Torah & Rationalism – Writings of the Gaon Rabbenu Aaron Chaim HaLevi Zimmerman zt”l
Torah & Rationalism – Writings of the Gaon Rabbenu Aaron Chaim HaLevi Zimmerman zt”l (Feldheim 2020, 216pp.)*
Ovadya Hoffman
Deviating from conventional book reviews I shall not enter into a discussion of the author – R. Chaim Zimmerman’s genius, schooling, breathtaking erudition, oeuvre, philosophies or his broader Weltanschauung. I leave that for the biographers, that is, if any will take up the challenge.[1] Nor does this survey qualify as a comprehensive book review as I will explain later on.
First, a word on the book itself. When a posthumously published book appears any critical minded reader wonders where the material came from, in what condition it was, did the publishers do any editing at all to the materials etc.? These are very important questions with serious ramifications and any responsible publisher should want to provide as much detail as possible. Unfortunately, in the present book we are presented with a vague picture. The reader is only informed (Preface, viii) “The text presented includes redacted variants of articles published during the 1980s under the headlineTorah and Logic.” No precise list of the publications’ previous appearances is given, a proper bibliography, no exact description of the redactions or even who committed the redactions – the editor, Moshe Avraham Landy, or R. Zimmerman himself. One example, which relates to the section I’d like to focus on, is Landy’s note on p. 131 n. 265 (duplicated in the Hebrew section, p. 174). He informs us that R. Zimmerman “compiled a page by page critique of Professor Ginzberg‘s A Commentary on the Palestinain Talmud that shows most of the sources quoted by Ginzberg are found explicitly in earlier lesser-known printed books on Talmud Yerushalmi; and any chiddush, or “original idea”, offered by Ginzberg could also be found in sefarim and books of previous rabbis and scholars. This critique was written about 1950, and for various reasons was not published. Some galley proofs and other remnants of this manuscript are in the archive of the collected writing of the Gaon Rabbenu… They are presented herein for the reader in the original Hebrew…” I am unsure if what is presented are pieces of a longer manuscript which runs “page by page” (on all three volumes of the Commentary and the posthumously published fourth volume) or if this is the complete critique which, in its current composition, only encompasses the first eighty or so pages of the first volume. Again, a precise description and an unequivocal report of the materials would have obviated any confusion.
CHAPTER IX – The Falsity of Chochmas Yisrael
I shall focus on R. Zimmerman’s charges leveled at Professor Louis Ginzberg’s Perushim VeChiddushim BaYerushalmi (herein, “Commentary”); specially the explicated charges mentioned in this chapter as they are reflective of the criticisms in the Hebrew recension, .Appendix, 175ff.), which will not be treated in this essay) ”רצנזיה“ I do not think such a presentation is misrepresentative or fragmentary of R. Zimmerman’s complete critique since he himself maintained that “[f]or the intelligent reader, the following evidential examples should suffice” (p. 131). Additionally, I resisted from responding to the cryptic one-liner allegations sprinkled on the preceding pages (pp. 127-130) since I’m not at all sure to what precisely R. Zimmerman was referring to and are, supposedly, detailed only in the Hebrew section. I surmise that the citations to the Commentary referenced in the notes of those one-liners were provided (or, suggested) by the editor of the manuscript, either Landy or Rabbi Eliyahu M. Zelasko (cf. p. 175). Finally, to assay the buildup and the opinions expressed in the chapter of the wider “Falsity of Chochmas Yisrael” is more tedious and requires a much more in-depth systematic debate as it relates to their different schools of thought, principles and religious philosophies, which is entirely beyond the scope of this scrutiny. This review is not intended as a rejoinder or an exculpation of Chochmas Yisrael, its “truthfulness” or its fidelity to Halachah and tradition. In this brief register it is strictly Ginzberg’s [rabbinic] scholarship I attempt to address in light of R. Zimmerman’s allegations; not the man, his beliefs or his affiliated institution(s). Transliterations below follow the method employed in the book under review. Emphasis, in italics, are of the current writer.
P. 127 He [Ginzberg] writes in his book that he developed a novel approach and a scientific method to Halachah.
These are Ginzberg’s actual words (English intro., viii): In these volumes an attempt has been made to deal with the writings of the mishnaic-talmudic period as a unit and, within the framework of a commentary on the first treatise of the Palestinian Talmud, to present a novel approach to the study of this literature.
To the initiated with the Yerushalmi’s commentaries I think a tenable argument can be made that Ginzberg’s tomes are a unique attempt at approaching the study of Talmud Yerushalmi with modern methods through the very framework he delineated in his introductions. Alas, R. Zimmerman did not offer examples to the contrary, i.e. books predating Ginzberg which approached the Yerushalmi mirroring the latter’s methods. This is in stark contrast to Solomon Zeitlin’s perspective who wrote in his review of the Commentary: “It is the first and only serious rabbinic work published so far in this country. Ginzberg is the first to give us a thorough, scholarly treatment of the Palestinian Talmud from the old rabbinic and also scholarly point of view.” Zeitlin, not being one to ingratiate with embellishment, went so far to suggest “Solomon ibn Adret said there was only one in a generation who could understand the Palestinian Talmud. Prof. Ginzberg, I believe without exaggeration, has no equal in our generation and is one of the greatest authorities on the Palestinian Talmud since the time of the Gaon of Vilna.”[2] Among the many Roshe Yeshivot and rabbanim who respectfully referred to and/or corresponded with Ginzberg, mention should be made here of what R. Mordechai Gifter wrote to Ginzberg upon receiving a copy of the Commentary זה כשבוע שהובא אוצר גדול לביתי הוא ספרו של כבודו “פירושים וחידושים בירושלמי”, ואתמול גמרתי העיון בכרך הראשון על שני פרקים הראשונים במס’ ברכות. ואף שאין כבודו צריך לדכוותי, לא אוכל להתאפק לומר לו “יישר חילו לאורייתא”, ואקוה שיזכה להו”ל ספרו על כל הירושלמי, להאיר עיני ההוגים בתלמוד זה. הספר גזל ממני הרבה שינה, ואקוה שיהיו לרצון לפניו הערות אחדות שמצאתי להעיר בדבריו[3]
P. 132
R. Zimmerman introduced the question regarding the strength of the obligation to recite the paragraphs of the Shema section; is it Biblical or rabbinical and, if any, which paragraphs? He called attention to the Peri Chadash and Sha’agas Aryeh who offered their respective “great pilpulim… The Sha’gas Aryeh in his great teshuvah [responsum] has a pilpul on the subject, where he quotes some pieces of the Peri Chadash and argues against them… Ginzberg writes in a very trivial and casual tone against these two renowned geonim… Ginzberg writes that these two geonim, despite all their lengthy pilpul, overlooked an explicit and open source in the Talmud Yerushalmi.”
Not only is this an overly exaggerated characterization of Ginzberg’s actual words, the irony is eyebrow raising as Ginzberg’s words are presented in the footnote and the readers can detect this themselves, save for the note which contains a truncated text of Peri Chadash and therefore gives a different impression of what Peri Chadash actually wrote and how he formulated his discussion. These are Ginzberg’s words [with emphasis on the phrasing under attack]: האחרונים האריכו לפלפלאם למ”ד ק”ש מן התורה ב’ פרשיות הן מן התורה או רק פרשה ראשונה (עיין פרי חדש ס”ו [ע.ה.: צ”ל ס”ז], ושאגת אריה ס’, ב’) ולא העירו על דברי הירושלמי ,כאן שכבר אמרנו בכמה מקומות שלהירושלמי ק”ש מן התורה, ומ”מ טרחו למצוא טעם למה אין צריך כוונה רק פרק ראשון ולא אמרו שפרק ראשון מן התורה ולכך צריך כוונה ופרק שני מדרבנן ולכן אינו צריך כוונה, וע”כ ששניהם מן התורה, ועיין ראש דבור הקודם, ואכמ”ל
First of all, such common stock phrases, in all of rabbinic literature, needs no elaboration other than to say that it is not perceived as an undermining and disdainful “very trivial and casual tone” (never mind the harsher verbiage, and no less from R. Hezkiah de Silva himself).
After repeating this same stricture (p. 133) R. Zimmerman adds: …it is astonishing that the academic “scientific scholar” Louis Ginzberg either did not understand the words of the Peri Chadash and Sha’agas Aryeh, or deliberately deceived to discredit them. The error of Ginzberg here is because in the same chapter of the Peri Chadash, the Peri Chadash himself quotes this Talmud Yerushalmi, and brings this very proof with respect to which Ginzberg claims that he “caught” the Peri Chadash and the Sha’agas Aryeh in overlooking the Talmud Yerushalmi. Of course, the Sha’agas Aryeh makes reference to the Peri Chadash, so obviously he does not have to repeat the proof from this Yerushalmi which is clearly stated by the Peri Chadash.
