Rebuilding Trust: The Algonquin at , July-

Ty Backer

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

NIPISSING UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

NORTH BAY,

October 2020 SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES CERTIFICATE OF EXAMINATION

Certificate of Examination

Supervisor(s): Examiner(s)

______Dr. Stephen Connor ______Mr. Robert Catsburg

______

Supervisory Committee:

______Dr. Brian Thorn ______

______

The ______Major Research Paper by

______Ty Backer

entitled

Rebuilding Trust: at War, July-September 1944

is accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

______Master of Arts in History

______October 7, 2020 ______Dr. Hilary Earl ______Date Chair of the Examination Committee

(original signatures on file) Abstract

This MRP is a case study of the Algonquin Regiment’s capabilities to rapidly reconstruct their ranks during periods of extreme casualty loss, between late July and early October 1944.

During this time, the Algonquin Regiment, like many other Canadian , experienced a continuous turnover of men due to high casualty rates resulting from the hard fighting in northwest Europe. Although the Algonquins suffered substantial losses from all ranks, they were able to reassemble their companies with new replacements in order to continue their offensive operations. This research argues that previous historical interpretations critical of both

Canadian battle performance and the replacement system are challenged by the experiences of the Algonquin Regiment. The MRP calls into question long-standing notions concerning

‘primary loyalty’ as the key to understanding both unit moral and battle performance. In doing so, this study reinforces the more recent interpretation centred on ‘swift trust’ as a more applicable lens through which to view the experiences, successes and failures of this single infantry . The principal question that this MRP answers is how reinforcements in the

Algonquin Regiment influenced overall battle performances during the late summer and early fall of 1944. Acknowledgments

I would first like to begin by acknowledging the traditional Anishnaabeg territory that

Nipissing University stands on today. Next, I would like to give my sincere appreciation and recognition to the faculty members of Nipissing University, especially those that I had the pleasure to learn from and get to know. I would like to thank you all for guiding me here with your much appreciated comments and recommendations. Also, I would like to acknowledge the support of my family, friends and peers. Their support and encouragement helped me get through the struggles of this past year.

Furthermore, I would like to extend a kind thank you to my committee and examiners.

Thank you Dr. Earl, Mr. Robert Catsburg, and Dr. Brian Thorn. I am very grateful of you all and

I want to thank each of you for taking the time to review and assist me in the development of my research project. Finally, last but not least, I would like to give my greatest appreciation to my supervisor Dr. Stephen Connor. I want to thank you for everything that you have done for me over the past year. I will be forever grateful for all the help and advice that you have given me in order to make this project come to life. You have not only been a great supervisor, but also a great friend.

This MRP is dedicated to all Second World War servicemen of the Algonquin Regiment, especially those replacements, who have not yet been fully recognized by Canadian history, nor by our collective memories. Your sacrifices will never be forgotten. Table of Contents

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………..page 2

Literature Review…………………………………………………………………………..page 6

Methodology……………………………………………………………………………….page 12

Chapter 1: Canadian Infantry Battalion at War…………………………………………….page 20

Chapter 2: The Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1944…………………………………………page 24

Chapter 3: First Blood: The Algonquin Regiment in Normandy, July-August 1944………page 32

Chapter 4: A Regenerated Battalion: Fighting towards the Estuary,

September 1944…………………………………………………………………………….page 55

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………….page 80

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………..page 84 Oh, what with the wounded And what with the dead And what with the boys Who are swinging the lead If this war isn’t over And pretty damn soon There’ll be nothing left In this old damn

-A Canadian Soldier1

1 Terry Copp, “'If This Was Isn't over, And Pretty Damn Soon, There'll Be Nobody Left, In This Old Platoon...': First Canadian , February-March 1945,” In Time to Kill: The Soldiers Experience in the West, 1939-1945, edited by Paul Addison and Angus Calder, 147–58, (Pimlico, 1997), 147.

1 Introduction

On the night of 8 August 1944, Keith Stirling’s D received their orders to make a strong attack down from Caen towards the city Falaise to capture Hill 195. Throughout the night, the Algonquins faced small arms fire, but they were able to push forward with the tanks of the British Colombia Regiment leading the way. As the sun came up and the infantry and tank squadrons lost the cover of darkness, D Company ran into heavy enemy resistance as they were ordered to hold their position until the tanks cleared the area. However, German artillery and tanks made short work of them, destroying all but two. Major Stirling and his men took up a defensive position as they tried to make contact with the rest of the squadron. Without any result, the men were stranded, while being continuously shelled by enemy tank and mortar fire. As nightfall came, the casualties continued to accumulate. The surviving Algonquins were driven back and withdrew to the nearest town of Bretteville-Le-Rabet. By this time, the men were exhausted, having had no sleep and little food remaining. Casualties were horrendous, especially given that this was the Algonquin Regiment’s first large offensive. Major Stirling, like many other Algonquins undoubtedly thought, where do we go on from here.2

This MRP is a case study of the Algonquin Regiment between late July and October 1944 and considers three main areas: the impact of battle, casualties and replacements during the battalion’s first 90 days in northwest Europe. This MRP argues that previous historical interpretations critical of both Canadian battle performance and the replacement system are challenged by the experiences of the Algonquin Regiment. Further, the MRP calls into question

2 This battle narrative derives from Major Keith Stirling’s account of battle experiences at pt.140 from the perspective of the combined squadron of Algonquin D Company and the BCR. LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

2 long-standing notions concerning ‘primary group loyalty’ as the key to understanding both unit moral and battle performance. In doing so, this study reinforces the more recent interpretation centred on ‘swift trust’ as a more applicable lens through which to view the experiences, successes and failures of this single infantry battalion. The principal question that this MRP answers is how reinforcements in the Algonquin Regiment influenced overall battle performances during the late summer and early fall of 1944.

During this time, the Algonquin Regiment, like many other Canadian infantry battalions in northwest Europe, experienced a continuous turnover of men, due to high casualty rates resulting from the hard fighting in the Normandy campaign. Although the Algonquins suffered substantial losses from all ranks, they were able to reassemble their companies with new replacements in order to continue their offensive operations. This question is important because popular belief holds that soldier battle performance during the Second World War can be correlated with primary group cohesion. Ultimately this means, the tighter the group, the better the performance. Men fought on not because they had to, but rather because they felt compelled to preserve the special bond of their unit. This myth is perpetuated in many popular depictions of war, especially throughout the story of “Easy Company” in Steven Spielberg’s acclaimed miniseries Band of Brothers.3

There is certainly some truth to the argument that soldiers fought for the men beside them in order to preserve the special relationships of one another. However, this model does not hold up for many units, whether allied or enemy, because of the heavy losses. Men had little time to

3 The miniseries Band of Brothers was based on the book Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne: From Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest, by Stephen E. Ambrose.

3 bond when the killed and wounded were regularly replaced with new reinforcements. Simply, by the fall of 1944, primary group cohesion could not be sustained because of the constant flow and need for new reinforcements. Therefore, the Algonquin Regiment’s campaign in Normandy,

Belgium, and Holland, will serve as case studies to explore the ways in which battle performances were in fact affected by different kinds of cohesion, or by other factors beyond primary group dynamics. The primary objective of this MRP is to compare the close-knit

Algonquin Regiment’s battle performances with the performances of the reinforcements who re- supplied the regiment. In doing so, this study will try to uncover if and how the Algonquin

Regiment performed any differently.

This MRP engages with key secondary sources focused primarily on battle performance, unit morale and cohesiveness and the Canadian replacement system. One of the most influential sources is the book Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945 by

G.L. Cassidy. The archival source base for this study is a wide range of wartime documents.

Canadian military and archival records such as newspapers, personal messages, and orders will be used in order to understand the struggles, judgements and reputations of replacements. Another significant volume of sources is the battle statistics and questionnaires, especially from the RG24 Volume 10,450 records of Library and Archives (LAC). Other documents such as wastage rates, divisional censorship and field return reports, are all useful in uncovering data regarding both casualties and reinforcements. Lastly, the most important source for this project is the LAC’s collection of war diaries that contain vital information regarding the daily activities ranging from the divisional level, down to the front-line

4 battalions. In particular, this research uses The Algonquin Regiment War Diary from the RG 24 textual records volume 15,000 of LAC.

This MRP is composed of 5 main sections. In the first, I consider the historiography and methodologies utilized by previous historians asking similar questions. The next segment,

Chapter One, provides a description of the components and makeup of a Canadian infantry battalion during the Second World War. Chapter Two introduces the Algonquin Regiment and provides a short regimental history before it came into action in July 1944. Chapter Three examines the first month of battle in August 1944, and provides an analysis on the Algonquin’s battle performances, group cohesion and reinforcement situation. Lastly, Chapter Four studies the regiment’s battle performances during the month of September 1944 in order to reveal the effects of introducing reinforcements within the ranks.

5 Literature Review

This MRP engages two significant types of historiography. First, as the basis of this research is focused on the Algonquin Regiment, it is necessary to review the previous literature on the ’s involvement in northwest Europe. Second the historiography regarding infantry reinforcement and battle performance is engaged.

The first wave of literature on the Canadian campaign in was the initial reports and summaries of Canadian battlefield experiences. The most notable figure who commenced the written works on Canadian battlefront participation was Charles Perry

Stacey, the official historian of the Canadian Army during the Second World War. He was tasked by the Canadian military to collect information from the front-line in order to create a Canadian recollection of the war. Through the use of operational records, reports, and experiences, Stacey created The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War.4 This official history approached the Canadian events in northwest Europe in a summarized and outlined manner. Therefore, his works summarized the war and its operational events. Stacey generalized and made assumptions about the Canadian Army’s combat performances. He describes the

Canadian Army as a maturing and experienced fighting force, but he also believed that the quality of the Canadian Army was not as effective as other allies.5 Although Stacey noted some of the Canadian Army’s courageous fighting qualities, he still believed that Canadians lacked

4 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, : The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960, 8.

5 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960, 641.

6 competence and leadership at the front.6 Therefore, the Canadian Army in the official history was regarded as a triumphant and feared force, but it was also described as an ineffective force with many weaknesses.

The second wave of historiography of the Canadian participation in the war took an even further perspective regarding combat performances in northwest Europe. Essentially, many historians began rethinking C.P. Stacey’s notions and reconsidering them at the operational level.

These historians began using different methodologies such as personal accounts and memoirs of the war, in addition to previously used documents. By developing these operational case studies, it brought forward a new approach to studying the Canadian war effort. This provided the historiography of the Canadian war effort with a better understanding of its micro-level developments.

A source belonging to this body of literature is Tug of War: The Canadian Victory That

Opened Antwerp by Denis and Shelagh Whitaker. This book examines the Canadian Infantry and

Armoured Divisions who were tasked with the assignment of clearing the port of Antwerp. Denis

Whitaker was a -Colonel during the war, he uses his own recollections and those of others through interviews to describe the battles near Antwerp. This work is one of the first and most influential to be very critical of the various inefficiencies Allied and Canadians had that resulted in errors, but it also began to shed light on the capabilities and the courageousness of the

Canadians. This source is valuable not only because it brings forward the operational mistakes that the Canadian battalions endured, but it also introduces the effectiveness of the Canadian

6 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960, 363.

7 forces in northwest Europe. This source and many others alike throughout this historiographical wave used a more specific case study approach to further explore the previous set narratives and notions of the Canadian participation in the Second World War.

The next generation of historians took a completely different perspective. This era of literature is the foundational basis of research and ideology for this MRP project. During this wave of literature, historians began to combine both the initial narratives of the war and the case study approach, with a new set of questions about Canadian participation in northwest Europe.

The main focus of this historiography was to uncover the previously set notions on the ineffective performances of the Canadian Army. Ultimately, this brought forward a large amount of work that contradicted these beliefs and demonstrated just how successful and effective the

Canadian Army was at the operational level. Therefore, this wave marked an end of the grand- narrative period because it began challenging previous assumptions set by past historians.

Throughout this new historiography, the study of Canadian combat effectiveness and motivations began to flourish.7

An important piece of literature best represented in this wave of historiography is Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy by Terry Copp. This book examines the Canadian contributions in Normandy through the study of accounts of each operation achieved by the

Canadian Army. In this piece, Copp challenges the opinions of British, American, and a generation of Canadian historians who accepted the critiques and failures of the Canadian Army.8

7 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 10.

8 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 6.

8 Therefore, Copp argues that the Canadian Army’s achievements in Normandy were greatly underrated and that the effectiveness of the Germans greatly exaggerated.9 Through the use of operational records, interviews and other new evidence such as battle and intelligence performance reports, Copp is able to reconsider the effectiveness of the operations carried out by the Canadian soldiers. As a result, he argued that the considerable amount of casualties from the

Canadian Army was a result of heavier fighting and closer enemy contact, rather than the previous assumption of operational battle failure.

Finally, the current wave of historiography being explored has moved away from the conventional elements of examining the battlefield. Traditional operational military historians largely reviewed operational history at its largest scale, but this new stream of historiography has considered battle operations at a micro-level. Thus, these works have begun challenging the common understandings of the war by studying human behaviours and social elements of front- line soldiers. One of the most influential historians of this research is Robert Engen and his book

Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. He specializes on topics such as Canadian soldiers combat motivations and behaviours during battle. This approach to studying motivations and behaviours will be applied in this research project in order to uncover the effectiveness and reliability of the Algonquin Regiment’s reinforcements in battle.

Unlike past studies on the lowest levels of tactical operations, such as S.L.A. Marshall’s work on the 7th US Infantry ’s battle at Kwajalein Island, Engen argues against the overall assumption that the successful outcome of a battalion “pivoted on the fire of a few men.”10

9 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 13.

10 S.LA. Marshall, Island Victory: The Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, (Bison Books, 2001), 79.

9 Therefore, similarly to Engen’s challenges of this notion, this MRP will demonstrate how and why the reinforcements played an essential role in overall successful outcomes of the Algonquin

Regiment in northwest Europe.

