations, under the coordination of the High Representative. SFOR assisted in carrying out the important civilian portion of the Peace Accords. To achieve the goal of better efficacy, SFOR and the organizations, which are assigned the task of carrying out the civilian portion of the Peace Accords, had to have a definite plan. SFOR had to be prepared to offer support when necessary. Thus, SFOR under the umbrella of its activities supporting the carrying out of the civilian portion of the Peace Accords, had the following task:
• To guarantee the national elections in October 1998; the County elections in 1997 and those in April 2000; the special election in the Republika Srpska, held in 1997; and the general elections held in November 2000.
47 • To ensure the support of OSCE in preparing for the above mentioned elections, as well as the establishment of rules governing political parties and control over the armed forces across the territory of BiH.
• To ensure the support of the UNHCR in overseeing the conditions under which the Refugees and Exiles return to the zones of division, also the prevention of conflicts in Returnee areas.
• To promote local and other laws, in cooperation with UNIPTF, which are based on the establishing and maintenance of peace.
• To work with the authorities in BiH to establish a security rim so as to sustain the Summit Pact on Stability within Southeastern Europe which was held on July 29 and 30, l999 in Sarajevo.
• To guarantee the Security Rim for the implementation of peace in the District of Br čko, as foreseen by the Arbitrator’s Agreement of March 5, 1999 for the supervision of Br čko, by UNIPTF and UNHCR. Oversight of the demilitarized zone of the District of Br čko.
• To support the International Tribunal for War Crimes Perpetrated on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which includes the patrolling, arrest, and extradition of persons accused of War Crimes.
4.4. Conclusion
From the very start of its mandate, SFOR was actively involved in infrastructure reconstruction projects, especially in areas of Return. They repaired roads, garnered necessary supplies so as to allow for the Return process, such as food, building materials, potable water supplies, etc. The SFOR troops ensured the support of the International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP) in their task of identifying the bodies that were found in mass graves. This is but a portion of the activities carried out by SFOR, in aiding all the suffering Peoples of BiH.
The work of SFOR within the framework of the military portion under the Peace Accords is clearly defined by instruments of the United Nations. These are strictly tied to the fundamental mission of SFOR. Meanwhile, in the support offered to organizations tasked with the civilian portion of the Peace Accords, one has the impression that the interpretation of the role to be played and the tasks of SFOR vary from situation to situation. SFOR controls its own activities and gives orders by its own authority as regards the carrying out of its mandate. Because it does so, it is impossible to state clearly as to whether mistakes exist or not.
48 United Nations Resolutions by the Security Council gave SFOR the mandate of creating a circle of security within BiH. Within the framework of its mandate, SFOR is to identify potential threats, engage them and, as a military force, resolve them. Thus far, SFOR has not captured some individuals against whom international warrants for arrest have been issued, as, for example, Karadži ć or Mladi ć. SFOR has captured and delivered to The Hague, 23 persons accused of having committed war crimes, that is, persons against whom international warrants have been issued and also against individuals who support terrorists or their activities. The presence of SFOR in such unstable political and security conditions in BiH is still very necessary. SFOR is certainly one of the most successful missions of the International Community in BiH. On the other hand, it is also certain that their prestige among the populace of all three Peoples is declining. Formerly, the vast majority of the people saw SFOR as their liberators. Today, those same people see SFOR as their oppressors. No doubt SFOR’s selective approach, manner and intensity of engagement in capturing individuals accused of war crimes has contributed to this change in view. The occasional and exaggerated demonstration of force did more to irritate than to assure a sense of security. An example of this is SFOR’s disproportionate participation in the process of crossing out incriminating content in textbooks and their frequenting school buildings while fully armed. Further their forced entry into civilian structures, as, for example, County and Canton Offices, business offices and banks, is seen as a clear overstepping of their mandate.
49 5. A Special Report The Restitution of Property Seized during Communist Rule
5.1. The manner and institutionalization of expropriated property in Bosnia while a territorial unit of FNRJ and SFRJ
5.1.1. The institutionalization of expropriation of property rights in (SR) BiH and SFRJ
Particular elaboration of the rights of an individual in a totalitarian system is hardly necessary. All totalitarian systems are, in essence, directed against the basic rights of man and the individual. The system of the so-called Socialist Workers Self-management in the former Yugoslavia is, in essence, a construct of an irrational anti-theistic ideology. It mercilessly oppressed all those who did not think as they did, while, at the same time, propagating the rights of the working class.
All legitimate regimes wish, at least in a declarative sense, to be seen as Democratic. Thus during the reign of the Marxist-Collectivist “visionaries” in the former Yugoslavia, the platitude of the so-called “Democratic Centralism” came into being. 11 Those who did not think as they thought were declared to be enemies of the people. Hundreds of thousands were victims of this utopian and repressive ideology.
In view of the fact that the Communist ideology was founded upon the idea of “collective ownership,” the consequences of this policy resulted in the liquidation of “class enemies,” and the expropriation of their property. The first blow was leveled at the churches and faith communities. Party functionaries and their followers vied with each other as to who had more hatred toward believers and faith-based institutions. Along with the general repression carried out by the Communists against adherents to various churches and faith communities, the expropriation of entire properties of those who were a hindrance to the realization of their “class project” was formally institutionalized.
Even though property could be expropriated through a simple decree, the Communist Party or self-willed wielders of party power nonetheless endeavored to reduce the procedure to an institutional framework. Thus, the taking of property within Bosnia and Herzegovina as a territorial unit of the former Yugoslavia was regulated by a multitude of legal norms. These were created by the centers of national power. Such norms are as follows:
11 The mouths of tyrants were always filled with the word “democracy.” As an example, the so-called “Stalin Constitution” of 1936, formally proclaimed all human rights that could only be imagined. The heritage left behind from Stalin’s regime hardly needs to be called to mind.
50 1. The Law of Agricultural Reform and Resettlement (Sl. list DFJ, No. 64/45; Sl list FNRJ , No. 16/46, 24/46, 101/47, 105/48, 4/51, 19/51, 21/56, and 55/57; Sl. list SFRJ, No. 10/65.)
2. The Law of Agricultural Reform and Resettlement, NR BiH (Sl. list NR BiH, No. 2/46, 18/46, 20/47, 14/51, and Sl. list SFRJ, No. 10/65.)
3. The Law Governing the Agricultural Land Fund under Societal Ownership, and the Granting of Land to Agricultural Organizations (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 2/46, 18/46, 20/47, 14/51, and Sl. list SFRJ, No. 10/65.)
4. The Law Governing the Treatment of Property Abandoned by the Owners during the Occupation, and Property taken from them by the Occupiers and their Accomplices (Sl. list DFJ, No. 36/45 and 52/45; Sl list FNRJ, No. 64/46, 88/47/ 99/48, and 77/49.)
5. The Law Governing the Nationalization of Private Enterprises (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 98/46, 99/46, 35/48, 68/48, and 27/53.)
6. The Law Governing the Nationalization of Leased Properties, and Construction Sites (Sl. list FNRJ , No. 52/58, 3/59, 24/59, 24/61, and 1/63.)
7. The Fundamental Law Governing the Expropriation of Property, (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 28/47.)
8. The Fundamental Law Governing the Treatment of Expropriated and Confiscated Forest Land (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 61/46, 88/47, 106/49, and 4/51.)
9. The Law Governing the Transfer of Enemy Property to Societal Ownership, and the Sequestration of Property from Absent Landlords (Sl. list FNR, No. 63/46, and 105/46.)
10. The Law Governing Trading of Land and Buildings (Sl. list SFRJ, No. 43/65, 57/65, 17/69, and 11/74.)
11. The Law Governing the Right to Ownership of Commercial Properties and Commercial Space (Sl. list SRBiH, No. 23/79, 26/86.)
12. The Law Governing the Confiscation of Property, and the Discharge of the Act of Confiscation (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 40/45, and 61/46.)
13. The Law Governing the Need of, and the Changes and Additions to the Law on Confiscation of Property, and the Discharge of the Act of Confiscation (Sl. list FNRJ , No. 61/46.)
51 14. The Fundamental Law Governing the Use of Farmland (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 43/59, 53/62, and 10/65.)
15. The Statutes Governing Reallocation of National Farmland having National Significance (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 99/46.)
16. The Statutes Governing Property Relationships and the Reorganization of Peasant Workers’ Cooperatives (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 99/46.) 12
5.1.2. The legal foundation for the law governing expropriation from 1945 through the time of democratic change
5.1.2.1. Agrarian reform
The Agrarian Reform measures taken by the Communist Authorities immediately after World War II 13 regulated the expropriation and transfer to state ownership of the following resources:
1. Large agricultural and forest resources with total area exceeding 45 hectares, or 25-35 hectares of arable land (fields, pastures, orchards, and vineyards) 14 provided that they were tilled or maintained, that is, made use of either by lease or by hired help.
2. Land parcels which banks, businesses, shareholding societies owned, and other legal and physical persons.
3. Land parcels owned by religious communities 15
4. The excess of arable land in land parcels which is beyond that foreseen by the Law governing land maximums.
12 The nomenclature of Legal Norms taken from A Proposal for the Law Governing Restitution - a proposal with built-in amendments composed by a team of experts for the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 13 The law governing Agrarian Reform and Resettlement came into force July 23, 1945. 14 This was the maximum amount of land allowed in private ownership by an individual farmer. As the exception, the maximum land ownership allowed for monasteries and religious communities was set at 10 hectares. Should the Communist Authorities determine that a given parcel of land owned by a religious institution was historically significant, the maximum of 30 hectares was allowed. The maximum land parcel allowed to persons not farmers stood at 3 to 5 hectares of arable land. Forestland was set at 5 hectares for the same individual. When compared to other Socialist countries that introduced agrarian reforms after World War II, these land maximums were the lowest. The maximum land ownership was later “guaranteed” by the Constitution of SFRJ . 15 The socialist nomenclature did not allow the use of the concept Church , hence the term religious community was used instead. It included the Catholic Church, as well as the Serbian Orthodox Church.
52 5. The excess of arable land beyond 3-5 hectares whose owners are not farmers by trade.
6. Land parcels that during the course of the war were left without a legal owner or heir, regardless of the reason.
The process of expropriation that was carried out in keeping with the Law on Agrarian Reform and Resettlement lasted about three years and during that time in the former Yugoslavia some 1,500,000 hectares of land were expropriated.
The Law Governing the People’s General Land Fund of 1953 reduced the maximum land to be held to 10 hectares (as an exception, 15 hectares) and subsequently, some 300,000 additional hectares of land was confiscated. This land was used exclusively by the Socialist sector of agriculture.
The economic consequences of the Agrarian Reform measures taken by the former Yugoslavia including those on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina were detrimental. The land fund became very fragmented and as a result no intensive agricultural activities could be sustained. That portion of land that passed over into societal ownership following the Russian Collective Farms example was in fact left without real ownership and because it had no real owner, it was unable to produce any positive economic gain.
5.1.2.2. The reallocation of agrarian landholdings and forest resources
So as to avoid the consequences of fragmentation of landholdings, the Communist authorities carried out the process of reallocation of landholdings and forest resources at their own discretion. Reallocation of landholdings represents the expropriation of land from private landholders, with compensation, and its annexation to the societal sector, so as to “round out” that sector. Keeping in mind that in the former Yugoslavia, a government of rights was not in play, the reallocation of landholdings and resources that caught the eye of those who were in power, proved injurious to the land or resource owners.
Above and beyond the reallocation measures, the measure limiting the rights of ownership were also measures of commassation, 16 that is, the redistribution of land parcels on a “rational” basis. The goal was to group together land parcels for the building of hydroelectric objects, agricultural roads, etc. In contrast to reallocation measures, the measure of commassation could be put into motion at the request of private owners of land, as for example at the request of the majority of owners of agricultural land parcels that would be used to accomplish some agro-technical measures.
16 The laws of the Republics and the Provinces of the former Yugoslavia regulated the problems that were caused by commassation.
53 5.1.2.3. Colonization of expropriated land
Along with the above-mentioned measures, the Agrarian Reform went further, namely, the colonization of expropriated resources. The Communist Authorities took these measures for social reasons, however, they also took them for political reasons. The massive colonization of abandoned regions, was in part the consequence of the economic policies that the Government was fostering at the time. Meanwhile, these measures were largely used as an instrument that was designed to change the geopolitical picture of the state at that time. Colonization was, at the same time, an instrument of political pressure and retaliation for wartime losses. 17
The ethnic structure of the colonists for the region of SAP Vojvodina, as it existed at the time, can be an instructive example. Of the total number of colonists resettled on the abandoned parcels of land, 76.6% were Serbians, 13.3% were Montenegrins, and the remaining percentage was comprised of the leftover minorities of the former Yugoslavia. Such ethno-social policies changed the ethnic structure of this region forever. It was ruinous, and, to the detriment of the former population occupying the area.
5.1.3. The nationalization of the “expropriations of the expropriators”
Elaborating the fan-spread of measures of expropriation of private ownership carried out by the Communists in the former Yugoslavia, it is sometimes difficult to define the fundamental differences one might find from case to case. Meanwhile, in the end, all these measures achieve the same effect, for they are all the result of the same ideological foundation.
The Communists understood the term nationalization to be the forced transfer from the private domain into the public or State domain of all enterprises within a given economic field - major enterprises, that is, enterprises of a particular sort or size - with, or without compensation. With the act of nationalization, the effect of expropriation was not the only effect achieved. The enforcement of these measures prevented both legal and real persons whose property was expropriated from regaining subjective rights to the property that they lost by act of nationalization.
The ideological apologist for the regime of the time defined nationalization as an “economic- political measure” that can (but need not!) be carried out with appropriate compensation. Keep in mind that the motto representing the communist ideology was “ the dictatorship of the proletariat” . The just compensation of those individuals who were affected by expropriation of property was caught-up by this economic-political philosophy and such individuals can be said to be transformed into real proletarians. This radical measure was eagerly referred to as “the expropriation of the expropriators” by those who set themselves
17 Under the burden of these measures, some 500,000 folksdoj čers, that is, ethnic Germans, were forced to abandon their holdings in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
54 up in business as the executors of the measure. Translated, this demagogic definition of nationalization should be read as an act of expropriation of the entire capitalist class. 18
The Law Governing the Nationalization of Private Enterprises, enacted December 6, 1946 by The Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, transformed all private enterprises, ranging across 42 different industries, into State Economic Enterprises. In those instances where the nationalization of an enterprise was compensated, the owners were paid in State Obligation Bonds which had little or no real value.
5.1.4. Expropriation - a measure of expropriation in the “common interest”
Expropriation represented the confiscation of privately owned real estate. Through this Act, private property was turned into state ownership. Such measures were taken when it was “ in the common interest” and accompanied by “just compensation”.
In contrast to nationalization, compensation was given in money, while for expropriated farm resources, natural compensation came into play. If an agreement on compensation could not be reached, the Court, outside the framework of a legal suit, determined the compensation. These matters were decided upon at the Federal level 19 at first, and subsequently, by the statutes at the Republic or Provincial levels of the former State.
The extent of the established demagoguery on the part of the authorities of the time is reflected by the legal definition applied to the expropriation of only a portion of a parcel of real estate. The definition reads : “ If at the time of the expropriation of a portion of a real estate parcel it is determined that the owner does not have an economic interest in making use of the remaining portion of said real estate, that is, if, because of the expropriation, it is impossible, or essentially made difficult for the remaining portion to stand as viable, then, at his request, that portion of said real estate is also expropriated.”
5.1.5. Confiscation - sanctions for criminal acts
Confiscation also represented forced expropriation. This measure was always undertaken without compensation for the expropriated resource. In essence, it was a sanction that was pronounced matter-of-factly upon those committing a criminal act. This measure of expropriation was pronounced optionally, and could be pronounced upon a person who committed a criminal act for which at least a three-year sentence was pronounced. Even though it was defined as an inconsequential and optional sentence, often it was of a more serious nature than the main sentence. This practice was made use of to settle accounts
18 The October Revolution in the USSR was followed by extensive nationalization—not only industry, business and trade, but also landholdings were transferred entirely to State ownership. 19 The Fundamental Law on Expropriation (Sl. list FNRJ, No. 28/47).
55 with enemies of the Socialist system. Namely the Criminal Law of SFRJ foresaw the possibility of pronouncing this judgement “ for whatever criminal offence against humanity and International Law, or against the economy and unity of the Yugoslav market, as well as against the official duties of official personages within Federal bodies, or the Armed Forces of SFRJ.”
Every act of opposition to the reigning single-mindedness in Socialist Yugoslavia was defined by law as a criminal act. Included were: 1) participation in the armed forces of the enemy, 2) collaboration with the enemy, 3) counter-revolutionary acts, 4) a verbal offence, 5) revealing military or State secrets, etc. Hence, one can easily see the range of reasons for carrying out these measures of expropriation.
In light of the ease with which the governmental structures pronounced - as they determined the need - sanctions based on these criminal offences, the expropriation of private property was a convenient way of settling scores with obnoxious members of society. The confiscated property was transferred to societal ownership and the local County Officials thus had it at their disposal.
5.1.5.1. The Act of sequestration - insurance of property interests of the state
Prior to carrying out the act of confiscation of private property, an act of sequestration was carried out. This was done as “ a measure of insurance.” By virtue of this act, all or part of a piece of property of a person, which was expected to be subject to Confiscation, was sequestered. In the former Yugoslavia, this problem was regulated by a string of laws governing expropriation. 20
The essence of these measures largely demonstrates the character of the entire societal system and the make-up of the State in the former Yugoslavia. The application of these measures resulted in great prejudices against those under suspicion and against those who were subject to measures of expropriation or defamation.
This measure casts a light on all the hypocrisy of the authorities then in power, as well as the Marxist-Leninist ideology.
20 For example, “The Law Governing Confiscation of Property and the Execution of the Act of Confiscation.” The Law Governing the Transfer of Property Belonging to Enemies of the State, to Ownership of the State, and the Sequestration of Property from Absent Landowners.” The Law Governing the Approach to Resolving Property Abandoned by the Owners during the Occupation, and Property Confiscated by the Occupiers and their sympathizers” and other laws of like nature.
56 5.2. An introduction to the problem of restitution in BiH
With a wholehearted application of the above mentioned measures, the fate of hundreds of thousands of “class enemies” in the former Yugoslavia was determined on the basis of ideological, quasi-sociological standards. It is difficult to express the suffering that the greater part of the population of the former Yugoslavia passed through. The accumulated historical injustice did not relate exclusively to the loss of property. It was accompanied by systematic persecution and humiliation of all those who had an opposing belief or whose world-view could not partake in the flow of self-managed socialism.
With the fall of Communism in 1991 and with the introduction of democratic elections, the newly formed government verbally took on the task of returning confiscated properties to their former owners or their legitimate successors. A systematic reworking of The Law Governing Restitution had not yet begun on the part of the responsible bodies. Nor had this measure found its way into the procedural workings of the Parliament. Despite the urgency facing the Bosno-Herzegovinian economy in this matter it is unclear when and in what form measures of restitution will truly begin. It is abundantly clear, even to non-experts, that no just or efficacious measure of restitution can take place without strong fiscal support.
At the start of this year, a tenant in Sarajevo appealed to the Legal Advisor to Iustitie et pax. Her land was nationalized by a decision rendered in 1998, by the County Center-Sarajevo, on the basis of The Law on Nationalization from 1956. The reason given for doing so was that due to negligence at the time of an earlier act of nationalization, her property - which is located in the center of the city - was not nationalized due to an error. The complaint of the former owner of the land parcel was dismissed as being premature. The explanation given was that BiH, along with its Entities, still do not have a positive legal regulation by which such problems of Restitution might be resolved.
Rightly so, the question arises: Is the past really behind us?
5.2.1. Preliminary activities with the goal of resolving the problem of restitution
The Office of the High Representative to BiH, by virtue of his Act of August 13, 1999 - directed to the Parliament of BiH - concludes that there is consonance between the authorities and the population of BiH, as regards the suitability of executing measures of restitution for properties nationalized during the time of the previous regime. This Act defines the fundamental principles that the Parliament of BiH and the Legislative Bodies of the Entities are to observe when resolving the problem of Restitution. The text of the Act, in essence, represents the outline for The Framework for the Law on Restitution of Nationalized Properties in BiH. The Act foresees agreement among future laws governing Restitution passed by the Entities. The finding of the framework concludes that with the
57 conveying of the framework for the law, urgent measures are to be taken by the Entities to enact laws governing the problem of Restitution. (It is the duty of the Entities to incorporate these laws within six months from the day of their proclamation in the Official Gazette of BiH (Sl. glasnik BiH).
The Outline was put together in a contrived and surface manner, inasmuch as it includes acts of nationalization or expropriation as the only relevant methods of expropriation of private property. From the start, the fundamental principles upon which the Framework Outline is based contains essential discriminatory signs relating to the future process governing expropriation cases. This is apparent in that it protects the existing status of legal subjects who are making use of the expropriated property and excludes in advance the former owners from the process of natural restitution - a method that is allegedly preferred as the method of Restitution. Recognizing the full difficulty of the problem, and the unavoidable fact of negative implications to the entire economic, social, and political milieu , the Representative of the International Community in BiH significantly endeavor to retard the process of formulating and executing laws on Restitution.
5.2.1.1. A brief review: The law on restitution - a proposal with “built-in amendments”
A team of experts for the Government of BiH formulated A Proposal for the Law on Restitution with built in amendments in December 1999. The proposal was to be the basis for consideration by the legislative bodies of this Entity. To this day, nothing has been done to bring this law into existence. Time will tell what sort of legal solutions will be enacted and also whether they will succeed in reconciling the imperative demanding justice, on the one hand, and the chronic lack of funds in the National Budget of BiH, on the other hand.
In view of the fact that the matter is very complex and sensitive, a long and sharp parliamentary debate is expected. The extensive efforts taken by those who have enriched themselves at the expense of others under the former national authority in order to thwart such a law will be seen soon enough. The fact that too many such individuals are still present in all spheres of society, makes resolution of the already heavy atmosphere created by the problem of Restitution all the more urgent.
5.2.1.2. Fundamental provisions for The Proposal for a Law on Restitution in the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Law on Restitution in FBiH should - as intended by its authors - comprise a consistent whole with an entire set of enacted laws regarding privatization. In view of the fact that the issue is complex, the expert team for the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina composed a fair copy outlining the matter. This will become in all likelihood the
58 basis of parliamentary debate and a framework for the procedures of enacting the future law governing Restitution in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here in below, we will offer a brief analysis of this proposal.
With the Proposal for Restitution in FBiH , the principles, format, subject, manner of and approach to the problem of restitution are regulated. This law defines restitution as the return of property and rights to their former owners (legal and real persons) that were taken from them on the basis of coercive ordinances 21 as well as the granting of compensation for confiscated properties and material resources.
5.2.2. Subjects of restitution
The right to restitution belongs to former owners whose property was confiscated without foundation or with baseless legal action under duress or fraud on the part of representatives of the State.