Let us inspect the Peri Chadash. He begins chapter 67 with a thorough exposition determining what the obligatory status is with regards to reading chapters of the Shema. After about eight long paragraphs he arrives at his own conclusion that the reading of both chapters are biblically mandated and suggests that Rambam’s words appear to evoke the same opinion. He writes: מעתה נשאר לנו לברר הדעת השלישי’ והיא היותר אמיתי מכולן דפרש’ שמע ופרשת והיה אם שמוע השתי פרשיו’ הוו מן התור’… וכך מטין דברי הרמב”ם ז”ל… וזו היא דעתי ומסתייעא הדין סברא דילן מהא דגרסינן בפ’ היה קורא…
Moving on to a dissection of the respective topic in the Bavli in order to prove his opinion, Peri Chadash qualifies that there is a Tanaitic dispute if the reading of bothalso require intent (“kavannah”) or only one of the chapters and adduces support from a Tosefta, interpreting the two opinions to be debating this last question vis-à-vis intent. To further corroborate this interpretation Peri Chadash finally adds: ובירושלמי אמרינן מה בין פ’ ראשון דבעי כוונ’ לפ’ שני דלא בעי כוונ’ ומשני לה, נמצא דהני תנאי ס”ל דשתי פרשיו’ ראשונו’ הוו מן התור’…
It seems it is quite reasonable, if not absolute, to understand Peri Chadash’s usage of the Yerushalmi only as support to his interpretation of the views in the Tosefta regarding intent as it of the Tosefta. In other words, Peri Chadash ”דהני תנאי“ relates to did not cite the Yerushalmi in order to settle the question regarding the status of the Shema passages. One would imagine that if it was his intention do so he would have introduced such a critical source much earlier in his discussion and devoted more than a brief quote of this Yerushalmi passage. It appears that Sha’agas Aryeh too understood the Peri Chadash in this vein since, in his responsum, he does not merely “make(s) reference to the Peri Chadash” – he systematically went through Peri Chadash’s proofs and refutes them one by one, yet he does not single out the Yerushalmi in attempt to disprove the proof from it. PP. 134
Before moving to this example it is important to present the relevant rabbinic materials. Briefly put, the Yerushalmi presents two opinions as to why one must have his feet together when praying. One of the two opinions learns this from the exegetical requirement of the Kohanim to Amishnah in Yoma (2:1) tells .(”עקב בצד גודל“) walk heel-beside-toe us that prior to certain Temple regulations Kohanim would race up the ramp in order to merit doing a particular service. The Tosefos Yeshanim (Yoma 22a s.v. bezman) points to this contradiction; namely, how were the Kohanim permitted to run if it is indicated in the Yerushalmi that the Kohanim were required to walk heel-beside-toe? ואין נראה“) Dismissing the possibility that theyran heel-beside-toe Tosefos Yeshanim goes on to present (”לומר דרצין עקב בצד גודל קאמר ושמא כיון שלא [היו] עדיין“ :what appears as two answers. Answer 1 since they had not =) ”עסוקין בעבודה כמו בהולכת אברים לכבש יכולין לרוץ yet been involved in a service, such as the delivering of the limbs אי נמי רצין עקב“ :via the ramp, they were allowed to run). Answer 2 בצד גודל שלא להראות כמו עושה כן אלא כי כן צריך לו לילך בשעת עבודה .One readily discerns that this reading is textually defective .”’כדפי On the margin of this folio in the standard Vilna edition, a gloss is ,see Siah Yitzchak [Nunes Vaes =) ”וע’ ש”י“ brought closing with Jerusalem 1960, p. 293]), presenting a substantiated alternative reading which, for the sake of brevity, I will not get into other than to point out that the alternative phrase indicates that there is no second answer. Instead, the rest of the text is a further explanation of a particular, related Talmudic passage elsewhere. On the other hand, in R. Avigdor Arieli’s edition of the Tosefos Yeshanim (Jerusalem 1993, p.30) some text of Tosefos HaRosh is incorporated and אי נמי רצין עקב בצד גודל [קאמר שהיו ממהרין“ :such is the text given This answer seems to say that the Kohanim .”[…ללכת בענין זה would hurriedly walk heel-beside-toe. The nuanced difference borne in this answer compels one to consider that Siah Yitzchak’s emendation is more likely.
This now brings us to the commentary of R. Avraham Abba Schiff in his To’afos Re’em which R. Zimmerman uses to level charges against Ginzberg. Here is the pertinent text of R. Schiff: …ובירושלמי… אמרו זהו שעומד ומתפלל צריך להשוות את רגליו כו’ ח”א כמלאכים וח”א ככהנים כו’ שהיו מהלכים עקב בצד גודל וגודל בצד עקב משמע משם דוקא וכ”כ התוס’ ישנים יומא שם עיי”ש שכ’ אי נמי רצין עקב בצד גודל שלא להראות כחו עושה כן אלא כי כן צריך לו לילך בשעת עבודה כדפי’ עכ”ל ודבריהם אלו אינם מובנים והנראה לי דט”ס יש שם וכנ”ל אי נמי רצין ועולין בכבש עקב כו’ ור”ל דמתני’ ה”ק היו רצין עד לכבש והולכין בכבש כדרכן עקב בצד גודל וזהו שסיימו בת”י שלא להראות כחו עושה כן כו’ פי’ במ”ש ועולין בכבש לא להראות כחן היו עולין לכבש דעולין בכבש כדרכן עקב בצד גודל אלא עיקר הקדמתן במ”ש היו רצין דהיינו עד לכבש…
R. Schiff likewise noted the textual difficulty of the Tosefos Yeshanim and therefore suggested a different reading. He proposed that the second answer means (reads) the Kohanim would run up until the ramp but from there they would walk heel-beside-toe. If this is the second answer it seems somewhat forced as its underlying rationale is presumably to restrict running when ascending the ramp, i.e. executing a designated service, and it is essentially the same as the first answer.
Returning to R. Zimmerman, after he informs us of the aforementioned Tanaitic contradiction, he continues: Tosefos Yeshanim… gives these two terutzim [solutions] to answer this contradiction. On the Sefer Yere’im… there is a perush [commentary] by the name To’afos Re’em where he brings all the bekiyus [referecnes] on this subject. He also writes this contradiction and explains both terutzim. And after he writes these two terutzim, he references the Tosefos Yeshanim, as quoted above.
Next, R. Zimmerman asserts that: …with the claim of originality, Ginzberg answers the contradiction asked by the Rishonim and of Tosefos Yeshanim with these two solutions, not being aware that Tosefos Yeshanim himself wrote these two answers word for word.
Here too, Ginzberg’s text is presented and the reader can see that he nowhere asserts any claim of originality. He merely referenced the classic sources, including the Tosefos Yeshanim, and then paraphrased what some of the Rishonim asked and answered. The only phrase one can guess (or, read into) which R. Zimmerman based this imputation is where Ginzberg wrote, regarding the distinction of ascending the ramp ,But .”והיה אפשר לומר“ ,when executing an actual part of the service this is borderline pedantic as any accustomed student of rabbinics does not expect an author to reiterate every time they allude to an aforementioned source. He essentially claimed that Ginzberg quoted the sources but “did not make the effort to look up the Tosefos Yeshanim, and he plagiarized the words of the To’afos Re’em… taking credit for himself, and taking for granted that no one will catch him in plagiarizing these two big “chiddushim” word for word from the To’afos Re’em.” By that token one must assume as well that the other sources which Ginzberg quoted and dealt with were also gotten from a different (albeit, unnamed) source. More importantly, it is not entirely clear that To’afos Re’em even spelled out both answers of Tosefos Yeshanim, precluding the possibility that Ginzberg plagiarized “word for word from the To’afos Re’em”. Never mind the strange notion that Ginzberg wouldn’t look up an explicit Tosefos Yeshanim which he cited and instead opted to quote an unclear formulation of the To’afos Re’em.
(The reference in p. 135 n. 279 to theCommentary should read: .’הלכת כהנים זו…‘ should read ”שהרי על הלכה כהנים זו“ and ,’עמוד 45‘ For “keves” on p. 134, “keveṣ” or “kevesh” should be supplied.) PP. 136 R. Zimmerman opined that with all the reference books on the Yerushalmi et al. …if someone has in front of him all these sefarim when he learns Talmud Yerushalmi (he does not have to be an expert in Halachah), he could produce most of Ginzberg’s works.
Leaving aside this fantastic assumption and the certain debatable quality of the older reference books, one wonders if the careful inclusion of “most” was some admission that even with all reference books at one’s disposal, Ginzberg’s monumental ‘Legends of the Jews’, however, could certainly not have been produced by just anyone, not even today with our advanced digital databases. If this assumption is correct, one wonders how to reconcile the acknowledgment of Ginzberg’s singular erudition but then to accuse him of plagiarizing even known, classical sources.
PP. 137
R. Zimmerman gave some examples to illustrate Ginzberg’s dependency on the various reference books and in particular Rabbi Dov Ber Ratner’s ‘Ahavas Tzion vi-Yerushalayim’ of which he alleges: Ginzberg being aware that one may discover the obvious, that most of his references and citations are plagiarized from Ratner… and others, always tries to disqualify Ratner and others.[4]
I’m going to leave aside the obvious question as to the merit of such a claim, whether or not an author should always cite areference book at every instance. Instead, I prefer to determine if there is any basis at all to the claim of deceit.
The first example of Ginzberg’s alleged attempt to disqualify Ratner’s work is R. Zimmerman’s oblique citation to the English introduction of the Commentary. Here are Ginzberg’s actual words: The most important source for establishing a correct text are the numerous quotations… and one must be grateful to Baer Ratner (1852-1917) for collecting them in twelve volumes of his work… The parallels must however be used with great caution for the following reasons…
Ginzberg then continued to list three sound and ostensibly true critiques and words of caution.[5] Perhaps interpretation is in the eyes of the reader so suffice it to say there is no readily discernible attempt to “disqualify Ratner’s work”. Conversely, in Ginzberg’s Seride Yerushalmi, after he described the importance of collecting and collating quotes of Yerushalmi as found in Rishonim, he וכבר התחיל במצוה הרב הגדול וכו’ כמוה”ר בער ראטנער נ”י בספרו“ stated יקר הערך ורב השבח ספר “אהבת ציון וירושלים” אשר בו העיר על גרסאות ,New York 1909) ””.הירושלמי שבספרי הראשונים והאיר עיני לומר הירושלמי intro. IV). Such statements would be counterproductive and ineffective if attempting to disqualify a work.
