國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所碩士論文 Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies National Sun Yat-Sen University Master Thesis

國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所碩士論文 Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies National Sun Yat-sen University Master Thesis

從統合主義，威脅感與儒家思想探究臺灣公民民主價值 An Investigation of Civilian Support for Democratic Values in Taiwan: Corporatism, the Terror Threat, and Confucianism

研究生: 高燕迪 Andi Kao

指導教授: 顧長永博士 Dr. Samuel C.Y. Ku 共同指導教授: 劉正山 Dr. Frank C.S. Liu

中國民國 102 年 6 月 June 2013

國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所碩士論文 Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies National Sun Yat-sen University Master Thesis

從統合主義，威脅感與儒家思想探究臺灣公民民主價值 An Investigation of Civilian Support for Democratic Values in Taiwan: Corporatism, the Terror Threat, and Confucianism

研究生: 高燕迪 Andi Kao

指導教授: 顧長永博士 Dr. Samuel C.Y. Ku 共同指導教授: 劉正山 Dr. Frank C.S. Liu

中國民國 102 年 6 月 June 2013

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis committee members

Samuel C.Y. Ku, Chuei-Ling Shin, Frank C.S. Liu, and Chia-hao Hsu for their support and guidance. I owe a debt of thanks to my advisor, Professor Samuel C.Y.

Ku, whose contribution to this work extends beyond his guidance through the thesis writing process. Professor Chuei-ling Shin provided invaluable feedback and constructive criticism that refined the content of this study. Her timely advice significantly helped me clarify the logic of my arguments. I am deeply grateful to

Professor Frank C.S. Liu for taking the time to work with me on this project. His ideas, suggestions and criticisms were essential to its completion. He deserves special thanks. Professor Chia-hao Hsu has been extremely generous with his time and insights. His encouragement and instruction greatly enriched my graduate experience and continue to be an inspiration.

Many other professors at National Sun Yat-sen University aided in this thesis and I would like to thank especially Wen-cheng Lin, Eugene Kuo, Ming-Hsuan Lee, and Frank Ying for their helpful comments and suggestions. My classmates have provided me with companionship and encouragement, and I am truly thankful for their patience.

My family has been a wonderful support system over the years and I could not have accomplished so much without their love and support.

i Abstract

Since 1975 the number of state regimes categorized as ‘democratic’ has risen dramatically. According to one analysis, 69 percent of countries of the world had authoritarian regimes in that year, while only 24 percent could be described as liberal democracies. By 1995 only 26 percent of countries in the world were authoritarian and almost half had become liberal democracies.1 This tremendous expansion was also notable for being remarkably indiscriminate in extent and background, with countries in Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa having institutionalized electoral competition, each proceeding from diverse political-economic circumstances and societies.

In spite of this impressive proliferation, democratization has shown itself to be a capricious process, with ambiguous victories, setbacks, and many legacies of authoritarianism remaining intractable. At the same time, doubts have been raised about the unequivocal commitment to civil rights and liberties of ‘established’ democracies. With these caveats in mind, this study will investigate the sources of authoritarian tendencies as self-reported by Taiwanese citizens. Using data collected by the Taiwan Social Change Survey in 2006, I will run a regression trying to locate the source(s) of authoritarian beliefs using three hypotheses. The results will indicate whether and how the development of corporatist economic institutions, sensitivity to a national security threat, and traditional culture impact a citizens’ support for freedom of association, and the rights to demonstrate and strike.

Keywords: Taiwan, corporatism, terror threat, Confucianism, democratic consolidation

1 David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis, Democratization (Cambridge, MA: Policy Press, 1997).

An Investigation of Civilian Support for Democratic Values in Taiwan:

Corporatism, the Terror Threat, and Confucianism

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements i

Abstract ii

Table of Contents iii

List of Charts v

List of Tables v

I. Introduction 1

a. Thesis Statement 1

b. Research Methodology 3

c. Structure of Thesis 5

II. Theoretical Framework 6

a. Corporatism 6

i. Corporatism and convergence theory 6

ii. State guidance under the KMT 10

iii. Comparison with South Korea 25

b. The Terror Threat 28

i. Post 9/11 re-emergence 28

ii. Evidence of the terror exception 30

iii. The Terror Threat in Taiwan 32

c. Confucianism 45

i. Confucian culture 45

iii ii. Asian Values debate 50

iii. Trust in the ruler 52

III. Democratization and Democratic Consolidation 54

a. Democratization 54

i. The third wave 54

ii. Theories of democratization 55

iii. Democratic reversal 58

b. Legacies of One-Party Rule 63

i. National identity 69

ii. A middle-class society 74

iii. State-sponsored democratization 78

c. Civil Rights 85

i. Freedom of association 88

ii. Protest demonstrations 97

iii. Labor unions 119

IV. Regression Analysis 136

a. Variable Selection 136

b. Preliminary Results 142

c. Regression Results 145

V. Conclusion 154

a. Democracy with an Adjective 154

b. Democracy and Capitalism 161

c. Politicized Civil Rights 164

References 170

iv Appendix 194

List of Charts:

Chart 3.1: Huntington’s waves of democratization and reversal 60

Chart 3.2: Party Preference 83

Chart 3.3: 2012 Legislative Yuan election results: Northern and Central Taiwan 72

Chart 3.4: 2012 Legislative Yuan election results: Southern Taiwan 72

List of Tables:

Table 3.1: Emerging social movements in Taiwan, 1989 105

Table 4.1: Support for allowing civil liberties 142

Table 4.2: Regression with 3 terror variables (signs on coefficients) 144

Table 4.3: Regression with 3 terror variables 144

Table 4.4: Summary of significant variables 146

Table 4.5: Regression analysis: Classification table 149

Table 4.6: Regression analysis: Variables in the equation 149

Table 4.7: Regression analysis: Omnibus tests of model coefficients 149

Table 4.8: Regression analysis: Model summary 149

Table 4.9: Regression analysis: Hosmer and Lemeshow test 150

Table 4.10: Regression analysis: Classification tablea 150

Table 4.11: Regression analysis: Contingency table for Hosmer and Lemeshow test 150

Table 4.12: Regression analysis: Variables in the equation (Demonstrations) 151

Table 4.13: Regression analysis: Variables in the equation (Public Meetings) 152

Table 4.14: Regression analysis: Variables in the equation (Nationwide Strikes) 153

I. Introduction

a. Thesis Statement

This thesis investigates the causal relationship of three variables, namely, corporatism, the terror exception, and Confucianism, with extent of support for civil rights in the Taiwanese context. Numerous studies have postulated the importance of political culture and citizen beliefs on democratization.2 At the very nascence of democratic consolidation, popular trust in political institutions is critical in lending legitimacy to the democratization regime.3 Citizen attitudes about the proper functions of government are a fundamental cog in developing civil society in a young democracy such as Taiwan. The freedom of association and rights to demonstrate and strike are basic civil liberties essential to the practice of liberal democracy. A high level of support for civil rights among a country’s population acts as a buffer against illiberal government policies in democratic countries. Conversely, widespread ambivalence toward civil rights may tempt the leaders of a state to arrogate power at the expense of its citizens. For years after a country has undergone a formal democratic transition, neutral or favorable feelings toward authoritarian policies may continue to exist among a portion of the population. This paper will therefore attempt to measure the strength of any causal relationships between several social variables and support for restricting civil rights. I test several hypotheses explaining the sources of tolerance of authoritarian policies among the Taiwanese citizens, including preference for government intervention in the free market, a sense of fear of terrorism,

2 Shelley Riggerr, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). (See also Pollack et. al., 2003; Stockton 2006; Paolino and Meernik 2008; Qi and Shin 2011.) 3 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). (See also Diamond 2002; Johnston 2005; Luhiste 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997; Mishler and Rose 2000.)

1 and affinity for paternal governance attributed to the tradition of Confucianism shared between several East Asian countries.

The first variable under study, corporatism, refers to a state-guided labor relations system. Corporatist states are generally characterized by an acute degree of institutionalization of society, whereby the negotiation process between capital and labor occurs under the aegis of the state. The Kuomintang (KMT) party governed

Taiwan as an authoritarian regime with extensive control of labor relations for almost four decades. The KMT has continued to be one of the two major political parties in

Taiwan and has maintained close ties with its labor union patrons. Corporatism as practiced by the KMT was undergirded by martial law, which restricted civil liberties and gave the state excessive powers. A citizen’s affinity for corporatism and its attendant interplay of labor, capital and state interests may be associated with a willingness to allow the government to restrict civil liberties.

The second variable, the terror exception, is a stratagem employed by governments in which the threat or perceived threat of imminent attacks against the state is manipulated to justify restricting civil rights. Employment of the terror exception has been a dominant theme of international politics since the turn of the 21st century. September 11th is the miasma from which the most recent incarnation of the terror exception has been fabricated. In the US, the legislation that has since been passed has eroded civil liberties, initially in the form of the Patriot Act during the

George W. Bush administration, and now continuing under the Obama presidency, with the right to assassinate anybody in the world sans habeas corpus now granted to the president.4 Taiwan has a well-armed adversary on the mainland, and the Chinese

4 Glenn Greenwald, "Who Is the Worst Civil Liberties President in US History?" The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 02 Nov. 2012. Web. 03 Dec. 2012. See also Savage, Charlie. "Muslim Cleric Aulaqi Is 1st U.S. Citizen on List of Those CIA Is Allowed to Kill." The New York Times. The New York Times, 09 Oct. 2011. Web. 06 Dec. 2012.

2 Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing has frequently given veiled and direct warnings to the Taiwanese lest they stray towards independence. Suspicion of the mainland’s intentions may give citizens reason to entrust the government with extra- constitutional powers.

The final variable, Confucianism, has been passed down over 2,500 years and is based on the writings of a Chinese scholar and his followers. The argument that

Confucianism is antagonistic to individual rights rests on the communitarian nature of

Confucianism, which proposes paternalism to be the foundation of good government.

Scholars argue that this tenet of Confucianism makes citizens of East Asian countries more prone to sacrifice individual rights for just rule from above. Some scholars credit Confucianism with playing an integral role in the development of East Asian countries in the latter half of the 20th century. Such a view attributes the rapid economic growth in East Asian countries to their citizens’ beliefs in the rectitude of a paternalist state structure. Confucianism is another potential explanation for the existence of a conservative strand of society who supports restricting social and labor groups from advancing their interests. According to the three hypotheses formulated above, the more that a citizen prefers a state structured by corporatist labor relations, feels that terrorism is a bona fide and unique threat to state security, and is steeped in the values of Confucianism, the lower their overall level of support for civil rights should be.

b. Research Methodology

The Taiwan Social Change Survey provides the data for this paper. In the mid-1980s the National Science Council implemented a research project to track

Taiwan’s political, economic, social and cultural changes. Since 1985 the Academia

3 Sinica has been in charge of conducting this survey. The Survey is a long-term, cross-sectional project that follows 5-year cycles which rotate selective modules.5

The 2006 version featured two themes, “Family,” and “Citizen and Role of

Government, ” which have provided the dataset for my research.

Choosing appropriate questions to capture the three variables is critical to the validity of the results of this study. Therefore, the questions from the Survey that I have chosen to approximate a citizen’s belief in the principles of corporatism, the terror threat, and Confucianism are sensitive to this need. They circumscribe the proposed hypotheses and are adequately discriminating from alternative explanations.

I describe the specific questions used to measure corporatism, the terror threat, and

Confucianism in Chapter II.

Using the selected data, I have run binary regression analyses with three different response variables that indicate a citizen’s extent of support for civil liberties.

The questions from the survey ask the respondent if the government should allow: public meetings, demonstrations and nationwide strikes. I code each variable 1 if the respondent believes the government shouldn’t allow the particular form of protest, and 0 if they believe the government should allow it.

The results of the binary regression analysis will indicate the validity of the three hypotheses, namely, whether corporatism, the terror threat, and Confucianism have a significant impact on the level of support for civil liberties in Taiwan. All three of the explanatory variables are also dichotomous, with 1 indicating that: the respondent believes the government should intervene in the free market; the government should have the right to implement extra-constitutional measures during a time of heightened security risks; and that a virtuous leader guarantees an ideal

5 See the following for more details about the Taiwan Social Change Survey, results from other years (1985-2010), and themes for future surveys. "Taiwan Social Change Survey." Taiwan Social Change Survey. Academia Sinica, 30 Nov. 2012. Web. 16 Dec. 2012.

4 government. Besides these three hypotheses, I also include a number of control variables in the regression model, including gender, age, education level, ethnicity, political affiliation, and impression of the proportion of corrupt politicians in the government.

c. Structure of Thesis

The following chapter lays out the theoretical framework by discussing the three variables, corporatism, the terror threat, and Confucianism as the terms have developed in meaning, and their relevance to Taiwan. After detailing the history and contemporary usages of the three variables under study, Chapter III then moves on to a discussion of the ‘third wave of democratization,’ including a brief outline of democratization theories, a description of the democratization process as it occurred in Taiwan, and the development of the freedoms of association and assembly, and the labor movement in Taiwan. Chapter IV introduces the data and provides the results of the binary regression analysis run with SPSS software. Chapter V draws conclusions.

5 II. Theoretical Framework

a. Corporatism

i. Corporatism and convergence theory

Wolfgang Streeck (2006) describes the development of the concept of corporatism in the 1960s as an intellectual and theoretical response contradicting

‘American normalism.’6 The emergence of a body of work advancing corporatism as a theory of political economy came largely from the impetus of European social scientists. Their work was a direct challenge to an assumption in the literature suggesting that the advanced industrial nations were converging on the US model.

The ‘convergence model’ took as precept that a linear path to modernization could be followed by all countries. According to this model, the US was the most advanced of the industrial societies and had achieved this position because of its political- economic organization. Consequently, if European countries wanted to continue modernizing, they should mimic the US model. A typical argument from this perspective is presented in the work of Kerr et al. (1960).7

The events of the tumultuous years between the late 1960s and 1970s cautioned social scientists against adopting an ‘end of theory’ mentality and shook confidence in the US model. Backlash against the teleology of the convergence model belief grew during this period. During this period, the United States was mired in the war in Vietnam, and the subsequent economic recession precipitated strident demands for change both within and without the US. European social scientists also observed worker and student uprisings in Europe and the growth in organizational strength of labor movements throughout the region. These latter developments in

6 Wolfgang Streeck, “The Study of Organized Interests: Before ‘The Century’ and after,” In Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.) The Diversity of Democracy: Corporatism, social order and political conflict (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 3. 7 Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

6 Europe offered a distinct alternative to the US model, with scholars intrigued by the potential institutionalization and assertive role that labor organizations might play in the political economy.8 Part of the appeal of corporatism in the 1970s came from its ability to explain phenomena that were simply missing from the liberal-pluralist and

Marxist frameworks. These new phenomena included the incorporation of interest groups into the decision-making process of the state, social pacts to guarantee labor peace involving unions, management, and government regulators, and industrial policies mandating the participation by business and labor among others.9

With its increasing prominence in the literature, scholars began paying more attention to the features of corporatism and comparing them with other theories of social organization. Corporatism has been hypothesized as an alternative theory for societal relations to both liberalist/pluralist and ‘Marxian-totalitarian’ thought. In his seminal article on the subject, Dahl (1961) described pluralism in the western nations as being based on ‘polyarchies’ built upon different and competing social interests with no singularly acknowledged center of power binding their contest.10 Pluralism assumes that socially constituted groups (labor organizations, business groups, farmers’ groups, women’s organizations, religious groups, etc.) have equal status in relation to the state. According to pluralism, power is evenly distributed throughout society and all social groups with a good cause will get a chance to make their case.11

Marxism, in contrast, is founded upon the idea of class conflict rather than class harmony. It takes as its starting point a government founded upon the interests of the working class, insofar as the bourgeois elements are eviscerated from any

8 Streeck 2006, op. cit., p. 9-12. 9 Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The other great “Ism” (New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 42. 10 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961). 11 Jean Grugel, Democratization: A critical introduction (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002).

7 decision-making authority within the state-working class party apparatus.12 Marxism, as it was practiced in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and other Marxist-Leninist states, excluded all grassroots participation in decision-making, such as through public opinion, elections, interest groups, etc. This totalitarian variant of Marxism permitted no challenge from below to the leaders of the state.13

Corporatism can be described as lying somewhere in the middle of this spectrum of governance. Labor relations within a corporatist state are guided by the leaders, but are not explicitly totalitarian. The state performs the function of regulating interest groups, while at the same time institutionalizing labor and capital into the state structure. Policy is articulated from the product of negotiations between labor, capital, and state representatives at the behest of the state. Such bargaining does not operate under total control of the government (as in Marxist-Leninism) nor as completely unfettered entities (as under liberal-pluralism). The two most distinguishing features of corporatism are (1) a strong but not totalitarian state, (2) structured and institutionalized interest groups that are usually limited in number and functions.14

Before moving on, it is important to appreciate the lack of consensus on the definition of corporatism, as it indicates the primacy of cultural and historical contexts.

In “Still the Century of Corporatism?” Schmitter (1974) emphasizes that the crux of corporatism consists of bargaining between autonomous groups and the government.15 Following Schmitter’s lead, scholars have offered different defining

12 Pierre Birnbaum “Universal Suffrage, the Vanguard Party and Mobilization in Marxism,” Government and Opposition 20(1) 1985, pp. 53-69. For a discussion of the derivations of Marxism- Leninism, see Peter Worsley, Marx and Marxism (London: Routledge, 1989). 13 Wiarda 1997, op. cit., p. 6. 14 Ibid p. 6-7. (See also Michael J. Brenner, “Functional Representation and Interest Group Theory: Some notes on British practice,” Comparative Politics (October) 2(1) 1969, pp. 111-134 and Philippe C. Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” Review of Politics 85 January 1974, pp. 85-131. 15 Schmitter, 1974, op. cit. Schmitter’s article argued that there were no ‘one best-fits’ for either the path to democracy, nor the best way to practice it.

8 characteristics of corporatism, as well as varying interpretations of the necessary conditions for a government to be considered as operating under the corporatist paradigm. Some emphasize that corporatism is a political-economic system in which the state takes direct action in directing the economy. Others suggest that the main feature of corporatism is the integration of major social groups within the state in order to achieve coordinated guidance.16 Some scholars argue that the incorporation of the working class into the state is the essence of the corporatist model, while others stress the government’s demonstrated commitment to four principles: unity, order, nationalism and success in the economic realm.17 Still others prefer procedural norms, such as the location of initiative in policy implementation, the power of bureaucracies to regulate organizations, and the methods of coercion available to the state in classifying corporatist state regimes.18

Another stream of thought queries corporatism from an ontological basis. One argument questions whether corporatism as it exists in democracies (so-called societal corporatism) could even be considered a separate form of political system or if it were merely an extension of the pluralist-liberal fold.19 A contrary view suggested that all forms of corporatism are authoritarian in nature.20 Refuting this latter suggestion, Leo Panitch (1977) argues that corporatism is a viable alternative in liberal democracies, despite the common misperception of the affiliation between

16 Wiarda 1997, op. cit, p. 15-21. 17 Leo Panitch, “Recent Theorisations of Corporatism: Reflections on a growth industry,” British Journal of Sociology 31(2) 1980, pp. 175 and J.T. Winkler, “Corporatism,” Archives of European Sociology 17(1) 1976, pp. 100-36. 18 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, “Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating corporatism,” American Political Science Review 73 December 1979, pp. 967-86. Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in comparative perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978). 19 Alan Cawson, Corporatism and political theory (New York, NY: Oxford Oxfordshire,1986). (See also Martin 1983; Almond 1983.) 20 Amos Perlmutter, Modern Authoritarianism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).

9 democracy and capitalism.21 Lehmbruch (1974) is careful in distinguishing liberal corporatism from both its variant in pre-industrial Europe, as well as from authoritarian corporatism.22 Surveying the corporatist literature, Hall (1986) proposed that governments at different times exhibit corporatist tendencies, and argued for research to be done into investigating the varieties of corporatism.23

Despite these differences over the nature and, in some cases, salience of corporatism as a model, it is still a useful theoretical concept if applied judiciously.

Offe (1981) argues that corporatist states enhance the power of working-class groups by liberalizing access to policy formation, while Crouch (1982) suggests that corporatism has the potential of expanding democracy to the management of industrial affairs.24 On the other hand, critics have argued that corporatism is responsible for high levels of inequality, and that it increases alienation and apathy, drives down participation and diminishes the quality of governance.25 Faced with these semantic and interpretive issues when discussing corporatism, it becomes incumbent on any specific analysis to expound the features of corporatism as they are manifested in situ for the particular case under study.

iii. State guidance under the KMT

The KMT’s adoption of corporatism antedated its arrival on Taiwan, as the party implemented a similar strategy over the areas it controlled while on the mainland. Through the KMT’s quasi-Leninist party structure, it aggressively co-

21 Leo Panitch, “The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies, 10(1) April 1977, pp. 61-90 22 Gerhard Lehmbruch “Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism,” Paper presented to the IPSA Round Table on Political Integration, Jerusalem, 1974, pp. 1-2. 23 Peter Hall, Governing the Economy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1986), p. 269. 24 Clause Offe, “The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups,” In S. Berger (ed.) Organising Interest in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 153-54. Colin Crouch, The Politics of Industrial Relations, 2nd edition (London: Fontana, 1982). 25 Gabriel Almond, “Corporatism, Pluralism and Professional Memory,” World Politics 35 1983, pp. 245-60.

10 opted society by controlling organizations and interests, and acting as the single coordinator between various sectors.26 After retreating to Taiwan, the KMT’s desire to infiltrate every aspect of societal life in Taiwan extended to labor-capital relations.

Only one legal representative, the Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL), existed as the lone conduit through which Taiwanese labor could express their grievances. The CFL leadership’s support base was similar to that of Legislative Yuan legislators in that both were elected while still on the mainland and were not subject to regular elections until after martial law was lifted in the late 1980s (Ho 2006). Through the CFL, the

KMT secured crucial working-class support. In practice, the CFL represented the interests of the ruling party over those of the rank-and-file membership. The CFL’s monopoly on the legitimate representation of workers wasn’t broken until 2000, when

Chen Shui-bian became the first president ever from the opposition Democratic

Progressive Party (DPP). Within the first year of his inauguration, President Chen delivered on his campaign promise to legalize the Taiwan Confederation of Trade

Unions (TCTU) and end the CFL’s official monopoly on labor representation.27

Taiwan’s labor relations system was erected from the foundations of its party structure. Influenced by its early Russian advisors, the KMT built an extensive

Leninist system of party organizations within factories in the 1950s.28 Taiwanese greatly outnumbered the KMT mainlanders, so the latter relied on this system to nurture a basis of support from the local population of the island. The party recruited party cadres for management positions in charge of personnel, welfare and security departments in factories and sent party apparatchiks to work closely with labor unions,

26 Mikael Mattlin, Politicized Society: The long shadow of Taiwan’s one-party legacy. Copenhagen, (Denmark: NIAS Press, 2011), p. 29. (See also Kung 1995) 27 Ming-sho Ho, “Challenging State Corporatism: The politics of Taiwan’s labor federation Movement,” The China Journal 56 July 2006, pp. 122. (See also Tat Yan Kong, “Labour and Neo-Liberal Globalization in South Korea and Taiwan,” Modern Asian Studies 39(1) February 2005, pp. 168. 28 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 35.

11 as well as farmers’ organizations and business organizations.29 Moreover, KMT professionals offered a number of services, including vocational training, job placement, free medical care, and technical help to farmers and business organizations.30

Hsiao (1990) described three different periods of state relations in Taiwan under the KMT’s authoritarian rule: ‘political forces in absolute command’ (1947-

1962); ‘economic forces in relative command’ (1963-1978); and ‘social forces in mobilization’ (1979-1990).31 In the first period, the party-military controlled all aspects of public life as a matter of regime survival. Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist army had lost the mainland to the communists, and the generalissimo was forced to retreat ignominiously to Taiwan. While Chiang and his acolytes were still on the mainland, the situation in Taiwan turned volatile. The Japanese colonial administration had departed from Taiwan upon Japan’s surrender and the ending of hostilities in World War II. Shortly after their exodus, many Taiwanese became discontent after coming to the conclusion that the Republic of China (ROC) administration was going to treat Taiwan as conquered rather than liberated territory.

The administration appointed by Chiang Kai-shek to handle affairs on Taiwan was concerned primarily with extracting resources from the island to bolster the nationalist army in the Chinese civil war. Corruption and nepotism was rampant under the ROC administration led by General Chen Yi.32 Taiwan’s economy also experienced hyperinflation and high unemployment in its transition from a wartime economy.33

29 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 108. 30 Harmon Zeigler, Pluralism, Corporatism, and Confucianism: Political association and conflict regulation in the United States, Europe, and Taiwan (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988). 31 Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao, “Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 24 July 1990, pp. 164-5. 32 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A political history (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 59. 33 Ibid, p. 92.

12 Adding an explosive element to the situation, over 160,000 young Taiwanese men drafted by the Japanese for military service were repatriated to the island only to find poor job prospects, a new foreign government, and a surfeit of carpetbaggers.

The tension soon erupted in violence when agents of the Taiwan Tobacco and

Wine Monopoly Bureau beat a widowed vendor and accidentally shot and killed a local Taiwanese. An angry mob of local Taiwanese chased after the agents and, in the confusion, another man was killed upon coming out of his home to investigate the commotion outside.34 The Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau had already been a target of denunciation by the Taiwanese, as had its director, Ren Wei-jun. The

Taiwanese despised the Monopoly Bureau for its draconian enforcement of the KMT monopolies on tobacco and alcohol, goods that were sold at exorbitant prices to the

Taiwanese.35 The day after the incident, angry crowds of Taiwanese exacted revenge for the beating and accidental death by beating to death two Monopoly Bureau agents and sacking a branch office of the Monopoly Bureau. From the Monopoly Bureau office, the crowd went to the Office of the Administrator General to petition for an end to all monopolies. Before the crowd was able to enter the compound, a machine gun opened fire without warning from within, killing at least four people and dispersing the crowd.36

Violence on both sides continued in the ensuing days, while delegations of citizens attempted to negotiate with the government. Among the Taiwanese demands were immediate local elections, abolition of irresponsible police units and the Taiwan

Garrison Command, appointment of more native Taiwanese to higher positions, and

34 Chien-Chao Hung, A New History of Taiwan (Taipei: The Central News Agency, 2011), p. 326. 35 Christian Schafferer, The Power of the Ballot Box: Political development and election campaigning in Taiwan (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 2003), p. 23. 36 Hung 2011, op. cit., p. 326-27.

13 an end to the economic monopolies the KMT government had established.37 General

Chen Yi quickly came to the conclusion that the Taiwanese demands were too radical, and asked for reinforcements from the mainland.38 Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-shek was under mounting pressure from the communist forces who were close to capturing

Changchun in northeast China. In January, the US mission led by General George C.

Marshall was withdrawn from China, an acknowledgement by the U.S. that nothing short of full-scale involvement could prop Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT regime. In the same month, communist forces under Lin Piao launched a major offensive in

Manchuria, what would be the first of five such maneuvers.39 This precarious position solidified Chiang’s unaccommodating stance towards the unrest on Taiwan.40

Even while negotiations between General Chen Yi and a delegation of Taiwanese citizens were ongoing, a contingent of nationalist soldiers were secretly deployed and landed in Keelung Harbor.41 Beginning on March 9, the ROC forces and 10,000 troop reinforcements from the mainland engaged in indiscriminate killing. Manhunts were conducted throughout the island and prominent leaders were sought and executed in the streets. In the following weeks, several thousand Taiwanese were killed, thousands went to jail, and three thousand citizens fled.42 In total, an estimated

18,000 to 28,000 people died in the violence directly attributable to the 2-28

Incident.43 Roy (2003) suggests that this tragedy also brought to an end the “home rule movement” that had begun under the Japanese occupation and was still actively

37 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 65. 38 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 34. 39 Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China: The political struggle, 1945-1949 (Second Edition) (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), p. xv 40 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 70. 41 Dafydd Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan: Party change and the democratic evolution of Taiwan, 1991- 2004 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005). (See also Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 67.) 42 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 66-70. 43 Caroline Gluck, "Anniversary of Deadly Taiwan Riot." BBC News. 27 Feb. 2007. Web. 9 Dec. 2012.

14 seeking independent Taiwanese governance until the brutal suppression of the 2-28

Incident and imposition of martial law.44

Needing to co-opt segments of the local population and allay the general antagonism felt toward mainlanders by local Taiwanese after the 2-28 Incident,

Chiang implemented a popular and successful land reform program that redistributed land from a small concentration of landowners to the tenant farmers who worked it.

The émigré regime didn’t have any personal alliances with the landowning class, and the communists’ astonishing victory over the ROC had convinced Chiang of the value of consolidating agrarian support. The landowners were pacified with shares in four newly nationalized companies that were appropriated from the Japanese.45 All labor unions were nationalized entities with compulsory membership, giving the government extensive resources to mobilize votes during elections, as well as considerable ideological control.46 The KMT banned protests, and industrial disputes were settled by arbitration through the government. A gold standard based on the millions of taels of gold that Chiang Kai-shek had pilfered from China also helped the

KMT government combat hyperinflation that had struck the Taiwanese economy in the immediate post-war period.47

The second period of labor relations, ‘economic forces in relative command,’ began in the 1960s and featured a shift from a strategy of Import Substitution

Industrialization (ISI) to one of Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI). Instead of

44 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 72. 45 I-chou Liu, “The Development of the Opposition,” In Steven Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp. 68. (See also Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 92; Marsh 2003.) 46 Chyi-herng Chang and Trevor Bain, “Employment Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Globalization and state corporatism,” Journal of Industrial Relations 48(1) 2006, pp. 101. 47 Shih-hui Li, “The Currency Conversion in Postwar Taiwan: Gold standard from 1949 to 1950,” The Kyoto Economic Review 74(2) December 2005, pp. 191-203. Chiang Kai-shek also brought China’s reserves of silver, foreign exchange, and valuable pieces of artwork when he retreated to Taiwan. See also O’Neill. 2010. How Chiang Spirited China’s Gold Away from the Reds. http://guanyu9.wordpress.com/2010/06/06/how-chiang-spirited-china’s-gold-away- from-the-reds/. June 06, 2010. January 7, 2013.

15 protecting local industries, the KMT relaxed its trade policies and allowed small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to develop markets overseas. As a result of these policies, a class of both Mainlander and Taiwanese private capitalists emerged, the number and profits of SMEs grew, and the numbers of urban middle class and industrial workers increased dramatically. The change represented a new independent focus on economic considerations rather than the subordination of economic growth to efforts to retake the mainland, as was the case during the first period. By this time, most honest assessments gave the KMT little chance of conquering the Mainland.

The United States was digging itself deeper into Vietnam, and its presence in the region prevented any serious attempt by either side of the Taiwan Strait to change the status quo by force. To cope with this reality, the KMT looked to establish deeper roots in Taiwanese society. Although economic interests were given greater consideration, the KMT still retained its paramount status in labor relations. The

KMT courted prominent economic actors during this period by giving them more commercial opportunities in exchange for their support.48

An inflammatory crackdown on a Human Rights Day march sponsored by the editors and staff of a magazine published by opposition activists marked the beginning of the third period in December 1979. The editorial board of Formosa

Magazine included almost all of the leading figures of the opposition, including

Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh, Li Yi-hsiung, Yao Chia-wen, Chen Chu, Lu Hsiu- lien, Chang Chun-hung, and Lin Hung-hsuan. Formosa’s offices around the island were essentially the organizational core of the opposition dangwai (literally, ‘outside the party’) movement.49 Prohibited from formally establishing a political party, the dangwai was a loose coalition of activists and politicians drawn from different

48 Hsiao 1990, op. cit., p. 164. (See also Ash and Greene 2007.) 49 Li 2005, op. cit. (See also Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 21.)

16 socioeconomic backgrounds but united in their demand for democratization. The conviction and imprisonment of several prominent of the leaders of the dangwai for organizing the peaceful march was a watershed moment in Taiwan’s democratization, and the entire episode later came to be known as ‘The Kaohsiung Incident.’ Many of those imprisoned would go on to become influential politicians within the DPP. The suppression of the march and subsequent imprisonment of the staff of Formosa redounded in unforeseen consequences for the KMT regime. Family members of the jailed Kaohsiung Incident opposition and their lawyers won seats in the 1980

Legislative elections, with several finishing first in their districts. The felicitous momentum continued for the opposition when several dangwai candidates won seats in the 1981 Provincial Assembly and municipal executive elections.50

Pressure for political liberalization began mounting in the 1980s and resulted in galvanizing civil society, particularly in the latter half of the decade. Social movements centered on environmental protection, consumers’ rights, minority rights, etc. quickly came into being.51 Chu (1992) showed that between 1983 and 1988 there was a ratcheting up of the number of social movement activities, with the lifting of martial law in 1986 sparking a new trend of large-scale demonstrations.52 Labor activists likewise believed the environment to be favorable for organizing an independent labor movement. Previously, the KMT government strictly censored leftist literature and anyone found in possession of such materials risked imprisonment or worse. The party also used propaganda to pacify workers, preaching a “harmony culture” and entreating workers to treat their factories as they would their

50 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 24. 51 Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 7. 52 Yun-han Chu, 1992. Crafting Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei, Taiwan: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992).

17 home or school.53 However, even had the party-state not enforced a zero tolerance policy on labor incitement and produced such unctuous propaganda, whether or not a broad-based leftist movement could have been sustained is dubious.54 Taiwan’s economy experienced sustained growth and an impressively equal distribution of wealth even as a potemkin “free China.” Taiwan’s experience under the KMT is a notable exception to the hypothesis that economic growth and democratization are positively correlated. Yap (2012) finds that it was an economic downturn, not growth that impelled the KMT to democratize.55 Some have suggested that Taiwan’s economic performance is one among the reasons the KMT was able to hold power for so long.56 Other scholars, while granting the transformative capacity that impressive economic growth had on Taiwanese society, question the definitive link between high growth and democratization.57

Labor disputes also began occurring more frequently during this period and sporadic efforts to organize workers emerged. However, it wasn’t until 1987, when the issue of a year-end-bonus became a contentious issue between labor and management, that there was any evidence of a large-scale, island-wide movement of

Taiwanese labor.58 Politicians also tried to build political parties based on labor concerns in the late 1980s. Some members of the newly established Democratic

Progressive Party (DPP) split off to form the Labor Party, followed by the creation of a Worker’s Party led by a famous union leader. However, both of these parties soon

53 James W.Y. Wang, “The Political Economy of Collective Labour Legislation in Taiwan,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39(3) 2010, pp. 63. 54 Naiteh Wu and Tun-jen Cheng, “Democratization as a Legitimacy Formula: The KMT and political change in Taiwan,” In John Kane, Hui-Chieh Loy, and Haig Patapan (eds.). Political Legitimacy in Asia: New leadership challenges (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 250. 55 Fiona O. Yap, “A Strategic Model of Economic Performance and Democratization in South Korea and Taiwan,” British Journal of Political Science 42(1) January 2012, pp. 213-239. 56 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 152. Roy suggests that strong economic growth enhanced the KMT’s prestige, but at the same time created new threats to its status as the ruling party. 57 Wen H. Kuo, “Democratization and the Political Economy of Taiwan,” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 11(1): Fall 1997, pp. 5-24. (See also Clark and Clark 1993) 58 Hsiao 1990, op. cit., p. 171.