The proposal listed those authorized for restitution: 1. Real persons. In the event they died, their spouses, their blood relatives, as well as brothers and sisters, and their children.
2. Religious communities, or organizations who have standing as legal persons.
3. Associations of citizens and other legal persons, that is, their legal adherents. The right to restitution of confiscated property, in the meanwhile, would not be given to former owners to whom a just compensation was paid, or to whom other rights or things of value were given in exchange. Article 5, Paragraph 2 of the Proposal for a Law of Restitution presumes that the compensation given was just, as long as said compensation was determined on the basis of the law wherein it was defined by the term “just.” This legal resolution of such matters is very problematic and undesirable for former owners of confiscated property. I think that the fairest legal solution would be if the right to restitution would be granted to all persons to whom an equivalent value in compensation was not given for the confiscated property or rights. Naturally, the compensation would be equivalent to the ensuing loss. Paragraph 3 of the above mentioned Article would deny restitution to those persons from whom property or rights were confiscated “on the basis of a judgement for a crime committed, which, by International Conventions, represents a War Crime”. Keeping in mind the ease with which the former authorities passed defamatory judgements. They readily accused persons of having committed War Crimes. Also, keeping in mind that processes of rehabilitation were not undertaken after the fall of Communism in BiH, I think that this decision does not contribute much to the realization of the principles of Justice.
21 The Ordinances governing confiscation of property referred to in a previous section of this Report that are relevant to the process of Restitution. ”The Mode and Institutionalization of the Confiscation of Property in BiH, as a territorial unit of FNRJ-SFRJ.” Our thinking is that this list is incomplete for it fails to list some laws that are of fundamental importance as relates to the institutionalization of property confiscation.
59 Considering that those who proposed the measures for restitution and who defined the regulations governing exclusion from restitution did not use the expression “ judgement of the court ”, but rather used the expression “ judgement ”. All sorts of decrees and decisions enacted by various bodies that represented centers of power in the former nation could thereby be rehabilitated. It cannot be said of them that they acted on the basis of legal principles, not to mention on the basis of other democratic categories.
For foreign persons, legal or real, the right to restitution was regulated based on the principle of reciprocity. Persons who were compensated for expropriated property on the basis of International Treaties also would not have the right to restitution which would be the logical solution.
According to the Proposal for a Law on Restitution, the right to restitution would be held by legal successors of legal persons whose property was transferred to the State or to societal ownership. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is named to bear the obligation of monetary restitution. One needs to take into consideration that we are speaking of an Entity- based law that needs to be brought into harmony with the corresponding law of BiH, when adopted, and that yet needs to be adopted by the Parliament of BiH. A person who, on the day of adoption of this law, would be in possession of the property covered by the law of restitution would be considered to be the natural one to be obligated.
5.2.3. The form and manner of realizing restitution
The proposal for Property Law foresees the following forms of restitution:
1. Natural Restitution - the return of property to its former owner, as well as the confirmation of the co-owner's portion and the owner's share. The property would be returned in the condition it is in at the time of the enactment of the Law. In the event the property's value has significantly increased from the time of its expropriation, it is permitted that the former owner receive his share of the increased value to the extent that this is possible without causing damage to the property to be returned.
2. Compensation - confirmation of the limit of the damages sought by the former owner toward the obligated party on the basis of the value of the property to be returned. It is to be expressed in KM in the form of certificates that could be used to buy businesses and shares in a business. It could also be used to buy apartments and the like. 22 With regard to the fiscal liquidity of the State and its businesses, this version of compensation will not have real value in the foreseeable future. 23 If a property covered by the law of restitution is in the ownership of a third party and that party gained ownership on the basis of valid
22 When defining this form of restitution, the one propounding it did not keep in mind that Banking Institutions, wherein the damages sought could be deposited by citizens, were abolished. 23 The value of Certificates can serve us as an example: At present, their value stands at 1.5% of their nominal value.
60 obligation, then the person, who gained the property without obligation and later received compensation for its transfer, is considered to be obligated to provide compensation.
3. By Agreement of the Parties - the Law keeps this possibility open up to the moment of a legal decision regarding the restitution.
The imprecision of this decision leaves open the possibility of discretionary evaluation of the matter and room for manipulation without any particular criteria governing restitution!
As we can see, the former owners of property will achieve their rights under very undesirable conditions with the enactment of this Proposal. The Proposal does not foresee monetary compensation for confiscated resources for which natural restitution is no longer possible. Of particular difficulty is the restitution of real estate. Real estate, to a large degree, will be the matter under consideration by this Proposal.
The Proposal foresees an undesirable “compensation” in place of natural restitution of real estate, for the following reasons:
1. The work of particular organizations would be made difficult under the Proposal's requirement of restitution of real estate, such as: governmental bodies, health-care facilities, schools, places of higher education, science or culture.
2. At the request of a business firm, when the restitution of buildings or spaces occupied by the business would endanger the continued operation of the business. 24
3. With the return of farmland, to the extent that the operation of the farm would suffer significantly or the work of the holder of the land would be made difficult, compensation, instead of natural restitution, would be given also at the request of the holder of the farm property.
4. With the return of forests or forestland, if the return of said land would significantly endanger the stewardship of the complex, also at the request of the holder of the property.
5. With the return of a developed construction site, as well as those sites parceled-out for construction up to the very time the Law on Restitution takes effect.
For those entitled to restitution, the legal solution offered for restitution of goods is undesirable. The solution is somewhat mitigated by the directive that gives the owner whose
24 In the event that such burdensome conditions do not exist, and that the building is leased to a third party, the building or business space does not return to the owner. In such cases, the person leasing the property is obligated to the owner. The lease relationship ceases within one year from the day the law takes effect.
61 property was confiscated priority over other persons in receiving shares or co-owner privileges from the party in possession of the property, that is the party who last was entitled to make use of it.
In an attempt at solving the problems surrounding restitution of apartments covered by dweller's rights for social reasons, the advocate of the changes to the law decided to protect the rights of those dwelling in the units by granting them the right to lease them. This would apply to those living in apartments now owned by the City or State. This right would assure that the person covered by tenant's rights and his spouse would have lifetime right to live in the apartment covered by the law of restitution. This right, according to The Proposal for a Law on Restitution, could not be transferred to a third party - including members of the immediate family. The apartment would be returned to the former owner. However, he is obligated to grant a lease to the bearer of tenant's rights and to his spouse to live in the apartment for life. A separate law would regulate such leases. Inasmuch as the owner of the apartment would wish to sell the apartment, he would be bound to give first-offer rights to the tenant under lease. Interpreting this formulation of the law proposed as a legal solution, the spouse of the bearer of the right to possession of the apartment would not have first-offer rights to purchase the apartment. The author of The Proposal for a Law on Restitution resolves the problem of restitution of real estate that has cultural, artistic, or historical significance in Solomon-like fashion. He keeps in mind that the protection and preservation of cultural and historical resources is in the interest of the common good. To the extent that such objects are an integral part of museum collections, galleries, and similar institutions, the property is returned to the former owner - however, not placed in his possession. Meanwhile, to the extent the rightful owner has the means to care for and present to public view such objects, the goods could be returned to him. The conditions under which one may keep such goods would also come under a special law. The possibility is left standing that, at the request of the former owner, just compensation could be made in place of returning the property to him.
5.3. Legal solutions which limit the rights of lawful owners with the goal of protecting the common good and the position of religious communities
As can be clearly seen from all that was stated above, the initiator of The Proposal for a Law on Restitution looking for a solution to this problem, demonstrates a clear conformist tendency. In view of the difficult economic and social conditions facing Bosnia and Herzegovina, this is entirely understandable. The Nation, as a poverty stricken Restitution Debtor, wishes to assume as few obligations as possible. In doing so, the Nation wishes to maintain some semblance of social stability and fiscal liquidity.
Meanwhile, some particular solutions being offered are incompatible with the principles upon which modern democratic nations found their market economy - the direction, at least, that this Nation declares to be its goal.
62 As a relic of past times, the intention of retaining state monopoly over particular profitable jurisdictions remains. To the extent the State has the will to return the unjustly confiscated property of others, it must first be consistent in recognizing the problem. Next, the State must be prepared to assume the obligation of equivalent compensation - even if that would mean that the State would have to assume a long-range debt obligation.
The above-mentioned Proposal for a Law on Restitution does not take into consideration the lost-profit factor (lucrum cessans), which is the result of institutionalized expropriation, nor the pain, suffering, and poverty that resulted from the brutal and callous act of expropriation. Hence, it is incomprehensible that solutions are offered such as the one covered by Article 17 . The aim of this article is to attempt to prevent the return of real estate that is an integral part of infrastructure, namely, energy producing objects, watersheds, municipal utilities, roadways and the like. Even though the former owners - pro forma, at least - are given first- right-to-buy preference in the purchase of shares, or the right of co-ownership with the party now in possession of the property, it is clear that this will not be possible based on the solutions offered in the proposal. This is so because the State has excluded such real estate jurisdictions from the privatization process. Besides, as a counter-value to the property that was confiscated, most frequently only a fictive "compensation" is being offered - in such manner that compensation will not be given even for the actual damages (damnum emergens) done to the owner.
A particular problem with the Proposal is the exclusion from the right of compensation of “former owners from whom property or rights have been confiscated, and who have received “just compensation ”, or to whom other goods or rights were given in exchange of their property.” 25 A resolution in law that states what compensation is to be considered just, is defined on the basis of the very same law by which property was confiscated, and as such, is unacceptable. The former Authorities most often compensated owners for their property by giving them worthless Government Bonds, or some symbolic compensation. According to the Proposal, both real and legal persons who come under this regulation would, once again, be short-changed.
It is entirely certain that the process of restitution will stagnate in the procedural sphere. Taking into consideration the strength of the legal Nation and “the rule of rights” in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can project in advance problems which will arise with the attempt to realize rights - already lame, at best, that are being offered as restitution to former owners. According to The Proposed Law on Restitution, legal action must be initiated by the plaintiff within 120 days of the Law being put into effect. The body responsible for the case is bound to deliver an adequate solution within 60 days from the day the legal action was taken. One cannot be convinced that this time frame can be met by the Administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if one bears in mind the scope and complexity of the matter.
25 Article 5, Paragraph 1 , A Proposal for a Law on Restitution.
63 Regretfully, standards that carry over from times past, continue to be in place throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and are found to be universally acceptable. All activities of a Democratic nation should be geared toward the realization of Freedom and toward an affirmation of each individual in society. As we have seen, many regulations in the Proposal are not aimed in that direction. In instances when it is impossible to make natural restitution, the State - which made use of the property for many years - would finally have to give just compensation to those who suffered damage because of confiscation. The compensation should be proportional to the market value of that property at the time of its expropriation.
On principle, it is unacceptable to once again deny the same rights confiscated previously. The protection of the State does not automatically result in protection of the common good. The denial of rights to legal and real persons, using the common good as an excuse, does not lead society toward general progress. To the extent the solutions offered to solve the problem of restitution are adopted, the present authorities, if they wish to be consistent, must keep in mind that the action of Religious Communities is also of interest to the common good. As a result, the Religious Communities should receive a special status on the basis of the regulations, which would give a modicum, at least, of satisfaction for the wrongs suffered and for the humiliation heaped upon them. The Religious Communities and Churches of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the meanwhile, are not seeking any sort of privileged position relating to the measures taken toward restitution. Their only aim is to achieve a legal status that would guarantee them to have rights equal to all others in the process of restitution. Party activist Authorities in the former Yugoslavia went out of their way to tread on the rights of Believers, most especially Church Pastors. As a result of a decades-long assault on religion, a collapse in the moral structures of society took place. With the collapse of the former State, this moral decay bore fruit in the form of a bestial war. The Faith Communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina have the obligation and responsibility of fostering a culture of peace, tolerance, and social justice. For this reason, it is necessary that this be made possible.
The State Authorities have the obligation and burden of correcting the historical injustices brought on by the Communist rule. Restitution is the obligation of the State. It took upon itself this obligation when it assumed the International role as the Successor State of the former SR BiH. This role also extends from the Dayton Constitution for BiH, which guarantees all rights and freedoms based on the standards outlined in the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms and all its associated protocols. 26
The return, or the just compensation for expropriated property to its former owners would mean, not only the return of material goods taken from them, but also the moral satisfaction for suffering and humiliation endured while in the grist mill of socialistic totalitarianism.
From all that was said above, and because of the objective difficulties surrounding the act of restitution, it would be most appropriate for the obligated party to establish consistently
26 Article II, annex 4, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
64 positive regulations based on principles of justice when returning confiscated property. In cases where it is still possible to return such property, the method of doing so should be one of natural restitution along with the eventual possibility of natural compensation, as well.
Unreasonable insistence on urgent payment of just compensation for property that was expropriated would bring this Nation to a state of complete chaos and collapse. This would be in no one's interest.
6. Sources
I. Nevenko Herceg and Zoran Tomi ć: Elections and the Election Campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the year 2000. University of Mostar-Center for the Study of the Press, Mostar, 2000, pp. 85-90, 117-138, 146-155.
II. The Daily and Weekly Press: Slobodna Dalmacija, BH Dani, and Dnevni Avaz.
III. OHR: Priorities for 2001. Recommendations of the Administrative Committees of organizations concerned with questions of Human Rights and the Working Group for the Protection of Human Rights.
65
66 KOMISIJA “JUSTITIA ET PAX” ET “JUSTITIA KOMISIJA BISKUPSKA KONFERENCIJA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE I BOSNE KONFERENCIJA BISKUPSKA
67 68 Sadržaj
Umjesto uvoda 71
1. Prioritetni zadaci za 2001. godinu u rješavanju problema ljudskih prava u BiH po mišljenju Me ñunarodne zajednice 72
2. Stanje ljudskih prava u BiH 2001. godine 79
2.1. Socijalna slika 79
2.2. Normativno - administrativni kaos u Bosni i Hercegovini 80
2.3. Problemi u pravosu ñu 82
2.4. Šutnja administracije 83
2.5. Implementacija Anex-a 7 Dyjtonskog sporazuma ili kršenje prava na povratak 85
2.6. Kršenje Ustavom zagarantiranih prava na slobodno vjersko uvjerenje i slobodu ispovijedanja vjere 86
2.7. Obrazovanje 87
2.8. Stanje u oblasti sredstava javnog priop ćavanja 88
3. Politi čka kriza u BiH 90
4. SFOR (Stabilization Forces) u Bosni i Hercegovini 98
5. Specijalno izvješ će - restitucija imovine oduzete tijekom komunisti čke vladavine 102
6. Izvori i literatura 115
69 70 Umjesto uvoda
Svi ljudi su stvorenja Božja i zato su u svome ljudskom dostojanstvu pred Bogom jednaki. On ih sve voli na njemu svojstven na čin i želi da se svi spase. (Usp. 1 Tim 2,4)
Snagom svoga ljudskog dostojanstva svi ljudi imaju jednako pravo na temeljna ljudska prava koja su definirana u razli čitim svjetskim pravnim poveljama i deklaracijama. Zaštitu i unapre ñenje temeljnih ljudskih prava Katoli čka crkva je prepoznala kao sastavni dio svoga poslanja naviještanja Kraljevstva Božjega me ñu ljudima. Upravo zato je to i sržni smisao postojanja i djelovanja preko 30 europskih Komisija Justtitia et pax (Pravda i mir), me ñu kojima je kao punopravna članica i Komisija Biskupske konferencije Bosne i Hercegovine (BK BiH). Kao i sve druge tako i naša Komisija ima za cilj promicati pravdu i mir prema na čelima Evan ñelja i društvenog nauka Crkve.
U tom duhu i s tim ciljem naša Komisija je pripremila ovo Izvješ će o stanju ljudskih prava u Bosni i Hercegovini za 2001. Svjesni svojih malih mogu ćnosti, nudimo Vam naš pogled na stanje u socijalnom, pravnom, koji je izuzetno složen, pravosudnom, obrazovnom i medijskom podru čju. Pored toga nudimo prioritete me ñunarodne zajednice, čiji predstavnici imaju zadnju riječ o svemu u BiH, te naše vi ñenje politi čke krize u 2001. i pogled na ulogu i djelovanje SFORA u BiH kao pokazatelja okruženja primicanja ili osporavanja ljudskih prava. I pored ozbiljnosti drugih tema – konstitutivnost naroda, ustavno rješenje BiH i drugo-, ove godine u specijalnome izvješ ću fokusiramo se na problem restitucije u BiH kao vrlo važno pitanje. Našim pogledima želimo upoznati doma ću i svjetsku javnost na neke akutne probleme vezane uz temeljna ljudska prava.
Zahvalni svima koji se trude oko istinskog promicanja temeljnih ljudskih prava u ovoj napa ćenoj zemlji, poti čemo na još ve će zauzimanje za ista, što je i osnovni cilj našeg Izvješ ća.
71 1. Prioritetni zadaci za 2001. godinu u rješavanju problema ljudskih prava u BiH po mišljenju Me ñunarodne zajednice
Slijedom dosadašnje prakse predstavnici me ñunarodne zajednice u BiH su postavili prioritetne zadatke u oblasti ljudskih prava za 2001. godinu. Smatramo potrebnim najprije predstaviti ciljeve me ñunarodne zajednice u ovom izvješ ću, kako bi se i iz njihove perspektive još bolje uo čili odre ñeni problemi, koji mu če ovu zemlju: 27
1.1. Povratak izbjeglica i raseljenih osoba:
• Uskladiti zakone koji reguliraju ulazak u posjed imovine (Zakon o stambenim odnosima, Zakon o privatizaciji i Zakoni o prestanku primjene Zakona o napuštenim stanovima), a zatim izmijeniti i dopuniti kako bi se uspostavio dosljedan sustav povrata imovine u kojem ne će biti diskriminacije; • Podržati strukturu RRTF-a (Radna grupa za povratak i rekonstrukciju) i PLIP-a (Plan za implementaciju imovinskih zakona) koja dobro funkcionira i kojoj podršku daju organizacije koje imaju svoje predstavnike na terenu, kako bi se nadgledao i garantirao zajedni čki pristup i politika u vezi s implementacijom imovinskih zakona i kako bi se koordinirale strategije povratka i financiranje; • Uspostaviti funkcionalan sustav za razmjenu informacija o povratu imovine izme ñu stambenih organa vlasti i OMI-ja kako bi se sprije čilo višestruko korištenje stambenih jedinica; • Provesti sve odluke CRPC-a (Komisija za povrat imovine izbjeglih i raseljenih osoba), u skladu sa zakonima o provo ñenju CRPC odluka; • Završiti proces urgentnog izdavanja rješenja i deložacija višestrukih korisnika; • Izdavati rješenja kronološkim redom; • Identificirati i osigurati alternativni smještaj (putem budžetskih sredstava) od strane lokalnih organa vlasti; • Provesti sve odluke u zakonski definiranim rokovima, čak i u slu čaju da organi vlasti ne osiguraju alternativni smještaj; • Osigurati transparentnost procedura za nadovjeru ugovora koji se odnose na stanove za koje nije podnesen zahtjev za povrat; • Izraditi Projekt kvalitetnog rukovo ñenja u oblasti upravnog i financijskog sektora, u suradnji sa OESS-ovim (Organizacija za europsku sigurnost i suradnju) Odjelom za demokratizaciju, kako bi se osigurala odgovornost lokalnih organa vlasti koji rješavaju imovinska pitanja (osiguravanje budžetskih sredstava za alternativni smještaj, ve ća efikasnost u implementaciji imovinskih zakona);
27 Vidi: “Ljudska prava u Bosni i Hercegovini, prioriteti za 2001. godinu”, Preporuke Upravnog odbora organizacija koje se bave pitanjima ljudskih prava Radnoj grupi za zaštitu ljudskih prava, (5. velja če 2001. godine)
72 • Preventivne mjere : Mora se izvršiti pritisak na lokalne policijske organe, posebno u osjetljivim podru čjima povratka, da provedu operativne planove u cilju pove ćanja prisutnosti policije da bi se pružila zaštita od mogu ćeg nasilja u vezi s povratkom. Prioritet će se dati pra ćenju implementacije tih planova; • Angažiranje javnih tužitelja : Intervenirat će se kod javnih tužitelja koji su obvezni pokrenuti istražni postupak vezan za ozbiljna kaznena djela; • Kaznena istraga : Posebna pažnja će se posvetiti slu čajevima u kojima lokalni dužnosnici pokušavaju ograni čiti sankcije protiv po činitelja kaznenih djela pokretanjem prekršajnih postupaka (umjesto kaznenih); • Kazneno gonjenje i odgovaraju će kažnjavanje privremenih korisnika koji otu ñuju imovinu iz stanova; • Sustavno prikupljanje informacija o slu čajevima nasilja u vezi s povratkom (RRV) s obzirom da oni imaju negativan utjecaj na proces povratka. Ovaj statisti čki materijal se treba izraditi i koristiti prilikom kontakta s dužnosnicima za provo ñenje zakona koji neefikasno obra ñuju probleme u vezi s vladavinom zakona; • Pove ćati pra ćenje na terenu mjera koje poduzima lokalna policija u vezi sa RRV i kršenjem imovinskih zakona, uklju čuju ći otu ñenje imovine. Kada se zvani čno objave rezultati ponovne registracije, izraditi regionalni pregled raseljenih osoba i tabelu prognanika za problemati čna podru čja po pitanju imovine/održivog povratka; • Disciplinski postupak i sankcije me ñunarodne zajednice protiv šefova policije i policajaca : Pove ćati broj smjenjivanja s dužnosti opstrukcionisti čkih ili neefikasnih policajaca, oduzimanja potvrde za rad policajcima i izdavanja rješenja o nepoštivanju pravila dužnosti policajaca. Maksimalno korištenje institucije tužitelja za interne disciplinske mjere i disciplinske komisije, uz pra ćenje me ñunarodne zajednice, uklju čuju ći zloupotrebu imovine; • Žalbe protiv javnih tužitelja i sudaca : Podnijeti izvješ ća o ponašanju pojedinih tužitelja ili sudaca odgovaraju ćem vije ću za provjeru; • Osigurati prikupljanje informacija preko Centara za pravnu pomo ć koje podržava UNHCR i ureda ombudsmena; • Unaprijediti razmjenu informacija s entitetskim ministarstvima i izme ñu njih; • Izvršiti financijsku kontrolu u poduze ćima odabranim da posluže kao primjer kako bi se ocijenila njihova kadrovska politika i ustanovilo postoje li bilo kakvi diskriminacijski dokumenti. Potrebne su sljede će aktivnosti: 1. Osigurati sredstva za zapošljavanje profesionalnih revizora (uz pomo ć OHR-ovog odjela za borbu protiv korupcije) ili identificirati implementiraju će agencije unutar me ñunarodne zajednice, 2. dobiti dozvolu za izvršavanje revizorske kontrole od odgovaraju ćih organa vlasti i poduze ća, 3. nadgledati projekt i 4. ocijeniti rezultate; • Uklju čiti donatore i OHR-ov Ekonomski odjel u razgovor o korištenju uvjetovanosti investicija radi promidžbe pravednih na čela zapošljavanja povratnika prije ulaganja; • Javno objaviti politiku me ñunarodne zajednice i o čekivanja u vezi sa zapošljavanjem povratnika, na primjer preko objavljivanja izjava za tisak;
73 • Nadgledati rad komisija za implementaciju odgovaraju ćih članaka radnog zakonodavstva (članak 143. u federalnom zakonu i članak 152. u Zakonu Republike Srpske); • Ocijeniti implementaciju Sporazuma o me ñusobnim pravima i obvezama u implementaciji mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja i njegov utjecaj na isplatu mirovina preko me ñuentitetske linije razgrani čenja i izme ñu podru čja koje pokrivaju mirovinski fondovi unutar Federacije; • Analizirati postoje će pravne okvire i izraditi, zajedno s Ekonomskim odjelom, politiku kojom bi se osigurala isplata mirovina na mjestu boravka pojedinca; • Raditi s Ekonomskim odjelom OHR-a na uspostavi mehanizama za transfer sredstava , u ovom slu čaju za mirovine, preko me ñuentitetske linije razgrani čenja; • Procijeniti problem pristupa zdravstvu za razli čite kategorije stanovništva; • Izvršiti pregled postoje ćeg zakonskog okvira i odrediti strategiju kojom će se osigurati zdravstveno pokri će bez obzira na mjesto prebivališta (entitet/kanton) i lokalitet mirovinskog fonda; • Uspostaviti mehanizam prijenosa sredstava iz Zavoda za zdravstveno osiguranje (u koje se upla ćuje doprinos za zdravstveno osiguranje) u bilo koju instituciju zdravstvene zaštite u BiH. • Osigurati da op ćine u primjeni zakonskih propisa o zdravstvenoj zaštiti pružaju istu na ravnopravnim osnovama; • Zajedni čki pratiti napredak u oblasti reforme udžbenika i realizacije me ñuentitetskog Sporazuma o obrazovanju od 10. svibnja 2000; • Prikupiti informacije tijekom 2001. godine u vezi s djecom i nastavnim kadrom iz reda manjinskog naroda; • Dati što ve će zna čenje pitanju obrazovanja na razini politi čkih struktura OHR-a; • Pripremiti moderan zakonski okvir za osnovno i srednje obrazovanje na temelju standarda Europske unije; • Promovirati usvajanje modernog zakonskog okvira za visoko obrazovanje; • Podržati modernizaciju i racionalizaciju sadašnjeg sustava na osnovu Bolonjske deklaracije, koriste ći se pritom mogu ćnostima regionalnog razvoja koje pruža Pakt stabilnosti, kao i instrumenti Europske unije za razvoj i suradnju.