IBID He copies from Ratner verbatim without mentioning his name.
The reference is given to Commentary p. 54 where Ginzberg indeed quoted the same two passages from the Yalkut which Ratner quoted. Now, even before analyzing the material one must wonder if two authors cite the same classical and relevant sources is that sufficient to presume one copied from the other?[6] In any case, if one reads the detailed discussion of Ginzberg it is unmistakable that he independently studied and scrutinized the sources for he included much detail of which Ratner does not give the slightest mention. Furthermore, mention should be made of the fact that the referenced volume of Ratner was published in 1901 and the first volume of Ginzberg’s ‘Legends’, a work which had begun in 1903 was published in 1909 (JPS 2003[7], intro. XVI). There, in describing the distance between earth and heaven (the focus of the aforementioned Yalkut) Ginzberg referenced the Yerushalmi under discussion in addition to numerous other sources (ibid. p. 10 n. 31 & 32). Interestingly, he did not, however, cite the Yalkut which he later cited in his Commentary. With intent to minimize Ginzberg’s scholarship we can fault him for not referencing the Yalkut in the notes to his ‘Legends’. But, an obvious explanation can be, due to the enormous and difficult task in reworking all available ancient texts and incorporating them into a flowing narrative by necessity would require paraphrasing and omitting subtle Aggadic amplifications. The passage in the Yalkut, which Ginzberg expresses doubts per its original text, contains almost identical phrasing as the Yerushalmi and therefore added nothing for his sources. Had Ginzberg only known about the Yalkut passages from Ratner he should have referenced it in his ‘Legends’. This is, again, leaving aside the perplexing claim that someone who organized and authored the intricate, colossal and scholarly sources and discussions in the notes to the ‘Legends’ did not independently know the Yalkut, a primary text quoted throughout the ‘Legends’.
IBID …he writes “many erred” because they did not know the sources, but the sources are written by Ratner…
Ginzberg commented that a particular passage of the Yerushalmi is found similarly in the Bavli, and while some Rishonim/Geonim quote the passage as it’s reflected in the Yerushalmi Ginzberg posited that their source was from the Bavli, unlike Ratner who quoted the parallels in the Sheëltot and BH”G and determined that their source was the Yerushalmi. Ginzberg concluded the brief comment by exclaiming וטעו אלה שאמרו גשבה“ והשאלתות השתמשו כאן ,בירושלמי עיין מה שכתבתי .גואניקא א’, פד Ginzberg clearly was taking issue with what some erroneously assumed that the Yerushalmi was the common source for those two authorities, not that some did not know the sources. Besides for his objection being rather clear, when one examines the reference to Geonica they are met with a more detailed analysis of this error. As if it’s not explicit enough, there Ginzberg wrote: “In his learned scholia… Ratner does not hesitate to attribute it to the Yerushalmi as Rabbi Aha’s source, and yet it can be readily demonstrated, from the words of the Sheëltot, that it goes back to the Babli.”
P.138 Again, Ginzberg writes ‘Ratner did not indicate this source’, and this is an outright falsification, because in that same place Ratner quoted the source.
The reference here is to Commentary (p. 75 fn. 84). Ginzberg writes לאוהבו של מלך שבא והרתיק על פתחו של מלך. במחזור ויטרי שי”ג (וראטנער לא העיר על מקור זה) גרס, תערו במקום פתחו, וזה יותר מדויק… a footnote reads ,”מקור זה“ In the parenthesis, after וכן לא העיר על הילקוט… אשכול… ושלחן ארבע שמביאים דברי הירושלמי על התכיפות R. Zimmerman must have been referring to the Yalkut reference since Ratner (cited by R. Zimmerman) does not refer to Mahzor Vitri, Eshkol or Shulhan Shel Arba. Yet, even the Yalkut is only cited by Ratner on On the .”מי שתוכף לסמיכה שחיטה“ the preceding piece of Yerushalmi piece under discussion, indicated by the caption of Ginzberg’s quote, Ratner only makes reference to the Amsterdam ed. of the Yerushalmi and did not note the textual variants contained in the Yalkut. Aside for this not being “an outright falsification”, the language used to quote Ginzberg is misleading. R. Zimmerman specifically referred to the footnote in Commentary, though it does not say there “Ratner did not indicate this source”; that exact phrasing is in the main text regarding the Mahzor Vitry which Ratner did not reference. The footnote says (if rendered in English) “he also did not indicate A, B and C.” If one were to object that A was indeed indicated by Ratner then a fairer phrasing would be something to the effect of “one of the sources was quoted by Ratner” thereby not wholly discrediting the author’s point.
At this junction I’d like to refer to one piece produced in the Hebrew section (p. 211) as it directly relates to this piece. Ginzberg’s aforementioned text is quoted and then R. Zimmerman notes מ”ש “במחזור ויטרי שי”ג גרס תערו במקום פתחו” לא היה ולא נברא. וזה לשונו [במחזור וויטרי] סימן י”ז [עמוד 13] א”ר חמי של מי שאינו סומך גאולה לתפלה למה הוא דומה לאוהבו של מלך שבא והרתיק על פתחו של מלך… וכו’. ואמנם הגירסא זו [תרעו ולא כמ”ש גינזבורג תערו] הובא בספר המנהיג [דיני תפלה, עמוד מ”ד, הוצאת מוסד הרב קוק] וכבר ציינה ראטנער [אהבת ציון וירושלים, צד 11] וזה המחבר זייף דברי ראטנער כדרכו. ואמנם כך פירשו שמה המחזור וויטרי, תרפ”ד, דף 31, כמו שציין גינזבורג אלא שהרי המחזור וויטרי סותר את עצמו…
Admittedly I’m unsure what to make of this protest. R. Zimmerman unabashedly quotes a second text from Mahzor Vitry, which Ginzberg was explicitly not referring to, and then impugns Ginzberg of quoting a spurious text from Mahzor Vitry (and plagiarizing from Ratner), despite R. Zimmerman’s subsequent acknowledgment that Mahzor Vitry does elsewhere contain the very text quoted by Ginzberg. Additionally, the bracketed words, which dismiss Ginzberg’s quote of are also disingenuous since Ginzberg was not referencing the ,”תערו“ Manhig’s text at all. This also brings us back to my earlier suspicion of the editor’s methods: Who inserted these erroneous brackets? Was R. Zimmerman being unfair or was the editor unmindful?
In summation, a pattern emerges before the reader which betrays a vendetta against Ginzberg; picayune criticisms and inflated accusations which don’t hold much water. Any time a reference provided by Ginzberg had been cited elsewhere it is automatically assumed to be stolen and any explanation offered is deemed unlearned, unless there is precedence to it then it is assumed to be plagiarized. It appears it was Ginzberg himself who was the object of R. Zimmerman’s attacks, while grasping at straws under the pretense of a scholarly critique. One cannot but wonder why R. Zimmerman did not publish these galleys while Ginzberg was alive, affording him the opportunity to respond. It is not as if R. Zimmerman was one to shy from polemicizing, as he famously engaged with R. Menachem M. Kasher over the International Date Line matter. Had R. Zimmerman published the materials while Ginzberg was still alive perhaps he, and its current readership, would have merited the author’s own rebuttal.[8] ______
*My thanks to the editors at the Seforim Blog and R. Moshe Maimon for reviewing the paper and offering their suggestions. [1] For a brief biographical sketch, see the journal Yeshurun (Israel 2012, Vol. 27, 855ff.). [2] JQR (April 1943, p. 433). [3] Marc B. Shapiro, Saul Lieberman and the Orthodox (Scranton 2006, p. 13 n. 45, 31-21; for R. Gifter see n. 117). It would not be out of place to note how R. Zimmerman addressed Prof. Saul Lieberman,
לחד מתקיפי דורנו הגאון המופלא הבקי בכל מכמני התורה והחכמה (Shapiro, ibid. p. 42), while Lieberman referred to Ginzberg
מרא דהלכתא ומרא דאגדתא הגר”ל גינצבורג
(Sinai, Jerusalem 5739, p. 225; repub. Mehkarim BeTorat Eretz Yisrael, Jerusalem 1991, p. 127). On a different occasion Lieberman estimated: ודבר אחד מבליט את גינצבורג מתוך כל החכמים שקדמו לו. בספריהם של בעלי “חכמת ישראל”, ואפילו מן הגדולים שבהם, אתה מוצא לפעמים טעויות גסות בפירושן ובפשטן של הסוגיות אשר לפניהם. מה שאין כן אצל גינצבורג העומד למעלה מזה. בכל ספריו ומאמריו המרובים אין אף פעם טעויות ממין זה ודומה להן. ואין לזלזל בפרט חשוב זה, כי טעויות גסות מן המין הנ”ל פוסלות את כל הספר בעיני בני תורה והמחבר מאבד על-ידי זה את הסמכות ואת ההשפעה שלו. ועוד זאת: גינצבורג באחת מחוברותיו “תשובה בדבר יינות הכשרים והפסולים למצוה”… הראה את כוחו גם בפסק הלכה כאחד הרבנים הגדולים, ואף בני הישיבה שאין להם עסק עם חכמת ישראל רואים בו מתוך ספרו זה אחד משלהם, את העילוי מישיבת טלז וסלובודקה.