In past Canadian military historiography, there have also been several influential historians who have studied the battle performances of infantry reinforcements. Authors such as

C.P Stacey, Jack Granatstein, and , have all reviewed the controversies surrounding Canada’s Second World War replacement system. Each has brought forward similar claims which have shaped the popular beliefs that still hold strong notions of Canadian reinforcements to this day. They suggest that Canada’s reinforcement system was not large enough to meet the needs of the units on the front lines. C.P. Stacey affirms this when he criticized Canadian military authorities’ miscalculation of wastage rates for a Canadian infantry unit after periods of intense combat. Additionally, Canadian military historiography also implies that the Canadian reinforcements were too young and poorly trained to go overseas.11 Many historians such as Granatstein and Whitaker, have criticized the Canadian Army and the

Mackenzie-King government for sending infantry reinforcements who were unready for combat.12 This idea brought forward the notion that high casualty rates were related to the unpreparedness of infantry reinforcements.

Nonetheless, these assumptions have been challenged by some. In particular, Terry Copp in his study, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945, has given the issue a little more nuance. He argues that the Canadian reinforcements did in fact receive

11 Historians such as C.P Stacey, Jack Granatstein, and Denis Whitaker have each argued this.

12 Caroline D'Amours, “Reassessment of a Crisis: The Infantry Reinforcements of Canada during the Second World War,” (Canadian Army Journal, 2012) 75.

10 adequate training and that they should be regarded as playing an essential role in the fighting of northwest Europe.13 Thus, this research project will engage with these two historiographical perspectives using the case of the Algonquin Regiment in northwest Europe. Horrendous casualties made the battalion rely on supplies of reinforcements to rebuild their ranks. By

September 1944, the original status of the Algonquin Regiment had completely changed. Primary group cohesion could no longer be possible as the reinforcements made up a large extent of the regiment’s strength.

13 Caroline D'Amours, “Reassessment of a Crisis: The Infantry Reinforcements of Canada during the Second World War,” (Canadian Army Journal, 2012) 75.

11 Methodology

In order to understand the interpretive method that will be used for the subject of this paper, this chapter will be structured into two separate segments. The first will briefly examine the historiography of previous methodologies used to better understand the theory behind the topic of battle performances, and the second part will develop the type of constructed approach that this MRP will be using going forward.

The main question that this research seeks to answer is how did the reinforcements affect battle performances of the Algonquin regiment during the late summer and early fall of 1944.

Therefore, the main assumption of this study will examine the ways in which the new supply of replacements affected the operations of the Algonquin Regiment. This MRP examines this question because of previous notions and the popular beliefs that assumed that soldier battle performances during the Second World War were correlated with primary group cohesion. It has been argued that this ‘Band of Brothers’ style of soldier cohesion is what made Allied battle performances successful. This means that infantry soldiers fought on to preserve the special bond and unity of their unit. Historians in the past have argued that soldiers fight for the men beside them in order to preserve the special relationships of one another. However, primary group cohesion of original regimental members could not be the case for the Algonquins because of the constant flow and need for new reinforcements. For these reasons, the Algonquin Regiment’s campaign in northwest Europe will be used as a case study to see if and how the battle performances were in fact affected by different models of cohesion or any other incidences.

One of the first historians to begin asking questions about infantry soldier combat motivations and performances was John Ellis. In his book, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in

12 World War II, Ellis took an in-depth look inside the everyday life of an Allied infantryman during the Second World War. Specifically, he investigated the reasons why infantrymen of the Allied forces were able to overcome constant stress and never ending battle.14 Ultimately, Ellis used first-hand accounts and war-time documents to develop an understanding of how an Allied soldier’s attitude, discipline, and morale remained generally stable during periods of extreme disarray. In the end, he argued that a front-line soldier did not fight so much for politics and patriotism, rather a soldier relied on their fraternity of comrades within their units who were sharing the same experience and suffering that they were.15 Therefore, Ellis is one of the first historians that argued on behalf of primary group cohesion. An Allied soldier on the front-line of the war was “forced to look only to his immediate circle for support and understanding, for any meaning in the chaos around him.”16

The next wave of historians who approached combat motivations and battle performances was done by authors such as Omar Bartov and Martin van Crevald. In van Crevald’s book,

Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945, he compared the maintenance of combat efficiency between the U.S. and German infantry soldiers. Ultimately, he concluded that average German soldiers did not fight for social prestige, nor their beliefs in Nazi ideology, even though it was not completely ruled out. Rather, they fought for some of the same reasons as

14 John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 210.

15 John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 281.

16 John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 288.

13 the Allied soldiers, because he felt himself a member of a well-integrated and well-led team.17

Similarly, Bartov in his book Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, examined the attitudes of the in an attempt to gauge the degree in which the

Wehrmacht constituted an integral part of state and society in the Third Reich.18 Bartov used a very similar approach to this question as Ellis and van Crevald had previously had. He used soldier family letters, war diaries, and German military reports to understand the primary group cohesion within the German Army. Bartov believed that German Army policy throughout the war promoted cohesion amongst the front-line soldiers. The Wehrmacht method installed a sense of esprit de among the men by raising battalions and on a regional basis to make linguistic and cultural affinities between the men.19 Therefore, Bartov argued that German soldiers were highly motivated by the organization of primary groups, and that the destruction of these groups had severe impacts to the organizational disintegration of the army.20 Nevertheless,

German soldiers became victims of ‘Hitler’s war ideologies’ and in order to survive, they needed to rely on their bonds formed within primary group cohesion.

Based on these past methods of approaching the history of soldier performances and attitudes on the battlefield, these theories all encompassed the same general notion that soldiers

17 Martin van Crevald, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), 164.

18 Omer Bartov, Hitlers Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 3.

19 Omer Bartov, Hitlers Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 30.

20 Omer Bartov, Hitlers Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 104.

14 fought on to preserve their own group’s cohesion. Without a primary group formation, armies on both sides of the conflict were deemed doomed in facing an enemy who fought for their brothers beside them. Consequently, this MRP uses a new approach to studying group cohesion amongst the Canadian infantry. There is a relatively new theory which contends with these past notions of primary group cohesion.

Canadian historian Robert Engen and his use of the ‘Swift Trust Theory’ is one of the first approaches to contradict the popular assumption that performance and combat motivations were correlated with the popular ‘Band of Brothers’ group cohesion model. The first discussions of Swift Trust came in a study published in 2005, by a team led by Uzi Ben-Shalom on the Israeli

Defence Forces during the Al-Aqsa Intifada of 2001.21 This investigation determined that primary group cohesion could not be sustained, since the original units were under a constant process of splitting up and reintegration.22 As a result, it is argued for the first time that fighting units worked-well together even though primary groups split apart. Rather than a complete breakdown of forces, the dynamics of trust could be developed along different lines. Thus, this new theory of Swift Trust went against the previous assumptions of group cohesion and became the basis of Engen’s study on Canadian infantrymen.

In his book Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945,

Engen used his own model of Swift Trust Theory as a method of approaching the history of

Canadian infantryman during the Second World War. He used sources such as battle experience

21 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 15.

22 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 15.

15 questionnaires, censorship reports, and statistical records from war documents to uncover the battlefield behaviours of Canadian infantrymen.23 Fundamentally, Engen’s book examined the reasons why Canadian infantrymen behaved in such ways that they did, particularly in light of extreme adversity.24 Engen’s conclusion is that primary group cohesion could not have been a factor in the battle performances of the Canadian . He argued that soldiers were willing to fight, with or without being a part of a regiment because,

“While the regimental ‘family’ could be a source of inspiration and pride, high casualty rates among infantrymen, coupled with a reinforcement system that was forced to send replacements to regiments with increasing disregard for regional distinctiveness, made regimental identification difficult to sustain.”25

Therefore, a form of Swift Trust had to have taken shape for many of the infantry regiments of the Canadian Army. Not only did this research deny the primary group cohesion model within the Canadian infantry regiments, but it also illustrated how Canadian infantrymen remained efficient and successful during times of extreme casualties. It has been made evident in past literature of the Canadian participation in northwest Europe that Canadian infantrymen were generally perceived as inefficient. Thus, this book and its unique approach to rejecting these previous notions is the reason why it is the primary driving force behind this MRP.

This research paper uses the Algonquin Regiment as a case study within Engen’s theory.

The case study will borrow and test Engen’s approaches by applying it to the context of the

23 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 9.

24 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 7.

25 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 45.

16 Algonquins. Like most Canadian regiments, the Algonquin regiment raised their battalions regionally, meaning that most soldiers had come from the military district in order to help them possess a local identity.26 Most of the Algonquin’s came from both North Bay and Timmins districts at the beginning, but by the end of August 1944, this proved no longer to be the case.

With extreme casualties came new reinforcements, who were no longer a part of the original group’s cohesion. Therefore, this MRP will be testing this method to uncover if and how the battle performances were affected by these new relationships between reinforcements. The Swift

Trust Theory will be used as the basis of this research project in order to reveal the effects of fighting alongside unfamiliar faces within the Algonquin Regiment. Additionally, the most significant aspect of this new theory is that it is rejecting previous assumptions, while bringing forward new features of Canadian infantrymen that historians have just begun to consider.

The foundations of this study will be mainly examining the months of August, into early

October 1944 in order to reveal the improvised and readjusted battalion of the Algonquin

Regiment. By analyzing this time period, it will expose the underlying evolution of the

Algonquin Regiment. The regiment made its first appearance in northwest Europe at the very end of July 1944, but by the end of August, the infantry battalion had completely progressed with new replacements that changed the Algonquins into a completely ‘new regiment.’ New faces replaced old one’s, and almost all of the men within the Algonquin’s soon became men with no background or ties to the regiment. This is where Robert Engen’s Swift Trust approach will come in the analysis of the evidence, as it will reveal how new replacements had to believe in

26 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 43.

17 themselves and had to trust in the training of strangers.27 Thus, this MRP will be asking some of the same questions deriving from the ‘grandfathers’ of this approach, such as Ellis, Bartov, and van Creveld, while incorporating Engen, the ‘father figure’ of this project, into the methods of proceeding the case of the Algonquin Regiment.

Additionally, it is also important to mention that my approach for analyzing the

Algonquin’s performance in the fall of 1944 will also differ from Engen’s methodology to also incorporate Arthur Gullachsen’s method of studying reinforcements. In his Phd thesis, An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945, Gullachsen demonstrates the effectiveness of the Canadian Army at reinforcing and reconstituting units that had previously suffered extreme losses. Unlike previous notions on the matter, he argued that the

Canadian divisions were able to rebuild and re-equip themselves in a rapid manner.28 Gullachsen describes the Canadian reinforcement system compared to the German one to have the qualities of a ‘phoenix,’ since it continuously reinforced its combat units in a rapid manner. He concluded that during the majority of the campaigns in northwest Europe from 1944 to 1945, the Canadian

Army operated effectively to maintain regular unit equipment inventories and personnel levels.29

For the purpose of my MRP, I want to incorporate Gullachsen’s method of analyzing the efficiencies of the Canadian personnel and equipment reinforcements through quantitative evidence. In doing so, this approach of examining the reinforcement system will provide

27 I Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 158.

28 Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945”, Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository,(2016), 2.

29 Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945”, Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository,(2016), 251.

18 evidence to further illustrate the combat performances of the Algonquin Regiment. Also, this will provide a regimental level history of the Canadian replacement system within the greater scope of the Canadian Second World War historiography. Therefore, my approach to this regimental level of history will integrate both Engen’s theory of group cohesion with Gullachsen’s approach of studying reinforcements to test their respective conclusions on the case of the Algonquin

Regiment.

19 Chapter One Canadian Infantry Battalion at War

In January 1943, the Algonquins became part of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division

(4CAD). This formation, previously an infantry division, was reconstructed to be an armoured division by Canadian high command.30 During the campaign in North Africa, the Allies learned from their mistakes and noticed that they lacked the cooperation between tank and infantry units on the battlefield. Shortcomings and deficiencies between tank and infantry units brought forward the creation of the new 4CAD. The formation reorganized in order to encompass an armoured brigade, an infantry brigade, and artillery formations. The Algonquins found themselves as one of the three battalions comprising the 10th Infantry Brigade, which also included the Lincoln and Welland Regiment, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, along with the 10th Independent Machine Gun Company (New Brunswick Rangers). In October

1942, the Algonquins and the rest of the 4CAD, trained in England for the next year and a half, to perfect their combined tank, artillery, and infantry operations.31 At the end of July 1944,

4CAD finally mobilized to fight in Normandy, with the Algonquin Regiment as one of its essential infantry battalions.

During the Second World War, a Canadian infantry battalion, such as those in 4CAD, composed a tactical unit of ground forces which made up the most important elements of maneuver. The total paper strength of an infantry battalion listed 37 officers and 811 other ranks

30 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 44.

31 4th Canadian Armoured Division Order of Battle (OOB).

20 (ORs).32 Smaller than a usual infantry battalion from an infantry division, the Algonquins and the rest of the infantry units within the 4CAD made up for their numbers in armoured vehicles and light-weaponry among the supporting armed . These battalions were divided into three distinct Echelons. “F” Echelon consisted of combat companies of the battalion which were located on the front-lines. These soldiers formed the ‘tip of the spear’ and were deployed to close with and destroy the enemy. “A” Echelon, generally located a several miles behind “F” Echelon, held the transports, supplies, and spare equipment of the battalion. Lastly, “B” Echelon which came under divisional control, held Battalion Headquarters (HQ), medical staff, and Left out of

Battle personnel (LOB).33 These were the three components which organized and functioned within an infantry battalion.