1.2. Reforma policije i sudstva:
• Zakonodavna reforma - neprihvatljiva odlaganja unutar pravnog sustava u vezi sa svim fazama pravnog procesa (od prvih policijskih istraga, podizanja optužbi do sudskih saslušanja) trebala bi se rješavati putem revizije kaznenih zakona i kaznenih postupaka u RS-u i Federaciji. Propust zakonskog sustava u pogledu brzog rješavanja takvih slu čajeva direktno se odražava na slu čajeve kršenja prava na povratak. Zato je potreban koherentan i konsolidiran pristup ovom pitanju; taj nedostatak bi se trebao prioritetno rješavati u okviru sudske reforme. Reforma sudskih postupaka, promoviranje definiranja jedinstvenih procesnih sudskih
74 smjernica, pravilnika, itd., ja čanje uloge javnih tužitelja, slabljenje uloge i funkcije istražnih sudaca, uz obuku sudaca, tužitelja i odvjetnika putem Vije ća Europe, doma ćeg Odbora za trening i IJC; • Ubrzati reformu sudskog sustava i kaznenih i gra ñanskih postupaka u skladu sa zaklju čcima i preporukama iz finalnih tematskih izvješ ća JSAP-a, putem nastojanja IJC-a, uz naro čitu pažnju posve ćenu poboljšanju rada sudaca i tužitelja, uz smanjenje odlaganja i neefikasnosti sudskog sustava i unapre ñenje reforme kaznenog i gra ñanskog postupka; • Uspostaviti institucije za obuku koje će pružiti, izme ñu ostalog, prakti čnu obuku budu ćih i postoje ćih sudaca i tužitelja, te cjelovitu, konstantnu pravnu edukaciju pravnika. Sa stajališta ljudskih prava, institucije za obuku bi trebale pružiti obuku u oblasti sudske administracije i vo ñenja i okon čanja predmeta, u cilju poboljšanja sudske ekonomi čnosti i smanjenja perioda odgoda, kao i neefikasnosti unutar sudskog sustava; • Promovirati depolitizaciju policije uspostavljanjem funkcije policijskog komesara u svakom ministarstvu unutrašnjih poslova; • Izvršiti pritisak na policijske organe u pravcu ujedinjenja etni čki podijeljenih policijskih uprava; • Izvršiti pritisak na lokalne organe u pravcu poboljšanja i ja čanja mehanizama unutrašnje kontrole; • Izvršiti pritisak na lokalne organe u pravcu reforme procedura uhi ćenja i pritvaranja, kao i pretresa; • Kontinuiran rad s dužnosnicima lokalne policije u Federaciji i RS-u u pravcu reforme i poboljšanja procedura uhi ćenja i pritvora. • Sudska administracija . Sa stajališta ljudskih prava, institucije za sudsku obuku će pružiti trening iz oblasti sudske administracije i vo ñenja i zaklju čivanja slu čajeva, u cilju poboljšanja sudske ekonomi čnosti i smanjenje perioda odga ñanja i neefikasnosti unutar sudskog sustava; • Seminari/obuka za sudce, tužitelje i policiju . Me ñunarodna zajednica podržava i poti če inicijative Vije ća Europe, doma ćeg Odbora za obuku, UNMIBH-a i Neovisne sudske komisije. Obuka bi se trebala osobito usmjeriti na pitanje istraga i postupaka u svezi s povratkom.
1.3. Izgradnja kapaciteta doma ćih institucija za ljudska prava:
• Izraditi zakon o ujedinjenju Doma za ljudska prava i Ustavnog suda BiH na osnovu Izvješ ća usvojenog od strane Venecijanske komisije u 2000. godini; • Unaprijediti suradnju izme ñu agenata i doma ćih organa vlasti putem odgovaraju ćeg financiranja, politi čke podrške i održive integracije agenata u strukture vlade BiH; • Osigurati odgovaraju će financiranje od strane države za institucije iz Aneksa 6 i 7, u minimalnom iznosu od 600.000 KM za svaku instituciju, odnosno za BH
75 ombudsmene, Dom za ljudska prava i CRPC, u skladu s dokumentima za prijem u Vije će Europe i "Road Map" Europske Unije, te pla ćanje neispla ćenih iznosa; • Osigurati odgovaraju će kadrove za institucije iz Aneksa 6 i 7 , što se posebno odnosi na mjesto arhivara Doma za ljudska prava, i osigurati odgovaraju ći prostor za Dom kako bi isti mogao obavljati svoje aktivnosti; • Osigurati odgovaraju će financiranje entitetskih institucija ombudsmena putem integriranja budžeta za institucije u entitetske budžete za 2001. godinu; prihva ćanje neophodne minimalne strukture i op će strukture institucija putem Memoranduma o razumijevanju s OESS-om; • Podržati preimenovanje ombudsmena RS koji trenutno obavljaju ovu dužnost, te imenovanje kvalificiranih kandidata u Federaciji; • Osigurati prijevod i objavljivanje Op ćeg okvirnog sporazuma za mir u BiH (Dayton) u službenim glasilima BiH , posebno Sporazuma o zaštiti ljudskih prava (Aneks 6) i statusa me ñunarodnih mehanizama za zaštitu ljudskih prava u BiH (Aneks 4). • Posti ći procent implementacije od preko 90% i za odluke Doma za ljudska prava i odluke BiH ombudsmena, što uklju čuje OHR-ov i OESS-ov aktivni monitoring procesa implementacije zajedno s agentima tri vlade, putem redovnih kontakata i sastanaka s agentima; • Nastaviti s podrškom od strane drugih me ñunarodnih organizacija , posebno UNMIBH-a i IJC-a, u procesu implementacije. • Ministarstvo za ljudska prava i izbjeglice treba predsjedavati sastancima na temu implementacije imovinskih zakona na kojima sudjeluju i predstavnici me ñunarodne zajednice i resorna entitetska ministarstva koja su nadležna za implementaciju. • Uloga Ministarstva za ljudska prava i izbjeglice u procesu povratka će se morati poja čati tijekom 2001. godine . Ovo Ministarstvo može odigrati važnu ulogu u omogu ćavanju razmjene informacija me ñu entitetima u vezi s povratkom raseljenih osoba i implementacijom imovinskih zakona. Tako ñer će se razgovarati i o Protokolu izme ñu OHR-a, UNHCR-a, Ministarstva za ljudska prava i izbjeglice i entitetskih ministarstava o prioritetima povratka i rekonstrukcije za 2001. godinu. • Promoviranje angažmana doma ćih centara za pravnu pomo ć (koje trenutno podržava UNHCR) i doma ćih ne vladinih organizacija u svim aktivnostima na pra ćenju i reformi, kako bi centri i NVO postali dugoročno održivi. Potrebna je obuka i financijska podrška; • Promoviranje donošenja bh Zakona o udruživanju i fondacijama i dva sli čna zakona u Federaciji i RS-u. Zakonska procedura još uvijek uveliko ovisi o doma ćim parlamentima; • Pra ćenje op ćih okvirnih zakona od kojih se ne o čekuje da pokriju sve pravne probleme i ograni čenja s kojima se suo čavaju ne vladine organizacije. Ovo se posebno odnosi na financijske aspekte, kao sto su porezi i carine, a koji imaju snažan efekt na održivost ne vladinih organizacija u BiH.
76 • Izvršiti pritisak na lokalne organe vlasti da otvore centre i da zaštite žrtve trgovine ljudima , kako bi takve osobe mogle svjedo čiti protiv onih koji se bave trgovinom ljudima; • Pružiti pomo ć Vladinim Ministarstvima i ne-vladinim organizacijama u rješavanju pitanja koja su u okviru njihove nadležnosti prema doma ćem planu rada; • Izvršiti pritisak na doma će organe vlasti da ubrzaju kazneni postupak u slu čajevima trgovine ljudima . • Nadležni organi moraju pružiti informacije o svim nestalim osobama, u skladu sa svojim obvezama prema Daytonskom mirovnom sporazumu, i to Aneksu 7, članak V. • Organi vlasti moraju osigurati da dovoljno sredstava bude dodijeljeno Komisiji za traženje nestalih osoba, kao i sudovima, kako bi mogli nastaviti s realizacijom Me ñuentitetskog programa ekshumacija.
1.4. Osobni integritet zvani čnika:
• Podvrgavanje postupku provjere podobnosti onih policajaca koji ne poštuju imovinske zakone; • Odlu čno provo ñenje politike IPTF-a vezane za registraciju i nepridržavanje propisa , s ciljem da se osigura da onim pripadnicima policije koji ne ispunjaju kriterije podobnosti ili koji se nedoli čno ponašaju ne bude dozvoljeno da rade kao policajci; • Vršenje pritiska na lokalne organe policije da pokrenu interne disciplinske postupke protiv onih pripadnika policije kojima je dostavljeno izvješ će IPTF-a o nepridržavanju propisa; • Pra ćenje rada komisija/savjeta u vršenju profesionalne provjere sudaca i tužitelja na dužnosti, pod kontrolom IJC-a, a s ciljem utvr ñivanja njihove podobnosti da obavljaju te poslove; • Dugoro čno reguliranje profesionalnosti sudaca i tužitelja putem kodifikacije imenovanja i disciplinskih postupaka, kao što je predvi ñeno Pravilnikom o radu komisija/savjeta, kao i ja čanje autoriteta komisija/savjeta. Ove dvije procedure su zna čajne za dugoro čno razvijanje standarda neovisnosti i profesionalnosti u sudskom sustavu, a same procedure bi se trebale odvijati u skladu sa standardima sadržanim u profesionalnim eti čkim kodeksima koji su tako ñer usvojeni u 2000. godini; • Pružanje pomo ći komisijama/savjetima, putem IJC-a, u tuma čenju zakona koji reguliraju pitanja vezana za sudce i tužitelje , kako bi se pomoglo u uspostavljanju njihovog autoriteta u reguliranja pitanja, bez politi čkih utjecaja, koja se ti ču sudaca i tužitelja, te predložile izmjene ili donijele dodatne neophodne regulacijske mjere kako bi se osigurala primjena eti čkih i profesionalnih standarda; • Podvrgavanje postupku provjere podobnosti sudaca koji ne poštuju imovinske zakone; • Smjena onih zvani čnika koji konstantno opstruiraju ovaj proces, bilo putem odluke PIK-a ili u skladu s ovlaštenjima Visokog predstavnika;
77 • Usvajanje zakona kojima se suspendiraju s dužnosti oni zvani čnici koji opstruiraju primjenu imovinskih zakona; • Sudsko gonjenje i kažnjavanje onih zvani čnika koji se ne pridržavaju zakona ili opstruiraju njihovu primjenu.
1.5. Poštivanje me ñunarodnih ugovornih obveza od strane Bosne i Hercegovine:
• Osigurati poštivanje osnovnih na čela me ñunarodnog prava po pitanju izbjeglica , što uklju čuje repatrijaciju (refoulement) i pristup odre ñenom teritoriju (repatrijacija - u originalu "refoulement" - je termin koji ozna čava povratak u zemlje i oblasti gdje osoba strahuje za vlastitu sigurnost - ovo na čelo se tako ñer primjenjuje tamo gdje postoji velika vjerovatno ća da će do povratka do ći indirektnim putem, kao i na samoj granici); • Osigurati poštivanje prava azilanata i izbjeglica; • Osigurati pristupa čnost procedure za odobravanje azila u BiH putem mehanizma za identifikaciju i proslje ñivanje UNHCR-u potencijalnih azilanata i izbjeglica; • Sveobuhvatna obuka djelatnika Ministarstva za ljudska prava i izbjeglice, Državne grani čne službe, lokalne policije, sudstva i ostalih struktura u smislu upoznavanja sa zakonskim propisima o izbjeglicama; • Izraditi podzakonske akte u sklopu Zakona o imigraciji i azilu i druga neophodna uputstva, u suradnji s Ministarstvom; • Tražiti trajna rješenja za izbjeglice iz SR Jugoslavije i R. Hrvatske. • Me ñunarodna zajednica treba sura ñivati s Ministarstvom za ljudska prava na zapo činjanju procesa sa činjavanja izvješ ća koji se moraju podnijeti tijelima odre ñenim ovim ugovorima . Osigurati tehni čku pomo ć u ovom procesu. Kasni se sa četrnaest izvješ ća koji se moraju podnijeti nadležnim tijelima ustanovljenim po svih šest ugovora. Najve ća pažnja treba se posvetiti izvješ ćima koja se podnose Odboru za ekonomska, socijalna i kulturna prava i Odboru za ljudska prava, kao i izradi Centralnog dokumenta za podnošenje izvješ ća tijelima uspostavljenim prema ugovoru o ljudskim pravima; • Poboljšati status nacionalnih manjina u BiH , uklju čuju ći i status Roma, u skladu s Okvirnom konvencijom o zaštiti nacionalnih manjina putem implementacije Okvirne konvencije za zaštitu nacionalnih manjina u Bosni i Hercegovini (po četkom 2001. godine).
78 2. Stanje ljudskih prava u BiH 2001. godine
2.1. Socijalna slika
Napa ćeno i ratom osiromašeno stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine ni nakon šest godina od svršetka ratnog sukoba nema ekonomskih uvjeta ni za prosje čnu egzistenciju. U sveop ćoj konstelaciji društveno-politi čkih i gospodarskih odnosa ve ćina stanovništva ne vidi izlaza iz bijede u kojoj se našla, te traži na čine kako oti ći iz svoje domovine. Prema neslužbenim statistikama, utemeljenim na anketnim uzorcima iz rujna 2001. godine, oko 60 % mladih je izrazilo želju za odlaskom iz BiH. Zabrinjava masovan odliv stru čnog kadra. Obrazovani mladi i srednjovje čni ljudi su u nemogu ćnosti prona ći bilo kakav posao, a ako su ve ć zaposleni nisu u mogu ćnosti priskrbiti zaradu kojom bi zadovoljili osnovne egzistencijalne potrebe. Stoga, ako se ne žele okrenuti kriminalu 28 , prisiljeni su sre ću potražiti negdje drugo. U isto vrijeme preko milijun bosansko-hercegova čkih državljana, koji su tijekom rata izbjegli u inozemstvo sve više gube nadu da će ubrzo biti osnova za održiv povratak. Stopa nezaposlenosti u stalnom je porastu i u Federaciji BiH pred kraj ove godine ve ć prelazi 40 %, a nezaposleni uglavnom ne dobivaju nikakvu naknadu od države. Stanje u Republici Srpskoj je još gore. Nemogu ćnost bilo kakvog zaposlenja zasigurno je u ovome trenutku najve će iskušenje za gra ñane a time i državu BiH. A ono je, u velikoj mjeri, posljedica politi čkoga rješenja, kojim je podjela zemlje poslužila zaustavljanju rata ali ne i uspostavi mira s ljudskim licem. Socijalno stanje u BiH je uvjerljiva potvrda da odsutnost rata nije jamstvo željenomu miru.
Od oko 412 000 trenutno zaposlenih u Federaciji BiH, preko 42 000 je na čekanju zbog nedostatka posla ili uslijed nastanka "tehnološkog viška", kojega se poslodavci ne mogu lako osloboditi. Za trajanja ovakvog statusa radnici na čekanju ne ostvaruju nikakve prihode ili od poslodavaca dobivaju simboli čna mjese čna primanja koja se kre ću izme ñu 10 i 30 DM. Prema službenim podacima Federalnog zavoda za statistiku, u listopadu 2001. godine prosje čna mjese čna pla ća u Federaciji BiH iznosila je 458 DM, dok samo prehrambena potroša čka košara za četvero članu obitelj iznosi oko 440 DM.
Državni aparat pokazuje izrazitu nesposobnost da se nosi s općeraširenom crnom burzom roba i upošljavanjem radnika "na crno" - bez pla ćanja zdravstvenog i mirovinsko-socijalnog osiguranja. Dok diljem Bosne i Hercegovine cvjeta nelegalno tržište roba sumnjiva podrijetla, državne blagajne se slabo pune, te nadležne instancije nisu u mogu ćnosti ispuniti svoje osnovne obveze prema gra ñanima. Primjerice, prosje čna mirovina u Federaciji BiH krajem 2001. godine iznosi oko 169 DM, dok se ona posljednjih mjeseci u Republici Srpskoj kre će oko 50 DM. Stoga se nerijetko po ulicama naših gradova mogu vidjeti slike umirovljenika kako kopaju po kontejnerima sme ća, što bi im trebala biti "nagrada" za višedesetljetni mukotrpan rad. Prosja čenje je postala uobi čajena pojava, na koju tijela izvršne vlasti više niti
28 Prema službenim podacima Federalnog ministarstva unutrašnjih poslova u prvih šest mjeseci 2001. godine broj kaznenih djela u Federaciji BiH porastao je za 8,7 %.
79 ne obra ćaju pozornosti. Kako dalekim i neuvjerljivim za grañane BiH se čini govor o pravu na posao!
2.2. Normativno - administrativni kaos u Bosni i Hercegovini
Nakon okon čanja stravi čnog rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, Daytonskim mirovnim sporazumom definirano je ustrojstvo nove države. Bosna i Hercegovina je država tri konstitutivna naroda, podijeljena na dva teško kompaktibilna entiteta, od kojih je jedan (Republika Srpska) centralisti čki ustrojena jednonacionalna administrativno-"državna" jedinica, a drugi (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine) federalno ure ñen dvonacionalni konglomerat podijeljen na deset županija ili kantona. Županije kao teritorijalne jedinice sastoje se od op ćina koje su zna čajni segmenti državne uprave. Pored toga u BiH egzistira i Distrikt Br čko, koji je po mnogo čemu, zapravo, tre ći entitet. Sa stajališta me ñunarodnog prava Bosna i Hercegovina je jedinstvena, me ñunarodno priznata država, ali prema vlastitim pozitivno-pravnim normama u biti je podijeljena na dva labavo povezana dijela. Distrikt Br čko je trebao postati svojevrsna, za sada neuspjela, paradigma povezivanja podijeljene zemlje. Pravne sveze koje bi trebale održavati integritet ovog me ñunarodno-pravnog subjekta, doimaju se uistinu tananim. S obzirom na geopoliti čki i geostrateški zna čaj prostora koji zauzima i neuskla ñen odnos svjetskih sila, ne čudi činjenica da se naša država de facto nalazi pod, istina ne proglašenim ali stvarnim, protektoratom me ñunarodne zajednice.
Nepomirljivost vladaju ćih politi čkih opcija - radikaliziranih tijekom rata, rezultirala je sporazumom koji je stvorio složenu pravnu konstrukciju u BiH. Složenost organizacijskog ustrojstva Bosne i Hercegovine neminovno se odrazila na šarolikost, a samim time i na neuskla ñenost njenog pravnog sustava. Ova mala zemlja ima trinaest ustava i jedan statut! I sam pogled na pravne propise, koji su na snazi, rječito govori kakva je normativno-pravna situacija u BiH nastala realizacijom Daytonskog sporazuma. Rije č je o sljede ćim pravnim propisima: 1. Pravni sustav utemeljen na Anex-u 4. Op ćeg okvirnog sporazuma za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini, (daytonski Ustav BiH). Ne treba smetnuti s uma da je on rezultat kompromisa i težnje me ñunarodne zajednice da uspostavi mir pod svaku cijenu. Kao takav ovaj pravni sustav nije ni mogao sadržati do kraja na čelna i pravedna rješenja, jer je posljedica nastalog stanja tijekom rata. Neosporna je činjenica da su ovim ustavnim rješenjima ozakonjeni rezultati ratnog nasilja i agresije.
2. Pravni sustav Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine utemeljen na Washingtonskim sporazumima iz 1994. godine, a potvr ñen Daytonskim sporazumom. Ovdje imamo zakonodavstvo iz nadležnosti Federacije i zakonodavstva deset županija (kantona) koje imaju velike zakonodavne ovlasti. Svaka županija prema Ustavu Federacije Bosne i
80 Hercegovine ima vlastiti ustav, zakonodavno tijelo, vladu s resornim ministarstvima (osim ministarstva vanjskih poslova i ministarstva obrane) i predsjednika županije.