(ibid., pp. 613-614) [4] Noteworthy is Ratner’s own declaration that in preparation for his volume on mas. Rosh Hashanah he utilized Ginzberg’s Seride Yerushalmi היו לנגד עיני הספר היקר שרידי ירושלמי מאת הרב הגדול…:on Rosh HaShanah -Ahavas Tzion vi) ר’ לוי גינצבורג מנויארק והשתמשתי בו במס’ רה”ש Yerushalayim, Vilna 1911, Rosh HaShanah, petah davar). Indeed the two had maintained correspondence even prior to the publication of Seride Yerushalmi, as is evident from the letter Ratner quoted which he received from Ginzberg (Ahavas Tzion vi-Yerushalayim, Piotrków 1908, Pesahim p. 55) and in the subsequent volumes he continued to use Ginzberg’s Seride Yerushalmi and Geonica. Incidentally, one instance akin to the “trivial and casual tone” but in Ratner’s work which, with equal justice, should have awakened the ire of R. Zimmerman, Ratner Ahavas) …המפרשים יגעו בזה לפרש, אבל הגי’ הנכונה בשרידי ירושלמי :wrote Tzion vi-Yerushalayim, Vilna 1913, Bez. p. 10). [5] Similar words of caution were likewise expressed a few years later by another contemporaneous eminent scholar and expert on Talmud Yerushalmi, Professor Saul Lieberman (HaYerushalmi Kiphshuto, N.Y. & Jerusalem 1995, intro. p. 24). The words of caution had already proven to be wise and advisory as Lieberman, earlier in his ‘Al HaYerushalmi’ (Jerusalem, 1929), in multiple instances called attention to some mistakes in Ahavas Tzion vi-Yerushalayim. Cf. also J.N. Epstein in Mehkarim BeSifrut HaTalmud uVeleshonot HaShamiot, Jerusalem 1988, Vol. 2 Part 1, p. 263 n. 1. More currently, Prof. Yaacov Sussmann acutely demonstrated the shortcomings of Ratner’s magnum opus in the journal Mada’ei HaYahadut (World Union of Jewish Studies 2002, vol. 41 pp. 23; my thanks to R. Eliezer Brodt for this last reference.) [6] It would appear that the only distinction with regards to Ginzberg is that he belonged to the “Chochmas Yisreol” camp which R. Zimmerman frequently disparaged. Otherwise, what would prevent R. Zimmerman from leveling the same charges against R. Chaim Heller, a universally recognized talmid hacham and scholar par excellence, who compiled a collection of parallel sources of the Yerushalmi in his essays ‘HaMa’alot LeShlomo’ (LeShelomo, Berlin, 1910, 246ff.) and ‘A”D [‘Al Derech] Mesoret HaShas BeYerushalmi’ (LeDovid Zvi, Berlin 1914, 55ff.), both published after Ratner’s Ahavas Tzion vi-Yerushalayim? The same can be said for R. Ze’ev Wolf Rabinovitz’s ‘Sha’are Torath Eretz Israel’ (Jerusalem, 1940) who certainly made use of Ahavas Tzion vi-Yerushalayim but only seldom referenced it, as did R. Shlomo Goren in his ‘HaYerushalmi HaMefurash’ (Jerusalem, 1961). Is one to accuse them too of plagiarism in all the instances they could have quoted Ratner? Conversely, in his review of Prof. Ginzberg’s posthumously published fourth volume of theCommentary and R. Goren’s HaYerushalmi (Kirjath Sepher, Jerusalem, vol. 33 p. 199), Professor Avraham Goldberg noted the common sources often cited by both in drawing parallels between the Yerushalmi and other rabbinic texts, yet he apparently saw no oddity and did not go as far as to accuse the later of the two, R. Goren, of plagiarism, for obvious reason. This point of common sources is of serious significance as it relates to multiple instances where R. Zimmerman alleges the charge of plagiarism. One in particular is found in the Hebrew section (199ff.) where R. Zimmerman claims that Ginzberg copied from Jehiel Bornstein and the texts of both of these figures is then presented side-by-side in ”היה נראה לי”; “את“ should read ”היה ראוי לו“ in Bornstein’s text) should read”ג’ פעמים“ ;should be omitted ”את הכוכבים הסמוכים לארץ“ ישיבנו”; “שיבאו השמש…“ should read ”ג’ כוכבים”; “אולי ישיבני“ ;should be omitted ”לא נבעו להם“ in ”והירח”; “לא…“ should read ”והריח ורבי ור’ חנינא“ should read ”ורבי חנינא כוונו“ in Ginzberg’s text The subject under .(”רק ב’ דקים“ should read ”כוונו”; “רבי ב’ דקים discussion pertains to the solar and lunar rotations in calculating the time of twilight (ben hashmashot). R. Zimmerman points out that Bornstein had explained the Talmudic passage in an essay published in the journal ‘HaTekufah’ (Warsaw 5786) and Ginzberg copied his explanation, even including what Bornstein had inserted in parenthesis, except that the former Anglicized the word “refraction” [presumably to conceal the plagiarism]. In truth, there’s reason to believe that Ginzberg had seen Bornstein’s essay since he referenced Bornstein’s incipient essay in his ‘Legends’ (JPS Philadelphia 1968, VI p. 129 n. 758). However, since the objective was to explain a Talmudic passage, to offer “the simplepeshat ”, avouched by the is it incredulous that Ginzberg ,”פירושים “וחדושים titular independently arrived at the same explanation? Did R. Goren, who suggested the same explanation in his HaYerushalmi (p. 8), also plagiarize from Bornstein or Ginzberg? The parenthesis in question are in fact a parenthetical explanatory gloss which would have rightfully been placed as such by any commentator expounding the given Talmudic passage and the usage of the word “refraction” is common locution for the subject under discussion. Let us not forget that Ginzberg was a highly competent mathematician to the extent that Albert Einstein was impressed with his knowledge in mathematics (cf. The Responsa of Professor Louis Ginzberg, N.Y. & Jerusalem 1996, intro. pp. 3, 15). In all likeliness, an individual of such caliber would have independently comprehended this passage, as did Bornstein. Furthermore, the collated texts of Ginzberg and Bornstein bear very dissimilar phraseology in their attempts to explain the passage. (See also Heshey Zelcer’s comparison of three later commentaries on this passage, Ḥakirah N.Y. 2004, vol. 1 p. 113). [7] This edition of the Legends should be used with caution as there are numerous typographical and referential errors in the main text as well as in the notes. As with all publications, Ginzberg’s Commentary was at the mercy of its publishers and it too suffered corrupted passages, some of which he communicated to S. Petrushka (see below, fn. 8). [8] For instance, Simcha Petrushka published in the Bitzaron periodical a letter which he had sent Ginzberg containing questions and notes on his Commentary. Upon receiving a letter in response to each of his claims, Petrushka had the letter published in the following Bitzaron issue (N.Y. 1945, vol. XII, 214ff.). Book Announcement: Volume Five of Amudim beToldot haSefer haIvri
Book Announcement: Volume Five of Amudim beToldot haSefer haIvri
By Eliezer Brodt
I am very happy to announce the recent publication (and Sale) of an important work, which will be of great interest to readers of the Seforim Blog, the fifth volume of, Amudim be- Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri by Professor Yaakov Shmuel Spiegel, of Bar-Ilan University’s Talmud department. As I have written in the past, Professor Spiegel is one of the most prolific writers in the Jewish academic scene, authoring of over 160 articles and 18 books (16 of those are publications for the first time of works which remained in manuscript). Many suspect that he knows the secrets of Hashbot Hakulmos (automatic writing) (about which see here).
His articles cover an incredibly wide range of subjects related to many areas of Jewish Studies, including history of Rishonim, piyutim authored by Rishonim, bibliography and minhaghim, to name but a few. His uniqueness lies not only in the topics but also that his work has appeared in all types of publications running the gamut from academic journals such as Kiryat Sefer, Tarbiz, Sidra, Alei Sefer, Assufot, Teudah, Kovetz Al Yad and also in many prominent Charedi rabbinic journals such aYeshurun , Yerushasenu, Chitzei Giborim, Moriah, Sinai and Or Yisroel. It is hard to define his area of expertise, as in every area he writes about he appears to be an expert!
Worth noting that recently thanks to the hard work of a dear friend of mine, all of his published articles are available for free download here.
He has edited and printed from manuscript many works of Rishonim and Achronim on Massekhes Avos and the Haggadah Shel Pesach (and IYH some more are on the way). He is of the opinion, contrary to that of some other academics, that there is nothing non-academic about printing critical editions of important manuscript texts. Although there is a known “belief” in the academic world, “publish or perish,” which some claim is the cause of weak articles and books, at times, Spiegel’s prolific output does nothing to damper the quality of his works.
Another point unique to Speigel’s writings, besides his familiarity with all the academic sources, he shows great familiarity with all the classic sources from Chazal, Geonim, Rishonim and Achronim, to even the most recent discussions in Charedi literature – this bekius (breadth) was apparent well before the advent of search engines of Hebrew books and Otzar Ha-hochmah. Alongside all this is his penetrating analysis and ability to raise interesting points.
Another point of interest is although he is an Academic and from the Mizrachi world, he is on very good terms with various Charedei scholars. In his first few volumes, he thanks R’ Yehoshua Mondshine and Rabbi Dovid Tzvi Hillman for their useful comments. In other volumes he thanks R’ Yaakov Stahl. In his two most recent volumes he thanks Rabbi Shaul Alter, Rosh Yeshiva of Ger who has started reading and commenting about his material.