18 dissipated without much fanfare, foreshadowing the impuissant character of class- based interests in democratic Taiwan.59

Despite the difficulty in cultivating relationships upon class interests in

Taiwan, workers and intellectuals struggled valiantly to organize new unions or replace existing ones controlled through the state-party apparatus. These activists strove to build an independent labor movement that could challenge the KMT’s monopoly over labor representation. Their greatest success was made within public enterprises such as China Petroleum and Taiwan Power whose managers, themselves public employees, were less apt to repress union activities and more willing to make concessions to workers’ demands. These early efforts at establishing an independent union movement soon succumbed to effective counter-organizing by public enterprises. Similar to the fates of the Labor Party and Worker’s Party, the early independent labor movement soon receded into irrelevance.60

If labor-based political parties and independent union organizing within public enterprises were thoroughly demoralized, labor activists were able to find a niche in politics by cooperating with the opposition DPP. Labor and the DPP created an alliance formally for the first time in 1992, with the establishment of The Taiwan

Labor Front. Their cooperation was mutually beneficial; by the early 1990s, the DPP had realized that it could not win general elections based on identity and independence appeals alone and needed to expand its support base. Meanwhile, factions of the DPP that had pro-labor sympathies were natural allies of the labor movement.61 The DPP’s success in capturing local office was also considered a boon to labor, since local administrations had the authority to distribute considerable material advantages to labor unions under Taiwan’s de-centralized administrative

59 Wu and Cheng 2011, op. cit., p. 250. 60 Ibid, p. 251. 61 Wang 2010, op. cit., p. 62.

19 system.62 Forging an alliance with the DPP was hence both a strategic ploy to undermine the CFL’s dominance of labor issues as an organ of the KMT and the result of common ideology between activists and elements of the party. The 2000 election also marked a tangible shift from focusing on grassroots organizing to bolstering labor’s influence on the legislative process.63

Cooperation between labor activists and the DPP continued in part due to the

KMT’s adamant refusal to accommodate autonomous labor federations. The KMT realized that allowing an autonomous labor federation to exist legally would provide the DPP with an organized support structure. At the time, the opposition faced a rigid vote threshold and lacked a broad base of support, two features that threatened to keep the DPP as a weak and minor party in national elections. Hence, the DPP and labor had a shared interest and worked together to erode KMT control over the state and labor relations. These efforts were bolstered by the DPP’s success in local elections and effective labor organizing, even without official sanction. Labor activists exploited a loophole in the Labor Union Law, which did not prohibit industrial unions from establishing their own local federations. Local mayors and magistrates could legalize a local faction, which eventually succeeded in dismantling the local structures of state corporatism. When the TCTU was finally legalized by the incoming Chen administration in 2000, there were already eight local federations of industrial unions, of which six were in DPP-controlled administrative units.64

Labor and social movements were initially jubilant about the prospects of progressive reform under a DPP administration. From the nascence of labor and social movement organization in the 1980s, activists had felt antagonistic at best toward the leader of the state and his party. With President Chen Shui-bian’s election

62 Kong 2005, op. cit., p. 169. 63 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 123-4. (See also Han and Chiu 2000.) 64 Wang 2010 op. cit., p. 64. (See also Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 119.)

20 in 2000, a president came into office who promised to recognize independent labor unions and whose party welcomed social activists into its membership. Chen aroused optimism among reform advocates by appointing prominent social activists to positions within his administration. Aligning itself with the DPP government, however, did not guarantee either increased union membership or greater influence in the shaping of legislation. The TCTU’s association with the DPP actually made it harder both to attract existing industrial unions into its fold and to inaugurate new local federations throughout the polarized Chen Shui-bian administration. Once the

TCTU became allied with the government, labor leaders spent less time organizing, and the union’s popularity among Taiwan’s workers dwindled. The TCTU also began to struggle financially, relying on government subsidies to stay afloat. The TCTU’s alliance with the DPP exacerbated partisan struggles within the labor movement, as some accused the union of sacrificing its political independence. Moreover, union participation and the overall number of industrial unions fell into decline during the

Chen Shui-bian administration.65

Likewise, labor activists learned that simply helping elect a president from the opposition DPP was nostrum neither for labor’s immediate objective of securing legislative influence, nor for its ultimate objective of autonomous bargaining power vis-à-vis management. Chen Shui-bian faced a hostile legislature controlled by the

KMT and its pan-blue coalition, leading to political gridlock and extreme polarization.66 Chen also had to deal with an obstreperous rival in China. Undeterred by its failed efforts to sway the election in its favor, Beijing developed a new strategy to correspond with a new era in Taiwan under a DPP president. Rather than engage with President Chen, Beijing wooed members of the KMT, People’s First Party (PFP,

65 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 124-5. 66 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 8-9. (See also Wang 2008; Wang 2010, op. cit., p. 68.)

21 formed by James Soong after splitting from the KMT), and moderate DPP members, and continued its policy of currying favor with influential Taiwanese businessmen.67

President Chen’s unresolvable political vulnerabilities were symbolized by his appointment of Tang Fei, a KMT member, as his first premier. The DPP was compelled during the Chen administration to take policy stances that vacillated between pursuing reform and seeking political compromise and expediency.68

The KMT recaptured the presidency in 2008 after what has since been widely panned as a dismal performance by Chen Shui-bian in office, marred by ineffectual policies, corruption and a stagnant economy. Ma Ying-jeou took office at an inauspicious time, as the sub-prime mortgage market crash in the United States catalyzed a global recession and stymied international trade.69 Taiwan’s export-based economy suffered from the contraction in international demand and put President Ma in a difficult policy position; the KMT had courted labor unions during their time out of office and now encountered countervailing demands. Their traditional business ties urged greater labor market flexibility, while labor argued for greater protections and rights.70

Confident that a mélange of policy measures would collectively reduce unemployment and invigorate the Taiwanese economy, President Ma pursued desultory policies aimed at combating interminably high unemployment and languishing economic growth. On the one hand, the Ma administration froze minimum wages for 2009 and introduced policies designed to give businesses greater

67 Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, “The Chen Shui-bian Administration’s Mainland Policy: Toward a modus vivendi or continued stalemate?” American Asian Review XX(3) 2002, pp. 91-124 68 Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao and Ming-sho Ho, “Civil Society and Democracy-Making in Taiwan: Reexamining the link,” In Yin-wah Chu and Siu-lun Wong (eds.). East Asia’s New Democracies: Deepening, reversal, non-liberal alternatives (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.43-64. (See Rigger 2001 for more on President Chen Shui-bian’s difficulties while in office, including on the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant) 69 Yih-chyi Chuang, “What’s Wrong with Taiwan’s Economy? Impact of Globalization,” Taiwan Development Perspectives (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, 2009). 70 Wang 2010, op. cit., p. 76.

22 control over foreign labor. On the other, the Legislative Yuan passed amendments to the Labor Union Law, the Collective Bargaining Agreement Act, and the Settlement of Disputes Law. These measures were designed to provide job security and prevent employers from fleeing the country if they failed to give workers back pay, severance pay, or wages. However in practice the revisions were ineffectual at best and, at worst, privileged employers over their workers.71 The Taiwanese legislative body also introduced various programs to contain unemployment, such as job re-training, formalized recruitment by municipal governments, and expanded public works with

President Ma’s endorsement.72 A recent cause celebre provoked by a depiction of Ma

Ying-jeou as “an ineffectual bumbler” by The Economist exemplifies the popular discontent felt by the public.73

Another legacy of KMT one-party rule in Taiwan is the unsatisfactory handling of the ill-gotten assets obtained from party-owned enterprises (POEs).74

Through its control of these POEs, the KMT has become ‘the world’s richest political party’75 and given the erstwhile authoritarian regime a tremendous advantage over the opposition DPP. The party’s assets have come particularly from its involvement in the highly regulated sectors of insurance, leasing, banking, brokerage, investment trust, mass media, public utilities, and real estate. The KMT’s variant of corporatism included generous government financing of state and party-owned enterprises.

71 Ibid, p. 78 72 Ibid. (See also Ma 2011). For further discussion, see "Taiwan," Asian Labour Update. Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 11 Jan. 2011. Web. 6 Dec. 2012. http://www.amrc.org.hk/node/1079 for a discussion on the amendments to the Labor Laws and also Hong-kou Wang and Hannah Liu, "New Labor Laws Mark Milestone in Taiwan's History: President." The Central News Agency. 1 May 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2012. 73 "Ma the Bumbler." The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, 17 Nov. 2012. Web. 08 Dec. 2012. 74 Yun-han Chu, “The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation,” In Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), p. 152. (See also Matsumoto 2002.) 75 Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Political Democratization and KMT Party-Owned Enterprises in Taiwan,” The Developing Economies (September) 40(3) 2002, pp. 360 (See also Rigger 2001, op. cit. p. 10; Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 11.) The KMT still owns one business, the Central Investment Holding Co. See Yu- chung Wang and Jake Chung. "Ruling Spotlights KMT’s Hold on Assets." - Taipei Times. 04 Jan. 2012. Web. 04 Jan. 2013.

23 During the 1950s and 1960s, funding provided to these enterprises composed 10-20 percent of the annual financial expenses of the government. That percentage rose to

20-30 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, as the KMT government implemented the second phase of Import Substitution focused on energy-intensive projects. 76 Besides the hefty operational support that the KMT government gave to POEs, these enterprises also benefitted from a close relationship to the government’s strategic economic development programs. 77

Marsh (2003) notes that corporatism characterized the predominant labor regime of state/party-owned enterprises and export-processing zones.78 By controlling both the management and operations of POEs, the KMT government also regulated labor relations and intervened in labor affairs, instituting a corporatist labor regime model. POEs were also a sinecure for KMT party loyalists, integral to the system of rewards and retirements. Moreover, throughout the authoritarian period, the extant and nature of the KMT’s business empire was kept hidden for political reasons. 79 To the average Taiwanese citizen, corporatism was felt most acutely in the government’s monopolization or overwhelming control of military, transportation, electrical power, oil, copper, aluminum, steel, oil-chemistry, and chemical fertilizers industries, the postal service, shipping, and marketing of cigarettes, liquor, chemical fertilizer, and oil. 80

The question of how to deal with these assets continues to plague Taiwanese politics and remains one of the more intransigent legacies of authoritarianism.

Opponents of the KMT believe that the assets continue to be a blemish on the record

76 Dianqing Xu, “The KMT Party’s Enterprises in Taiwan,” Modern Asian Studies 31(2) May 1997, pp. 402 77 Ibid, p. 406. 78 Robert M. Marsh, “How Important is Social Class Identification in Taiwan?” The Sociological Quarterly 44(1) Winter 2003, pp. 37-59. 79 Ibid, p. 400. 80 Ibid, p. 402-3.

24 of Taiwan’s democratization to this day.81 With estimates for the amount in assets that the party owns ranging from hundreds of billions to trillions of NT, 82 democracy advocates have adamantly denounced the disparity in financial resources between the former authoritarian party and the DPP as antithetical to the notion of liberal democracy.

v. Comparison with South Korea

South Korea has experienced a similar transformation from a corporatist political economy and can be readily juxtaposed with Taiwan. The two countries have had analogous experiences dating before the 20th century. Both Taiwan and

South Korea have historically fallen within China’s sphere of influence, South Korea as a tributary state and Taiwan as an archetypal frontier region. Japanese imperialism is also a shared feature between the two countries, although its variant in South Korea was more conflict-ridden and bloodier than in Taiwan. In an accident of history, the

KMT regime likely owes its survival to the Korean War for inadvertently saving

Taiwan from invasion and a potential coup de grace by the red army. By drawing the

United States into the region, the Korean War prevented the communist army from mounting an amphibious attack against the ROC on Taiwan.

Taiwan and South Korea are also regarded as successful cases of a transition from authoritarian government to democracy. Both countries belong to the third wave of democratization via the commencement of their formal democratization in the late

1980s. Powerful domestic opposition forces and international pressure forced both governments to accept constitutional revisions. In Taiwan the party was at the apex of the authoritarian regime, while South Korea’s leadership was centered upon the

81 Chris Wang, "KMT Assets Called 'root of Evil'." Taipei Times. 27 Aug. 2012. Web. 25 Nov. 2012. 82 Ibid

25 military. Although the democratization processes had many similarities, South

Korea’s variant of authoritarianism featured frequent and bloody internecine struggles, a phenomenon which was absent from Taiwan. Politics in South Korea were also largely split along regional affiliations, compared to national identity in the case of

Taiwan.83

Bruce Cumings (1984) described both Taiwan and South Korea before their contemporaneous democratization process as “bureaucratic-authoritarian industrializing regimes” and included them with Japan as making up a regional economic bloc.84 South Korea and Taiwan have both experienced ‘miraculous’ economic growth that earned them the nickname, along with Hong Kong and

Singapore, of the “Four Tigers (Dragons).” Prior to democratization, under the successive authoritarian regimes of General Park Chung-hee (1963-1979) and the more liberal Chun Do-hwan (1980-1988), the South Korean state promoted development via trade expansion. The state relied on increasing its trade volume to facilitate its economic plans, and utilized financial and fiscal incentives to encourage large-scale investments, specifically in export industries. However, unlike the trajectory of export-oriented growth in Taiwan, which was driven by small and medium enterprises, the South Korean government encouraged the growth of large- scale conglomerates that reaped substantial benefits from the state’s policies.85

83 Sung-Joo Han, “South Korea in 1987: The Politics of Democratization,” Asian Survey 28(1) January 1988, pp. 52-61. (See also Pei 1998.) 84 Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences,” International Organization 38 Winter 1984, pp. 1-40. 85 Cheng-tian Kuo, “Taiwan’s Distorted Democracy in Comparative Perspective,” In Wei-Chin Lee (ed.) Taiwan in Perspective (Boston, Mass: Brill, 2000).

26 South Korean labor has also been able to develop a powerful and independent movement that has consistently been more influential than labor unions in Taiwan.86

At least part of the reason that South Korean labor movements have had an easier time of organizing is due to the diverging legacies of authoritarian rule. The KMT regime in Taiwan was much more cohesive and more deeply entrenched in society than the exclusive and military-led leadership exhibited in South Korea under Park and Chun.87 State guidance in the economic policies of both South Korea and Taiwan had lasting implications for each country’s respective growth path. Both countries adopted corporatist economies to encourage growth and control labor relations under the aegis of the state.

This brief comparison with South Korea highlights the differences in practice between corporatist regimes. For this reason, choosing a question that accurately measures a respondent’s support for a corporatist political-economic structure requires careful scrutiny. The question from the survey that I use to approximate the respondent’s support for corporatism is sensitive to the history of POEs under the

KMT regime in Taiwan. It is also a reliable measure as pertains to the literature on the features of corporatism, as it investigates the respondent’s opinion of government intervention in the free market. As discussed above, the KMT has historically had a strong hand in controlling the direction of economic development. Taiwan’s economy was nurtured by the KMT by virtue of its control of labor relations, adoption of a series of economic plans, and intervention through financing and monopolization.

The question I chose to represent support for corporatism focuses on government intervention. Responding that the government should continue to intervene in the free

86 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 126. (See also Minns and Tierney 2003.) Kong (2005) shows that the strength of the labor movement in Korea gave the Korean government incentive to incorporate it in a tri-partite regime of labor-capital-state. 87 Kuo 2000, op. cit. (See also Kong 2005, op. cit., p. 168-9.)

27 market is taken as an indication of a preference for corporatism as the foundation of

Taiwan’s political economy.

b. The Terror Threat

i. Post 9/11 re-emergence

Nearly 30 years after corporatist theory’s re-articulation in the 1960s as an alternative to the convergence model and its eulogization of the United States, Samuel

Huntington (1993) raised the specter of inexorable warfare.88 Huntington proposed that implacable differences between civilizations would inevitably lead to violence, warning that the major fault line in global politics would lie between western and non-western nations. For many, Huntington’s theory represented the replacement of communism, heretofore the greatest threat to western liberal democracy, with cultural dissonance. Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis was a criticism of Francis

Fukuyama’s (1992) assertion that liberal democracies had triumphed over all other forms of governance following the end of the Cold War.89 Huntington cautioned against unbridled optimism of the West’s triumph and jejune neglect of security concerns. In an article entitled The Clash of Civilizations (1993), Huntington theorized a nebulous bête noir, citing irreconcilable differences between civilizations as the origin of future warfare.90 Huntington believed that fundamental differences exist between civilizations, most importantly of all, religion.

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the clash of civilizations trope was used extensively to generate support for a particular agenda of escalating U.S.

88 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs 72(3) Summer 1993, pp. 22-49. 89 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Free Press, 1992). 90 Huntington 1993, op. cit.

28 military activities in the Middle East.91 The same rhetoric was simultaneously used to instill a general sense of fear among the population. For whatever purpose, the terror exception legitimized the US government’s abrogation of civil liberties for defense against a stateless entity based on a priori prejudices. A fear of unrestrained civil liberties is not uncommon to government elites, as it was present among even the founders of France and the United States, considered to be the exemplars of modern liberal government. Przeworski (2010) notes that regarding the freedom to express opinions uninhibited by government censure, US founders were ambivalent at best, while the French founders were intolerant of it.92 Both the selective upholding of civil rights to harass and target certain segments of society and the outright denial of them have been a recurring story of the United States from its inception.93

A diminution of civil liberties in the United States has frequently occurred during war or when there is a widespread belief, often disseminated by the mass media, of an imminent threat to national security. The U.S. congress passed its first

Sedition Act in 1798, making it illegal for anyone to criticize the president. At the time, the legislation was rationalized as necessary protection from the influence of radical revolutionaries such as the Jacobin movement in France. During the post-

WWII era of anti-communist hysterics, subversive elements were monitored without regard for civil liberties, professors were forced to take loyalty oaths, and writers, actors and directors were blacklisted.94 Rehnquist (1998) reviews the subordination of civil liberties to security concerns during past wars in the United States, including

President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the Sedition

91 Mark B. Salter, “The Clash of Civilisations and the War on Terror(ists): An imperialist discourse,” Global Dialogue 5(1/2) Winter 2003, pp. 116-25. 92 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 93 Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The rise of legitimate opposition in the United States, 1780-1840 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). (See also Stone 2004.) 94 Anthony Lewis, “Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror,” Wisconsin Law Review (2) 2003, pp. 265.

29 and Espionage Acts during World War I, and Japanese internment during World War

II.95 Although Rehnquist doesn’t propose a clear method for judging the basis for curtailing civil liberties, he implies that a mechanism to prevent overreliance on extrajudicial measures should exist. Other authors are even more emphatic in suggesting that civil liberties should be an appurtenance to the power of the policing arm of the state during times of war.96 The willingness of citizens to allow governments to suspend their civil rights fits Kaplow and Shavell’s (2002) observation that legal and civil rights have nowhere been absolute.97

ii. Evidence of the terror exception

Threat can have a tangible effect on beliefs and behaviors on both an individual and societal level. Research has indicated that threat increases intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia, regardless of whether the threat is real or subjectively construed. When the threat exists at a national level, it can result in policies that are pejorative to civil liberties. Studies by Cottam (1994) and Hermann

(1988) show that elites, under conditions of threat, tend to face a more rigid decision- making environment and are more likely to promote dogmatic policies.98 Sales (1973) found that periods of societal threat are associated with higher aggregate measures of authoritarianism.99 Of greater concern for countries with experience under military dictatorship, McCann (1997, 1998) found that greater societal threat increases

95 William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil liberties in wartime (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc, 1998). 96 Richard A. Posner, “Security Versus Civil Liberties,” Atlantic Monthly 288(5) December 2001, pp. 46-48. 97 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002). 98 Martha Cottam, Images and Interventions: U.S. policies in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1994). Richard K. Herrmann, “The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A strategy for drawing inferences about perceptions,” International Studies Quarterly 32(2) 1988, pp. 175-203. 99 Stephen M. Sales, “Threat as a Factor in Authoritarianism: An analysis of archival data,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 28(1) 1973, pp. 44-57. (See also Doty et al. 1991.)

30 aggregate support for political candidates viewed as powerful, forceful, strong and active.100

Scare tactics such as the terror threat demonstrate the inclination of political, economic, social and cultural elites to evade the requirement of accountability on the part of the state and other institutions, abuse their powers, influence the public and manipulate expressions of nationalism and other forms of shared identity for purposes of self-interest.101 Terror is a common stratagem used by conservatives to arrogate powers at the expense of civil liberties. The post-9/11 context provides a contemporary example to examine the relationship between public opinion and anti- terror policies.102 The findings of many of these studies confirm Sales’ (1973) observation that threat is one of the basic causes of authoritarianism.103

A series of polls taken immediately after the September 11th attacks showed that an average of nearly 70 percent of Americans agreed that it would be necessary to give up some civil liberties and personal freedoms as part of the war on terror.104 The same authors found that support for anti-terror surveillance measures ranged from 26 percent (government monitoring of personal telephone calls and email) to 63 percent

(government monitoring of Internet chat groups). Nearly half, 45 percent, of respondents supported using military tribunals to try suspected terrorists, and 61 percent supported a national ID system. Davis and Silver (2004) found in late 2001

100 Stewart J.H. McCann, “Threatening Times, ‘Strong’ Presidential Popular Vote Winners, and the Victory Margin,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 73(1) 1997, pp. 160-70. See also Steward J.H. McCann, “The Extended American Social, Economic, and Political Threat Index (1788- 1992),” Journal of Psychology 132(4) 1998, pp. 435-49. 101 Victor Perez-Diaz, “The Possibility of Civil Society: Traditions, character and challenges,” In John A. Hall (ed.) Civil Society: Theory, history, comparison (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 1995), p. 80-109. 102 Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav, “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” American Journal of Political Science 49(3) 2005, pp. 593-608. (See also Davis 2007; Davis and Silver 2004; Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos 2002; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009.) 103 Sales 1973, op. cit. (See also Rokeach 1960; Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford 1950.) 104 Leonie Huddy, Nadia Khatib and Theresa Capelos, “The Polls-Trends: Reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,” Public Opinion Quarterly 66 2002, pp. 431.

31 and 2002 varying levels of support for extra-constitutional measures such as warrantless searches of suspected terrorists (23 percent), indefinite detention of non- citizen suspected terrorists (47 percent), government monitoring of telephone and e- mail communications (34 percent), and requiring national ID cards (54 percent) in late

2001 and 2002.105

These studies show that a person who is fearful of terrorism has a higher tolerance threshold for authoritarian measures implemented by the government. From these findings, it is safe to say that an unreasonably fearful citizenry is anathema to the principles of liberal governance. Perez-Diaz (1995) worries that pluralism is being threatened by absolutism, dogmatism and totalitarian tendencies as a result of unremitting traditional and non-traditional security threats, including terrorism.106 A high level of fear in a society may tempt the government of a young democracy to exploit the opportunity to roll back the achievements of social and labor movements and hinder their development.

iii. The Terror Threat in Taiwan

Taiwan has had a long and varied experience with colonial masters and external powers, the most prominent being a European power (the Dutch in the 17th century), the first imperial power among Asian nations (Japan from 1895-1945), and the KMT émigré regime (1947-?). Taiwan has been both fortuitous and cursed by its position in the region, with the island being the setting of fierce violence and foreign invasions until the early 20th century. Some Taiwanese still today express resentment

105 Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public opinion in the context of the terrorist attacks on America,” American Journal of Political Science 48 2004, pp. 28-46. (See also Mondak and Hurwitz 2012.) 106 Perez-Diaz 1995, op. cit.

32 over the lack of independent sovereignty for the islanders in the past. 107 Prior to the

20th century, Taiwan attracted foreign traders who stopped on the island en route to or from the mainland, as well as pirates and vigilantes. After the First Sino-Japanese

War, Taiwan came under the influence of the Japanese imperial court. Japan’s leaders were intent on establishing a colonial empire, and integrated Taiwan into their ambitions. Japan was forced to renounce its imperial ambitions following WWII, and after Chiang Kai-shek’s removal to the island, Taiwan became an unofficial ally of the United States. Many Taiwanese celebrated Japan’s defeat and departure, hopeful of finally being granted self-autonomy. Tens of thousands lined the streets in anticipation of the victorious Chinese Nationalist soldiers.108 Most expected that mutual respect and comity would govern the relations between the liberated island and Mainland China.109

The ROC government on Taiwan from the end of World War II until 1949 turned out to be an affront to the Taiwanese public. About forty-eight thousand soldiers arrived from the mainland within the first year after the Japanese surrender.

To the Taiwanese, these soldiers were overwhelmingly uneducated, poorly disciplined and slovenly.110 After being accustomed to the highly educated and well-trained

Japanese, the sight of the war heroes was a shock for many. The soldiers’ behavior soon proved the worst of the islanders’ anxieties correct. Any area that hosted KMT soldiers proliferated in carpet-bagging and outright theft. With the onset of inflation after the war, it became impossible for a KMT soldier to survive on his pay alone.

Looting and plundering of the local population became de rigueur for the soldiers and

107 See Teh-fu Huang and Ching-hsin Yu, “Developing a party System and Democratic Consolidation,” In Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien. Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (Hong Kong University Press, 1999), p. 85-100 for a description of Taiwan’s ‘sweet potato culture.’ 108 Hung 2011, op. cit. 109 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 5. (See also Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 58) 110 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 59.

33 officers of the ROC army, following the precedent set on the mainland. The looting was initially confined to the homes of Japanese expatriates, but soon spread to

Taiwanese homes, schools, hospitals and temples.111 The appointed administration under Chen Yi was soon despised for coming ostensibly to depredate the entire island.112 At the end of 1945, the Japanese colonial administration owned about two- thirds of all land on Taiwan. All of this was confiscated by the KMT, as well as some

500 Japanese factories, private houses, and companies engaged in primary or secondary production, accounting for about 17 percent of Taiwan’s total GDP at the time.113

From a Taiwanese perspective, this activity was reprehensible. However, the

ROC soldiers and officers involved in the spoliation believed that the Taiwanese should be grateful to the soldiers for liberating the island from the imperialist

Japanese.114 Therein, the Taiwanese should gladly contribute to sustaining the ROC soldiers on the island, rebuilding the mainland after the war, and supporting the KMT in the Chinese civil war as a matter of patriotic duty. According to this perspective, if the Taiwanese did not see things in this manner, it was due to invidious Japanese sympathies. An estimated 90 percent of all economic enterprises on Taiwan (most of them taken over directly from the Japanese) were appropriated by the Chen Yi administration between 1945 and 1947.115

Regardless of the legitimate criticisms of Japanese colonial rule, the period from 1895-1945 irrevocably set the island apart from its former claimant, the mainland regime. Tokyo envisaged turning Taiwan into a model colony as proof to the western imperial powers in the region of Japan’s qualification as a great power.

111 Ibid, p. 62-65. 112 Schaefferer 2003, op. cit., p. 23. 113 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 35-6. 114 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 58. 115 Hung 2011, op. cit., p. 322.

34 Compared to the brutal tact taken in Korea, Taiwan was treated fairly well by the

Japanese. By the end of its period as a colony of the Japanese, Taiwan had become a socially stable and urbanized society. Agriculture developed impressively under the adept management of Japanese technocrats and the unrestricted importation of

Japanese expertise. The colonial administration also brought many diseases under control, including malaria, dengue fever, typhus fever, and cholera.116 When the first

ROC soldiers came over following the end of WWII, Taiwan was probably more developed economically than any province in China.117

After Chiang Kai-shek’s defeat by the communists, he fled to Taiwan where

ROC forces had been stationed since the end of the war. He hoped to occupy Taiwan long enough to defend against an inevitable communist attack, regroup, and then retake the mainland. Chiang faced deteriorating circumstances as the U.S. cut military funding to the ROC and abandoned Chiang to his fate. Fortunately for the

Generalissimo, the Korean War broke out before the communists could deploy the

150,000 troops rumored to have been mobilized to attack the ROC on Taiwan, and the

KMT regime survived its inchoate period on Taiwan riding the coattails of United

States military support and nonmilitary aid amounting to $100 million annually from

1954-1964.118

Wu and Cheng (2011) suggest that the KMT regime had a more tenuous claim to legitimacy than other authoritarian governments because of its emigration from the mainland and of the enmity felt by local Taiwanese after the 2-28 Incident.119 Chiang crushed organized opposition by pacifying, killing, or forcing into exile the leaders most ardently against the KMT. The memory of martial law still draws considerable

116 Hung 2011, op. cit., p. 269 117 John Minns and Robert Tierney, “The Labour Movement in Taiwan,” Labour History 85 November 2003, pp. 103-28. 118 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 151. 119 Wu and Cheng, op. cit., p. 239-40.

35 Taiwanese rancor.120 The period known as the ‘white terror’ lasted from 1949 until

1987, and was based on four laws curtailing civil liberties and political rights: the

Martial Law, the Criminal Code, the National General Mobilization Law, and the

Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion.121

Martial law prohibited the establishment of political parties, and restricted the freedoms of speech, assembly, association and communication.122 Article 100 of the

Criminal Code stipulated harsh punishment for any person who committed an overt act with the intent to destroy the organization of the state, seize state territory, change the constitution by illegal means, or overthrow the government. The National

General Mobilization Law granted the government the authority to restrict or prohibit newspapers, press wire services, and the printing of articles and other materials arbitrarily. In addition to these three laws, the KMT government promulgated the

Temporary Provisions in April 1948 to justify its repression of dissident voices on the island. The articles in the Temporary Provisions granted extensive powers to the president during the period of civil war with the communists, nullifying key provisions of the ROC constitution.123 Even after the lifting of martial law in 1987, the Temporary Provisions remained in effect until 1991 when both a unified opposition and pressure from within Lee Teng-hui’s own party finally brought to an

120 The recent controversy over the sale of Want Want Media is just one example. Lak-sin Loa, "Students Pan ‘Martial Law’ Rules." - Taipei Times. 8 Dec. 2012. Web. 10 Dec. 2012. And also Lok- sin Loa, Hsiu-chuan Shih, and Stacy Hsu, "Ma Meets Protests at Human Rights Event." - Taipei Times. 11 Dec. 2012. Web. 11 Dec. 2012. 121 Schaefferer 2003, op. cit., p. 5-6. 122 Chyuan-jeng Shiau, “Civil Society and Democratization,” In Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp. 105. 123 Schaefferer 2003, op. cit., p. 6.

36 end the Temporary Provisions and with it, the period of civil war as far as the ROC was concerned.124

China was a constant presence in the terror threat ideology for the residents of

Taiwan during the period of martial law and has continued to be a cause for angst among a considerable segment of Taiwanese.125 Throughout the post-war period, the rival KMT and CCP regimes regarded each other as rebellious traitors and vowed to extirpate one another. The KMT enacted the aforementioned laws making up the legal framework of martial law ostensibly for the security of the state. While the peril of violence has shrouded the relationship across the Taiwan Strait, the two sides have refrained from escalating the discord into full-scale military conflict. The respective militaries have rarely been mobilized in overt displays of aggression, with notable exceptions being the 1954-55 and 1958 bombardment by the Chinese of several offshore islands belonging to the KMT, and the 1995-96 Missile Crisis in retaliation for Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell.126

In the 1970s Taiwan’s claim to sovereignty over the mainland, as well as its international prestige was severely damaged when the United States and China began moving towards rapprochement. Taiwan relinquished its seat in the UN just prior to a

General Assembly vote granting the CCP regime in Beijing the seat belonging to

China. The diminution in the KMT’s international standing forced the party to

124 The official end of the civil war between the PRC and the ROC has proven elusive, as a peace pact has yet to be signed. See "Taiwan-China Peace Accord 'Very Unlikely:' AIT Ex-Head." WantChinaTimes.com. 11 Apr. 2013. Web. 06 May 2013. 125 Emerson Niou, “The China Factor in Taiwan’s Domestic Politics,” In Philip Paolino and James Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 167. 126 For a detailed account of the 1954-55 Crisis, see Gordon H. Chang and He Di, “The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, luck, deterrence,” The American Historical Review 98(5) 1993, pp. 1500-1524. For more on the 1958 crisis, see Marian D. Irish, “Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy: The Quemoy Crisis of 1958,” The Political Quarterly 31(2) April 1960, pp. 151-162. For more on the 1995-96 Cross-Strait Crisis, see Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, credibility, and the use of force,” International Security. 25(2) 2000, pp. 87-123.

37 reconsider its singular focus on the communist threat. As the KMT’s hopes of reconquering the mainland dissipated, the justification for privileging the military in economic affairs also lost credibility. The government began spending less on the military and emphasized economic growth and development apart from the needs of the armed forces. The loss of UN recognition was also a serious setback for the KMT regime, as it challenged the raison d’être of martial law and basic legitimacy of the government. Needing to restore some dignity to the regime and bolster its legitimacy on the island itself, the KMT began in the mid-1970s to strengthen its ties with local

Taiwanese.127

The process of ‘Taiwanization’ was an attempt to mollify criticisms against the KMT by cultivating local Taiwanese political talent. As a result, the proportion of

Taiwanese in the KMT grew steadily from the mid-1970s on. Taiwanization was carried on more fervently after Chiang Kai-shek’s death in 1975 and the subsequent ascent of his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to the presidency in 1978.128 Despite the younger Chiang’s conservative lineage and credentials (he served as supervisor of the commissar system in the armed forces, head of the internal security network, founder of a youth “anticommunist” organization, and defense minister), he demonstrated a commitment to reforming the KMT. Among his priorities were expanding the efforts of recruiting local Taiwanese into higher positions in the government, favoring technocrats over traditional party-connected individuals, and actively exposing and punishing government corruption.129

President Chiang Ching-kuo also pursued economic ties with other countries and actively sought to expand Taiwan’s international trade and increase the volume of

127 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 6. 128 Vice president Yen Chia-kan served the rest of Chiang Kai-shek’s term in office, from 1975-1978. See Roy (2003 op. cit., p. 156.) 129 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 157.

38 foreign direct investments coming into Taiwan. Although there was still mutual discord between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the younger Chiang devoted a greater proportion of economic resources to major infrastructure projects, subsidizing research and development activities, and opening a high-tech industrial park, rather than to the defense budget.130 During the Chiang Ching-kuo period the KMT replaced “recovering the mainland and reunifying China” with “building up Taiwan” and “shared affluence” as primary slogans.131

After Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in 1988, his vice president Lee Teng-hui became the first native Taiwanese president, albeit elected by a vote within the KMT party congress rather than via popular election. Conservative members of the KMT resolutely opposed Lee’s nomination, fearing that their position in the party would deteriorate rapidly under his leadership. Their opposition exacerbated the existing disunity within the party between mainlander conservatives and reformers.132 Lee

Teng-hui lacked a loyal base within the KMT and faced a hostile faction of conservative mainlanders who resolutely opposed further democratization and

Taiwanization of the party. However, the conservative faction’s standing in the party had already been progressively diminishing. A growing middle-class of Taiwanese supported gradual reform and stability, and political liberalization had further solidified the reformers’ position vis-à-vis the conservative faction. The lifting of martial law in 1988, and abrogation of the Temporary Provisions in 1991 paved the way for national elections to the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, the first time that all of the members of both bodies were elected by the Taiwanese.133

130 Huang and Yu 1999, op. cit., p. 89. 131 Chu, Yun-han. 2012a. “The Taiwan Factor,” Journal of Democracy (January) 23(1): pp. 42-56, p.46. 132 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 170. 133 Schafferer 2003 op. cit., p. 62 (See also Chu 1998.)

39 Lee Teng-hui was also adroit at outmaneuvering his conservative rivals within the party. The DPP’s strong performance in the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections allowed Lee to skillfully position himself between the DPP and conservative KMT faction, at times forming an alliance with the former to isolate the latter.134 With his position at the pinnacle of the KMT affirmed, the conservative faction became irreparably ostracized from the party, and split to form the Chinese New Party (later to become known as the New Party, or NP). Lee continued to encourage further

‘Taiwanization’ of the government and endorsed stronger ties with the international community and more ‘international space’ for Taiwan.135

The leadership in Beijing watched with apprehension as the momentum for democratic reforms spread organically from a democratization movement led by the dangwai to the KMT’s own championing of Taiwanization. President Lee Teng-hui embraced both symbolic and substantive reforms designed to relinquish the KMT’s claim over all of China. On April 30, 1991, Lee abrogated the Temporary Provisions, bringing an official denouement to the civil war between the communists and nationalists on the Taiwanese side. In his first year as president, Lee announced plans to gradually reduce the number of military personnel and removed the restriction against soldiers joining political parties other than the KMT.136 The CCP interpreted

President Lee’s actions as confirmation that the new leadership in Taiwan wished to renounce its ties with the mainland and move towards independence.

If the reforms implemented by Lee Teng-hui drew Beijing’s ire, the DPP platform was anathema to CCP leaders. The DPP had originated in the 1970s when intellectuals and politicians began organizing with the hope of transforming politics from outside of the party-state. The amorphous dangwai movement was generally

134 Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 50. 135 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 171. 136 Ibid. (See also Schaefferer 2003 op.cit., p. 9.)