3. Pravni sustav Republike Srpske legitimiran Daytonskim sporazumom, a nastao isklju čivoš ću volje jednog naroda.
4. Konstitutivni i funkcionalni propisi Distrikta Br čko , koji je nastao kao rezultat politi čkog kompromisa zbog strateškog zna čenja ovog podru čja Bosne i Hercegovine.
5. Pravni sustav Republike Bosne i Hercegovine od 06. travnja 1992. godine do potpisivanja Daytonskog sporazuma (ratno zakonodavstvo za podru čje pod kontrolom bošnja čko-muslimanskog naroda), djelomi čno je ostao na snazi temeljem ustavne odredbe o kontinuitetu BiH.
6. Pravni sustav Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosne , čiji su u činci priznati Washingtonskim sporazumima, a ostao je u primjeni preuzimanjem pravnih rješenja u županijama s hrvatskom ve ćinom.
7. Pravne norme nastale korištenjem ovlasti Ureda visokog predstavnika (OHR) - Visoki predstavnik (Wolfgang Petrisch) se u BiH pojavljuje kao arbitar, donose ći odluke sa zakonskom snagom, a koriste ći ovlasti iz Anex-a 10 Daytonskog sporazuma. Pored pretežite dobre namjere nedovoljna senzibilnost OHR-a pri vršenju zakonodavne funkcije i nedore čenost tih zakonskih rješenja doprinose normativnom kaosu. Poseban problem predstavlja to što se nomotehnikom OHR-ovih zakonodavaca u tradicionalno kontinentalno-europski pravni sustav Bosne i Hercegovine inkorporiraju norme anglosaksonskog tipa, što tako ñer doprinosi pravnoj zbrci.
8. Pravni sustav bivše Socijalisti čke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (SFRJ), te bivše SRBiH koja je kao federalna jedinica propale države tako ñer imala svoje zakonodavstvo . Ovi pravni propisi su uvelike ostali na snazi preuzimanjem cjelokupnih zakonskih rješenja, uz eventualne - često bezna čajne izmjene. Zakonodavna tijela su inercijom preuzela i zakonska rješenja koja su inkopatibilna s osnovnim na čelima demokracije.
9. Obveze nastale sklapanjem me ñunarodnih ugovora, te preuzimanjem me ñunarodnih ugovora i konvencija koje je potpisala bivša SFRJ . Kod ovog pravnog vrela - koje je po svojoj snazi iznad zakona i Ustava, interesantno je napomenuti da je Daytonski ustav tijekom pregovora Anex-om 1 ("Dodatni sporazumi o ljudskim pravima koji će se primjenjivati u Bosni i Hercegovini" ) poja čan nizom standarda koji se ti ču ostvarivanja ljudskih prava, a koji proizlaze iz prihva ćanja niza taksativno navedenih me ñunarodnih konvencija: • Konvencija o spre čavanju i kažnjavanju zlo čina genocida iz 1948. godine,
81 • Ženevske konvencije I-IV o zaštiti žrtava rata iz 1948. godine i Ženevski protokoli I-II iz 1977. godine, • Konvencija koja se odnosi na status izbjeglica iz 1951. godine i Protokol iz 1966. godine , • Konvencija o nacionalnosti udanih žena iz 1957. godine, • Konvencija o smanjenju broja osoba bez državljanstva iz 1961. godine, • Me ñunarodna konvencija o eliminaciji svih vrsta rasne diskriminacije iz 1965. godine, • Me ñunarodni ugovor o gra ñanskim i politi čkim pravima iz 1966. i Opcionalni protokoli iz 1966. i 1968. godine, • Me ñunarodni ugovor o gospodarskim, socijalnim i kulturnim pravima iz 1968. godine , • Me ñunarodna konvencija o eliminaciji svih vrsta diskriminacije žena iz 1979. godine, • Konvencija protiv mu čenja i drugih vrsta okrutnog nehumanog ili ponižavaju ćeg tretmana ili kažnjavanja iz 1984. godine, • Europska konvencija o spre čavanju mu čenja, nehumanog ili ponižavaju ćeg tretmana ili kažnjavanja iz 1987. godine, • Konvencija o pravima djeteta iz 1989. godine, • Konvencija o pravima radnika na privremenom radu u inozemstvu i članova njihovih obitelji iz 1990. godine, • Europska povelja za regionalne jezike i jezike manjina iz 1992. godine i • Okvirna konvencija za zaštitu nacionalnih manjina .
Kao što je vidljivo, teško bi se mogao prona ći na čin kojim bi se svi navedeni propisi mogli uskladiti u jedan harmoniziran i efikasan pravni sustav. Kompleksnost bosansko- hercegova čkog pravnog sustava, složenost nedorasle izvršne administracije i prisutna diskriminacija doprinose vladavini kaosa, umjesto vladavine prava.
2.3. Problemi u pravosu ñu
Rad sudova u Bosni i Hercegovini tako ñer ne doprinosi vladavini prava. Pravda se zbog sporosti sudova ponekad čini nedostižnom. Iako je velik broj sudaca tijekom rata napustio BiH, njihov broj u odnosu na broj stanovnika nije ispod prosjeka u Europskoj zajednici. Me ñutim, njihov neprofesionalan odnos prema gra ñanima i predmetima, kao i loša materijalno-tehni čka opremljenost i nestabilnost pravnog sustava utječu na gomilanje neriješenih predmeta na sudskim policama. Za primjer možemo uzeti (ne)efikasnost sudova u glavnom gradu BiH:
Op ćinski sud I u Sarajevu je u 2000. godini radio na 231 146 predmeta, od čega su 45 242 predmeta zaostala iz prethodne godine. U 2001. godinu preneseno je 63 504 predmeta, što je nešto manje od 30 % neriješenih predmeta. Me ñutim, porazna je činjenica da je kod ovog suda ostalo neriješeno čak 62 % gospodarskih i oko 60 % radnih sporova 29 . Od zaprimljenih 7687 parni čnih predmeta u 2000. godini je ostalo neriješeno 4483 (što je neefikasnost oko 58
29 Radni sporovi bi se prema Zakonu o parni čnom postupku trebali rješavati po žurnoj proceduri!
82 %), a efikasnost pri rješavanju kaznenih predmeta za 2000. godinu je kod ovog suda bila oko 50 %. Strahovito porazno djeluju brojke o u činkovitosti Odjeljenja knjige položenih ugovora (KPU), gdje je od 33 885 predmeta u 2000. godini ostalo neriješeno i prenijeto u 2001. godinu čak 24733 (73 %). Tako je primjerice za obi čnu uknjižbu prava vlasništva u zemljišne knjige potrebno čekati od dvanaest do četrnaest mjeseci.
Kod Op ćinskog suda II u Sarajevu od 95 294 rješavana predmeta u 2000. godini preko tre ćine je prenijeto u 2001. godinu (oko 62 % neriješenih privrednih sporova, oko 60 % kaznenih predmeta, 56 % parni čnih i oko 52 % radnih sporova).
Kantonalni sud u Sarajevu je od 33 754 predmeta koja je rješavao u 2000. godini, u 2001. godinu prenio nešto manje od 20 %. I ovdje je primjetan zaostatak pri rješavanju prvostupanjskih parnica (od 75 riješeno 26), kao i upravnih sporova (neriješeno 965 od ukupno 1698 predmeta).
Kako bi se pove ćala efikasnost i neovisnost sudova, visoki predstavnik je svojom Odlukom od 13. ožujka 2001. godine 30 naložio formiranje Neovisne pravosudne komisije (International Justice Commission-IJC). Navedena institucija ovom odlukom dobiva mandat za usmjeravanje i koordiniranje reformi pravosu ña u BiH, te za poduzimanje mjera koje bi doprinosile unapre ñenju vladavine zakona. Na čelo ove institucije je kao direktorica postavljena g ña Rakel Surlien - sutkinja iz Norveške, a angažirano je 15 me ñunarodnih i 11 lokalnih službenika, izravno zaduženih za sudsku reformu i monitoring pravosu ña. Neovisna pravosudna komisija je dobila ovlast da može intervenirati u postupcima koje vode sudske i tužiteljske komisije, a može i zahtijevati prekid postupka sve do kona čne odluke visokog predstavnika. Visoki predstavnik time pored zakonodavne i izvršne objedinjuje i prerogative sudske vlasti. Prije formiranja IJC reforme pravosuña pokrenute su u okviru Misije UN u BiH za procjenu sudskog sustava (JSAP), te su na entitetskim, a u Federaciji BiH i na županijskim razinama oformljene komisije za procjenu rada sudaca i tužitelja. Osnovne smjernice ove institucije identi čne su onim koje ima IJC.
Zakonom o sudskoj i tužiteljskoj funkciji materijalni položaj sudaca u Federaciji BiH je uvelike poboljšan. On je sucima donio mjese čne zarade izme ñu dvije i tri tisu će DM, zavisno o sudskom rangu. I pored toga stanje u pravosu ñu 2001. godine nije se popravilo. 31 Ovo stanje u pravosu ñu pogoduje uvjerenju gra ñana da svoja prava sudskim putem ne mogu ni ostvariti ni zaštititi
2.4. Šutnja administracije
Pri analizi (ne)funkcioniranja svih segmenata vlasti u Bosni i Hercegovini nikako se ne može zaobi ći šutnja administracije kao zapreka pri ostvarivanju zakonom zagarantiranih prava.
30 Odluka je objavljena u "Službenim novinama FBiH", broj 14/01, i u "Službenom glasniku Republike Srpske". 31 Statisti čki podaci iz oblasti pravosu ña za 2001. godinu još nisu obra ñeni.
83 Ovdje ćemo prikazati postoje će stanje preko rada upravno-pravnih tijela, po zahtjevima gra ñana za povrat bespravno zaposjednute imovine. Ne treba smetnuti s uma da je kao relikt iz bivšeg socijalisti čkog naslje ña u BiH ostalo stanarsko pravo kao specifi čno pravo svojevrsnoga zakupa, sli čno pravu vlasništva. Ono se sastoji od doživotnog prava korištenja stambenog prostora, koje je u društvenom vlasništvu, a nositelj stanarskog prava ga je mogao prenositi samo na članove svog obiteljskog ku ćanstva (suposjednike nositelja stanarskog prava). Trenutno je na snazi čitav set usvojenih zakona kojima bi se trebale implementirati odredbe Anex-a 7 Daytonskog sporazuma, vezane za povratak izbjeglih i ratom raseljenih osoba. Iako je od svršetka rata prošlo ve ć više od šest godina, službene statistike kazuju da je zaklju čno s listopadom 2001. godine u Federaciji BiH vra ćeno tek 44 % imovine vlasnicima i nositeljima stanarskih prava, u Republici Srpskoj samo 22 %, a u na podru čju Distrikta Br čko pravo na povrat uzurpirane imovine ostvarilo je samo 9 % podnositelja zahtjeva. Pored svega navedenog i politi čara na vlasti koji svoje interese ostvaruju pod etiketom borbe za dobro naroda ili partije, kao jedna od poteško ća pri ostvarivanju povrata imovine egzistira i šutnja administracije. A zapravo je i ona u službi ljudi na vlasti, koji utje ču na to tko će dobiti radno mjesto u strukturama op ćinske, županijske ili državne administracije.
Nadležna upravna tijela su prema Zakonu o upravnom postupku ("Sl. novine FBiH", broj 2/98, i 48/99), dužna riješiti predmetnu stvar u roku od 30 dana od dana podnošenja zahtjeva, a maksimalno u roku od dva mjeseca - ukoliko je potrebno sprovesti poseban ispitni postupak. Me ñutim, nisu rijetki slu čajevi gdje nadležno tijelo ne donese rješenje niti nakon četiri ili pet godina od podnošenja zahtjeva (iako za rješavanje nema nekih bitnih zapreka, niti spornih činjenica). Zakon doduše u tom slu čaju stranci pruža mogu ćnost pokretanja drugostupanjskog postupka - kao da je zahtjev odbijen ili mogu ćnost pokretanja upravnog spora pred nadležnim sudom. To za stranke redovito predstavlja dodatne troškove, koje često sebi ne mogu platiti. Kad postoji šutnja administracije i u drugostupanjskom postupku, kao jedina mogu ćnost pomo ći (osim pokretanja upravnog spora pred nadležnim sudom) preostaje ulaganje zahtjeva za izvršenje inspekcijskog nadzora i eventualno podizanje prekršajne prijave protiv voditelja postupka i samog tijela - koje je bilo dužno donijeti predmetno rješenje. Navedeni zahtjevi podnose se Federalnoj upravnoj inspekciji, koja djeluje u okviru Ministarstva pravde F BiH. Činjenica da je navedeno tijelo zatrpano zahtjevima gra ñana (što mu znatno otežava rad i smanjuje efikasnost) jasan je pokazatelj nepoštivanja na čela zakonitosti u BiH. Malo pomaže činjenica da su za neažurne voditelje postupaka i nadležna tijela predvi ñene dosta rigorozne nov čane sankcije za nedonošenje upravnih akata u zakonskim rokovima. Me ñutim, sam spomen mogu ćnosti izvršenja upravnog nadzora, često pritiš će “neažurne” voditelje postupaka na brže rješavanje.
Sasvim je razumljivo i opravdano nepovjerenje gra ñana u funkcioniranje pravnog sustava - pa samim tim kod njih redovito postoji odre ñena doza straha kad kod tijela državne uprave trebaju ostvariti kakva prava. Ove zapreke subjektivne naravi redovito nastaju onda kad se prava trebaju ostvariti na teritoriju pod pretežitim utjecajem drugog konstitutivnog naroda. Nije rijedak ni slu čaj kad su predmeti formalno-pravno riješeni u korist predratnih nositelja
84 stanarskog prava ili vlasnika uzurpirane nekretnine, ali ovi nisu u mogu ćnosti ostvariti prava koja su konstatirana pravomo ćnim i izvršnim upravnim aktima. Izvršni postupak iz ove oblasti se uglavnom pokre će na zahtjev stranke, nakon što tijelo čiji akt se ima izvršiti donese zaklju čak kojim se dozvoljava izvršenje. Iako su dužna donijeti zaklju čak o odobrenju izvršenja u roku od 15 dana od dana podnošenja zahtjeva, nadležna tijela vrlo često odbijaju pokrenuti izvršni postupak uz obrazloženje da nemaju mogu ćnosti osigurati nužni smještaj za bespravne korisnike. Ovakvo postupanje postalo je op ćom pojavom te se me ñu populacijom ve ćinskog stanovništva tolerira i redovito smatra normalnim. To uvelike govori o poratnom stanju duha u Bosni i Hercegovini.
Kakvu snagu pravne norme imaju u BiH svjedo či i činjenica da stranke uop će ne mogu sudjelovati u postupku do dana koji im se odredi upisom na tzv. "liste čekanja". Praksa ovakve "susretljivosti" nadležnih tijela strankama omogu ćuje da se tek po proteku četrdeset i više dana mogu obratiti voditelju predmetnog upravnog postupka. Time im se omogu ćuje da u postupku mogu iznijeti bitne činjenice ili se eventualno informirati o potrebnim relevantnim dokazima tek kad je zakonski rok za rješavanje istekao. Jasno je kako postoje odre ñene politi čke smjernice koje nadležna tijela dobivaju iz centara mo ći, a sve s ciljem održanja postoje ćeg stanja.
2.5. Implementacija Anex-a 7 Dyjtonskog sporazuma ili kršenje prava na povratak
Kao što je vidljivo, državni sustav Bosne i Hercegovine sadrži mnoštvo nedore čenih elemenata koji se ti ču svih sfera društvenog života. Ogroman upravni aparat koji je me ñunarodna zajednica instalirala u BiH ipak nije u mogu ćnosti adekvatno reagirati na nagomilane probleme. Gra ñani sve teže ostvaruju svoja prava posredstvom tijela me ñunarodne zajednice. Čitav blok zakona koje je donio Ured visokoga predstavnika s intencijom ostvarivanja prava povratka - predvi ñenih Anex-om 7 Daytonskog sporazuma, samo predstavlja teško ostvarivo slovo na papiru. Visoki predstavnik je pokušavaju ći reanimirati funkcioniranje pravnog sustava, u skladu s daytonskim ovlastima, bio prinu ñen nametnuti veliki broj zakona koji nisu mogli biti usuglašeni u redovitoj parlamentarnoj proceduri. Unato č tih i sli čnih nastojanja u BiH, šest godina nakon potpisivanja mirovnoga sporazuma, oko milijun i tristo tisu ća prognanih i raseljeni se ne može vratiti u svoje domove! Stje če se dojam da je OHR ve ć od po četka tolerirao praksu onemogu ćavanja povratka prognanih u RS. To je rezultiralo op ćim mnijenjem da je RS u Daytonu "stvorena" samo za srpski narod! Samo od sebe se postavlja pitanje je li ve ć ustaljena praksa nametanja zakona efikasno sredstvo ako ih oni koji bi ih trebali provoditi ne smatraju svojima? S druge strane, pravo na održiv povratak je temeljno pravo svakoga gra ñanina, ali i temelj opstojnosti i pokazatelj demokrati čnosti BiH.
Nerijetki su pokušaji gra ñana da putem Ureda ombudsmana za ljudska prava riješe svoje probleme vezane za povratak. U namjeri da se spriječi pogubna praksa državne
85 administracije, krajem listopada 1999. godine Ured visokog predstavnika (OHR) je nametnuo Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o upravnom postupku (“Sl. novine FBiH”, broj 48/99), kojim je omogu ćena nazo čnost ombudsmana u svim fazama upravnog postupka. Ta činjenica zorno ukazuje na kakve administrativne barijere gra ñani nailaze pri pokušajima ostvarivanja svojih prava. Na žalost ova institucija ima dosta zanemariv utjecaj u društvenim tijekovima BiH, pa tako i na tijek upravnog postupka. Ombudsmanske konstatacije o kršenju ljudskih prava naj češ će nemaju nikakvog ubrzavaju ćeg utjecaja na postupak. Napominjemo da je zada ća ombudsmana mnogo šira, a mi je ovdje povezujemo s problemima povratka. Aktivnosti ombudsmana redovito završavaju na razini preporuke, iako imaju ovlasti pokretati i postupke. Ostaje pitanje zašto Dom za ljudska prava, čije su odluke obvezuju će i koji upu ćene mu predmete rješava do 80%, nije našao svoje odgovaraju će mjesto u ovom tako složenom i važnom pitanju?
Velike poteško će pri funkcioniranju vlasti i pravnog sustava u cijeloj BiH proizlaze, kao što smo vidjeli, iz nedore čenosti pravnih propisa, ali i iz nedostatka političke volje za realizaciju Op ćeg okvirnog sporazuma za mir. Ukoliko razrješavanje ovih problema krene ka pravednoj realizaciji presude Ustavnog suda o konstitutivnosti sva tri naroda na cijelom teritoriju BiH, mogao bi se pojaviti tra čak nade za raspetljavanje ovog gordijskog čvora. Presuda Ustavnoga suda zahtijeva hrabrije i iskrenije korake na svim razinama. Bez njih će problematika povratka prognanih, čini se, sve uvjerljivije i štetnije ukazivati da Daytonski sporazum nije okvir u koji će ikada biti mogu će smjestiti demokratski ure ñenu BiH. Interes gra ñana i naroda u BiH, ali i šire, i poštivanje temeljnih ljudskih prava traži da se "mit Daytona" ne pretvori u negaciju njegove pozitivne strane i zapreku njegove korekcije ili poboljšanja u odlu čuju ćim to čkama.
2.6. Kršenje Ustavom zagarantiranih prava na slobodno vjersko uvjerenje i slobodu ispovijedanja vjere
Tijekom rata u BiH do temelja je uništeno na tisu će sakralnih zdanja (crkava, džamija, manastira i vjerskih objekata). Sustavnim rušenjem i obeš čaš ćivanjem vjerskih objekata pokušavalo se ne samo uništiti kulturno i vjersko povijesno naslije ñe gra ñana druge nacionalnosti i vjeroispovijesti nego i time odaslati poruku da je "etni čko čiš ćenje" podjela me ñu narodima kona čna, te da povratka prognanih ne može i ne će biti. Na žalost, diljem cijele Bosne i Hercegovine kao spomenici barbarizma i iracionalne mržnje još uvijek strše ruševine povijesnih vjerskih spomenika. Politi čke i državne strukture omogu ćavaju i pomažu obnovu porušenih i gradnju novih vjerskih objekata onih vjerskih zajednica ili crkava koje su na odre ñenome entitetu u ve ćini. Iako su organizirani u Me ñureligijsko vije će, ni najviši vjerski poglavari ne nalaze na čina kako dogovorno sprije čiti tu vrstu o čite zlouporabe svetoga. U svakome slu čaju, nije mogu će u duhu vjerske tolerancije razumjeti stav predstavnika crkava i vjerskih zajednica, koji prihva ćaju da se politi čari i njihove partije, zbog svojih interesa, blagonaklono odnose prema njima i njihovim zajednicama, a u isto vrijeme krše temeljna
86 prava pripadnika drugih vjerskih zajednica. Time, možda i nesvjesno, daju dojam da i sami pristaju na kršenje temeljnih vjerskih, a to zna či ljudskih prava.
Kao što je iz ranije izloženog vidljivo, posebno tegobna situacija pri ostvarivanju ljudskih prava je u RS. Nacionalna i vjerska diskriminacija proistje ču iz samog Ustava RS, s obzirom da je ona definirana kao "država srpskog naroda" 32 . Ovaj stav zakonodavca reflektira se na sve sfere društvenog života u tom dijelu Bosne i Hercegovine. Ustavni sud je osporio da bi RS bila "država srpskoga naroda". Ali time nije otklonjena praksa po kojoj Srpska pravoslavna crkva ima prava, koja druge crkve ili vjerske zajednice i njihovi članovi nemaju. Samo kao primjer daleko dublje i šire problematike mogu se navesti doga ñanja u Trebinju i u Banja Luci, koja su se dogodila u prolje će 2001. godine.
Naime, tih dana se u navedenim gradovima - na uporno traženje OHR-a i drugih predstavnika me ñunarodne zajednice a pod jurisdikcijom RS, trebao obilježiti simboli čan po četak obnove u ratu do temelja uništenih džamija, koje muslimani smatraju simbolima svoje opstojnosti na tim prostorima. Pri pokušaju polaganja kamena temeljca Osman- pašine u Trebinju i Ferhat-pašine džamije u Banja Luci dogodili su se nemile scene. Ovaj doga ñaj, koji je trebao ohrabriti i simbolizirati budu ći povratak Bošnjaka-muslimana u RS, pretvorio se u znak protesta protiv povratka i protiv identiteta povratnika. Pored predstavnika Islamske vjerske zajednice, fizi čki su napadnuti i nazo čni predstavnici me ñunarodne zajednice. Wolfgang Petritsch je za navedena doga ñanja izravno optužio vlasti RS. Snaga prosvjednika, ali i svojevrsna odobravanja zabilježena na sredstvima javnog priop ćavanja RS, jasno ukazuju na postoje ću klimu u pogledu implementacije mirovnog sporazuma u ovom dijelu Bosne i Hercegovine kada su u pitanju temeljna vjerska prava.