Some of his articles were collected into a volume called Pischei Tefilah u-Mo’ad, which was reviewed a few years back here on the Seforim Blog. This volume is currently out of print.
One of Professor Spiegel’s main areas of interest has been the History of the Jewish Book. He has written numerous articles on the subject and published four books on this topic in a series called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri.
Volume one was first printed in 1996 and is called Amudim be- Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri: Haghot u-Maghim. It was reprinted with many important additions in 2005 (copies are still available). It was reviewed by Dan Rabinowitz and myself, a few years back here on the Seforim Blog.
The second volume is called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha-Ivri; Kesivah Vehatakah. This volume is currently out of print and will hopeful be the subject of a book review by Dan Rabinowitz and myself in the near future.
The third volume is called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha- Ivri;Bisharei Hadefus and is out of print. (Seehere ). The fourth volume is called Amudim be-Toldot ha-Sefer ha- Ivri:Hadar Hamechaber (copies are still available).
I think that anyone who has an interest in the Jewish Book will enjoy this work immensely.
In the near future I hope to review this work in depth.
I am selling copies of this work; part of the proceeds helps the efforts of the Seforim Blog.
For more information about purchasing this work, feel free to contact me at [email protected]
To get a sense of what exactly this new book is about, here are the beginning of the Table of Contents (or view the entire Table of Contents as a PDF):
“Did The Bach Really Draw a Cow?” Eruvin 20 b – Hagahot ”הא אתמר עלה“ HaBach on Rashi
“Did The Bach Really Draw a Cow?” Eruvin 20 b – Hagahot HaBach on ”הא אתמר עלה“ Rashi
Eli Genauer
Summary
The diagram in the first edition of the Bach (1824) is much more accurate than how it is depicted in later editions, especially the Vilna Shas. The Bach’s picture features a long feeding trough, (an whereas Vilna and others show it looking more like something ,(אבוס attached to the animal. The Zhitomir Shas compounds the error by leaving out an essential characteristic of the situation under discussion. The new editions of the Talmud get it much better. The one diagram I found in a manuscript and the diagram in the Soncino Pesaro edition of 1515 (which was based on a manuscript) are very close to the drawing in the Bach (1824).
The picture in the Bach focuses on the relationship between an animal, which אבוס its feeding trough and a well. One of the key words here is is the feeding trough.[1]
מסכת עירובין :משנה י״ז׃
[2]משנה: עושין פסין לביראות …… From Sefaria around a well (in the [ ]פסין MISHNA: One may arrange upright boards Reshut Harabim in order to permit drawing water from the well on Shabbat.) [A well is usually at least four Tefachim wide and ten Tefachim deep. Therefore, it is considered a Reshut HaYachid, and it is Asur to draw water from it on Shabbat, as that would constitute a violation of the prohibition to carry from a Reshut HaYachid into a Reshut HaRabim. The Chachamim therefore sometimes made a Kulah that a virtual partition may be built in the area surrounding the well, so that the enclosed area could be considered a Reshut HaYachid.]
Perush Chai (see here):
Gemara on 20b
The Gemara discusses a case where the owner fills a bucket and gives water to an animal or fills a bucket and then pours water into a trough from which the animal then drinks
לא ימלא אדם מים ויתן בשבת לפני בהמתו, אבל ממלא הוא ושופך והיא שותה מאיליה
A person may not fill a bucket with water and hold it before his animal on Shabbat; but he may fill it and pour it out (into a trough.) The animal then drinks of its own accord.
הא אתמר עלה אמר אביי הכא באבוס העומד ברשות הרבים גבוה עשרה טפחים ורוחב ארבעה וראשו אחד נכנס לבין הפסין
The Gemara qualifies the case of pouring water into a trough by saying that the above Baraita is dealing with a cow standing inside a house with windows open to the Reshut HaRabim, eating from a trough that stands in the Reshut HaRabim that is ten tefachim high and four tefachim wide, ( meaning it is a Reshut HaYachid), and one end of this trough extends into the area between the upright boards surrounding a well. Here is what it looks like.
Source: Chavruta English (see here, p. 14).
רש״י –הא איתמר עלה כו‘
הא איתמר עלה כו‘ – כלומר כי בעינן ראשה ורובה בדלא נקיט לה וכי הוי ראשה ורובה שרי וברייתא דקתני לא ימלא ויתן הוא עצמו לבהמתו הא תרצה אביי לקמן דלאו בבהמה העומדת ברה“ר וראשה ורובה בין הפסין עסקינן אלא בבהמה העומדת בבית וחלונות פתוחות לה לרה“ר ואיבוס מתוקן לה )ב”ח( לפניה ברה“ר גבוה י‘ ורחב ד‘ דהוי רהי“ ונותן לה שם תבן ומספוא מרה“י וראש האיבוס נכנס לבין הפסיןואשמעינן דלא ימלא מן הבור ויגביה הדלי על ראש האיבוס וילך דרך ר רה“ויטלטל הדלי על האיבוס לפני בהמה ואע“ג דקייל“ עומד אדם ברה“ר ומטלטל ברה“י בהמוצא תפילין (לקמן עירובין ד‘ צח:). הכא אסור: The portion of Rashi relevant to the diagram in the Bach is in bold.
It is a case where the animal is standing in the – בבהמה העומדת בבית house which has windows open to the Reshut HaRabim and a trough is positioned in front of it in the Reshut HaRabim and it is 10 tefachim high and 4 tefachim wide which makes it a Reshut HaYachid, and the into the trough in the Reshut (תבן ומספוא)owner puts animal feed HaYachid and the front portion of the trough enters into the area (בין הפסין) between the upright boards
In the Vilna Shas (Eruvin,1881) in the middle of this description in Rashi, there is an indication to look at the Hagahot HaBach.
The Hagahot HaBach are suggestions for textual emendations in the Talmud and Rashi, copied from the notes that the author added to his copy of the Talmud. The Bach died in 1640 but these suggested emendations were not printed until 1824. Here is the title page of this original edition: The picture is in the bottom right corner of the Daf and looks like this: Here it is straightened out:
It has all the elements mentioned in Rashi…an animal standing in a which extends אבוסhouse (with a window) connected in some way to an through the Reshut HaRabim and into the area between the upright posts surrounding the well. Nevertheless, I had two issues with this depiction 1. Did the Bach really draw a picture of an animal in his Gemara? does not look like a trough positioned on the ground אבוס The .2 that has substantial dimensions. (10 tefachim high and 4 tefachim wide).
In the first edition of the Hagahot HaBach ( Warsaw 1824), the picture looks like this:[3]
We have all the elements described in Rashi, but the house and animal could אבוסare depicted by words rather than pictures. The crucial easily be a feeding trough which stands on the ground and has significant enough dimensions to make it a Reshut HaYachid. I find this depiction a more accurate one than what appeared in the Vilna Shas.
What was the origin of the depiction in the Bach? We know that the Bach emended the text based on manuscripts he had, or by using his logic to arrive at the proper text.[4] It would be nice if we could find a manuscript with a similar depiction, as this might give us a clue to the source of the Bach. Fortunately, there are two such sources.[5]
Source #1- Rashi-Commentary on Talmud Bavli (Eruvin and Betsah)
The Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford Oxford England Ms. Opp.
Add. Qu. 23 –15th century (1426-1475), online here. Emphasis:
Compared to printed Bach: There is no indication of where the animal is standing, but otherwise .אבוס it is quite similar, especially its depiction of the
Source #2:
Soncino Pesaro 1511(?) – First printed edition of Eruvin.[6] Its source was from manuscripts.
Compared to printed Bach: There are some differences with the depiction of the Bach, mainly in אבוסthe positioning of the animal, but this depiction also shows the being a long substantial structure.[7]
After the printed edition of the Hagahot HaBach appeared in 1824, those Hagahot began to be included in printed Gemarot.[8] I was able to find a number of editions containing this diagram which were printed between 1824 and 1881 when the Vilna edition was published.
The first I examined was Vilna/Horodna 1836 which included the Hagahot Ha’Bach after the Peirush Mishnayot of the Rambam. It was the first printed edition to include these Hagahot on Eruvin after 1824.[9] We already see major changes from the first edition, including the [X] .אבוס picture of the animal and the change to the depiction of the The second printing I examined was Chernowitz 1847. This printing retained the exact diagram of the 1824 edition:
The third is in the normally reliable Zhitomir edition of 1862.[11] It by not having it extend into the area אבוס completely misplaces the surrounding the well. It turns out that the depiction attributed to the Bach appearing in the first printed edition of Hagahot HaBach is more in line with the words of Rashi than the “improvements” to that depiction made in subsequent editions.[12]
[1] Manger is defined as a “long open box or trough for horses or cattle to eat from”. I use “trough” as a definition for Jastrow ( 1926 edition, page 4)defines it as either a .אבוס feeding receptacle, bowl for working men, manger, stall or stable. Manger/trough seems to be what is meant here because the dimensions are given as at least ten Tefachim high and four Tefachim wide and it is stated that it is standing on the ground
Steinsaltz English translation renders our case (available on Sefaria) “….eating from a manger or trough that stands in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide.” [2] All translations are based on Sefaria.org, the William Davidson Talmud based on the Steinsaltz English Talmud. [3] While there are a few Gemarot at the NLI which were hand copied from the actual Gemara of the Bach, there is not one for Eruvin. Therefore, the first edition of the Bach is our only source for what the Bach’s diagram actually looked like. [4] Amudim B’Toldot Sefer HaIvri, Hagahot U’Magihim , Spiegel p. 366 , (Ramat Gan, 2005) the paragraph beginning with the words “Sof Davar…” [5] I examined four other Rashi manuscripts on this Daf and none had a diagram. Also, none of them, nor any other Rashi text I saw include the word “Kazeh”. That would indicate there most likely was no diagram in the original Rashi work. However, we do have one manuscript with a diagram, and more importantly the Soncino Pesaro edition which contains quite a complex diagram. The editors of this edition worked from multiple manuscripts and often decided the text based on a majority. They did not add diagrams on their own and therefore they included this depiction based on the manuscript(s) they had. [6] After Soncino, until much later, empty spaces were left where Soncino had included a diagram. This Soncino diagram was the reason why an empty space existed in this Rashi in subsequent editions of the Talmud until Amsterdam 1717 which eliminated the empty space. It has stayed that way until today.