40 split into two groups: politicians and activists. These groups had different but complementary strategies for opposing the KMT’s authoritarian rule. The activists were composed of intellectuals who published prolifically and made rudimentary attempts to build a nationwide movement. Although certain subjects were taboo, such as personal attacks on the Chiangs, favorable comments about the PRC, advocating independence, or any challenge to the legitimacy of the Nationalist government, these dissidents still had plenty of substantive pabulum from which to challenge the authoritarian party.137

The dangwai politicians preoccupied themselves with nurturing support bases to challenge the KMT through local elections.138 Initially, the opposition confined its demands to political liberalization, including political neutrality on the part of the military and security agencies, the judiciary and the civil service, equal media access, and regulations on the KMT’s party-owned enterprises.139 Most of these issues were addressed on the KMT’s own initiative in the 1980s, after the party had conceded that the futility of violence against the opposition, economic growth, Taiwanization of the

KMT, and international recognition of China had made liberalization a fait accompli.

With these demands met, new cleavages came to the fore, disaggregating the opposition movement into factions that still hinder the unity of the party today.140

Although the DPP formally abolished factions in 2006, spheres of influence still exist and the New Tide faction has remained a major player in intra-party

137 Zeigler 1988, op. cit. 138 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 17. 139 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 59. 140 After Tsai Ing-wen’s defeat in the 2012 presidential election, the New Tide faction has emerged as the biggest winner within the DPP. See below. Frank Hsieh’s recent visit to China also illustrates the continuing inability of the DPP to formulate a united position on its orientation toward China, thanks primarily due to differences of opinion between the factions Enru Lin, "New Tide Takes Lion's Share in DPP Poll." Www.ChinaPost.com.tw. 16 July 2012. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.

41 politics.141 New Tide Magazine was founded in 1984 by activists from the Writers and Editors Alliance, and became the eponym for the faction containing its members within the DPP. The New Tide faction was overtly pro-independence, and advocated aggressive demonstrations to force democratic reforms. On the other hand, the

Formosa Faction generally followed a more centrist ideology and was based on personalities more so than issues.142 Over time the issues at stake in the jostling between factions have included cooperation or confrontation with the ruling KMT, the ideological orientation of the party between moderation and radicalism, and the party’s orientation toward Taiwan independence. Both factions have at times been dominant within the DPP. Many pro-independence exiles returned to the island in

1990 and bolstered the New Tide’s position in the party. However, the 1991 National

Assembly elections were a devastating defeat for the New Tide faction, as voters overwhelmingly rejected the DPP’s radical independence platform.143 After 1991, the

DPP de-emphasized independence and reformulated its position on independence, suggesting that making a formal declaration of independence was superfluous, equating the current status quo with Taiwanese independence.144

Notwithstanding the DPP’s shying away from explicitly demanding formal independence, the KMT used the threat of Chinese invasion profusely in election campaigns throughout the 1990s. Attacking the DPP for ignorantly inviting an attack from the mainland became an inveterate part of the KMT’s election strategy. During the 1991 National Assembly elections, some KMT advertisements used imagery of the Tiananmen massacre and the PRC invading India and Vietnam and warned that the DPP’s proposal for rewriting the constitution would result in war. During the

141 Enru Lin, "New Tide Takes Lion's Share in DPP Poll." Www.ChinaPost.com.tw. 16 July 2012. Web. 06 May 2013. 142 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 25-34. 143 Ibid, p. 31. 144 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 91.

42 1995 Legislative Yuan elections the KMT used the slogan, ‘Giving the DPP a chance is giving Taiwan independence a chance, even more it is giving the CCP a chance to militarily attack Taiwan.’ The trend continued in the 1997 and 1998 executive elections, with slogans proclaiming ‘DPP = Taiwan independence = war.’145

Advertisements admonishing that, ‘The DPP only dares to shout about the Taiwan

Independence Clause to Taiwan independence fanatics, when faced with the stability loving middle class it puts on the mask of happiness and hope’ appeared in these later elections, marking a subtle shift in the foundation of its attacks.146 Campaign ads of this kind targeted Chen Shui-bian, who the KMT derided as a prototypical vacillating, self-interested politician. During the 2000 presidential elections, one particularly poignant TV ad was the ‘Off to war ad,’ which showed young Taiwanese singing

“I’m off to war, I’m off to war, because of Abian’s [Chen Shui-bian’s] one sentence

‘Long Live Taiwan independence’ Taiwan will be engulfed in the fires of war and 85 percent of Taiwan’s 20-29-year olds will immediately go to the battlefield.” The ending of the ad showed the Taiwanese youth waving goodbye with the slogan,

‘Abian shouts Taiwan independence, war starts in the Taiwan Strait.’147

The mainstream KMT led by Lee Teng-hui has also used similar tactics in jockeying against the non-mainstream, conservative faction of its own party. After

1991, Lee Teng-hui further consolidated his support within the KMT. The foremost conservative KMT rival of Lee, Premier Hau Pei-tsun, retired in 1993, and in the same year, conservative mainlanders split from the KMT.148 The defection of the conservative wing allowed the KMT to find a comfortable niche, vilifying both the

NP and DPP as extremists on the unification-independence spectrum, while

145 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 106. 146 Ibid, p. 106. 147 Ibid. p. 108 148 Ibid, p. 16-17. (See also Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 73.)

43 presenting itself as the party of stability. For example, one slogan stated, ‘Refuse the

Taiwan independence, violent and drug selling DPP, refuse the power seeking, profit seeking and rapid unification NP.’ During the 1994 provincial governor and city mayor elections (the first in which the NP took part), the KMT lambasted the NP for promoting ‘rapid unification,’ and obeisance to the CCP. One ad concluded, ‘The NP shouts loudly protect the ROC, and actually it is forcing Taiwan to be annexed by the

CCP.’ The KMT recycled the China threat in the 1996 presidential elections against the NP. One of the KMT’s ads mimicked a New Party slogan by adding an extra word to each keyword. It read, ‘New leadership = Jiang Zemin, New Order =

People’s Liberation Army, New Hope = Unified.’149

The China threat has been a recurring theme of Taiwanese politics. The CCP in Beijing is a hostile neighbor that has never renounced the use of force against

Taiwan and has in the past made threatening public statements directed towards

Taiwanese politicians and citizens. Moreover, politicians in Taiwan are quick to manipulate the China issue for political gain. Threat is therefore a conspicuous part of the political theater in Taiwan. As previous studies have shown, this enduring threat may heighten a citizen’s sensitivity to the terror exception, with the consequence that Taiwanese are generally more willing to exchange civil liberties for protection. The question in the survey used to measure a respondent’s internalization of terrorism as a realistic threat is posed as, “Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen. Do you think the authorities should have the right to…[1] detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial; [2] tap people’s telephone conversations; [3] stop and search people in the street at random.”

Each item asks the respondent to mark their level of agreement or disagreement with

149 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 104.

44 the options, “Definitely should have right,” “Probably should have right,” “Probably should not have right,” “Definitely should not have right,” and “Can’t choose.” The results of the regression analysis will show the extent of the relationship between societal fear and support for civil rights in Taiwan.

c. Confucianism

i. Confucian culture

East Asia features some of the world’s most ethnically homogenous countries, led by the notorious case of Japan.150 Taiwan isn’t exceptional, with 98 percent of its population descendent from Han Chinese. Of that population, 70 percent are from southern Fujian Province, 15 percent are of Hakka origin, and 12 percent are

‘Mainlander’ (immigrants after WWII).151 Within the region, China, Taiwan, South

Korea, Japan and Vietnam are referred to as Confucian-dominant cultures. Taiwan’s ethnic homogeneity and the influence of Confucianism may lead to a higher tolerance for authoritarian policies among its citizens. Some scholars believe that participatory democracy is incongruous with East Asian countries because of the reach of paternalism in these Confucian-dominated societies.152

Confucianism developed in the rice-agriculture societies of East Asia and has been credited with imbuing in those countries a strong sense of kinship and collective ideals emphasizing the welfare of the village community over the individual.153 As a result, these societies lacked any concept of universal public good or public rights,

150 Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Democracy in East Asia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). 151 "Society: Ethnic groups." Taiwanese Cultural Society. Web. 30 Nov. 2012. . 152 Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985). 153 Yasusuke Murakami, “Le Society as a Pattern of Civilization,” Journal of Japanese Studies 10(2) Summer 1984, pp. 279-363.

45 such as assembly, participation, or protest.154 Subjects were expected to appeal to paternalistic authorities rather than act separately from the collective, either as an individual, or as a smaller group within the community. For thousands of years

Confucian thought was embedded in the state institutions and structure of Chinese society. After WWII, Confucian state structures and schools as a formal part of state institutions basically disappeared. The associated norms of propriety, education, self- cultivation, and social order, however, have remained influential in popular culture, as well as behavior.155

Confucius lived twenty-five hundred years ago during a time when the Zhou

Dynasty was dissolving. Nostalgic for the perceived order and prosperity of the Zhou at the height of its power, Confucius devoted much of his writings to the method of restoring proper governance to the people. He grew up in a family of modest means, even though he was a descendent of the former Yin dynasty aristocracy.156 Confucius has had an ineffable impact on East Asian countries, perhaps most directly in the case of China. Slingerland (2008) points out that from 1313 until 1910, memorizing the core of the Confucian teachings was required of every single educated Chinese.157

Much of what is considered to be Confucian thought is unlikely to have been taken directly from the master’s own writings, but filtered through his many disciples.

Regardless of their sources, the Four Books [including two books, Lunyu (The

154 Edward Shils, “Reflections on Civil Society and Civility in the Chinese Intellectual Tradition,” In Tu Wei-ming (ed.) Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 71. 155 Jeffrey Broadbent Vicky Brockman, East Asian Social Movements: Power, protest and change in a dynamic region (New York: Spring Science and Business Media, LLC, 2011). For example, the recent controversy over a student’s impertinent remarks to the Minister of Education sheds light on beliefs about respect for social position and appropriate behavior towards people in positions of authority. See Mei-hsiu Hung and Jennifer Huang. "Professors Back Petition against School Apology." - Taipei Times. 7 Dec. 2012. Web. 12 Dec. 2012. 156 Kung-chuan Hsiao, A History of Chinese Political Thought, Volume One: From the beginnings to the sixth century A.D. (trans. F.W. Mote) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979). 157 Edward Slingerland, “Classical Confucianism (I): Confucius and the Lun-Yu,” In Bo Mou (ed.). Routledge History of Chinese Philosophy (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008).

46 Analects) and Mengzi (Mencius), and two articles Daxue (Great Learning) and

Zhongyong (The Doctrine of the Mean), adopted from the book Liji (The Book of

Rites)] are the foundation from which Confucian culture is derived. The questions contemplated in these writings are the essence of man and community, becoming a complete man in the community, and the methods and goals of state management.158

The Analects is considered the most authentic of the classic texts and is a reflection of Confucius’ thoughts on the essence of man. Benevolence and reciprocity are two of the integral ideas elucidated. Of the Four Books, Mencius says the most about community and administration of the state. To win over the people of the nation, the sovereign should always regard the interests of the people first.

Confucians believe that the value of the community and the value of the self are supplementary to one another. The relationship between these two values is contained in chengren (complete others) and chengji (complete self). The Doctrine of the Mean supplies the ontological foundation for this ideal of mutually benefitting man and community, suggesting that man achieves metaphysical actualization when he completes himself and others. Confucian thought on social governance is developed in the last of the Four Books, the Great Learning. In this work, Confucius proposes the “three creeds” of illustrating virtue, reforming the people, and attaining excellence as principles and stratagems for managing the state.159 The Great

Learning teaches the method in which one can behave morally, regulate the family, govern the state, and stabilize the world.160

Confucianism has been described as an ideology, religion and belief system on which East Asian society is based. Its content includes moral, social, political and

158 Weixi Hu, “On Confucian communitarianism,” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2(4) October 2007, pp. 475-487. 159 Zhongde Liu and Luo Zhiye (eds.), The Chinese / English Four Books (trans. Legge J). Changsha: Hunan Chubanshe, 1992), pp. 541. 160 Hu 2007, op. cit.

47 religious expositions. In the political realm, Confucianism supposes that an ideal civil society is submissive, with each actor behaving according to his/her position in a hierarchy. According to Confucianism, the social order consists of five cardinal relationships: rulers and subjects, husbands and wives, parents and children, siblings, and friends.161 Strict observance of not only law, but also customs and mores is necessary to maintain such a rigid social structure. Besides behaving appropriately to one’s place in society, virtue is esteemed and each individual, and particularly the sovereign, is expected to cultivate oneself and educate others.162 Regarding the interaction between society and state, Confucianism teaches that the state should be an extension of the family. It envisions a paternalist government as the paragon of the state-society relationship.163 Uniformity in thought and an emphasis on the good of the state rather than the good of the individual are requisites for a perfect society.164

Holding the state together is a virtuous leader who takes care of his people, akin to

Plato’s “philosopher king.”165

In Confucian thought, the moral quality of the leader is therefore the most consequential aspect for the vitality of a state. A healthy society and state rely upon a moral leader to “rule by virtue” rather than through “rule by laws.” According to this reasoning, the leader simply needs to be virtuous and internalize the moral character of a “gentleman,” and the people will follow. Although the moral fiber of rulers in

East Asia during the Cold War is equivocal, authoritarian rulers in the region

161 Samuel Yamashita, “Confucianism and the Modern Japanese State 1904-1945,” In Tu Wei-ming (ed.) Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral education and economy and culture in Japan and the four mini-dragons (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 153. 162 Wm. Theodore De Bary, East Asian Civilizations: A dialogue in five stages (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988). 163 Broadbent and Brockman 2011, op. cit. 164 Hu 2007, op. cit. 165 Hsiao 1979 op. cit., p. 88.

48 generally escaped accountability to citizens and international criticism over their illiberal practices by virtue of having powerful benefactors.166

Scholars who use the lens of Confucianism to investigate East Asian societies have attributed a panoply of social, political, economic and psychological/behavioral phenomena to Confucian beliefs. One study implicates Confucian thought in diminishing women’s participation in leisure activities in Taiwan.167 Another stream of literature investigates Confucianism’s orientation vis-à-vis liberal western democratic practice. Shi and Lu (2010) focus specifically on the compatibility of minwei bangben (the people alone are the basis of the state) with democracy in China and Taiwan. They assert that the precept of minben is the wellspring of paternalism in Confucianism, as it prioritizes the welfare of the people to maintain the rulers in power, rather than extending political rights to the subjects.168 The authors found that minben did, in fact, have a measurable impact on both Chinese and Taiwanese citizens’ views of democracy. Conversely, Chaibong (2004) warns that

Confucianism’s incongruence with liberal democracy should not be taken for granted.

Rather than linger on authoritarian rulers’ use of Confucianism, he believes that we should remain cognizant of the potential for a “free at last” Confucianism that will be renewed and reinvigorated once East Asian countries have become fully consolidated democracies.169 Jung (1999) offers a pointed critique of Huntington’s (1991) dismissal of Confucianism as incompatible with liberal democracy, arguing instead that Confucian thought clearly contains elements contrary to authoritarianism, such as

166 Muthia Alagappa, Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and contracting democratic space (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). See also Gold 1996; Yamashita 1996.) 167 Chiung-Tzu Lucetta Tsai, “The Influence of Confucianism on Women’s Leisure in Taiwan,” Leisure Studies 25(4) November 2006, pp. 469-476. 168 Tianjian Shi and Jie Lu, “The Shadow of Confucianism,” Journal of Democracy 21(4) October . 2010, pp. 125. 169 Hahm Chaibong, “The Ironies of Confucianism,” Journal of Democracy 15(3) 2004, pp. 106.

49 an immanent suspicion of absolute knowledge and transcendental beings.170 He goes further in averring that, Confucianism has actually shown less of a predilection for totalitarianism, religious fanaticism, and terrorism than either Christianity or Islam.171

ii. Asian values debate

Between the 1970s and 1980s the “Four Asian Tigers”- Singapore, Hong

Kong, South Korea and Taiwan- began receiving international attention for their high economic growth and rapid industrialization. This phenomenon inspired a

Singaporean Prime Minister to hypothesize about the salutary effects that Asian

Values might have on economic performance. Along with the Asian Tigers, Japan’s remarkable post-war re-industrialization and ascension to the world’s second largest economy further instantiated the claims of Asian Values adherents. More recently,

China’s double-digit annual growth rate and sustained positive performance through the 2008 financial crisis have further piqued interest in the mystique of Asian Values and its core Confucian culture.172

At the zenith of enthusiasm for the emerging economic success of Asian nations in the 1980s, Lee Kuan Yew, suggested more stridently that Asian Values were a unifying regional ideology. He argued that Asian countries shared particular cultural characteristics that should serve as the foundation for political economies adapted for the region. Asian Values derives from the paternalist beliefs of

Confucianism. Scholars who argue from this perspective believe that Confucianism’s

170 Kang Jung, “Confucianism and Democracy in East Asia: A critique of Samuel P. Huntington’s third wave,” Korea Journal 39(3) 1999, pp. 322. 171 Jung emphasizes Confucianism’s religious aspects to compare it with Christianity and Islam. The question of the extent to which Confucianism can be likened to a religion will continue without resolution. 172 See David H.D. Truong, “Striving Towards ‘Doi Moi’ II,” Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), p. 328-39 for more on Vietnam’s economic growth after liberalization.

50 privileging of the leader over the individual has a salubrious effect on economic growth.173 According to Confucian thought, aggrandizing the state and maintaining its health is the apotheosis of political relations. Some scholars go so far as to deprecate western liberalism as ill-suited for the East Asian Confucian states.174

Reminiscent of the criticisms made against convergence theory, Asian Values have also been used as an equipoise to liberalism’s preponderance. Asian Values were especially useful to Lee Kuan Yew for deflecting criticisms of Singapore’s paternalist and illiberal form of rule, and to absolve it of responsibility for numerous human rights violations.175

There is some debate over the origins of Asian Values, with the earliest proposed formulation deriving from personal statements Yew made in the 1950s.176

Irrespective of its origin, various actors have used the Asian Values paradigm for contradictory purposes. During the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the same cultural foundation that had hitherto been credited for engendering economic growth was now derided for its deleterious effects. Several articles indicted specific aspects of Asian culture such as the importance of personal relationships in staffing, the indifference to widespread corruption and bribery, suspect corporate management, and connections between politicians and businessmen as precipitating the economic crisis. World leaders made disparaging remarks directly accusing Asian values of culpability in the

Asian Financial Crisis.177 The contumely was tinged with criticism of Confucianism as an inappropriate belief system from which state and economy should be structured.

173 Richard H. Franke, Geert Hofstede, and Michael H. Bond, “Cultural Roots of Economic Performance: A research note,” Strategic Management Journal 12(S1): Summer 1991, pp. 165-73. 174 Pye 1985, op. cit. (See also Kausikan 1997; Tatsuo 1999; Bell and Hahm 2003.) 175 Fukuyama 1992, op. cit., p. 23. (See also (Barr 2000; Ojendal and Antlov 1998, p. 527.) 176 Michael D. Barr, “Lee Kuan Yew and the ‘Asian Values’ Debate,” Asian Studies Review 24(3) September 2000, pp. 309-34. 177 Seung-hwan Lee, “The Significance of ‘Asian Values’ and Discursive Space,” Korean Journal 41(3) Autumn 2001, pp. 198-212.

iii. Trust in the ruler

In addition to the Asian Values debate, scholarly attention on China has crescendoed in the past thirty years. The scope of this voluminous literature touches on the social, cultural, economic and political dimensions of ancient Chinese civilization. With China’s growing economic clout, scholars have shown an interest in investigating the potential impact of Chinese culture on global affairs. Chinese political scientists at Tsinghua University led by Yan Xue-tong and Daniel Bell have inspired philosophical rumination over the influence Confucianism and ancient

Chinese political thought may have on the field of international relations.178

Proponents of this school argue that Confucianism compares favorably to contemporary western liberalism and its erroneous worldview organized by nation- states. Instead of the “individual, community and nation-state,” Chinese political thought is structured upon “Tianxia [all-under-heaven], state, and family.”179 Critics of this approach ridicule this explication of Confucianism as a feeble attempt at moralizing the authoritarian features of China and Confucian countries in East Asia.

Callahan (2008) suggests that the emphasis on Confucianism as the foundation of

China’s political outlook comes from the argument’s plausible engagement with common temporal ideas, such as nationalism, globalization, socialism, world peace, etc.180 The core of Confucian thought has hence been foisted into IR theory comfortably as a foil to western liberalism.

178 Feng Zhang, “Debating the ‘Chinese Theory of International Relations’: Toward a new stage in China’s international studies,” In Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyan (eds.) Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and perspectives (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2012), p. 80. 179 Tingyang Zhao, “Rethinking Empire from a Chinese Concept ‘All-under-Heaven’ (Tian-xia),” Social Identities 12(1) 2006, pp. 29-41. Quoted in William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?” International Studies Review 10(4) December 2008, pp. 749-761. 180 Callahan 2008 op. cit., p. 759.

52 The crux of the link between paternalism and trust in a virtuous leader is that primary agency belongs to the leader or head of the hierarchy. Civil society exists as a subordinate to the decision-making prerogative of the leadership under this paradigm. To measure the extent to which a respondent believes in the advantages of a paternalist government, I use the question, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following: as long as our leader has high ethics and morals, we can trust him/her to do anything for our county.” The respondents are asked to select from a range including “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Neither agree nor disagree,” “Disagree,”

“Disagree strongly,” and “Can’t choose.” Averring stronger agreement with the statement is taken as a deeper commitment to paternalist government, and therefore, to the tradition of Confucianism.

53 III. Democratization and Democratic Consolidation

a. Democratization

i. The third wave

The phenomenon known as the third wave of democratization is acknowledged as having begun in Portugal in 1974. Since that time, liberal norms and practices have transplanted authoritarian governance in countries from Latin

America, Africa, Asia, and East-Central Europe. At the conception of the third wave, at least 68 percent of countries in the world were authoritarian; by 1995 that number had dropped drastically to 26 percent. Those countries that had adopted liberal reforms and moved out of the ranks of authoritarian governments had accommodated some admixture of competitive elections and guarantees for political and civil rights.181

Francis Fukuyama (1992) aroused debate when he exalted the triumph of western liberal democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. At that time both South Korea and Taiwan were already five years removed from historic changes on their paths toward democratization.182 Fukuyama claimed that communism’s failure elucidated the inadequacy of all forms of governance other than those dedicated to liberalism. Consequently, the third wave of democratization would continue uninhibited by erroneous beliefs and flawed models. Hughes (2012) offers a pointed criticism of Fukuyama for, among other reasons, failing to “establish a logical coherence and notion of universal progression to events.”183 Similarly, other scholars have gone beyond Fukuyama’s one-size-fits-all assertion and investigated the process

181 Potter et al. 1997, op. cit. 182 Fukuyama 1992, op. cit. In 1987 South Korea elected a new president by direct election for the first time in twenty-six years (See Sung-Joo Han, “South Korea in 1987: The politics of democratization,” Asian Survey 28(1) January 1988, pp. 52-61.) Martial law was lifted in Taiwan in the same year. 183 Chris Hughes, Liberal Democracy as the End of History: Fukuyama and postmodern challenges. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), p. 39.

54 in which authoritarian regimes can transform into liberal democracies. The results of their inquiries have generated numerous theories on why and how authoritarian governments undergo democratization. Most fall within the frameworks of three general theoretical approaches: the modernization approach; the transition approach; and the structural approach. Theories within these three frameworks have shared ideas and analytical procedures that are categorically different from those of the other approaches. The three categories of theories also operate from disparate loci of democratization.184 The following section will give a brief description of these general theories of democratization and the phenomenon of democratic reversal before examining the democratization process in Taiwan.

ii. Theories of democratization

According to modernization theories, a number of social and economic circumstances must be extant before democratization can take root. Lipset’s (1960) seminal work, Political Man, is the classic text describing the modernization approach.185 Based on evidence from Europe, North America, Australia, and Latin

America, Lipset found that countries with sturdier foundations of democracy consistently possessed higher levels of socioeconomic development.186 The evolutionary theory is paradigmatic of the modernization approach and assumes that social change is unidirectional, progressive, and gradual, resembling the assumptions underpinning Fukuyama’s (1992) theory.187 Hence, according to modernization theories, countries have progressed from a primitive state to varying levels of

184 Potter et al., 1991, op. cit. p. 10. 185 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The social bases of politics (London: Heinemann, 1960). 186 Ibid, p. 31. (See also Lipset 1959.) 187 Fukuyama 1992, op. cit.

55 advancement on a straight path of development.188 Walt Rostow (1960, 1964) theorized five different stages in the evolution of societies and suggested that the most efficient path toward democratization was to follow that of the already developed democratic states.189 A second element associated with the modernization approach is functionalist theory, whose adherents believe that all political systems perform the same set of functions. While these functions may be performed by different structures conditional to each society, each state’s purpose for existence is the same.

Each state will prioritize further movement along the route to modernization.

Movement forward occurs as an outcome of internal factors such as the forms of differentiation, secularization, urbanization, industrialization, and participation of society.190

The transition approach is exemplified by Rustow’s (1970) work, which criticized Lipset’s thesis and the modernization approach for failing to address how a democracy is created in the first instance.191 Scholars using the transition approach to democratization focus on the political processes and elite initiatives and choices that result in democratization.192 Rustow’s model includes three phases and a

‘background condition,’ national unity, which requires belonging to a single political community and sharing a correspondent commitment to a recognized political identity.193 After national unity has been established, the three phrases of

188 Renske Doorenspleet, Democratic Transitions: Exploring the structural sources of the fourth wave (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005), p. 56. 189 Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-commmunist manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960). See also Walt Whitman Rostow, “The Takeoff into Self-Sustained Growth,” In Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (eds.). Social Change: Sources, patterns, and consequences (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 285-300. 190 Doorenspleet 2005, op. cit., p. 57. 191 Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to democracy,” Comparative Politics 2(3) April 1970, pp. 337-63. See also Potter et al. 1991, op. cit., p. 13. 192 Potter et al. 1991, op. cit., p. 10. (See also O’Donnell et al., 1986; Mainwaring et al., 1992; Shain and Linz 1995; Gill 2000, p. 43-80.) 193 Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, civil society and the transition process (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 43.

56 democratization are: a ‘preparatory phase’ consisting of major conflict between the opposition and the entrenched status quo forces; a ‘decision phase,’ or a ‘historical moment’ where compromise occurs; and finally, the ‘habituation phase’ where a new generation of elites sincerely believes in the democratic rules that were negotiated during the ‘decision phase.’194 Individual agency is crucial to this explanatory framework. Shain and Linz (1995), for example, believe that who rules and how during the period of interim government determine the extent that democratic practices can be institutionalized.195

Both the transition and structural approaches are concerned with long-term processes of historical change.196 However, in contrast to the transition approach, the structural approach is premised on the particular interrelationships of power structures within a state, specifically those in the economic, social and political domains.197 Barrington Moore (1966) created the framework for the structural approach.198 Moore’s research explored why, between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries, when agrarian societies were transforming into industrial states, some political regimes became democratic, some fascist, and others communist.199 Moore found a general pattern of dynamic relationships between peasants, lords, urban bourgeoisie and the state, which resulted in liberal democracy. Moore famously pronounced, ‘no bourgeoisie, no democracy’ based on the findings of his research.200

A new branch of modernization theory emerged in the tumult of the 1960s.

As elaborated in the previous section concerning corporatism and convergence theory

194 Potter et al. 1991, op. cit., p. 14. 195 Yossi Shain and Juan Linz (eds.). Between States: Interim governments and democratic transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 21. 196 Potter et al. 1991, op. cit., p. 18. 197 Anthony Giddens, Sociology (2nd edn) (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). (See also Rueschemeyer et al., 1992.) 198 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966). 199 Doorenspleet 2005, op. cit., p. 74. 200 Potter et al. 1991, op. cit., p. 19. (See also Harriss et al. 2004.)

57 the 1960s were a time of upheaval in the arena of political theory. Cataclysmic events around the world proved that the optimism characterizing the post-war period was illusory. Daniel Chirot described the period as follows:

The American debacle in Vietnam and the eruption of major racial troubles in the mid 1960s, followed by chronic inflation, the devaluation of the American dollar, and the general loss of America’s self-confidence in the early 1970s, ended the moral conviction on which modernization theory had come to base itself. A new type of theory became popular among younger sociologists, one that reversed all of the old axioms. America became the very model of evil, and capitalism, which had been seen as the cause of social progress, became a sinister exploiter and the main agent of poverty in most of the world. Imperialism, not backwardness and the lack of modernity, was the new enemy.201

In part due to this pessimism, a new branch within the modernization approach emerged, whose proponents focused on dependency and democratization. These scholars, using the experience of Latin America as a model, attributed the absence of democratization in those countries not to poor performance as measured by socioeconomic indicators, but as a direct result of the history of colonization and exploitation perpetrated precisely by those heretofore eulogized advanced economies.

In turning modernization theory on its head, the dependency theorists proposed that states with high levels of dependency are more likely to have unequal distributions of income, low levels of economic development, and authoritarian political systems.202

iii. Democratic reversal

Much to the chagrin of scholars and citizens of third wave countries anticipating a smooth transition to democracy, both the processes and outcomes of democratization have been ambiguous at best. Some countries have reverted back to authoritarian government, while others are beleaguered by corruption, violations of

201 Daniel Chirot, “Changing Fashions in the Study of the Social Causes of Economic and Political Change,” In J.F. Short (ed.). The State of Sociology: Problems and prospects (London: Sage Publications, 1981). Quoted in Doorenspleet 2005, op. cit. 202 Doorenspleet 2005, op. cit., p. 64. (See also Kaufman et al. 1975, p. 306-309; Frank 1967, 1969.)

58 constitutionally guaranteed checks and balances, poor human rights records, political gridlock, ineffective administration, and failure to promote distributive justice.203

Descriptions of ‘illiberal democracies’ appear frequently in the democratization literature.204 Moreover, even those countries that are ostensibly democratic may in fact operate in ways very different from the imagined ideal.205

Andreas Schedler (1998) described processes in which democracies “break down” or suffer from “erosion.” In the case of the former, Schedler believes that

“unbounded uncertainties” may persist in democratizing regimes that threaten to reverse the achievements of democratic actors. Similarly, erosion may result in the

‘slow death’ of a young democracy insofar as a progressive diminution of civil society and democratic guarantees encroaches on the state. Among the features that

Schedler suggests are indicative of democratic decay are: subversion of the rule of law by the state, the rise of hegemonic parties that violate the principle of competitive elections, the loss of legitimacy of electoral institutions, unfair advantages accrued to incumbent politicians’ access to state resources and the mass media, and exclusionary citizenship laws.206

Samuel Huntington himself was aware of the potential for setbacks in newly democratized countries. He proposed that waves of democratization were often accompanied by a reverse wave, in which some of the rudimentary democratic systems would shift toward more authoritarian government (see Chart 3.1).207 The first wave of reversal accelerated during the economic-induced distress of the 1930s,

203 Yin-wah Chu and Siu-lun Wong (eds.). East Asia’s New Democracies: Deepening, reversal, non- liberal alternatives (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010). 204 Huntington 1993, op. cit. (See also Collier and Levitsky 1997; Zakaria 1997; Fox 1997; Bell et al. 1995, p. 1-16, 36-40; Grugel 2002.) 205 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 10. 206 Andreas Schedler, “What is Democratic Consolidation?” Journal of Democracy 9(2) 1998, pp. 94- 97. 207 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 16.

59 while the second wave followed the post World War II economic crises, the rise of subversive parties, and slippages in democratic efficiency and authenticity.208

Huntington (1997) observed the same trend continuing for the third wave, remarking that most of the newly democratized countries were only nominally democratic, or democratic in its electoral sense only, while leaders still acted arbitrarily and individual rights were suppressed in the name of the state.209 Echoing Huntington’s lament, Collier and Levitsky (1997) suggest using “democracy with an adjective,” e.g. hybrid-democracy, semi-democracy, illiberal democracy, elite democracy, etc., to categorize many of the third wave democracies.210

Chart 3.1: Huntington’s waves of democratization and reversal

Waves Years

First long wave of democratization 1828-1926

First wave of reversal 1922-1942

Second, short wave of democratization 1943-1962

Second wave of reversal 1958-1975

Third wave of democratization 1974-

Noting the precedence of democratic reversals from past waves of democratization, Larry Diamond (1996) questioned whether the third wave of democratization had exhausted its potential shortly before the turn of the new millennium.211 Other scholars have examined the possibility that a ‘reverse wave’ has

208 Stockton 2006, op. cit. 209 Samuel P. Huntington, “After Twenty Years: The future of the third wave,” Journal of Democracy 8(4) 1997, pp. 3-12. 210 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual innovation in comparative research,” World Politics 49(3) 1997, pp. 430-51. (See also Zakaria 1997.) 211 Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?” Journal of Democracy 7(3) 1996, pp. 20-37.

60 already begun to erode democratic achievements in third wave democracies.212 A quick scan of the democratization literature, particularly since 2007, shows that pessimism over the fate of third wave democracies is intensifying.213

Even in putatively established democracies, authoritarian policies can replace liberal practices. The post-9/11 United States is one of the oft-cited examples of a mature democracy suspending civil liberties and imposing draconian measures on its citizens.214 Similarly, there has been a dramatic surge in the membership and activities of fascist and right-wing groups in the wake of the anguish caused by the

2008 ‘Great Recession.’215 Finally, the uncovering of numerous banking and financial scandals has also created new uncertainties about the rights of citizens in a globalized era, specifically the extent to which citizens can or should be protected from malfeasance and predation by international institutions.

The complications of democratization and democratic consolidation have been the topic of a voluminous amount of research. Within this literature, theories about the path to democratization have generally been organized according to their explanatory concerns (transition, consolidation, quality) and levels of analysis (macro, meso, micro).216 Tilly (2007) elaborates on these explanatory concerns, noting that their substance largely explains the level of procedural democracy in a given polity.217 Pateman (1970) emphasized that procedural norms are an insufficient

212 Olena Nikolayenko, “Press Freedom during the 1994 and 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine: A reverse wave?” Europe-Asia Studies 56(5) July 2004, pp. 661-686. (See also Nathan 2003; Levitsky and Way 2002.) 213 Wolfgang Merkel, “Are Dictatorships Returning? Revisiting the ‘Democratic Rollback’ Hypothesis,” Contemporary Politics 16(1) March 2010, pp. 17-31. 214 Glenn Greenwald, "Washington Gets Explicit: Its 'War on Terror' is permanent." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 17 May 2013. Web. 20 May 2013. 215 Peter Walker and Matthew Taylor, "Far Right on the Rise in Europe, Says Report." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 11 June 2011. Web. 20 May 2013. 216 Chu and Wong 2010, op. cit. 217 Charles Tilly, Democracy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

61 valuation of democracy, and that citizens’ participation in governance, rather than representation, is sine qua non to a comprehensive democratic theory.218

Democratic deepening has proven much more elusive if viewed through this alternative framework. In fact, despite the spread and extension of relatively free and fair elections, as well as the introduction of democratic institutions across large swaths of the world, several of the assumptions about the benefits of democratization have been proven fallible.219 Birdsall (1998) bemoans empirical evidence that the spread of democracy has seemingly been accompanied with rising global and national levels of income inequality.220 Many forms of participatory democracy are also underdeveloped and discouraged in the third wave democracies. Transformative social reform has also been slow to emerge in newly democratized countries, and optimism for redistributive policies and elimination of social inequality in new democracies has generally been unrequited in genuine change.221

Scholars are cognizant of the enigma of democratic institutionalization sans democratic deepening. A substantial body of research has been done on the causal relationships between economic and political liberalization and democratization on the one hand, and social equality and political inclusiveness on the other.222

Przeworski (2010) identifies four pervasive challenges that continue to hamper democratization and spread dissatisfaction with the democratization process, including, “ (1) the incapacity to generate equality in the socioeconomic realm, (2) the incapacity to make people feel that their political participation is effective, (3) the

218 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 21. (See also Macpherson 1977; Grugel 2002.) 219 Joseph Wong, “Adapting to Democracy: Societal mobilization and social policy in Taiwan and South Korea,” Studies in Comparative International Development 40(3) Fall 2005, pp. 88. 220 Nancy Birdsall, “Life is Unfair: Inequality in the world,” Foreign Policy 111 Summer 1998, pp. 77. 221 Ibid, p. 78. 222 Wong 2005, op. cit. (See also Weyland 1996; Kapstein and Mandelbaum 1997; Goodman et al., 1998; Encarnacion 2001; Chuang 2004; Loh 2008.)

