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Political integrity laws in and the search for stability

Louise Baker

Now 30 years into independence, Papua New Guinea often Louise Baker is a faces crises in governance. Although it has maintained a record student of law at The of unbroken democratic government, the country’s political Australian National system has evolved in quite dysfunctional ways to the extent University and a Visiting Scholar at the University that problems of governance, economic hardship and social of Hong Kong. despair are threatening the regime’s continued legitimacy. This article analyses the attempt by Papua New Guinea to ‘engineer’ the development of a stable system of parties and executive government through the introduction of the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates.

Under the leadership of Sir Mekere Morauta Papua New Guinea’s party system, (Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea from culminating in public concern about the 1999 to 2002), the Papua New Guinea (PNG) abuse of the system by the previous Skate government’s first priority was to ‘restore government, had brought instability in integrity to our great institutions of State’ politics to the point where there was (Post-Courier, 15 July 1999). The Organic Law widespread agreement that ‘something had on the Integrity of Political Parties and to be done’. Morauta himself declared ‘it is Candidates (OLIPPAC), or the Integrity Law, no secret that Papua New Guinea has was a major constitutional reform introduced problems with the way the political system in 2000 and certified in 2001 (Standish 2001). operates…they have been building up for The primary goal of the OLIPPAC is to help years, they need solving now’ (Post-Courier, create a stable system of parties and executive 26 August 1999). Through consultation with government. Although the law was the Constitutional Development Commission, reorganised with minor amendments in Morauta instigated a ‘home grown’ package 2003, the essential purpose remains of political reforms, the OLIPPAC, as well as unchanged. This paper uses the 2003 complementary legislation to reform the amended version throughout. The frailty of electoral system.

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Inherent in the design of the OLIPPAC is intentions of the legislation. Next it sets out the belief that changing the institutional rules the legal mechanisms created by OLIPPAC of the game in Papua New Guinea will to achieve these goals, not published substantially change political behaviour. elsewhere. An investigation follows of recent Whether this is so remains to be seen. At this political manoeuvrings to see whether the early stage of reform, members of parliament law is being followed, and whether it is have generally not followed the Integrity having the intended effects of improving the Laws. This behaviour is similar to that in Fiji integrity of political parties and candidates. where laws to strengthen political parties and Finally, the paper argues that the reform restrict party hopping have failed to reduce focuses primarily on the ‘integrity’ of political the number of independent candidates or, as parties in the sense of their wholeness (unity, in Papua New Guinea, to discourage new and hence strength), and their inter- parties being formed or splitting in relationships in creating and supporting the parliament (Fraenkel 2004). Indeed, there prime minister and the cabinet, rather than may be a tendency in Papua New Guinea to on the ‘integrity’ of parties and candidates place too much emphasis on changes to in the other, ethical sense of probity and political institutions when what lies at the avoiding outside influences, spelt out in the heart of the problem are behavioural issues 1975 Constitution. Experience to date points (May 2005b). The ‘engineering’ of weak to the need for further changes to make the parties into stronger alliances and the reforms effective, even within the OLIPPAC’s shifting of coalitions of independents into narrow view of integrity. parties will take time. As Reilly (2002) points out, it may not eventuate at all. There are some signs that political parties Parliamentary instability in Papua New Guinea have become stronger as a result of OLIPPAC, with some improve- Central to the problems of governance in ment in political stability, but there are also Papua New Guinea is the way the country’s signs that entrenched patterns of divisive legislative and executive branches of govern- behaviour remain. Arguably, to achieve the ment have evolved since independence. The intended political changes the historical and PNG Constitutional Planning Committee cultural roots of governance problems in (CPC) of 1972–74 followed the standard Papua New Guinea need to be addressed. Westminster model in expecting that the These include the entrenched political culture legislature would supervise and control of localised and personalised campaigning, the executive, but this has not been as well as fluid party allegiances. Time is a realised. crucial element in any attempt at institutional In a recent report to the United Nations reform. However, political engineers often Development Programme (UNDP), two want the most advantageous changes in the academics and a former Speaker of the House, short run, rather than what may be the most Bernard Narokobi, identified three structural desirable reforms for the long run. In the case problems as the primary cause of of Papua New Guinea, there is the danger that parliament’s failure (Okole et al. 2003) the OLIPPAC may be a simplistic, and • the development of a highly fluid and therefore ineffective, solution for the inherently unstable political system, entrenched problems of governance. with weak political parties, personalised This paper first sets out the concerns that and parochially based politics, and led to the Integrity Law, then identifies the intense political competition

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• the overwhelming dominance of parlia- predictability, and connections to strong ment by the executive—a characteristic bases in society. By contrast, political parties which is evident in the executive’s in Papua New Guinea are poorly anchored practice of adjourning parliament for in society and typically do not have a wide months on end, and in the lack of membership base among the populace (Okole effective scrutiny of government by the et al. 2003). Politicians show little allegiance opposition or obligation to the party they nominally represent and often appeal and respond to • the widespread belief that PNG politics clan particularities rather than taking a and government is corrupt, which they national perspective or encouraging civic argue is largely due to the unstable responsibility. The weakness of parties has political system and weakened legislature. meant that, for political survival, MPs engage These problems have emerged in a in activities in the form of regular favours to situation where, over successive elections, their followers. This behaviour is central to parties have been weakened rather than the claims of nepotism or ethnic favouritism strengthened; the number of candidates has in Papua New Guinea, known as wantokism increased from an average of 6 per seat in —an entrenched social structure with 1972 to 26 per seat in 2002; and the number political ramifications (Standish 1994). of independent candidates has grown. Despite inheriting a Westminster parlia- Successful candidates in 2002 won with a mentary democracy, Papua New Guinea has median of 16 per cent of the vote, with not developed a strong two-party system. winning totals as low as 7 per cent in some There have been between 12 and 22 parties constituencies—an indication that the with members in parliament over the last majority of MPs are not representative of their decade. Most parties function almost solely electorates. The re-election of sitting members as parliamentary factions, tending to of parliament is also highly uncertain, given mobilise around personalities more than that the turnover rate of MPs has been policies. Indeed, strategy and tactics are seen extremely high, reaching 75 per cent in the as more important than issues or policy for 2002 national elections. These factors achieving parliamentary office, a character- exacerbate the practice of what is called istic of PNG coalitions that, as May (2005a) ‘money politics’, and political instability by argues, has dominated political behaviour encouraging MPs to use their office to seek since the early 1980s. immediate gains—politics, in other words, The weak party system contributes to is widely seen as a form of business (May instability on the floor of parliament where, 2001). following an election, many members can be readily persuaded to change partners, The PNG party system coalitions and parties. This often means A primary cause of political instability in abandoning the political platform they Papua New Guinea is the very weak party nominally stood for during the campaign system. The first parties competing for power period. PNG constitutional expert, Professor in independent Papua New Guinea were John Nonggorr, explains that MPs in Papua started in the 1960s, but, despite this early New Guinea are not tied to a party by start, the country has not developed a strong ‘anything at all’, which he says encourages party system. Strong parties commonly and perpetuates corruption.1 Reportedly, display unity among members, consistency blackmail, bribery and extortion have become in party stances on policies, and hence very effective tools to make and unmake

