Relations with the Non-Orthodox Unit 11 Talmud the Limits of Mutual Recognition of Opposing Views. 1ב עמוד יג דף עי

Relations with the Non-Orthodox Unit 11

Talmud The limits of mutual recognition of opposing views.

תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף יג עמוד ב1 אמר רבי אבא אמר שמואל: "שלש שנים נחלקו בית שמאי ובית הלל, הללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו, והללו אומרים הלכה כמותנו. יצאה בת קול ואמרה: 'אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים הן, והלכה כבית הלל."

וכי מאחר שאלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים, מפני מה זכו בית הלל לקבוע הלכה כמותן? - מפני 1( שנוחין ועלובין היו, 2( ושונין דבריהן ודברי בית שמאי. ולא עוד אלא 3( שמקדימין דברי בית שמאי לדבריהן...

רש"י "עלובין" - סבלנין. "ושונין דבריהן ודברי בית שמאי" - כשהיו בית שמאי מביאין ראיה לדבריהם מן התורה, ובית הלל מביאין ראיה ממקרא אחר, והיו בית הלל דורשין את המקרא של בית שמאי למה בא, ולא היה קל בעיניהם,2 כאותה ששנינו במסכת ברכות )י, ב(: "בית שמאי אומרים: "בערב כל אדם יטה ויקרא ובבקר יעמוד, שנאמר )דברים ו:ז( 'בשכבך ובקומך'", ובית הלל אומרים: "כל אדם קורא כדרכו, שנאמר )שם( 'ובלכתך בדרך'. אם כן, למה נאמר 'בשכבך ובקומך'? - בשעה שדרך בני אדם שוכבין, ובשעה שדרך בני אדם עומדין." "שמקדימין דברי בית שמאי לדבריהן" - דקאמרי להו: "מעשה שהלכו זקני בית שמאי והדר זקני בית הלל."3

1 Although the sources that have been discussed in the units to this point have all been based upon sources that appear either in the body of R. Lichtenstein’s, Z”L, essays of their footnotes, in this case he makes passing reference to the principle of “Eilu VaEilu”, discussed in this Gemora, at the top of p. 148. 2 I somewhat facetiously refer to the premise of this type of give-and-take as the “Law of Conservation of Verses”, in the sense that traditionally it is assumed that the particular phraseology of a given verse can be employed as the source for a single derivation, rather than multiple derivations. Consequently, if Beit Hillel has a usage for the phrase that Beit Shammai quotes as the proof for their position, Beit Hillel has effectively refuted that proof. 3תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף יג עמוד ב אמרו בית הלל לבית שמאי: "לא כך היה מעשה, שהלכו זקני בית שמאי וזקני בית הלל לבקר את רבי יוחנן בן החורנית, ומצאוהו יושב ראשו ורובו בסוכה ושלחנו בתוך הבית. אמרו להן בית שמאי: ")אי( משם ראיה?" אף הן אמרו לו: "אם כך היית נוהג, לא קיימת מצות סוכה מימיך". ללמדך, שכל המשפיל עצמו )כמו שעשו ב"ה ע"י הקדמת דברי ב"ש לפני דברי עצמן( הקדוש ברוך הוא מגביהו )וקובע ההלכה כמוהם(, וכל המגביה עצמו הקדוש ברוך הוא משפילו. כל המחזר על הגדולה - גדולה בורחת ממנו, וכל הבורח מן הגדולה - גדולה מחזרת אחריו. וכל הדוחק את השעה - שעה דוחקתו, וכל הנדחה מפני שעה - שעה עומדת לו. Said Beit Hillel to Beit Shammai:

אמת ליעקב4 אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים. במאמר זה נתקשו בו המפרשים, ונ"ל לפרש בזה, דהנה בכתובות )דף נז א( פרש"י וז"ל: אבל כי פליגי תרי אמוראי בדין או באיסור והיתר, כל חד אמר הכי מסתבר טעמא, אין כאן שקר, דכל חד וחד סברא דידי' קאמר. מר יהיב טעמא להיתרא, ומר יהיב טעמא לאיסורא. מר מדמי מלתא למלתא הכי, ומר מדמי לה בענינא אחרינא. ואיכא למימר אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים הם, זימנין דשייך האי טעמא, וזימנין דשייך האי טעמא, שהטעם מתהפך לפי שינוי הדברים בשינוי מועט עכ"ל. והכי נמי י"ל בכאן, דהיינו שכל אחד השיג ברוה"ק דבריו. דרך משל: סומכוס השיג ברוה"ק דממון המוטל בספק חולקין, ולאשר שהשגתו היה באספקלריא שאינה מאירה קסבר שהוא בכ"מ, ובאמת הוא רק כשאינן מוחזקין. וכן בכ"מ דפליגי תנאים, הלכה כשניהם, רק שחסר לו לדברי אחד מהן איזה תנאי. וכשיהיה התנאי ההוא, אז יתקיים דברי שני. וכן בגיטין )ו ב( אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים. זבוב מצא ולא הקפיד, נימא מצא והקפיד. וכן הוא בכל מקום. וכן הוא בדניאל שהשיג דברי אלקים חיים, ולא השיג אותן בשלימות עד שהוצרך לפירוש. וכן כל תנא השיג דבריו ברוה"ק, רק שלא השיגן בשלימות, וחיסר מהן איזה תנאי או שאר איזה דבר. ומחמת שכל מצוה יש לה שרש למעלה, ואיסור מצד דין, והיתר מצד חסד, ודבר שיש בו איסור מאיזה תנאי והיתר על איזה תנאי, בית שמאי שבא להם רוה"ק מצד גבורה, ראו האיסור שבתוכה, ובאמת שחסר כאן עוד תנאי שתאסר, רק שלא השיגו בשלימות רק הכלל, בחסרון תנאים המצטרפין, ובית הלל להיפך. עיין בשל"ה דף כ"ו )בתולדות אדם, בית חכמה תליתאה ח( ותבין. דרך משל, שנים שמעו מרבן זה אסור וזה מותר, ושניהם אמת, רק שלכל אחד צריך תנאי מתחלף, כמו גבי חתול וחולדה בפרק אלו טרפות )נג א( עיין שם:

Eiruvin 13b R. Abba stated in the name of Shmuel: “For three years there was a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel, the former asserting, ‘The Halacha is in agreement with our views’ and the latter contending, ‘The Halacha is in agreement with our views’. Then a Bat Kol issued announcing, ‘[The utterances of] both are the words of the living God, but the Halacha is in agreement with the rulings of Beit Hillel’.”

“Did it not so happen that the elders of Beit Shammai and the elders of Beth Hillel went on a visit to R. Yochanan b. HaChoranit and found him sitting with his head and greater part of his body within the Sukkah while his table was in the house?” Beit Shammai replied: “From there proof [may be adduced for our view for] they indeed told him, ‘If you have always acted in this manner you have never fulfilled the commandment of Sukka’.” This teaches you that: 1) Him who humbles himself, the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Raises up, and him who exalts himself, the Holy One, Blessed Be He, Humbles; 2) From him who seeks greatness, greatness flees, but him who flees from greatness, greatness follows; 3) He who forces time is forced back by time but he who yields to time finds time standing at his side. ביוגרפיה - אמת ליעקב 4 R. Yaakov Lorberbaum was born ca. 1770 in Zabrov, Galicia. He studied Tora with R. Meshulam Igra in Tismenitz, and served as the rabbi of several communities. In 1809 he was appointed rabbi of Lisa, Poland, where he opened a yeshiva. Some of his students became illustrious Tora scholars. He was considered a leading scholar in his time, and he Halachic questions were sent to him by many rabbis. He died in 1832. R. Yaakov wrote a number of important Halachic works, including Chavot Daat (a commentary on Yoreh De'ah) , Torat Gittin (on the laws of divorce) , Beit Yaakov (on the laws of Jewish marriage contracts) , and Derech Chaim (a siddur containing laws of prayer) . Netivot HaMishpat, his commentary on Choshen Mishpat, was first published in Zolkva, 1809 - 1816. This work contains a critique of the Ketzot HaChoshen written by his older contemporary, R. Aryeh Leib HaKohen Heller. R. Yaakov conducted extensive correspondence with major rabbinical figures of his time. (Bar Ilan CD ROM)

Since, however, “Both are the words of the living God”, what was it that entitled Beit Hillel to have the Halacha fixed in agreement with their rulings? Because 1) they were kindly and modest, 2) they studied their own rulings and those of Beit Shammai, and 3) were even so [humble] as to mention the actions of Beit Shammai before theirs…

RaShI s.v. Aluvin Patient. s.v. VeShonin Divreihen VeDivrei Beit Shamai When Beit Shamai would bring a proof to their point of view from the Tora, and Beit Hille would bring a proof from somewhere else, Beit Hill would interpret the text of Beit Shamai regarding the purpose that it serves, and they did not take it lightly in their eyes (i.e., instead of ignoring what their opponent argued, they would take it seriously and attempt to demonstrate how it served a different purpose, thereby justifying their own position not only with a proof, but also an alternate interpretation for the opponent’s proof.)5 It is just like what we learn in Brachot 10b: Beit Shammai says: “In the evening (with respect to the Mitzva of the recitation of the Sh’ma prayer), a person should lie down, and in the morning he should stand, as it is said, (Devarim 6:7) ‘when you lie down and when you rise up.’” Beit Hillel says: “Each person reads in whatever position he is in, as it is said, (Ibid.) ‘as you go in the way’ (i.e., whichever way you wish, including either lying down or standing up, regardless of the time of day). If so, why does the Tora state, ‘when you lie down and when you rise up’? At the time when people ordinarily lie down; at the time when people ordinarily rise up.” s.v. SheMakdimim Divrei Beit Shammai LeDivreihen As was said, “Did it not so happen that the elders of Beit Shammai and the elders of Beth Hillel went on a visit to R. Yochanan b. HaChoranit and found him sitting with his head and greater part of his body within the Sukkah while his table was in the house…”6