Here is Bomberg 1522: Amsterdam 1646:
Amsterdam 1717: [7] One possible source for diagrams was the Chochmat Shlomo of the Maharshal which was printed in 1580 in Prague. It included many diagrams left out of the Bomberg Shas. It, however, has no diagram of this case. [8] The first time it was included in a printed edition of a Gemara was Fuerth 1829 (Maamar al Hadpasat ha-Talmud with Additions, ed. A.M. Habermann. Jerusalem, 1952 [Hebrew] p.132). However, it was only included for Masechet Berachot and Seder Zeraim. In 1832, Masechet Shabbat was printed without the Hagahot Ha’Bach. The rest of the Talmud was not printed there. [9] See footnote above on the Fuerth edition which did not include Eruvin. There was an edition printed in Vienna from 1830-1833 but according to Maamar al Hadpasat ha-Talmud, it did not include the Hagahot Ha’Bach. There was also an edition of the Talmud printed in Prague between 1830-1835, but it also did not contain the Hagahot Ha’Bach. This makes the Vilna/Horodna edition of 1836 the first to include the Hagahot Ha’Bach on Eruvin. (See pages 133-134 of Maamar al Hadpasat ha-Talmud). [10] Warsaw 1860 is exactly the same as Vilna/Horodna 1836. תבניתו פוליו”Maamar al Hadpasat ha-Talmud….p.142 writes [11] גדול ויפה מאד.” 12]] I examined three of the newer editions of Shas; Vilna HaChadash, Oz Vehdar and Vagshal Nehardea. They all had improved substantially on the picture depicted in the Vilna Shas.
Vagshal can be seen here.
R. Ahron Soloveichik: “In Defense of My Brother”
R. Ahron Soloveichik: “In Defense of My Brother”
Marc B. Shapiro
In his recent post here Professor Shnayer Leiman showed how almost magically, things from the past, thought to be lost, can be brought back to life as it were. I recently had the same experience. In my Torah in Motion class a couple of weeks ago (seehere ) I was discussing the Jewish Observer “eulogy” for R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik. I mentioned R. Moshe Tendler’s strong response in theAlgemeiner Journal (see here), and I further noted that R. Ahron Soloveichik also wrote a very long article in the Algemeiner in which he defends the Rav against the attack of a certain rabbi. (R. Ahron also deals with the Jewish Observer article). For many years I have been trying to get a copy of R. Ahron’s article as unfortunately I never saved it years ago. I couldn’t find the particular issue at any of the libraries I checked. Even the family of R. Ahron was not able to provide a copy. Yet as Leiman mentions in his last post, “Miracles sometimes do occur.” In my class, I mentioned how I was not able to find the article, and I hoped that it could still be discovered somewhere. One of the listeners contacted me to let me know ברוך שמסר עולמו לשומרים !that in his grandfather’s papers he found it (The listener’s grandfather was the great R. Shlomo Schneider, author of the four-volume collection of responsa Divrei Shlomo.)
The Seforim Blog is happy to be able to post R. Ahron’s article, thus preserving it for posterity. See here.
Exciting Update: All of the relevant articles from theAlgemeiner Journal (and other publications) relating to the passing of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik will appear in a forthcoming essay at the Seforim blog that I will co-author with Mr. Menachem Butler of Cambridge, MA, who has done extensive research into this episode over many years and has graciously made available his research for the Seforim blog readers.
Response to Criticism, Part 3
Response to Criticism, Part 3
Marc B. Shapiro
Continued from here.
Let me continue with Rabbi Herschel Grossman’s review. [1] This post will complete my response to around a quarter of his review, so we still have a long way to go.
Grossman writes (p. 42) According to Shapiro, “Maimonides would be surprised that . . . later generations of Jews . . . latched onto his earlier work;” and it “is certainly one of the great ironies of Jewish history that the Thirteen Principles became the standard by which orthodoxy was judged.” Finally, “the characteristic that gave them their afterlife . . . is precisely their outer form . . . Had Maimonides listed a different number of principles in the Mishneh Torah . . . these would have become the Principles of Judaism.” In other words, after postulating that Rambam innovated these obligatory beliefs, Shapiro concludes that it was the popular acceptance of these Principles that established halachic practice.
If you look at the quotations from my book that Grossman has cited, you can see ellipses. The problem here, and this would be unknown to the average reader who does not bother to see what I actually wrote, is that the complete sentences without the ellipses mean something very different than what Grossman wants the readers to think they say. Here is the complete first sentence that he cites (from p. 7 in my book): “Presumably, Maimonides would be surprised that in seeking to define the essentials of Judaism, later generations of Jews, both scholars and masses, had latched onto his earlier work rather than his more detailed formulation in theMishneh Torah.” I think all readers will agree that the part of the sentence that Grossman quotes, with strategic ellipses, does not give the reader the true sense of the sentence. I can’t say whether this is a result of bad faith or careless writing.
Here is the complete second sentence that Grossman cites (from p. 15 in my book): “It is certainly one of the ironies of Jewish history that the Thirteen Principles became the standard by which orthodoxy was judged, for, as is well known, Maimonides himself was attacked for supposedly holding heretical views, at odds with his very own Principles.” Again, we see that by use of a strategic ellipsis, Grossman give the reader a false impression of what I wrote.
Here is the complete third selection that Grossman cites (from p. 14 in my book).
Returning to the Thirteen Principles, the characteristic that gave them their afterlife and caused them to become the formulation of the Jewish creed is precisely their outer form, that is, the fact that they were formulated as a catechism with all the Principles listed together. Had Maimonides listed a different number of Principles in the Mishneh Torah (e.g., twelve or fourteen), these would have become the principles of Judaism. But he did not, and thus the Thirteen Principles stuck.
In this case, the use of ellipses does not distort what I said.
Grossman states that I postulated that “Rambam innovated these obligatory beliefs.” We have already seen that this is complete nonsense. I never said that Maimonides invented the “obligatory beliefs,” as this would mean that before Maimonides there was no conception of traditional Jewish beliefs, which is a ridiculous notion.
In his final sentence, Grossman states that I concluded “that it was popular acceptance of these Principles that established halachic practice.” This is indeed my opinion, but I would also add that it obviously took time for the Principles to achieve widespread acceptance. Nothing I have said here is unusual or radical, and it is also opinion of many others who have written on the subject. Here, for example, is what R. Meir Orian writes in his book on the Rambam (published by Mossad ha-Rav Kook).[2]
ראינו כי בעצם ערר רבנו משה התנגדות בכל חיבור שכתב . . . גם קביעתם של שלשה עשר העיקרים של היהדות – שבמרוצת השנים נתקדשו בקדושת התורה והאומה – לא היתה לפי רוח גדולי הדור שבזמנו There were other competing systems of dogma, but I state that none of them could compete with Maimonides’ formulation, both because of Maimonides’ supreme authority and also because popular piety prefers more dogmas to fewer. It is no accident that there are almost a hundred different poetic versions of the Principles, of which Yigdal is only the most famous. These are reflections of the popular attachment to the Principles, not to any rabbinic decision in favor of Maimonides. So if we conclude that the Principles establish halakhic practice, then yes, it was popular acceptance of these Principles that established the halakhic practice, much like popular acceptance and rejection of halakhic rulings throughout history has established halakhic practice.
Had the religious masses accepted an alternative formulation of Jewish dogma, then this would have become the standard. The rabbis can give rulings, but from talmudic times to the present it is the masses of religious Jews that determine if a halakhic ruling is accepted or not. Even with regard to the greatest poskim, you find that for some of their rulings the religious masses simply refused to accept them (perhaps because they found them too difficult and were already accustomed to do things in a different way, e.g., R. Moshe Feinstein and time clocks on Shabbat). I am not sure what Grossman’s problem is with the notion that popular acceptance can determine halakhic practice. Maybe he thinks that halakhah is only about the posek issuing a ruling. However, especially when speaking historically, we must also take into account that the religious masses (the “olam”) also have a crucial role to play in how halakhah develops.
This important notion is elaborated upon in the recent book by R. Ronen Neuwirth, The Narrow Halakhic Bridge, pp. 293ff. Here is one passage from R. Kook that R. Neuwirth quotes (from Eder he-Yekar, p. 39): “All of the mitzvot of the rabbis that we fulfill – their main foundation is the acceptance of ‘the entire nation’ which is the honor of the nation.” Grossman, pp. 42-43, quotes the following sentence from my book (p. 17, mistakenly omitting a few words in his citation):
It seems that there is even halakhic significance to the Principles, as seen in the fact that R. Israel Meir Hakohen [Mishnah Berurah 126:2] records that one who denies the divinity of the Torah, reward and punishment, the future redemption, and the resurrection cannot serve as a prayer leader. Had Maimonides not included these Principles in his list, it is unlikely that denial of the last two, which are not necessarily of prime importance to a religious life, would disqualify one in this way.