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governments in Papua New Guinea. These Deputy Prime Minister Sir , was practices are utilised most often during ‘horse- out of the country. In December 1998, Prime trading’—the process of coalescing between Minister Skate won a seven-month adjourn- rival parties, which occurs either post-election ment to prevent parliament sitting, as did or before a vote on a no-confidence motion. Prime Minister Morauta in December 2000. All members, not just those from small parties Similarly, Prime Minister Somare obtained a or independents, are targeted. All five-month adjournment in January 2004 governments since the first election in 1972 after failing to muster the required numbers have been coalitions, usually of about five to pass a controversial constitutional law parties, but due to the weak party system these change (although parliament did meet coalitions have shown little stability. briefly to elect a new Governor-General). All The frequency of attempted parlia- were seeking to avoid a vote of no-confidence mentary motions of no-confidence and during the period of vulnerability that members ‘crossing the floor’ provides the followed their ‘grace’ period of legislated clearest indication of weak political parties. protection. In response to this cycle of Section 145 of the 1975 Independence instability, the media has expressed wide- Constitution prohibited votes of no- spread and mounting cynicism about the confidence for six months after a government behaviour of politicians and the way the was formed. From 1991, this period of political system has evolved, with many immunity was extended to 18 months. Since citizens calling for its urgent reform. independence, there have been three success- Successive governments in Papua New ful votes of no-confidence, in 1980, 1985 and Guinea have been unable to operate 1988. There have, however, been many more effectively at the poicy level because of the attempts, and such motions are levers used weakness of parties and the executive. The by MPs to gain benefits in exchange for their late Sir Anthony Siaguru said that Papua allegiance to the prime minister. Even though New Guinea’s politicians were concerned it restricts when votes of no-confidence can with establishing their place in a system that be held, Section 145 has been seen as the has an entrenched culture of short-term cause of much parliamentary instability as remedial measures, preventing more prime ministers devise ways of avoiding or medium and long-term, ‘farsighted’ policies stalling such challenges. (Siaguru 2001a). As a consequence, the PNG For example, in May 1988, Prime Minister experience of parliamentary democracy has Wingti adjourned parliament to avoid a vote seen politics become largely procedural, with of no-confidence but was defeated when more emphasis on access to and removal parliament reconvened in July of that year. from power, and less on the public purpose Then, in September 1993, Prime Minister in the exercise of power (Ghai 1997). The Wingti resigned and immediately sought re- OLIPPAC was a response to this instability election in a parliamentary session in parliament and the party system. It was dominated by his supporters, rather than hoped the reforms would lead to greater face a motion of no-confidence, possible after parliamentary and cabinet stability, thus February 1994. Winning a re-election was preventing further ‘institutional decay’ preferable for Wingti because he would earn (Okole 2002). In turn, the reformers argued, 18 months more grace, and might have lost the Organic Law would lead to better the vote of no-confidence. The Opposition policymaking and implementation and thus had no time to mobilise in response to his better governance, more ‘integrity’, and less resignation because Wingti’s likely challenger, corruption in politics (Okole et al. 2003).

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The OLIPPAC governments had not made an Integrity Law their priority, since it was assumed that the The OLIPPAC was passed 84–0 on the political party system would develop on its second vote of the National Parliament on 7 own, given sufficient time.2 December 2000 and came into force on 22 The OLIPPAC reforms have two key February 2001—just in time for the 2002 objectives national elections. Prime Minister Morauta • to stabilise and encourage the develop- declared the passage of the Organic Law as ment of political parties through new ‘the most significant reform since the rules that regulate the formation, Constitution was adopted at independence’ composition and funding of parties (Morauta 2002:np). ‘Organic Laws’ in Papua • to stabilise the executive through New Guinea are designed to implement over provisions that limit how MPs can vote 550 recommendations that were made by the on a motion of no-confidence against the Constitutional Planning Committee at executive, as well as establishing rules for independence but not incorporated in the the formation of government, defections Constitution. At present, there are 21 Organic from political parties and offences for Laws in place. Because they derive their breaking the law, and imposing existence from the Constitution, Organic restrictions on independent MPs. Laws combine with the Constitution to form the supreme laws of the country, and are strongly entrenched. Developing political parties The Constitution obliges the parliament to enact an Organic Law to implement Sub- Formation and composition of parties Division V1.2.H of the Constitution—to make The primary intention of Parts III and IV of the provisions regulating the behaviour and OLIPPAC is to encourage the development conduct of political parties and candidates. of stronger political parties in Papua New Sub-Division V1.2.H of the Constitution (in Guinea. The first step is to ensure that all particular, Sections 129 and 130) seeks to political parties are registered (Section 27). To protect elections and to prevent candidates qualify for registration (Section 28), parties from being improperly or unduly influenced must by outside (especially foreign) or hidden • become incorporated as an association influences. The new preamble to the OLIPPAC, supplementing the amendments • have a president, secretary, treasurer, in 2003, declares the law is ‘responding to public officer, and a parliamentary leader the nationwide call to strengthen and bring (if the party has a presence in parliament) about political stability’. It clarifies the • have at least 500 financial members (and underlying purpose of the law, which is to a register of all financial members) ‘develop and nurture a political culture in which intrinsic values of constitutional • have a formal Constitution that dictates democracy are respected and maintained’, minimum requirements for internal party and ‘to ensure participation of people to democracy (that is, party members must enhance the principle of government of the be free to choose their executive at periodic people, for the people, but more importantly, elections in which all such members have by the people’. No Organic Law on this topic a right to vote, and all members must have was passed for 25 years, despite several the opportunity to stand for election for proposals by groups of MPs. Until 2000 the party executive positions)

