3 November 2011 Speaker: Gary Sick, Adjunct Professor Of

Date: 3 November 2011 Speaker: Gary Sick, Adjunct Professor of International and Public Affairs, Senior Research Scholar, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, NY, USA Chair: Kenneth H. Keller, Professor and Director, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center, Italy

“The Strategy of Pre-emptive War”

The third part of Professor Gary Sick’s lecture series focused on the events that followed the end of the Iranian revolution to the point where the US became the dominant power of the Persian Gulf. The presentation detailed the growth of America’s presence in the Persian Gulf; a presence with the initial objective of preventing the Soviet Union from acquiring political and economic control of the region and ultimately, to ensure access to Persian Gulf oil.

During the Carter Administration, there was a fear that the Soviets had set their sights on controlling the Persian Gulf and eventually, the Indian Ocean. President Carter, in response, announced the Carter Doctrine, warning against the intervention of any outside power into the Persian Gulf and threatened military action. Sick argued that this announcement marked the official transfer of power in the area from Britain to the United States. The instrument used to enforce this policy was the Rapid Deployment Joint Taskforce, an organization which essentially laid the foundation for a prominent military presence into the future.

The Reagan administration continued the policies of the Carter years intensifying the presence of troops in the region. In 1980, soon after the Iranian revolution, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein led his army into the Iranian province of Khuzestan for four principle reasons: to regain control of the ‘lost Iraqi province’, to access the wealth of oil in that area, to assume control of the river dividing Iraq and Khuzestan leading to the Gulf, and to establish Iraq as the dominant actor in the region. In 1982 the Iranian government successfully defended the province and launched a counter attack with similar motivations. The first Gulf War lasted eight years in total and an estimated 350,000 lives were lost.

In the middle of the conflict, the United States was discovered to have sold arms to Iran in a covert effort to bargain in order to have American hostages released. As a result, the US lost credibility among oil-rich Arab states. Because the US did not want to lose this strategic relationship, it broke its neutrality in the war and eventually became an ally of Saddam Hussein to solidify its commitment to Iraq.

The events preceding the United States’ direct involvement were puzzling: an Iraqi air force plane attacked the U.S.S Stark killing 37 Americans; the US then used this event as a catalyst for

increasing its arms against Iran, which seemed counterintuitive to some. The joint attack against Iran persisted until the US inadvertently shot down an Iranian commercial flight, mistaking it for an Iranian military plane, killing nearly 300 people.

After the first Gulf War, the close relationship between the United States and Iraq continued despite the fact that Saddam Hussein had launched deadly attacks against his own people even using poison gas. Professor Sick argues that Iraq took advantage of the partnership with the United States and soon after the end of the war with Iran, Iraq sent armed forces to Kuwait. This attack marked the beginning of the second Gulf War and was inspired by Iraq’s ambition to be the dominant force in OPEC by gaining control over Kuwait’s oil reserves. The United States joined forces with Syria and other Arab states and after 100 hours of conflict, Iraq was defeated. The US decided not to proceed to Baghdad, but applied strict sanctions on both Iran and Iraq to prevent their participation in the global system.

Sick believes that this policy of ‘restraining the bad guys’ in the Persian Gulf continues today though under different guises. The United States remains the prevailing power and uses its presence to stifle the military and economic growth of both countries.

Together, these events and interventions propelled the United States from a point in 1981 where it had very little military presence to the situation today where American military bases are commonplace in the Persian Gulf. Given this reality, Professor Sick laid out the question to be discussed in his final lecture: What Happens Now?