62 incapacity to ensure that governments do what they are supposed to do and not do what they are not mandated to do, and (4) the incapacity to balance order and noninterference.”223 Any fair assessment of democratic consolidation should therefore engage with a comprehensive set of observations including, but not limited to the procedural aspects of democratic transition. Additionally, a careful study of the democratization process also requires a longitudinal approach to trace the course of liberal practices. Having reviewed the potential hindrances to the democratization process, the next section scrutinizes Taiwan’s track record of carrying out liberal governance.

b. Legacies of One-Party Rule

Reflecting on the experiences of other third wave democratizers, observers might well conclude that Taiwan has prima facie had a smooth transition from an authoritarian government to a liberal democracy. Taiwan’s nearly violence-free and competitive electoral politics at both the local and national levels have duly received plaudit from the international community. The transformation from an authoritarian state governing under the aegis of suspended constitutional rights to a full electoral democracy with universal suffrage occurred rapidly after the repeal of martial law. At that time, Taiwan held the record for the longest period of martial law in history.

Since then, Taiwan has settled into a competitive two-party political system, and the island has passed the ‘two turnover test,’ as the presidency was peacefully transferred from the KMT to the DPP in 2000 and subsequently regained by the former in 2008.

223 Przeworski 2010, op. cit., p. 1-2.

63 Taiwan has undergone seven rounds of constitutional amendments since

1986.224 Scholars have criticized the constitutional amendments for perceived flaws in both the procedure and outcome of the seven rounds of revision. At times, the process of amending the constitution has seemed to be more of an imposition by the ruling KMT rather than a negotiation between political parties. Furthermore, political expediency and short-term political compromise provided the incentive for constitutional reform rather than a detailed and coherent vision.225 Both the DPP and the NP have in the past boycotted the constitutional reform process altogether.

Despite the numerous rounds of constitutional amendments, the basic five-branch structure, made up by the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Control

Yuan and Examination Yuan, has remained intact.226 Dafydd Fell (2005) presciently reasoned that Taiwan would become a two-party polity after the 2000 constitutional amendments.227 Since then, independent candidates who are often backed by either

KMT or DPP (affiliated) factional support have in fact outperformed third party candidates.228

In 2004 a new National Assembly, after being disbanded since 2000, was elected and called into session to pass the seventh and putatively final round of constitutional amendments. The new revisions de facto concluded the period of

Taiwan’s constitutional reforms based on a new clause requiring the support of three- fourths of parliament and approval of fifty percent of eligible voters in a referendum

224 June Tsai, "Forum Scrutinizes Constitutional Reform Under DPP." Taiwantoday.tw. 9 Mar. 2007. Web. 08 May 2013. 225 Chu 1999, op. cit. 226 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 54. 227 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 145. (See also Stockton, Hans. 2012. “Identity is Dead, Long Love Identity: The relative influences of ethnicity, future status, and partisan identification on voting in presidential elections on Taiwan 2004-2012,” Paper presented at The Maturing of Taiwan Democracy: Findings and insights from the 2012 TEDS survey conference. November 3-4, 2012. Taipei, Taiwan; Wu 2008; Gobel 2012.) 228 Shelley Rigger, Electoral Reform, Issue Cleavages and the Consolidation of a Two-Party System in Taiwan (2011). APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN:

64 for any new amendment.229 At the procedural level then, Taiwan’s democratic consolidation process can be considered an exemplar of success compared with the examples of other third wave democracies, especially those of Latin America and

Eastern Europe.230

However, as the previous section argued, merely assessing successful democratization on the standard of procedural democracy is insufficient and derogatory to the spirit of liberalism. The procedural qualities of democracy such as exercising free and fair elections with a multi-party system provide only a superficial assessment of the practice of liberal governance. It may be an important indicator of the health of the body politic, however its value as the definitive basis for judgment of democratic consolidation per se is tenuous. Holden (1993) concurs that neither the creation of political parties nor the holding of elections predestine the granting of democratic freedoms and rights.231 Some scholars insist that true democratization entails a significant and institutionalized redistribution of power.232

Even the procedural features of Taiwan’s democracy are liable to criticism.

Some analysts are skeptical of whether the constitutional issue has truly been settled, or if open conflict is just in abeyance.233 Chen Shui-bian drew the ire of KMT members by turning constitutional reform into a political ploy in late 2006 while he was embroiled in scandal and popular support for his party was disintegrating.

President Chen proposed discarding the existing constitution and initiating a process

229 Stockton 2010, op. cit., p. 22. See also Hille, Kathrin. "Taiwan Approves Constitutional Reform." Financial Times: 10. Jun 08 2005. ABI/INFORM Complete. Web. 29 Nov. 2012. 230 Joseph Wong, “Deepening Democracy in Taiwan,” Pacific Affairs 76(2) Summer 2003, pp. 235-56. (See also Matsumoto 2002, p. 359.) 231 Barry Holden, Understanding Liberal Democracy (New York, NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 232 Jean Grugel, Democratization: A critical introduction (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2002). (See also Beetham 1992; Tornquist 2001.) 233 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 55.

65 to draft a new constitution.234 Although Chen’s proposal fizzled out under escalating pressure on his administration, Lee Teng-hui rekindled the debate in 2011 by making remarks that Taiwan should replace the ROC Constitution with a new one that reflected modern realities.235 Stockton (2010) argues that the last round of constitutional reforms haven’t settled whether the KMT will become a party government under the new electoral system or a dominant party with few checks on its power.236

Taiwan’s polity also retains several legacies of one-party rule that have survived a quarter century after the lifting of martial law. Meanwhile, other anti- democratic tendencies have materialized in the evolution of Taiwan’s democracy. A peculiar aspect of Taiwan’s democratization process is that immanent characteristics of the Taiwanese state have both aided the democratization process and produced features that are anomalous to liberal democratic principles. This irony is demonstrated by the interesting fact that former president Lee Teng-hui, who ruled for eight years without an electoral mandate from Taiwanese citizens, is known as “Mr.

Democracy” to the public. Mattlin (2011) warns that Taiwan’s political transition has shown signs of being frozen in a state that isn’t quite liberal, yet resolutely isn’t authoritarian.237

Among the remaining challenges for democratic consolidation is the legacy of an extensive local patronage network between KMT and local politicians, which has allowed local factions to continue playing a vital and controversial role in elections.

Local factions were pivotal in providing organized support bases to Taiwanese

234 Edward Cody and Anthony Faiola, “Chen Plans Debate On Taiwan Charter." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 14 Mar. 2006. Web. 06 Feb. 2013. 235 Shu-ling Ko, "Lee Calls for Constitution to Be Scrapped." 20110322 Lee Calls for Constitution to Be Scrapped. Taipei Times, 22 Mar. 2011. Web. 08 May 2013. 236 Stockton 2010, op. cit., p. 40. 237 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 27.

66 politicians, especially after the 1970s when the KMT promoted local Taiwanese to higher positions within the government. Their continued role in politics after democratization has been more controversial. Constitutional amendments were passed in 2005 that would purportedly limit the influence of factions in Taiwanese politics and negate many of the ills that tarnished Taiwan’s democracy, including extremism, lowered inter-party competition, heightened intra-party competition, candidate-centered politics, vote-buying, clientelism and organized crime.238 These amendments replaced the SNTV system with a majority system, halving the number of legislators from 225 to 113, with elections to the Legislative Yuan occurring every four years beginning from 2008, with 73 legislators elected from single-member districts, 34 legislators from an open party-list ballot, and 6 legislators from the aboriginal population.239 Similar reforms in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines have been shown to reduce factionalism in politics.240 However, the results of Taiwan’s reforms have been mixed, as factionalism has obstinately continued influence

Taiwanese politics.241 Stockton (2010) simulated the results of the 2008 Legislative

Yuan elections and surprisingly found that the new system strengthened the KMT, transformed Taiwan into a two-party system, and increased the disproportionality of the vote:seat ratio.242

238 Teh-fu Huang, “Party Systems in Taiwan and South Korea,” In Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, Hung-mao Tien (eds.) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 144-47. (See also (Cox 1996; Cox and Niou 1994; Cox and Thies 1998; Hsieh 1996, 1999; Wang 1996; Lin 1996.) 239 Stockton 2010, op. cit., p. 24 (See also Lin 2006; Jou 2009.) 240 Ibid 2010, op. cit., p. 22. 241 Christian Gobel, “The Impact of Electoral System Reform on Taiwan’s Local Factions,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 41(3) 2012, pp. 88. 242 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Is the Kuomintang Invincible?” In Wei-Chin Lee. Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), p. 37. (See also We 2008.)

67 Waffling support for democratic ideals among Taiwanese citizens has also proven a difficult obstacle to overcome for Taiwan’s consolidating democracy.243

Scholars have shown that popular trust in political institutions is an integral component of democratic consolidation.244 Trust is an essential socio-psychological concept that forms the foundation of social and political life. A high level of trust between a polity and its citizenry can enhance social well-being, prosperity, and the health of democracy.245 One study found that Taiwanese voters have a surprisingly low satisfaction and commitment to democracy and that there is a moderate but measurable alienation from government.246 Other scholars have found recent evidence that popular trust in political institutions declined in Taiwan between 2001 and 2006.247 The level of satisfaction with democracy among Taiwanese also seems to be contingent on election results. Chu (2012b) observed that 96.3 percent of KMT supporters believed that the 2012 elections (in which a KMT candidate won) were free and fair, compared with 50.5 percent of DPP voters.248

In addition to these domestic concerns, Taiwan must also confront an external threat from a CPP government whose territory includes the ancestral homeland of

98% of Taiwan’s population. The China factor in Taiwanese politics introduces an existential Gordian knot to the congeries of issues relevant to democratization. Ethnic identity and national identity are thereby both contentious and fluid, complicating

243 Rigger (2001) describes the vote-buying, corruption (‘black gold,’ heijin) and gangster politics that continued to plague Taiwanese politics, even after political liberalization. 244 Diamond 1999, op. cit. (See also Diamond 2002; Johnson 2005; Luhiste 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2000.) 245 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity (New York, NY: Free Press, 1995). See also (Bianco 1994; Cook 2001; Hardin 2006; Putnam 1993; Warren 1999.) 246 Stockton 2006, op. cit. 247 Huo-yan Shyu, “Trust in Institutions and the Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan,” In Wei-Chin Lee. Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), p. 92. 248 Yun-han Chu, “Empirical Indicators Showing the Maturing of Taiwan Democracy,” Paper presented at The Maturing of Taiwan Democracy: Findings and insights from the 2012 TEDS survey conference. November 3-4, 2012. Taipei, Taiwan.

68 even further the democratization process.249 The following sections describe the processes and idiosyncrasies of Taiwan that have spurred democratization as well as discomfited its consolidation.

i. National identity

Prior to the 1990s, ethnic identity was more salient than national identity in determining political orientation. As mentioned earlier, the 2-28 Incident, albeit rarely spoken of during the period of martial law, still fomented indignation from an older generation of Taiwanese who had witnessed the wanton violence of the KMT regime. Ethnic discrimination was also conspicuous in the unfair treatment of local

Taiwanese, including the overwhelming control of government positions held by the minority mainlanders, who accounted for only 15 percent of the population in

Taiwan.250 Until the 1990s, ethnic justice and democratization made up the entirety of the DPP and its predecessor, the dangwai’s political platform. Indeed, going beyond these issues would have been detrimental to the opposition, as the movement was made up of disparate groups with oftentimes contradictory economic demands.251

After Chiang Ching-kuo’s death, Lee Teng-hui accelerated the Taiwanization of the KMT and successfully isolated the conservative mainlander faction within the party. The DPP rapidly lost its unifying cause and was forced to experiment with new issues to attract voters. Rigger (2001) finds that by the mid-1990s, the DPP’s original reform agenda had been accomplished, conducted even before Lee Teng-hui and the

249 Paolino and Meernik 2008, op. cit. Przeworski (1995, p.21) argues that if ethnic identity is a divisive and prominent issue in a society, “it is more likely a consequence of institutional failure rather than a cause of it.” The premise that ethnic identity is correlated with institutional failure is enough for the present purpose. 250 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Democracy in a Mildly Divided Society,” In Philip Paolino and James D. Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008) p. 11-12. 251 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 7.

69 KMT faced a direct presidential election. The first issue that the newly formed DPP attempted to rally voters around was Taiwanese independence. At its 1991 National

Party Congress before the National Assembly election the DPP inserted a plank in its platform calling for a new constitution and the creation of a new “Republic of

Taiwan,” explicitly endorsing Taiwanese independence.252

However, it had not been a foregone conclusion either that the DPP would advocate Taiwanese independence, or that it would employ national identity in formulating its policies. The DPP’s emphasis of Taiwanese independence was a result of intraparty struggle, when the radical New Tide Faction briefly triumphed over the moderate Formosa Faction. DPP candidates performed anemically in the elections, as the KMT won well over 67 percent of the vote and almost 77 percent of the new seats.253 Political commentators attributed the DPP’s resounding defeat in the

1991 National Assembly to its adoption of the independence plank. The results of the election rebuffed the pro-independence wing of the party and prompted the party to subsequently adopt a more moderate stance on the independence issue.254

Following the disastrous 1991 National Assembly elections, the DPP turned to the issue of UN membership as an ersatz party plank for Taiwanese independence.

The issue was popular and innocuous enough that the KMT co-opted it.255 This pattern of KMT co-optation of an idea originating with the DPP has been repeated frequently in Taiwanese politics post-democratization. During the period of authoritarian rule, the KMT was an ideologically flexible party devoted to maintaining control of the island ante omnia rather than any shared ideological

252 Ibid, p. 151. 253 Chu 1999, op. cit., p. 150 254 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 32. (See also Sutter 1992; Fell 2005, op. cit., 100.) 255 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 39. (See also Diamond and Plattner 1998, op. cit.)

70 conviction.256 On issues such as national health care coverage and UN membership, the KMT showed itself amenable to reform, belying the image of it as a rigid ex- authoritarian regime.257

While the KMT has been able to convince voters that it has transformed itself from an authoritarian regime into a competitive democratic party, the DPP has been burdened by its lack of intraparty consensus on the national identity issue.258

Although the DPP has shed its most radical pro-independence supporters, it has not lost a vocal base of supporters who hold tenaciously to pro-Taiwan sentiments. The party’s reputation as fecklessly provocative is embodied in the ‘independence plank’ that still remains in the DPP charter.

The DPP has generally found success in national elections to be enigmatic, although the 2012 Legislative Yuan elections showed that the pan-green camp is able to mobilize its support base, primarily in the south, to win positions in the island’s legislative body.259 Still, the DPP has struggled to penetrate the KMT’s stranglehold on north and central Taiwan. In the 2012 Legislative Yuan elections, voters in those regions elected 39 KMT legislators to the DPP’s 9, and the pan-green coalition remained the minority in the legislature, holding only 43 seats overall to the pan- blue’s 69 (See charts 3.1 and 3.2 below).260

256 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 32. 257 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 151. 258 The most recent controversy was over former Premier Frank Hsieh’s trip to Mainland China. See for example Rich Chang, "DPP Struggles to Form China Policy." - Taipei Times. 25 Nov. 2012. Web. 22 Dec. 2012. 259 Jacques deLisle, Shelley Rigger, Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, M. Terry Cooke (discussants). “Taiwan’s Presidential and Legislative Election: Implications for cross-strait relations, U.S. policy and domestic politics.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. Friday, January 20, 2012. 260 See "2012 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RESULTS." - Taipei Times. 15 Jan. 2012. Web. 23 Dec. 2012. I consider the following to be in northern Taiwan: Keelung City, New Taipei City, Taipei City, Taoyuan County, Yilan County, Hsinchu County, Hsinchu City, Greater Taichung, Yilan County, Hualien County, Changhua County, Nantou County, and Miaoli County. I consider the following to be in southern Taiwan: Chiayi County, Chiayi City, Greater Tainan, Greater Kaohsiung, Pingtung County, Taitung County.

71 Chart 3.3: 2012 Legislative Yuan election results: Northern and Central Taiwan

District KMT DPP People First Party

Keelung City 1 0 0

New Taipei City 10 2 0

Taipei City 7 1 0

Taoyuan County 6 0 0

Hsinchu County 1 0 0

Hsinchu City 1 0 0

Yilan County 0 1 0

Miaoli County 2 0 0

Greater Taichung 4 3 1

Changhua County 3 1 0

Nantou County 2 0 0

Yunlin County 1 1 0

Hualien County 1 0 0

Total 39 9 1

Chart 3.4: 2012 Legislative Yuan election results: Southern Taiwan

District KMT DPP PFP

Chiayi County 1 1 0

Chiayi City 0 1 0

Greater Tainan 0 5 0

Greater Kaohsiung 2 7 0

Pingtung County 1 2 0

Taitung County 0 1 0

Total 4 17 0

The nature of Taiwan’s relationship with China is the most important social issue separating political camps. However, opinions on the national identity issue are

72 not one-dimensional, but depend on a number of external factors, such as the threat of military intervention by China, the commitment of the US to Taiwan’s security, and democratization and liberalization in China.261 Niou (2008) found that a plurality of

Taiwanese respondents (38 percent) would accept either unification or independence, conditioned on whether or not peace across the Strait was maintained.262

These voters are wary of what they view as an extreme and irrational pro-

Taiwan sentiment of some elements within the DPP. China’s omnipresent threat to use force if it deems it necessary to protect its core interests, and the ineluctable development of economic relationships between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have dissuaded enough voters, particularly in the north, from voting for the pan-green coalition. The KMT has consistently been able to, if not obtain a majority in the legislature, at least prevent the DPP from forming one itself. The DPP’s unenviable position was evident during the first term of the Chen Shui-bian administration, when

President Chen’s overtures to the mainland were cold-shouldered by Beijing, despite taking, “the most accommodating explicit campaign position toward China at that time,” including appointing several members of the KMT to his cabinet.263

China’s presence across the Taiwan Strait is a major hindrance to the election of a second DPP president. Taiwanese voters are aware of the outstanding threat that

China poses to Taiwan’s national security. A considerable number of Taiwanese voters therefore approach the national identity rationally, and would support either peaceful unification with a democratic China or peaceful independence. The national identity issue is fraught with difficulties for the DPP because of its reputation for being obstinately pro-Taiwanese, despite the existence of more accommodating

261 T.Y. Wang, “National Identity and Democratization in Taiwan: An introduction,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 40(1-2) April 2005, pp. 8. 262 Niou 2008, op. cit., p. 171. 263 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 188. (See also Clark, Cal. 2000. The 2000 Presidential Elections. New York, NY: Asia Society, p. 15.)

73 members within its fold. A recent survey underscores the DPP’s imbroglio; when asked whether or not they understood what the DPP’s China policy entails, a mere

15.8 percent of respondents said they understood, while 62.5 percent were unaware of the contents of the policy.264 Until the DPP can settle its schizophrenic orientation towards cross-strait policy, the Taiwanese electorate will likely remain skeptical of the party’s ability to handle the presidential mandate.

ii. A middle-class society

Taiwan is unique among third wave democracies in the level and breadth of economic prosperity from which democratization evolved.265 Between 1960 and

1985, the average annual economic growth rate was 8.8%, while the GDP per capita during that time grew from $164 to $3,290, a twentyfold increase. The gross national product (GNP) rose from US$1.67 billion in 1952 to about US$77.3 billion in

1986.266 Moreover, this remarkable economic growth did not produce high levels of income inequality. Between 1950 and 1980, the overall Gini coefficient fell from about .56 to .28, while the poverty rate also declined dramatically during this time.267

This remarkable economic growth occurred prior to the annulment of martial law and commencement of democratization. More surprisingly for disciples of neo-liberalism, it occurred under a state guided economy before substantial economic liberalization was implemented.

Among the policies that contributed to strong and equitable economic growth were land reform, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in the 1950s, export-

264 Chris Wang, "DPP Scores Poorly in Public Poll." - Taipei Times. 20 May. 2013. Web. 10 June. 2013. 265 Paolino and Meernik 2008, op. cit. 266 Hsiao and Cheng 1999, op. cit., p. 110. 267 Wu and Tun-jen Cheng 2011, op. cit. (See also Kuo 2000; Fell 2005; Ash and Greene 2007.)

74 oriented industrialization (EOI) in the 1960s, and a return to ISI in the 1970s.268

Rapid industrial growth and land reform combined to restructure Taiwanese society.

Land reform in the 1950s separated the former landowner class from its source of power, while simultaneously creating a small landowner class. It also generated support for the KMT from individual farm families, increased agricultural productivity and stimulated grassroots democracy in Taiwan.269 The KMT’s land reform program has been touted as its most successful political and economic policy.

It culminated in the granting of property rights to more than 2 million Taiwanese and a wide redistribution of wealth away from the traditional landed gentry class. Many of the former landowners sold the stock they had received as compensation to

Taiwanese outside of the traditional elite, greatly reducing income inequality throughout Taiwanese society.270

Meanwhile, the KMT state’s policy of ISI was designed to meet domestic economic needs and build local industrial capabilities. The main beneficiaries of ISI were the erstwhile Taiwanese landlords who became the first indigenous industrial capitalists by holding onto their shares in the four nationalized industries, party- owned enterprises, mainlanders who owned industries, and local entrepreneurs. The next phase of industrialization policy, EOI, was essential to the rapid growth of the

Taiwanese economy in the 1960s-1970s. Its modus operandi was the promotion of exports through the development of labor-intensive industries. Measured by percentage of GDP, Taiwan’s industrial sectors overtook its agricultural sectors for the first time in 1963.271 As a consequence of the shift from ISI to EOI, private

268 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 148-50. (See also Hsiao and Cheng 1999, p. 110; Marsh 2003, p. 40.) 269 Rigger 2001, op. cit. (See also Tsai 1967; Yang 1970; Schafferer 2003.) 270 Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao and Hsiao-shih Cheng, “Taiwan,” In Ian Marsh, Jean Blondel, Takashi Inoguchi (eds.) Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia (New York, NY: United Nations University Press, 1999), p. 115. (See also Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 92.) 271 Ibid, p. 116-17.

75 capitalists, both mainlanders and Taiwanese, small and medium-sized enterprises, a newly-created urban middle class, and the industrial working class all grew in number and economic activity.272 The second phase of ISI began in the 1970s and was designed to restructure the economy to feature energy-intensive and capital-intensive industries, and to develop large-scale infrastructure projects, called the “Great Ten

Constructions.”273

The KMT’s land reform and industrial policies created a large class of wage earners, a group of industrial capitalists, and a prominent Taiwanese middle class.274

Between the mid-1950s and mid-1980s, Taiwan’s working class increased from less than 15 percent to more than 40 percent of the total population, while Taiwan’s middle class rose from about 20 percent to more than 30 percent, with a concurrent decline in the farming population.275 The United States provided a generous amount of nonmilitary aid, amounting to $100 million, or about 40% of Taiwan’s capital formation for nearly 20 years, finally ending in 1965. Part of the aid went toward infrastructure projects, while some went toward training technical specialists. Almost all of the aid, 80%, came in the form of unrequited grants to Taiwan; American aid accounted for over one-third of Taiwan’s total investment and 74 percent of all investment in agriculture.276 The KMT was remarkably successful in the economic realm and transformed Taiwan into a middle-class society during its period of authoritarian one-party rule.277 The impressive economic growth cum repressive state

272 Hsiao 1990, op. cit., p. 165. 273 Hsiao and Cheng 1999, op. cit., p. 119. 274 Marsh 2003, op. cit., p. 41. 275 Once making up more than 90 percent of the population, Taiwan’s farmers made up only 9 percent of the work force in 2003 (See Schafferer 2003; Roy 2003 op. cit., p. 25.) 276 Roy 2001, op. cit., p. 90. 277 Cal Clark Janet Clark, “The Political Economy of Rapid Development in Taiwan,” Journal of Developing Societies. 9 1993, pp. 197-211.

76 control precluded the development of class-based organization and mobilization in

Taiwanese politics.

Prior to democratization, class politics were secondary to ethnic identification.

As a result of the unique confluence of class, ethnicity, and the distribution of political and economic resources in Taiwan, ethnic identity served as a suitable avenue through which class-related grievances could be articulated.278 However, clearly defined class awareness is essential to developing an understanding of how society works and about the processes that shape citizens’ lives in society.279 Identity politics has continued to constitute the dominant discourse in Taiwan in the guise of national identity post-democratization. In the post-2000 political milieu, social class doesn’t fit as neatly into a political schema centered on identity politics. Class-based concerns have hence been limited in salience and ability to instigate energetic popular mobilization within Taiwanese politics.

According to Gates (1987), Taiwanese are aware of wealth and educational distinctions, yet social class is not a significant source of political identity.280

Taiwan’s political spectrum lacks a Left/Right division that is a feature of many industrial and post-industrial countries. Research has shown that even Taiwanese who self-report themselves as being members of the working class tend to support cooperation rather than conflict in labor-management relations.281 Despite the fact that previous studies have shown that class politics have a salubrious effect on democratic reform, transition and consolidation, Taiwan has managed to achieve

278 David D. Yang, “Classing Ethnicity: Class, ethnicity, and the mass politics of Taiwan’s democratic transition,” World Politics 59(4) July 2007, pp. 537. 279 Martha E. Gimenez, “With a Little Class: A critique of identity politics,” Ethnicities 6(3) September 2006, pp. 424 280 Hill Gates, Chinese Working Class Lives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). (See also Winckler and Greenhalgh 1988, p. 35-36; Rigger 2001; Wu and Cheng 2011, op. cit., p. 251.) 281 Robert M. Marsh and Cheng-kuang Hsu, “White-Collar Proletarianization? The Case of Taiwan,” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 13 1994, pp. 43-69.

77 democratization with a near-complete absence of class-based discourse in mainstream political debate.282 This deficiency remains an obstacle to Taiwanese citizens’ general understanding of social relations both on Taiwan and between Taiwanese across the Taiwan Strait.

iii. State-sponsored democratization

A watershed moment in Taiwan’s state-facilitated democratization process occurred when the KMT tolerated the establishment of a political party on September

28, 1986 by dangwai politicians and activists. Since that historic breakthrough, the pertinent issues and alignment of political groups along those issues has included continuities as well as transmutations. Ever since the 2-28 Incident, the designation of mainlander and “other” (generally centered on the idea of “local Taiwanese,” but also including Hakka and Aborigines) has tinctured political debate. As a consequence, Taiwanese politics continue to be dominated by an admixture of national and ethnic identity, and political parties founded on class-based issues have been marginal to the political process. On the other hand, the issues salient to

Taiwanese politics have included independence, crime, corruption, stability in cross- strait relations and economic concerns.

Taiwan’s relatively peaceful transition to a successful procedural democracy has delivered more triumphant than tragic moments, including the holding of direct presidential elections in 1996, the first ever in the island’s history. Since then more laudatory events have followed in the process of democratic consolidation. In 2000 the opposition DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidency, leading to the first peaceful turnover of power by democratic process in Taiwan’s history. Then, in 2008,

282 Streeck 2006, op. cit., p.15 (See also Castles 1987; Navarro 1991; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992, p. 97; Linz and Stepan 1996 op. cit., p. 11-15; Chu and Wong 2010.)

78 the KMT won back the presidency, as its candidate Ma Ying-jeou took office and ushered in a new period of KMT-led government. As noted earlier, with Ma Ying- jeou’s election to the presidency, Taiwan fulfilled Huntington’s (1991) “two turnover” test of successful democratic consolidation.283

Although the moniker ‘Free China’ was never apposite for the authoritarian party-state in Taiwan led by the KMT, competitive and regular local elections gave the regime a semblance of being at the administrative helm of a democratic entity.

Although independent political parties were prohibited from participating, the democratization process in Taiwan was nonetheless succored by the experience of electioneering. Elections have been held as early as 1950, with positions open at the village, township, county, and provincial levels.284 Taiwanese are familiar with the routine of elections and have traditionally participated at high rates at the local level, albeit shrouded under the pall of authoritarian rule. Local elections were first a means of building local support for the KMT and nurturing rival factions to insulate its position by keeping competition restricted to a local scale.285 After the KMT was impelled into opening more seats in the national representative bodies, local elections also provided the party with a human resource pool from which to recruit Taiwanese politicians. The process of ‘Taiwanization’ allowed opportunistic native Taiwanese politicians such as Lee Teng-hui to build enough influence within the party to eventually wrest control of the party from the conservative mainlander elite. The conservative non-mainstream faction of the KMT ultimately split and formed their own political party, the NP, in 1993.

Local elections were instrumental for the KMT in building grassroots support.

The party endorsed one or more local factions and established patronage networks

283 Huntington 1991, op. cit., p. 266-7. 284 Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2010, op. cit., p. 27. 285 Chu 1998, op. cit., p. 139.

79 throughout the island.286 Supporting more than one faction in an election was a rewarding “divide and rule” strategy for the émigré regime. Playing the local factions off one another provided the KMT with a measure of control over local politics, and helped to forestall the development of independent political forces.287 Among the most profitable favors that the KMT bestowed upon local Taiwanese politicians were licenses for local public utility businesses, including gas companies, bus companies and credit unions. Credit unions especially provided local politicians with large profits and mutually beneficial social connections with local businessmen.288 Even after political liberalization, the KMT continued to dominate the political system, and was hence able to maintain and even strengthen its vast patronage network, including party elite, civil servants, local factions, and soldiers.289

Local elections prior to democratization also functioned as an outlet for the political ambitions of local Taiwanese, and provided arenas for real competition between factions, the victor gaining personal emolument and the spoils from local office.290 This form of patronage begot institutionalized corruption, but it did so explicitly at the local level. At the upper echelons of Taiwan’s central government and bureaucracy, the KMT party members remained aloof from local corruption and vote buying, never being directly involved with either dirty money or mafia interests

(“black gold”). The cabinet and legislature thus earned a reputation for being relatively clean and above the iniquity of money politics.291

After liberalization, the single, non-transferable voting in multimember districts (SNTV) electoral system written into the ROC constitution heavily favored

286 Huang and Yu 1999, op. cit., p. 86. 287 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 6. 288 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 10. (See also Wu and Cheng 2011, op. cit., p. 252.) 289 Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 29. 290 The KMT was resolutely not totalitarian. Despite its dominance in socio-economic activities, it nevertheless allowed a great deal of flexibility to local government. See Hsiao and Cheng 1999, p. 114. 291 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 10.

80 the KMT. This type of system demands a coordinated and complicated strategy in order for a political party to maximize its share of legislative seats. To successfully navigate the SNTV system, political parties must be able to manage candidates and mobilize supporters, capabilities in which the DPP compares unfavorably with the

KMT due to the latter’s finances accrued over forty years in command of the state, longstanding relationships with local factions, guaranteed support of civil servants, teachers, and the military (the so-called ‘iron votes’), and a 4,000-strong full-time professional party staff. Under an SNTV system, a party attempts to win multiple seats in most districts through the use of two strategies: first, by estimating the number of votes it will receive in each district (in order to nominate the ideal number of candidates); and second, by ensuring that votes are distributed evenly among its nominees. If either of these fail, the party will gain a disproportionately small number of seats given its support.292 The SNTV system was replaced in 2004 with a majority system, however the KMT performed even more impressively after the change, winning 53 percent of the vote in the 2008 Legislative Yuan elections but gaining an incredible 78 percent of the seats.293 Also, the practice of buying votes, clientelism and organized crime involvement in politics have continued as routine features of local Taiwanese politics.294

The KMT government has shown itself to be remarkably resilient, holding onto the presidency until 2000 and maintaining its majority in the legislature until the

2001 Legislative Yuan elections. Lee Teng-hui, the former vice president of Chiang

Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, served as the president of Taiwan without a mandate from its citizens for eight years before winning the first direct presidential elections in 1996. The DPP won the presidency under fortuitous circumstances in

292 Rigger 2001, op. cit. 293 Stockton 2010, op. cit., p. 37. 294 Gobel 2012, op. cit.

81 2000, when Chen Shui-bian garnered only 39% of the popular vote. A split in the

KMT facilitated Chen’s victory in the 2000 elections. James Soong, one of the most popular KMT politicians at the time, disobeyed party leadership and ran as an independent candidate. It is unlikely that Chen would have won the election without

Soong’s participation in the election.295 President Chen’s re-election in 2004 was controversial as well, with an assassination attempt on Chen during the week of the elections allegedly winning him the sympathy votes to push him past the KMT’s ticket of Lien Chan and James Soong. After he was re-elected by a margin of

300,000 ballots, or .2% of the total cast, the KMT led large-scale protests against the election results.296

The DPP has had trouble breaking a pitifully low threshold of votes in national elections, usually gaining around 35 percent of the vote total throughout the first decade after democratization.297 Chart 3.2 below shows the party preferences of voters in several surveys taken between 1983 and 2000. The KMT has had a clear advantage over the DPP/dangwai in the proportion of voters who say they “like” or support the political party. As mentioned in a previous section, the political landscape in Taiwan is not structured on a traditional Left/Right divide. This unique circumstance has led to a phenomenon in which the KMT ‘poaches’ traditional DPP supporters by appealing to these voters on economic policy and the promise of stability in cross-strait relations.298 Rigger (2001) emphasizes that, “while Taiwanese complain about political corruption, environmental destruction, economic inequality, and other issues on which the DPP leads the KMT, they tend to vote on economics

295 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 186-7. 296 Chi Huan, “Referendum and Democracy: The experience of Taiwan,” In Philip Paolino and James Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 121. See also "Chen Back in Taipei after Shooting." CNN. Cable News Network, 6 May 2004. Web. 19 Dec. 2012. 297 Hsiao and Cheng 1999, op. cit. 298 Stockton 2012, op. cit.

82 and national security, and on these issues, the DPP trails the ruling party” (emphasis in original).299 Faced with such an inopportune environment, the DPP’s success has come primarily from its candidates’ personal appeal and a desire among voters for checks and balances in the political system.300

Chart 3.2: Party Preference

25 KMT DPP 20

0 1983 1986 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 2000

Chart taken from Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 157.

To the dismay of members of the DPP, a considerable segment of Taiwanese voters credit the KMT for Taiwan’s democratization process. The former authoritarian party has adapted well to the post-democratization political environment by democratizing its party structure and distancing itself from the conservative mainlander faction. In contrast, a poor public image has chronically plagued the DPP throughout the period after democratization. In 1991, 37.7 percent of respondents believed that the KMT was a party that promoted democracy, while only 21.5 percent

299 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 41. 300Ibid, p. 145.

83 considered the DPP to do the same. A survey taken in 1998 asked a series of questions about which party was more capable of performing a set of policy tasks, the

DPP or the KMT. The KMT was considered better than the DPP at overcoming diplomatic hardships (34.2 percent to 10.0 percent), enhancing economic prosperity

(35.6 percent to 10.3 percent), ensuring national security (46.5 percent to 6.4 percent), and leading Taiwan’s political direction (32.5 percent to 15.6 percent).301

However, even when there has been palpable frustration among the Taiwanese public directed at the KMT, the DPP has not necessarily been a beneficiary. President

Ma has squandered much of the faith that Taiwanese voters had in the KMT’s economic policies. Frustratingly for the opposition, the DPP hasn’t been able to inspire any confidence in its own competence. A year-end survey taken by the

Taiwan Thinktank in December 2012 revealed that even with widespread discontent over almost all aspects of the nation’s situation, and a 68.2 percent disapproval rating for President Ma Ying-jeou, 57 percent of respondents still did not view the DPP favorably.302 The DPP’s poor suasion among voters is further demonstrated by the fact that 55.7 percent of respondents supported a massive demonstration against

President Ma organized by the party for the beginning of 2013, while only 30.7 percent of those surveyed expressed support for the DPP.303 In May 2013, a poll conducted by the Taiwan Brain Trust showed that even with Ma’s approval rating at

13 percent, 44.3 percent of respondents did not believe that the DPP would fare any better as the ruling party than the KMT.304

301 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 161-3. 302 See Chris Wang, "DPP Lost, Aimless: Koo Kwang-ming." - Taipei Times. 31 Dec. 2012. Web. 30 Dec. 2012. 303 Chris Wang, "People Pessimistic and Unhappy with Ma: Poll." - Taipei Times. 24 Dec. 2012. Web. 24 Dec. 2012. 304 Chris Wang, "DPP Scores Poorly in Public Poll." - Taipei Times. 20 May. 2013. Web. 10 June. 2013.