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• disclose information about their office that political party is guilty of misconduct in and their finances office under the Leadership Code (Section 88). Similarly, a successful candidate who • not have discriminatory or divisive fails to file a financial return may receive a policies that seek to challenge national fine of up to K2,000 and is guilty of unity. misconduct in office under the Leadership In addition, no person can be a member Code (Section 89). Misconduct under the of more than one political party at the same Leadership Code is a severe offence, which time (Section 24). can lead to MPs being dismissed from their These provisions are intended to seats in parliament and prohibited from promote strong, broad-based political parties holding a designated ‘leadership’ position with stable membership, in addition to for three years. moving parties away from being ‘owned’ by One of the main objectives of the funding a few dominant personalities. This, it is provisions is to strengthen political parties hoped, will encourage the institution- in the parliament. It is hoped that through alisation of the party system and, therefore, public funding, the previously large number provide greater continuity in politics in of independent candidates will be encouraged Papua New Guinea. to seek party endorsement. Similarly, it is hoped this will mean that party membership Funding of political parties ceases being predominantly about personal Part VI of the OLIPPAC provides that advancement. A further intention is that registered parties will be eligible to receive public funding would help discourage election funding for endorsed candidates money politics (such as MPs being ‘bought’ from a Central Fund administered by the by parties which refund their campaign Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates expenses) by providing an alternate avenue Commission (IPPCC) (Sections 75 and 76). for campaign funds as well as ensuring Public funding is provided to parties on the transparency. basis of each elected and party endorsed MP There are fixed formulas for public (Sections 78 and 85). funding. For parties to obtain public funding, • A party will receive from the state candidates and parties are required to K10,000 per year for each MP who was • maintain records of all expenditure party endorsed (Section 78).4 during the election campaign • MPs who are elected as independents or • file financial returns to the IPPCC each members of an unregistered party, along year (Section 86). with unsuccessful candidates, are not eligible for any public funding (Section Part VII of the OLIPPAC requires that 75). financial returns are to be submitted by parties (Section 88) and successful candidates • OLIPPAC provides public funding for (Section 89) to the Registrar of Political female candidates in order to encourage Parties within three months after the return women to stand in elections, and of the writs following a general election, and persuade more parties to support women parties must submit returns every 12 months in their campaigns. Reilly (2002) thereafter.3 A political party that fails to file a interprets the intention of the law as financial return may be subjected to a fine of promoting the development of parties as up to K5,000 and each Executive Officer of more open organisations in which any

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citizen, including women, can participate strengthening the party system as well as (Reilly 2002). eradicating the practice of money politics. In A registered party will be reimbursed up practice, however, public funding may have to 75 per cent of K10,000 for any female a limited impact in light of the large amounts candidate they endorse, if she obtains at which citizens and non-citizens alike can least 10 per cent of the votes cast in the donate to candidates, and which candidates electorate; or an amount fixed by the spend, regardless of whether they are IPPCC, whichever is the lesser (Section independents or members of a registered 6 83). However, a successful female political party. candidate is not entitled to any payment from the Central Fund under this Section Stabilising the Executive (Section 83); instead her party may claim funding of K10,000 under Section 78. Formation of government Under the new regulations, all other Part V, Division 4 of the OLIPPAC has funding to political parties from citizens, changed the way government is formed non-citizens and international organisations following an election in Papua New Guinea. must be registered with the IPPCC’s Central The new rules stipulate that Fund. • preceding an election of the prime minister, • Citizens (Section 79) and non-citizens the largest party in parliament is invited (Section 81) can contribute up to to nominate a person to seek the majority K500,000 (about A$200,000) per party, endorsement in the house and hence to per year, per contributor. form government (even though he or she • Citizens and non-citizens can contribute may not at this stage have the largest up to K500,000 per candidate, per coalition of parties) (Section 63) election, per contributor (either directly • if there are two or more parties with an to the party, the candidate or via the equal number of MPs, the Electoral Central Fund) (Sections 79 and 81). Commission advises the Governor- • Contributions made directly to a party General as to which political party has or a candidate who is a member of a party the highest number of formal votes and must be declared with the Central Fund the Governor-General will invite the within 30 days of the contribution being leader of that political party to test their made (Sections 79 and 81). support in the house to form government There is no cap on the amount inter- (Section 63) national organisations can contribute, but • independent MPs have to make a decision they can only donate to a party through the in the period between the return of the Central Fund (Section 80).5 writs and the election of the Speaker at Although there are now financial the first sitting of parliament—the first incentives for parties to recruit and endorse vote of the new house—either to join a independent candidates and expand their political party or remain independent. If bases, the question remains whether the fixed MPs choose to stay independent, they amount per successful endorsed candidate will remain so for the rest of the term of of K10,000 is sufficient to achieve this parliament (Section 69). objective. This is pertinent since public The intention here is to avoid the post- funding is intended to play a major role in election system of ‘horse-trading’ where

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parties offer inducements to gain the support • following investigation by the Ombuds- of MPs, particularly independents, for rival man Commission, if the Member is found prime ministerial contenders. not guilty of misconduct in office (Section 57(3)), he or she will be free to join another Party defections registered political party or remain One of the OLIPPAC’s most ambitious independent from a political party provisions seeks to combat the practice of (Section 60(2)). If, after investigation, the ‘party-hopping’ and thereby stabilise the Ombudsman Commission is satisfied executive. Part V, Division 5 of the OLIPPAC that the Member is guilty of misconduct covers defections from political parties and in office under Section 59(3), the matter voting restrictions. shall proceed in accordance with Part V Restrictions are now placed on MPs, of the Organic Law on the Duties and forbidding them from leaving their party to Responsibilities of Leadership. join or form another party or become an The OLIPPAC’s imprecision in relation independent (Section 65), or leaving the party to who resolves such issues and how they with which they were a member when first are to be resolved has caused major problems elected (Section 65). to date, as discussed below. Penalties are imposed on any MP who The sanctions for party defection are breaks these restrictions (Sections 67 and 68). powerful, if applied. The range of penalties Furthermore, • may include (Section 68) loss of a ministerial MPs who leave their party will be or committee position, repayment of party investigated by the Ombudsman funding and/or dismissal from parliament. Commission, which may refer the matter MPs elected with party endorsement are to a Leadership Tribunal, comprising also restricted in their voting on particular National Court judges, that will decide matters in parliament. They must vote in whether their grounds for defection were accordance with the party resolution valid. (position) on motions of no-confidence against • the two grounds for a valid defection are the prime minister or ministry (Section 70); if the party has breached its own the appointment of a prime minister (Section Constitution, or if the party has been 71); the national budget (Section 72); and declared insolvent (Section 57(2)). amendments to the Constitution (Section 73). Where MPs vote against their party’s • a ‘serious breach of the party Constitution’ resolution on the above four matters they are by the registered political party is deemed to have resigned from that political defined as a breach that ‘would be likely party (Section 67), and hence may suffer the to bring the integrity and reputation of full sanctions under Section 68 (above). the Member into disrepute’ (Section The clear aim is to promote party 57(5)). solidarity. Significantly, although this was • the Member has the onus to establish not well known in Papua New Guinea until that a valid ground existed for their 2003, a party can decide to change its vote by resignation (Section 58(2)), otherwise resolution, and move against the sitting they will be found guilty of misconduct prime minister, whom they initially supported, in office and face sanctions under the as long as they do so collectively (Sections Leadership Code (Section 58(3) and Part 70, 71, 72 and 73). Furthermore, party V). members can abstain from votes on any of