Within the Algonquins and the rest of the Canadian infantry battalions, there were three main sections that each played an essential role in combat. First, the elements of a Headquarters

(HQ), consisted of the commanding officer, his Second-in-Command, and Intelligence officer, as well as the attached medical officer. There were also ORs within HQ who acted mostly as drivers, batmen, orderlies and over twenty stretcher bearers.34 The units were

32 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 3.

33 LOB was a personnel system strategy within Canadian infantry battalions which originated from the First World War in order to preserve part of an infantry unit's fighting core in case of heavy casualties. Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016), 86.

34 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 3.

21 another component within an infantry battalion’s HQ. The battalion’s eight were assigned to each of the Rifle Companies and were often referred to as “Scout Platoons.”35 Next, the men who worked in the Signal Platoon maintained the radio, wire, and telephone communication lines between the battalion, and the higher and parallel formations. The last element surrounding an infantry battalion’s HQ was the Administrative Platoon. These units held the men who acted as vehicle drivers, cooks, fitters, and various other tradesmen who kept the battalion functioning36

Second was the Support Company. This portion of the battalion contained the specialized platoons which aided and reinforced the Rifle Companies in combat. In total, the Support

Company encompassed seven officers and 185 ORs. The Mortar Platoon had six detachments that were paired into three sections of rifleman.37 These men were responsible for providing fire support with mortars which launched explosive and smoke bombs. The Carrier Platoon contained four subsections and one platoon HQ and were equipped with lightly armoured tracked vehicles called Universal (Bren) carriers that could be used for a variety of missions, such as reconnaissance or as a quick reaction force. The Carrier platoon enjoyed a higher number of light support weapons than a Rifle Company, but did not have the manpower to hold ground

35 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 3.

36 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 3.

37 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 4.

22 indefinitely.38 Next, was the Anti-tank Platoon armed with quick firing 6-pounder anti-tank guns for offensive and defensive operation against enemy armour and positions.39 Lastly, the Pioneer

Platoon mainly acted for engineering purposes. Comprised five strong assault sections the platoon provided specialist men and equipment for the disposal of breaching obstacles or mines40

The largest component of a Canadian infantry battalion encompassed the four Rifle

Companies at the ‘sharp end.’ This is where the bulk of the men were deployed and composed the backbone of an infantry battalion. Overall, the infantry battalion consisted of four companies

(coy) “A,” “B,” “C,” and “D,” each commanded by a Company HQ most often led by a Major, with a as his Second-in-Command. Each Company consisted of three platoons designed by number. Each of these platoons also consisted of a Platoon HQ, which was managed by a platoon , a sergeant and two ORs.41 In turn, a platoon maintained three sections of riflemen, which each encompassed around ten soldiers. Like many other infantry battalions, this is how the Algonquin Regiment was assembled. However, it is their regimental history and culture that differed them from other Canadian battalions.

38 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 4.

39 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 4.

40 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 4.

41 Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 4.

23 Chapter Two The Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1944

This chapter examines the mobilization of the Algonquin Regiment as an infantry battalion and how the unit’s group cohesion began collectively shaping itself throughout the years leading up to deployment in Normandy. Creating a sense of regimental identity is one of the main factors that went into building a common soldier’s identity. As a unit raised and recruited initially in northern Ontario, the Regiment nurtured its unique character connected both to its remoteness but also notions of a ‘northern identity.’42 This sense of projecting a rugged northern identity shaped the regiment’s own identification and sense of distinctiveness. The

Algonquin Regiment took pride in its northern roots and reflected in its iconography such by a bull moose on the regimental crest as a symbol of the region and the Ojibwa phrase “Ne-Kah-

Ne-Tah,” which loosely translates as “We Lead, Others Follow,” as the unit’s motto.43 Therefore, the regiment symbolism reinforced and developed members' sense of their own unique identities of northern Ontario, symbolically shaped offering emotive energy to be drawn from both notions of remoteness and Indigenous history.

42 Local Northern identity was constructed over time, shaped by the resource extraction industry, harsh environment conditions, and the sentiments of remoteness compared to urban areas in southern Ontario. Nicholas Mcguire, ““Being Resilient, being Reliable, and Being Resourceful:” Voices of Citizen-Soldiers of the Algonquin Regiment, 1960s to 1990s,” Nipissing University School of Graduate Studies, February 2018.

43 National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Volume 3, Part 2: Infantry Regiments - The Algonquin Regiment,” Government of Canada, National Defence, 9 August 2010, www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par2/ar-eng.asp.

24 The Algonquin Regiment originally formed as a volunteer infantry company in Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario as the 97th Regiment of Rifles, a formation.44 In 1903, the unit was renamed as the 97th Regiment but was known as the “Algonquin Rifles.” 45 Throughout the war, the Algonquin Rifles served as a battalion in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF). The unit’s recruitment area was geographically large and boasted companies out of northern Ontario. The companies of the Algonquin Rifles were mainly used as Canadian Railway Troops and as reinforcement battalions for the on the front-lines.46 As a result, many northerners originally from the Algonquins served in the battles of the Great War, but the regiment itself never had its own operation. Following the end of the war, the formation disbanded facing reorganization. The 159th, the 228th, and the 256th Battalions were all perpetuated from the Algonquin Rifles.47 The area of the Algonquins now encompassed the greater regions of Sudbury, Nipissing, and the northern regions up to the Porcupine Gold

44 National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Volume 3, Part 2: Infantry Regiments - The Algonquin Regiment,” Government of Canada, National Defence, 9 August 2010, www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par2/ar-eng.asp.

45 “The Algonquin Regiment,” Canadiansoldiers.com, accessed April 30 2020, https:// www.canadiansoldiers.com/regiments/infantry/algonquinregiment.htm

46 “The Algonquin Regiment,” Canadiansoldiers.com, accessed April 30 2020, https:// www.canadiansoldiers.com/regiments/infantry/algonquinregiment.htm

47 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 3.

25 Camp.48 Remaining a militia unit of volunteer citizen soldiers, throughout the interwar period, members spent their time holding annual summer camps and training exercises. In 1933, the unit officially changed its title to the Algonquin Regiment.49

In 1936, the Algonquins reorganized yet again. ‘A’ Company in Sudbury amalgamated with the Sault-Ste-Marie Regiment to form a new Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury Regiment.50

Accordingly, the Northern Pioneers Regiment, which functioned out of the Huntsville, Parry

Sound, and Muskoka areas, were amalgamated and folded into the Algonquin Regiment. From then on, the Algonquins were no longer solely men from northern Ontario, but many of the men also derived from the regions of Muskoka. The Algonquin’s regimental area was massive, extending from Bracebridge and Parry Sound in the south, to Timmins and Cochrane in the north, with regimental headquarters situated in between at North Bay.51 During this period, the regiment devoted significant time to learning new drill formations and mastering the elements of new battalion, company, and platoon organization. By the mid-1930s, the situation in Europe began more unstable despite Anglo-French appeasement. Yet until 1939 few, including

Canadians viewed war as a means to blunt German aggression. This would change in the

48 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 3.

49 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 3.

50 National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Volume 3, Part 2: Infantry Regiments - The Algonquin Regiment,” Government of Canada, National Defence, 9 August 2010, www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par2/ar-eng.asp.

51 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 4.

26 aftermath of the failure of the ‘Munich Peace’ signalled by the German annexation of

Czechoslovakia.

By the summer of 1939, the Algonquin Regiment numbered some 250 men, including commissioned and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).52 In September 1939, as Canada joined other allied nations in war against , the Algonquin Regiment began to transition from a peacetime militia to an active in the Canadian Army.53 Yet, despite its incorporation as an active service regiment, the Algonquins continued to recruit across northern

Ontario and continued to foster a ‘northern’ sense of identity and pride. This element would serve a key ‘connector’ and proved central to the development of primary group loyalty for this initial iteration of the regiment.

With the declaration of war, the Algonquins now had to bolster their ranks in order to prepare for eventual overseas deployment. Yet while other Canadian regiment’s joined the first transports to Britain in 1940, the Algonquins remained in Canada. By the summer of 1940, three officers, Major N. Evoy, Captain G. Ellesmere, and Captain Stirling, took on the task of recruiting more men from northern Ontario.54 Such new recruits were described by Major G.L.

Cassidy quintessential ‘norther boys’, born and raised in the outdoors and accustomed to the

52 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 4.

53 The Algonquin Regiment was mobilized for active service on 24 May 1940. It was redesignated as ‘1st Battalion, The Algonquin Regiment, CASF’ on 7 November 1940. National Defence and the Canadian Forces, “Volume 3, Part 2: Infantry Regiments - The Algonquin Regiment,” Government of Canada, National Defence, 9 August 2010, www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/his/ol-lo/vol-tom-3/par2/ar-eng.asp.

54 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 6.

27 “hardy life.”55 Yet given the unit’s wide recruitment area, variations existed. For example, men from the Muskoka’s generally came from backgrounds as farmers and bushmen. In areas around

North Bay, men were raised as trappers, guides, fishermen, and bushmen where those from more northerly regions such as Timmins were primarily miners and lumberjacks.56 However cultivated, in important ways, the regiment’s identity as northern proved entirely appropriate and empowered members to consider themselves as distinct ‘Algonquins’ compared to men from other regiments. Since most of the members derived from working class backgrounds, the regiment itself developed a unique reputation as tough and shrewd. Critically, in this initial period, the gradual disappearance of a soldier's local identity allowed for the development of the regimental esprit.

During the first two years of the war, the Algonquins participated in various training schools in northern Ontario, Fort William and . Most of their time was spent training, bonding, and developing primary groups with one another until they were called into action in the winter of 1942.57 The regiment’s first assignment came in February 1942, when the

Algonquin’s were deployed to serve in a home defence role in Newfoundland as part of the 20th

Infantry Brigade.58 After nearly a year in this stationary role, the Algonquins were finally called

55 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 7.

56 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 7.

57 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 14-22.

58 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume I: Sis Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1955), 537.

28 upon to deploy overseas. On 11 June 1943, the Algonquin Regiment embarked for Britain as part of the 10th Infantry Brigade, a part of the newly formed 4CAD.59 Upon sailing overseas the

Algonquins were near the relative size of an infantry battalion.60 The ORs that made up the battalion were generally young northerners, all of whom volunteered to fight alongside commanders and officers not much older then they were.61

After arriving in Britain on 18 June 1943, intense training began.62 However, for the most part, the infantry and armoured rehearsed independently and it was not until May 1944 that the Canadian Army placed new emphasis on infantry and tank combined operations within the division.63 Training exercises soon followed. For example, one of the largest was Exercise

Iroquois, a training operation specifically designed to familiarize officers, down to squadron leaders, in the use of battle groups designed to defeat the enemy in numbers, equipment, and

59 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 44.

60 Total size of an infantry battalion within the 4th Canadian Armoured Division is 37 officers and 811 ORs. Seminar 1: “‘You’re in the Army now!’: The Canadian Army at War, 1944- 1945,” https:// web.archive.org/web/20130512010113/http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.c om:80/ Commonwealth/Canadian/canadian_army.htm, 3.

61 2/3 of the Canadian soldiers in Normandy were between the ages of 18 and 25. Also, the average Canadian soldier in the was only 5’7’’ in height and weighed less than 160 pounds. Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2003), 15,16.

62 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 48.

63 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2003), 31.

29 offensive spirit superiority.64 Exercise Iroquois closely resembled the first battles that the 4CAD later faced in Normandy, yet without the extensity and realism of the battlefield which proved impossible to simulate.

During these training periods both at home and in England, the men of the Algonquin

Regiment had much time and opportunities to form relationships and special bonds with each other. Within the regiment there were already many old friendships which began during pre war militia service but would intensify with increased training, recreational sports, and nightly entertainment. In effect, training, shared experience, necessity, companionship, time and common identity and cultural familiarity continued to develop. For example, in January 1944, the Algonquins boasted an team which won the division’s league championship.65

Thus, as a collective , the Algonquins continued to strengthen bonds supported by an underlying shared perception of a specific northern identity. In short, as these men of the Algonquin

Regiment mostly originated in northern Ontario, they also had many years to connect with one another and for a common group identity to evolve .

In the summer of 1944, the Algonquins received word from divisional commander,

General Kitching that the 4CAD would be used after the secret invasion of Normandy. Yet despite the invasion’s initial success, the drive inland soon stalled and the failure to capture Caen on D-Day, set back the division’s schedule for deployment. Since formations were not able to move as far into Normandy as planners hoped, leaving 4CAD with no room to land at the

64 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2003), 31.

65 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 59.

30 beachheads until Caen and its surrounding area were captured.66 Consequently, they were delayed nearly a month and a half later. On the morning of 25 July 1944, the Algonquin

Regiment and the rest of the 10th Infantry Brigade landed in Normandy.67 Initially tasked with breaking through and driving south behind enemy lines, the battalion had to ensure getting armoured vehicles and infantry past the heavily entrenched areas surrounding the greater Caen area.68 The Algonquins proceeded that night to Caen and commenced their initial offensive to assist in liberating areas from the defending German positions along the Caen-Falaise road.

In very short order, they would soon discover just to what length the Germans would go to stop them.

66 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 64.

67 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, July 1944.

68 G.L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 74.

31 Chapter Three

First Blood: The Algonquin Regiment in Normandy, July-August 1944

On 6 June 1944, the Allied invasion of Normandy marked the beginning of the bloodiest months in Canadian history. During this period, the Normandy killing fields inflicted carnage on a scale comparable to the dreadful Great War.69 was the initial attack, but the most difficult operations came later while trying to liberate northern , defended tenaciously by some of the best German formations.70 By the end of July, after over a month of heavy resistance in the region of Caen, Allied forces had taken control of the flattened city. The

Canadians launched their next plan, codenamed ‘Totalize,’ which commenced a heavy attack from the Caen sector in the direction of Falaise in order to break through the heavily fortified enemy positions to the south, and to gain vital ground in the areas near Falaise.71 As early as 29

July, General Henry Crerar, commander of the First Canadian Army, instructed General Guy

69 The first three months in Normandy were the most violent. After only a few months of fighting, the infantry companies, including those of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, had sustained casualties in the numbers close to those suffered during the entire 14 months of the Italian Campaign from 1944-45. Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 130.