2.7. Obrazovanje
Pitanja iz oblasti obrazovanje u FBiH ve ćim dijelom se nalaze u nadležnosti županija. Nažalost, u Bosni i Hercegovini još nije izra ñen odgojno-obrazovni sustav koji bi omogu ćavao ustavom zagarantirano potrebno zajedništvo, na jednoj, i pravo izobrazbe na maternjim jezicima za sva tri konstitutivna naroda, na drugoj strani. Ovo podru čje je po svojoj naravi vrlo složeno, ali i vrlo važno. Ne će ga biti lako riješiti ni uz puno više dobre volje pa i znanja nego ga pokazuju oni koji su si uzeli za pravo da o tome, tko zna po koji puta u ovoj Zemlji, odlu čuju ne pitaju ći što o tome misle i što žele prihvatiti narodi.
U Federaciji Bosne i Hercegovine obrazovanje je u nadležnosti županija pa je zaživjela praksa da se putem prora čuna financiraju uglavnom samo one obrazovne ustanove koje
32 Nakon prihva ćanja Anex-a 4 - Ustava BiH, usvojen je 1995. godine amandman XLIV na Ustav Republike Srpske, kojim je članak 1. Ustava RS izmijenjen i glasi: "Republika Srpska je država srpskog naroda i svih njenih gra ñana". Ustav Srpske Republike Bosne i Hercegovine je donesen 28. velja če 1992. godine, predstavljaju ći osnovni akt "nove države" i bio je uvod u krvavi rat i genocid. Prije donošenja tog ustava, a do potpisivanja Op ćeg okvirnog sporazuma za mir (14.12.1995. godine) ovaj ustav je u više prilika mijenjan sa čak 43 amandmana, a po prihva ćanju Daytonskog sporazuma preimenovan je u Ustav Republike Srpske.
87 prate programe "ve ćinskoga" naroda. Ipak, treba napomenuti da je ve ć u nekim mjestima (Stolac, Čapljina, Prozor, Bugojno) u istim školama nastava organizirana po bošnja čkome i hrvatskome programu. Jasno, to dvojno obrazovanje se financira iz županijskih prora čuna. Ali, postoji još puno mjesta ugroženosti prava Bošnjaka na teritoriju pod dominacijom ve ćinskoga hrvatskog stanovništva i identi čne ugroženosti Hrvata u županijama s bošnja čkom ve ćinom. Dosta se prisjetiti ve ć zaboravljene "škole-šatora" na Žabljaku, op ćina Tešanj, ili maltretiranja hrvatske djece u Varešu. "Škole za Europu", koje je od 1994. u Sarajevu, Zenici, Tuzli Travniku, Konjicu i Žep ču osnovala Vrhbosanska nadbiskupija, su prve privatne škole sa pravom javnosti u kojima su u velikom postotku zastupljena djeca svih narodnosti i vjera. Prava je šteta što ovaj pokušaj otvaranja škola s multietni čkim zna čajkama, u kojima se nastoje njegovati postoje će razli čitosti i nužno zajedništvo, nije naišao na ve će razumijevanje i podršku doma ćih, a pogotovo me ñunarodnih predstavnika u strukturama vlasti.
Školstvo u RS je organizirano isklju čivo na srpskom jeziku i po srpskim obrazovnim programima. Dakle, samo za srpsku djecu. Kolike i kakve napetosti i zlouporabe su u ovoj oblasti društvenog života mogu će, pokazala su doga ñanja s po četka ove godine u Distriktu Br čko. Tamo su se desili prosvjedi "srpskih srednjoškolaca" i u čenika osnovnih škola zbog toga što nisu dopuštali da u iste škole popodne idu i djeca povratnika Bošnjaka i Hrvata.
Sve ovo ukazuje da bi pitanju školstva uop će, a napose izradi školskih planova i programa, kao zaloga mira i prosperiteta u BiH, trebalo pokazati više i druga čije pozornosti nego se to čini. Predstavnici Me ñunarodne zajednice - koliko god bili dobronamjerni - ne će biti od koristi ako se i na ovom tako osjetljivom podru čju budu služili metodom nametanja svojih rješenja.
2.8. Stanje u oblasti sredstava javnog priop ćavanja
O slobodi medija u Bosni i Hercegovini teško je govoriti. Pored u čestalih politi čkih pritisaka svih politi čkih stranaka na novinare stje če se dojam kako u ovoj struci nedostaje profesionalnosti. No, u pitanju je sloboda novinarstva i medija u BiH. Iako bosansko- hercegova čko novinarstvo obiluje mnoštvom neobjektivnih i neprofesionalnih novinara, o čito najve ći problem predstavlja činjenica da se ve ćina medija, na ovaj ili onaj na čin, nalazi pod kontrolom politi čkih centara mo ći.
Ured visokog predstavnika u BiH je radi ure ñenja stanja u ovoj oblasti uspostavio Neovisno povjerenstvo za medije (IMC), koje je zaduženo za rekonstrukciju medija javnog priop ćavanja. Stje če se dojam da pojedini djelatnici IMC-a (kasnije Regulatorne agencije za medije) idu na ovom podru čju u smjeru stvaranja nekog nadnacionalnog medijskog sustava, gdje se skoro svako spominjanje nacionalne posebnosti ima smatrati nacionalizmom, odnosno atakom na daytonske tekovine. Po čekom svibnja 2001. godine intervencijom IMC došlo je do gašenja signala nekih medijskih elektronskih centara, tako mostarskom "EROTEL-u", tako ñer je ukinuto emitiranje
88 televizijskih programa iz Savezne Republike Jugoslavije i Republike Hrvatske (HRT). Srbi u RS, kao zasebnom, njihovome entitetu, imaju i po imenu i po sadržaju svoje elektronske medije širokog opsega. Hrvati u BiH su ovim potezima ostali jedini konstitutivni narod bez televizijskog kanala koji bi emitirao na hrvatskome jeziku. 33 Istina, dosadašnja televizija BHT (bosansko-hercegova čka televizija) je transformirana u Federalnu televiziju (FTV). Cilj ove transformacije je napraviti televiziju koja će se mo ći gledati na cijelom prostoru BiH, a u kojoj će ravnopravno biti zastupljeni bošnja čki i hrvatski interesi. Ali, to se nije dogodilo i postoji opravdana bojazan da se ne će ni dogoditi u dogledno vrijeme. Ure ñiva čka politika FTV je promijenjena i manje je tendenciozna nego je bila u vrijeme postojanja BHTV. Ali, po njezinu programu, strukturi zaposlenih, na činu izvješ ćivanja Hrvati je, nažalost, ne prepoznaju kao svoju Televiziju. Nedovoljna zastupljenost hrvatskog jezika u programu FTV je uvjetovana i činjenicom što Hrvati novinari, koji mogu dobiti radno mjesto na toj televiziji, ne znaju ili ne žele govoriti hrvatski jezik.
Neosporna je potreba žurnog preure ñenja medijskog prostora u Bosni i Hercegovini, ali tu reformu treba provesti u duhu tolerancije i ravnopravnosti sva tri konstitutivna naroda. Stanje u medijima name će zaklju čak da bi Me ñunarodna zajednica, koja je preuzela ulogu jamca uspostavljanja zajedni čkog i financijski samoodrživog medijskog sustava Bosne i Hercegovine, trebala više uvažavati razli čitosti svih njenih naroda i gra ñana.
33 Nakon ukidanja "Erotel-a" u BiH djeluju samo tri lokalne TV postaje koje emitiraju program na hrvatskom jeziku: "HTV Mostar", "Oskar-C" (Mostar) i "TV KISS" iz Kiseljaka.
89 3. Politi čka kriza u BiH
Rijetko je koja rije č doživjela tako veliku inflaciju i svoju dekadencu kao rije č “kriza”. Nju upotrebljavamo za sve i svašta, tako da ona u svom izvornom zna čenju prosudbe, rasprave ili procjene ozbiljnih problema često biva neozbiljno shva ćana. Na prostoru Bosne i Hercegovine uvijek je bilo manjih ili ve ćih kriza, te njihovih opre čnih interpretacija. Ratni vihor je najgrublji dokaz postojanja složenih kriza i najneprikladniji na čin njihova rješavanja. Daytonski mirovni sporazum, usuglašen 21. studenog a sve čano potpisan 14. prosinca 1995. u Parizu, imao je namjeru biti odre ñeno rješenje ratno-politi čke krize 1991.-1995. u Bosni i Hercegovini. Njemu je uspjelo zaustaviti rat, ali ne i ukloniti korijene dubokih politi čkih kriza na ovim prostorima. Koliko god bio nepravedan, sporazum je bio bolje rješenje od daljnje ratne opcije. Bosansko-hercegova čki Hrvati, kao najmalobrojniji konstitutivni narod ove zemlje, prihvatili su Daytonski sporazum s velikim oduševljenjem i olakšanjem, iako su dva daytonska entiteta – Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine i Republika srpska – te pravno neriješeno pitanje Br čko-Distrikta, od po četka predstavljala potencijalna žarišta novih politi čkih kriza, zbog čega neki hrvatski predstavnici u Daytonu nisu uop će potpisali sporazum. Potencijalna žarišta su sve više postajala realnost, kada su entiteti vo ñeni “etni čkim na čelima” iz dana u dan sve više dobivali na važnosti, a daytonska konstrukcija zajedni čke države sve više blijedjela. Time je kod Hrvata u Bosni i Hercegovini opravdano rastao sve ve ći strah za njihova nacionalna prava u ovoj zemlji, a Daytonski sporazum je sve više postajao izvorištem politi čkih kriza a ne njihovih rješenja. U tom kontekstu treba gledati zaista veliku politi čku krizu u Bosni i Hercegovini u 2001. godini.
Politi čka kriza u 2001. doživjela je svoju kulminaciju pri konstituiranju vlasti poslije op ćih izbora održanih 11. studenog 2000. Dakle, korijeni ovogodišnje krize leže u prošloj kalendarskoj godini, a kriza je kulminirala u ovoj godini. Središnje mjesto u ovoj krizi igra privremeni izborni zakon za izbore 2000., jer u to vrijeme nije bio izglasan nikakav stalni izborni zakon. Privremeno izborno povjerenstvo, čiji je mandat utvr ñen Aneksom 3. Op ćeg okvrinog sporazuma za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini, a koje se sastojalo od doma ćih i inozemnoh članova, na čijem je čelu bio voditelj Misije OESS-a za BiH veleposlanik Robert L. Barry, usvojilo je, zapravo primilo k znanju nametanje pravila i propisa prema kojima su održani izbori u studenome 2000. Ona istinska ali skrivena namjera OESS-a, organizatora tih izbora, je bila smanjiti utjecaj dominiraju ćih nacionalnih stranaka, koje su im se činile velikom zaprekom na putu politi čke stabilizacije i demokratizacije zemlje, te na taj na čin pripomo ći ne strogo nacionalno programatskim strankama, od kojih su o čekivali ve ću kooperativnost u implementaciji Daytonskog sporazuma.
Politi čki kamen smutnje su postale izmijenjene odredbe pravila za izbor izaslanika za Dom naroda Parlamenta Federacije BiH. Institucija Doma naroda utemeljena je s ciljem zaštite vitalnih nacionalnih interesa konstitutivnih naroda, i ne postoji u Republici srpskoj. Izmjenu odredbi donio je 11. listopada 2000. predsjedatelj Privremenog izbornog povjerenstva
90 gospodin Barry, uz pristanak i blagoslov Visokog predstavnika Me ñunarodne zajednice 34 u Bosni i Hercegovini OHR-a gospodina Wolfganga Petritscha, nepuni mjesec dana prije samih izbora, nakon višemjese čnog odlaganja i uz protivljenje dva hrvatska člana izbornog povjerenstva. Za našu temu bitne promjene su:
1. Da je svim članovima županijskih skupština dopušteno da glasovati za sve županijske zastupnike u federalnom Domu naroda. Glas je proporcionalan gdje su kandidati na svakoj listi ozna čeni kao Hrvat, Bošnjak ili ostali. Etni čka kvota za svaku županiju će osigurati da je broj Hrvata i Bošnjaka u federalnom Domu naroda po 30, a broj ostalih 20. Nadalje se osigurava preraspodjela slobodnih zastupni čkih mjesta izme ñu županija; 2. Uvodi se nova metoda dodjele mjesta raznim županijskim skupštinama koja treba pokazati utjecaj izbornog tijela u svakoj županiji. Na taj na čin ova pravila žele omogu ćiti da predstavljanje svake županije u Domu naroda oslikava snagu izbornog tijela u toj županiji, dok istodobno osigurava minimum predstavljanja za svaku županiju; 3. Regulira se raspodjela mjesta po etni čkim skupinama.
Prva promijenjena odredba ove odluke vezana za proceduru izbora izaslanika iz županijskih skupština bila je najviše upitna, čak su je neke hrvatske politi čke stranke, okupljene oko Hrvatske demokratske zajednice, proglasile protuustavnom i nepravednom, smatraju ći da su time ugrožena jednaka i suverena prava hrvatskog naroda u BiH da bira svoje predstavnike u Dom naroda Parlamenta Federacije BiH i Parlamentarne skupštine BiH. Sukladno ranijim izbornim pravilima, zastupnike u Dom naroda birali su klubovi zastupnika u županijskim skupštinama, dok je izmijenjenim pravilima bilo predvi ñeno da svaka stranka, strana čka udruga ili skupina od tri zastupnika u županijskim skupštinama može predložiti listu kandidata za Dom naroda Federacije iz reda Hrvata, Bošnjaka i iz reda ostalih. Važno je pripomenuti da se promjena odnosila na županijsku razinu, odakle su se prije birali zastupnici za Dom naroda po strogom etni čkom na čelu. To zna či da su stanovnici jedne županije birali kandidate iz svoje etni čke skupine. Po promijenjenom na čelu kandidati se mogu birati neovisno o nacionalnoj pripadnosti. U tome su neke hrvatske stranke vidjele udar na suverenost i konstitutivnost hrvatskog naroda jer su predstavnike hrvatskoga naroda mogli predložiti i izabrati pripadnici drugih naroda. One su podnijele zahtjev za izmjenu ovih pravila, odnosno njihovo vra ćanje u sklad s njihovom interpretacijom ustava, to jest vra ćanje prethodnih rješenja izbornih odredbi.
Drugi politi čki kamen smutnje bila je izmijenjena struktura broja i nacionalnog sastava biranih zastupnika iz županijskih skupština u odnosu na op će izbore 1996. i 1998. godine. OESS se pozivao na kriterije broja registriranih bira ča uskla ñeno raspodijeljenih po županijama i popisu pu čanstva iz 1991. godine. Neke hrvatske stranke su to smatrale nelogi čnim, jer su neke županije npr. s desetak tisu ća Hrvata mogle birati isti broj hrvatskih zastupnika kao i
34 Treba re ći da je vrlo složen pojam, u kojem OHR i OESS imaju klju čne uloge, te da ni oni nisu uvijek bili jedinstveni u svojim pogledima.
91 neke s devedeset tisu ća Hrvata. Osim toga, one su isticale mogu ćnost velikog upliva bošnja čkih zastupnika u županijskim skupštinama na izbor hrvatskih predstavnika. Tvrdile su da čak 19 hrvatskih zastupnika u Dom naroda Federacije od ukupno njih 30 mogu izabrati bošnja čki predstavnici.
Što se ti če izbora predsjednika i dopredsjednika Federacije, nova pravila omogu ćavaju zastupnicima iz redova ostalih da mogu birati bilo u Klubu bošnja čkih ili u Klubu hrvatskih izaslanika. Jer Ustav Federacije BiH odre ñuje da to regulira samo klub bošnja čkih i hrvatskih zastupnika (B, čl.2), predbacivalo se izbornom povjerenstvu da je novim izbornim pravilima prekršilo odredbe Ustava Federacije BiH, pa je stoga izmjena protuustavna i nezakonita.
Ultimativne zahtjeve hrvatskih stranaka za revizijom izmijenjenih izbornih pravila OESS nije prihva ćao. Odnosi su se zaoštravali i polarizirali. Kriza se produbljivala krajem 2000. U Mostaru je 23. listopada 2000 na sastanku nekih hrvatskih politi čkih stranaka donesena odluka u tri to čke:
1. Izmjene su protuustavne te predstavljaju nastavak procesa dekonstituiranja hrvatskog naroda u BiH pa se zahtijeva njihovo povla čenje i istodobno inzistira da se pravo i na čin izbora zastupnika u domove naroda standardizira tako da odgovaraju ći klubovi naroda predlažu i biraju svoje zastupnike u domove naroda oba entiteta i na razini BiH. 2. Donesena je odluka da se u subotu, 28. listopada 2000. godine, u Novom Travniku održi Hrvatski narodni sabor BiH, na kojem će se razmotriti ustavno-pravna pozicija hrvatskog naroda u BiH te na čini ostvarenja jednakopravnosti, suverenosti i konstitutivnosti hrvatskog naroda u BiH. 3. Utemeljen je Poticajni odbor za pripremu i organizaciju Hrvatskog narodnog sabora BiH, kojeg čine predstavnici svih hrvatskih politi čkih stranaka nazo čnih na sastanku. 35
28. listopada organiziran je i održan najavljeni Hrvatski narodni sabor u Novom Travniku, koji je slovio kao novo najviše politi čko tijelo hrvatskog naroda u BiH. Na sjednici je usvojena Deklaracija o pravima i položaju hrvatskog naroda u BiH i Odluka o raspisivanju Referenduma hrvatskog naroda u BiH. Sjednici u Novom Travniku bio je nazo čan vrhbosanski nadbiskup Vinko kardinal Pulji ć zajedno s provincijalom Bosne srebrene fra Mijom Džolanom i velikim brojem sve ćenika iz vrhbosanske i mostarske biskupije.
Nakon napete izborne kampanje, za vrijeme koje je bilo skidanja s liste kandidata ili oduzimanja mandata bez prava njihove zamjene što je presedan u demokratskom društvu, izbori su provedeni 11. listopada 2001. Istog dana paralelno, po odluci Hrvatskog narodnog sabora, održan je referendum u mjestima s hrvatskom ve ćinom, u kome se odlu čivalo o regulaciji odnosa prema BiH. U takvoj formulaciji neki su gledali separatisti čke tendencije. Na službene rezultate izbora se dugo čekalo. Konstituiranje zakonodavnih tijela trebalo se
35 N. Herceg – Z. Tomi ć, str. 88. Sastanku nisu nazo čile sve hrvatske stranke ma kako one bile važne ili nevažne.
92 obaviti u ustavima propisanom vremenu, na saveznom nivou za 30, a na federalnom za 20 dana od službenog proglašenja. OESS je indirektno, ne žele ći, tjerao izbornu vodu na mlin nacionalnih stranaka. Njihove ishitrene pa i tendenciozne poteze one su znale vješto iskoristiti i predstaviti kao napade na vitalne nacionalne interese, samo nacionalno bi će i identitet. To potvr ñuje i HDZ-ov izborni slogan: «Oslobo ñenje ili istrebljenje». HDZBiH je pobijedila u 5 od 10 županija, a istodobno je ultimativno tražila reviziju izmijenjenih odredbi te je odbijala u ći u proceduru izbora izaslanika i tako je blokirala rad svih zakonodavnih tijela na federalnoj i županijskoj razini. Veleposlanik Barry, kao predsjedavaju ći Privremenog izbornog povjerenstva, tek je 23. velja če 2001. godine potvrdio sastav Doma naroda parlamenta BiH, nakon njihovog izbora od strane “krnjeg” sastava Doma naroda Parlamenta FBiH i Narodne skupštine RS. “Krnjeg” zato što zastupnici iz bloka Hrvatskog narodnog sabora nisu nazo čili. Na konstituiraju ćoj sjednici Doma naroda Parlamenta Federacije BiH bilo 14 (od 30) izaslanika iz reda hrvatskog naroda, 25 (od 30) izaslanika iz reda bošnja čkog naroda i 19 (od 20) izaslanika iz reda ostalih. Oni su izabrali 5 izaslanika Hrvata i 5 izaslanika Bošnjaka u Dom naroda Parlamenta BiH. 36
Novoformirani Hrvatski narodni sabor BiH bojkotirao je rad ovog doma i osporavao njegovu legalnost i legitimnost sa stajališta neustavne procedure, nepostoje ćeg legitimnog kvoruma, neustavnog glasovanja ostalih, te proceduralnih i poslovni čkih propusta, po kojima je npr. predsjedavaju ći starog saziva imao sazvati konstituiraju ću sjednicu, a on je to uporno izbjegavao. Gospodin Ante Jelavi ć je 1. ožujka 2001. izjavio da je od tog dana Federacija čisto bošnja čka, to jest bez Hrvata, da su institucije u Bosni ilegalne i nelegitimne. Niti će u njima sudjelovati, niti će njihove odluke priznati. To je omogu ćilo da u zakonodavna tijela budu izabrani kandidati koji se nisu kandidirali na izborima ili pak nisu zadobili ve ćinsko povjerenje bira ča.
Jednostrana promjena izbornih odredbi nije bila demokratska. Promjene nisu bile najsretnije rješenje. Izborni zakon nije bio u skladu s demokracijom i njime su radikalne snage još više oja čale, izjavila je 20. travnja 2001. godine u Sarajevu i Doris Pack, predsjednica Ureda za jugoisto čnu Europu pri Europskom parlamentu u Strassbourgu. Time postavljeni cilj OESS- a, ublažiti snagu nacionalnih stranaka, nije ostvaren. Hrvatske stranke su smatrale promjene tihom neustavnom revizijom Daytonskog sporazuma na štetu konstituvnosti hrvatskog naroda, udar na njegove vitalne interese, poput prava na izbore zastupnika zna čajnih zakonodavnih institucija i prava na samoodre ñenje. Biskup Peri ć je analiziraju ći te doga ñaje pred ameri čkim Kongresom izjavio 25. srpnja 2001. da Hrvati svojim izbornim pravom mogu birati i Srbina za svoga zastupnika koji će ga predstavljati, ali hrvatski narod ne može predstavljati Hrvat, kojega su izabrali Srbi i Bošnjaci.