Grossman writes:
Contrary to Shapiro’s hasty assumption, the Rambam is not the source for this Halacha. The source is the Talmud Yerushalmi, cited by the Tur [Orah Hayyim 126] as follows: “A prayer leader who skips two or three words does not have to go back to say them, except for one who does not mention ‘the Resurrection of the Dead,’ for perhaps he is a disbeliever [kofer] in the Resurrection of the Dead, and [the blessing] ‘Who rebuilds Jerusalem,’ for perhaps he does not believe in the Coming of the Mashiach.” Obviously, the ruling of the Mishnah Berurah is not an “invention” based on the Rambam. does אין מחזירין אותו Grossman’s translation is not exact as not mean “does not have to go back”, and the translation also but for our purposes ,ומכניע זדים שמא מין הוא omits the words this is not crucial.
The first thing to note is that I never said that the Mishnah Berurah’s source for his ruling is the Rambam’s Principles. What I said is that had the Rambam not included the Messianic era and Resurrection among his principles, denial of them would not have been enough to affect a Jew’s status (so that he couldn’t be a prayer leader, etc.). I will explain what I mean, as Grossman has once again completely misunderstood my point.
Let us take Resurrection, which is mentioned in the Mishnah as an obligatory belief. Nevertheless, the Rambam was suspected by both opponents and supporters as not really believing in it literally. In response to this suspicion, he wrote his famous Letter on Resurrection, which affirms the literalness of Resurrection and tells us that when he included it in his Principles he really meant it. Imagine if Maimonides, in his Letter on Resurrection, had not affirmed literal Resurrection, but instead defended the notion that it is to be understood metaphorically, as referring to the World to Come. Had that occurred, then the Rambam’s great authority would have ensured that belief in Resurrection would not be required.
My point is therefore simple: If the Rambam had declared that belief in Resurrection is not required, I do not believe that the Mishnah Berurah would have regarded this approach as heretical and thus invalidated a hazzan who held such a view, despite what other rishonim might have held. Similarly, had the Rambam not included the Messianic Era as a Principles of Faith, I do not believe that it would have been regarded as an obligatory belief, denial of which is heresy. It might have been a “recommended” belief, but not a generally accepted “obligatory” belief. In my opinion, this shows the great significance of the Rambam from both a theological and a halakhic perspective.
If you look at Jewish history, you will find that while many have asserted that certain beliefs are obligatory (e.g., gilgul, existence of demons, Divine Providence encompassing the animal kingdom, Daas Torah, R. Shimon Ben Yohai authored the Zohar, the Sages were infallible in matters of science), these beliefs have never become generally accepted to the extent that those who do not share them are regarded by the wider Orthodox world as outside the fold. Only Maimonides’s Principles were able to do such a thing. This explains what I mean when I say that had Maimonides not regarded the Messianic Era or Resurrection as obligatory beliefs, that “it is unlikely that denial” of them would have been enough to place the stamp of heresy on such a person, and thus to disqualify him from being a hazzan.
On p. 44 of his article, Grossman returns to the matter that I (and others) raised, that the Thirteen Principles are not mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. I also suggested that in his later works Maimonides was not attached to his earlier formulation of thirteen principles, as he presents a more detailed formulation of required beliefs in the Mishneh Torah.
In response to my point that one would have expected the Thirteen Principles to be listed in Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, Grossman writes (p. 44)
Here, too, Shapiro indicates that he is unaware of the structure of the Mishneh Torah. The entire work is an expansion of the 613 Mitzvos: The entire work is introduced by Rambam’s Sefer haMitzvos which lists all 613 Mitzvos, and each of the sections Halachos( ) has a listing of the Mitzvos included therein. Consequently, there is no place to highlight the Thirteen Principles inHilchos Yesodey haTorah, since there are explicit Mitzvos for only three of them—emunah, yichud and avodah zarah, which he in fact does list in the introduction to this section. He could not have listed all the rest since they are not Mitzvos.
I reject this paragraph. There is a good deal inHilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah that has nothing to do with explicit“ Mitzvos.” For that matter, there is a good deal in the Mishneh Torah as a whole that is not related to “explicit Mitzvos.” In addition to what I mentioned in my last post, one can also add the last two chapters of Hilkhot Melakhim, which are about the messianic era and have nothing to do with mitzvot. The Rambam included these chapters because he felt that this material is important, and he did not limit himself in theMishneh Torah to only matters that derive from explicit‘ Mitzvos”. Therefore, there is nothing about the “structure of the Mishneh Torah” that would have prevented him from listing the Thirteen Principles as a unit inHilkhot Yesodei ha- Torah or elsewhere. In fact, most of the Principles are already listed in Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, but just not together as a unit (which was my point), which shows that he had no problem listing them even though “they are not Mitzvos.”[3]
As for my wondering why the Principles are not listed together as a unit, which Grossman sees as an illustration of how I am unaware of the structure of the Mishneh Torah, let me begin by repeating what I wrote in my last post: R. Yaakov Nissan Rosenthal, on the very first page of his commentary Mishnat Yaakov to Sefer ha-Madda, also wonders about the point I made, that the Thirteen Principles as a unit are never mentioned in the Mishneh Torah. (Had I known this when I wrote my book, I certainly would have cited it.)[4]
ותימא למה לא הביא הרמב“ם בספרו ה”יד החזקה” את הענין הזה של י“ג עיקרי האמונה, וצ”ע
R. Avraham Menahem Hochman writes:[5]
מאחר וכל כך חמורה הכפירה, וגדולה החובה לדעת את י”ג. . . העיקרים, כיצד זה השמיטם מספרו ה”יד החזקה”, ולא כתבם כפי שסדרם בפירוש המשנה
והנה אחר שהתבאר שהאמונה בי”ג העיקרים היא בסיס לתורה נשוב לשאלה הרביעית (בסוף פרק ה’) אשר לכאורה היא פליאה עצומה מדוע השמיט הרמב”ם ביד החזקה את החובה הגדולה להאמין בי”ג עיקרים, באופן חיובי, ולא סדרם כי”ג יסודי האמונה שחובה להאמין בהם
R. Hochman goes on to explain that most of the Principles are indeed mentioned in Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torahin a positive sense (even if not as a unit of Thirteen Principles). He also notes the following important point, that when principles of faith are mentioned in the Talmud, they are never listed in a positive sense, that one must believe X. Rather, they are listed in a negative sense, that one who denies X has no share in the World to Come. Why Maimonides, in his Commentary on the Mishnah, chose to formulate the Principles in a positive sense and require active belief as a necessity for all Jews—something the Talmud never explicitly required—is an interesting point which we will come back to. Regarding some of the Principles the difference is clear. For example, according to the Talmud, denial of Resurrection is heresy, but one who has never heard of the Resurrection and thus does not deny it, or affirm it, is a Jew in good standing. For Maimonides, however, the doctrine of Resurrection must be positively affirmed. In a future post we can come back to which Principles even the Talmud implicitly requires positive affirmation of (obviously number 1, belief in God, but there could be others as well).
Even when it comes to other basic ideas of Maimonides, which are not included as part of the Thirteen Principles, we find that scholars wondered why Maimonides did not include them in Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah. For example, R. Joseph Ibn Caspi writes:[6]
הנה תמהתי על כבודו בספרי המכונה ספר הסוד, כי [אם] כן עשה הוא. דעת תורתנו ויסוד הדת למה לא מנה זה בהלכות יסוד [!] התורה בתחלת מנותו היסודות
With regard to the Thirteen Principles themselves, in R. Jacob Yitzhaki’s popular Sephardic Mahzor Oholei Yaakov: Rosh ha- Shanah, p. 59b, he states:
ובאמת גם הרמב”ם ז”ל לא זכר מהעיקרים הללו לא בספרו הגדול משנה. תורה ולא בס’ המורה שחבר אחריו בזקנותו. ואם היה עודנו מחזיק בם היה לו להזכירם בס’ המדע והמורה, כי שם מקומם, ורק נזכרו בפי’ המשנה שחבר בבחרותו כידוע R. Yitzhaki agrees with my point that it is significant that the Thirteen Principles as a unit are not mentioned in the Mishneh Torah(or in the Guide of the Perplexed; he is obviously aware that the individual principles appear in ואם היה עודנו ,various places in the Mishneh Torah). His words show that he, too, is not certain ,מחזיק בם היה לו להזכירם that the notion of Thirteen Principles was still something the Rambam held to when he wrote the Mishneh Torahand Guide of the Perplexed. Grossman can reject R. Yitzhaki’s point the same way he rejects what I wrote, but readers can see that what we have written is not something completely ignorant, as Grossman would have people believe.
On pp. 44-45, in response to my suggestion that in his later years the Rambam did not feel bound to the Thirteen Principles as the ultimate summation of Judaism, Grossman refers to a passage in the Rambam’s Letter on Resurrection. Here the Rambam mentions that in his commentary to Sanhedrin he expounded on fundamentals of Judaism, and he mentions that he did likewise in the Introduction to the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah. I myself refer to this source in Limits, p. 6, as one of the few times the Rambam mentions the Principles subsequent to his the Commentary on the Mishnah. This does not change the fact that the Rambam does not refer to the Principles as a unit in the Mishneh Torah or the Guide, and the understanding of Judaism found in these latter works is not always the same as what we see in the Principles. I would assume that it is in the Rambam’s later, and indeed greater, works that we should look in order to identify his final statements on matters of Jewish belief.