70 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 130.

71 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 208.

32 Simonds, to plan a major operation on the Caen-Falaise axis to break through the German positions along the main road.72

The Canadians were tasked with keeping pressure on the area in order to gain ground and to prevent the Germans from transferring forces to the western flank, where the Americans were on the verge of breaking through west of the Orne.73 The forces made available for the operation were the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, as well as the newly arrived 4CAD. The 1st

Polish Armoured Division and support from the Royal Canadian were also made available to General Simonds’ for the major operation.74 Accordingly, the Algonquin Regiment and the rest of the 4CAD infantry battalions were assigned to hold the ground east of the main

Caen-Falaise road. This would allow the division’s inexperienced infantry the opportunity to understand “ the feel of things,” while also securing needed ground for a future attack toward

Falaise.75 Canadian military planners knew that it would take at-least two ‘break-in' operations to penetrate the two German defence lines in the general areas of May-sur-Orne, Tilly-la-

Campagne, La Hogue, and Hautmesnil-St. Sylvain.76

72 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 211.

73 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 187-188.

74 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 208.

75 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 189.

76 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 208.

33 The southern Caen region, in which the Algonquins were fighting, was primarily made up of open country, with good roads leading to the Seine and to Paris. German military planners believed that they had to firmly defend this area in strength, as a Canadian breakthrough would cut off their forces fighting the British and American forces further west.77 On 31 July, Adolf

Hitler himself ordered the construction of a new defensive line based behind German lines on the

Somme River. Nevertheless, he continued to insist that his commanders in Normandy concentrate fully on stopping the Allied breakout beforehand.78

The outline plan for Operation Totalize had three phases. The first was a night attack on 7 and 8 August 1944, supported by heavy bombers, conducted by an Anglo-Canadian force consisting of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and the 51st Highland Division, in order to break through the first enemy positions on Verrières Ridge.79 Canadian high command designed the second phase to breach the Hautmesnil-St. Sylvain area during the day, using the 4CAD and the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division. This phase would have very heavy air support, including heavy day bombers in addition to all available medium bombers.80 The third and final phase, as

Simonds saw it, would be the seizure of the high ground at Point 195, west of the main highway,

77 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 20.

78 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 189.

79 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 191.

80 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 209.

34 and other high ground east of the road immediately and dominating Falaise. This needed to be done by the Polish Armoured Division and units of the 4CAD.81

At 2300 hours on the night of 7 August 1944, Halifax and Lancaster bombers began dropping their bombs over the targeted positions.82 By dawn, the 4CAD moved between Fleury- sur-Orne and the Falaise Road to launch their part in phase two of the operation. General

Kitching's plan for the 4th Division involved advancing the infantry brigade on the right and the armoured brigade on the left. The 10th Infantry Brigade was tasked with capturing the villages of

Cintheaux and Hautmesnil, and to seize and control the general area of Bretteville.83 To that end,

B, C, and D Coys of the Algonquin Regiment were allocated to the armoured squadrons of the

British Columbia Regiment (BCR) under the codename ‘Worthington Force.’84 The Algonquins, under the command of the BCR were ordered to seize Point 195, a hill just west of the main

81 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 209.

82 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 218.

83 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 222.

84 The Worthington Force, named after the commanding officer of the BCR’s Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Worthington, was a battlegroup formed by the tanks of the British Columbia Regiment and the infantry of the Algonquin Regiment. The task force was ordered to capture a piece of high ground known as Point 195, but in the confusion of the night, they found themselves some six kilometres northeast of their objective. Although the battlegroup crashed through the last major German defensive line, nobody knew where they were before German units in the area heavily attacked and destroyed the formation. Mike Bechthold, “Lost in Normandy The Odyssey of Worthington Force, 9 August 1944,” Canadian Military History, 19 (2010), 5.

35 highway.85 The plan called for them to move past Cynthieux and bypass the town of Bretteville- le-Rabet in order to cross the highway behind enemy lines to reach Point 195.86

The officer commanding the battlegroup, Lt.-Col. D. G. Worthington, also commanding officer of the BCR, decided to drive on in the darkness. In his plan, he wanted to by-pass the enemy resistance at Bretteville-le-Rabet under the cover of darkness. This involved circling to the left, eastward, and then swinging to the right across the main highway to reach Point 195.

Unfortunately, the main body of this force went east of the village of Estrees-la-Campagne instead of west of it. As a result, the Algonquins and BCRs arrived at the incorrect ‘high ground position’ on the wrong side of the Falaise road, around 6500 yards north-east of their real objective at Point 195.87 At the wrong position, Worthington Force was ambushed by elements of

12th SS Panzer Division. Tiger and Panther tanks encircled their position and continued attacks all day which gradually wore down the isolated Algonquin and BCR forces.88 Overall, the failed operation proved strategically costly as the entire division’s advance had to be delayed.

85 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 207.

86 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

87 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 226.

88 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 227.

36 C.P. Stacey described this attempt by the combined Algonquin and BCR group to carry out orders as one of the most costly actions of the entire operation.89 The tragic episode proved bloody. The BCR lost 47 tanks, almost their entire strength in just its first few days of fighting.

The Algonquin Regiment’s total casualties for the 9 and 10 August amounted to 128 men, including 45 taken prisoners.90 This represented roughly 36 % of the battalion’s infantry rifle companies. Significantly, the battalion also lost Lt-Col. AJ Hay who was subsequently replaced by Lt-Col. R.A Bradburn.91 Casualties were so high that men from both B and C companies had to be reorganized into a single unit. Out of the original four officers and 105 ORs from B company, to only two officers and 52 ORs remained. Accordingly, C company had only one officer and approximately 27 ORs left fit for duty.92 Taken together, such ‘wastage rates’ were not only unanticipated by Army planners but also on par with the worst Canadian losses in the

Great War. In effect, at least for B and C coys, the old unit that had lived and trained together since at least 1940 effectively ceased to exist.

On the morning of 10 August 1944, General Simmonds decided to pause and reorganize the remaining Canadian positions in the areas of the Quesnay Woods.93 The all-out Canadian

89 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 225.

90 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 228.

91 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

92 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, April 1945.

93 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 211.

37 attack for the city of Falaise quickly came to an end, and Allied high command had deemed the entire operation as a failure. The Canadians advanced some nine miles from the start line on 7

August, but the enemy had successfully held them off. From this point on, the First Canadian

Army would have to reorganize itself and plan another large-scale attack. The 4CAD then retired to the St. Sylvain area and awaited their orders to prepare for their new effort in the near future.94

General Montgomery, the commander for 21st and all Allied ground forces in northwest Europe, soon issued another directive ordering the next phase of operations for the

Canadian Army’s attack towards Falaise. His intentions for the future were “to destroy the enemy forces in that part of France,” which referred to west of the Seine and north of the Loire.95 Thus, the next plan of action after fighting down the Falaise highway involved pivoting north and capturing the areas up to the River Seine. On 11 August, just one day after the failure of Totalize,

General Montgomery ordered the Second , rather than First Canadian to capture the town of Falaise.96 The Canadians now had a new plan. Canadian military planners designed

Operation Tractable to dominate the Falaise area “in order that no enemy may escape by the

94 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 231.

95 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 232.

96 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 237.

38 roads which pass through, or near, it.”97 Otherwise very similar to the plan for Operation

Totalize, the attack would be launched in daylight and Canadian units would advance through artillery and smoke screen barrages. Once the Second Army’s efforts to capture Falaise were well advanced, the Canadians would exploit south-eastwards and capture the areas surrounding Trun.

During the advance on the late morning of 14 August, alert German gunners took their toll on the advance despite the smoke cover. By the late afternoon, the main body of the 10th

Infantry Brigade was in the area of Olendon, which stood beyond the Laison River.98 At this same time, the Algonquin Regiment were carrying out their advance towards Epancy. Despite enemy artillery, overall, the assault had been a complete success. The 4CAD’s diarist had reported that by 2300 hours, the entire division had crossed the Laison, and captured prisoners numbering 15 officers and 545 other ranks.99

On the morning of 15 August, the Canadian advance towards Falaise resumed. The

Germans had strong ground and a dominant long ridge of defensive lines running directly north of Falaise and east of the main road.100 The Algonquin Regiment, which had been chosen to

97 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 237.

98 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 241.

99 LAC, RG 24 Volume 13,789, 4th Canadian Armoured Division General Staff War Diary, August 1944.

100 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 248.

39 assault Epancy from the north, “had a long hard fight before the place was finally made good.”101

The last stage of this offensive intended to finally close the gap. The gap refers to the pocket which formed around the city of Falaise. The remaining German formations within this pocket were encircled by the Allies. The Canadian Army drove south-east along the line of the Dives, while the Second British Army came in from below Falaise, pushing the remaining Germans through the gap.102 By 18 August, the Germans retreating through the Falaise Gap had reached full velocity. The two next nights had brought all the German forces in the area east across the

River Orne.103 Henceforth, the 4CAD continued pushing on from Trun to Chambois. The new task for the Canadians at this time was to cross the River Seine and to “complete the destruction of enemy forces.”104 Once crossed, they were to establish themselves in the regions north of

Rouen. The problems for the Germans continued as they now had to save their remaining forces south of the Somme from encirclement and to stabilize the front, if possible, on the Seine.105

101 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 230

102 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 259.

103 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 255.

104 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 280.

105 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 296.

40 The 4CAD were then tasked with taking control and crossing the small bridgehead at

Criquebeuf. On the morning of 27 August, the division’s infantry units began to cross the Seine.

While advancing, the formations of 4CAD received tremendous welcomes from the French population.106 The heavy pounding from the air which Rouen had suffered did not prevent its people from greeting their Canadian liberators with warmth and hospitality. In the countryside and beyond, the reception remained always the same.107

On the afternoon of 31 August, the commander of the Allied troops, General Bernard

Montgomery, issued new orders in the light of the rapidly developing situation. The Commander- in-Chief desired General Crerar to drive on that night so as to take over the Somme to the northern villages of Pont Remy and Abbeville. This would allow the Second Army to push on and secure the areas of Arras and St. Pol. General Crerar told Montgomery that he would order the 4CAD to do this, since they were now north of the Seine and available for further action.108

The Algonquins were on the move again. With the first month of battle now completed, the original state of the regiment fundamentally transformed. What was left of the regiment had survived their first taste of battle in Normandy, and continued their march towards liberating

Belgium. Yet even as late summer turned to early fall, the replacements had begun to fill the

106 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

107 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 298.

108 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 298.

41 ranks of a once ‘northern’ regiment. How will the Algonquin’s battle performances be considered given that the month of August 1944 proved to be one of hardship and despair for the regiment?

Based on the records and statistical data used for this study, the battle performance of the

Canadian Army, and especially the case of the Algonquin Regiment in Normandy has been greatly undervalued by both historians and the public. After the debacle of Operation Totalize, the Algonquin Regiment, like many other Canadian infantry units, were running most of its offensive efforts well below strength.109 Furthermore, the men were exhausted and worn down from their first taste of battle. Thus, the battle performances undertaken by the Algonquins need reexamining in order to reveal the overlooked efforts and immense achievements, as well as the reasons for the missteps that took place throughout the month of August 1944.

Well before the Allied landings in Normandy, Canadian military authorities realized that there could potentially be a large gap opening between the number of infantrymen required to maintain combat unit strength and the number reinforcements intended to replenish these units.110 These problems unfolded at the beginning of August when the Canadian Army began experiencing significant losses in Normandy which revealed the poor organization of

109 Many Canadian infantry battalions were fighting well below strength. The number of reinforcements dispatched to the front-lines was insufficient to cope with the amount of casualties suffered in the month of August. For example, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders only received 24 reinforcements while suffering 218 OR casualties throughout the month of August 1944. Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945”, Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository,(2016), 199.

110 Caroline D'Amours, “Reassessment of a Crisis: The Infantry Reinforcements of Canada during the Second World War,” (Canadian Army Journal, 2012), 73.

42 reinforcements.111 Fighting in northwest Europe ended up being much longer and more intense than previously expected. The forecasted wastage rate for over three months of intense activity for an infantry unit was 48 %.112 However, the actual percentage of casualty rates actually sustained by Canadian fighting units in Normandy amounted to 76 %.113 The projected wastage rates were so awfully miscalculated because the military officials had estimated the wastage rates of Normandy based on past battle experiences.114 Consequently, such high never-before-seen rates during the Normandy campaign put pressure on a reinforcement pool both too small and unprepared to meet the needs of units fighting on the front lines. This reinforcement issue remained a major concern for both military leaders and officials for the remainder of the fall of

1944. As a result, the battalions fighting on the front-lines in Normandy felt their full effects.

Casualties in Normandy had been heavier than planners anticipated.

Certainly, steep casualty rates such as those felt by the Algonquins in August were not solely a result of their relative battle experience. A determined defence, years of preparation and an intimate familiarity with the highly defensible terrain provided the Germans with significant tactical advantages. In effect, the Canadian infantry were required to maneuver, attack and

111 Caroline D'Amours, “Reassessment of a Crisis: The Infantry Reinforcements of Canada during the Second World War,” (Canadian Army Journal, 2012), 74.

112 Colonel C.P. Stacey, Canadian Army Historical Report No.134. Historical Sketch, Rates of Wastage of Personnel. Canadian Army Overseas, 1939-1945, (Canadian Military Headquarters, London, U.K., 5 April 1945), 4.

113 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 284.