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these four categories of motion, but if they Recent amendments to the vote against their party resolution on such OLIPPAC matters their votes will not be counted (Section 66). In March 2003, the Somare–Marat Similarly, independents who voted for Government announced plans to repeal and the appointment of a particular prime replace the OLIPPAC as well as make minister must continue to vote in support of changes to Section 145 of the Constitution to that prime minister on all four matters or extend the vote of no-confidence grace period. abstain (Sections 70, 71, 72 and 73). Describing the OLIPPAC (2001) as ‘riddled Independents who have not voted in support with flaws and defects’, the prime minister of the prime minister’s appointment can vote said his intention for the new amendments in any way they like on any subject. was to leave behind ‘a legacy of political The intention behind this central element stability and good government’ (Somare of the reforms is to encourage party member- 2003:np). The changes deal with three factors ship and enforce party solidarity, and thereby that impact on political stability: the activities reduce the influence and bargaining power of political parties and their members, of independents and party members. independent members, and motions of no- Provided that penalties for defections are confidence. enforced, these reforms have the potential to To improve the administration and entrench patterns of loyalty to parties’ voting understanding of the law, the amendments behaviour in parliament, and hence to bring also included a complete re-arrangement of more stability and strengthen the executive. the entire layout of the OLIPPAC.7 Prime Offences Minister Somare has said these changes would further strengthen and entrench the role of Part V, Division 4 (Section 74) of the OLIPPAC political parties as key players in Papua New has made it a criminal offence for a party or Guinea’s system of government and party official to use unlawful means to force, guarantee political stability and continuity, threaten, intimidate, lock up or otherwise which has been lacking (PacNews 2003). The interfere with the free movement of MPs in amendments did not cause much political relation to performance of their parlia- controversy. The first vote on the new version mentary duties. of the OLIPPAC was passed on 17 July 2003, In the past, MPs were subject to intense when 74 members voted in support of the ‘lockup’ sessions, known as ‘camping’, law and six voted against it. The second and before votes of no-confidence against a prime final vote was taken on 19 September 2003, minister or ministry or votes for a prime with 81 MPs voting in support and seven minister after a national election. Parties that voting against. The new version of the are found guilty of committing these acts will OLIPPAC was certified on 15 October 2003 have their registration cancelled by the and is now in force. The main features of the Registrar of Political Parties and pay a fine amendments related to the activities of of up to K5,000. Moreover, individual party parties and their members, the situation of members will be subject to the Criminal Code independent candidates, and motions of no- in relation to these matters. The OLIPPAC confidence. fails to provide any further detail on how this section should be administered or who should be responsible for the ‘policing’ of it.

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Activities of political parties and The primary intention here is to reduce their members the number of independent candidates contesting national elections. The provision Public funding for party executives provides a disincentive for candidates to run To further strengthen the role of political as independents by preventing them from parties, the national executives (president, soliciting financial and other support from secretary and treasurer) of political parties political parties. The reform is also an attempt that have members of parliament, will now to eradicate the practice of political parties be remunerated through public funds strategically endorsing multiple candidates (Section 25). in an electorate to improve the winning chances of a favoured candidate. Office of the Opposition and election of the Opposition leader The motion of no-confidence This provision aims to strengthen the legislature by formally establishing an Office Sir in 2003 also used the of the Opposition (Section 64). Members of discussion of stability in government to the Opposition must democratically elect one attempt to change the no-confidence of their members to be the Leader of the provisions. The National Parliament Opposition. The elected leader then appoints debated, voted on, and subsequently one of his or her members to be the Deputy dropped the prime minister’s proposed Leader. The national budget for each year will amendment to Section 145, Subsection (4), make funds available for the operation of the of the Constitution, which deals with Office of the Opposition. motions of no-confidence. This was a government initiative to enhance stability Independent members in the executive by providing the prime minister and the cabinet three years’ Endorsement of candidates immunity from votes of no-confidence. The amendment specified that the grace period Part V, Division 1 of the OLIPPAC provides of any government formed after a general new restrictions on candidates contesting election is to be extended from 18 months to elections to the National Parliament and 36 months and, for a vote of no-confidence political parties’ endorsement of independ- to be successful, an absolute majority vote ent candidates. of 55 votes or more is required. • An independent candidate is prohibited Section 145 has served as a ‘safeguard’ from receiving or soliciting support from provision, and enabled the continuation of a political party (Section 53). • democracy in Papua New Guinea by Political parties are prohibited from preventing a single party or individual endorsing and/or supporting more than leaders from dominating when they have one candidate for an electorate (Section lost control of the house. Yet frequently 54). threatened changes of government are seen • The penalty imposed for a winning as causing the subversion of development candidate who is found guilty of and the national goals of Papua New receiving or soliciting support from a Guinea, and so there was a desire to delay political party is nullification of the the time when a vote of no-confidence would election win (Section 54). be allowed.

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A number of MPS expressed dis- The OLIPPAC in practice satisfaction with the proposed amendment, concerned that an entrenched government The OLIPPAC to date has shown some might not necessarily be a good government. limited success but also serious weaknesses. Western Highlands Governor and former Despite some early signs that the OLIPPAC prime minister, , asked: ‘what was helping create a degree of stability and happens for the 36 months if it’s the wrong accordingly, predictability, in politics, recent government…where are the checks and political developments have demonstrated balances?’ (Post-Courier, 19–21 September how the OLIPPAC can be ignored, manip- 2003). The implications of his question are ulated and interpreted for political gain. profound. The Westminster system of parliamentary and cabinet government requires the executive to maintain the Successes confidence of the legislature, but the amendment would have further delayed any Strengthening parties formal test of the government’s support. The reforms have had some success in Despite these criticisms, Prime Minister strengthening the party system through its Somare pushed on with his amendments requirement that parties be registered. and vowed to hold accountable all party Nonggorr notes that parties now know who leaders and MPs who did not vote for the their members are, whereas ‘before the proposed changes (Chin 2003). The Prime legislation, nobody knew which party an Minister denied claims that he had a individual MP belonged to…party member- personal interest in extending the grace ship was literally fluid’.8 The OLIPPAC’s period prohibiting votes of no-confidence, requirement for compulsory registration has and argued that his primary intention was brought formality and coherence to what to maintain his term and that of the current were previously chaotic, loose arrangements. coalition government for the full five years It is debatable whether the OLIPPAC (Taimbari 2003b). rules aimed at strengthening parties have For whatever reasons, insufficient MPs been successful in reducing the number of voted for this amendment to the Constitution, parties in parliament. For example, a total of and the divisions between party members on 43 parties had registered by the February this issue appear to indicate defiance of the 2002 deadline, compared with the 20 parties OLIPPAC requirement for party unity in that contested the 1997 national elections. voting on constitutional amendments. What Of these, some 22 parties had members was lacking were definitive party resolutions successful in the 2002 elections. By June 2004, and stances, reflecting divisions within there were only 15 registered political parties parties. Whether this was deliberate defiance in the PNG parliament (Integrity of Political of OLIPPAC or not, this constitutional law Parties and Candidates Commission 2004). was clearly not being followed. If the matter A reduction in party numbers was a goal of were taken to the courts for a ruling, there the OLIPPAC, which may appear to have would be months of delays by which time succeeded in encouraging smaller parties to the political moment would have passed. amalgamate or merge with larger parties in parliament. The number of small parties with MPs normally declines during the terms of PNG parliaments, however, as MPs seek to ‘get with the strength’ and increase their