Kriza je u prolje će dosegla svoj vrhunac. Velike optužbe mogle su se čuti i s jedne i druge strane. Hrvatski narodni sabor je, iz pozicije da je hrvatski narod u BiH sveden na drugorazrednu, nekonstitutivnu razinu čime je ugrožena njegova jednakost i ravnopravnost,
36 Isto, str. 131.
93 ultimativno postavljao uvjet da se u 15 dana promijeni ustav i izborni zakoni. Promjene bi trebale osigurati regionalizaciju cijele Bosne i Hercegovine s autonomnim ovlastima, ili će oni proklamirati svoj entitet s vlastitim ustavom, samoupravu s vlastititom vladom, zakonodavstvom, sudstvom i porezima itd., to jest revitalizirati Hrvatsku republiku Herceg- Bosnu, s opravdanjem da su Srbi u Dyatonu dobili svoju republiku a Bošnjaci postdaytonskim promjenama svoju. Samouprava bi obuhvatila pet od deset županija Federacije. To su glavni zahtjevi Hrvatskog narodnog sabora održanog 3. ožujka 2001. u Mostaru. Time bi “pax Daytoniana” bio stavljen “ad acta” i imao muzejsku vrijednost. Bili su to potezi traženja ravnopravnosti za Hrvate sve do odvajanja, ako druga rješenja ne budu mogu ća. OHR i OESS su drasti čno odgovarali da će strogo kazniti sve koji grade paralelne antidaytonske strukture. Tako je Visoki predstavnik OHR-a isklju čio gospodina Antu Jelavi ća iz Predsjedništva BiH i zabranio mu zajedno s još šest politi čara politi čko i strana čko djelovanje. Usprkos toga delegati HDZ–a su izabrali Jelavi ća za svoga strana čkog predsjednika.
Biskup Ratko Peri ć je na Hrvatskom narodnom saboru u Mostaru održao govor. Polaze ći od rezultata referenduma koji je održan paralelno s izborima 11. studenog 2000., po kome hrvatski narod u BiH ima pravo na samoobranu svoga bi ća, i svojih prava, obveza i sloboda, on je pozdravio Sabor kao plebiscitarno izborenu i o čitovanu odluku hrvatskog naroda. Preporu čio je da Sabor kao društvena i politi čka institucija treba ostati kao trajna i stabilna institucija. Biskup je dalje istaknuo jednakopravnost svih naroda u BiH. Zauzeo se za reviziju Washingtonskog i Daytonskog sporazuma zbog nepravedne podjele BiH. Gospodin Wolfgang Petritsch je sam reagirao na biskupov govor i predbacio mu za “govor mržnje”. Podršku biskupu Peri ću dala je i Biskupska konferencija BiH, koja je sa svoga susreta u Sarajevu 8. ožujka 2001. izdala priop ćenje, u kojemu se kolegijalno usvajaju “na čela” koja je mons. Ratko Peri ć iznio na zasjedanju u Mostaru 3. ožujka. Oni nadalje izražavaju svoje neslaganje s ignoriranjem politi čke volje hrvatskog naroda od strane Me ñunarodne zajednice. Biskupi tvrde da promijenjeni izborni zakon, na čin biranja članova Predsjedništva, uloga Doma naroda stvarno dokidaju ravnopravnost i jednakost hrvatskog naroda u odnosu na druga dva naroda. Oni pozivaju kako Me ñunarodnu zajednicu tako i hrvatske legalne i legitimne predstavnike na dijalog. Ogra ñuju se od onih koji bi vitalne hrvatske interese htjeli iskoristiti u privatne svrhe, kao i od onih koji bi mogli svesti hrvatski narod na nacionalnu manjinu. Isticanjem “na čela” Hrvatskog narodnog sabora biskupi su indirektno naglasili da ne podržavaju sve na čine njihove izvaninstitucionalne obrane.
Naelektrizirana klima prešla je s politi čkog na sva društvena podru čja. Ona je zahvatila i hrvatsku komponentu vojske Federacije BiH, čime se pokazala povezanost politi čkih i vojnih dužnosnika. Časnici, do časnici i vojaci hrvatske komponente otkazivali su poslušnost novopostavljenom ministru obrane, po nacionalnosti Hrvatu. Kasarne su napuštane da bi ih zaposjedale ili blokirale spontano okupljene žene i demonstranti. Predstavnici Me ñunarodne zajednice vidjeli su u tome otvoreni pokušaj stvaranja vlastite vojske revitalizirane Herceg- Bosne.
94 Slu čaj Hercegova čke banke je tako ñer drasti čni odgovor OHR-a. S velikim oružanim snagama upali su 18. travnja 2001. u središnjicu u Mostaru. Banku su jedni smatrali da je predstavljala jedan od temelja gospodarske mo ći Hrvata u BiH, a drugi su mislili da ju je osnovao HDZ i da su sve važnije institucije pod hrvatskom kontrolom bile prisiljene raditi s tom bankom. Ovom doga ñaju je prethodilo postavljanje privremene upraviteljice 5. travnja 2001., zbog sumnji u postojanje tajnih ra čuna kojima se financira hrvatska samouprava. Predstavnici me ñunarodne zajednice u BiH još uvijek nisu dokazali i objavili nezakonite radnje u poslovanju te banke.
Zaklju čak
Politi čka kriza u BiH u 2001. bila je zapravo ustavna kriza, koja je u kona čnici produkt nedovoljno i nedetaljno definiranih podru čja u Daytonskom sporazumu, kojim je BiH dobila ustav, ali bez utemeljenih i precizno formuliranih državnih institucija i struktura. Čini se da je takav nedovoljno razra ñeni ustav, kome su potrebne dopune, najviše odgovarao Me ñunarodnoj zajednici. Pored velike zasluge u mirovnom procesu u BiH, te velikih nov čanih investicija ona je ovakvim ustavnim dogovorom dobila mogu ćnost skoro neograni čene kontrole u zemlji bez oficijelno pravnog preuzimanja uloge protektorata. Svoju ulogu su opravdavali time da samo jaka me ñunarodna prisutnost i njihovo demokratsko iskustvo mogu riješiti me ñunacionalne konflikte i dovesti zemlju do stabilizacije i demokracije. Ova politi čka kriza, izme ñu ostalih dokaza, pokazala je gore postavljenu tezu kao čistu iluziju.
Ovlasti Visokog predstavnika u BiH su zaista velike. U ovoj krizi su se na djelu dokazale: on zabranjuje politi čko djelovanje, ukida pravo da se bude biran, oduzima mandat legitimno izabranim predstavnicima, utje če na donošenje zakona, neke zakone ili zakonske ukaze sam donosi, poput himne, grba i zastave, prije sudskog postupka odobrava nasilni ulazak u banku i plijeni dokazni materijal itd. Postupci u ovoj krizi dokazuju da su njegove ovlasti ve će od protektorata ili «quasi-protektorata». U zadnje vrijeme su one čak i proširene. U mogu ćnosti je utjecati na rad sudstva i policije, medija itd. Pod kraj 2001. je u Brüsselu dobio ovlast sastavljati neku vrstu paralelne vlade.
Hrvati su jedan od tri konstitutivna naroda u BiH. Nova izborna pravila su vrijedila, istina, za sve narode, ali su najviše poga ñala hrvatski narod kao najmalobrojniji, jer je omogu ćeno zastupnicima ostalih naroda da dominantno utje ču na izbor zastupnika iz jednog naroda. Upravo je tu najmalobrojniji narod najviše pogo ñen, jer je prakti čno omogu ćeno da hrvatske predstavnike u Dom naroda mogu u kona čnici birati predstavnici druga dva konstitutivna naroda. K tome, uvo ñenjem kategorije “Ostali” i statusa koji im je, suprotno propisima EK o manjinama, dan može se re ći da je uveden četvrti konstitutivni narod. Time je pozicija ve ćinskoga naroda u FBiH još više oja čala, ali i dovedena u pitanje konstitutivnost Hrvata u BiH. Na taj na čin nije došla do potpunog izražaja slobodna i demokratska bira čka volja ve ćine hrvatskog naroda. Glavni smisao Doma naroda je da zašti ćuje kolektivna prava sva
95 tri konstitutivna naroda u BiH. Čini se opravdanim pitanje, je li ovako konstituiran Dom naroda u mogu ćnosti istinski štititi vitalne interese svakog konstitutivnog naroda u BiH?
Konstitutiranje i uloga Hrvatskog narodnog sabora je po sebi dobra ideja, koja bi, po našem mišljenju, trebala biti iznadstrana čko svehrvatsko moralno obvezuju će savjetodavno tijelo, u kojem bi se trebali čuti stavovi svih politi čko-strana čkih, društveno-kulturnih i crkvenih predstavnika, koje bi kao najviša moralno obvezuju ća hrvatska instanca štitilo vitalne hrvatske interese. Konstituiran u najve ćoj politi čkoj krizi, bez potrebne reputacije i recipiranog moralnog profila i autoriteta, Sabor je, čini se, bio strana čki ispolitiziran. Ideja takvog Sabora postojala je i prije ove krize, koju tada vladaju ća stranka nije prihva ćala. Dojam je da se konstituiranjem Sabora prekasno pokušalo izdi ći stvarnu problematiku sa strana čkog na svenacionalnu hrvatsku razinu. Možda su iz sli čnih strana čkih politi čkih razloga dva hrvatska člana iz te stranke, 2000., pri donošenju vrlo važne odluke Ustavnog suda BiH o konstitivnosti tri naroda u BiH na svim prostorima, bila protivna. Nadalje, politi čki scenarij ove krize bio je sli čan donekle, naravno u sasvim drugim okolnostima, na onaj iz 1992., kada su hrvatski članovi u Predsjedništvu, prije Barryevog nepravednog izbornog zakona, napustili svoja mjesta u Predsjedništvu, Vladi, Parlamentu i istovremeno proglašavali izdajicama one preostale Hrvate. npr. u Sarajevu. Najja ča hrvatska polit čka stranka u BiH je sama vladala u ime hrvatskog naroda desetak, istina teških, godina, ali tako je neosporno pored velikih uspjeha, s jedne strane, u najve ćeoj mjeri, s druge strane, doprinijela katastrofalnom stanju Hrvata u BiH, ili to ona, nažalost, nije uspjela sprije čiti. Umjesto priznanja vlastite suodgovornosti, koju se sada u izvjesnoj mjeri željelo podijeliti s drugima, pribjeglo se konstituiranju Hrvatskog narodnog sabora, a po svemu sude ći je ta ista stranka imala sve konce u svojim rukama i povla čila sve važne politi čke poteze unutar Hrvatskog narodnog sabora.
Nakon dugotrajne blokade od strane ve ćine izabranih hrvatskih zastupnika pristupilo se konstituiranju vlasti. Ona mjesta koja su pripadala legitimno i legalno izabranim hrvatskim zastupnicima popunjena su Hrvatima koji su dobili daleko manje glasova. Što prvi nisu htjeli, to su drugi objeru čke prihvatili. Ne može ih se za to kriviti, na na čin na koji su prvi činili. Vlast je svima slatka i opasna napast. Ušavši u strukture nove vlasti, Hrvati su se upustili u frontalnu borbu protiv “svojih” ne biraju ći sredstva, pa se dobio dojam, da im je važniji ostanak na vlasti, nego svi legaliteti i legitimiteti. Na kraju treba re ći da je hrvatski narod u ovoj krizi pretrpio najve će udarce i štete. Paušalno i neopravdano se na Hrvate u BiH kao zajednicu gleda kao na separatiste, ultranacionaliste i šoviniste, iako treba priznati da me ñu njima kao i me ñu pripadnicima drugih naroda ima i takvih težnji. Za vrijeme ove krize Hrvati su dobili previše “žutih i crvenih kartona”, to jest negativnih politi čkih bodova, na doma ćoj i me ñunarodnoj politi čkoj sceni. Neutemeljeno su kao narod okarakterizirani kao nekooperativni i netolerantni, te za suživot s drugim narodima u BiH nespremni. Unutar samog hrvatskog korpusa stvoren je veliki jaz. Hrvatski narod je zbog ratnih stradanja i poratnih nepravdi i me ñusobno podijeljen. Kako to obi čno biva u tome su neki predstavnici Me ñunarodne zajednice u BiH pokazivali i dokazivali snagu ja čega. Iako su i sami uvidjeli svoje o čite propuste, nisu imali snage javno ih priznati, a još manje
96 ispraviti. Činilo se da su se vodili onom rimskom: divide et impera, a ovdje: zavadi pa vladaj. Kao da im je sve ovo poslužilo da barem oštrim stavom prema najslabijima pokažu snagu i bar neke uspjehe. Hrvatski politi čari su pokazali premalo politi čkog sluha, takta i zrelosti, premalo se ostavljalo prostora da možda i oni drugi imaju isti cilj iako ga žele ostvariti drugim putem i na činom. Jedni su se odlu čili za politi čku borbu izvan institucija, drugi za sudjelovanje u vlasti bez izbornoga pokri ća naroda koji zastupaju. Ne može se opravdati odsutnost politi čke volje kod pojedinih hrvatskih politi čara i stranaka da u čine što su mogli kako bi se, u krivi i prema hrvatskome narodu nepravedni daytonski okvir, ugradila što pravednija slika BiH. S druge strane, mora se podvući da su postupci predstavnika Me ñunarodne zajednice doveli do stanja u kojem su Hrvati prestali biti politi čki faktor u BiH. Takvo stanje ne može voditi stabilizaciji, demokratizaciji i prosperitetu ove zemlje. Istina, povratak vojaka u kasarne i hrvatskih parlamentaraca u parlament nagovještava spremnost za prevladavanja nastaloga jaza u hrvatskom korpusu i rješavanja temeljnih pitanja u okviru institucija. Ali, ostaje otvoreno pitanje spremnosti sadašnjih predstavnika Me ñunarodne zajednice i doma ćih struktura vlasti da adekvatno riješe i položaj hrvatskoga pitanja u BiH. Politi čka kriza u BiH se na sre ću smirila, ali nije riješena. Mnogo se o čekuje od provo ñenja odluke Ustavnog suda BiH o konstitutivnosti tri naroda na teritoriji cijele BiH, o čemu se trenutno vode ozbiljniji politi čki pregovori.
Komisija Justitia et pax Biskupske Konferencije(BK) BiH vidi budu ćnost ove zemlje kao jedinstvene države u kojoj su sva tri konstitutivna naroda ravnopravna i kojoj su svakoj osobi zagarantirana sva temeljna ljudska prava. Justitia et pax BK BiH smatra politi čku krizu u BiH 2001 zaoštravanjem polarizacije, kako na politi čkoj tako i me ñunacionalnoj razini, koja nije nikomu od koristi, niti i jednom narodu u ovoj zemlji, niti ovoj državi a niti Me ñunarodnoj zajednici.
97 4. SFOR (Stabilization Forces) u Bosni i Hercegovini
4.1. Zada ća i povijest nastanka IFOR-a
Nakon potpisivanja Op ćeg mirovnog sporazuma 14. prosinca 1995. godine u Parizu, poslije pregovora u Dayton-u, NATO multinacionalne snage su dobile mandat za implementaciju vojnog aspekta Op ćeg mirovnog sporazuma (Anex 1A), a nazvane su IFOR. Njihov mandat je zapo čeo 20. prosinca 1995. s trajanjem od jedne godine. U okviru svog mandata osnovna zada ća IFOR-a obuhva ća:
• razdvajanje vojnih snaga entiteta Bosne i Hercegovine, Federacija (Bošnja čko- Hrvatski entitet) i Republika Srpska (Srpski entitet) do sredine sije čnja 1996. godine, • prijenos podru čja izme ñu dva entiteta do ožujka 1996. godine (Daytonskim sporazumom je predvi ñeno da pojedina područja koja su pripadala jednom entitetu pripadnu drugom) i • prikupljanje teškog naoružanja unutar entiteta do lipnja 1996. godine.
Tijekom svog jednogodišnjeg mandata IFOR je nadgledao dugu 1.400 km me ñuentitetsku granicu i prikupio je oko 800 komada teškog naoružanja i druge opreme. Osim toga, osposobio je oko 60 mostova i otvorio oko 2.500 km puta u cijeloj BiH i preuzeo je komandu nad sarajevskim aerodromom. Na ovaj na čin je uspostavljeno sigurnosno okruženje u BiH koje je omogu ćilo i drugim organizacijama da po čnu sa svojim radom unutar civilnog aspekta Op ćeg mirovnog sporazuma. Tako su kreirani uvjeti za po četak povratka normalnog života u BiH. Pri kraju jednogodišnjeg mandata u BiH su organizirani prvi poslijeratni slobodni izbori u rujnu 1996. godine, za čiju je provedbu IFOR dao podršku.
Vojni aspekt Op ćeg mirovnog sporazuma - IFOR je u okviru svog mandata, brzo i efikasno ostvario zada će koje su pred njega bile postavljene i uživao je podršku naroda BiH. Nakon rata i svih podnesenih strahota došao je mir koji se morao poštovati. Akcije koje je IFOR vodio dovele su do stabilne reintegracije podru čja izme ñu entiteta, uklanjanje teškog naoružanja van dometa istog te tako uklonile mogu ćnost ponovnog izbijanja sukoba.
4.2. Transformacija IFOR - SFOR
Nakon mirnog sprovo ñenja izbora u rujnu 1996. godine IFOR je uspješno završio mandat za sprovo ñenje vojnog aspekta Mirovnog sporazuma. Politi čka situacija u BiH je još uvijek bila nestabilna i nesigurna. Nakon završetka izbora u rujnu 1996. godine, NATO ministri obrane su zaklju čili da je potrebno reorganizirati snage kako bi mogli nastaviti s uspostavom sigurnog okruženja u BiH, po isteku mandata IFOR-u u prosincu 1996. godine. U studenom- prosincu 1996. godine napravljen je plan za sigurnost u BiH, koji je usvojen u Parizu. Ministri vanjskih poslova i ministri obrane zemalja NATO pakta zaklju čili su da je potrebno smanjiti vojne snage i organizirati Snage stabilizacije (SFOR). Mandat SFOR-a zapo čeo je 20.
98 prosinca 1996. godine, na dan isteka mandata IFOR-a. Razlika zadataka izme ñu SFOR-a i IFOR-a vidljiva je ve ć u njihovim imenima. IFOR (Implementation Forces) - snage za implementaciju mira. SFOR (Stabilization Forces) – snage za stabilizaciju mira. Na po četku mandata snage SFOR-a su brojale oko 32.000 trupa, što je otprilike upola manje od snaga IFOR-a.
SFOR kao i IFOR djeluje unutar strogih pravila koja su odre ñena člankom VII. UN, gdje je to čno odre ñeno djelovanje i uporaba sile u njihovoj misiji kao i zaštita njih samih. U okviru svog mandata osnovna zada ća SFOR-a je sudjelovanje u stvaranju sigurne i stabilne okoline za izgradnju održivog mira, dok su specijalni zadaci SFOR-a:
• sprije čiti ponovna neprijateljstva, odnosno utvrditi mirovni napredak, • unaprijediti klimu u kojoj se mirovni proces može poboljšati, • osigurati potporu civilnim organizacijama u okviru njihovih mogu ćnosti.
4.3. Sudjelovanje zemalja u SFOR-u
Sa znatno smanjenim snagama SFOR je bio u mogu ćnosti koncentrirati se na implementaciju glavnih odredbi Anex-a 1A Mirovnog ugovora tj. osiguranje uvjeta za rad lokalnih i me ñunarodnih organizacija, kao i potporu drugim organizacijama. SFOR trenutno ima oko 20.000 vojnika.
U rujnu 2001. godine slijede će zemlje članice NATO snaga imale su svoje trupe u BiH: Belgija, Kanada, Češka Republika, Danska, Francuska, Njema čka, Gr čka, Ma ñarska, Island, Italija, Nizozemska, Norveška, Poljska, Portugal, Španjolska, Turska, Velika Britanija i Sjedinjene Ameri čke Države.
Zemlje koje nisu članice NATO, a imaju trupe u BiH su: Albanija, Austrija, Argentina, Bugarska, Estonija, Finska, Irska, Letonija, Litva, Maroko, Rumunjska, Rusija, Slova čka, Slovenija i Švedska.
Snage zemalja koje nisu članice NATO uklju čene su u operacije SFOR-a na istoj osnovi kao i snage zemalja članica NATO. To ukazuje na činjenicu mogu ćeg zajedni čkog rada u operacijama u miru, što je od velikog zna čenja za cijelu Europu. Glavni komandant snaga SFOR-a je osoba iz zemlje koja je članica NATO. Iz dostupnih izvora informiranja se vrlo malo zna o uspješnosti ovakvog na čina funkcioniranja.
4.4. Potpora SFOR-a u civilnom dijelu Mirovnog sporazuma
Nastavljaju ći sprovo ñenje vojnog aspekta Mirovnog sporazuma, SFOR je pomagao u implementaciji sigurnosnog okruženja za civilnu i politi čku rekonstrukciju. Za sprovo ñenje civilnog dijela Mirovnog sporazuma zadužene su sljede će organizacije: Ured visokog
99 predstavnika (OHR), UNIPTF, UNHCR, Organizacija europske sigurnosti i suradnje (OESS), Me ñunarodni sud za ratne zlo čine u bivšoj Jugoslaviji (ICTY), te mnoge druge vladine i nevladine organizacije.
Civilne aspekte Mirovnog sporazuma sprovode me ñunarodne organizacije, unutar koordinacije Visokog predstavnika. S obzirom na važnost civilnog dijela Mirovnog sporazuma SFOR je pomagao u njihovu sprovo ñenju. U cilju što bolje efikasnosti SFOR i organizacije zadužene za sprovo ñenje civilnog dijela Sporazuma su morale imati plan s to čno odre ñenim zadacima SFOR-a za potporu, kada je to bilo potrebno. Tako je SFOR u sklopu svojih aktivnosti u potpori sprovo ñenja civilnog dijela Mirovnog sporazuma imao sljedeće zadatke:
• jam čenje sigurnosti za državne izbore listopada 1998. godine, op ćinske izbore 1997. godine i travnja 2000. godine, specijalne izbore u Republici Srpskoj 1997. godine i op će izbore u studenom 2000. godine;
• osiguranje potpore OESS-u u pripremama za gore spomenute izbore kao i izradi pravila za politi čke stranke, kontrolu naoružanja vojski na prostoru BiH;
• potpora UNHCR-u u nadgledanju uvjeta za povratak prognanih i raseljenih osoba, povratak u zone razdvajanja, prevencija konflikata u podru čjima povratka;
• promocija lokalnih i drugih zakona u suradnji s UNIPTF-om koji su temeljni za uspostavu i održavanje mira;
• rad sa vlastima BiH na uspostavi sigurnog okruženja pri održavanju Samita Pakta stabilnosti za Jugoisto čnu Europu, koji je održan u Sarajevu, 29. i 30. srpnja 1999. godine;
• osiguranje sigurnog okruženja za implementaciju mira u Distriktu Br čko, arbitražni sporazum od 5. ožujka 1999. godine, superviziju za Br čko, UNIPTF i UNHCR-u. Nadgledanje demilitarizirane zone Distrikt Br čko;
• potpora Me ñunarodnom sudu za ratne zlo čine po činjene na podru čju bivše Jugoslavije ICTY, što uklju čuje patroliranje, hvatanje i prebacivanje osoba koje su optužene da su po činile ratne zlo čine
4.5. Zaklju čak
Od po četka svog mandata SFOR je aktivno bio uklju čen u projekte rekonstrukcije infrastrukture posebno u mjestima povratka ljudi na svoja ognjišta. Obnavljali su putove, dopremali potrebne materijale za po četak povratka (hrana, gra ñevinski materijal, vodo- snabdijevanje i sl.). SFOR-ove trupe osiguravaju potporu Me ñunarodnoj komisiji za nestale
100 osobe (ICMP) u njihovim zada ćama prepoznavanja tijela iz masovnih grobnica. To je samo dio aktivnosti koje je SFOR radio kao pomo ć za sve napa ćene narode u BiH.