114 Colonel C.P. Stacey, Canadian Army Historical Report No.134. Historical Sketch, Rates of Wastage of Personnel. Canadian Army Overseas, 1939-1945, (Canadian Military Headquarters, London, U.K., 5 April 1945), 5.

43 occupy positions without any of the advantages enjoyed by the defenders. As a result, the high wastage rates often paralleled those on the western front during the Great War.115 The Canadians were often left in the open with exposed flanks or penned up in fields bordered by high and nearly impenetrable hedges while Germans were well covered behind their heavily fortified defences and able to make use of deadly yet effective indirect fires impacting pre-planned coordinates.

While it is true that Canadians did enjoy material superiority, concerns mounted that they would not have enough infantrymen to effectively conduct operations. Even in open country, smaller scaled tactical infantry assaults lacked the manpower to overcome the dug-in Germans.

Consequently, the Algonquin’s, like many Canadian units, could rarely concentrate enough infantrymen to obtain the appropriate force ratios necessary to overcome determined German defenders.116

Other than material superiority, the Germans had the upper-hand in virtually every other tactical consideration. First, the geography and conditions of the land were heavily in favour of the German defences. Most of the Algonquin’s fighting took place in areas described as “rolling wheatland.”117 Most of the terrain south of Caen possessed wide open fields and farmland. This

115 Terry Copp, “'If This Was Isn't over, And Pretty Damn Soon, There'll Be Nobody Left, In This Old Platoon...': First Canadian Army, February-March 1945 .” In Time to Kill: The Soldiers Experience in the West, 1939-1945, edited by Paul Addison and Angus Calder, 147–58, (Pimlico, 1997), 148.

116 Terry Copp, “'If This Was Isn't over, And Pretty Damn Soon, There'll Be Nobody Left, In This Old Platoon...': First Canadian Army, February-March 1945 .” In Time to Kill: The Soldiers Experience in the West, 1939-1945, edited by Paul Addison and Angus Calder, 147–58, (Pimlico, 1997), 155.

117 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

44 not only left infantrymen without cover, but it also made the armour and vehicles highly susceptible to anti-tank weapons. Algonquins often found themselves fighting in farmer’s fields, villages or having to cross various water obstacles. Such areas often provided virtually no cover, while the Germans were generally dug-in or shielded with prepared defences.

As noted, fresh reinforcements were often blamed for the high casualty rates and the operational struggles of Canadians fighting during the fall of 1944. Although considerable numbers of reinforcements bolstered Canadian ranks in intervals, many battalions failed to receive an adequate supply.118 This was certainly the case for the Algonquin Regiment as they hardly received any at all. By 30 August 1944, the battalion had suffered a total of 264 casualties, which dropped their regimental strength total to low of 70 %.119 Nonetheless, during the entire month of August, only 21 reinforcements arrived to fill the ranks.120 This shortfall is particularly compelling as nearly 30 % of the Algonquin Regiment was out of the fight by the end of August, with the majority of these casualties coming from the four rifle companies, the fighting power of the battalion. In short, throughout August for more than an entire month, the fighting strength of the Algonquins was severely diminished and unfilled by new men.

Clearly from the end of Operation Totalize to the advance into Belgium, the Algonquins suffered from a critical shortage of men. As a result, on 12 August, the regiment reorganized into

118 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 284.

119 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

120 Gullachsen, Arthur Willoughby, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945" (2016). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 335.

45 three infantry companies, rather than the usual four.121 As a result, from the battles in Epancy, to crossing into Belgium three weeks later, the Algonquins operated with one less infantry company than expected. Even with the infantry companies at full strength it would have been a gruelling task against German defenders, yet the Canadians were forced to make due.

Despite the high cost in men, throughout August, the Algonquins did not think of themselves as failing. During Operation Totalize, the entire 10th Infantry Brigade advanced approximately nine miles in two days of combat. Such movement proves an excellent achievement for the Brigade’s initial major operation.122 Rather than regarding Totalize as a debacle laid at the feet of the infantry battalions, the Algonquins fought hard against heavily fortified enemy positions at Cintheaux and Bretteville-le-Rabet.123 Overall, most Canadian infantry battalions performed very well. Unfortunately, a planned all-out assault towards Falaise, without total support from Allied bombers, and the severe underestimation of German forces in the area is what prevented a major breakthrough.124 This interpretation of Totalize can be

121 B and C coys had suffered very high casualties during operation Totalize, thus the regiment had to reorganize itself on a basis of three coys. LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

122 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,156, 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1944.

123 John English concluded that the operational failure of Totalize had less to do with soldier inexperience, but rather with the result of a flawed plan.

124 John English, The Canadian Army in the Normandy Campaign: A Study in the Failure of High Command, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Works, 2009), 104.

46 attributed to the case of the Algonquins as they had to face an exceptional enemy force, without any aid from Allied bombers.125

Many accounts of the Canadian campaign in Normandy focus on the operational struggles and failures, yet few explain the many accomplishments and favourable outcomes.126

Certainly, the Algonquin Regiment struggled at times throughout the month of August, but it also had many achievements. For instance, during Operation Tractable, the infantry battalions of the

4CAD were responsible for taking a crossing point at Damblainville, but heavy opposition led to a change in order to switch the crossing attempt to the left in order to cross the Dives River at

Couliboeuf instead.127 At Couliboeuf, two platoons of the Algonquin Regiment had previously captured and gained control of a bridgehead on 16 August. For over 48 hours, the rifle companies of the Algonquin Regiment led the charge and took up a defensive position in an anti-tank screen along the Couliboeuf area in order to allow the crossing of the entire 4CAD.128 As a result, the

Algonquins endured heavy casualties from shelling and machine gun fire from the German 89th

125 In total, approximately 3462 tons of bombs were dropped on the villages on the flanks of the attack. However, the bombers only targeted the flanks, and none of the frontal positions of the assault. Therefore, the bombings failed to ever have any serious impact on the stoned-walled defences in the vicinity of the Algonquin attack. C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 218.

126 Terry Copp’s Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy is one of the first studies that challenged the past conventional views of Canadian battle performances during the war.

127 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 252.

128 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

47 Infantry, but did not break and succeeded in holding position until the crossing could be completed.

Another such positive outcome came at the village of Hordouseaux on 21 and 22 August

1944. The Algonquins were tasked with holding the area, while other units of 4CAD took the city of Trun. The regiment received word that a German armour column and troops from the 21st

Panzer Division had broken through between divisional lines at Trun.129 The Algonquins spotted the Germans in the valley below their position at Hordouseaux and then commenced firing mortars, and machine gun fire on the area, assisted by artillery and Air Force Typhoons.

The Algonquin’s actions resulted in a massacre with the Germans suffering horrific losses in both personnel and vehicles. Men who saw the chaos referred to the area as ‘Death Valley’ because the ditches actually ran with blood.130 There were also individual tales of heroism at Death

Valley. For example, Lt. David Armstrong, from Cobalt Ontario, led a patrol of Algonquins into the valley to give assistance and protection to a of tanks stuck there. He and his small group came back with 30 odd prisoners.131 In total, Algonquin patrols brought back over 200

German prisoners in only two days of action.132

129 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

130 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

131 Lieutenant David Booth Armstrong was a renowned scout among the men of the Algonquin Regiment. He was from Cobalt, Ontario and died a day later on 21 August 1944. Veterans Affairs Canada, “Canadian Virtual War Memorial,” The Canadian Virtual War Memorial (CVWM) - Memorials - Remembrance - Veterans Affairs Canada, 2020, www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/canadian-virtual-war-memorial.

132 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

48 As the overall German strategic situation began to deteriorate rapidly in August, the

Algonquins continued their attritional engagements perhaps best represented by their role in the mauling of the 12th SS Panzer Division. The Algonquins chased them from 20 to the 31 August and the formerly elite division that at one time enjoyed a strength of over 20,000 men and 150 tanks, fled Normandy with only 300 men, 10 tanks, and no artillery.133 During the final days of fighting to close the Falaise Gap, approximately 208 officers and 13,475 other ranks passed through the First Canadian Army’s prisoner-of-war cages.134 Also, in the newly liberated areas of the Falaise, Argentan, Chambois, Vimoutiers and Trun, retreating German forces left behind a grand total of 3043 guns and vehicles.135 Although the Algonquins faced tactical struggles, manpower shortages and certainly made costly errors, the regiment remained active in depleting and finally driving German forces from France. At this battalion level, often overlooked by historians, success in defeating and seizing ground should not be obscured by the operational failures once so prominent in the historical literature. Certainly at the very heart of operational performance is infantry group morale and soldier cohesion. Indeed, it can be argued that it is

133 On D Day the 12th S.S. Panzer Division had had a strength of over 20,000 men and 150 tanks. After 23 August, 300 men, 10 tanks, and no artillery. C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 271.

134 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 265.

135 187 tanks and self-propelled guns, 157 lightly armoured vehicles, 1778 lorries, 669 cars and 252 guns were found by the British investigators of No. 2 Operational Research Section.C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 265.

49 central to a successful tactical operations. Nonetheless, the overall morale of the Algonquins will be examined in order to reveal if battalion’s battle performances were hampered by poor morale.

The month of August 1944 brought forth a series of events that quickly altered the emotions and attitudes of the Algonquins. At the beginning of the month, when the regiment first went into action, the troops were enthusiastic to join the fight, but by the end of the month, many of the surviving men were depleted. In particular, C.P. Stacey used a report by the 10th SS

Panzer Division describing the Canadian infantry’s low morale which caused them to often retreat or surrender.136 This analysis however misrepresented the Canadians who fought in

Normandy. While morale, essentially a ‘finite resource’ definitely depleted throughout the campaign, Canadians continued to engage the enemy without significant retreats or surrenders at the battalion level and above.137 By the end of August, the Algonquin Regiment had successfully fought their way through Normandy and while progress was at times slow, members understood the difficulties that confronted them and felt that they had been given the ‘tough job,’ and were proud of the way they had been carrying it out.138

Heavy action along the Seine and the extreme casualties suffered there meant that the

Canadian formations, particularly the infantry of 4CAD were tired and depleted when launched

136 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army, 1943-1945. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2016), 15.

137 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 14; John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 199.

138 Censorship Report, Canadian Army Overseas, 15-30 August 1944, (LAC Microfilm Reel T-17925), 1.

50 into the next stage of offensive operations.139 This proved to be particularly true for the

Algonquins. After fighting across the Seine during the last days of August, the Algonquins were told by divisional command that they were to have four days of much needed rest in order to refit the Battalion. However, with new orders from Crerar to keep pushing north, the Algonquins continued their march without any rest. In total, until reaching their rest area in Vauchelles-les-

Quesney by 4 September 1944, the Algonquins were on the offensive for a total of 22 days.140

Consequently, the remaining Algonquins, fresh from significant offensive operation, continued on without appropriate rest or cleanliness. This meant that the unit spent nearly three weeks outside in bivouac areas, under constant threat of enemy fire, and without any bath parades.

The battle experience questionnaires for the Normandy campaign in 1944 reveal that 33 and 30 % of Canadian officers considered hot showers, cleanliness, and rest and sleep, as the most important factors for raising the morale of their men.141 For the men of Algonquin

Regiment, so long without proper bathing or rest, morale certainly strained. Compounding the challenges, the regiment already faced were the severe casualties resulting from heavy and nearly continuous fighting. In short, the men of the Algonquin Regiment had to deal with losing many of their original members. Unsurprisingly, junior officers reported that heavy casualties during

139 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 297.

140 From there fighting in the town of Epancey to reaching their rest area near the Belgian border in Vauchelles-les-Quesney, the Algonquins spent a total of 22 days on the offensive without any reports of rest or bathing. LAC, RG24 Volume 14,156, 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade War Diary, August-September 1944.

141 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,450. Battle Experience Questionnaires Normandy 1944.

51 intense combat proved the sixth top factor to lower morale among infantrymen.142 Having to carry on the assault, while continuously losing members throughout August, certainly played a major factor in affecting the collective confidence and spirit of the Algonquins.

Finally, a lack of reinforcements could negatively impact unit morale. Nearly 10 % of respondents to battlefield questionnaires noted that the lack of reinforcements as the number one factor in lowering the morale, a challenge not lost on the Algonquins as they received few reinforcements during their entire month offensive in France.143

The morale of the Algonquin Regiment fluctuated throughout August as the unit underwent its first taste of battle. Yet, the unit as whole neither broke nor was it deemed unfit for operations. In effect, periods of low morale during August could have affected battle performance, but did not stop the battalion from continuing their fight, a reality clearly understood by the commander of the Algonquin Regiment, Lt.-Col. R.A Bradburn. Addressing his men, he stated:

In these hot August days, amidst the dust of the battle field, it is not always easy to keep up the pressure. But there are momentous days and complete victory lies ahead, and it's certain so long as we do not relax.144

After Normandy, confidence and pride in their fighting abilities would again be put to the test as the Algonquin’s pushed into Belgium. Unaware of the hardships that would soon come,

142 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,450. Battle Experience Questionnaires Normandy 1944.

143 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,450. Battle Experience Questionnaires Normandy 1944.

144 Part I: Orders by Lt. Col R.A. Bradburn Commander of the Algonquin Regiment in LAC RG24 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 11 August 1944.

52 many Algonquin’s shared the widespread sentiment held by many Canadians that their hard work had paid off and no obstacle or enemy force would stop their advance.145

As we have seen, the first generations of Canadian military historians interpreted

Canadian battle performance as inadequate at best, and at worst a near failure. C.P. Stacy for example argued that the lack of battle experience negatively meant Canadian formations “failed to make the most of their opportunities.”146 Yet such interpretations are based upon a false, counterfactual standard and fail to take into consideration important objective and subjective realities. To argue that Canadians failed to capitalize on their opportunities requires both hindsight and an assumption that operational planning combined with optimum execution universally produces the desired outcomes. Such notions have long been rejected by military planners and historians alike.147

Despite the initial failure of Worthington Force, the Algonquin Regiment was in fact effective and reliable at gaining well-defended ground. This is particularly in evidence when the conditions, force dispositions and pressures of advance are taken into consideration. For instance, Operation Totalize is overlooked as an operational failure rather than a hard fought advance on heavily defended enemy ground. Not only did Canadians face unfavourable odds, but

145 Censorship Report, Canadian Army Overseas, 1-15 September 1944, (LAC Microfilm Reel T-17925), 1.

146 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 274-275.