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chances of gaining power and sharing in the parliament. Previously, independents had rewards of office. So this change may not much bargaining power on the floor of result from the OLIPPAC, although now parliament, but the OLIPPAC appears to when parties merge they must do so by party have reduced this somewhat. Note, however, resolution. that the number of independents usually falls Parties have been strengthened by the throughout the terms of all governments, new rules, in that the influence of until just before a motion of no-confidence, independents was reduced in the 2002 when their leverage is greatest. Parliament (Table 1). Fewer independent candidates were elected in 2002—17, as against 36 in 1997. A feature of the 2002 Weaknesses election was that 15 of the 17 independents The formation of government moved into the strongest camps prior to the election of the prime minister and could In August 2002, the formation of the new thereby avoid being stuck in a weak party. government in accordance with the OLIPPAC Somare’s National Alliance was clearly the meant that the horse-trading antics, a feature strongest party in the 2002 national of past post-election periods, were not as elections, even before the end of polling across prominent as previously. However, the the country, whereas Morauta’s People’s practice has not been eliminated. Rather, a Democratic Movement lost 30 of its 42 seats. new form of politicking was evident in 2002 The National Alliance, with 11 MPs before where parties, instead of individual MPs, the polls, grew to 19 endorsed candidates now held sway. For example, the National elected, and they were joined by another five Alliance led by Sir Michael Somare worked MPs by the time the parliament met in August for two weeks before the first sitting of the 2002. The OLIPPAC has encouraged all new parliament to gather the numbers to form except two independents, David Anggo and government. It was necessary for Somare to Paias Wingti, to join parties once elected to make deals with other, smaller parties in order

Table 1 Independent candidates: votes and seats, 1987–2002

Election 1987 1992 1997 2002 Candidates 1,513 1,655 2371 2,878 Independents as a percentage of candidatesa 63.4b 74.1 73.2 ..c Percentage of votes for independent candidates 40.9 63.1 48.4 ..c Percentage of seats won by independents 20.8 35.8 33.0 16.5d a The data on party endorsement and independent candidacy is at best approximate, based on information given at the time of nomination, and subject to change before polling. b From Oliver (1989). c The Report of the 2002 election has not been finalised, and this data is not readily calculated. d In 2002, only 103 of 109 results were declared; this represents 17 of 103 seats (the elections in 6 seats in the Southern Highlands were deemed ‘failed’, and conducted in April–May 2003 as supplementary elections). Source: Table prepared by Bill Standish, The Australian National University, using the PNG Electoral Commission Report on the 1997 National Election.

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to build the support of 52 members (of the candidates out of 22 had party endorsement. 103 MPs then declared elected), which he A further issue is that many independent required to be endorsed as prime minister. candidates running in the by-elections may Somare signed an ‘irrevocable’ memorandum have had ‘strong links’ to political parties of understanding with five other smaller (Standish 2005:9). The continuation of this parties during this period, setting out agreed practice in 2004 is a concern given that the policy priorities. With a bandwagon effect, OLIPPAC was specifically amended in 2003 his nomination as prime minister ultimately to prevent it. Under Section 53 of the Integrity received 88 votes. Similarly, the leader of the Law, independent candidates are prohibited People’s Democratic Movement, Sir Mekere from receiving or soliciting support from a Morauta, tried to gain the allegiance of several political party. A significant obstacle for the of the smaller parties in his attempt to claim successful implementation of this provision the prime ministership. is that the OLIPPAC remains silent on who Under the OLIPPAC, smaller parties should police the elections and how Section have taken the place of independents in 53 should be enforced in response to influencing the larger parties during the breaches. Effectively, this provision is formation of government. The smaller parties rendered powerless in the absence of any tried to increase their numbers and also detailed guidelines. formed alliances to increase their bargaining power in the allocation of ministries. A Public funding and financial disclosure potential danger is that the stakes will now A major problem since the enactment of the be higher since the major parties will be OLIPPAC is the delay for over 12 months in forming deals mostly with other political providing funds for the Registrar to set up a parties, rather than individuals. Money and Secretariat to manage the affairs of the promises can still be offered and thus remain Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates the prime bargaining tools. Commission (IPPCC, previously the Central Funds Board of Management). Hence, Independent candidates although payments to some parties were Results from by-elections held in 2003–04 announced in late 2004, the OLIPPAC’s under the new Limited Preferential Voting public funding and financial disclosure (LPV) scheme indicate that party identific- provisions have not been implemented in ation remains weak in Papua New Guinea full.9 A further problem is that not all and that the OLIPPAC has not succeeded in candidates and political parties have filed reducing the number of candidates contesting their financial returns accurately and in full elections. Standish argues that, despite following the 2002 National Elections. strong National Alliance campaigns in Abau Indeed, the accounting requirements are and Yangoru, and the involvement of Enga strict and would be difficult to obey in the Governor Peter Ipatas in Wabag, ‘there is little turmoil of an election campaign. Nonggorr sign that OLIPPAC has changed people’s suggests that political parties have also behaviour so as to strengthen political probably not complied with the ongoing parties’ (Standish 2005:7). Party endorse- requirement to submit financial returns every ment was ‘largely an afterthought in most of 12 months as the OLIPPAC requires the Highlands seats, and meant little on the (Nonggorr 2004). ground’. This behaviour was seen in other The IPPCC cannot enforce the OLIPPAC’s electorates as well; for example, in the penalties for parties that do not submit a Moresby North-East by-election only four financial return, or that submit incomplete