84 Clearly, the KMT’s success at navigating democratization and remaining influential in Taiwanese politics is incontrovertible. It has preserved support among significant groups within Taiwanese society and has re-emerged triumphantly after disastrous electoral performances during the Chen Shui-bian presidency. Part and parcel to its revival after eight years spent as the opposition was its reputation among middle-class Taiwanese. Strong economic growth under the KMT palliated objections to authoritarian rule and gave the party credibility in the economic realm throughout the 1990s. Despite squandering much of its reputation under the Ma administration, the KMT continues to be regarded by a considerable number of

Taiwanese as the better of the two political parties.

c. Civil Rights

There is a stream of literature that questions the competitiveness of Taiwan’s electoral system. Some scholars are pessimistic about the long-term prospects for the

DPP in presidential elections, and argue that there are several major impediments to a

DPP presidency, including the KMT’s governing experience and assets accrued during authoritarian rule, its reputation for economic prowess, and an insuperable vote threshold for the DPP.305 Despite these reservations, there might still be serendipitous prospects for advocates of a liberal democratic Taiwanese state. Progressive reforms have been accomplished on Taiwan through alternative strategies such as protests.

Since the late 1980s protestors have successfully forced closures of environmentally

305 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 145. (See also Hsieh 2010, p. 29-30; Lee 2010, p. 3-4; Rigger 2010, p. 42-43; Chang et al., 2011; Mattlin 2011 op cit., p. 41-6; Stockton 2012; Jacques deLisle, Shelley Rigger, Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, M. Terry Cooke (discussants). “Taiwan’s Presidential and Legislative Election: Implications for cross-strait relations, U.S. policy and domestic politics,” Foreign Policy Research Institute Friday, January 20, 2012.

85 harmful plants and the cancellation of plans for building others.306 Electoral politics are only one method of bringing Taiwan closer in harmony with the spirit of social democracy. An accountable and transparent government, mechanisms to permit citizen participation, and the guarantee of a basic standard of welfare can be achieved by alternative methods.

The late Howard Zinn (2008) eloquently described the urgency for citizens to escape from “election madness” and concentrate on nurturing democratic principles through “educating, agitating, organizing our fellow citizens in the workplace, in the neighborhood, in the schools.”307 Speaking of the American context, he wrote, “[o]ur objective should be to build, painstakingly, patiently but energetically, a movement that, when it reaches a certain critical mass, would shake whoever is in the White

House, in Congress, into changing national policy on matters of war and social justice.”308 Zinn concurs with other authors mentioned previously (p.47-8) who argue that democratic principles extend beyond solely the procedural dimension. Grassroots organizing and labor unionization are efficacious methods for progressive reform in lieu of electoral politics.

Taiwan is especially in need of strong social movements and independent labor unions. The Chen Shui-bian administration left activists from many quarters dismayed at the lack of progress under a DPP presidency. On the foreign policy front,

Chen was blackballed by Beijing, who chose to invite KMT members and moderate politicians to the mainland. Domestically, Chen was stonewalled by an obstinate

306 Ya-chung Chuang, Activism as a Vocation: Social movements in urban Taiwan (Duke University, PhD dissertation, Durham, NC: Duke University, 2000). (See also Rigger 2001 op. cit., p. 139; Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 197.) 307 Howard Zinn, “Election Madness,” The Progressive March 2008. 308 Ibid.

86 KMT that claimed enough seats in the legislature to stymie DPP initiatives.309 The

DPP also time and again favored political expediency and compromise with conservatives once in control of the presidency. Even with the participation of social movements activists in the policy-making process and the appointment of anti-nuclear activists and supporters of the education reform movement as ministers, there was little to celebrate in substantive social reform during the Chen Shui-bian era.310 The unrequited sacrifices of social and labor activists during the Chen administration have cautioned progressive activists against relying entirely on the efforts of the DPP to recapture the presidency.

A healthy democracy requires fealty to democratic principles and guarantees extending across political elites and the masses. In addition to competitive political parties and strong social democratic parties, an active labor movement has also been shown to be a critical factor in the creation of a welfare state in a democracy.311 The freedoms of association and assembly and the right to strike are quintessential to these institutions. Without the freedom of association, opposition political parties may be constantly threatened by arrest or of having their activities disrupted or monitored.

Under such duress, activists are hampered from organizing a united movement against the sitting government. Similarly, the freedom of assembly sustains democracy by formalizing a method of direct participation by citizens. Public demonstrations, although not always congruous to the spirit of democracy, are an important mechanism for expressing popular support or dissatisfaction with the government.

309 Shelley Rigger, “The Democratic Progressive Party: From opposition to power, and back again,” In Wei-Chin Lee (ed.) Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), pp. 54. (See also Mattlin 2011, op. cit., p. 79-81.) 310 Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 56. Some of the legislation passed during Chen’s presidency were: The Protection for Workers Incurring Occupational Accidents Act (2001); the Gender Equality in Employment Act (2002); the Employment Insurance Act (2002); the Protective Act for Mass Redundancy of Employees (2003); and the Basic Environment Act (2002). See Hsiao and Ho (2010). 311 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 30.

87 Finally, a credible threat to strike gives labor movements leverage against management in negotiations. Without the right to collectively withhold labor, management is more likely to abuse or coerce workers into accepting poor working conditions.

i. Freedom of association

Taiwan has a long history of political activity in the form of meetings between individuals disgruntled by lack of local autonomy and rule by outsiders. In 1885, after centuries of immigration from the mainland, foreign incursions finally induced the Qing government into formally decreeing Taiwan a province. The Sino-French

War (1884-85), in which French soldiers marched on Taipei before retreating to

Penghu, was the immediate stimulus for according Taiwan this status. Even earlier, in 1874 the Japanese had sent a retaliatory force to the island after a group of aborigines killed fifty-four shipwrecked sailors from the Ryukyu Islands.312

On November 12, 1885, Liu Ming-chuan became Taiwan’s first governor. Far from Beijing, Liu was given considerable discretion to develop Taiwan without interference from the royal court. Prior to 1885 Taiwan was an agricultural backwater with an economy that was based on agricultural self-sufficiency. Its closest point of contact to the mainland is the southeast coast of China’s Fujian province, the ancestral origin of the majority of Taiwanese. After Liu became governor, the island increased its involvement in regional trade, and a railroad was completed in 1891 connecting

Taipei and Keelung, with a further extension to Xinzhu opened in 1893.313 At the end of Chinese rule there were an estimated 2.6 million people living on the island (5.34

312 Hung 2011, op. cit., p. 204-7. 313 Ibid, p. 211.

88 people/square mile). The outbreak of war between China and Japan abruptly ended

Taiwan’s brief experience as a province of the Qing Dynasty.

The Japanese empire defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War. Both countries had been exposed to outside political and economic philosophies, and had modernized their militaries. Japan’s victory granted it the status of first Asian colonial power and marked the first time in 2,000 years that China could not claim to be the regional hegemon. The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki gave Japan suzerainty over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, and opened the door to Japanese influence in

Korea. Japanese leaders were aware of the numerous concessions that the western colonial powers had extracted from China via war and threat. Protected by the waters surrounding it, Japan had developed its society in self-imposed isolation from 1639 until 1868 via a policy of seclusion (sakoku) under the Tokugawa government. The landing of Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853 at the Port of Edo and subsequent treaties signed with the foreign powers unleashed domestic forces divided on whether to “expel the barbarian” or “open the country.” In 1868 powerful landlords helped restore the Japanese Emperor to the center of power. After the Meiji government eliminated the last armed insurrection and created the 1889 Meiji Constitution, Japan embarked on a tortuous path of expansion and militarization.314 A successful experiment of colonial rule on Taiwan would show the Western powers that an Asian country too was capable of becoming a great power, and would be a testament to the success of reforms implemented following the Meiji Restoration. Japan leaders therefore administered Taiwan as a model colony and formulated policies and practices according to observations made on expeditions abroad by Japanese intellectuals.

314 Kenneth S. Latourette, The History of Japan (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1947).

89 When Japanese troops first set foot on Taiwan after the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the island was no longer the raw frontier region that it had been for much of its history.

However, there was still only rudimentary industrialization, concentrated in the north, and political unity was absent throughout much of the island.315 Taiwan was dependent on subsidies from Tokyo until 1904, with a large proportion dedicated to the military and suppressing rebellious groups.316 There was even sentiment among the Japanese elite questioning the feasibility of keeping Taiwan as a colony, and some suggested that selling the island back to China was the only prudent decision.317

Nevertheless, Japan successfully turned Taiwan into a self-sufficient colony by developing its agricultural sector, introducing a compulsory general education system, quelling the violent uprisings that had plagued the island during the Qing era, and consolidating political rule over the island. As violence against the administration declined, Japanese officials turned their attention to developing the island into an appendage of the Japanese empire. Den Kenjiro became the first civilian governor-general of Taiwan in 1919 and immediately announced an assimilation policy of Taiwanese into the power structures of the colonial government.318

Political activism was inchoate throughout the decade after World War I, even with the colonial administration’s forbearance of repression during the ‘liberal twenties’ in Japan. There was only limited support for radical political action or violent protest, and membership in associations explicitly calling for home rule was relatively low. Just as the KMT would do during its period of authoritarian rule, the

Japanese colonial administration presided over a flourishing economy. Taiwanese

315 Hung 2011, op. cit., p. 225. 316 Ibid, p. 260-66. 317 Ibid, p. 252. 318 Ibid, p. 276.

90 therefore accepted, if begrudgingly, the presence of foreign occupation. Unlike later under the KMT regime, however, most Taiwanese did not evince overt political antagonism to the Japanese, despite the grievances that many had against colonial rule.

Although the Taiwanese were discriminated against, the Japanese colonial administration was not corrupt, and the professional bureaucracy imported from Japan managed the colony efficiently.319

The Japanese colonial administration violently suppressed militant groups, making the idea of revolutionary overthrow obsolete. Taiwanese therefore began forming intellectual groups devoted to securing more local autonomy, inspired by the rhetoric of self-determination that proliferated at the time of World War I.320 The

‘home rule movement’ began in Tokyo with the establishment of the Keihatsu kai or

Enlightenment Society. Soon after, the Enlightenment Society reorganized itself as the Shinmin kai or New People’s Society, which eventually involved hundreds of educated Taiwanese. The first in situ political organization agitating for autonomy was the Taiwan Bunka Kyokai or Taiwan Cultural Association. Included among its various pursuits were sponsoring public lectures in major cities and towns throughout the island, publishing a magazine, holding seminars on culture, and sponsoring a summer training school for youth. The activities spearheaded by the Taiwan Cultural

Association encouraged other societies, clubs and associations to develop, including youth societies, women’s associations, and reading clubs.

Collectively, the proliferation of these associations and clubs led to the inauguration of the People’s Party in 1927. The party platform emphasized the establishment of democracy in Taiwan, economic reform, and an improved social system, and had a membership of 439 people. Several leaders of the People’s Party

319 Ibid, p. 311-18. 320 Ibid, p. 278.

91 formed the Self-Rule League in 1930 after falling out with the group. Despite the new banner, many of the demands of the Self-Rule League were the same as those made by the Cultural Association and the People’s Party, centering on the establishment of local governance and popular suffrage. Japanese militarists, an ever- present group in Japanese politics, eventually dismantled the Self-Rule League and its predecessors. A young group of navy officers ended the ‘liberal twenties’ in Japan by assassinating Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi in 1932, thus beginning a period of a less accommodating stance by the Japanese colonial government toward dissent.321

The outbreak of the second Sino-Japanese war in 1937 curtailed the efforts of home rule organizations, and the Self-Rule League voted to disband a month after the war began. Similar political organizations wouldn’t appear again on the island until well into the period of authoritarian rule under the KMT, as pro-Taiwanese activists were exiled abroad following the transfer of Taiwan from Japan to the ROC. After

World War II, the ROC government arrogated the position and property of the

Japanese colonial administration and its appurtenant colonials. Anti-ROC sentiment reached a climax during the 2-28 Incident, when the government slaughtered tens of thousands of people. General Chen Yi declared martial law on two separate occasions after the initial demonstrations demanding reform.322

Between mid-1947 and 1949 the Communists killed 150,000 ROC soldiers in

Manchuria, won victories in Henan and Hebei, and gained control over Manchuria and Shandong. General Chen Cheng, who replaced Wei Dao-ming as governor of

Taiwan, declared martial law for a third and final time on May 19, 1949. A wave of arrests and executions followed immediately afterwards, and the leader of Taiwan’s autonomy movement in the 1920s and 1930s, Thomas Liao, fled to Tokyo. On

321 Ibid, p. 277-86. 322 Heng-wen Liu and Hou'an Liu, "Martial Law," Encyclopedia of Taiwan Online. 12 Dec. 2012. Web. 27 Dec. 2012.

92 November 30, the Chinese Nationalists moved their capital from Chongqing to Taipei and Chiang Kai-shek came out of retirement to become the president once again.

Chiang did nothing with the suspended constitution and the ‘white terror’ period of arbitrary repression began anon.323

‘Free China’ was an appellation commonly applied to Taiwan until the early

1970s and the loss of its seat in the UN. Taiwan was technically a constitutional democracy, although in reality a single party controlled the government. During the period of authoritarian KMT rule, the Temporary Provisions act granted the president extraordinary powers. Both the freedoms of speech and assembly were severely restricted. This apparent contradiction of the argument made by the regime and its international backers that the nationalist government on Taiwan was the rightful,

“liberal” claimant over all of China did not trouble the authoritarian regime. The

KMT promised to rescind the Temporary Provisions when the communist threat dissipated. To establish a semblance of legitimacy over Taiwan, the émigré regime allowed local elections, with Provincial Assemblyman being the highest elected office.

There were also two other alternative parties to the KMT ‘competing’ in elections.

These parties were nothing more than a subterfuge of the KMT, and were derisively called “flower vase parties.”324 A group of Mainlander intellectuals and members from the sparse number of Taiwanese politicians tried to form a Chinese Democratic

Party separate from the KMT in the late 1950s.325 The movement ended in 1960 after its leader, Lei Chen, a highly respected ex-KMT member, was imprisoned. Although independent candidates regularly participated in elections and had a respectable vote

323 Hung 2011, op. cit. p. 311-13. 324 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 10. 325 Liu, I-chou 1999, op. cit., p. 66

93 and seat share, a second organized opposition failed to materialize until the late

1970s.326

In 1969 the KMT government began allowing a limited number of supplementary seats for elections to the national parliament. The elections were necessary because there had not been an election to that body in over twenty years, and the seats of those senior legislators who had been elected on the mainland were noticeably in diminution.327 Eleven new members were elected to the Legislative

Yuan and eight to the National Assembly in the 1969 supplementary elections.

Taiwanese politician Kang Ning-hsiang, who later would become one of the dangwai’s first leaders, won a seat in the Legislative Yuan.328 Although the government still restricted the freedoms of speech and assembly, national elections gave candidates a platform to attack the KMT on a narrow set of issues.329

Beginning from the second round of Legislative Yuan elections in 1972, independent candidates campaigned using the dangwai label. Adopting this term was an atavism to the 1950s movement led by Lei Chen. Dangwai candidates emphasized democratic reforms predicated on the lifting of martial law and reassertion of the full powers of the constitution. By the mid-1980s a number of conditions, such as the

KMT’s loss of international recognition, a growing share of Taiwanese in the KMT, and the growth of a middle class, had made repressing the opposition untenable for the party. When the DPP was created out of the dangwai in 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo tolerated it and even spoke of ending martial law.330

From its inception at the meeting of dangwai activists, The DPP has been composed of diverse groups endorsing contradictory strategies. The resulting

326 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 10. (See also Mattlin 2011.) 327 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 172. 328 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 18. (See also Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 158.) 329 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 11. 330 Ibid, p. 12.

94 factionalism, each group seizing its right to freedom of association, has deeply compromised party effectiveness. Initially, moderate members preferred working through elections, while more radical elements advocated organizing mass demonstrations.331 These general attitudes about political efficacy have remained true even after the most radical pro-independence supporters split from the DPP to form the Taiwan Solidarity Union.332 Prior to democratization, the cleavages within the dangwai movement were latent. As long as the KMT continued to arbitrarily detain, silence, and kill opposition members, the dangwai’s disagreements remained subdued and the party managed to have at least a façade of being unified.

Chen Shui-bian won the presidency in 2000 for the DPP by collecting a meager 39 percent of the vote, benefiting from an acrimonious split in the KMT.

Although there were no mass protests against president Chen during his first term, radical KMT legislators proposed impeaching him within his first year of taking office.333 Chen’s controversial re-election in 2004 was met with KMT-led protests, some erupting in violence. The KMT charged the DPP with vote rigging and pan- blue legislators were livid about an election-week assassination attempt on Chen that they claimed to have cost the KMT the election.

Although the former authoritarian party had lost the presidency, it still maintained a majority in the legislature, depriving the DPP of the clout necessary to pass legislation. The inherent flaws of Taiwan’s democratic system that were concealed when the president and the legislature were of the same party became

331 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 19. In this case, it was the 1977 Chungli Incident that showed the differences in strategy and orientation between the radical and moderate elements of the dangwai. 332 After the 2012 presidential election, the DPP has again emphasized protests, planning a series of demonstrations around the island leading to a massive demonstration with a hoped-for 100,000 people participating. See Wang, Chris. "DPP Planning 10 Local Rallies from Saturday." - Taipei Times. 13 Dec. 2012. Web. 31 Dec. 2012. 333 Philip Paolino, “Semi-presidentialism and Voters’ Views of Divided Government in Taiwan,” In Philip Paolino and James Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), p. 135-52.

95 apparent. Deadlock defined President Chen’s eight years in office, as time and again he was thwarted by the KMT’s recalcitrance. Furthermore, the DPP’s party structure allowed considerable autonomy to its legislators, and the enduring disunity in the DPP that had been supine after the 1996 presidential elections burst out once again.

President Chen tried to reform the party’s structure during his first term in office, but was repeatedly frustrated by internecine division. The 2006 DPP party chair elections were generally acknowledged as being a snub to President Chen’s cross-strait policies.

Legislator Lee Wen-chung, a member of the New Tide faction, took the opportunity to criticize President Chen’s decision-making model. 334 In January, former party chairman and ‘divine leader’ of the DPP Lin Yi-hsiung unexpectedly announced his intention to quit the party due to his disappointment with the political situation under

Chen’s presidency.335

Also in 2006, Chen Shui-bian’s son-in-law was arrested on charges of insider trading. Following the arrest, the KMT launched a petition to recall the president and publicly defended its merit. Although the recall motion temporarily unified the DPP, the relationship between factions within the DPP hit a nadir soon after the motion failed. A group of academics closely associated with the DPP issued a petition asking

Chen to resign. Soon after, former DPP chairman and revered democracy activist

Shih Ming-teh began a movement for the same purpose. Within five months, thousands of demonstrators were joining Shih’s “Red Shirt” demonstrations.336

At the time of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (2006) whose data form the basis of this paper, the insider trading scandal involving President Chen Shui-bian’s close circle had created a gulf within the DPP. In July Chen’s supporters in the party

334 Rigger 2010, op. cit., p. 56-60. 335 Jewel Huang, "Former DPP Chairman Leaves Party." Taipei Times. 25 Jan. 2006. Web. 13 May 2013. 336 Rigger 2010, op cit., p. 61.

96 resorted to proposing a ban on factions to force compliance within the party and silence the New Tide, the faction most critical of President Chen. Despite the protests of New Tide legislators, the party succeeded in banning factions, an ironic volte-face for the former pro-democracy party.337 Factionalism never disappeared, and re- emerged once again after Chen Shui-bian’s second term expired in 2008, aggravated by the imprisonment of the former president and his wife on corruption and graft charges.338

In 2006 Freedom House gave Taiwan the highest ranking for both civil liberties and political rights, and attested that both freedom of assembly and association were well respected in Taiwan. Also in 2006, the KMT held democratic elections for the position of party chairman, the first time since it had ever done so.339

There should hereafter be general support among both parties for the freedom of association in the public, as it had become an inveterate part of Taiwanese political life.

ii. Protest demonstrations

Demonstrations against government policies have not been as long-established a part of Taiwan’s political history as political meetings and associations. By the end of the first decade of the 1900s, the Japanese had mercilessly destroyed any direct challenges to its authority over Taiwan. The home rule movement that developed under the Japanese colonial administration was intellectually driven, and did not endorse militant activity against Taiwan’s colonial masters. Like the Japanese, the

337 Ibid, p. 61-62. 338 After the 2012 election defeat of Tsai Ing-wen, the New Tide faction picked up 6 seats, emerging with power blocs centering on Frank Hsieh and Yu Shyi-kun as the biggest winners in the Central Executive Committee elections. See Lin, Enru. "New Tide Takes Lion's Share in DPP Poll." Www.ChinaPost.com.tw. 16 July 2012. Web. 30 Dec. 2012. 339 For more on Taiwan’s rankings from 2002 until 2012, see "Taiwan." Freedom House. Web. 03 Jan. 2013.

97 KMT similarly began its period of rule with violence. After the truculent repression of the 2-28 Incident, the KMT government faced virtually no organized opposition.340

Under martial law, the party pre-empted the formation of independent organizations outside the purview of the party-state by creating its own pro-regime groups.341 Even seemingly innocuous forms of communal gathering such as religious festivals were placed under surveillance as a part of the ‘white terror.’342 Rigger (2001) notes that during the early period of KMT rule, Taiwanese were politically passive, and the few political dissidents who dared to publicly air their grievances were imprisoned or exiled.343

However, by the time of the 1977 elections, the KMT’s international reputation and legitimacy as the sole representative of China had become severely tarnished. Countries around the world had switched their formal recognition to the communist regime across the Taiwan Strait. President Chiang Kai-shek, who had led the KMT since the 1920s, died in 1975. His death, combined with the success of the

KMT in recruiting local leaders and factions into the party, severely weakened loyalty within the KMT. KMT politicians subsequently took advantage of the growth of subtle oppositions to assert their independence from the party center, refusing to exert much effort in support of the party’s chosen candidates.

The 1969 supplementary Legislative Yuan elections provided the context for a formative moment in the dangwai’s development. Huang Hsin-chieh, one of a precious few dissident politicians elected to a seat in the local assemblies during the

1960s, asked Kang Ning-hsiang to run his campaign in the 1969 Legislative Yuan

340 Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 45. During the era of white terror, thousands of people were executed and 140,00 people were subjected to political persecution. See Tai-lin Huang, "White Terror Exhibit Unveils Part of the Truth." - Taipei Times. 20 May 2005. Web. 29 Jan. 2013. 341 B.J. Dickson, “The Lessons of Defeat: The reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950-52,” The China Quarterly, 133 1993, pp. 56-84. (See also Ho 2007.) 342 Gates 1996, op. cit., p. 231-36. (See also Jordan 1995, p. 150-1.) 343 Rigger 2001, op. cit.

98 elections. Huang won election, and became one of two opposition legislators in the

Legislative Yuan. Meanwhile, Kang won a seat on the Taipei City Council in 1969, and then a seat in the Legislative Yuan in 1972. Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning- hsiang, along with opposition politician and former KMT member, Chan Chun-hung, formed the nucleus of the inchoate opposition movement.344

The birth of what would become the DPP’s more ideologically and intellectually oriented wing came early in the development of the dangwai opposition movement. Kuo Yu-hsin, an opposition politician, recruited a new generation of opposition activists into politics in 1975. Kuo’s legislative campaign assistants included Lin Cheng-chieh, Hsiao Yu-chen, and brothers Wu Nai-jen and Wu Nai-teh.

The opposition’s new strategists diverged from the moderate group over orientation and tactics, preferring mass movements over electoral politics. The ideological disagreements between the younger group of dangwai activists and the election- driven camp came to the forefront of oppositional politics in several episodes in the late 1970s.345

Kang Ning-hsiang founded The Eighties, a magazine representing the less confrontational approach of the moderate wing of the dangwai. The staff of Formosa, on the other hand, supported activist, mass-based politics to promote a similar moderate agenda. Although both The Eighties and Formosa were forceful in their criticisms of authoritarian rule, the editors of Formosa aggressively built a broad- based movement. Formosa staffers established branch offices all over the island through which pro-democracy activities could be coordinated. Their efforts to build

344 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 17. 345 Ibid, p. 18-19.

99 support for the opposition island-wide were an unprecedented challenge to the KMT’s control of government.346

Opposition candidates played a prominent role in the 1977 elections. Huang and Kang solicited dozens of opposition candidates to coordinate their campaigns under the dangwai label. Altogether, fourteen dangwai candidates won seats in the

Provincial Assembly. The race for Taoyuan county executive was close; the dangwai candidate, Hsu Hsin-liang, was expected to lose the election because of a fraudulent vote count orchestrated by the KMT.347 In Chungli, more than 10,000 of Hsu’s supporters surrounded the main police station. The protest turned violent, and the angry crowd overturned several cars and set them on fire. A National Chungyan

University student and a teenager were killed when police opened fire, and the protest escalated into a riot, later becoming known as the Chungli Incident.348 There had not been another riot since the events of 2-28, and it occurred only two years after the generalissimo’s death. Despite the fatal violence, the general population of Taiwan blamed the rioters for its asinine response.349 Most Taiwanese regarded the election result as a bagatelle, and couldn’t understand why the demonstrators would react so irrationally.

In the aftermath of the Chungli Incident, a vigorous debate threatened to divide the young opposition movement. Kang Ning-hsiang and his moderate supporters within the dangwai believed that mass demonstrations were rash and less effective than electoral politics in building popular support, along with being potentially deleterious to movement solidarity. The younger group of former campaign assistants supported mass protests, even if at the risk of inciting violence, to

346 Ibid, p. 21. 347 Ibid, p. 20. 348 Schaefferer 2003, op. cit., p. 26. (See also See also "The Chungli Incident (Zhongli Incident)." The Chungli Incident (Zhongli Incident). Encyclopedia of Taiwan, 2011. Web. 04 Jan. 2013.) 349 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 167.

100 publicize the KMT’s transgressions. They were frustrated with competing in the party-state’s sham electoral politics, and welcomed more aggressive tactics.350

Just over a year later, another crisis illuminated the cleavage among dangwai activists. Henry Kissinger’s furtive visit to China in 1971 was just the beginning of steady rapprochement between the United States and China. On December 16, 1978,

Jimmy Carter announced his intention to normalize relations with the PRC the following month. The news devastated Taiwan and provoked expressions of anti-

Americanism from Taiwanese citizens. Allegedly fearing popular unrest, Chiang

Ching-kuo responded by canceling the island-wide elections for all levels of government scheduled for December 23.351 Although the opposition was predicted to perform well, Kang Ning-hsiang issued a statement giving his blessing to the KMT’s decision. Other moderates argued that cancelling the elections was a reasonable response to such a crisis and advised dangwai candidates to abandon campaigning to support the ROC. Kang’s endorsement was unpopular among many dangwai activists who believed the cancellation to be unnecessary and announced in order to avoid losing seats to the nascent opposition movement. The young radicals who disagreed made plans for antigovernment street demonstrations. A series of peaceful rallies occurred over the following months, leading to the arrest of Yu Teng-fa, who had been elected Kaohsiung County Executive, and the suspension of Hsu Hsin-liang from office for two years.352

One of the defining moments in Taiwan’s democratization history mentioned in Chapter II was the Kaohsiung Incident when an opposition-led protest march on

International Human Rights Day in December 1979 ended in violence between demonstrators and police. The KMT regime used the violence as a pretext to arrest

350 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 19. 351 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 20-21 352 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 168.

101 the organizers of the march, notably the staff of Formosa Magazine, a group of dangwai moderate activists including Huang Hsin-chieh, Shih Ming-teh, Li Yi-hsiung,

Yao Chia-wen, Chen Chu, Lu Hsiu-lien, Chang Chun-hung, and Lin Huang-hsuan.

Although Kang Ning-Hsiang recruited an impressive team of defense attorneys to defend the Formosa group, the leading activists were still sentenced to long prison sentences.353

Whereas the 1977 Chungli Incident was an indication of simmering divisions within the opposition movement, the Kaohsiung Incident has had more indelible repercussions on the process of democratization. The jailing of Huang Hsin-chieh and other leaders of the more radically activist branch of the dangwai created a vacuum for new groups to counter Kang Ning-hsiang’s moderate camp. Two new groups emerged to fill this void, including the Formosa group defense attorneys, led by Chen Shui-bian, Hsieh Chang-ting, Su Chen-chang, Yu Ching, Chiang Peng-chian, and Chan Chun-hsiung, and the young radicals led by Lin Cheng-chieh, Hsiao Yu- chen and the Wu brothers, Wu Nai-jen and Wu Nai-teh.

Political scientist Hu Fu identified four distinct factions that had formed within the dangwai by 1984, including the Writers and Editors Alliance (who later that year would establish New Tide Magazine), the Dangwai Public Policy Research

Association (the successor to the Dangwai Campaign Assistance Group) led by defense attorneys Yu Ching and Hsieh Chang-ting, the Progress Faction (composed of independent-minded dangwai politicians such as Lin Cheng-chieh, Tsai Jen-chian,

Tsai Shih-yuan), and the imprisoned Formosa Faction.354 Among these factions, New

Tide’s activists were the, “faction with the highest intellectual level, the strictest

353 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 21. 354 Ibid, p. 23.

102 discipline, the strongest commitment to struggle and the hardest ideology.”355

Members of this faction were unabashed in their criticisms of Kang Ning-hsiang and the moderate dangwai activists. Meanwhile, the Progress Faction eventually sided with the Formosa Faction because it found self-determination less dogmatic than

Taiwanese independence.356

On September 28, 1986, dangwai activists meeting in a ballroom at Taipei’s

Grand Hotel passed a motion to establish a political party, calling themselves the DPP.

At the time, the most prominent members of the Formosa Faction were still being held as political prisoners. The nascent opposition party underwent another change in its internal power structure when the jailed Formosa Magazine activists began to be released in the late 1980s. When Chang Chun-hung and Huang Hsin-chieh were pardoned in March 1988, they immediately joined the DPP leadership.357 Once its leaders were released from prison, the Formosa faction’s moderate stance once again became the dominant voice in the opposition.358 The moderate faction under the New

Tide and Kang’s leadership had been discredited among dangwai activists due to sharp criticism from the young radicals in the early 1980s, allowing Formosa to reassert itself as the moderate voice of the DPP.

In response to Formosa’s rapid recovery and rise, the New Tide faction cultivated ties with the first two DPP party chairs, and was able to capture the position of DPP general secretary and deputy general secretary. Worried by the New Tide’s influence on the party, the newly released Formosa moderates used their martyrdom to garner general support, while attracting many of Kang’s erstwhile supporters.

355 Chen-liang Kuo, Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong (The DPP’s painful transformation) (Taipei: Tianhsia Publishing Company, 1998), p. 166. Quoted in (Rigger 2001, p. 24.) 356 Tun-jen Cheng and Yung-ming Hsu, “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism, and Party Realignment,” In Charles Chi-Hsiang Chang and Hung-Mao Tien (eds.) Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the third wave (New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 146. 357 Ibid, p. 27. 358 Ibid, p. 22.

103 Between 1988 and 1991, internecine fighting within the newly created DPP was so intense that many observers believed the DPP wouldn’t survive intact.359

The New Tide faction launched a campaign endorsing Taiwanese independence as a formal plank of the DPP’s platform. This was explicitly a political move, as New Tide activists hoped that the independence issue would galvanize its supporters and deprecate Formosa’s pragmatic, centrist strategy. By staking its position on the Taiwan independence issue, the New Tide faction gambled that an emotional appeal, along with the return of exiled advocates of Taiwanese independence, would redound in electoral support. The struggle between New Tide and Formosa came to a head in 1991, during the elections for party chairmanship.

Hsu Hsin-liang (Formosa) and Shih Ming-teh (who had no factional support but was initially supported by New Tide) were the front-runners for the position. To secure the chairmanship, Hsu and his supporters made a bargain with New Tide to amend the

DPP platform to include the independence plank. After the DPP’s resounding defeat in the 1991 National Assembly elections, moderate DPP politicians have moved en masse away from Taiwanese independence. The influence of members advocating independence within the DPP has ex post facto dwindled. Instead, most DPP politicians now support the claim that the status quo is independence and the most pro-independence activists of the DPP split to form the Taiwan Solidarity Union

(TSU) after the 2000 elections.360

The dangwai’s commitment to mass-based activism prior to formal democratization opened the floodgates for other forms of political and economic demands. From the mid-1980s, social movements demanding a variety of civil rights and social justice emerged. Ho (2010) describes five stages of Taiwan’s social

359 Ibid, p. 27. 360 Ibid, p. 33.

104 movement development including, fermentation (1980-1986), popular upsurge (1987-

1992), institutionalization (1993-1999), incorporation (2000-2007) and resurgence

(2008-2010).361

Shiau (1999) identified four state objectives of the social movements, including, criticizing the state’s inaction, advocating new protection policy for minorities and the disadvantaged, challenging the state’s corporatist mode of control, and establishing rules for politically sensitive issues (see table 3.1 below). Instances of collective protest multiplied throughout the 1980s, with 175 held in 1983, 335 in

1986, and 1,172 in 1988. Between 1983 and 1988 social protests of all types grew steadily, with economic issues showing the largest growth. Large-scale protests involving more than 5,000 participants more than doubled from 5 in 1986 to 12 in

1988.362

Table 3.1: Emerging social movements in Taiwan, 1989

Stated objectives Major participating organizations I. Criticizing the state’s inaction Consumer movements Local anti-pollution protest movements The conservation movement The anti-nuclear power movement The non-homeowners’ ‘shell-less snail’ movement

II. Advocating new protection The aborigine human rights movement policy for minorities and the New Testament church protests disadvantaged Handicapped and disadvantaged welfare group protests Veterans’ welfare protests The Hakka rights movement

III. Challenging the state’s The labor movement corporatist mode of control The women’s movement The student movement The farmers’ movement The teachers’ rights movement

361 Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 5. (See also Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 45; Hsiao 2011.) 362 Shiau 1999, op. cit., p. 108.

105 IV. Establishing rules for The human rights movement politically sensitive issues The mainlanders’ home-visiting movement The Taiwanese home-visiting movement

Table taken from Chyuan-jeng Shiau, “Civil Society and Democratization.” In Steve Tsang and Hung- mao Tien (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1999), pp. 108.

A number of factors came together in the 1980s to inspire the diversity of social activism. The US successfully pressured Taiwan to remove many of its tariff and non-tariff barriers and to revalue the New Taiwan Dollar in response to the latter’s rapid economic growth. Taiwan’s international competitiveness subsequently suffered from the re-evaluation of the NTD, which rose upwards of 50 percent between late 1986 and 1989. Chiang Ching-kuo’s neo-mercantilist policies were also largely unbeneficial to consumers, farmers and laborers, and damaged the environment. Furthermore, currency and other economic problems worsened the inequality gap and created demand for welfare programs. Finally, with the lifting of martial law in 1987, social movements centered on respect for human rights proliferated.363 In the late 1980s a growing faction within the KMT realized that the dangwai’s electoral victories and the threat of mass demonstrations under continued authoritarian rule might topple the regime altogether.364 The KMT hence contrived to implement political reforms that would allow it to maintain its position in control of the government, while permitting more space for political opposition and civil society.