147 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003); Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, 1976) ; John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme, (London: Penguin Books, 1983).

53 they also had to do so without the help of any reinforcements. The month of August 1944, proved to be a time period of learning and adjustment for the Algonquins. Mistakes were made, heavy casualties endured, morale impacted, but yet the Algonquin Regiment never collapsed, unlike their German counterparts.148

The Algonquin’s performance as an important element of what Terry Copp dubbed the

‘Cinderella Army’ demands reconsideration. In short, as a freshly deployed battalion without combat experience, their accomplishments were remarkable. Despite substantial casualties, few reinforcements, and facing a tenacious enemy under unfavourable conditions, the Algonquins continued to push deeper into occupied Europe.

148 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 278.

54 Chapter Four

A Regenerated Battalion: Fighting towards the Scheldt Estuary, September-October 1944

As the British Second Army broke through the German defensive line at the Seine, and had the Germans on the run north towards the Low Countries, the Algonquins and the rest of the

4CAD were tasked to protect the western flank along the coast. Unlike Normandy, this new terrain along the coast mainly consisted of dikes, marshes, and swamp lands. Instead of favouring tanks and artillery, this new geography advantaged the infantry. As ever the terrain gave every advantage to the defenders. Enemy infantry benefitted from the seemingly endless levees and polders near the coast, perfect cover for German machine gun nests and snipers.149

First Canadian Army’s new task turned to driving ahead with the ‘utmost energy’ towards the port city of Antwerp.150 In terms of grand strategy, Antwerp was of the greatest importance. The port city contained the only location for both the capacity to satisfy the needs of the Allied advancing armies.151 As the Allies progressed deeper into Europe, their supply lines needed to be augmented and strengthened. Thus, the new plan of attack shifted to seize the port city as quickly as possible.

149 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 136.

150 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007), 25.

151 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007), 35.

55 While these main operations were on the move, High Command tasked 4CAD with fighting preliminary skirmishes of the Scheldt battle along the northern sector of the coast.152 The

Algonquins and the rest of the 4CAD were tasked with clearing the areas west of the Leopold canal on Dutch-Belgian border. Their main thrust throughout the month of September would come up against one of the main German positions covering the Antwerp approaches.153 Hitler regarded holding the positions near the Scheldt as the most important task on the entire Western

Front.154 For nearly four days, the Algonquins were on the move. They crossed the River Somme on 3 September, 1944 and drove until arriving at their bivouac area at Vauchelle-les-Quesnoy, near the city of Abbeville.155 Upon arrival and during a few short days of rest, the Algonquins finally received their first sizeable batch of reinforcements. The Algonquins resumed their journey north and crossed the Belgium frontier near the town of St. Riquiers on 7 September

1944.156 From then on, the Algonquins were tasked with clearing small villages until arriving at the Leopold Canal. 4CAD then ordered the Algonquins to make a bridgehead across the Leopold

Canal at Moerkerke. This would become one of their greatest challenges of the war.

152 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 361.

153 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 361.

154 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 164.

155 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 1- 4 September 1944.

156 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 7 September 1944.

56 General Simmons ordered the Algonquin Regiment to make an immediate crossing of the double canal line at the village of Moerkerke. At this location, the Leopold Canal and the Canal de Dérivation de la Lys both ran parallel, separated by a dike of approximately 60 feet wide.157

High Command believed that a sudden surprise crossing conducted by the Algonquins would keep the Germans in that area on the move, while the remaining Germans at Ghent Canal were in full retreat.158 The plan was quite straightforward. All four Algonquin infantry companies would cross both canals in assault boats ferried by men from the Lincoln and Welland Regiment. Once across, companies were tasked in taking control of a specific objective spaced nearly 75 yards apart.159 A and D coys were spaced apart respectively on the left and right flanks.

Shortly before midnight on 13 September, under the cover of darkness, the four companies began their initial crossing of the two 90 foot wide canals.160 Shortly after commencing, the entire assault came under heavy enemy artillery and machine gun fire. All four companies were in bitter combat with enemy defensive positions. The Germans continued concentrating most of their fire power on the canal which made it impossible for the engineers to construct a bridgehead. By early morning, most of the regiment’s ammunition had run out, and ferrying attempts with resupplies were also impossible under constant enemy shelling.161 Under

157 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007), 53.

158 Shelagh Whitaker and Denis Whitaker, Tug of War, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984), 98.

159 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 139.

160 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007), 53.

161 Eye witness account of the battle by Capt. Herbert, LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 13 September 1944.

57 this extreme fire, several men ran around and picked ammunition from the wounded and dead.

Early mist brought forward a German counter-attack, which resulted in even more Algonquin casualties. The Engineers continued to attempt to put the bridge across, but enemy fire forced them to retire each time. By noon on 14 September, Lt-Col Bradburn received orders from divisional HQ to withdraw. Under a smoke screen and a barrage of artillery and mortars, the surviving men retreated back to the South side of the canal.162 The casualties were horrendous. C coy was one of the worst hit, casualty rates were around 75 % for the whole company.163 In total, eight Officers and 145 ORs were casualties of the failed assault, including 66 men who were missing, cut off from the escape back to Moerkerke.164

48 hours after the Algonquin’s failed attempt to seize Moerkerke, the Lake Superior

Regiment took the town by crossing another bridge near Maldegann.165 By then, the area of

Moerkerke had been softened and eradicated of any large enemy presence. At this time, the

Algonquins were reorganized and put back under the command of the South Alberta Armoured

Regiment for their next series of operations north of the major city of Ghent. The next big operation came at the town of Assenede. Canadian intelligence made it apparent that the area had been held by a strong number of escaping Germans from the 712 infantry division. On the morning of 18 September, the four infantry companies of the Algonquins, alongside the tank

162 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 14 September 1944.

163 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 145

164 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 151.

165 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 153

58 squadrons of the South Alberta’s, entered the town with a combined tank and infantry attack.166

By the end of the day, the combined formation had taken control of the entire town centre and had successfully cleared the area from any remaining German forces. Nevertheless, this did not come without significant casualties suffered by the Algonquin infantrymen.167 Two days later, the

Algonquins were on the move again as their tank and infantry formation were assigned with the task of crossing into Holland and clearing the major road to the city of Philippine.168 Their journey into Holland came without any major incident and the battalion arrived at Philippine on the evening of 20 September. As they dug in and held their new position in the city, over 200

German prisoners were processed by the Algonquins.169

The next assignment for the 4CAD was to aid in the fighting north of Antwerp.

Specifically, units had to clear German resistance inside the Breskens Pocket. This area proved to be heavily fortified by remaining German forces and it was situated for defence on the southern shores of the Scheldt. The Algonquins and the rest of 10th Infantry Brigade were responsible for seizing control of the Isabella Polder, which was the only land bridge that went into the Breskens eastern half of the Pocket.170 For these operations, the 4CAD split the infantry units of the

Algonquin Regiment in half. A and B coys were sent to assist the tanks of the South Alberta’s in

166 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 18 September 1944.

167 Heavy casualties were sustained in order to capture the town of Assenede. For instance, A coy had endured 23 casualties in only an afternoon. G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 155-156.

168 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 20 September 1944.

169 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 20 September 1944.

170 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army: The Canadians in Northwest Europe, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007), 89.

59 sweeping missions around the area of Hulst, while A and B coys took offensive positions along the dikes of the Isabella polder.171 In the last week of the month, the Algonquins suffered more heavy casualties while unsuccessfully attempting to break through the enemy positions. By the end of September 1944, both groups of the Algonquins were given reserve roles for the next few days. During these final days before the eventual , the Algonquin Regiment spent the rest of its time resting and reorganizing for another major operation along the coast.

The question now is if the battle performances of the Algonquin Regiment were in any way shaped or impacted by the eventual inclusion of replacements.

Similar to the previous chapter, the battle performances of the Algonquins will be revisited in order to expose their undervalued efforts. However, rather than reviewing the battalion in action without any reinforcements, this chapter will assess their operations with them in order to reveal if the Algonquin Regiment benefitted from continuous supplies of replacements. One of the most significant engagements to reconsider is Moerkerke. Although the

Algonquins failed to achieve their objective and suffered terrible casualties, their battlefield performance must be considered in wider terms than either the specific shortcomings of the unit’s platoon leadership or indeed the riflemen themselves. Quite simply, the failure of the

Leopold Canal crossing was a ‘perfect storm’ of factors. From the beginning, the overall plan was a bad one, ill-prepared, rushed and founded on weak intelligence of enemy strength and positions. The Algonquins were instructed to cross on the same day as their night raid. In effect, reconnaissance efforts to obtain as much information as possible on the enemy were conducted

171 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 161.

60 in as little time as possible. Most of their information, particularly from civilian sources, suggested few enemies were present and recce parties were hampered by poor weather.172

Indeed, before launching the nighttime assault, the area across the canals was reported to be clear of any significant enemy defences.173 This miscalculation of enemy forces meant the Algonquins faced unanticipated and overwhelming resistance.

On the night of 13 September 1944, the main road of Moerkerke was defended by the

245th German Infantry Division. This formation, with approximately 5000 men, remained a considerable force even though it had lost many men and equipment.174 Also, as events were to prove, reserves were easily made available as their protected flank was covered by the German

64th Infantry Division. When news of the attack reached German commanders, they gave the

“the strictest instructions that the bridgehead must at all costs be eliminated.”175 The nearly 350

Algonquin infantrymen who took part in the canal crossing had no chance against this determined and entrenched German force. Thus, the combined underestimation of enemy forces and the hurried plan to construct a bridgehead across the canals condemned the Algonquin assault even before it started.

172 LAC, RG24 Volume 14,156, 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade War Diary, 13 September 1944.

173 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 361.

174 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 362.

175 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 362.

61 Other deficiencies increased the casualties sustained at Moerkerke. In addition to the failed recce patrols, air support before and during the attack proved useless. The day before the night-time assault, air photographs were misleading as they did not locate the approximate

Germans strength and existing German defences.176 Further, in the midst of the assault, air power failed to provide any support. In the early morning, when the infantrymen were running short on ammunition, Lt-Col Bradburn even tried to call for ammunition to be dropped by parachute.

However, no planes were available.177 Perhaps most challenging was the actual canal crossing itself and proved the hardest obstacles to overcome during the entire attack. In order to get over the obstacles and into enemy territory, the Algonquins had to paddle across the first canal, then heave the assault crafts up and over the near vertical climb to reach the dyke between the two canals. The banks rose to nearly 18 metres, and the companies were required to navigate them under constant enemy fire and shelling.178

Once across, men had to scramble up the final bank, in plain sight of the German forces, a nearly impossible task for soldiers already tired even before they got to the battlefield.179 Of course, the assault also needed a steady supply of munitions as well as the casualty evacuation meaning that the assault required multiple crossings, in both directions. Several attempts were made at 0930 and again at 1130, to ferry ammunition across the canals, but all the attempts failed

176 At one point, the air photographs indicated an area of the canals that was inundated, but there was actually none at the time of the crossing. Shelagh Whitaker and Denis Whitaker, Tug of War, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984), 98.

177 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 13 August 1944.

178 Shelagh Whitaker and Denis Whitaker, Tug of War, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984), 98.

179 Shelagh Whitaker and Denis Whitaker, Tug of War, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984), 98.

62 due to heavy enemy fire.180 Also, once it was time to withdraw back to Moerkerke, there were only a few able bodies left to bring back the wounded. This proved to be even more difficult since most of the men had to swim back across the canals.181

The last major factor contributing to the failure was a breakdown in communications. It was discovered after the attack that there was a German sympathizer communicating with the enemy and telling them the positions of the Algonquins through a wireless set.182 As a result, the

Algonquin’s Command Post was continually shelled, no matter how often it moved. In total, it moved three times, the first two buildings were left in flames, and the third building also the

Regimental Aid Post was demolished.183 Not only were their movements compromised, but the

Algonquins also had to deal without regular communication from HQ. Over the course of the battle, errors and miscalculations piled up to create a disaster. In the end, the Algonquin’s task to cross the canals was fated for disaster even before the operation began. Similarly to reevaluating battle performances, the influences of Algonquin group morale need much reconsideration. As a result, it will uncover if the addition of reinforcements had any effects on the attitudes and spirits of the Algonquin Regiment throughout their battles in September 1944.

At the end of August, the Algonquins assumed that the 4CAD would have four days to rest in the Buchy area. General Crerar’s new order to keep on moving proved them wrong, and in

180 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 14 September 1944.

181 Eyewitness account of the battle by Maj. A K StirlingLAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 14 September 1944.

182 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 145.

183 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 14 September 1944.

63 the early hours of 1 September, the infantry units of 4CAD moved on again in the direction of

Abbeville.184 This meant that the Algonquins had to wait once again for much needed rest.

Letters home certainly expressed the hard work and long hours that they had to endure.185 Some of the drivers were so tired that they kept falling asleep at the wheel.186 It was not until 4

September that the battalion finally had the chance to take a break and reorganize, for the first time in over a month. Although the Algonquin’s ranks were depleted, their spirit was not shattered. Most of the men willingly accepted their sacrifices and struggles as an essential of victory. This is evident in the mindset of their commander. In his own personal message, Lt. Col

R.A. Bradburn stated:

When the struggle was in its most critical stage there were some who had doubts as to whether we would win through. But you and I have no doubts - not one; we knew that so long as we did our duty all would be well; and today, all is well. 187

Clearly the Algonquins were exhausted from previous operations which certainly impacted the morale of some men, but overall the unit remained a cohesive fighting unit.