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or false returns, if there is lack of funding to votes for Prime Minister Somare’s constitut- enable the commission to effectively discharge ional amendment to Section 145 (to extend its duties.10 As a result, a significant section of the grace period before a vote of no- the OLIPPAC aimed at strengthening the confidence), and the threat throughout much integrity of parties and encouraging greater of 2004 of a vote of no-confidence against the transparency within them, has not worked Somare government. Both were important effectively. Nonggorr says this provision was tests of the discipline that OLIPPAC seeks to designed to make the running of political impose. parties more transparent, so that the public For the constitutional amendment to could have access to what the political party Section 145 to be passed, the legislation stood for, as well as where they were getting required the support of two-thirds of their funding from, how they were spending parliament on two separate votes held at least their money, and any improper influences two months apart. The amendment was there might be.11 Despite the stringent passed on its first vote in September 2003, financial disclosure provisions, the reforms despite the fact that four of the votes came in practice have been undermined by lack of from People’s Labour Party (PLP) members, funding and poor implementation. This has who voted for the amendment without the significant implications for the ability of the party fulfilling the OLIPPAC requirement of OLIPPAC to address some of the root causes adopting an official party resolution. The of party instability in Papua New Guinea. second vote for the amendment on 26 November was rescinded after it failed to Party splits obtain the required two-thirds majority. Some One of the primary goals of the OLIPPAC is 11 votes were declared invalid because the to prevent political parties dissolving and acting Speaker had received more than one creating new parliamentary factions. But, party resolution from the PLP, the United although MPs belonging to a single party are Resources Party (URP) and the People’s now required to vote with their party line on Progress Party (PPP). Five of the 11 MPs were the four above-mentioned matters, in practice, referred to the Ombudsman Commission to they have already started forming opposing face misconduct charges, which were later factions behind rival prominent members and dismissed. developing multiple resolutions on these The second vote was held in parliament matters. In fact, the Pangu Pati has been for the second time on 2 December 2003. The divided since before the Somare–Marat PPP and URP divided on the vote again. The government was formed in August 2002, with amendment had angered MPs, some of one faction supporting Foreign Minister Sir whom voiced their apprehension that they Rabbie Namaliu and the other , were being forced to vote with their parties who by mid 2004 was clearly with the for the changes even though many did not Opposition camp. agree with them. As Bogia MP John Hickey Even though each party has its own rules notes, ‘we know this decision is a bad one of conduct, most party constitutions do not but we are forced to make a bad decision…if have provisions for resolving internal I make a good decision, I’ll be tossed up disputes (Sepoe 2004). Consequently, much before the Ombudsman Commission’ confusion has ensued in relation to party (Taimbari 2003a:np). Acting Speaker Jeffery resolutions, with parties forming factions Nape accepted one PPP and one URP party when their internal differences cannot be resolution, which had their party leader’s resolved. Two recent examples of this are the endorsement over contrary resolutions. This

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appears to be an arbitrary decision and not The vote for the constitutional amend- in accordance with the OLIPPAC or ment suggests very little has changed as far Parliamentary Standing Orders. In the event, as the instability and fluidity of politics in the vote failed to reach a two-thirds majority, Papua New Guinea is concerned. Indeed, in because of abstentions, and so was rescinded early 2004 most of the disaffected former for the second time. In January 2004, after ministers and their factions joined the failing to muster the required numbers to pass Opposition and ‘camped’ in hotels while the constitutional change, Prime Minister seeking to gather the numbers for a vote of Somare’s government adjourned parliament no-confidence. PNG politics was again at the until 29 June 2004 to avoid facing a possible point where party factions originally in vote of no-confidence. The tight party government were pressing for a vote of no- discipline required under OLIPPAC was not confidence. A vote of no-confidence against manifest, and the episode was politically the Somare government was legally possible costly. The Prime Minister had sacked several because Sir Michael’s 18-month period of ministers who had opposed the constitutional grace expired in February 2004. Its passage change. Somare subsequently dropped the was highly likely, given that four of the ten Section 145 amendments, amid speculation parties in his coalition were split between that the governing coalition might be on the government and opposition factions.12 In late brink of collapse. May, however, Sir Michael Somare welcomed There have been three interpretations of the decision of Opposition leader at the time, the OLIPPAC on the three separate votes taken Sir Mekere Morauta, and his entire party for Prime Minister Somare’s constitutional (now renamed the Papua New Guinea Party) reform. The conduct of the three votes has to switch to the government, thereby helping demonstrated anything but stability. to stabilise his support. The Opposition Arguably, this could be a result of the law camp was divided as to who would be their failing to define exactly what a ‘party prime ministerial candidate (who must be resolution’ is, and as a consequence, the named in a motion of no-confidence), and definition has been left open to a wide variety never tested their numbers, and mostly of interpretations. In resolving some of the boycotting the remaining sittings in 2004. issues now arising in Parliament, the Speaker Disputes within parties arising from has found little guidance from the OLIPPAC conflicting decisions over both party or the Parliamentary Standing Orders. Indeed leadership and how party members should it was expected that the Standing Orders vote on Section 145 have been going on for would be revised to complement the 18 months and remain unresolved, both in OLIPPAC, but to date this has not occurred. the political arena and the courts. The splits Updating the Standing Orders would ensure are similar in the PPP, Pangu Pati and the that in the event of a party splitting, there are URP (Nonggorr 2004). In the case of the PPP, adequate provisions to guide the Speaker in since 2003, the party has been split into deciding who to recognise on the floor of factions, each claiming to be legitimate under Parliament (Nonggorr 2004). Loose interpret- the party’s constitution (The National, 26 ations of the OLIPPAC by the Acting Speaker January 2004). After initially being referred of Parliament have not served to strengthen to the Registrar of Political Parties, the issue the role of political parties and they have not went the National Court and, over a year later, made the coalition government any less remains unresolved. Although the rules for vulnerable to a vote of no-confidence. dealing with party defections are set out in