Social movements notably proliferated in 1989, the second year after the lifting of martial law and first after Taiwanese politician Lee Teng-hui became president. At least eighteen social movements protested against the state, criticizing it of being an archaic institution that was otiose in dealing with urgent issues. A large number of the social movements criticized the state for being inflexible and

363 Ibid p. 109. 364 Wu and Cheng 2011, op. cit., p. 249.

106 inadequate for the task of governing. Social movements organized throughout the

1980s and contributed to loosening the grip of the authoritarian regime on civil society. Chu (1999) observed that social movements were the most successful at paring away the penetration of the state into society. The state’s capacity in many key sectors such as business and industry, labor, mass media, schools and state employees has been reduced.365 There were at least eight major social movements organized around the interests of consumers, environmentalists, laborers, women, aborigines, farmers, students and teachers. More than 3,000 protests, most of which involved economic and environmental issues occurred in the 1980s. The methods of protest also began to vary, with petitions and demonstrations giving way to more contentious means, such as trespassing, squatting, hunger strikes, blockades and riots.366 These movements were a bellwether for the stymied development of class politics in Taiwan; the most strident social movements during the 1980s were those founded within the middle-class, indicating the near-absence of purely class-based political issues in

Taiwan. Even for those movements not arising among the middle-class, such as the farmer’s and labor movements, the target of criticism was the state rather than business.367

In late April 1991 Lee Teng-hui announced the abolition of the Temporary

Provisions, and initiated a process for constitutional revision and fully democratic national elections for the legislative bodies to be held. Social groups found more stable channels to express their political opinions after these moves. Especially after the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections, when Taiwan appeared to be headed for a three- party system, social movements had plenty of opportunities to make their positions

365 Chu 1999, op. cit., p. 149. 366 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 195-98. (See also Schafferer 2003, op. cit., p. 12-14.) 367 Shiau 1999, op. cit., p. 108.

107 heard.368 Some of the salient campaign issues in the 1990s that were articulated amidst pressure from social movements were corruption (“black gold politics”), social welfare, old age pensions, and national health insurance.369

However, removing the barriers to state access for civil society meant that social movements as a form of demand-making declined. Civil society’s role as antagonist receded as the state became more democratic and implemented reforms in the areas activists had previously focused on.370 Ho (2010) suggests that this period was characterized by the institutionalization of social movements, “insofar as they

[social movements] are increasingly tolerated by officials, are accepted by the public, and become the modular way for a variety of societal interests to stake their claims.”371

Social movements succeeded in getting legislation passed on environmental, women’s, and labor issues. Social movements won these victories in part due to their direct participation in some decision-making channels. Ho (2010) borrows the term,

“unobtrusive mobilization” from Katzenstein (1990) in describing social movements’ pursuits of journalistic autonomy, judicial independence, better protection for patients’ rights, and media democracy in Taiwan during this period.372

One notable exception to the institutionalization of civil society was a two-day protest in 1997 after the kidnapping and murder of a television star’s daughter. Tens of thousands of middle-class citizens poured onto the streets of Taipei on 4 May and

18 May to protest the deterioration of social order in Taiwan.373 The spontaneous protests were sparked by the kidnap and murder, however a number of high profile

368 Shiau 1999, op. cit., p. 112. The 1995 Legislative Elections were Taiwan’s second “three party election,” and the New Party took 21 seats and 13 percent of the vote. See Cooper, John F. 1996. “Taiwan’s 1995 Legislative Yuan Election,” Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies 1(132) 369 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 24-5. 370 Shiau 1999, op. cit., p. 112. 371 Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 10. 372 Ibid, p. 10-12. 373 Chu 1999, op. cit., p. 161. Public security, social order, and crime were crucial issues to the Taiwanese public thanks to a series of high-profile crimes. See (Shafferer 2003, op. cit., p. 151-2.)

108 murders had recently happened that highlighted the indifference of the police force to eliminating crime.374

Rigger (2001) says of this period that, although social movements were able to generate debate on specific issues in the public realm, Taiwanese voters tended to vote on economic issues and national security.375 The DPP is handicapped inasmuch as voter behavior hinges on these issues. For many voters, the KMT’s reputation for strong economic growth and predictable relations with China is enough to sway their vote. It was only after the costly split in the KMT that Chen Shui-bian was able to capture the presidency for the DPP in 2000. Chen won with less than 40 percent of the vote, while independent candidate James Soong received 36.8 percent and KMT candidate Lien Chan 23.1 percent. As soon as the election results were announced, angry protestors gathered outside of the KMT’s central headquarters in Taipei demanding that Lee resign as KMT chairman. Although the demonstration was technically illegal, Mayor Ma Ying-jeou did nothing, even joining the protestors on the first night. Most of those gathered were James Soong’s supporters, irate that Lee had passed over their candidate, choosing Lien instead to run on the KMT ticket.

Some claimed that Lee refused to nominate Soong to sabotage his political rival. Lee was accused of being indifferent to the certain division of the KMT precipitated by picking his protégé and weaker candidate Lien Chan. The protests eventually succeeded in forcing Lee’s immediate resignation, after he had initially only promised to resign several months later in September, during the KMT party congress.376

374 In 1996 a high-ranking DPP official, Peng Wan-ju, was murdered after leaving a meeting in Kaohsiung. Also in 1996, legislator Liao Hsueh-kuang was kidnapped and briefly imprisoned in a dog cage in a remote mountain area. In November 1996, Taoyuan County chief executive Liu Pang-yu and eight associates were murdered while in Liu’s home. 375 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 41 376 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 229.

109 The DPP’s ascension to the presidential office marked a new era in the development of Taiwan’s social movements. During the 1990s social movements found a niche between society and the state, working from within the decision making process to advocate for progressive change. After the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated, social movements became incorporated within the state through their affiliation with the new ruling party. This was the first peaceful exchange of power in

Taiwan’s history under the ROC, and opposition activists celebrated exuberantly.

Chen appointed social movement activists to key positions in his administration.

Social activists hoped to push transformative reforms more swiftly with an ally occupying the president’s pulpit. The occupations of public space by mass demonstrators that had been rife within Taiwan during the democratic transition period were largely dormant during the DPP years.377

Despite social movement activists’ inclusion within the halls of power, the

Chen administration often neglected their proposals for the sake of political expediency. President Chen became the leader of Taiwan backed by a party that had no prior experience as the governing party. Chen appointed a strictly nonpartisan cabinet immediately after election, hoping to attenuate the dual difficulties of a weak mandate and a majority opposition in the legislature. Hoping to appease KMT legislators who would be working with a premier appointed by an opposition president for the first time ever, Chen chose KMT member and former defense minister Tang

Fei for the position. Other key posts were filled by former president Lee Teng-hui’s advisers Tien Hung-mao (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Tsai Ying-wen (Mainland

Affairs Council head).378 Moreover, Chen maintained much of Lee Teng-hui’s

377 Wang 2010, op. cit., p. 68. 378 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 199.

110 military and security apparatuses for fifteen months before replacing them with his own people.379

For democracy activists, the peaceful turnover of power in 2000 fulfilled a significant tenet of democratization. A DPP member now occupied the presidency, and party membership increased by 50% from March 18 to late May in 2000, rising from 200,000 to 300,000. One party insider estimated that a further 100,000 members had been added by December of the same year.380 Notwithstanding the promising increase in party membership, the DPP faced difficulties in building an internal consensus. As an opposition party, the DPP had had no use for mechanisms that gave central leadership the prerogative to force party members into line. Consequently,

DPP members had developed their support bases independently from central leadership, and factionalism was an inveterate feature of the party. Tensions between the presidential office and party members continued throughout Chen’s presidency and, by the time Chen left office, had destroyed any semblance of unity within the DPP.381

Protests led by the KMT erupted once again, after President Chen was re- elected in 2004 by another narrow margin and an election-week assassination attempt.

Protestors demanded an investigation into the shooting incident, along with a vote recount, accusing the DPP of improprieties.382 The protests were marred by clashes between protestors and police, the worst case of election violence since the early

1990s.383 Two years later, in 2006, the KMT also joined the anti-Chen Shui-bian protests organized by fed-up DPP members. Riddled by rumors of corruption scandals,

379 Mattlin 2011, op. cit. 380 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 199 381 Rigger 2010, op. cit., p. 54-59. 382 William Foreman, “500,000 Protest Disputed Taiwan Election: President says he will back vote recount and an investigation into his recent shooting.” The Times Union Albany, NY: 28 March 2004: A9 383 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 130.

111 an estimated 90,000-200,000 protestors demanded that Chen resign.384 Although the

KMT participated in and led several protest demonstrations during Chen Shui-bian’s tenure, it generally kept aloof from social movement protests.385

Social movement activists helped in passing several pieces of legislation during Chen’s first term, including the Protection for Workers Incurring Occupational

Accidents Act (2001), the Gender Equality in Employment Act (2002), the

Employment Insurance Act (2002), the Protective Act for Mass Redundancy of

Employees (2003), and the Basic Environment Act (2002). In 2002 two major groups organized large-scale counter-mobilization movements. Schoolteachers protested to protect their privileged exemption from income tax, and farmers’ association leaders protested to show their opposition to regulation of their corrupt cooperatives. These movements were inimical to social movement activists and disrupted the momentum for reform.386

President Chen’s impetuous style of leadership also frustrated social movement activists. The DPP continuously vacillated between reform and political compromise during its tenure. During his first year in office, Chen pursued business friendly policies and loosened environmental regulations and welfare policies purportedly to save the stagnant economy. He also made several statements asserting that welfare redistribution should be subordinate to economic development.387 It wasn’t until Su

Tsen-chang’s premiership (2006-2007) that a reformist agenda re-emerged in the

DPP’s policy proposals. However, the belated and weak effort was for naught, as the

Chen Shui-bian administration was wracked by scandals, and the DPP turned to

384 "Taiwan Leader Faces Mass Protest." BBC News. BBC, 09 Sept. 2006. Web. 14 Jan. 2013. 385 Ming-sho Ho, “Weakened State and Social Movement: The paradox of Taiwanese environmental politics after the power transfer,” Journal of Contemporary China 14(43) May 2005, pp. 339-52. (See also Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 58.) 386 Ibid. (See also Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 57.) 387 Ibid. p. 411-13. (See also Stephen Philion, “The Impact of Social Movements and Democratization in Taiwan,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39(3) March 2010, pp. 159-60.)

112 appeals to national identity to generate support, choosing not to spend political capital pursuing social reform.388

Philion (2010) believes that the Chen administration’s record shows that neither the KMT nor the DPP is willing to challenge the neo-liberal model of development, which sanctions laissez-fair free market capitalism and spurns legislative intervention to protect citizens’ rights.389 Social movements have been unable to free themselves from their strategic alliance with the DPP despite modest results.

Although research has shown that social movements as a rule accomplish the most when allied with working-class political parties, the DPP’s commitment to these issues is equivocal, especially given the subservience of class politics to identity politics in

Taiwan.390 Even under a DPP president, structural unemployment, capital flight, slashed welfare budgets, flexible union organizing rules, and increasing inequality continued to plague Taiwan.391

The 2008 elections were a boon to the KMT, as the former authoritarian party won an overwhelming victory in the Legislative Yuan elections and then re-took the presidency. Taiwan’s new legislative body included only 27 seats held by DPP members out of the 133 seat unicameral chamber. In contrast, the pan-blue coalition, composed of the KMT (81 seats), the People First Party (1 seat), the Non-Partisan

Solidarity Union (3 seats) and one independent candidate who endorsed the KMT presidential campaign, won a three-fourths majority. Hence, the KMT had the potential to line up enough votes to pass bills and budgets and adopt a no-confidence vote on the Cabinet (simple majority), impeach or recall the president and vice president (two-thirds majority), and adopt a constitutional amendment (three-fourths

388 Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 59. 389 Philion 2010, op. cit., p. 161. 390 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Policy Press, 1992), p. 97. (See also Navarro 1991.) 391 Philion 2010, op. cit., p. 160.

113 majority vote). The KMT could also prevent the opposition party from proposing bills or resolutions in the chamber.392

Immediately after his administration was installed, President Ma Ying-jeou pursued a number of conservative policies including legalizing casinos, trimming the national pension system by exempting farmers, tightening control over public television, and increasing the number of on-campus military officers.

Environmentalists, welfare activists, media reform activists, and education reform advocates all voiced their opposition in response to President Ma’s attempts to roll back progressive reforms.393

The DPP, finding itself in the opposition once again, has actively encouraged supporters to take to the streets to maintain its support base and pressure the Ma government. In August, only three months after President Ma’s inauguration, the DPP called for large rallies to protest KMT misrule. The opposition party organized another rally two months later in October.394 Both rallies drew tens of thousands of supporters and their success prompted an announcement by DPP spokesman Cheng

Wen-tsan that the opposition was replacing legislative action with mass movements.

Another series of mass rallies greeted Chen Yunlin, chairman of the Association for

Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) when he visited Taipei to sign four agreements designed to improve relations between Taiwan and China.395

Ma Ying-jeou took office with the intention of improving ties with China and signing trade agreements with the mainland. Negotiations over a trade pact began in

2009 between representatives from the ARATS and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange

392 Chao-cheng Chen, “Party Politics after the 2008 Legislative Election,” In Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009 (Taipei: National Policy Foundation, 2009), p. 93-100. 393 Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p. 59. 394 Robin Kwong, “Taiwan protest over ‘incompetent Ma’” Financial Times. London. 27 Oct. 2008: 10. 395 Chen 2009, op. cit.

114 Foundation (SEF).396 The resulting Economic Cooperation and Framework

Agreement (ECFA) was the most controversial political issue of President Ma’s first term, inflaming sentiments over the national identity issue. ECFA’s critics charged the Ma administration with deliberately shutting out the opposition party and

Taiwanese citizens from the process, and for hastily signing an agreement regarding a sensitive matter without commensurate scrutiny. At the core of the conflict over

ECFA were concerns over national and state identity, issues that the DPP could easily capitalize on to mobilize its support base. The opposition party planned a massive rally for June 2010, hoping to draw 100,000 people to protest the Ma administration’s handling of the ECFA negotiations.397 Heavy rain on the day of the protest diminished the strength of the protest, however tens of thousands of Taiwanese still came out to demand a referendum on the trade deal with China.398

Demonstrations led by the opposition party and social movement activists have continued hounding the Ma Ying-jeou administration since his re-election in 2012.

Although President Ma won re-election by a comfortable margin, Taiwanese society has only grown more polarized.399 Groups protesting environmental degradation, the lack of judicial independence, media monopolization, the denigration of human rights, and cross-strait policies have led protests in the second term of the Ma administration.400

396 See Ching-chuan Yeh, “What Ma administration and Beijing government expect from ECFA and their strategic concern,” In Chih-Cheng Lo and Tien-Wang Tsaur (eds.) Deconstructing ECFA: Challenges and opportunities for Taiwan (Taipei: Taiwan Brain Trust, 2010), p. 59-62. 397 Vincent Y Chao, "All DPP Hopefuls to Participate in Anti-ECFA Rally." - Taipei Times. 16 June 2010. Web. 14 Jan. 2013. 398 Vincent Y. Chao, and Rich Chang, "Approaching ECFA: Protesters brave storms to rally against ECFA." - Taipei Times. 27 June 2010. Web. 14 Jan. 2013. 399 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Whom to Blame for Polarization in Taiwan?” Paper presented at The Maturing of Taiwan Democracy: Findings and insights from the 2012 TEDS survey conference. November 3-4, 2012. Taipei, Taiwan. 400 See Lok-sin Loa, "Activists Urge Government to Sanction Officials Involved in Wrongful Execution." - Taipei Times. 11 Oct. 2012. Web. 14 Jan. 2013. See also Wei-chen Tseng, and Jake Chung. "Organizations Protest Chinese Concert." - Taipei Times. 30 Dec. 2012. Web. 14 Jan. 2013.

115 The general public has also become disillusioned with the Ma Ying-jeou administration. President Ma’s approval ratings dropped to an all-time low of 15.2 percent in October 2012. The same survey reported his disapproval rating to be 76.6 percent. Respondents were asked a battery of questions about their feelings about the economy and the future. General increases in retail prices were listed as the issue that bothered respondents the most, followed by increases in fuel and transportation costs, water and electricity expenses, and finally premiums for labor and health insurance.401

A different survey found that the increase in fuel and electricity prices was the single incident with the greatest impact on Taiwanese lives that year, followed by the year- end bonus for retired civil servants and the capital gains tax on stock transactions.

Over two-thirds of respondents, 84.7 percent, described Taiwan as having experienced a bad year, while 68.1 percent said that jobs had been hard to find. Pessimism about the coming year was pervasive, with 63.9 percent indicating poor prospects. Civil servants, including military, police and government employees, was the only occupational category with more than half of the respondents being optimistic about the coming year.402

High unemployment among Taiwan’s youth also raised concerns about the island’s economic prospects. Taiwan’s government statistics office reported in

December that university school graduates made up 20% of the long-term unemployed population, and that Taiwan’s youth unemployment rate was 3.1 times that of the overall unemployment rate. In October, the unemployment rate of Taiwanese aged

15-24 reached 13.6%, much higher than the figures its rivals Japan (7%) and South

Lok-sin Loa, "Students Pan ‘Martial Law’ Rules." - Taipei Times. 8 Dec. 2012. Web. 14 Jan. 2013. Chris Wang and J. M. Cole. "Hundreds of University Students Gather in Taipei to Protest Next Media Deal." - Taipei Times. 30 Nov. 2012. Web. 14 Jan. 2013. 401 Chris Wang, "Poll Shows Ma’s Approval Rating at Its Lowest Yet." - Taipei Times. 30 Oct. 2012. Web. 15 Jan. 2013. 402 Chris Wang, "People Pessimistic and Unhappy with Ma: Poll." - Taipei Times. 24 Dec. 2012. Web. 15 Jan. 2013.

116 Korea (8.8%) had reported in September.403 A survey conducted at the end of 2012 by the Taiwan Thinktank showed widespread dissatisfaction with almost every aspect of the nation. A majority of respondents were unhappy with the increasing wealth gap, while 89.1 percent were concerned about stagnant wages. Meanwhile, the tax system, judicial system, and media reporting all received poor ratings.404

Hoping to parlay the general displeasure directed at President Ma into valuable political capital, the DPP organized a series of rallies leading up to a mass demonstration with three demands: a Cabinet reshuffle, a rejection of the controversial

Next Media Group deal and the organization of a national affairs conference. The demonstration attracted an estimated 100,000-200,000 people, and was attended by

DPP heavyweights Su Tseng-chang, Tsai Ing-wen, Annette Lu, Frank Hsieh, and Yu

Shyi-kun, as well as six DPP commissioners. Social movement activists also took the opportunity to express disapproval of Ma’s policies and highlight their own causes, such as closing nuclear power plants, stopping illegal land expropriation and supporting press freedom in China.405

After a brief lull in activity during the Chen Shui-bian administration, social movements have re-emerged as a potent feature of Taiwanese civil society. Besides protests coordinated by the DPP, there has also been a resurgence of independent activism led by student groups such as the ‘Wild Strawberry Movement’ and the

‘Youth Alliance Against Media Monsters,’ as well as environmental and anti-nuclear groups such as the ‘Taiwan Water Conservation Alliance,’ the ‘Nuke-4 Referendum

403 "Nation’s Youth Jobless Rate No. 2 in Asia: ILO Report." - Taipei Times. 27 Jan. 2013. Web. 27 Jan. 2013. 404 Chris Wang, "People Pessimistic and Unhappy with Ma: Poll." - Taipei Times. 24 Dec. 2012. Web. 15 Jan. 2013. 405 Chris Wang, "Thousands Protest against Ma." - Taipei Times. 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 15 Jan. 2013.

117 Initiative Association’ and the ‘Nuclear-free Homeland Alliance.’406 The desire for autonomy stems from the failed collaboration between civil society groups and the

DPP during the Chen administration. Social activists become disenchanted not only with President Chen’s capitulation to business interests, but also for the corruption that permeated the president and his inner circle.

At the time the Taiwan Social Change Survey was taken in 2006, the press was excoriating President Chen for the corruption allegations brought against his son-in- law earlier in May. Rumors about corrupt practices at the center of the Chen administration had been circulating for years. The Chen administration had also been roundly criticized from within its own party, as a result of erratic behavior and intransigent policy positions. In response to the mounting criticism, Chen announced that he would transfer most of his duties to Premier Su Tseng-chang.407

The KMT was unsatisfied and immediately launched a recall petition against the president. Although the recall campaign failed to generate enough votes to pass the two-thirds threshold, calls for President Chen’s resignation soon shifted from the pan-blue camp to elements from within Chen’s own party. Prominent DPP members began building a movement as part of the internecine fighting. The pandemonium caused by the corruption allegations disrupted the traditionally strong link between the

DPP and protest movements. The results of the survey might capture this polarization within the DPP, and show more ambivalent support for social protests among DPP supporters than historically has been the case. Particularly, at the time that the survey was conducted, in July and August, DPP politicians had temporarily unified to boycott

406 Hsiao-yi Chen and Jake Chung. "Interview: Student protest leader speaks on civil liberties." - Taipei Times. 3 Dec. 2012. Web. 13 May 2013. I-Chia Lee, "Greater Taichung Groups Protest Land Reclamation Policy, Sea Contamination." - Taipei Times. 23 Apr. 2013. Web. 13 May 2013. Chris Wang, "Environmental Groups Slam DPP." - Taipei Times. 23 Jan. 2013. Web. 13 May 2013. 407 Rigger 2010, op. cit., p. 61.

118 the KMT’s recall motion. The responses of pan green supporters might reflect this ephemeral mobilization around the president, and show a weaker link between pan green party affiliation and support for the protest demonstrations. Pan blue supporters, on the other hand, might report greater tolerance for protests, as portrayed by their enthusiastic participation in the anti-Chen protests.

iii. Labor Unions

Labor relations in Taiwan are still guided by the principles of the 1947 ROC

Constitution, including standards related to the right to subsistence, employment, labor protection, relationships between interest groups, and government-sponsored social security. While still on the mainland, legislators passed various pieces of legislation such as the Labor Union Law (1929), the Collective Agreement Law (1930), the Law on Settlement of Industrial Disputes (1928), and the Factory Law (1929). The legislation passed during this ‘Golden Decade’ of labor laws was inspired by careful study of the legal framework underpinning European industrial relations systems.408

The KMT government’s imposition of martial law negated the constitutionally designed industrial relations (IR) system that had been built between the years 1928 to

1937. The KMT argued that the fundamental interests of national security and political stability compelled it to replace the IR system with a program called the

National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. Throughout the period of nearly 40 years under martial law, protests by the labor force were strictly prohibited.409 Moreover, both union leaders and management acquiesced to

408 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 100. 409 This is an approach often adopted by newly industrialized countries (NICs). See S.M. Chen, Deconstruction of Party-state Capitalism (Taipei: Taipei Society Report, 1994).

119 the mandate of the party-state, and industrial disputes were customarily settled through government arbitration.410

Under the state’s corporatist structure, business groups and trade unions were organized hierarchically in a pyramid system.411 At the top of the hierarchy was the

Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL), the only nationally recognized labor organization until 2000. Article 8 of the Labor Union Law, implemented in 1929 and revised in

1949, stipulated that each administrative area would have only one federation of trade unions, authorized by the CLF. The exclusive legal status granted to the CFL redounded to its benefit in qualifications for government subsidies and, more importantly, the exclusive privilege to sit on advisory councils on behalf of labor interests. Later, after the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) was established in 1987, the

CFL was the only labor organization permitted to join in CLA meetings within the

Executive Yuan. The CFL was the sole labor organization allowed to participate in the formulation of labor policy and, being a patron of the state, was complaisant with the conservative alliance between bureaucrats and business.412

Many common functions of labor unions were explicitly prohibited by the state.

The 1929 Labor Union Law (revised in 1931, 1932, 1937, 1949 and 1975) continued to outlaw national organization of single-sector unions. The right to strike was expressly forbidden. The process of collective bargaining was also constrained, as state approval was needed before collective agreements would be deemed legally valid.

Each county was allowed only one federation of trade unions, and horizontal linkages between counties were forbidden to suppress labor solidary from forming at the local level.413

410 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 101. 411 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 111. (See also Kuo 1995.) 412 Ibid, p. 109. (See also Wang 2010 op. cit., p. 63.) 413 Wang 2010, op. cit., p. 63. (See also Chen 1997, p. 166.)

120 Instead of being a potent force for workers’ rights, membership in national labor unions was compulsory and the government and employers manipulated worker participation to boost industrial production and guarantee the loyalty of the military, public servants, and teachers as a bulwark against popular discontent. The bloated public sector and its local chapters of the national labor union provided workers with a high degree of job security, but no rights to independent organization. During the first several years of martial law, the KMT adopted only fringe benefits to preempt the development of greater pressure for subsistence support.414

At the local level, the Labor Union Law kept individual unions weak and disaggregated. Membership in the CFL provided the only horizontal linkage between local trade unions. The Labor Union Law established two legally recognized forms of unions: industrial unions and occupational unions. Workers employed in a workplace with over 30 employees could organize themselves into an “industrial union,” while workers in smaller workplaces or the self-employed could organize into an

“occupational union.”415

The Labor Union Law stipulated that industrial unions could only be organized at the plant or workplace level. Workers in state-owned enterprises comprised the only group attached through a labor union to cohorts in other localities. According to the law, even joint unions representing workers in different factories under the same owner were prohibited. Thus, industrial unions in large state-owned enterprises were the only labor organizations capable of exerting nationwide political influence. To maintain control over these unions, the government mandated that only these labor

414 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 101. 415 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 111.

121 unions were allowed to join the CFL directly, rather than through local federations of labor.416

Occupational unions were designed to represent workers of the same trade. In reality, however, they were merely a secondary category of unions available to those who could not join industrial unions due to the requirement that thirty workers be employed. Among the members of occupational unions were self-employed workers

(such as taxi drivers), workers in small-size firms (such as tailors) and bosses of small companies. Members of occupational unions came from a wide range of social statuses and economic conditions, making it difficult for occupational unions to launch collective actions for their members.417

Yet these unions enjoyed sizeable membership numbers because, for some workers, joining an occupational union was the only way to enroll in government- supported labor insurance. Instead of engaging in activism on the behalf of workers, occupational unions functioned as officially licensed insurance agents. As a result, unsavory practices and corruption were common among the leadership of occupational unions, many of who were small-business owners looking to profit from the scheme.

In one spectacular case, an official enquiry exposed a family that owned eleven occupational unions for embezzlement of union fees and labor insurance funds, improper bookkeeping, irregular elections, and over-reporting of membership. The scandal, however, didn’t lead to any substantial reform of the system.418

As Taiwan’s industrial sector and economy continued to grow, there was a concomitant rise in the industrial accident rate. This ushered in a period of legislation regarding employment relations jurisprudence and standardized labor protection.419

416 Ibid, p. 112. 417 Ibid, p. 112. 418 Ibid, p. 112. 419 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 101.

122 The Labor Safety and Health Act (1974), the Factory Law (1975), the Labor Standards

Law (1984) and the Labor-Management Conference Rules (1985) were all passed during this period.420 The democratic changes of the 1980s also encouraged a grassroots labor union movement to develop that challenged the government’s privileged position in labor relations. Workers developed a greater sense of solidarity and became more assertive in demanding legal rights. The number of industrial disputes rose rapidly, but the IR system that existed under the authoritarian regime was incapable of mediating between the bolder demands of labor and management. The resulting stress on labor relations encouraged activists to create a number of

‘unconstitutional’ (i.e., independent) unions that endeavored to represent workers who had no other recourse.421

In response to the growth in number and intensity of labor conflicts, the KMT established the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) on 1 August 1987, less than a month after the abolition of martial law. The CLA is a tripartite agency at the ministerial level that has charge over national labor affairs. The minister of the CLA recruits commissioners to represent the opinions of employers, employees, political and academic circles when reviewing labor policies, labor laws and regulations, and related projects and programs.422 In effect, the CLA represented the KMT party as the custodian of employment relations. The KMT retained its close ties with the CFL while the opposition DPP shunned both and agitated outside of the legal system in collaboration with the illicit independent unions. Both political parties solidified their bonds with particular labor unions, contributing to the politicization of labor.423

420 Kong 2005, op. cit., p. 159. 421 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 101. 422 "Organization and Human Resources." Organization and Human Resources. Council of Labor Affairs, 2012. Web. 21 Jan. 2013. 423 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 104.

123 The lifting of martial law initiated a new period of labor conflict. Labor disputes were more apt to turn into actual strikes, and there was a sharp increase in the number and type of illegal actions taken by labor activists. Workers went on numerous strikes, the majority of which were illegal according to the labor laws.424

Labor unions also became more proactive in demanding concessions from employers.425 The period from 1987-1993 witnessed an initial rise in labor militancy and subsequent shift to political lobbying. Given their greater ability to stand up for workers’ rights, industrial unions became the main organizational base for aggressive labor activity, including wildcat strikes and work stoppages.426 Independent-minded labor activists also used the momentum to cultivate their influence in existing unions.

Many grassroots workers won leadership positions by defeating KMT candidates in union elections.427

Through these activities, labor activists successfully organized non-union workers or seized control of KMT-sponsored unions. Organizing non-union workers happened primarily in the private sector, where unions were absent because of business’ reluctance to accept KMT party branches. Workers first needed to overcome the ingrained animus felt by both management and officials toward labor groups in order to organize unions in this sector. Some subsidiaries of Formosa Plastics, a private petrochemical giant, were successfully unionized in 1988 via this route.

Meanwhile, activists also attempted to take control of existing unions whose leadership was allied with the KMT. As a result of this strategy, there was an expansion of labor’s organizational basis in the late 1980s. Labor activists also took to

424 Hsiao and Ho 2010, op. cit., p.50-53. (See also Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 195-6.) 425 Tat Yan Kong, “Labour and Neo-Liberal Globalization in South Korea and Taiwan,” Modern Asian Studies 39(1) February 2005, pp. 158. 426 Shuet-yin Ho, Taiwan: After a long silence: The emerging unions of Taiwan (Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Research Center, 1990). (See also Hsiao and Ho 2010 op. cit., p. 50-53.) 427 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 112-13.

124 the streets to publicize their plight. Protests were staged over wage and benefit demands, including issues of overtime, holiday pay, and annual bonuses, which the

Labor Standard Law granted but were not always honored by management.428

Activists also concentrated their efforts on developing new linkages between unions, testing the regime’s resolve in enforcing Article 8 of the Labor Union Law.

Autonomous union leaders in northern Taiwan formed an informal “Brotherhood

Union” in September 1987 to help spur the growth of inter-union solidarity. In April

1988 the Association of Union Cadres was set up in southern Taiwan for a similar purpose. Another organization, the National Federation of Independent Trade Unions, was established in May 1988 and was later admitted as a member of the World

Confederation of Labor despite lacking legal status in Taiwan. Before the Taiwan

Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU) was finally legalized in 2000, many similar efforts were made to establish and spread connections within a geographic area or by industry.429

In 1988, in defiance to these challenges, the KMT announced revisions to the

Labor Union Law, the Labor Dispute Law and the Labor Standard Law to favor management, and increased repression. Some of the revisions included the removal of compulsory union membership, legalization of parallel unionism in the same workplace, banning unions from certain industries such as utilities, and requiring a higher level of consultation with union membership regarding any industrial action.

Additionally, management was given more flexibility to compete internationally and limitations on working hours were relaxed. These motions combined to weaken the autonomous labor movement that had been developing within Taiwanese industries.430

428 Ibid, p. 113. (See also Ho 2003. 429 Ho 1990, op. cit., p. 87-88. (See also Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 114.) 430 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 104. (See also Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 114

125 The KMT also implemented further revisions to consolidate the government’s capabilities in industrial dispute arbitration, beginning with the establishment of a

Division of Labor Affairs for Taiwan’s High and District Courts in 1988. This improved the government’s capability to preside over labor disputes, and the number of arbitration cases increased substantially after its creation. The government then increased the executive branch’s supervisory oversight of labor organizations with the promulgation of the 1993 Labor Inspection Law. Furthermore, the government has become habituated to using the Labor Standards Law to effect administrative orders and amendments, which has affected all labor contracts written since 1988.431

Sanctioned by these strengthened legal powers, government repression of labor militancy with the compliance of management began in earnest again in 1989. Police ruthlessly suppressed a strike that year at the Far Eastern Chemical Fiber Company.

In 1990 eight activists who led the strike were pronounced guilty of disturbing public peace and received sentences varying from probation to jail time.432 Also in 1990, an activist was sentenced to twenty months in prison for organizing a protest by a group of laid-off workers. As a result of the repression, spontaneous strikes that had become common in the late 1980s gave way to more moderate means of agitation such as lawsuits and working through legal channels for mediation.433

Even before 1989, the labor movement’s strategy had gradually been shifting from grassroots organizing to influencing the legislative process to counter the government’s proposed revisions.434 With the dangwai’s transformation into a formal political party, labor unions gained an important mode of access to the state.

Previously, the opinions of labor activists were kept out of the legislature by state

431 Ibid, p. 114. 432 Yo-zhi Gao, Wen-xin Chen, and Zhen-kai Zhu, "Laborers Have Feeble Voice in Taiwan Elections." WantChinaTimes.com. 25 Nov. 2010. Web. 23 Jan. 2013. 433 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 114. (See also Chu 2003, p. 25.) 434 Ibid, p. 114.

126 control of labor via its corporatist structure and authoritarian nature. Susceptible to police harassment and job insecurity, members of labor movements had to keep low profiles in accordance with the framework of legal regulation. The presence of the opposition party in the legislature, however, suggested a relaxation of state control over the expression of labor interests. The subtle change of the state-society relationship opened a new window for labor movements. Within the DPP, the radical

New Tide faction was the main force that drafted the guidelines for collaboration among progressive social movements.435

The alliance between labor and the DPP was one of convenience for the labor movement. After political liberalization, two initial attempts to cultivate a political party representative of class issues failed. Both a Labor Party, led by an opposition legislator, and a Worker’s Party, started by a famous union leader, basically disappeared within years of their creation.436 At the same time, an independent union movement was creeping into public enterprises such as China Petroleum and Taiwan

Power. The initial success of union organizers can be attributed to the tolerance that managers of public enterprises, themselves public employees, had of union activities.

Managers of public companies were more willing to concede to workers’ demands at the public’s expense. Unions were able to petition successfully for items such as wage raises and year-end bonuses. The independent union movement soon died out after many of the unions in public enterprises had gained their independence.437

However, labor’s alliance with the DPP has been a frustrating venture. Since the time it began to coalesce in the 1970s, the DPP has been composed of a patchwork

435 Wang 2010, op. cit., p. 59. 436 Taiwan had 220 registered political parties as of November 2012, including the Labor Party. The KMT and the DPP are the biggest political parties, with the PFP and TSU and, to a lesser extent, the New Party playing minor roles. Patrick Boehler, "Taiwan Rejects Linspired Political Party." NewsFeed Taiwan Rejects Linspired Political Party Comments. 26 Nov. 2012. Web. 21 Jan. 2013. 437 Wu and Cheng 2011, op. cit., p. 251.

127 of diverse and often contradictory interests. As described earlier, the dangwai attracted activists from all sectors of Taiwan’s society with diverse backgrounds and ideologies, and from the outset, distinct strands within the opposition pursued different goals and favored different strategies. Opposition activists shared only one thing in common: a desire to replace the KMT’s authoritarian rule with a functioning democracy. On economic issues, members of the dangwai diverged considerably.438

Since full democratization, the DPP has found it difficult to reconcile these contradictions in endogenous economic interests among its supporters. White-collar workers make up the largest socioeconomic constituency within the DPP. Among this group, entrepreneurs make up the lion’s share. Their interest in joining the DPP comes in part from their resentment of KMT policies favoring big businesses at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).439

The DPP also naturally attracts social activists dedicated to the interests of disadvantaged groups within Taiwanese society, such as farmers, the elderly, women, and labor. This segment of the population opposes other aspects of the KMT’s economic policies such as those privileging economic growth over equality and redistribution. Although these activists are a vocal part of the DPP, they compose a smaller percentage of the party’s support base compared with the middle-class.440

Forming an economic policy that simultaneously adheres to the various segments within the DPPs’ demands for growth, full employment, environmental protection, privatization, and laissez-faire policies is a chimerical notion. While the DPP remained in the opposition, declaring a uniform position on economic policy was unnecessary, and the tensions within the party remained subdued. Individual DPP

438 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 139. 439 Ibid, p. 40, 167. 440 Ibid, p. 40, 139, 167.