Djelovanje SFOR-a u okviru vojnog dijela Mirovnog sporazuma to čno je propisano poveljama Ujedinjenih nacija. To je striktno vezano za SFOR-ovu osnovnu misiju. Me ñutim, u potpori organizacijama koje su zadužene za civilni dio Mirovnog sporazuma stje če se dojam da su tuma čenja uloge i zadataka SFOR-a razli čita od situacije do situacije. SFOR sam sebe kontrolira i izdaje nare ñenja, a s obzirom na tuma čenje mandata u skladu s vlastitim shva ćanjem nemogu će je kontrolirati postoje li greške.
U rezolucijama Vije ća sigurnosti UN-a, SFOR-u je dan mandat da stvori sigurno okruženje u BiH. U okviru svog vojnog mandata SFOR mora identificirati prijetnju, baviti se tom prijetnjom i riješiti je kao vojna snaga koja ima mandat da to u čini. SFOR još uvijek nije uhitio pojedine osobe za kojim je podignuta Me ñunarodna kaznena optužnica (Karadži ć i Mladi ć). SFOR je uhitio 23 osobe osumnji čene za ratne zlo čine tj. osobe za kojima je podignuta Me ñunarodna kaznena optužnica i predao ih Sudu u Hagu, a isto tako i pojedine osobe koje podržavaju teroriste ili bilo koju vrstu teroristi čke akcije. Nazo čnost SFOR-a u ovakvim nestabilnim sigurnosnim i politi čkim uvjetima u BiH je još uvijek jako potrebna.
SFOR je zasigurno jedna od najuspješnijih misija meñunarodne zajednice u BiH. S druge strane je sigurno da njihov ugled kod puka u BiH, i to sva tri naroda, opada. Prije ih je ve ćina doživljavala kao osloboditelje, danas sve više kao tla čitelje. Tome je, zasigurno, doprinio, prije svega, selektivan pristup i razli čit na čin i intenzitet njihova angažmana pri uhi ćenju optuženih za ratne zlo čine. Povremena pretjerana demonstracija sile više je iritirala nego jam čila sigurnost. K tome, njihovo neprimjereno sudjelovanje u procesu precrtavanja inkriminiranih sadržaja u udžbenicima i zalaženje u škole s oružjem kao i nasilno ulaženje u civilne objekte (op ćinske i županijske urede, banke ...) pri čemu se može govoriti i o prekora čenju mandata.
101 5. Specijalno izvješ će - restitucija imovine oduzete tijekom komunisti čke vladavine
5.1. Modusi i institucionalizacija oduzimanja imovine u Bosni i Hercegovini kao teritorijalnoj jedinici FNRJ - SFRJ
5.1.1. Institucionalizacija i titulusi izvlaštenja u (SR)BiH - FNRJ i SFRJ
O pravima čovjeka u totalitarnim sustavima nije potrebna posebna elaboracija. Svi totalitarni sustavi su u svojoj biti okrenuti naspram temeljnih prava čovjeka i ljudske slobode. Sustav tzv. socijalisti čkog radni čkog samoupravljanja u bivšoj državi, koji je u svojoj biti konstrukcija iracionalne antiteisti čke ideologije, nemilice je satirao sve neistomišljenike, a formalno propagirao prava radni čke klase.
Svi državno pravni režimi žele se bar deklarativno prikazati demokratskim. Tako i za vladavine marksisti čko-kolektivisti čkih "vizionara" u ex Jugoslaviji nastaje floskula o tzv. "demokratskom centralizmu" 37 . Neistomišljenici su proglašavani neprijateljima naroda, te je kao žrtva ove utopisti čko-represivne ideologije zape čaćena sudbina stotina tisu ća ljudi.
S obzirom da je komunisti čka ideologija zasnovana na ideji kolektivnog vlasništva, kao nužna posljedica tog projekta slijedila je likvidacija "klasnih neprijatelja" i oduzimanje njihove imovine. Prve na udaru su bile crkve i vjerske zajednice. Partijski funkcionari i poklonici su se naprosto natjecali da dokažu svoju mržnju prema vjernicima i vjerskim institucijama. Pored op će represije koju je komunisti čka vlast provodila naspram pripadnika crkava i vjerskih zajednica, nastala je institucionalna otima čina cjelokupne imovine svih onih koji su bili smetnja ostvarenju tog "klasnog projekta".
Iako je imovina mogla biti i bila oduzimana jednostavnim dekretima Komunisti čke partije ili samovoljom partijskih mo ćnika, komunisti čki vlastodršci su proces izvlaštenja nastojali svesti u institucionalne okvire.
Tako je za Bosnu i Hercegovinu, kao teritorijalnu jedinicu bivše Jugoslavije, oduzimanje imovine bilo regulirano mnoštvom pravnih normi, kreiranih u ideološkom središtu državne mo ći : 1. Zakon o agrarnoj reformi i kolonizaciji ("Sl. list DFJ", broj 64/45; "Sl. list FNRJ", broj 16/46, 24/46, 99/46, 101/47, 105/48, 4/51, 19/51, 21/56 i 55/57; "Sl. list SFRJ", broj 10/65).
37 Tiranima su uvijek bila puna usta demokracije. Primjerice, tzv. "Staljinski ustav" iz 1936. godine je u SSSR-u formalno proklamirao sva ljudska prava koja su se mogla samo zamisliti. Kakav je trag ostavio Staljinov režim ne treba posebno spominjati.
102 2. Zakon o agrarnoj reformi i kolonizaciji NR BiH ( "Sl. list NR BiH", broj : 2/46, 18/46, 20/47, 14/51, i "Sl. list SFRJ", broj 10/65). 3. Zakon o poljoprivrednom zemljišnom fondu društvenog vlasništva i dodjeljivanju zemlje poljoprivrednim organizacijama ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj: 2/46, 18/46, 20/47, 14/51 i "Sl. list SFRJ", broj: 10/65). 4. Zakon o postupanju s imovinom koju su vlasnici morali napustiti tijekom okupacije i imovinom koja im je oduzeta od strane okupatora i njihovih pomaga ča ("Sl. list DFJ", broj: 36/45 i 52/45; "Sl.list FNRJ", broj: 64/46, 88/47, 99/48 i 77/49). 5. Zakon o nacionalizaciji privatnih poduze ća ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj: 98/46, 99/46, 35/48, 68/48 i 27/53). 6. Zakon o nacionalizaciji najamnih zgrada i gra ñevinskog zemljišta ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj: 52/58, 3/59, 24/59, 24/61 i 1/63). 7. Osnovni zakon o eksproprijaciji ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj 28/47). 8. Osnovni zakon o postupanju sa ekspropriranim i konfisciranim šumskim posjedima ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj: 61/46, 88/47, 106/49 i 4/51). 9. Zakon o prijelazu u društveno vlasništvo neprijateljske imovine i o sekvestraciji nad imovinom odsutnih osoba ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj: 63/46 i 105/46). 10. Zakon o prometu zemljišta i zgrada ("Sl. list SFRJ", broj: 43/65, 57/65, 17/69 i 11/74). 11. Zakon o pravu vlasništva na poslovnim zgradama i poslovnim prostorijama ("Sl. list SRBiH", broj: 23/79 i 26/86). 12. Zakon o konfiskaciji imovine i izvršenju konfiskacije ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj: 40/45 i 61/46). 13. Zakon o potrebi i izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o konfiskaciji imovine i izvršenju konfiskacije ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj 61/46). 14. Osnovni zakon o iskorištavanju poljoprivrednog zemljišta ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj: 43/59, 53/62 i 10/65). 15. Uredba o arondaciji državnih poljoprivrednih dobara op ćedržavnog zna čaja ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj 99/46). 16. Uredba o imovinskim odnosima i reorganizaciji seljačkih radnih zadruga ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj 99/46). 38
38 Nomenklatura pravnih normi prenesena iz Prijedloga Zakona o restituciji - Prijedlog sa ugra ñanim amandmanima, koji je sastavio Ekspertni tim Vlade Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine.
103 5.1.2. Pravni osnovi izvlaštenja od 1945. godine do demokratskih promjena
5.1.2.1. Agrarna reforma
Mjerama agrarne reforme koju je komunisti čka vlast po čela sprovoditi odmah po svršetku II. svjetskog rata 39 , regulirano je oduzimanje i prelazak u državno vlasništvo sljede ćih dobara :
1. velikih poljoprivrednih i šumskih dobara čija ukupna površina prelazi 45 hektara ili 25-35 hektara obradive zemlje (oranice , livade, vo ćnjaci i vinogradi) 40 , ako su obra ñivani odnosno iskorištavani putem zakupa ili najamne radne snage; 2. zemljišni posjedi koji su bili u vlasništvu banaka, poduze ća, akcionarskih društava i drugih pravnih i fizi čkih osoba; 3. zemljišni posjedi vjerskih zajednica 41 i svih vrsta zadužbina (svjetovnih i vjerskih); 4. viška obradive zemlje zemljišnih posjeda iznad zakonom predvi ñenog zemljišnog maksimuma; 5. viška obradive zemlje iznad 3-5 hektara čiji vlasnici nisu zemljoradnici po osnovnom zanimanju; 6. zemljišnih posjeda koji su tijekom rata iz bilo kojih razloga ostali bez vlasnika i bez pravnih slijednika.
Postupak izvlaštenja koji je sprovo ñen u smislu Zakona o agrarnoj reformi i kolonizaciji , trajao je oko tri godine i za to vrijeme je u tadašnjoj FNRJ oduzeto 1 566 000 hektara zemlje.
Zakonom o zemljišnom fondu op ćenarodne imovine iz 1953. godine zemljišni maksimum je dodatno smanjen na 10 hektara (izuzetno 15 ha), te je naknadno oduzeto oko 300 000 hektara zemlje - koja je isklju čivo dodjeljivana socijalisti čkom sektoru poljoprivrede.
Gospodarske posljedice agrarne reforme koja je sprovedena na podru čju bivše Jugoslavije, pa tako i na podru čju Bosne i Hercegovine, su bile pogubne. Zemljišni fond je postao jako usitnjen te se na njemu nije mogla sprovoditi intenzivna ratarska proizvodnja. Onaj dio posjeda koji je po uzoru na ruske kolhoze (kolektivno vlasništvo) prešao u tzv. društveno
39 Zakon o agrarnoj reformi i kolonizaciji stupio je na snagu 23. srpnja 1945. godine. 40 Toliko je iznosio propisani zemljišni maksimum koji je pojedinac (zemljoradnik) mogao imati u privatnom vlasništvu. Iznimno je zemljišni maksimum za samostane i vjerske zajednice iznosio 10 hektara, a ako su prema mjerilima komunisti čkih vlasti vjerske institucije bile od povijesnog zna čaja, mogao je iznositi i do 30 hektara. Zemljišni maksimum za osobe koje nisu zemljoradnici iznosio je od 3 do 5 hektara obradive zemlje, a kod šumskih posjeda sveden je na 5 hektara. U pore ñenju s ostalim socijalisti čkim zemljama koje su poslije II. svjetskog rata sprovele agrarnu reformu, ovi zemljišni maksimumi imali su najniži prag. Zemljišni maksimum kasnije je bio "zajam čen" i Ustavom SFRJ. 41 Socijalisti čka nomotehni čka praksa nije koristilila pojam Crkva, te je zakoniski termin "vjerska zajednica" obuhva ćao Katoli čku Crkvu te i Srpsku pravoslavnu Crkvu u ondašnjoj državi.
104 vlasništvo, fakti čki je obezvlašten, te bez pravog vlasnika nije mogao proizvoditi pozitivne privredne efekte.
5.1.2.2. Arondacija poljoprivrednog zemljišta i šumskih dobara
Da bi se izbjegle posljedice usitnjavanja zemljišnih posjeda, komunisti čke vlasti su po vlastitom naho ñenju sprovodile i mjere arondacije poljoprivrednog zemljišta i šumskih dobara. Arondacija predstavlja oduzimanje zemljišta u privatnom vlasništvu i njihovo pripajanje društvenom sektoru "da bi se ovo zaokružilo", a uz davanje naknade. Imaju ći na umu da u bivšoj Jugoslaviji nije bila na djelu vladavina prava, prilikom sprovo ñenja arondacijskog postupka ošte ćeni su mnogi vlasnici dobara koja su zapala za oko tadašnjih vlastodržaca.
Pored navedenih mjera arondacije mjera ograni čavanja prava vlasništva tako ñer su mjere komasacije 42 , čiji je cilj tako ñer bilo grupiranje zemljišnih posjeda, izgradnja hidromelioracijskih objekata, poljoprivrednih puteva i sl. Za razliku od mjera arondacije, postupak komasacije mogao se pokrenuti i na zahtjev privatnih vlasnika zamljišta (npr. ve ćina vlasnika poljoprivrednog zemljišta na kojem se ima izvršiti ova agrotehni čka mjera).
5.1.2.3. Kolonizacija
Uporedo uz navedene mjere agrarne reforme išao je i postupak kolonizacije izvlaštenih dobara. Ove mjere su komunisti čki vlastodršci sprovodili iz socijalnih, ali i iz politi čkih razloga. Masovna kolonizacija nakon rata opustjelih podru čja je jednim dijelom posljedica ekonomske politike koju je država sprovodila u to vrijeme. Me ñutim, ona je ve ćim dijelom bila instrument uz pomo ć kojega je mijenjana geopoliti čka slika prostora ondašnje države. Kolonizacija je ujedno bila i instrument politike prisile i revanšizma prema ratnim gubitnicima. 43
Za primjer može poslužiti nacionalna struktura kolonista za podru čje tadašnje SAP Vojvodine, gdje je od ukupnog broja osoba koje su uklju čene u kolonizaciju 76,6 % bilo Srba, 13,3 % Crnogoraca, a preostali dio pripao je ostalim narodima i nacionalnim manjinama bivše države. Ovakva nacionalno-socijalna politika zauvijek je promijenila nacionalnu strukturu ovog podru čja i pogubno bila na štetu negdašnjeg domicilnog stanovništva.
42 Problematika komasacije bila je regulirana zakonima republika i pokrajina bivše države . 43 Pod teretom ovih mjera podru čje bivše Jugoslavije moralo je napustiti oko 500 000 folksdoj čera.
105 5.1.3. Nacionalizacija - "eksproprijacija eksproprijatora"
Elaboriraju ći lepezu mjera izvlaštenja iz privatnog vlasništva, koje su komunisti sprovodili u ex Jugoslaviji, ponekad je teško definirati temeljne razlike koje bi činile razliku od jedne do druge. Me ñutim, u kona čnici sve ove mjere postižu iste efekte jer su rezultat iste ideološke podloge.
Pod nacionalizacijom su komunisti podrazumijevali prinudni prijelaz iz privatnog u društveno ili državno vlasništvo svih poduze ća iz odre ñenih gospodarskih grana, krupnih poduze ća, stvari odre ñene vrste i veli čine - s naknadom ili bez naknade. Nacionalizacijom nisu postizani samo efekti izvlaštenja, ve ć je provedbom ove mjere isho ñen i gubitak pravne sposobnosti izvlaštenih pravnih i fizi čkih osoba, tako da oni više nisu u mogu ćnosti stjecati onu vrstu subjektivnih prava koja su obuhva ćena nacionalizacijom.
Nacionalizaciju ideološki apologete tadašnjeg režima definiraju kao "privredno- politi čku mjeru" koja može (a i ne mora !) biti izvršena uz "pravednu" naknadu. S obzirom da je moto komunisti čke ideologije bila "diktatura proleterijata", pravednim naknadama su izvlaštene osobe koje je zaka čila ova privredno-politi čka mjera uistinu u činjene proleterima. Ovu radikalnu mjeru etablirani izvršitelji i naredbodavci rado nazivaju i "eksproprijacijom eksproprijatora". U prijevodu ove demagoške definicije nacionalizacija bi trebala biti akt razvlaštenja kapitalisti čke klase 44 .
Zakonom o nacionalizaciji privatnih privrednih poduze ća od 06.12.1946. godine, u tadašnjoj FNRJ nacionalizirana su sva privatna poduze ća iz 42 gospodarske grane, čime su pretvorena u državna privredna poduze ća. U onim slu čajevima gdje je nacionalizacija išla uz naknadu bivšim vlasnicima ispla ćivana je u državnim obveznicama koje u biti nisu imale skoro nikakve vrijednosti.
5.1.4. Eksproprijacija - mjera izvlaštenja u "op ćem interesu"
Eksproprijacija je predstavljala oduzimanje nekretnina koje se nalaze u privatnom vlasništvu, čijim izvršenjem se konstituira društveno vlasništvo. Ova mjera poduzimana je tako ñer kad je to bilo u "op ćem interesu" i uz "pravednu naknadu".
Za razliku od nacionalizacije ovdje je ispla ćivana naknada u novcu, a za eksproprirano zemljoradni čko dobro dolazila je u obzir i naturalna naknada. Ako se sporazum o naknadi ne postigne, naknadu štete odre ñivao je sud u izvanparni čnom postupku. Ovu materiju su u po četku ure ñivali savezni 45 , a nešto kasnije propisi republika i pokrajina bivše države.
44 U SSSR-u je poslije listopadske revolucije izvršena potpuna nacionalizacija - ne samo industrije, trgovine i prometa, nego i zemlje koja u cijelosti prelazi u državno vlasništvo. 45 Osnovni zakon o eksproprijaciji" ("Sl. list FNRJ", broj 28/47).
106 O razmjerima etablirane demagogije kod ondašnje vlasti govori i zakonska definicija kad se eksproprijacija vršila samo na jednom dijelu nekretnine :"Ako se prilikom eksproprijacije dijela nekretnine utvrdi da vlasnik nema privrednog interesa da koristi njen preostali dio, odnosno ako je zbog toga na njenom preostalom dijelu onemogućena ili bitno otežana njegova egzistencija, na njegov zahtjev eksproprira se i taj dio nekretnine."
5.1.5. Konfiskacija - sankcija za po činjeno kazneno djelo
Konfiskacija je tako ñer predstavljala prinudno izvlaštenje, s tim da je ova mjera uvijek poduzimana bez ikakve naknade za izvlašteno dobro. Ona je u biti sankcija koja je uzgredno izricana po činiteljima kaznenih djela. Ova mjera izvlaštenja izricana je fakultativno, a mogla se izre ći osobi koja je po činila kazneno djelo za koje je izre čena kazna zatvora u trajanju od najmanje tri godine. Iako je definirana kao sporedna - fakultativna kazna, često je bila teže prirode od glavne kaznene sankcije. Ovo je institut korišten za obra čun s neprijateljima socijalisti čkog sustava. Naime, Kazneni zakon SFRJ predvi ñao je mogu ćnost njenog izricanja "za bilo koje kazneno djelo protiv osnova socijalisti čkog samoupravnog društvenog ure ñenja i sigurnosti SFRJ, kaznenih djela protiv čovje čnosti i me ñunarodnog prava, protiv privrede i jedinstva jugoslavenskog tržišta, protiv službene dužnosti službenih osoba u saveznim tijelima i protiv oružanih snaga SFRJ".
Svako protivljenje vladaju ćem jednoumlju u socijalisti čkoj Jugoslaviji je zakonski definirano kao kazneno djelo, a ovdje potpadaju i: sudjelovanje u neprijateljskoj vojsci, kolaboracija s neprijateljem, kontrarevolucionarno djelovanje, verbalni delikti, odavanje službene i vojne tajne i dr. Stoga nije teško pojmiti iz kojih je sve razloga poduzimana ova mjera izvlaštenja.
S obzirom na lako ću s kojom su po potrebi vladaju ćih struktura izricane sankcije za ova kaznena djela, konfiskacija imovine je bila vrlo zgodno sredstvo za obra čun s nepo ćudnim članovima društva. Konfiscirana imovina prelazila je u društveno vlasništvo, a njome su raspolagale op ćinske vlasti.
5.1.5.1. Sekvestracija - osiguranje imovinskih interesa države
Prije sprovo ñenja mjera konfiskacije redovito je izvršavana sekvestracija kao "mjera osiguranja", koja je predstavljala privremeno oduzimanje cjelokupne ili dijela imovine osobe za koju postoji osnovana sumnja da će protiv nje biti izre čena mjera konfiskacije. U bivšoj državi ova problematika je bila regulirana nizom zakona o izvlaštenju 46 , kako bi državni interes unaprijed bio osiguran.
46 Npr. " Zakon o konfiskaciji imovine i izvršenju konfiskacije ", " Zakon o prijelazu u društveno vlasništvo neprijateljske imovine i o sekvestraciji nad imovinom odsutnih osoba "; " Zakon o postupanju sa imovinom koju su njeni vlasnici napustili tijekom okupacije i imovinom koja im je oduzeta od strane okupatora i njegovih pomaga ča" i dr.
107 Bit ove mjere uvelike pokazuje karakter cjelokupnog društvenog sustava i državnog ure ñenja bivše SFRJ. Primjenom ovih mjera prejudicirala se krivnja osumnji čenih, a ujedno i osu ñenih osoba -protiv kojih je pokrenut postupak izvlaštenja i difamacije.
Preko ovog instituta zrcali se svo licemjerje ondašnje vlasti i oktroirane marksisti čko- lenjinisti čke ideologije.
5.2. Uvod u problematiku restitucije u BiH
Zdušnom primjenom prethodno navedenih mjera u bivšoj Jugoslaviji je prema ideološkim, kvazi-sociološkim mjerilima krojena sudbina stotina tisu ća "klasnih neprijatelja". Teško je iskazati patnje kroz koje je prolazio ve ći dio stanovništva negdašnje države. Nanesena povijesna nepravda se nije odnosila samo na gubitak imovine, ve ć je bila popra ćena sustavnim progonom i ponižavanjem svakog tko je imao druk čija uvjerenja i čiji se životni smisao nije mogao uklopiti u tokove samoupravnog socijalizma.
Padom komunizma 1991. godine i provedbom demokratskih izbora novoformirana vlast verbalno je preuzela obvezu vra ćanja oduzete imovine bivšim vlasnicima ili njihovim zakonskim sukcesorima. Sustavna izrada Zakon o restituciji kod nadležnih tijela još uvijek nije zapo čela, niti je ovaj postupak još krenuo u parlamentarnu proceduru. S obzirom na svu bremenitost bosansko-hercegova čkog gospodarstva, neizvjesno je kada će i u kojoj formi restitucijski postupak uistinu zapo četi jer je i laicima jasno da pravedne i u činkovite restitucije nema bez snažne fiskalne potpore.