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the OLIPPAC, the Integrity Law needs to give The two meanings of ‘integrity’ of more specific guidance to the Speaker in such political parties and candidates cases. In particular, it requires a provision that if the Speaker’s ruling is challenged, The OLIPPAC is clearly an ambitious attempt where the matter should be referred to, and to legislate for the ‘integrity’ of the Papua resolved. The fact that these issues have gone New Guinean political system as a whole. to court indicates just how serious the Two meanings of ‘integrity’ have been divisions within parties remain, and how identified in respect to politics in Papua New thoroughly the intention of OLIPPAC has Guinea (Siagaru 2001b). On the one hand, been violated in 2004. It is important that ‘integrity’ denotes honesty and ‘uprightness’ future disputes be resolved politically and in the conduct—decisions, actions and not in the courts. This is essential in order to behaviours—of political parties and preserve the independence of the courts and candidates. On the other hand, it can also to avoid lengthy delays and constitutional mean ‘wholeness’ or an ‘unbroken state’, that confusion on urgent political matters. is, integrity as stability. As at April 2005, Prime Minister Somare The concept of party stability connotes an has used various means of stalling or idea of firmness or the unchanging loyalty of warding off a vote of no-confidence, and in a member of a party to that party—it implies the process removed several ministers, the ability of a party to stay together, regardless including three Deputy Prime Ministers. of the ‘political wind’. Moreover, stability also Two, Dr (PPP) and Moses means that a party must have a definite Maladina (Peoples Action Party), have not governmental organisation that is not likely joined the Opposition, but the third, Andrew to break down or fall apart. Similarly, integrity Baing, has. The position of Deputy Prime of conduct in political parties is guaranteed Minister has been vacant for 12 months. when measures are taken to ensure the Prime Minister Somare’s moves and the formation, purpose and activities of political ambitions of his opponents have created parties are not corrupted and are not impaired, antagonism with a number of his previous but are measured against public welfare and ministers and supporters and they and many the national interest to ascertain their honesty MPs have shown little respect for the ‘spirit’ and uprightness. of the Integrity Laws in the process. Ironically, It seems unlikely that integrity in both the Prime Minister has been saved by senses of the term can be achieved through divisiveness within the Opposition, as legislative reform. Rather, it appears that the demonstrated by the move in February 2005 OLIPPAC reforms were intended to legislate by Bill Skate, a former Speaker and Prime for the integrity of the country’s political Minister, to have himself ‘expelled’ from his system primarily by strengthening it; to create party within the Opposition. Clearly, the stability and continuity in government rather Somare government could still face a vote of than primarily stressing the integrity of no-confidence at any time until June 2006. conduct of political parties and candidates The OLIPPAC in its first years of operation in Papua New Guinea. This is an important has not been able to stabilise PNG politics distinction. because the very purpose of the Integrity Law Whether the reforms will be successful has been twisted and manipulated. Events in changing deeply ingrained political thus far suggest the Integrity Law has not practices that are arguably at the heart of the been able to ensure the wholeness of political governance problems in Papua New Guinea parties or to create stability among them. depends greatly on their ability to address

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the lack of integrity of conduct of political governance problems in Papua New Guinea, parties and candidates, as indicated by the and the OLIPPAC did not address these reportedly high levels of corruption and the issues as priorities of reform (Standish 2004). relationships of reciprocity often alleged in More broadly, it is hard to see how reform PNG political discourse. Although the exclusively through legislation (from ‘above’) OLIPPAC includes rules intended to make could possibly prevent the interaction of MPs more accountable, and thereby money politics and localism, and encourages integrity of conduct (such as by consequently enforce the integrity of conduct keeping detailed records of campaign of political parties and candidates. This is expenditure), these provisions are not central because integrity is normally seen as a to the purpose of the law, which is the character trait that develops from the inside strengthening of the party system. The out and cannot be forced from the outside in. OLIPPAC has not been able to encourage all Indeed, integrity is not just a matter of MPs to take initiatives to address public strength, but has moral and ethical qualities. interests above and beyond their own, more Improving the integrity of the political system limited, interests. as a whole involves questions and principles that may be beyond the mechanisms embodied in the OLIPPAC. The effectiveness of political Although the OLIPPAC can be used to engineering in Papua New help overcome some of the problems of a weak Guinea party system, such a law on its own cannot solve Papua New Guinea’s enculturated It is hard to be definitive about the success of political practices and their associated the OLIPPAC at such an early stage of the problems. The OLIPPAC’s performance to reforms, but some interim conclusions can date demonstrates this point. Although the be drawn. The implementation of the reforms have had some limited success in OLIPPAC prior to the 2002 national elections strengthening political parties, the law has evoked much hope in Papua New Guinea, been unable to change now standard political with many people believing the reform would practices, including localised and be a major turning point for the nation. Papua personalised campaigning, party-splitting, New Guinean political discourse has long and horse-trading in parliament, as well as expressed a general lack of confidence in the use of money politics. leaders and cynicism about the quality and Prime Minister Somare’s repeal and honesty of politicians. In this context, it was replacement of the original OLIPPAC, as well widely assumed the reforms would address as attempted further amendments to the perceived corrupt political behaviour, by Constitution, also suggest that—rather than legislating for the integrity of conduct of improve political stability—the OLIPPAC political parties and candidates. However, reforms have themselves become a tool for this was only the secondary aim of the the manipulation of the political landscape. legislation. The central aim of the OLIPPAC Prime Minister Somare has called for Papua is to strengthen political parties and thereby New Guinea’s leaders to respect the ‘spirit’ stabilise the political system. In part this has of the integrity law, arguing been achieved, in that there were fewer …this country desperately needs independent candidates elected in 2002. stability and we as leaders simply However, the practice of money politics and cannot afford to be squabbling localism can be seen at the heart of amongst ourselves at this critical stage

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in our much needed recovery. The References upheaval and uncertainty that it is causing are undermining all of the Central Funds Board of Management, 2003. good work that we are doing (Somare Press Release on Financial Returns of and 2005:8). Funding to Registered Political Parties for The implications of his statement are 2002, Central Funds Board of profound. For as long as there is a genuine Management, Port Moresby, 11 March. lack of political will to both follow and enforce Chin, J., 2003. ‘Testing, tempting times for the provisions of the OLIPPAC, as well as PNG’s ambitious MPs’, The Canberra uncertainty surrounding who should be Times, 19 August:11. responsible for taking action when breaches Fraenkel, J., 2004. ‘Electoral engineering in occur, Papua New Guinea will never obtain Papua New Guinea: lessons from Fiji the stability it is searching for. Unless the and elsewhere’, Pacific Economic PNG government takes immediate action to Bulletin, 19(1):122–33. address the deliberate disregard for the legislation, and clarifies essential aspects of Ghai, Y., 1997. ‘Establishing a liberal its operation, there is a danger that Papua political order through a constitution: New Guinea’s major home-grown reform the Papua New Guinea experience’, effort could turn out to be ineffectual. Development and Change, 28(2):303–30. Entrenching political change takes time, Hriehwazi, Y., 2004. ‘Weak leaders blamed and Papua New Guinea is a very new state. for creating instability’, The National, 26 The country is still building its political January. institutions and learning how to adapt them Integrity of Political Parties and to a diverse society. The idea of a nation is a Candidates Commission and the Office work-in progress. Papua New Guineans of the Registrar of Political Parties, patently want development and are looking 2004. List of Members of Parliament by to their leaders to provide it. Clear political Political Party. Statistics collated by Dr analysis and genuine desire for reform are Orovu Sepoe, University of Papua New needed for Papua New Guinea’s leaders to Guinea. steer the country in this direction. Further May, R.J., 2001. State and Society in Papua changes to ensure compliance with the New Guinea: the first twenty-five years, Integrity Law are required to make the Crawford House, Adelaide. reforms effective, even within its basically limited view of integrity, and help those who ——, 2005a. Yo-yo politics: political parties are seeking stability. So far it would appear in Papua New Guinea, Research School that OLIPPAC has not provided accepted of pacific and Asian Studies, The rules of the game, and hence provided the Australian National University, stability that Papua New Guinea’s leaders Canberra (unpublished). are seeking, and which is essential for ——, 2005b. Political change in Papua development. The question raised by several New Guinea: is it needed? Will it observers, including Papua New Guineans, work?’, Research School of Pacific and remains: whether changing the rules of party Asian Studies, The Australian National and parliamentary behaviour can change the University, Canberra (unpublished). dynamics of political behaviour in Papua Morauta, M., 2002. ‘Explaining the New Guinea? proposed political integrity laws’, The