128 legislators were generally allowed to formulate their own economic priorities without interference from the party chair.

Notwithstanding these diverse groups, the DPP has gained a reputation for being an anti-business party, stemming from its opposition to several huge industrial projects. In 1998 the German chemical giant Bayer AG cancelled a project planned in

Taichung County after the county executive, a member of the DPP, decided to make the project contingent upon the results of a local referendum. Although the DPP chairman supported the project, the intransigence of a DPP-led government reinforced the DPP’s image as an anti-business party.441

Whereas moderates within the party are wary of being perceived as unfriendly to business, other members, including many in the New Tide Faction, openly welcome the party’s support for labor and environmental concerns. The DPP tried to rid itself of its anti-business label in the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections by holding weekly economic sessions in which elected DPP officials met with industrialists, economists, management experts, and labor leaders. Among the most highly regarded members who attended were Formosa Plastics head Wang Yung- ch’ing, the president of the Evergreen Group, and leaders of company unions such as

China Chemical and Central Petroleum.442

Predictably, the Chen Shui-bian presidency failed to mold the DPP’s economic policy into a coherent form.443 Many of the same contradictions and structural limitations still prevent the DPP from forming a comprehensive economic policy approach. While the DPP cannot afford to ignore business interests, individual

441 Ibid, p. 41. 442 Kong 2005, op. cit., p. 173. (See also Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 139.) 443 The China issue continues to be the most difficult enigma for the DPP to solve. The 2012 elections showed that the DPP has yet to develop an economic policy that convinces the electorate of the party’s competence in dealing with China. See Rich Chang, "DPP Struggles to Form China Policy." - Taipei Times. 25 Nov. 2012. Web. 18 Jan. 2013.

129 legislators will not abandon the interests of activists who make up a small but influential portion of the party membership. Taiwan is a young democracy and, even after two terms under a DPP president, the political landscape in which social movements and labor unions interact with the state is still being shaped.444

After his election, President Chen found balancing his party members’ competing economic interests to be an ineluctable burden. Both the president and his party were criticized on both sides of labor issues for not doing enough to advance their respective interests. Chen’s promises during the presidential campaign to emphasize welfare reform were tested as soon as he stepped into the presidential office. The most serious economic recession to hit Taiwan since the 1970s occurred almost immediately after Chen was inaugurated. Responding to the crisis, Chen opined at a press conference in September 2000 that, “Social welfare can be put off, but economic development can’t be.”445 Social activists also roundly criticized

President Chen for using the KMT-dominated legislature as an excuse to compromise on his campaign promises for welfare reform.446

On the other hand, Chen Shui-bian was still regarded by his detractors as being anti-business for his decision to cancel a planned dam in southern Taiwan and stop construction of a fourth nuclear power plant. Both projects would have greatly expanded industrial production, but were controversial for their environmental consequences.447 Despite establishing greater links between elected officials and top industrialists and passing business friendly legislation in his first year, critics attacked

444 Michael Hsin-Huang Hsiao, “Social Movements in Taiwan: A typological analysis,” In Jeffrey Broadbent and Vicky Brockman (eds.) East Asian Social Movements (New York: Spring Science and Business Media, LLC, 2011), pp. 252. 445 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 38. 446 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 200. (See also Roy 2003 op. cit., p. 231; Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 142; Jason Blatt, "Scholars Hit at DPP over Business Links." South China Morning Post. 18 June 2002. Web. 18 Jan. 2013.) 447 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 41.

130 the DPP for officially recognizing the TCTU in March 2000. The criticism encouraged officials within the CLA to delay final approval for months before TCTU leaders were finally able to use their DPP patrons to pressure the CLA to accept the official status of the TCTU.448

Soon after the DPP legalized independent unions, the CFL split into four national organizations: the Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL), Taiwan

Confederation of Trade Unions (TCTU), Chinese General Labor League (CGL), and

National Trade Union Confederation (NTUC). Labor relations suffered as a result of the confusion caused by multi-affiliation and associated problems. Each labor union’s national center also kept its close ties to a political party. In 2000 the CLA made an attempt to end the influence of the opposition parties, the KMT and PFP, over labor unions, but its efforts ultimately did not succeed.449 The influence of the central government in labor relations therefore seemed unchanged under the DPP.

Communications between the national unions and the national employers’ organizations was and still is confined to irregular political consultative conferences under the aegis of the political parties.450

Along with the politicization of labor negotiations, corporate interests have gained influence at the expense of unions due to the continuing slowdown in global economic growth and increased unemployment in Taiwan. This process has been facilitated by the government’s retention of control over the IR agenda, where worker participation and collective bargaining mechanisms are both absent from the relationship between labor unions and employer organizations. Labor legislation is also crafted without the direct participation of labor representatives. Both political camps will readily mobilize their rank-and-file for demonstrations, but exclude their

448 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 120. 449 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 106. 450 Ho 2006, op. cit., p. 121.

131 elected representatives from negotiation. As a result, labor market policies are formulated with respect to their potential benefit for national economic development objectives rather than a concern for workers’ interests.451

Neo-liberal globalization has also taken leverage away from Taiwanese labor unions. Strikes become less effective in an environment where businesses can easily relocate to China in search of cheaper workforces. Skilled workers in each industrial sector of Taiwan’s economy are also departing for the mainland to receive higher salaries and better work-life balance.452 This hollowing out of industrial labor undermines the power of labor unions by eliminating a valuable segment of labor union membership. Moreover, much of the growth in union membership in Taiwan after democratization has been from a rise in occupational unions rather than workplace-based industrial unions. Together with the loss of skilled workers to the mainland, the growth in occupational unions has diluted labor’s collective identity by increasing the proportion of politically inactive members in labor unions.453

Despite these setbacks, several pieces of legislation have been passed since the mid-1990s that strengthened the social security safety net, implemented unemployment assistance measures aimed at making citizens re-employable, increased unemployment benefits, and fortified employee insurance rights. Another statute, the Gender Equality at Work Law, was passed in 2002 to improve the status of women in the workplace. After passage of this law, Taiwan’s labor laws became compliant with international human rights requirements.454

Labor activism has also re-emerged after a brief abeyance during the Chen administration. In December 2008, just months after Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration,

451 Ibid, p. 121-22. 452 Crystal Hsu, "Taiwan Losing Skilled Workers: Report." - Taipei Times. 23 Jan. 2013. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 453 Kong 2005, op. cit., p. 157-58. 454 Chang and Bain 2006, op. cit., p. 104.

132 labor associations from all across Taiwan participated in a protest in front of the CLA building against the practice of businesses forcing employees to take unpaid leave.455

Less than six months later, a group of labor organizations planned a Labor Day rally to protest the government’s ineffectual policies in fighting unemployment.456 In 2010

The National Federation of Independent Trade Unions led a group of labor representatives in a protest against proposed changes to the Labor Standards Act that would loosen restrictions on the hiring and employment of contract workers.457 A year later, a spate of deaths blamed on overwork led to a protest against Article 84-1 of the Labor Standards Law, which states that working conditions for certain jobs can be set through negotiations between labor and management, thus excluding them from other articles regulating maximum working hours, overtime hours, and minimum holidays.458

President Ma’s re-election by a comfortable margin in 2012 hasn’t silenced labor union activity. In October 2012 labor organizations staged a rally against low wages, unfair labor policies, rising prices and a growing labor insurance deficit that led to minor clashes between police and the protestors. The demonstration was held in response to the Cabinet’s decision to only partially agree to the CLA’s proposal to raise the legal minimum wage, the Cabinet’s plan to relax restrictions on the hiring of foreign laborers, and its consideration of establishing a separate minimum wage for foreign workers.459 Less than a month later, labor organizations joined with students and social activists to protest a variety of economic and social issues, including the

455 Shelley Huang, “Union Members Protest over Unpaid Leave." - Taipei Times. 24 Dec. 2008. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 456 "10,000 to Join Labor Day Protests, Say Unions." Www.ChinaPost.com.tw. 29 Apr. 2009. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 457 Shelley Huang, "Union Activists Protest Proposed Labor Changes." - Taipei Times. 15 July 2010. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 458 I-chia Lee, "Workers Protest against Overwork, Bad Conditions." - Taipei Times. 8 Aug. 2011. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 459 Lok-sin Loa, "Labor Activists Pelt Police with Eggs." - Taipei Times. 29 Oct. 2012. Web. 24 Jan. 2013.

133 ‘merchandization’ of education, racial discrimination, forced land seizures, a development-oriented economy, and deteriorating social insurance systems.460 Then in January 2013, more than a dozen labor groups from all over Taiwan joined together to make five demands on the Ma administration: not cutting the labor insurance annuity payment, basic guarantees for retirement, government budget appropriation to supplement the Labor Insurance Fund in the event that it fails to provide basic guaranteed payments, not loosening labor regulations for a free economic demonstration zone and amending Article 28 of the Labor Standards Act. The

National Federation of Independent Trade Unions initiated the protest and argued that

President Ma Ying-jeou’s plan for becoming a “free-trade island” should not be achieved by sacrificing working conditions in Taiwan.461

Neither of the major political parties has relinquished its ties to labor unions.

Both the KMT and DPP prefer to settle labor disputes through legal channels of mediation rather than through labor militancy. In 1999 the KMT planned new restrictions on labor organizations through a revision of the 1988 Settlement of Labor

Disputes Act, including bans on strikes in key industries, institutionalizing a mandatory cooling off period, and ending of compulsory arbitration.462 A KMT-led

Executive Yuan then approved in 2009 several contradictory motions, making it easier for workers to strike by removing the requirement of a general meeting to be held before calling a strike, but prohibiting workers in hospitals, utility companies, and certain financial and telecommunication business sectors from striking.463

460 Lok-sin Loa, "Labor Rights Activists Stage Mass Protest." - Taipei Times. 26 Nov. 2012. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 461 I-chia Lee, "Labor Groups March for Workers’ Rights." - Taipei Times. 20 Jan. 2013. Web. 24 Jan. 2013. 462 Kong 2005, op. cit., p. 175. These plans were abandoned during the 2000 presidential election, when the KMT took a more conciliatory approach to labor. 463 "Taiwan Simplifies Strike Procedure but Sets Limits to Sectors Allowed." BBC, 19 Apr. 2009. Web. 24 Jan. 2013.

134 The opposition DPP has been similarly reserved, if not hostile to strikes as a method of labor activism.464 The party’s experience under President Chen has convinced its moderate members of the necessity of working with business interests to secure funding and support from prominent members of Taiwanese society.

Striking has also become less effective as a method of procuring concessions directly from businesses. Taiwan’s industrial unions, the most aggressive in campaigning for workers’ rights, are hemorrhaging, as Taiwanese companies have simply moved their operations across the strait in search of a cheaper workforce. Since the mid-1990s, the Taiwanese labor movement has been crippled by industrial transformation, capital outflows, technological upgrading and factory closedowns, the combined effect of which has been to limit the utility of workers strikes.465

The tepid support that both parties extend to labor militancy should make political party an insignificant variable in determining support for a nationwide strike from the results of the survey. The question on the survey refers to a nationwide strike, a more militant form of labor activism than has ever occurred on Taiwan. With the lack of support among the major political parties for unilateral moves made on the part of labor organizations, their supporters can be expected to disapprove of this type of action. Although the DPP has social activists within its ranks, the bulk of its membership comes from the middle-class, a group that is in large part unlikely to support a nationwide strike.

464 Chin-fen Chang and Heng-hao Chang, “Who Cares for Unions: Public attitudes toward union power in Taiwan, 1990-2005,” China Perspectives 83 2010, pp. 64. 465 Jou-juo Chu, “Labor militancy and Taiwan’s export-led industrialization,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 33(1) 2003, pp. 34.

135 IV. Regression Analysis

a. Variable Selection

The Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) has been conducted annually nationwide since 1985. It was created under the auspices of the National Science

Council for the purpose of collecting and archiving baseline information about

Taiwanese society through the responses of the general adult population. The TSCS is a long-term, cross-sectional survey project that has been distributed in 5-year cycles so as to facilitate the observation of social changes over time. The TSCS is the largest survey series among all general social surveys in the world.466 The data taken for this paper came from the second wave of the fifth phase (2005-2009) of the TSCS, which took place between July and August 2006. The sample size for this survey is n =

1,972. The questionnaire asks respondents about their views on citizenship and the role of the government in Taiwan. Along with basic demographic information, the respondents are asked a series of questions from categories such as daily life and globalization, economic development, the role of the government, government ethics, risks in information networks, etc.

A set of three questions related to citizens’ beliefs about civil liberties and freedoms is included in the survey. The questions are prefaced with the instruction,

“There are many ways people or organizations can protest against a government action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line.” Among the possible answer choices are, “Definitely,” “Probably,” “Probably not,” “Definitely not,” and

“Can’t choose.” The three methods of protesting the government that the respondent is asked to consider are, “Organizing public meetings to protest against the

466 "Taiwan Social Change Survey." Taiwan Social Change Survey. 26 Mar. 2013. Web. 01 Apr. 2013.

136 government,” “Organizing protest marches and demonstrations,” and “Organizing a nationwide strike of all workers against the government.” For the purpose of this paper, each question is taken separately as a dependent variable in the regression analysis. If the response is “Definitely not,” or “Probably not,” the value for the variable is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. Responses besides those mentioned above

(i.e. couldn’t understand the question) are labeled as missing. Therefore, a designation of “1” indicates that the respondent believes that, in an ideal government, the particular civil freedom or right shouldn’t exist. Accordingly, I employ a binary logistic regression analysis to test the relationship between the three independent variables and citizen support for civil liberties.

As described in the previous sections, the three independent variables I test are: whether or not the respondent believes that the government should intervene in the free market; whether or not the respondent identifies terrorism as an exceptional case necessitating the suspension of certain constitutional guarantees; and the extent to which the respondent is guided by Confucian principles. The first independent variable, support for corporatism, is tested by the question, “Some people think the government should continue to intervene in major industrial enterprises to support them with special funds, while others think the government should not intervene in the free market. Do you think the government should intervene or not?” If the respondent selected “Should continue to support the major industrial enterprises with special funds,” the variable is assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the expected sign on the corporatism variable is positive, which would indicate that support for corporatist economic relations, depicted by government intervention in the free market, is correlated with approval for restricting civil liberties and freedoms.

137 A three-part question from the survey measures a respondent’s attitude toward granting the government extra-constitutional powers during a time of heightened security risk. The question asks, “Suppose the government suspected that a terrorist act was about to happen. Do you think the authorities should have the right to… a.)

Detain people for as long as they want without putting them on trial; b.) Tap people’s telephone conversations; c.) Stop and search people in the street at random.” The respondents are asked to choose from a list of possible responses including,

“Definitely should have right,” “Probably should have right,” “Probably should not have right,” “Definitely should not have right,” and “Can’t choose.” If the respondent indicates that the government “definitely should have right,” or “probably should have right,” to perform any of the above actions, the variable is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. Any other response is labeled as missing. The expected sign for all three variables is positive, indicating that the more susceptible a respondent is to the terror threat as shown by their willingness to grant the government extralegal powers to combat terrorism, the more supportive they should be of general restrictions on basic civil freedoms and liberties.

The final hypothesis, the effect of Confucian beliefs on support for civil liberties, is measured by the extent that a respondent agrees with the statement, “As long as our leader has high ethics and morals, we can trust him/her to do anything for our country.” The respondent is asked to choose between, “Strongly agree,” “Agree,”

“Neither agree nor disagree,” “Disagree,” “Strongly disagree,” and “Can’t choose.” If the respondent selected “Strongly agree,” or “Agree,” the variable is assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. All other responses are labeled as missing. The expected sign is positive, which would show that those respondents who have internalized

Confucian values, specifically blind trust in a moral leader, are more likely to agree

138 that the public should not be allowed to hold meetings, demonstrations, or a nationwide strike protesting the government.

Besides the three independent variables representing the hypotheses, I have also included six control variables. These control variables are: the respondents’ views on how prevalent corruption is among politicians in the government, education level, whether or not the respondent is a mainlander, whether or not the respondent supports the “pan-blue” camp, age, and gender. The first control variable is represented by a question from the survey asking respondents to speculate on, “how many politicians in Taiwan are involved in corruption,” with the possible answers being “Almost none,” “A few,” “Some,” “Quite a lot,” “Almost all,” and “Can’t choose.” The responses are assigned values ranging from 1 (“Almost none”) to 5

(“Almost all”). Respondents who are of the opinion that a greater proportion of politicians in Taiwan are corrupt are predicted to be less likely to accept restricting civil liberties and restrictions. The binary regression treats “Almost all” (5), as the control variable. Therefore, in the analyses, the Corrupt Politician variable corresponds directly with its assigned value, e.g. Corrupt Politicians (1) is the variable for “Almost none” (1), Corrupt Politicians (2) is the variable for “A few” (2), etc.

The variable for “Corrupt politicians” is categorical and based on the assumption that a respondent who believes a greater proportion of politicians are corrupt in Taiwan will be more likely to support the protection of civil liberties and rights.

Education level has been shown to have an impact on beliefs about political parties, candidates, and issues.467 Bobo and Licari (1989) found evidence suggesting that individuals with a higher level of education are also more tolerant of minority

467 William G. Jacoby, “The Sources of Liberal-Conservative Thinking: Education and conceptualization,” Political Behavior 10(4) Winter 1988, pp. 316-332.

139 groups.468 A variable indicating the level of formal education of the respondent captures the influence that education has on support for civil liberties in Taiwan insofar as education level is a relevant variable. Education level is measured by the number of years a respondent reported as having spent in formal education, i.e. a respondent who has spent one year in formal education is assigned a value of 1, two years, 2, etc. The expected sign is negative, which would indicate that a respondent who has spent a greater number of years in formal education will be less likely to believe that basic civil liberties shouldn’t be allowed by the government.

I also include a variable capturing ethnicity to measure whether having a parent from the mainland is a significant factor in support for civil liberties. Hsieh

(2008) argues that ethnicity has diminished as a salient factor in Taiwanese politics, while the importance of national identity has increased commensurately.469 The survey, however, doesn’t include a precise measure of the respondent’s views on national identity. Ethnicity has been a conspicuous cleavage in Taiwanese politics and may influence a respondent’s evaluation of civil liberties. If a respondent has at least one parent who is from mainland China, the variable is assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. If the respondent refused to answer the question, the variable is designated as missing. If the sign on the variable is positive and significant, it would suggest that respondents with an ethnic tie to the mainland are less likely to support basic civil liberties than those without such heritage.

Political affiliation is also included as a control variable to test whether a respondent’s support for the “pan-blue camp” has an impact on support for civil liberties. The KMT, the major political party comprising the pan-blue camp, has

468 Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Licari, “Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the effects of cognitive sophistication and target group affect, ” Public Opinion 53(3) 1989, pp. 285-308. 469 John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Democracy in a Mildly Divided Society,” In Philip Paolino and James D. Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), p. 11-24.

140 unfavorable connotations among some Taiwanese as the erstwhile authoritarian regime. If there is evidence that pan-blue supporters are more intolerant of civil liberties and freedoms, this animosity may be justifiable as a residual effect of authoritarian rule. If a respondent self-identifies as being affiliated with the pan-blue camp, the variable is assigned a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Missing values are treated as such. If the sign on the variable is positive and significant, it would suggest that pan-blue supporters are less supportive of basic civil liberties than non-pan-blue camp supporters.

Gender is also included in the equation to test whether being a male or female significantly affects a respondent’s support for civil liberties. De Vaus and

McAllister (2006) find strong support that women are more likely than men to be conservative in their political views.470 A variable capturing gender is therefore included, with males assigned a value of 1, and females, 0. Any other responses are treated as missing. If the sign on the variable is negative and significant, it would suggest that females are less likely to support civil liberties than males.

Finally, age is included in the regression to test for the possibility that older respondents are more conservative than younger citizens. Age has been found to be a significant factor for the expression of conservative opinions.471 Older respondents may risk losing more in terms of property and prestige than those of a younger generation if the government’s policies are aggressively challenged. The former are likely to have settled down and accumulated wealth and status that may be threatened by challenges to the social order. Therefore, I include a variable corresponding to the age, in years, of the respondent. If the sign on the variable is negative and significant,

470 David De Vaus and Ian McAllister, “The Changing Politics of Women: Gender and political alignment in 11 nations,” European Journal of Political Research 17(3) May 1989, pp. 241-262. 471 Francis D. Glamser, “The Importance of Age to Conservative Opinions: A multivariate analysis,” The Journal of Gerontology 29(5) 1974, pp. 549-554.

141 it would indicate that older respondents are less likely to support civil liberties than their younger cohorts.

b. Preliminary Results

Not surprisingly, the preliminary results of the survey show a clear differentiation in the number of respondents who think that the government should allow public meetings, demonstrations, and nationwide strikes to take place. Table

4.1 below displays the descriptive statistics obtained from the survey. Of the respondents who expressed a clearly affirmative or negative opinion, 28 percent believe that the mere holding of public meetings should not be allowed. Over half of those respondents stating that public meetings should not be allowed indicated the strongest opposition, that the government should “definitely not” allow public meetings to take place at all. Just under half (48 percent) of respondents with a clearly stated position believe that the government should not allow demonstrations to take place. Finally, over 70 percent of respondents answered that the government should not allow nationwide strikes to take place.

Table 4.1: Support for allowing civil liberties

Definitely Probably Not Probably Definitely Total Not Should Should Public Meetings 181 (9.7%) 343 (18.4%) 696 (37.2%) 649 (34.7%) 1869 Demonstrations 291 (15.5%) 616 (32.8%) 646 (34.4%) 326 (17.3%) 1879 Nationwide 620 (33.0%) 726 (38.7%) 340 (18.1%) 190 (10.1%) 1876 Strikes

These numbers indicate that at least until 2006, and possibly onward, there was a considerable segment of the Taiwanese population who valued stability and order over the unconditional guarantee of civil liberties. Roy (2003) noted that under

142 martial law, most of the public actually “preferred keeping martial law and cared less about seeking independence than about other matters such as crime, pollution, and the cost of living” (emphasis added).472 The purpose of this study is to elucidate sources of this authoritarian tendency in Taiwanese society.

In order to test the three hypotheses identifying these sources (corporatism, the terror threat, and Confucianism), I ran a binary logistic regression using three different response variables. The response variables are the measures of support for civil liberties previously described, specifically whether the government should allow public meetings, demonstrations, and nationwide strikes to take place. If the respondent believes that the government shouldn’t allow the indicated form of protest to take place, the variable is coded 1, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables are the dummy variables for the three hypotheses and the control variables for education level, ethnicity, corrupt politicians, political affiliation, age, and gender. Binary logistic regression uses binomial probability theory in which there are only two values to predict: that probability (p) is 1 rather than 0, in this case the probability that the respondent believes that the government shouldn’t rather than should allow the civil liberty. Logistic regression uses the maximum likelihood method, which maximizes the probability of placing the observed data into the appropriate category (1 or 0), based on the given explanatory coefficients. Since there are three different questions pertaining to the terror threat hypotheses, I first use SPSS regression software to examine each response variable (public meetings, demonstrations, nationwide strikes) while alternating the variable used to measure the terror threat (tap phones, detain people, random stop and searches). The results are displayed below, with the left- hand column indicating the civil liberty and terror threat variable used.

472 Roy 2003, op. cit., p. 162.

143

Table 4.2: Regression with 3 terror variables (signs on coefficients)

Intervene Trust Terror Education Mainlander Corrupt Politicians (2) (3) (4) Age Male Pan in free (1) a some quite Blue market almost none few a lot Public Meetings + + + - - + + - - + - - *detain

*tap + + - - - + + - - + - -

*stop and search + + + - - + + - - + - -

Demonstrati ons + - - + - + + - - + - - *detain

*tap + - - + - + + - - + - -

*stop and search + - - + - + + - - + - -

Nationwide Strike + + + + - + + + - - + - *detain

*tap + + + + - + + + - - + -

*stop and search + + + + - + + + - - + -

Table 4.3: Regression with 3 terror variables

Interven Trust Terror Education Mainlande Corrupt (2) (3) (4) Age Male Pan Blue e in free * r Politicians market (1) Public Meetings .421 .100 .245 -.064 -.705 1.540 .265 -.079 -.095 .005 -.055 -.600 *detain (.000) (.397) (.091) (.159) (.001) (.014) (.161) (.650) (.550) (.760) (.639) (.000)

*tap .436 .125 -.115 -.064 -.716 1.556 .271 -.090 -.108 .006 -.043 -.606 (.000) (.286) (.349) (.160) (.001) (.013) (.152) (.602) (.495) (.701) (.711) (.000)

*stop and .422 .118 .084 -.066 -.703 1.579 .275 -.083 -.101 .006 -.052 -.601 search (.000) (.317) (.471) (.146) (.001) (.012) (.145) (.633) (.525) (.697) (.653) (.000)

Demonstratio ns .301 -.040 .108 .027 -.613 1.983 .343 -.031 -.108 .006 -.169 -.655 *detain (.003) (.697) (.410) (.492) (.000) (.014) (.046) (.834) (.429) (.704) (.096) (.000)

*tap .310 -.030 -.065 .027 -.620 1.988 .347 -.037 -.114 .006 -.165 -.658 (.002) (.768) (.542) (.485) (.000) (.014) (.043) (.804) (.407) (.683) (.106) (.000)

*stop and .311 -.024 -.108 .027 -.623 2.008 .344 -.040 -.115 .006 -.169 -.660 search (.002) (.816) (.289) (.493) (.000) (.013) (.045) (.792) (.403) (.671) (.097) (.000)

Nationwide Strikes .262 .134 .068 .089 -.613 1.881 .257 .156 -.034 -.022 .014 -.634 *detain (.019) (.233) (.645) (.040) (.000) (.077) (.185) (.342) (.819) (.172) (.897) (.000)

*tap .262 .139 .019 .088 -.613 1.897 .259 .154 -.035 -.021 .012 -.634 (.019) (.215) (.874) (.041) (.000) (.075) (.180) (.348) (.812) (.178) (.913) (.000)

*stop and .263 .138 .011 .088 -.613 1.892 .260 .154 -.035 -.021 .013 -.634 search (.019) (.218) (.921) (.041) (.000) (.075) (.179) (.348) (.811) (.177) (.904) (.000) 144 Table 4.2 shows that “Intervene in free market,” “Mainlander,” and “Pan Blue” have a consistent sign across each of the response variables when run with each of the terror threat variables. The sign on “Intervene in free market” is congruent with the corporatism hypothesis, while the signs on both “Mainlander” and “Pan Blue” are opposite from what is predicted. When the unstandardized beta values and significance levels are included in Table 4.3, the same three variables, “Intervene in free market,” “Mainlander,” and “Pan Blue” are seen to be statistically significant.

Corrupt Politicians (1), “almost no politicians are involved in corruption,” is also statistically significant across all regressions, and education level is found to be statistically significant for all three regressions run on “Nationwide Strikes,” although its sign is opposite from what is expected. Finally, Corrupt Politicians (2), “a few politicians are involved in corruption,” is also statistically significant for the regressions run on “Demonstrations.”

c. Regression results

Table 4.4 displays the significant variables across the three dependent variables. Both “PanBlue” and “Mainlander” are statistically significant at the 99% level for all three dependent variables, while “InterveneFreeMarket” is significant at the 99% level for “Public Meetings” and “Protest Demonstrations,” and at the 95% level for “Nationwide Strikes.” Other variables that reached significance on at least one of the dependent variables were “Detain,” “Education,” “Corrupt Politicians,”

“Corrupt Politicians (1)” and “Corrupt Politicians (2).”

145 Table 4.4: Summary of significant variables

Public Protest Nationwide Meetings Demonstrations Strikes B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. PanBlue -.600 .000*** -.659 .000*** -.634 .000*** (.161) (.129) (.129)

InterveneFreeMarket .421 .000*** .307 .002*** .262 .019** (.116) (.101) (.112)

Mainlander -.705 .001*** -.616 .000*** -.613 .000*** (.215) (.165) (.156)

Detain .245 .091* .108 .410 .068 .645 (.145) (.132) (.147)

Education -.064 .159 .024 .539 .089 .040** (.045) (.039) (.043)

Corrupt Politicians .014** .006*** .148

Corrupt Politicians (1) 1.540 .014** 1.995 .013** 1.881 .077* (.628) (.805) (1.065)

Corrupt Politicians (2) .265 .161 .329 .055* .257 .185 (.189) (.329) (.194)

Standard Errors are reported in parentheses *,**,*** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

Details of the regression analysis are summarized in the Tables at the end of

this section. Tables 4.5 through 4.11 give the output results from the SPSS binary

regression run using “Demonstrations,” “Detain,” and excluding “Male” from the

variable set. Comparing the Classification Tables (Tables 4.5 and 4.10), the results

show that the percentage of outcomes correctly predicted by the model increased by 6

percentage points, from 53.5 percent to 59.5 percent, when including all of the

variables except for the gender variable. This is an impressive increase and provides

evidence that the model is a good fit. Table 4.6 shows the regression equation

without the addition of any variables. The Wald statistic in the equation tests the null

hypothesis that an equal number of respondents believe that the government should

and shouldn’t allow demonstrations. The significance level (0.004) shows that we

146 should reject the null hypothesis that there are an equal number of respondents in the population that believe that the government should and shouldn’t allow demonstrations. The Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients (Table 4.7) tests the hypothesis that there is at least some predictive capacity of the regression equation.

The values (significance <.05) show that the regression model is appropriate and has some predictive capacity. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 display the pseudo R-square values and

Hosmer and Lemeshow tests. Once again, the Cox and Snell R-square and

Nagelkerke R-square values are relatively low, however the Hosmer and Lemeshow

Significance Test shows that the model is a good fit. Table 4.11 shows the predicted and observed number of respondents who believe that demonstrations should and should not be allowed. The predicted numbers are obtained by using the full regression equation. These numbers correspond with Tables 4.5 and 4.10, which showed an increase of 6 percent in the accuracy of the model, given the full regression. Table 4.12 gives the results of the binary regression analysis, excluding gender. The equation obtained from the regression is:

Logit(Demonstrations) = -.675 + .307(Intervene) -.033(Trust) + .108(Detain) -

.616(Mainlander) + 1.995(CP1) + .329(CP2) - .033(CP3) - .110(CP4) -.659(Pan-blue)

+ .006(Age) + .024(Education)

The variables “Intervene in free market,” “Mainlander,” “Pan-blue,” “Corrupt

Politicians,” and “Corrupt Politicians(1)” are statistically significant at the 95%

Confidence Interval (P<0.05). Similarly, the Wald statistics show the same variables to be significant. The coefficients (B) are also displayed and show that a one unit increase in the belief that the government should intervene in the free market

147 increases the logit (estimated log odds) of the belief that the government shouldn’t allow demonstrations to occur by .307 units, controlling for political affiliation, age, education level, belief in Confucianism, sensitivity to the terror threat, ethnicity, and opinion on the number of corrupt politicians in the government. On the contrary, having a parent who is a mainlander decreases the logit (estimated log odds of the belief that the government shouldn’t allow demonstrations to occur) by .616 units, controlling for political affiliation, age, education level, belief in the free market, belief in Confucianism, sensitivity to the terror threat, and opinion on the number of corrupt politicians in the government. Likewise, being politically affiliated with the pan-blue camp decreases the logit of the belief that the government shouldn’t allow demonstrations to occur by .659 units, controlling for age, education level, belief in the free market, belief in Confucianism, sensitivity to the terror threat, ethnicity, and opinion on the number of corrupt politicians in the government.

The relationship can also be described in different terms. Respondents who believe that the government should intervene in the free market are 1.36 times more likely to believe that demonstrations shouldn’t be allowed by the government than those who don’t, controlling for political affiliation, age, education level, belief in

Confucianism, sensitivity to the terror threat, ethnicity, and opinion on the number of corrupt politicians in the government. Respondents who have a parent who is a mainlander are 46 percent less likely to believe that the government shouldn’t allow demonstrations as those who don’t, controlling for political affiliation, age, education level, belief in the free market, belief in Confucianism, sensitivity to the terror threat, and opinion on the number of corrupt politicians in the government. A respondent who is politically affiliated with the pan-blue camp is almost fifty percent less likely to believe that the government shouldn’t allow demonstrations as one who isn’t,

148 controlling for age, education level, belief in the free market, belief in Confucianism, sensitivity to the terror threat, ethnicity, and opinion on the number of corrupt politicians in the government. I include the output tables for “Protest Meetings”

(Table 4.13) and “Nationwide Strikes” (Table 4.14) for comparison.

Table 4.5: Classification table

Observed Predicted

Demonstrations Percentage Correct .00 1.00

Demonstrations .00 892 0 100.0

1.00 775 0 .0

Overall 53.5

Percentage

Table 4.6: Variables in the equation

B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)

Step 0 Constant -.141 .049 8.198 1 .004 .869

Table 4.7: Omnibus tests of model coefficients

Chi- df Sig. square Step 1 Step 88.279 11 .000 Block 88.279 11 .000 Model 88.279 11 .000

Table 4.8: Model summary

Step -2 Log Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R likelihood Square Square 1 2214.455a .052 .069

149 Table 4.9: Hosmer and Lemeshow test

Sig. Step Chi-square df .742 1 5.149 8

Table 4.10: Classification tablea

Observed Predicted

Demonstrations Percentage Correct .00 1.00

Demonstrations .00 589 303 66.0 1.00 372 403 52.0

Overall 59.5

Percentage

Table 4.11: Regression analysis: Contingency table for Hosmer and Lemeshow test

Demonstrations = .00 Demonstrations = 1.00 Total

Observed Expected Observed Expected

1 121 126.142 46 40.858 167

2 116 112.348 51 54.652 167

3 103 100.076 64 66.924 167

4 90 90.332 75 74.668 165

5 87 88.487 80 78.513 167

6 92 84.967 75 82.033 167

7 82 79.104 85 87.896 167

8 72 76.445 96 91.555 168

9 76 73.229 91 93.771 167

10 53 60.871 112 104.129 165

150 Table 4.12: Regression analysis: Variables in the equation (Demonstrations)

B Sig. Wald

PanBlue -.659 .000*** 26.211 (.129) Age .006 .686 .163 (.015) EducationLevel .024 .539 .378 (.039) InterveneFreeMarket .307 .002*** 9.197 (.101) TrustLeader -.033 .744 .107 (.103) Detain .108 .410 .679 (.132) Mainlander -.616 .000*** 13.914 (.165) Corrupt Politicians .006*** 14.370

Corrupt Politicians (1) 1.995 .013** 6.143 (.805) Corrupt Politicians (2) .329 .055* 3.690 (.329) Corrupt Politicians (3) -.033 .827 .047 (-.033) Corrupt Politicians (4) -.110 .422 .644 (.137) Constant -.675 .602 .272 (1.294) Standard Errors are reported in parentheses *,**,*** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

151 Table 4.13: Regression analysis: Variables in the equation (Public Meetings)

B Sig. Wald PanBlue -.600 .000*** 13.848 (.161) Age .005 .760 .093 (.017) EducationLevel -.064 .159 1.981 (.045) InterveneFreeMarket .421 .000*** 13.100 (.116) TrustLeader .100 .397 .718 (.118) Detain .245 .091* .2865 (.145) Mainlander -.705 .001*** 10.757 (.215) Corrupt Politicians .025** 11.175

Corrupt Politicians (1) 1.540 .014** 6.013 (.628) Corrupt Politicians (2) .265 .161 1.962 (.189) Corrupt Politicians (3) -.079 .650 .205 (.173) Corrupt Politicians (4) -.095 .550 .357 (.159) Male -.055 .639 .220 (.116) Constant -1.422 .336 .924 (1.479) Standard Errors are reported in parentheses *,**,*** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

152

Table 4.14: Regression analysis: Variables in the equation (Nationwide Strikes)

B Sig. Wald PanBlue -.634 .000*** 24.149 (.129) Age -.022 .172 1.870 (.016) EducationLevel .089 .040** 4.266 (.043) InterveneFreeMarket .262 .019** 5.502 (.112) TrustLeader .134 .233 1.420 (.112) Detain .068 .645 .212 (.147) Mainlander -.613 .000*** 15.456 (.156) CorruptPoliticians .148 6.780

CorruptPoliticians (1) 1.881 .077* 3.119 (1.065) CorruptPoliticians (2) .257 .185 1.760 (.194) CorruptPoliticians (3) .156 .342 .905 (.164) CorruptPoliticians (4) -.034 .819 .052 (.148) Male .014 .897 .017 (.111) Constant 2.488 .080 3.067 (1.421) Standard Errors are reported in parentheses *,**,*** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively

153

V. Conclusion

a. Democracy with an Adjective

Taiwan has been described as having successfully transitioned from an authoritarian regime to a democratic polity and as being a paragon of the third wave of democratization. After the lifting of martial law in 1987, democratic reforms have continued with remarkable celerity. The 1991 National Assembly elections were the first full democratic elections for a national body in Taiwan’s history, and elections for the Legislative Yuan soon followed in 1992. In 1996, Taiwanese gathered at the polls to choose the president in a direct election, the first time ever that an Asian country had chosen a state leader in such a process. Although the winning candidate, incumbent Lee Teng-hui, was a member of the former authoritarian party and had served as president for eight years without a mandate from the people, he was widely respected among the Taiwanese for his achievements while in office and for his reformist credentials. The opposition DPP reached a milestone in 2000, benefitting from a split in the KMT party and scraping together enough of the vote to capture the presidency. During the Chen Shui-bian administration, the seventh round of constitutional amendments was implemented, ostensibly concluding Taiwan’s constitutional revisions and solidifying Taiwan’s two-party structure. After spending eight years as the opposition, the KMT has re-invigorated itself and emerged victorious in the 2008 presidential elections, accomplishing a second peaceful turnover of power in Taiwan’s democratic era. Compared with the transitions of other former authoritarian countries into democratic forms, Taiwan has made a relatively peaceful transformation into a stable democracy.