The role of newly arriving reinforcements also played a large part in bolstering morale.

The arrival of new men not only aided the Algonquins on the battlefield, but also the attitude of original servicemen. For many, after fighting undermanned in Normandy for nearly a month, the

184 C.P. Stacey, The Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Volume III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North West Europe 1944-45, (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 299.

185 Censorship Report, Canadian Army Overseas, 24 August-10 September 1944, (LAC Microfilm Reel T-17925), 2.

186 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 125.

187 Part I: Orders by Lt. Col R.A. Bradburn Commander of the Algonquin Regiment in LAC RG24 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 2 September 1944.

64 arrival of new infantrymen was very much desired and in some cases demanded. For example, in a letter written by a soldier from the 4CAD, he stated that the men on the front-lines wanted and needed more reinforcements. “Our Army is short of reinforcements and our government won’t send the zombies over here.”188 This letter reflects a frustration expressed by the men fighting in north-west Europe, a direct challenge to previous historiography claiming reinforcements were untrainable and unwanted at the front.189 However, after suffering without reinforcements in

Normandy and realizing their need, replacements were very much sought after by infantry battalions, including 4CAD.

For Canadian infantry formations in northwest Europe, reorganizing the battalion was common, particularly when reinforcements were not immediately available. This meant that men were often shuffled to different platoons so that rifle sections could retain as much strength as possible.190 Although the number of Algonquin rifle platoons remained deficient throughout the entire month of August, unexpected readjustments helped them better prepare for the wave of reinforcements that came in September. In August, the Algonquins cobbled together platoons, and sometimes entire companies, from the remnants of decimated units. For this reason,

Algonquins were already experienced in fighting alongside unfamiliar faces, and fighting with

188 ‘Zombies’ were referred to as the men who served on the homefront and did not want to fight overseas. Censorship Report, Canadian Army Overseas, 16-30 September 1944, (LAC Microfilm Reel T-17925), 7.

189 Whitaker was one of the main historians who reinforced these claims. Shelagh Whitaker and Denis Whitaker, Tug of War, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984), 75.

190 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 156.

65 new men quickly became commonplace and accepted. Thus, in September, once new reinforcements arrived, it was not a new experience for original Algonquins, already accustomed to fighting alongside strangers. New faces replaced old by early September, requiring that infantrymen establish quick, cohesive connections with one another, like they had previously done in August. These relations among the original members and the reinforcements had to be made on the common basis of respect, reputation, and professional skill, all under the guidance of effective leadership.191 The Algonquin commanders and officers were not familiar with the term swift trust, but they understood that they had to display both their competence and their

“morale equipment to inspire,” in order to successfully bring together and lead a group of strangers.192

Throughout the Algonquin’s fall campaign, the leadership of the battalion was in fact exceptional. If morale within infantry units was to be sustained, it was often up to the battalion commander and his officers to build connections between soldiers in the face of horrible casualty rates. Soldiers within the Algonquin Regiment often had no pre-existing relationships with one another, but fighting for and beside these officers conveyed a common sense to fight for them.

From the top commander, all the way down to the NCO’s, the Algonquins had a remarkable group of leaders.

191 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 158.

192 Geoffrey Hayes, Crerar’s Lieutenants: Inventing the Canadian Junior Army Officer, 1939-45, (: UBC Press, 2017), 227.

66 For the Algonquins, leadership started at the top with Lt-Col. R.A Bradburn. He took over command of the Algonquin Regiment after the defeat of Operation Totalize.193 From then, until their reserve role at the Isabella Polder, Lt-Col. Bradburn never took a day off.194 He was a respected commander among the men who led the inexperienced Algonquins, into becoming one of the main fighting components of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. In particular, he was very well-liked among his men. He would often spend his days in the ranks encouraging and reassuring the men. One example of his leadership was when he ordered one of the quartermaster’s to buy up some 5,000 eggs for the men in the regiment.195 Bradburn was a true leader in the eyes of his men, and his high regard for his men was one meaningful way the soldiers within the battalion were able to come together under his guidance.196 Indeed upon

193 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 13 August 1944.

194 Lt-Col. Bradburn did not take his first day off until 28 September 1944. He spent a recreational day in Ghent. LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 13 August-28 September 1944.

195 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 125.

196 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 20 April 1945.

67 relinquishing his command of the battalion on April 1945, the war diarist recorded a glowing and heartfelt tribute.197

Even at the lowest levels of command, the Algonquins had leaders who boosted confidence and the performances. The quality of the Algonquin junior leadership during this period was perhaps best exemplified by Captain Alex Herbet from Cobalt, Ontario. He and two other of his men went after a German 20mm anti-aircraft gun that was wreaking havoc on the advancing Algonquins. Under fire from enemy rifles and machine guns, Captain Herbert and his men reached the enemy position and each tossed hand grenades until the guns went silent.198

This is just one example of the many cases of excellent and dependable leadership among the

Algonquin Regiment.

By the end of September, the attitudes and the confidence of the Algonquins had been restored, despite the losses at the Leopold Canal. Indeed, while particular concerns remained, the

197Lt-Col. Bradburn was relinquished command and was awarded “a well-earned rest” on the evening of 19 April 1945. While this date does represent a critical time for the battalion which was engaged in the vicious fighting for the Kuesten Canal, there is no indication that his removal was due to poor performance. One could speculate that a near death experience a few days earlier may have influenced the decision. However, given the difficult, yet ultimately successful operations that the unit conducted up until 19 April, clearly Bradburn continued to perform adequately. Further the war diary gave significant space detailing Bradburn’s contribution to the unit’s success and the popularity he enjoyed. “On the 14th of August Lt-Col. Bradburn led this depleted force into battles that finally closed the Falaise Gap. Later, with the unit reinforced he guided our destiny through the long series of exhausting battles which included the Seine crossing, Moerkerke, the Breskens Pocket, Centrum, Esschen, Bergen-Op-Zoom, Welberg, and Steenbergen. In February and March this year he led us in the strenuous fight for the Hochwald Gap and Veen. Always an inspiring leader, with steadfast courage and unruffled calm, he did on several occasions personally conduct some very hectic exchanges of fire. Now after having won the admiration and respect of all who served under him, he leaves us amidst a host of good wishes - Well done Sir, you have earned your rest - May you now enjoy it.” LAC RG24 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 19 April 1945.

198 Personal account of battle from Captain Alex Herbert in LAC RG24 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, September 1944.

68 overall morale of the Algonquins was described as “magnificent.”199 Not only were the

Canadians succeeding in their campaign towards the Scheldt, but they were also expeditiously gaining essential ground. For example, in a letter to his wife, a member of the Algonquin

Regiment wrote:

The war is now really great, isn’t it! Just like something you’d dream of. I don’t think he [the Germans] has, to put it frankly, the guts for much more of what he has already taken and the last week has been one big chase, on the go practically night and day. A little hard on the sleep, but we can catch up on that later.200

Such sentiment proved widespread among Canadians, despite heavy losses. Out of the total entire amount of Canadian letters examined for the period of 16 to 30 of September 1944,

1,877 letters expressed optimistic notions over the progress of the war, and only four were pessimistic.201 Several factors contributed to rise in morale. First, receiving a constant supply of reinforcements was one of the most important ways to raise the morale of the men. In the Battle

Experience Questionnaires, 13 % of Canadian officers indicated that the supply of reinforcements was the number one factor involved in raising the morale of an infantry battalion.202 Whether they were experienced in combat or newly trained did not matter. Once reinforcements began refilling the ranks, the Algonquins regained their mental toughness.

199 Censorship Report, Canadian Army Overseas, 16-30 September 1944, (LAC Microfilm Reel T-17925), 1.

200 This is a sample from a letter reviewed by the War Censors. The letter is written by a member of the Algonquin Regiment between the time period from 5-25 September 1944. Censorship Report, Canadian Army Overseas, 16-30 September 1944, (LAC Microfilm Reel T-17925), 1.

201 Censorship Report, Canadian Army Overseas, 16-30 September 1944, (LAC Microfilm Reel T-17925), 8.

202 LAC, RG24 Volume 10,450. Battle Experience Questionnaires NorthWest Europe 1944-45.

69 Individual beliefs and reliance on such men while fighting were just as powerful as any sort of group cohesion.

Second, the Algonquins as part of 4CAD, also received more rest. Throughout the campaign in Normandy, the Algonquins, like many other Canadian infantry battalions, received little rest. Experience reinforced the reality that every man had his breaking point. Indeed, a survey of combat troops revealed that the number one complaint from front-lines troops related to a lack of food, clothing, and equipment.203 The only realistic way to resolve such concerns and reduce battle exhaustion was to lower the intensity and duration of their combat.204 Accordingly, throughout the month of September, the Algonquins received three separate occasions of rest and leisure. The first was at the beginning of the month when they finally had the chance to reorganize and rest. In particular, this time was described as days of bathing parades, in which the soldiers received new clothing, warm baths, hot meals and evening entertainment.205 Such activities both boosted morale and prevented combat fatigue.

Critically, the Algonquins received rest in the immediate aftermath of the failed assault at

Moerkerke and at the end of the month just prior to launching into the battle of the Scheldt. After

Moerkerke, the Algonquins received two days of rest to rearrange their ranks and to refit many of

203 The number one complaint from the front-line, from 31 % of troops, was related to food, clothing, and equipment. John Ellis, The Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), 300.

204 Copp, Terry. “'If This Was Isn't over, And Pretty Damn Soon, There'll Be Nobody Left, In This Old Platoon...': First Canadian Army, February-March 1945.” In Time to Kill: The Soldiers Experience in the West, 1939-1945, edited by Paul Addison and Angus Calder, 147–58. (Pimlico, 1997), 151.

205 LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 4 September 1944.

70 the men with new gear.206 At the end of the month, after being placed as a reserve unit in the rear, the Algonquins once again received several days to rest and relax. From 27 to 30 of September

1944, the rifle companies of the Algonquin Regiment took turns in receiving recreational days off, while the battalion was holding a reserve position at Hulst and at the Isabella Polder.207 In a battle response questionnaire for the top factors involved in raising the morale of Canadian troops in northwest Europe, three of the top five answers were food, rest and recreation, and baths and cleanliness.208 Thus, it is apparent that throughout the month of September, days of rest were much more evenly spread out and distributed among the infantrymen of the Algonquin

Regiment. Unlike Normandy, the troops fighting along the coast had received much more required days off, which in turn, aided their battle performances as they were well rested and maintained a healthy fighting spirit. Certainly reinforcements would also play on this and potentially have effects on the performances and attitudes of the Algonquin Regiment.

After the campaign in Normandy, one of the most significant issues amongst the

Canadian Army fighting in northwest Europe was the lack of reinforcements. As previously noted, the wastage rates and reinforcements required to sustain infantry units in Europe was considerably underestimated. Therefore, the main concern throughout August 1944 evolved

206 Many men had to be refitted with new gear because those who had survived the battle had to swim back across both canals, leaving most of their gear behind. LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 14-15 September 1944.

207 Each day 50 men from A and B coy were allowed to spend a recreational day in the city of Ghent, while men from C and D coy were granted leave in Hulst. LAC, RG 24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 27-30 September 1944.

208 Top factors involved in raising morale: Rations and food (54 % of answers), rest and recreation (51 % of answers), baths and cleanliness (33% of answers). Other two factors in the top five were air support and receiving mail. LAC, RG24 Volume 10,450. Battle Experience Questionnaires NorthWest Europe 1944-45.

71 around heavy casualty rates and the lack of reinforcements. At this time, the inexperienced

Algonquins were struggling to maintain their demanding tasks. Further, as casualties mounted replacements were nowhere in sight. More importantly, key original members of the ‘primary group’ of Algonquins were lost. Reputable men, such as Officer Aldege Primeau of Iroquois

Falls, and Major Wallace MacPherson, a long time company commander, were killed in the first few weeks of fighting.209

Fortunately, in September the Algonquins and the rest of the 10th Infantry Brigade were significantly reinforced as large shipments of men arrived to make up for the huge losses of

August. By the end of September, the Algonquins received 519 new reinforcements throughout the month.210 One of the largest shipments occurred on 4 September, 1944 when nearly 70 new men were integrated within the four infantry companies.211 As each infantry company was made up of approximately 90 men, receiving such a large shipment demonstrates how the Algonquins rapidly transformed and suggested important limits to notions of primary group loyalty. Indeed, by the time of the assault on Moerkerke on 14 September 1944, a large number of men had few long-standing links to the unit and no ties to the original members from northern Ontario. The

Algonquin Regiment was no longer solely the group of hard working northern bushmen. By mid-

209 Aldege Primeau was killed on 9 Aug 1944 and Wallace MacPherson killed on 10 Aug 1944. Veterans Affairs Canada. “Canadian Virtual War Memorial.” The Canadian Virtual War Memorial (CVWM) - Memorials - Remembrance - Veterans Affairs Canada, 2020, www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/canadian-virtual-war-memorial.

210 Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945" (2016), Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository, 335.

211 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 4 September 1944.

72 September, the unit incorporated men from places such as Dartmouth, and

Edmonton, Alberta.212

In examining the field return reports in the war diaries, it is apparent to note that the

Algonquin Regiment was continuously and successfully replenished by reinforcements throughout the month of September. Although the Algonquins suffered 267 OR and 8 Officer casualties from 31 August to 30 September 1944, the supply of reinforcements remained constant.213 In early September, a total of 240 ORs were required to resupply the total strength of the regiment. Correspondingly, by 16 September 1944, the number of reinforcements required dropped to 187 men, and by the end of the month, only 14 OR reinforcements were needed to fully refill the ranks.214 Additionally, the total strength of the Algonquin Officers were also kept at a sufficient number. Throughout the entire month of September, the only considerable shortage of Officers came during the week ending on 23 September 1944. Even then, the required number was only five and these ranks were quickly refilled by the end of the month.215 Thus, it is evident that the reinforcements required to sustain the fighting strength of the Algonquin Regiment were adequately rebuilt and restored during the month of September after the horrendous campaign in

Normandy.