Emet LeYaakov s.v. Eilu VaEilu Divrei Elokim Chayim Regarding this passage, the commentators had difficulties. It seems to me that the way to explain it is in the following manner. In Ketubot 57a, RaShI explains: When two Amoraim (personalities from the Talmudic period) disagree with respect to a law or ritual permissibility or prohibition, each one says, “This is the most logical explanation.” There is no falsehood, because each one is articulating his own line of reasoning. One presents a reason for permitting, and one presents a reason for prohibiting. One compares one thing with another in the following fashion, and the other compares one thing with another in a different manner. And it is possible to say,

5 See fn. 2. 6 See fn. 3.

‘Eilu VaEilu Divrei Elokim Chayim”, in the sense that in certain situations this explanation applies and in others that explanation applies. Because the reasons can reverse with respect to subtle changes in the facts of a particular situation. The same could be said in this context, i.e., each one by means of Divine Inspiration reached the conclusion that he did. A parable: Sumchus perceived via Divine Inspiration that money whose ownership is doubtful should be divided equally among the claimants. And regarding his disputant whose spiritual vision was not as clear, he posited that this was the case in all situations, but in truth it was only when no one was in clear possession of the disputed funds. And similarly in every place where Tannaim (personalities quoted in the Mishna), the law is like both points of view, but one of them is lacking some specific condition. And when the condition is extent, then the second view wins the day. And so it is in Gittin 6b “Eilu VaEilu Divrei Elokim Chayim”. “A fly was found and he was not particular. But if he found it and was particular?...” And so it is in every case. And so it was with Daniel who perceived the Words of the Living God, but did not perceive them perfectly to the point where it was necessary to provide an explanation. So too every Tanna perceived his position via Divine Inspiration, just the he did not perceive them in their total perfection. And some condition or other detail is lacking…

Questions for thought and discussion: 1. Sometimes the Gemora states categorically that someone’s point of view was wrong:

Berachot 10b HE WHO RECITES THE SHEMA' LATER LOSES NOTHING. R. Chisda said in the name of Mar 'Ukba: “Provided he does not say the benediction of 'Who formest the light'.” An objection was raised from the statement: “He who recites the Shema' later loses nothing; he is like one reading in the Tora, but he says two blessings before it and one after.” Is not this a refutation of R. hisda? It is [indeed] a refutation.

or that the individual changed his mind:

Sukka 27a MISHNA. R. ELIEZER SAID, A MAN IS OBLIGED TO EAT FOURTEEN MEALS IN THE SUKKA, ONE ON EACH DAY AND ONE ON EACH NIGHT. THE SAGES HOWEVER SAY, THERE IS NO FIXED NUMBER EXCEPT ON THE FIRST NIGHT OF THE FESTIVAL ALONE. R. ELIEZER SAID IN ADDITION, IF A MAN DID NOT EAT IN THE SUKKA ON THE FIRST NIGHT OF THE FESTIVAL, HE MAY MAKE UP FOR IT ON THE LAST NIGHT OF THE FESTIVAL, WHILE THE SAGES SAY, THERE IS NO COMPENSATION FOR THIS, AND OF THIS WAS IT SAID: THAT WHICH IS CROOKED CANNOT BE MADE STRAIGHT, AND THAT WHICH IS WANTING CANNOT BE NUMBERED. GEMARA… R. ELIEZER SAID IN ADDITION. But did not R. Eliezer say that A MAN IS OBLIGED TO EAT FOURTEEN MEALS IN THE SUKKA, ONE ON EACH DAY AND ONE ON EACH NIGHT? (Implying that he could not make up a missed meal.) -Bira answered in the name of R. Ammi: “R. Eliezer recanted [of his previous statement]”…

Are we therefore to assume that wherever the Gemora does not make either of these comments, that the positions recorded are valid and the rule of “Eilu VaEilu” ought to be invoked? 2. Emet LeYaakov discusses this rule in light of the positions advocated by Tannaim and Amoraim. Can/should a distinction be made between them, on the one hand, and Rishonim and Acharonim on the other? 3. R. Lichtenstein, Z”L, categorically rejects applying this rule to the debates between Orthodox Poskim and thinkers, as opposed to those in the Conservative and Reform camps. Can/should such a distinction be made among groups associated with Orthodoxy? 4. In the final analysis, what might the parameters be for the rule “Eilu VaEilu”?

Practical applications of the source: 1. How might the approach of “Eilu VaEilu” inform interpersonal relationships when there are disagreements? Are there certain disagreements concerning which “Eilu VaEilu” cannot be said at the risk of becoming overly relativistic? 2. The disputes to which “Eilu VaEilu” are applied in the Gemora have to do with Halacha and Hashkafa. Could such an approach apply also to ostensibly secular matters politics, management, charity distribution, etc.?