154 A more discriminating inspection of Taiwan’s democracy shows that, although there are regularly held free and fair elections between at least two competitive political parties, there are still flaws that mar the image of absolute fealty to democratic ideals. The authoritarian era produced several legacies that continue to plague politics on the island. One such legacy is the gap in resources available to the two main political parties. The KMT, the former authoritarian regime, has been called the “richest political party in the world,” and disputes continue to surface over its assets collected over its time at the helm of a one-party state.473 Another unscrupulous practice left over from the authoritarian era is “black gold politics,” or the political corruption rooted in ties between gangsters and money politics, an accusation that even the DPP is not immune to.474 Perhaps more worrisome for

Taiwan’s democracy, the main opposition party, the DPP has found building support among the general population an elusive task. The ‘China factor’ in Taiwanese politics guarantees the KMT a small but significant fraction of the vote in presidential elections from Taiwanese who are wary of voting an opposition politician into office whom Beijing regards as antagonistic to its national interests. There is even some sentiment among scholars that the DPP faces an insuperable burden in gaining a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan.

Another component of democratic welfare is the quality of citizen beliefs about democratic principles and practices. Rustow (1970) emphasizes that a mature democracy is characterized by a society in which the norms and procedures of democracy have become inveterate among the elites as well as the masses.475

Similarly, Diamond (1997) suggests that a broad consensus across class, ethnicity,

473 Cheng-chen Hsiang and Jason Pan, "Taiwan High Court Rules Against BCC on Land Dispute." - Taipei Times. 10 Apr. 2013. Web. 18 Apr. 2013. 474 Chris Wang, "DPP's Ker Denies Report of Gangsters, Party Membership." - Taipei Times. 18 Apr. 2013. Web. 18 Apr. 2013. 475 Rustow 1970, op. cit. (See also Lagos 2001.)

155 nationality, and other cleavages on the desirability of democracy over any other alternative form of government is a prerequisite to democratic consolidation.476

According to these scholars, citizen beliefs are sine qua non to the success of democratic consolidation.

In Taiwan, there is still a considerable proportion of the population that holds conservative values redolent of the martial law period. The 2004 version of the

Taiwan Social Change Survey showed that 58.6 percent of the respondents believed that the government should have the power to restrict democratic rights when it believes it to be necessary, while only 31.2 percent held the view that “under no circumstances should democratic rights be restricted.”477 The 1998 version of the

Taiwan Social Change Survey asked respondents whether democracy is always the best political system, or if sometimes it is better to have an authoritarian system of dictatorship. Almost a third of the respondents, 31.9 percent, believed that authoritarian government is sometimes better than a democracy.478 Providing further confirmation that these results were not just anomalies, nearly two thirds of respondents (64.7 percent) to the 2010 Survey believed that brutal offenders should be punished immediately without recourse to a court of justice. Less than a third (32.2 percent) of respondents disagreed, with a paltry 4.4 percent strongly disagreeing.479

Recognizing the importance of citizen beliefs for a healthy democracy, several studies have examined the relationships between partisan and ethnic identification on attitudes towards regime satisfaction, efficacy, and government alienation in

476 Diamond 1997, op. cit. 477 Academia Sinica, Institute of Sociology. 2004. “Fourth Phase, Fifth Wave: Citizenship.” Taiwan Social Change Survey. Raw data. Taipei, Taiwan. 478 Academia Sinica, Institute of Sociology. 1998. “Third Phase, Fourth Wave: Political Culture.” Taiwan Social Change Survey. Raw data. Taipei, Taiwan. 479 Academia Sinica, Institute of Sociology. 2010. “Sixth Phase, First Wave: Globalization, Work, Family, Mental Health, Religion, Mass Communication, Political Participation, Leisure.” Taiwan Social Change Survey. Raw data. Taipei, Taiwan.

156 Taiwan.480 This paper contributes to this literature by testing three hypotheses on the sources of authoritarian values extant in Taiwanese society. In addition to ethnicity and partisanship, I investigated whether, (1) believing that the government should intervene in the free market; (2) according credulity to the terror threat argument; and

(3) holding Confucian values, are significant factors producing disapprobation for civil rights in Taiwan. Surprisingly, whereas the corporatism variable was found to be statistically significant, both the terror threat and Confucianism variables were statistically insignificant in the regression model. These results show that neither sensitivity to terrorism nor belief in a basic tenet of Confucianism, the absolute authority of a virtuous leader, is correlated with support for civil rights.

Before further analyzing the significant variable corporatism, some explanations for the insignificant variables, the terror threat and Confucianism, and several limitations to this particular study should be addressed. As explained in the section on the terror threat in Taiwan, the KMT regime rationalized authoritarian rule based on the existence of a threatening rival regime on the mainland. For over forty years, the four laws and provisions making up martial law granted the president extraordinary powers and curtailed the civil rights and liberties of Taiwanese citizens.

Even after martial law was lifted, the China factor has appeared persistently in

Taiwanese politics. On the eve of the first anniversary of the September 11th attacks,

Chen Shui-bian made remarks pointedly likening China’s deployment of missiles targeting Taiwan to terrorism.481 However, few Taiwanese today apart from President

Chen would draw the same parallel that the military threat posed by the Chinese

480 Stockton 2006, op. cit. (See also Chu 2008; Chu 2012b.) 481 Amber Wang,"Chen Urges Beijing to Renounce Threat of Force Against Taiwan." - The China Post. 11 Sept. 2002. Web. 11 June 2013.

157 Communist Party regime is terroristic in nature.482 Moreover, by 2006, the regime in

Beijing had arguably shown that it was reluctant to use violence against Taiwan, even with a DPP member in the presidential office. Instead, Beijing was implementing a

‘hearts and minds’ strategy designed to win over more Taiwanese politicians and members of the general public.483 Accordingly, the terror exception is not evident in

Taiwanese politics, and the regression results showed sensitivity to terrorism not to be significantly correlated with support for civil liberties.

The ‘virtuous leader’ trope is a fundamental element of the Confucian tradition. Therefore, respondents who identify themselves as being influenced by

Confucian thought are likely to indicate agreement with the question from the survey.

Following the logic of Asian Values, respondents who are influenced by Confucian values should be more conservative in their political outlook. However, the

Confucianism variable was not statistically significant in the regression model. By implication, this finding seems to refute the cultural justification for the restriction of civil liberties in East Asia, and suggests that contrary to the Asian Values argument,

Confucian values do not a priori lead to diminished support for civil and political rights.

Several limitations to this study also condition the results and their interpretations. The first regards the aptness of using the ‘virtuous leader’ theme as the be-all and end-all to capture a respondent’s inclination towards Confucian values.

However, Confucianism entails a myriad of beliefs that may not be reflected in a respondent’s answer to a single survey question about the right of a moral leader to govern. In addition to bestowing faith in a virtuous leader, Confucianism also

482 Anna Tsai, "Playing the Terrorism Card Bad for Taiwan." - Taipei Times. 12 Nov. 2012. Web. 11 June 2013. 483 Center for National Policy. CNP Panel on Cross-Strait Relations. More Talk Or More Tension? China's Taiwan Initiatives and Implications For U.S. Policy. 14 June 2005. Web. 12 June 2013. (See also Jianwei Wang, “Time for ‘New’ Thinking on Taiwan,” China Security 4(1) Winter 2008, pp. 120.

158 emphasizes the group over the individual, duty, paternalism, unequal social roles, etc., values which may influence a respondent’s support for civil liberties and aren’t included in the Confucianism variable used.484 Other Confucian values could consequently still be a significant factor affecting a respondent’s support for civil liberties and political rights. Another aspect to this seemingly incongruous finding might be the observed gap between individual vs. public spheres. The results might indicate that adherents to Confucian values tend to separate their personal belief system from political values. This finding demonstrates the limits of 21st century

Confucianism vis-à-vis the political realm.

A second limitation is the applicability of the findings for the current political situation in Taiwan. Taiwanese politics are in constant flux, and the political circumstances of 2006 bear only a superficial resemblance to the contemporary environment. Indeed, in a highly politicized society such as Taiwan’s, political alignments, citizen beliefs, and political ideologies are highly labile. This limitation is most relevant to the significance of the corporatism finding. Both political affiliation and ethnicity are more deeply ingrained aspects of identity and hence less likely to exhibit change over a short time span. Two years after the survey, the Great

Recession struck world economies in 2008, and in the same year, Ma Ying-jeou was elected president. The economic crisis has provided an opportunity for proponents of alternative economic models to publicize their criticisms of free-market capitalism.

This increase in the prominence of economic theories disentangling neo-liberal economic growth and liberal democratic values may have since influenced Taiwanese as well. However, in order for these counter-theories to hold weight among

Taiwanese, there must be a group of academics, politicians, and civil leaders

484 Sor-hoon Tan, “Democracy in Confucianism,” Philosophy Compass 7(5) May 2012, pp. 294.

159 dedicated to spreading a coherent vision. Absent this, it is unlikely that alternative economic theories will hold sway among the general population.

Another limiting point of contention involves the normative foundation of civil rights. Some scholars question the symmetry between western concepts of political liberties and civil rights, and their counterparts in East Asian countries.485

From this perspective, western phenomena such as an active civil society, unassailable civil rights, and latitudinous individual autonomy are inappropriate for

East Asian societies. Consequently, any comparison of state-society relations between countries is problematic, as each is embedded in different historical experiences and cultural understandings. Scholars who adopt this position demur at studies that attempt to graft western conceptions of civil liberties on non-western nations. As noted in a previous section, this appeal to cultural sensitivity originated in

Singapore, whose elites have been the ‘principal champions’ of cultural relativism.486

In addition to Singaporean elites, Asian leaders have fervently promoted Asian

Values in riposte to the influence of Western politicians.487 Observers should be chary of the claim that cultural differences condone a subjective application of civil and human rights, given that these interpretations proceeded from political leaders.

As pointed out earlier, Taiwan has in fact a lengthy tradition of social activism petitioning for civil liberties and political rights à la those practiced in western nations, even with its Confucian heritage. During the period of martial law, the fear of repression rather than cultural norms prevented Taiwanese from demanding their civil

485 Xia Yong, The Philosophy of Civil Rights in the Context of China (Leiden, the Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2011). (See also Hong Xiao, “Values Priority and Human Rights Policy: A comparison between China and western nations,” Journal of Human Values 11(2) October 2005, pp. 87-102.) 486 Garry Rodan, “Human Rights, Singaporean Style,” Far Eastern Economic Review 172(10) December 2009, pp. 29. 487 Fareed Zakaria, “Asian Values,” Foreign Policy 133 November-December 2002, pp. 39.

160 rights. As described earlier, social movements burgeoned immediately after martial law was repealed.

Taking into consideration the above explanations, limitation and rebuttals, the major findings of this study are elaborated in detail below.

b. Democracy and Capitalism

The results of the binary regression analysis show three variables, “Intervene in free market,” “Mainlander,” and “Pan-blue,” to be significant across all three civil liberties selected. The sign on the first variable, “Intervene in free market,” is positive, indicating that a respondent who believes that the government should intervene in the free market is more likely to believe that the government should also restrict civil liberties a priori, controlling for the other variables in the equation. A summary of the discussion relating to the relationship between democracy and capitalism is beyond the scope of this paper, however suffice it to say that there has been extensive research and speculation on the content and depth of the association.488

Regardless of the debate about capitalism and liberal democracy, the results of this study show that Taiwanese generally subscribe to a positive correlation between political liberalism and the free market. The rationale behind this finding includes

Taiwan’s extended period of corporatism guided by an authoritarian regime. Over the entirety of the period of martial law, the KMT directed the economy through its ownership of key industries under the party-state paradigm. Under its variant of authoritarian corporatism, the KMT exerted disproportionate influence in labor relations due to the monopolization of labor representation by the Chinese Federation of Labor (CFL), an apparatus of the party. Taiwanese citizens may regard

488 Masanobu Ido (ed), Varieties of Capitalism, Types of Democracy and Globalization (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012). (See also Friedland and Robertson 1990.)

161 government intervention in the free market as an illiberal practice because of its affiliation as a tactic carried out by the one-party state.

The bond between political liberalism and economic liberalization was also reified in the minds of Taiwanese by their concurrent development. In the mid-1980s

Taiwan’s trade dependency on the United States allowed the latter to use its leverage to enjoin Taipei to undertake neo-liberal reforms such as the opening of the

Taiwanese market and similar measures conforming to the ‘Washington

Consensus.”489 At the same time, a confluence of international and domestic factors had made political liberalization a fait accompli. As a result of these interacting processes, the positive correlation between democracy and capitalism was further entrenched in Taiwan’s political-economic ideology.

Meanwhile, another factor contributing to the belief in Taiwan of the veracity of the fundamentals of capitalist democracy among Taiwanese may be the process of democratization sui generis. One prominent segment of Taiwanese society that opposed the KMT was small and medium-sized business entrepreneurs, who resented the fact that the government provided them with little access to credit, subsidies, or other government assistance.490 The members of this group who were active in the dangwai pushed for economic liberalization hand in hand with political reform as a part of its demands. The KMT’s success in promoting equitable economic growth also created a burgeoning middle class of Taiwanese, which caused the impetus for economic liberalization to grow commensurately.491

Similarly, when DPP members began winning seats in greater numbers, their stakes in the political game changed. This caused a parallel shift in the incentive

489 Ming-chang Tsai, “Dependency, the State and Class in the Neoliberal Transition of Taiwan,” Third World Quarterly 22(3) June 2001, pp. 359-379. 490 Rigger 2001, op. cit., p. 40. 491 Huang and Yu 1999, op. cit., p. 92.

162 structures and dynamics of factional politics in the party. Once democracy advocates succeeded in getting elected to political office, business interests became a more strident voice in the DPP. The marginalization of social welfare and environmental issues within the DPP accelerated after Chen Shui-bian won the 2000 presidential election. An economic recession accompanied Chen into office, and business interests successfully redoubled their efforts to pressure the president and his party into resisting economic reforms considered pejorative to economic growth.492

The results of this study have shown that there is a significant positive correlation between a belief in the subordinate role of government in economic activity and support for civil rights. This finding is consistent with the common assertion that class politics plays a trivial role in political division in Taiwan.

However, government non-intervention in the market when taken to the extreme, can result in survival of the fittest protection of the privileged. Indeed, the basic principle of neoliberalism is the supremacy of the free market. Critics of neoliberalism in

Taiwan, e.g., those who seek to exercise their civil rights to enact legislation that ensures their welfare, therefore face a daunting challenge in advancing contrarian economic policies to free-market capitalism. The belief that the free market is an ineluctable outgrowth of liberal democracy puts the burden on workers’ rights activists to impugn the verity of neo-liberalism’s progressive credentials. If these activists fail in this endeavor, the segment of the population most likely to support workers’ rights in analogous democracies based on their commitment to progressive values may have only a tepid interest in, or even be hostile to, combating neo-liberal

492 Ming-sho Ho, “Neo-Centrist Labour Policy in Practice: The DPP and Taiwanese working class,” In Dafydd Fell, Henning Kloter, and Chang Bi-yu (eds.) What Has Changed? Taiwan Before and After the Change in Ruling Parties (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2006), pp. 142-43.

163 reforms in Taiwan.493 In this scenario, the legacy of authoritarian corporatism will continue to be a stumbling block for those resisting the creation of an apotheosis of an unfettered free market in Taiwan.494 The related finding according to the regression results that the number of years a respondent has spent in formal education, presumably elevating their understanding and interest in wider political and social issues, is negatively correlated with support for a nationwide strike, is similarly troubling for workers’ rights advocates.

c. Politicized Civil Rights

The second finding of this study is no more surprising, though a bit more disconcerting insofar as it belies the image of Taiwan as a flawless democracy composed of citizens unswervingly committed to basic civil liberties and freedoms.

Before the dangwai’s declaration that it was creating a political party in defiance of articles of the emergency provisions prohibiting the establishment of new parties, the opposition included members who actively engaged in grassroots organizing. A vocal and influential faction of the dangwai was committed to pursuing democratic reforms via such grassroots activism and did not shy away from disruptive forms of protest and demonstration. During the mid-1980s, with rapid political and economic liberalization taking place simultaneously, social movements proliferated and the dangwai/DPP found political utility in endorsing their development. Throughout the

1990s the DPP remained relegated to a minority in the Legislative Yuan and was kept out of the presidential office in part by the popularity of Lee Teng-hui, who served as

493 It is common, for instance, to see headlines such as the following in Taiwan, in which respected citizen and citizen groups advocate in support of free market reforms. Chris Wang, “Academics Urge Energy Liberalization." - Taipei Times. 29 Apr. 2013. Web. 29 Apr. 2013. 494 See, for example, the debate surrounding the creation of ‘free economic pilot zones’ to attract FDI. Yan-chih Mo, "Speed Up 'Free Economic Pilot Zones,' Ma Says." - Taipei Times. 25 Apr. 2013. Web. 25 Apr. 2013.

164 Taiwan’s president during the entire decade of the 1990s. Lee’s adept political maneuvering helped him to win the first-ever direct presidential elections in 1996, ultimately allowing him to serve twelve years as president of the island. Lacking any substantial institutional power, the DPP retained its loose party organization, allowing its members considerable freedom to develop personal constituencies and leeway in their political views.495

This combination of weak institutional power and loose party discipline gave members of the DPP incentive to develop grassroots networks and support social movements that continued to flourish throughout the 1990s, and whose main target was the state.496 As the party in power, the KMT was reluctant to establish more permanent ties with social movements, electing instead to appease social movement activists by passing legislation such as the Living Allowance for Middle Lower

Income Elderly People Act in 1994, the Welfare Allowance for Aged Farmers Act in

1995, and establishing the National Health Insurance plan in 1995, and unemployment insurance in 1999.497 In several instances, the KMT even poached the ideas of the DPP for its own self-interest.498

Insomuch as public demonstrations and protests were an indispensable tool of the opposition DPP prior to democratization, DPP supporters should be more likely to insist on the protection of basic civil liberties, such as the rights of association and demonstration. Likewise, the relationships that developed between social movement activists and DPP members during the 1990s should bolster the esteem that the latter’s supporters have for those aforementioned civil rights. However, the results of the regression analysis show the opposite to be true; those who are politically affiliated

495 Rigger 2001, op. cit. p. 72. 496 Schafferer 2003, op. cit., p. 12. 497 Fell 2005, op. cit., p. 31. 498 Ibid, p. 42. (See also Rigger 2001, p. 39.)

165 with the pan blue camp are actually more likely to support the rights of association and demonstration and the right to protest, controlling for other variables. The same relationship was also found for those who have at least one Mainlander parent, showing that ethnicity, although an impuissant indicator on most issues, still has some residual influence on Taiwanese society.

These apparently incongruous results can be explained by the political mise en scene at the time of the survey. In late May, President Chen Shui-bian’s son-in-law was brought in for questioning on suspicion of insider trading. Rumors of improprieties among President Chen’s closest circle had already been voiced publicly by this time. Opposition politicians accused Chen’s wife, Wu Shu-chen, of receiving free vouchers from the new management of Taipei’s Sogo Department Store, and questioned her role in facilitating its takeover.499 Two weeks after Chen’s son-in-law was first questioned by investigators, the KMT approved a proposal requesting a parliamentary vote to recall the president.500 The KMT’s motion to remove President

Chen from office failed in late June, as all DPP legislators boycotted the vote.501 The

DPP’s brief display of unity soon evaporated, though, and former party chairman and

DPP icon Shih Ming-teh issued an open letter calling for Chen to step down from his post in early August.502 Unsatisfied with Chen’s response, Shih then spearheaded a campaign between September and November 2006 dubbed, ‘A Million Voices

Against Corruption- President Chen Must Go,’ to publicize his criticisms against the president. The series of demonstrations started off on September 9, with about

200,000 people, mostly women, protesting in front of the Presidential Building on

499 "Chen Shui-bian's Son-in-Law Arrested." Shanghai Daily, 26 May 2006. Web. 29 Apr. 2013. 500 "KMT Seeks Chen Shui-bian's Recall." China Daily. 08 June 2006. Web. 29 Apr. 2013. 501 "Taiwan Opposition's Bid to Oust Chen Shui-bian Fails." People's Daily Online -- Taiwan Opposition's Bid to Oust Chen Shui-bian Fails. 28 June 2006. Web. 28 Apr. 2013. 502 Jewel Huang, "Presidential Office Replies to Shih Ming-teh's Letter." - Taipei Times. 10 Aug. 2006. Web. 28 Apr. 2013.

166 Ketagalan Boulevard. Despite being led by a high-profile member of the party, few

DPP legislators supported Shih’s campaign. Several DPP members lampooned Shih, and some of his old allies questioned his motives in starting the campaign.503 On

September 16, pro-Chen supporters organized a counter demonstration on Ketagalan

Boulevard shouting slogans against Shih’s ‘Red shirt’ movement.504

The 2006 Taiwan Social Change Survey was conducted between July and

August, after the KMT’s recall motion had failed and at a time when segments within the DPP were calling for President Chen to step down. On July 15, prior to Shih

Ming-teh’s open letter, a group of pan-green academics issued a public statement asking for Chen to resign. The emergence of intraparty dissent sparked a bitter public debate among DPP members over whether President Chen should resign.505 Two weeks later, on July 26, the same group of academics issued another appeal to the public, castigating leaders of the DPP and claiming to have collected 20,000 signatures supporting their petition. The group’s statement warned that, “[o]nly by developing an energetic and independent civil society can we improve the country’s democracy.”506

The results of the regression analysis are indicative of the acrimony felt by pan-blue supporters against President Chen, as well as the polarization within the president’s own party. Ideally, there wouldn’t be any significant correlation between support for civil liberties and political affiliation or ethnic identification. If there were to be any significant relationship, the most reasonable prediction would be that pan- green supporters and Taiwanese were more likely to support civil liberties, given the

503 Meng-yu Yang, “Who is Really under Attack during Anti-Chen’s Campaign?” BBC Chinese News, October 11, 2006. (See also Huang 2006.) 504 Fang-long Shih, “The ‘Red Tide’ Anti-Corruption Protest: What does it mean for democracy in Taiwan?” Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 1: November 2007, pp. 87-98. 505 Shu-ling Ko, "DPP Struggles to Maintain Unity." - Taipei Times. 19 July 2006. Web. 29 Apr. 2013. 506 Jewel Huang, "Pan-green Academics Call Again for Chen's Resignation." - Taipei Times. 27 July 2006. Web. 29 Apr. 2013.

167 prior reliance on political activism of the former and the history of structural discrimination against the latter. However, the results of the regression analysis show the reverse to be true; pan blue supporters and citizens with at least one Mainlander parent are actually more likely to support civil liberties. An important question for future investigation is whether this phenomenon of conditional support for civil liberties was an aberration caused by a singular circumstance or an immanent characteristic of Taiwanese society. If the latter is true, the subordination of support for civil rights to political considerations is indubitably unsettling to sanguine appraisals of Taiwan’s democracy.

Taiwan’s current democratic regime meets the qualities of a stable democracy according to the standard put forward by Linz and Stepan (1996), among others, of a shared normative and behavioral commitment to the specific rules and practices of the constitutional system, including a commitment by all significant actors to the laws, procedures, and institutions of the state.507 Within this general framework, however, the actual practice and daily function of democracy may be more tenuous. This study makes a critical observation on the state of democracy in Taiwan on the basis of two results. The first finding shows that, controlling for a range of variables, Taiwanese who believe that the government should intervene in the free market are more likely to oppose granting basic civil rights and freedoms unconditionally. This result might reflect a general belief among Taiwanese that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism are akin in their desirability. A widespread prejudice against communism is not surprising given the historic enmity felt by Taiwanese toward Beijing. The

Chinese Communist Party’s own process of economic liberalization over the past several decades may also further discredit alternative economic theories in the minds

507 Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 6-10.

168 of the Taiwanese public. Opponents of neo-liberalism in Taiwan will have to overcome these ingrained beliefs in order to promote their vision of social justice and workers’ rights. The second finding is consistent with other scholars’ observations of the hyper-politicization of Taiwanese society. Politicization has infiltrated Taiwanese financial institutions and the judiciary, invoking an urgent need to reflect on the condition of Taiwan’s democracy.508 Not only do Taiwanese form their opinions about the fairness of elections and satisfaction with democracy based on party affiliation, but party affiliation can also be a significant factor in support for granting civil liberties.509 A high level of politicization in a society can undermine popular trust towards political institutions, social trust between groups in society, and trust in democratic politics per se.510 Although Taiwan is often awarded plaudits for its democratic transition, the results of this study show there are still obstacles remaining for full realization.

508 Cal Clark and Alexander C. Tan, “Taiwan Enters the 21st Century: A rude awakening to the costs of success,” In Wei-Chin Lee (ed.) Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges (Singapore: World Scientific, 2012) p. 103-130. See also Wei-chen Tseng and Jason Pan. "Netizens Decry 'Light Sentence' for Lin Yi-shih." - Taipei Times. 03 May 2013. Web. 03 May 2013. 509 Chu 2012b, op. cit. 510 Mattlin 2011, op. cit.

169

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Book Chapters:

Chen, Chao-cheng. 2009. “Party Politics after the 2008 Legislative Election.” In Taiwan Development Perspectives 2009. Taipei: National Policy Foundation, p. 93-100.

Cheng, Tun-jen and Yung-ming Hsu. 1996. “Issue Structure, the DPP’s Factionalism, and Party Realignment.” In Charles Chi-Hsiang Chang and Hung-Mao Tien

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Chu, Yun-han. 1998. “Taiwan’s Unique Challenges.” In Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.) Democracy in East Asia. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 133-146.

Chu, Yun-han. 1999. “The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation.” In Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Clark, Cal and Alexander C. Tan. 2012. “Taiwan Enters the 21st Century: A rude awakening to the costs of success.” In Wei-Chin Lee (ed.) Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges. Singapore: World Scientific, p. 103-130

Diamond, Larry. 2002. “Consolidating democracies.” In Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, Pippa Norris (eds.) Comparing Democracies 2: New challenges in the study of elections and voting. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 210-27.

Gold, Thomas. 1996. “Civil Society in Taiwan: The Confucian dimension.” In Wm. Tu Wei-ming (ed.) Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, p. 244-58.

Ho, Ming-sho. 2006. “Neo-Centrist Labour Policy in Practice: The DPP and Taiwanese working class.” In Dafydd Fell, Henning Kloter, and Chang Bi-yu (eds.). What Has Changed? Taiwan Before and After the Change in Ruling Parties. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, p. 129-146.

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael. 2011. “Social Movements in Taiwan: A typological analysis.” In Jeffrey Broadbent and Vicky Brockman, East Asian Social Movements. New York: Spring Science and Business Media, LLC, p. 237-54.

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael and Hsiao-shih Cheng. 1999. “Taiwan.” In Ian Marsh, Jean Blondel, Takashi Inoguchi (eds.) Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia. New York, NY: United Nations Universtiy Press, p. 109-36.

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael and Ming-sho Ho. 2010. “Civil Society and Democracy- Making in Taiwan: Reexamining the link.” In Yin-wah Chu and Siu-lun Wong (eds.). East Asia’s New Democracies: Deepening, reversal, non-liberal alternatives. New York: Routledge, p.43-64.

Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 1996. “The SNTV System and Its Political Implications.” In Hung-mao Tien (ed.) Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the third wave. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, p. 193-212.

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Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2008. “Democracy in a Mildly Divided Society.” In Philip Paolino and James D. Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate p. 11-24.

Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2010. “Is the Kuomintang Invincible?” In Wei-Chin Lee. Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges Singapore: World Scientific, p. 25-40.

Huan, Chi. 2008. “Referendum and Democracy: The experience of Taiwan.” In Philip Paolino and James Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, p. 121-134.

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Huang, Teh-fu and Ching-hsin Yu. 1999. “Developing a party System and Democratic Consolidation.” In Steve Tsang and Hung-mao Tien. Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China. Hong Kong University Press, p. 85-100.

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Liu, I-chou. 1999. “The Development of the Opposition.” In Steven Tsang and Hung- mao Tien (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, p. 67-84.

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185 Offe, Clause. 1981. “The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups.” In S. Berger (ed.) Organising Interest in Western Europe Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 123-58.

Paolino, Philip. 2008. “Semi-presidentialism and Voters’ Views of Divided Government in Taiwan.” In Philip Paolino and James Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, p. 135-52.

Paolino, Philip and James Meernik. 2008. “Introduction.” In Philip Paolino and James Meernik (eds.) Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, p. 1-10.

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Shyu, Huo-yan. 2010. “Trust in Institutions and the Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan.” In Wei-Chin Lee. Taiwan’s Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges Singapore: World Scientific, p. 69-100.

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186 Streeck, Wolfgang. 2006. “The Study of Organized Interests: Before ‘The Century’ and after.” In Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck (eds.) The Diversity of Democracy: Corporatism, social order and political conflict. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, p. 3-45.

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Wang, T.Y. 2008. “Democratic Commitment in Taiwan: An analysis of survey data.” In Philip Paolino and Jim Meernik (eds.). Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in transformation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, p. 87-103.

Wu, Naiteh and Tun-jen Cheng. 2011. “Democratization as a Legitimacy Formula: The KMT and political change in Taiwan.” In John Kane, Hui-Chieh Loy, and Haig Patapan (eds.). Political Legitimacy in Asia: New leadership challenges. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 239-260.

Yamashita, Samuel. 1996. “Confucianism and the Modern Japanese State 1904-1945.” In Tu Wei-ming (ed.) Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral education and economy and culture in Japan and the four mini-dragons. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, p. 133-54.

Zhang, Feng. 2012. “Debating the ‘Chinese Theory of International Relations’: Toward a new stage in China’s international studies.” In Fred Dallmayr and Zhao Tingyan (eds.) Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and perspectives. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, p. 67-90.

Dissertations:

Chuang, Ya-chung. 2000. Activism as a Vocation: Social movements in urban Taiwan. Duke University, PhD dissertation, Durham, NC: Duke University.

Kung, I-Chun. 1995. The Penetration Capacity of an Immigrant State: The formation and consolidation of the social base of the KMT regime, 1950-1969, PhD dissertation, Taipei: National Taiwan University.

Lin, Jih-wen. 1996. Consequences of the Single Nontransferable Vote Rule. Comparing the Japan and Taiwan experiences. PhD dissertation, Los Angeles: University of California.

Conference Papers:

Chu, Yun-han. 2008. “East Asia’s Struggling Democracies: A view from the citizens,” paper delivered at the International Conference on the Experiments with Democracy in East and Southeast Asia: Two decades after, organized by the Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2-3 May 2008.

187 Chu, Yun-han. 2012b. “Empirical Indicators Showing the Maturing of Taiwan Democracy.” Paper presented at The Maturing of Taiwan Democracy: Findings and insights from the 2012 TEDS survey conference. November 3-4, 2012. Taipei, Taiwan. deLisle, Jacques, Shelley Rigger, Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, M. Terry Cooke (discussants). “Taiwan’s Presidential and Legislative Election: Implications for cross-strait relations, U.S. Policy and Domestic Politics.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. Friday, January 20, 2012.

Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2012. “Whom to Blame for Polarization in Taiwan?” Paper presented at The Maturing of Taiwan Democracy: Findings and insights from the 2012 TEDS survey conference. November 3-4, 2012. Taipei, Taiwan.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1974. “Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism.” Paper presented to the IPSA Round Table on Political Integration, Jerusalem.

Stockton, Hans. 2012. “Identity is Dead, Long Love Identity: The relative influences of ethnicity, future status, and partisan identification on voting in presidential elections on Taiwan 2004-2012.” Paper presented at The Maturing of Taiwan Democracy: Findings and insights from the 2012 TEDS survey conference. November 3-4, 2012. Taipei, Taiwan.

Websites:

"10,000 to Join Labor Day Protests, Say Unions." Www.ChinaPost.com.tw. 29 Apr. 2009. Web. 24 Jan. 2013.

"2012 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION RESULTS." - Taipei Times. 15 Jan. 2012. Web. 23 Dec. 2012.

Asian Labour Update. “Taiwan.” Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 11 Jan. 2011. Web. 6 Dec. 2012.

Boehler, Patrick. "Taiwan Rejects Linspired Political Party." NewsFeed Taiwan Rejects Linspired Political Party Comments. 26 Nov. 2012. Web. 21 Jan. 2013.

Center for National Policy. CNP Panel on Cross-Strait Relations. More Talk Or More Tension? China's Taiwan Initiatives and Implications For U.S. Policy. 14 June 2005. Web. 12 June 2013.

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Appendix:

Corporatism Variable

Intervene in the Free Market

Don’t want to answer 1 (42.5%)

Should continue to support 839 (42.5%)

Should not intervene 923 (46.8%)

Don’t understand 36 (1.8%)

Can’t choose 173 (8.8%)

The Terror Threat Variable

Right to Right to Stop and Right to Tap

Detain Search Phones

Don’t want to 2 (.1%) 2 (.1%) 2 (.1%) answer

Definitely should 143 (7.3%) 272 (13.8%) 200 (10.1%)

Probably should 200 (10.1%) 614 (31.1%) 461 (23.4%)

Probably should 416 (21.1%) 397 (20.1%) 423 (21.5%) not

Definitely should 1137 (57.7%) 624 (31.6%) 819 (41.5%) not

194 Don’t understand 10 (.5%) 10 (.5%) 10 (.5%)

Can’t choose 64 (3.2%) 53 (2.7%) 57 (2.9%)

Confucianism Variable

Trust a Virtuous Leader

Don’t want to answer 1 (.1%)

Strongly agree 476 (24.1%)

Agree 565 (28.7%)

Neither agree nor disagree 244 (12.4%)

Disagree 499 (25.3%)

Strongly disagree 114 (5.8%)

Don’t understand 10 (.5%)

Can’t choose 63 (3.2%)

195

國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所 碩士論文 Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies National Sun Yat-Sen University Master Thesis

國立中山大學中國與亞太區域研究所碩士論文 Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies National Sun Yat-Sen University Master Thesis