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National, 21 August. Available online at ——, 2001b. ‘Another look at integrity’, In- www.thenational.com.pg/1003/ House in Papua New Guinea, Asia Pacific integrity.htm. Press, The Australian National Nonggorr, J., 2004. ‘Splits and the University, Canberra:25–27. speaker’s role’, Post-Courier, 9 Somare, M.T., 2003. ‘It’s official’, The November. National, 11 March. Okole, H., 2002. ‘Institutional decay in a ——, 2005. ‘Securing Papua New Guinea’s Melanesian parliamentary democracy: future’, Papua New Guinea Yearbook 2005, Papua New Guinea’, Development The National and Cassowary Books, Bulletin, 60:37–41. Port Moresby:7–12. ——, Narokobi, B., and Clements, Q., 2003. Standish, B., 1994. ‘Papua New Guinea: ‘Strengthening a parliamentary the search for security in a weak state’, democracy for the 21st century’, in A. Thompson (ed.), Papua New Legislative Needs and Assessment Report: Guinea: issues for Australian security National Parliament of Papua New Guinea, planners, Australian Defence Studies report for a UNDP Consultancy Project, Centre, Australian Defence Force Port Moresby and Canberra. Academy, University of New South Oliver, M. (ed.), 1989. Eleksin: the 1987 Wales, Canberra. National Election in Papua New Guinea, ——, 1999. Papua New Guinea 1999: crisis of University of Papua New Guinea, Port governance, Research Paper 4, Depart- Moresby. ment of the Parliamentary Library, PacNews, 2003. ‘PNG: amendments target Canberra. Available online at stability, good governance: Somare’, 17 www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/ July. Available online at 1999-2000/2000rp04.htm (accessed 30 www.pacificislands.cc (accessed 19 April 2005). July 2003). ——, 2001. ‘Papua New Guinea in 1999– Reilly, B., 2002. ‘Political engineering and 2000’, The Journal of Pacific History, party politics in Papua New Guinea’, 36(3):285–98. Party Politics, 8(6):701–18. ——, 2004. Papua New Guinea’s Sepoe, O., 2004. Challenges of democracy, paper presented at the strengthening the political party system Political Culture, Representation and in Papua New Guinea, paper presented Electoral Systems in the Pacific at the Political Culture, Representation Conference, University of the South and Electoral Systems in the Pacific Pacific, Port Vila, 10–12 July. Conference, University of the South Available online at http:// Pacific, Port Vila, 10–12 July. Available www.usp.ac.fj/index.php/ online at http://www.usp.ac.fj/ piasdg_downloads/ (accessed 15 index.php/piasdg_downloads April 2005). (accessed 15 April 2005). ——, 2005. ‘Limited preferential voting: Siaguru, A., 2001a. In-House in Papua New some early lessons’, paper presented at Guinea with Anthony Siaguru: ‘The Great the conference Overcoming Constraints Game in PNG’, Asia Pacific Press, The in Papua New Guinea, Lowy Institute Australian National University, for International Policy, Sydney, 18 Canberra. February.

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Taimbari, C., 2003. ‘Revolt in govt’, The 6 Although documentation in the literature is National, 9 September. poor, candidates are believed to spend tens of thousands of kina in their campaigning ——, 2003. ‘Pressure mounts on attempts and in the Highlands region often government’, The National, 24 hundreds of thousands of kina. Thus, while September. party machines may benefit from regular state funding, the scale of such funding is not likely to have a significant impact on Notes campaign expenditures overall (Bill Standish, personal communication, 27 April 2005). 1 Interview with Professor John Nonggorr, 7 The OLIPPAC now has a preamble—the first Canberra, 25 September 2003. for an Organic Law in Papua New Guinea— 2 Interview with Professor John Nonggorr, which declares that the law is established in Canberra, 25 September 2003. response to a ‘nationwide call to strengthen 3 Returns cover all the contributions, receipts and bring about political stability to the and income of political parties, and details of system of government’ and ‘in order to expenditure which the party has incurred. protect the national election from outside or They must also include the names and hidden influences’. This development is in addresses of the contributors, the source and response to claims that the previous the nature of income and the dates upon OLIPPAC did not meet the original intentions which the transaction occurred. These returns of Sub-Division V.1.2.H of the Constitution. are then submitted to the Registrar of Political 8 Interview with Professor John Nonggorr, Parties who is appointed by the IPPCC. All Canberra, 25 September 2003. financial returns should become public 9 In 2003, the Central Funds Board of information. Management (now IPPCC) approved the 4 K10,000 equates to approximately A$ 4,000 distribution of K990,000 to 20 parties stating (The National, 27 April 2005). in a press release that the government had 5 This last point is the exact opposite of the ‘miserably failed to adequately fund the Constitution’s explicit ban on foreign Board and its Secretariat’ (see Central Funds donations (see Sub-Division V.1.2.H), a Board of Management 2003) prohibition also mentioned in the 10 The commission has recently advertised for Constitutional Development Committee’s specialist accounting staff for this role. First Draft of the OLIPPAC, but subsequently 11 Interview with Professor John Nonggorr, left out. Moreover, the Constitutional Canberra, 25 September 2003. Development Committee’s First Draft of the 12 The PPP, PAP, URP and Pangu Pati. See OLIPPAC, the Final Report of the Standish (2004). Constitutional Development Committee and the OLIPPAC’s Drafting Instructions all state Acknowledgments that ‘non-citizens cannot contribute directly I wish to thank Bill Standish for his to political parties or candidates—non- assistance with data and comments on this citizens can contribute to the Central Fund’. paper. I appreciate the helpful suggestions In a major change by the Morauta cabinet, such provisions were removed from the final from this Journal’s anonymous referee, and legislation and now non-citizens are free to comments from Nic Notarpietro on an earlier make direct donations to parties and version. I alone am responsible for the candidates. This means they can be article’s content, including any errors or approached for funding as well. omissions.

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