212 Kenneth Baker from Dartmouth and Private Stanley Hall from . Veterans Affairs Canada. “Canadian Virtual War Memorial.” The Canadian Virtual War Memorial (CVWM) - Memorials - Remembrance - Veterans Affairs Canada, 2020, www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/canadian-virtual-war-memorial.

213 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, September 1944.

214 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, September 1944.

215 One of these casualties was Major Cassidy. He was wounded on 18 September 1944, after his jeep was blown up by a land mine. He later returned after only suffering minor injuries. LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, September 1944.

73 The question remains, who were these new men and what impact did they have on the unit? First, many of the reinforcements arriving throughout the early fall of 1944, were not entirely new to the war. As a result of the widespread shortages and extreme casualty rates, popular belief among historians has argued that a large amount of Canadian reinforcements received incomplete training and were sent to the front-lines prematurely. However, this was not the case for the Algonquins. Evidence regarding reinforcement training suggests that the

Canadian Army did not send its men directly to the front without proper training. In a study conducted by Caroline D’Amours on Canadian infantry reinforcements in 2012, she discovered that in 1943 and 1944, the length of time that an infantryman spent in active army training before arriving at the front-line was an average of 117 days.216

Second, once arriving to their designated units, the new men often spent a few weeks at a regiment’s B Echelon or LOB contingent in order to acclimatize.217 This was done to avoid unnecessary errors in the field of battle. This practice was often followed by the Algonquin

Regiment despite their desperate need for men. For instance, before the first sizeable group of reinforcements came up to the front on 4 September, many were left behind to stay at the battalion echelon in the rear. This was carried out because the Algonquin command believed it was poor policy to rush these men into the infantry companies, while the battalion prepared to

216 Caroline D'Amours, “Reassessment of a Crisis: The Infantry Reinforcements of Canada during the Second World War,” (Canadian Army Journal, 2012) 83.

217 Terry Copp, Cinderella Army. The Canadians in North West Europe 1944-1945, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 2006), 308.

74 assault the enemy along the canals.218 Clearly, the Algonquins did not throw reinforcements into battle entirely unprepared.

Third, a considerable number of reinforcements were experienced personnel re-mustered from other areas. Due to the reinforcement shortage, the Army instituted a program of re- mustering troops.219 Within the Reinforcement Battalions many men had re-mustered. By the beginning of December 1944, over 10,000 men had been re-mustered from other trades into infantry units.220 These men were taken from their previous assignments and given a minimum of four to six weeks of refresher infantry training.221 Also, many were infantrymen returning to after earlier wounds as non-battle casualties. Thus, many reinforcements during the month of

September were not entirely new to the war. For the Algonquins, it was noted in the war diary that nearly 25 % of the reinforcements had previous battle experience, and that all the new men appeared well-trained as they stood up well under tough tasks.222 Clearly, challenging notions of the reinforcement inexperience, a considerable proportion of Algonquin replacements were in fact either seasoned or experienced not only with ‘army life’ but for many with fighting as well.

218 G. L. Cassidy, Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment, 1939-1945, (Cobalt, Ont.: Highway Book Shop, 1990), 126.

219 Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945" (2016), Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository, 94.

220 Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945" (2016), Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository, 92.

221 Burns, E. L. M. Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945. (Clarke, Irwin, 1956), 77.

222 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, April 1945.

75 As previously stated, reinforcements have been blamed as a critical cause for high casualty rates and the operational struggles of Canadian infantry battalions during the fall of

1944. However, in the case of the Algonquins, reinforcements brought the regiment much needed help. Indeed, a closer examination of both reinforcements and strengths of the Algonquins suggests a need to rethink such historical interpretations. First, August was the worst period for the strength of the regiment. By 30 August 1944, the Algonquins suffered a total of 264 casualties, which dropped their strength total to an approximate low of 70 %.223 Significantly, nearly 30 % of the Regiment was missing by the end of August, and a majority of them derived from the infantry. The replacements required to replenish the regiment was at a high of 240 men.224 For the entire month of August, only 21 reinforcements arrived to help the

Algonquins.225 Accordingly, at the beginning of September, the overall regimental strength and the required reinforcements were still inadequate. These numbers demonstrate two important realities: The Algonquins struggled to refill their ranks and at times of high casualty rates throughout August and early September, and reinforcements were rarely at the front. Therefore, the notion that new reinforcements caused higher casualty rates seems implausible in the case of

Algonquins.

Certainly, most reinforcements were inexperienced infantrymen, but training and the desperate need for reinforcements among the Algonquin infantry companies, allowed them to

223 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

224 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, August 1944.

225 Gullachsen, Arthur Willoughby, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945" (2016). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 335.

76 integrate swiftly into new shattered and reorganized units.226 Yet some past historians have

blamed operational failures on the ‘greenness’ and inexperience of reinforcements.227 In the case

of the Algonquins, no wartime evidence suggests that among the leadership or men, such a view

was not reflected. Indeed, there were no complaints regarding the lack of quality of the

reinforcements, a view reflected more generally in the army. In a battle questionnaire concerning

the quality of reinforcements, 60% of junior officers rated their incoming soldiers as of ‘high’

and ‘moderate’ quality.228 Therefore, the combination of proper training, the practice of leaving

reinforcements out of battle, and favouring their necessity rather than relative inexperience

suggests reinforcements were not only supported but also eased into battle in stages to manage

potential deficiencies on the battlefield.

Interestingly, while few complaints are in evidence, wartime sources often noted instances of commendable battle performance among new Algonquin reinforcements. For example, during the battle of Moerkerke, one company that contained “a good mixture of

Canadians - such men as Sergeant Percy Elcome, of Toronto, Private Peter Kusup, of Montreal, and Private Fred Plenis, of Noranda ” that came out all right.229 With only 11 of the 27

men emerging untouched from their platoon, they successfully dragged their boats out of the

226 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 159.

227 Whitaker claimed that the reinforcements only had rudimentary training and that they did not know how to load or fire their weapons. Shelagh Whitaker and Denis Whitaker, Tug of War, (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1984), 218.

228 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 192.

229 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 14 September 1944.

77 canals and faced machine gun bullets that fell around them.230 Despite intense enemy fire, heavy casualties, and dwindling supplies of ammunition, the platoon cleared defended buildings and broke up all the attempts by enemy reinforcements reaching the town. Such resilience demonstrates just how effective the fighting skills of this Algonquin platoon despite adverse conditions, within a unit quite different from that which had left northern Ontario four years earlier.

Another example of the fighting ability of the newly arrived reinforcements came during a battle at the eastern dyke on the main axis at the Isabella Polder. C and D coy were engaged in hand to hand combat in enemy defended buildings. The casualties were very high. Fresh men had to be sent up to the front-lines to reinforce the platoons of C coy. In total, one officer and 15 ORs joined the coy in combat. For the rest of the day, they were responsible for defending the captured German defences. Their actions were summarized in the war diary, “all were in fine fettle and killing was good.”231

Instances like these illustrate the common ‘swift trust’ needed for the Algonquins to successfully continue operations. As most of the ranks were refilled throughout September, men had to begin trusting the newly arriving men based on their common training and goals. Rather than fighting to preserve primary group cohesion, the Algonquin’s regenerated platoons had to trust their individual training and skills, as much as the ones of the new soldiers beside them.

Therefore, forms of ‘swift trust’ group cohesion can be attributed to one of the main aspects of the Algonquins greatest achievements. They were able to rapidly socialize, adapt on the

230 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 14 September 1944.

231 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, 22 September 1944.

78 battlefields, and adjust to the reality of being strangers in order to accomplish common goals.232

It was the reinforcements who enhanced confidence and brought a reassurance of a constant fighting force. Further adequate infantry training, previous battle experience, the LOB system, socializing and resting allowed the Algonquins to quickly form bonds of swift trust.

232 Robert Engen, Strangers in Arms: Combat Motivation in the Canadian Army 1943-1945, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), 205.

79 Conclusion

While commanding a rifle platoon in D Coy, Ernest Freve from Mattawa,

Ontario continued to lead his men although being mortally wounded during the battle at

Moerkerke. During the assault, Freve’s forward position was directly hit by an enemy shell, which injured himself and three others. It was later described by the men in his platoon that he never once thought about his own life, and refused evacuation from the battle. He continued shouting and encouraging his men even though he knew he was slowly dying. Under constant enemy fire, he continued encouraging his men and shouted until his very last breath, “Never mind me, dig in and get under cover.”233

Instead of criticizing the reinforcement system and blaming them for casualty rates and failed performances, reinforcements should be examined in a way which demonstrates their undervalued effectiveness. Other than the shortages in August and early September, the efforts of the reinforcements were in fact very effective at rebuilding the regiment and the trust of the men.

For one, with the arrival of new reinforcements, the Algonquins were able to efficiently reorganize their platoons.234 This meant that the regiment was able to regroup and restructure their infantry units after the month long struggle in August. Also, the reinforcements brought stability and reassurance among the original members of the battalion. And finally, the reinforcements performed very-well in battle. Therefore, this study on the performances and effects of the reinforcements provides an impression that the Algonquin Regiment, and the rest of

233 Corporal Ernest Freve Death Report in LAC RG24 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, September 1944.

234 LAC, RG24 Volume 15,000, The Algonquin Regiment War Diary, September 1944.

80 the Canadian Army, not only succeeded in their operations in northwest Europe, but that they also exceeded previous assumptions made by past historians.

So what does this mean for group cohesion and battle performances amongst the

Algonquins? This research project argues that the men among the ranks were ecstatic and relieved to receive new men. After several weeks of endless battles and heavy casualties without any reinforcements, the men were finally reassured when new arrivals began filling the depleted ranks. The original members of the Algonquin Regiment were especially satisfied when the men coming in were battle experienced. But even then, experienced or not, the Algonquins were appreciative of the well-trained men coming in to aid them in battle.235 Regardless of their background, training, or experience, the Algonquin reinforcements were relied upon by the members who had been dealing with extreme adversity. Therefore, in examining this specific era, this research suggests that the replacement of men through the reinforcement system was one of the largest contributing factors in the growth and efficient evolvement of the regiment in battle.

In connecting a review of the Algonquin reinforcements with the actions of the battalion, this research paper has demonstrated the reasons why and how the reinforcements affected battle performances on the battlefield. Therefore, this MRP also suggests that the incoming reinforcements played one of the most crucial and essential roles in shaping the first building block for recreating soldier cohesion. Not only did these men from new areas with different backgrounds change the overall dynamics of the regiment, but they also brought with them a new sustainable fighting force. By the end of September, the strength of the Algonquin infantrymen

235 Robert Engen, Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War, (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2014), 132.

81 were adequately rebuilt. Heavy casualties had ensued, but the reinforcements had come through in taking their place.

The reinforcement abilities of the Algonquins can be, and should be attributed to their successes on the battlefield. Other than the unlucky and vulnerable battle along the canals at

Moerkerke, the Algonquins and their new replacement infantrymen often performed very well in their advance towards the Scheldt. As the Algonquins and the rest of 4CAD pushed on, the

German Army units in Normandy and Belgium bled white while their front-line losses were never replaced.236 Thus, their failure to provide a large number of replacements can be used as the explanation for why their units got progressively weaker throughout the war, against the newly regenerated Canadian battalions. Other than the shortages in August, the Canadian reinforcements were often plenty and were successful at replenishing the front-lines of the

Algonquins. Therefore, the abilities of the Algonquins to reconstruct themselves while the defending Germans became increasingly weaker, was one of their strongest combat capabilities.

From the end of September 1944, to the end of the war in May 1945, the strength of the

Algonquin infantry was kept at an adequate level.237 This ensured a solid foundation as the

Algonquins continued their journey to liberating the rest of Europe.

In the greater historiography of the war, the Algonquin Regiment played a small role in outcomes of the Canadian and Allied war effort. However, the role of the Algonquin Regiment

236 Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945" (2016), Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository, 90.

237 Arthur Gullachsen, "An Army of Never-Ending Strength: The Reinforcement of the Canadian Army 1944-1945" (2016), Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository, 92.

82 during the campaign in northwest Europe is still significant for several reasons. At an operational and battalion level of history, the Algonquin campaign enjoyed great success. Other than the two inevitable breakdowns during Operation Totalize and at Moerkerke, the Algonquins performed very admirably. The regiment was often given important and daunting task that hinged the fate of

4CAD. Also, as previously covered, the Algonquins were often forced to make do without any real considerable reinforcements. For these reason, this case study reveals the importances of reinforcements and group cohesion. Not only does the Algonquin campaign illustrate the effectiveness of the battalion, but also the cooperation of its reinforcements. In a historical sense,

Algonquin offensives in northwest Europe are significant in uncovering why and how soldiers on the frontline were capable of fighting during periods of extreme casualty loss. Thus, the

Algonquin Regiment’s fighting during the late summer and early fall of 1944 reveals many great examples of soldier group cohesion and reinforcement battle performances that deserve further study.

In the end, it is my intention that this MRP will open deeper doors for the Algonquin

Regiment. Certainly September does not mark the end of their liberation march. They continued fighting some of their bloodiest battles in April 1945. What this study does do is that it unveils the impressive operational and tactical achievements of the Algonquin infantrymen. Even while facing unsurmountable odds, receiving little to no reinforcements, and having to reestablish groups of cohesiveness, the Algonquin Regiment continued persisting through each of their engagements in northwest Europe.

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