Po četkom ove godine Pravnom savjetovalištu " Iustitie et pax" se obratila stanovnica Sarajeva kojoj je rješenjem Op ćine Centar-Sarajevo, donesenom 1998. godine, nacionalizirano zemljište na temelju Zakona o nacionalizaciji iz 1956. godine, s obrazloženjem da je ranijom nacionalizacijom nastao propust, te taj dio zemljišta (koji se nalazi u centru grada) greškom nije nacionaliziran. Žalba ve ć bivše vlasnice je odba čena kao prijevremena, s obrazloženjem da BiH i njeni entiteti još nemaju pozitivno-pravnu zakonsku regulativu kojom bi bila riješena problematika restitucije.
S pravom se name će pitanje jesu li bivša vremena uistinu iza nas ?
5.2.1. Preliminarne aktivnosti u cilju rješavanja problema restitucije
Ured visokog predstavnika u BiH, svojim aktom od 13. kolovoza 1999. godine - upu ćenim Parlamentu BiH, konstatira suglasnost tijela vlasti i stanovništva BiH o primjerenosti sprovo ñenja postupka restitucije imovine koja je nacionalizirana za vladavine prethodnih režima. Ovim aktom definirana su temeljna na čela kojih bi se Parlament BiH i zakonodavna tijela entiteta trebali pridržavati prilikom rješavanja ove problematike. Tekst u biti predstavlja
108 nacrt Okvirnog zakona o restituciji nacionalizirane imovine u BiH, s kojim bi trebali biti suglasni budu ći entitetski zakoni o restituciji. Nacrtom se nalaže da se po donošenju Okvirnog zakona, po žurnom postupku krene u donošenje entitetskih zakona iz ove problematike (dužnost entiteta da ove zakone usvoje u roku od šest mjeseci od dana objavljivanja u Sl. glasniku BiH).
Nacrt je napravljen ishitreno i vrlo površno jer navodi kao predmet restitucije samo nacionalizaciju i eksproprijaciju kao relevantne metode izvlaštenja. Ve ć osnovna na čela na kojima se ovaj Nacrt temelji sadrži bitne zna čajke diskriminacije u budu ćem procesu izvlaštenja s obzirom da štiti postoje ći status pravnih subjekata koji koriste izvlaštenu imovinu, a unaprijed isključuje bivše vlasnike iz postupka naturalne restitucije koja se navodno preferira kao metoda povrata. Spoznavši svu težinu navedene problematike i neizbježnost nastanka negativnih mogu ćih implikacija na cjelokupan gospodarski, socijalni i politi čki milje, predstavnici me ñunarodne zajednice u BiH nastoje znatno usporiti postupak donošenja predmetnih zakona.
5.2.1.1. Kratak osvrt na "Zakon o restituciji-prijedlog s ugra ñenim amand- manima"
Ekspertni tim Vlade Federacije BiH je u prosincu 1999. godine na činio Prijedlog Zakona o restituciji s ugra ñenim amandmanima koji bi trebao biti osnovica za razmatranje kod zakonodavnog tijela ovog entiteta. Do današnjeg dana još nije ništa u činjeno kako bi novi zakon bio donesen. Vrijeme će pokazati kakva će zakonska rješenja biti usvojena i ho će li se njima uspjeti u pomirenju ostvarivanja imperativa pravednosti i kroni čnog nedostatka sredstava u državnom prora čunu BiH.
S obzirom da se radi o vrlo kompleksnoj i osjetljivoj materiji, o čekuje se duga i oštra parlamentarna debata. Koliki će biti otpori onih koji su se tijekom prošlog državnog ure ñenja okoristili tu ñom mukom, vrijeme će uskoro pokazati. Činjenica da su ti ljudi još uvijek prisutni u svim sferama društvenog života, otežava i onako bremenitu atmosferu koja je stvorena u svezi s ovom problematikom.
5.2.1.2. Temeljne odredbe Prijedloga Zakona o restituciji F BiH
Zakon o restituciji FBiH bi prema intenciji autora trebao činiti konzistentnu cjelinu s cijelim setom ve ć usvojenih zakonskih rješenja iz oblasti privatizacije, te je s obzirom na kompleksnost materije Ekspertni tim Vlade Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine na činio čistopis koji će najvjerojatnije biti osnovica parlamentarne debate i procedure usvajanja budu ćeg Zakona o restituciji Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. Izvršit ćemo kratku analizu ovog zakonskog prijedloga.
109 Prijedlogom Zakona o restituciji FBiH ure ñuju se na čela, oblici, predmet, na čin i postupak restitucije. Ovaj zakon pod restitucijom podrazumjeva vra ćanje stvari i prava bivšim vlasnicima (fizi čkim i pravnim osobama), koji su im oduzeti temeljem prinudnih propisa 47 , kao i davanje naknade za oduzeta prava i materijalna dobra.
5.2.2. Subjekti restitucije
Pravo na restituciju imaju i bivši vlasnici kojima su stvari i prava oduzeti bez pravne osnove ili na temelju besteretnog pravnog posla zaklju čenog pod prisilom ili prijevarnim djelovanjem predstavnika državne vlasti.
Prijedlogom su taksativno nabrojani ovlaštenici restitucije : 1. fizi čke osobe, a ako su one umrle - njihovi supružnici, srodnici u uspravnoj liniji, te bra ća i sestre i njihova djeca; 2. vjerske zajednice ili organizacijski oblici koji imaju svojstvo pravne osobe; 3. udruge gra ñana i druge pravne osobe, odnosno njihovi pravni slijednici.
Pravo na povrat oduzete imovine ne bi, me ñutim, imali bivši vlasnici kojima je ispla ćena pravedna naknada ili su im u zamjenu dane druge stvari ili prava. Člankom 5. stavak 2. Prijedloga Zakona o restituciji presumira se da je naknada pravedna ako je odre ñena temeljem zakona u kojem je definirana terminom "pravedna". Ovakvo zakonsko rješenje je vrlo problemati čno i nepovoljno za bivše vlasnike. Mišljenja sam da bi najpravednije zakonsko rješenje bilo kad bi pravo na restituciju bilo omogu ćeno svim osobama kojima nije ispla ćena ekvivalentna naknada za oduzete stvari ili prava, naravno koja bi bila u srazmjeru s nastalim gubitkom. Stavkom 3. navedenog članka pravo na restituciju ne bi imale ni osobe kojima su imovina ili pravo oduzeti "temeljem presude zbog kaznenog djela koje po me ñunarodnim konvencijama predstavlja ratni zlo čin". Imaju ći na umu lako ću pri kojoj su bivše vlasti izricale presude s difamacijskim elementima ratnog zlo čina, a da u BiH nakon pada komunizma nisu vo ñeni rehabilitacijski procesi, mišljenja sam da ova odredba ne doprinosi i suviše ostvarivanju na čela pravednosti.
S obzirom da predlagatelji prilikom definiranja ove odredbe kao temelj isklju čenja od restitucije nisu naveli termin "sudska presuda" ve ć samo "presuda", mogli bi biti rehabilitirani raznovrsni dekreti i odluke tijela koja su predstavljala centre mo ći bivše države, a za koja se ne bi moglo re ći da su baš djelovala po na čelu zakonitosti ( da ne govorimo o drugim demokratskim kategorijama).
47 Propisi na temelju kojih je oduzimana imovina, a koji su prema Prijedlogu Zakona o restituciji relevantni u procesu restitucijesu navedeni u prethonom dijelu izvješ ća, IV.1. "Modusi i institucionalizacija oduzimanja imovine u BiH kao teritorijalnoj jedinici FNRJ - SFRJ".Po mom mišljenju ovaj popis je nepotpun jer u njemu nisu nabrojani neki zakoni koji su bili od temeljnog zna čaja za institucionalizaciju imovinske otima čine…
110 Za strane fizi čke i pravne osobe pravo na restituciju regulirano je po na čelu reciprociteta. Osobe koje su za oduzetu imovinu obešte ćene po osnovi me ñunarodnog ugovora tako ñer ne bi imale pravo na restituciju, što je logi čno rješenje.
Prema Prijedlogu Zakona o restituciji pravo na restituciju imali bi i pravni slijednici pravnih osoba čija je imovina prešla u državno ili društveno vlasništvo.
Kao obveznik nov čane restitucije odre ñuje se Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine (s obzirom da je rije č o entitetskom zakonu - koji bi se po usvajanju trebao uskladiti s odgovaraju ćim zakonom BiH, a koji bi naknadno trebao biti donesen u Parlamentarnoj skupštini BiH), a obveznikom naturalne restitucije smatrala bi se osoba koja bi na dan usvajanja zakona raspolagala predmetom koji potpada pod restituciju.
5.2.3. Oblici i na čin ostvarivanja restitucije
Prijedlog predmetnog zakona predvi ña sljede će restitucijske oblike:
1. Naturalna restitucija - vra ćanje stvari u vlasništvo bivšem vlasniku, kao i utvr ñivanje suvlasni čkog dijela i vlasni čkog udjela. Stvar bi se vra ćala u stanju u kojem se nalazi u trenutku stupanja na snagu Zakona. Ako je vrijednost stvari znatno uve ćana u odnosu na njeno stanje u trenutku oduzimanja, dozvoljeno je da dosadašnji imatelj odvoji pripatke koji uve ćavaju vrijednost (ukoliko je to mogu će u činiti bez ošte ćenja predmeta povrata). 2. Naknada - utvr ñivanje visine tražbine bivšeg vlasnika prema obvezniku restitucije, na temelju vrijednosti predmeta restitucije, a izraženo u KM u vidu certifikata koji bi se mogli iskoristiti za otkup poduze ća i dionica u poduze ćima, te za otkup stanova i sl. 48 S obzirom na fiskalnu likvidnost države i njenih gospodarskih subjekata, ovakav vid naknade u skorije vrijeme ne će imati ve ću fakti čnu vrijednost. 49 Ako je stvar koja potpada pod restituciju u vlasništvu tre će osobe koja ju je stekla temeljem valjanog teretnog posla, obveznikom na naknadu smatra se osoba koja ju je stekla besteretno - a kasnije primila naknadu za prijenos. 3. Zakon ostavlja mogu ćnost dogovora stranaka o obliku restitucije, do trenutka pravomo ćnosti rješenja o restituciji. Nepreciznoš ću ove odredbe ostavlja se mogu ćnost diskrecijskog ocjenjivanja i prostor za manipulacije bez ikakvih posebnih kriterija povrata !
Kao što vidimo, bivši vlasnici će prema Prijedlogu Zakona o restituciji svoja prava ostvarivati pod vrlo nepovoljnim uvjetima. Navedenim prijedlogom nije uop će predvi ñena nov čana
48 Kod definiranja ovog oblika restitucije predlagatelj je smetnuo s uma da je ukinut Zavod za platni promet na čiji bi se evidentni ra čun gra ñana trebala upisati ova tražbina. 49 Kao primjer može nam poslužiti tržišna vrijednost op ćeg potraživanja (tzv. certifikata), koja se kre će oko 1,5 % od njihove nominalne vrijednosti.
111 naknada za oduzeto dobro, za koje više nije mogu ća naturalna restitucija. Posebno je otežana restitucija nekretnina koje će najve ćim dijelom biti predmet ovog postupka. Prijedlog umjesto naturalne restitucije nekretnine predvi ña nepovoljnu "naknadu" iz sljede ćih razloga :
1. Ukoliko bi zbog vra ćanja nekretnina, koje potpadaju pod restituciju, bila onemogu ćena ili znatno otežana djelatnost organizacija iz oblasti obavljanja djelatnosti: državnih tijela, djelatnosti zdravstva, odgoja, obrazovanja, znanosti i kulture. 2. Na zahtjev poduze ća, kod vra ćanja poslovne zgrade i poslovne prostorije kad ona predstavlja osnovno sredstvo poduze ća i ako bi njihovim vra ćanjem bila ugrožena njihova djelatnost. 50 3. Kod povrata poljoprivrednog zemljišta ukoliko bi se zbog vra ćanja znatno poremetila funkcionalnost poljoprivrednog dobra ili bi djelatnost imatelja bila znatno otežana. Naknada umjesto naturalne restitucije davala bi se tako ñer na zahtjev imatelja poljoprivrednog zemljišta. 4. Kod povrata šume i šumskog zemljišta, ako bi se vra ćanjem znatno ugrozilo gazdovanje šumskim kompleksom - tako ñer na zahtjev imatelja. 5. Kod povrata izgra ñenog gra ñevinskog zemljišta, kao i onog koje je dodijeljeno na gra ñenje do stupanja na snagu Zakona o restituciji.
Ovakva, za ovlaštenike restitucije nepovoljna zakonska rješenja, ublažena su odredbom koja im daje prednost pred drugim osobama u pribavljanju dionica ili suvlasni čkog udjela kod imatelja (posljednjeg nositelja prava rasplaganja).
Pri rješavanju problematike povrata stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo (koji su u društvenom - državnom vlasništvu) predlagatelj se iz socijalnih razloga odlu čio na zaštitu nositelja stanarskog prava putem obveznog zakupa, kojim se nositelju stanarskog prava i njegovom supružniku daje doživotno pravo uporabe stana koji potpada pod restituciju. Ovo pravo prema Prijedlogu Zakona o restituciji ne bi se moglo prenositi na tre će osobe - uklju čuju ći i članove obiteljskog ku ćanstva. Naime, stan se vra ća u vlasništvo bivšem vlasniku, ali je on obvezan nositelju stanarskog prava i njegovom bra čnom drugu omogu ćiti doživotno korištenje, uz zakup koji bi bio reguliran posebnim zakonom. Ukoliko bi ovlaštenik restitucije imao namjeru prodati stan, morao bi ga prethodno ponuditi nositelju stanarskog prava. Tuma čeći ovakvu formulaciju zakonskog rješenja, bra čni drug nositelja stanarskog prava poslije njegove smrti ne bi imao pravo pre če kupnje.
Predlagatelj Zakona povrat pokretnih stvari od kulturnog, umjetni čkog ili povijesnog zna čenja rješava na solomonski na čin, imaju ći na umu da je zaštita kulturnih i povijesnih dobara u
50 U slu čaju da ne postoje ovi otežavaju ći uvjeti, a zgrada je u zakupu kod tre će osobe - zgrada odnosno poslovna prostorija ne predaje se vlasniku u posjed, ve ć on stupa u obligacijski odnos kao zakupodavac. Zakupni odnos prestaje u roku od godine dana od dana stupanja na snagu zakona.
112 op ćem interesu. Ukoliko su takve stvari sastavni dio zbirki javnih muzeja, galerija i sli čnih ustanova, vra ćaju se u vlasništvo bivšim vlasnicima - ali ne i u njihov posjed. Me ñutim, ukoliko ovlaštenik restitucije raspolaže uvjetima za čuvanje i prezentaciju tih stvari, stvari bi se mogle vratiti i u njegov posjed. Uvjeti držanja takvih stvari bili bi tako ñer regulirani posebnim zakonom. Ostavljena je i mogu ćnost da se na zahtjev bivšeg vlasnika umjesto vra ćanja stvari u vlasništvo, odredi ranije spomenuta naknada.
5.3. Zakonska rješenja koja ograni čavaju prava ovlaštenika u cilju zaštite op ćeg interesa i položaj vjerskih zajednica
Kao što je iz svega izloženog vidljivo, predlagatelj Zakona o restituciji pri rješavanju ove problematike pokazuje izrazitu sklonost konformizmu. S obzirom na tešku ekonomsko- socijalnu sliku Bosne i Hercegovine to je potpuno razumljivo. Država, kao siromašni obveznik restitucije, želi preuzeti što manje obveza. Time želi zadržati kakvu-takvu socijalnu stabilnost i fiskalnu likvidnost.
Me ñutim, pojedina rješenja koja se nude su inkompatibilna s na čelima na kojima su zasnovani temelji modernih demokratskih društava tržišne ekonomije, čemu ova zemlja, barem deklaratorno, stremi.
Kao relikt bivših vremena, ostala je intencija zadržavanja monopola države u odre ñenim profitabilnim oblastima. Ukoliko uistinu postoji volja povrata nepravedno oduzetih dobara i prava, država bi trebala biti do kraja dosljedna pri realizaciji ovog problema i preuzeti obvezu za ekvivalentnu naknadu, pa makar preuzevši dug na duži period.
Navedenim Prijedlogom Zakona o restituciji nije uzeta u obzir izmakla dobit ( lucrum cessans ) koja je posljedica institucionalizirane otima čine, niti satisfakcija za pretrpljene duševne boli i siromaštvo za osobe kojima je imovina brutalno i bezdušno oduzimana. Stoga je neshvatljivo da se nude rješenja poput onog iz članka 17. gdje se pokušava onemogu ćiti povrat nekretnina koje su sastavni dio infrastrukture iz podru čja energetike, vodoopskrbljivanja, komunalija, prometa i veza. Iako je bivšim vlasnicima pro forma ostavljena prednost prvokupa dionica i stjecanja suvlasni čkog udjela kod imatelja, jasno je da prema ponu ñenim rješenjima to ne će biti mogu će – s obzirom da je država ove oblasti uglavnom isklju čila iz procesa privatizacije. Uz to, kao protuvrijednost oduzetoj imovini naj češ će se nudi samo fiktivna "naknada", tako da u tim slu čajevima ne će biti nadokna ñena ni stvarna šteta (damnum emergens).
Poseban problem predstavlja prijedlog isklju čenja od prava na restituciju "bivših vlasnika kojima je za oduzete stvari i prava ispla ćena pravedna naknada ili su im u zamjenu dane druge stvari ili prava". 51 Zakonsko rješenje koje kaže da se pravednom smatra naknada koja
51 Članak 5. stavak 1. Prijedloga Zakona o restituciji.
113 je kao "pravedna" definirana zakonom temeljem kojeg je imovina oduzeta, je uistinu neprihvatljiva. Bivše vlasti su za oduzetu imovinu naj češ će davale bezvrijedne državne obveznice ili simboli čne naknade. Prema predloženom bi pravne i fizi čke osobe koje potpadaju pod ovu odredbu ponovo ostale uskra ćene.
Posve je sigurno da će proces restitucije zapinjati i u proceduralnoj sferi. Uzimaju ći u obzir snagu pravne države i "vladavine prava" u Bosni i Hercegovini - unaprijed možemo projicirati probleme koji će nastajati pri ostvarivanju ionako šepavih prava koja se nude restitucionim ovlaštenicima. Prema Prijedlogu Zakona o restitucji postupak se pokre će na zahtjev stranke i mora biti podnesen u roku od 120 dana od stupanja na snagu zakona. Nadležno tijelo je dužno donijeti adekvatno rješenje u roku od 60 dana od dana podnošenja zahtjeva. Ne vjerujemo da je ovo rok koji bi administracija u BiH bila sposobna ispoštovati, a imaju ći u vidu obujam i kompleksnost materije.
Nažalost, i dalje ostaju op ćeprihva ćena mjerila koja bi trebala biti stvar davno prošlih vremena. Sve aktivnosti demokratske države morale bi biti usmjerene ka ostvarivanju slobode i afirmaciji svakog pojedinca u društvu. Kao što smo vidjeli, postoji dosta odredaba Prijedloga koje ne idu u tom smjeru. U slu čajevima kad nije mogu ća naturalna restitucija - država, koja je godinama koristila tu ñu imovinu, bi napokon trebala ošte ćenicima dati pravednu naknadu, koja bi bila razmjerna tržišnoj vrijednosti te imovine u trenutku izvlaštenja.
Na čelno je neprihvatljivo bilo kakvo ponovno uskra ćivanje ranije oduzetih prava. Zaštita interesa države ne zna či automatski i zaštitu op ćeg interesa. Uskra ćivanje prava fizi čkim i pravnim osobama uz izliku op ćeg interesa ne vodi ovo društvo k op ćem progresu. Ukoliko ipak budu usvojena ponu ñena rješenja - aktualna vlast bi, ako želi biti dosljedna, trebala imati na umu da je djelovanje vjerskih zajednica tako ñer od op ćeg interesa. Slijedom toga, vjerske zajednice bi posebnim odredbama zakona trebale dobiti i status koji bi im pružio kakvu - takvu satisfakciju za pretrpljene patnje i poniženja. Vjerske zajednice i crkve u BiH me ñutim, ne traže nikakav povlašten položaj u postupku restitucije. One samo pokušavaju ostvariti pravni status koji bi im jamčio ostvarivanje prava u ravni s ostalim restitucijskim ovlaštenicima. Partijski aktivisti koji su sudjelovali u državnoj vlasti bivše Jugoslavije su se naprosto natjecali u gaženju prava vjernika, a posebice crkvenih pastira. Kao posljedica te višedesetljetne prakse dolazi do pada moralnih vrijednosti u društvu, što se po propasti bivše države o čitovalo bestijalnim ratnim sukobom. Na vjerskim zajednicama u Bosni i Hercegovini stoji obveza i odgovornost promicanja kulture mira, tolerancije i socijalne pravde. Stoga im je potrebno omogu ćiti djelovanje u tom smjeru.
Na državnim tijelima leži teret i obveza ispravljanja povijesne nepravde, nanesene tijekom komunisti čke vladavine. Restitucija je obveza države koja proizlazi iz kontinuiteta koji je preuzela kao univerzalni sukcesor bivše SR BiH, a proistje če i iz daytonskog Ustava BiH
114 kojim su zajam čena sva prava i slobode po standardima izloženim u Europskoj konvenciji o ljudskim pravima i slobodama, te njezinim protokolima. 52 Vra ćanje ili pravedna naknada za oduzetu imovinu bivšim vlasnicima ne bi zna čila samo povrat materijalnih dobara ve ć i moralnu satisfakciju za pretrpljena poniženja koja su doživjeli u mlinu socijalisti čkog totalitarizma.
Iz svega navedenog zbog objektivnih teško ća koje pritiš ću restitucijskog obveznika, najsvrhovitije bi bilo pozitivnim propisima dosljedno urediti pravedna na čela budu će restuitucije i omogu ćiti povrat imovine gdje je još uvijek mogu će, a te su metode naturalna restitucija uz eventualnu naturalnu kompenzaciju….Inzistiranjem na urgentnoj isplati pravednih naknada za oduzetu imovinu ova zemlja bi se mogla dovesti u stanje potpunog kaosa i kraha - što ne bi trebalo biti nikome u interesu.
6. Izvori i literatura
Nevenko Herceg – Zoran Tomi ć: Izbori i izborna kampanja u Bosni i Hercegovini 2000. godine, Sveu čilište u Mostaru – Centar za studije novinarstva, Mostar 2001 (str: 85-90, 117, 130-138, 146-155)
II. Dnevni i tjedni tisak (Slobodna Dalmacija, BH Dani, Dnevni Avaz)
III. OHR: Prioriteti za 2001. godinu – Preporuke Upravnog odbora organizacija koje se bave pitanjima ljudskih prava Radnoj grupi za zaštitu ljudskih prava
52 Članak II. aneksa 4. Op ćeg okvirnog sporazuma za mir u Bosni i Hercegovini
115