The real problem is that again, Grossman simply does not understand what I am saying. He concludes this section of his criticisms by stating that, “Clearly the Rambam has not retracted his opinion that there are Principles, or roots – lacking belief in which, one is missing the fundamentals of Judaism.” Of course, I never said that in his later years the Rambam did not believe that there are Principles of Judaism. Even if we never had his Thirteen Principles, you can look at the Mishneh Torah and see that there are beliefs that if you deny them, you are missing the fundamentals of Judaism. My point about the Rambam not being tied to the Thirteen Principles has nothing to do with this. It thus makes no sense for Grossman, p. 46, to write that in the Guide the Rambam refers to the fundamentals of faith, and then to cite chapters from this work that require belief in God’s incorporeality, as if this has anything to do with what we are talking about. Let us not forget that it was the Rambam who chose thirteen principles.[7] He did not find this in the Torah or in the Talmud. When you examine the Mishneh Torah you see that he could just as easily have chosen fourteen principles, or even more (and later writers indeed added additional principles).
There is no need to belabor this any longer, but let me call attention to an error Grossman makes on pp. 46-47. He states that R. Joseph Albo refers to the Guide of the Perplexed “in explicating Rambam’s Principles.” He then cites Albo’s Sefer ha-Ikarim 1:3: “And why did he not include the dogma of creation, which everyone professing a divine law is obliged to believe, as Maimonides himself explains in the twenty-fifth chapter of the second part of the Guide of the Perplexed?” This is not an example of Albo using the Guide to explicate the Rambam’s Principles. In this chapter of Sefer ha-Ikarim, Albo asks why the Rambam does not include creation as one of the Thirteen Principles. He cites the Guide not to explicate the Principles but to show that the Rambam regarded creation as an essential doctrine, and therefore it should have appeared in the Principles. (Albo was unaware that later in life the Rambam added to the Fourth Principle the belief in creation ex nihilo.)
One point that Grossman is adamant about is that it is improper to suggest that the Rambam changed his mind when it comes to the Principles. That is because, Grossman states, the Rambam revised his Commentary on the Mishnah throughout his life, so if he did not change what he wrote in the Principles, it is “an indisputable indication” (p. 46) that it remained his opinion. The reader of Grossman’s essay will not realize that it is not a major point of my book to argue that the Rambam changed his mind about his formulations in the Principles. What I do suggest is that the Thirteen Principles as a unit is not his final statement of dogma, because he does not mention it in the Mishneh Torah or the Guide, and in those works you find other doctrines that are regarded as principles of faith which are not included in the Thirteen Principles. Furthermore, as we shall see in future posts, the Rambam has different emphases and even outright contradictions to the Thirteen Principles in his later works, so we are left with assuming that either he changed his mind or that his formulations in the Thirteen Principles were intended for a certain audience, but did not represent his true view, which would only later be revealed in the Guide – and perhaps even in the Mishneh Torah – to the spiritual and intellectual elites. I will deal with this in greater detail in a future installment of my response to Grossman. For now I just want to note that the approach that he regards as ignorant as well as apparently blasphemous, that the Rambam changed his views about certain matters in the Principles, is not unknown even among rabbinic figures.
In Limits, p. 148, I noted that R. Meir Don Plotzki claimed that while in the Twelfth Principle the Rambam requires that the Messiah be descended from Solomon, he does not mention this in the Mishneh Torah. For R. Plotzki, this shows that the Rambam retracted his earlier view (even though he never corrected what he wrote about this principle in the Commentary on the Mishnah).[8] This again illustrates the problem with so many of Grossman’s criticisms of me. He points to things I wrote that he thinks are absurd and ignorant, but what happens when I show that great rabbinic figures have said the same thing? Obviously, Grossman would not criticize them in the same way. Is this an example of the old “they could say it but you can’t”?
R. Eliyahu Meir Feivelson notes that in the Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Positive Commandment, no. 4, the Rambam includes as part of “fear of God,” fear of punishment. However, when he describes this mitzvah in the Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesodei ha- Torah2:1-2, there is no mention of fear of punishment, only :[R. Feivelson writes[9 .יראת הרוממות what is called
ויש להעיר עוד, שאולי יותר נכון לומר בדעת הרמב”ם, שהוא חזר בו מדבריו בספר המצוות, ולכן בספר משנה תורה נקט את יראת הרוממות. ורגליים לדבר, שהרי בהקדמתו לפרק חלק מנה הרמב”ם את האמונה בשכר ועונש, וכאחד מי”ג עיקרי אמונה. ואילו בהלכות תשובה (פ”ג הל, ו’-ח’) מנה את כל עיקרי האמונה פעם נוספת (ותחת זה מנה שם את האמונה בתורה שבכתב ושבע”פ לשני עיקרים), ולא הזכיר שם את האמונה בשכר ועונש, ושמא זה מוכיח על שינוי דעתו בענין זה
R. Feivelson mentions that in theMishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah3:6-8, when the Rambam lists the different types of heretical beliefs, there is nothing about Reward and Punishment. He therefore suggests that the Rambam changed his mind and no longer regarded this as a Principle.
If Grossman would read R. Feivelson like he reads me, he would protest that it is outrageous to suggest that the Rambam stopped believing in, or requiring belief in, Reward and Punishment. But this would be a mistake. R. Feivelson knows full well that Reward and Punishment is an important Jewish belief. He also knows that Hilkhot Teshuvah, chapter 8, is all about Reward and Punishment. All he is suggesting is that the Rambam ceased to regard this as one of the Principles of Judaism, denial of which is heresy, and which everyone must also positively affirm to be regarded as part of the Jewish community. Or perhaps he only means to say that the Rambam removed Reward and Punishment from the Principles so people would not focus on this as a motivation to observe of the Torah. If R. Feivelson is correct, then Reward and Punishment is no different than other true beliefs which the Rambam didn’t see fit to include in the Thirteen Principles.[10]
R. Feivelson’s basic idea, that the Rambam changed his mind about including Reward and Punishment as one of the Principles, was actually earlier suggested by R. Solomon of Chelm in his classic commentary Mirkevet ha-Mishneh, Hilkhot Teshuvah3:8:
וזה מכוון נגד י”ג עיקרים שבפירוש המשנה אלא שבחדא יש. . .) חזרה, ושם מונה שכר ועונש, וכאן בחיבורו השמיטו (לפי דמצוה לעבוד שלא ע”מ לקבל פרס מאהבה
Let me turn to one other place where it is possible that the Rambam changed his mind in a matter of dogma. There are a number of discussions of the Rambam’s view of the Messiah, and it is typically stated that he believes that the Messiah will be a prophet. Since R. Alter Hilewitz was recently mentioned in the Seforim Blog here, let me cite him.[11]
שהמלך המשיח בעצמו יהיה נביא, ולא סתם נביא, אלא נביא יותר גדול מכל הנביאים פרט למשה
That the Messiah will be a prophet is often stated as part of the dogma of belief in the Messiah, yet there is nothing in the Twelfth Principle about the Messiah being a prophet. Why then do so many assume that this is part of the Rambam’s Principle? I think the answer is because in theMishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 9:2, the Rambam states that the Messiah will be a great prophet, close to the level of Moses. He also mentions this in his Letter to Yemen.[12]
As mentioned, there is nothing in the Twelfth Principle about the Messiah being a prophet. Does this mean that the Rambam changed his mind? I don’t think we can say for sure. Yet it is noteworthy that in the Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim, ch. 11, when the Rambam speaks about the Messiah, he also does not mention anything about the Messiah being a prophet. In fact, in Hilkhot Melakhim 11:3 he tells us that R. Akiva thought that Bar Kokhba was the Messiah. Since Bar Kokhba was not a prophet, this is a proof that the Messiah does not need to be a prophet. Another relevant point is that inHilkhot Melakhim 12:3 the Rambam speaks of the Messiah as having ruah ha-kodesh, which is a lower level than prophecy. Thus, it appears clear that according to Hilkhot Melakhim the Messiah will not be a prophet, or at least does not need to be a prophet.[13]
How to explain the fact that in Hilkhot Teshuvah the Rambam says that the Messiah will be a great prophet, while in Hilkhot Melakhim he does not mention this at all, and he refers to Bar Kokhba, thus showing that the Messiah does not need to be a prophet? R. Joseph Kafih states that the Rambam changed his mind on this matter. When writing his Letter to Yemen and Hilkhot Teshuvah the Rambam thought that the Messiah needed to be a prophet, however, his later position is reflected in Hilkhot Melakhim.[14] R. Kafih makes this claim even though there is no evidence that the Rambam ever altered what he wrote in Hilkhot Teshuvah. My point in mentioning this is not to claim that R. Kafih is correct in his assumption, only to show, in opposition to Grossman, that great commentators have indeed been prepared to state that the Rambam changed his mind, even if we have no evidence that he later corrected his earlier works.[15]
Regarding prophecy, R. Shlomo Aviner cites R. Kook that Adam was a greater prophet than Moses. I found this formulation noteworthy, as it contradicts Maimonides’ principle that Moses was the greatest prophet. In response to my question, R. Aviner replied to me that Adam is not to be included in regular history, and was thus not the among the prophets Maimonides was referring to.[16]
אדם הראשון הוא מחוץ לחשבון ההסטורי הרגיל ולפניו, ושורש כל בני האדם
R. Aviner cited as his source Orot ha-Kodesh, vol. 1, p. 280, In fact, I found a more apt .זיהרא עילאה דאדה”רwhich refers to source in Shemonah Kevatzim3:66, where R. Kook puts the matter very clearly:
זיהרא עילאה דאדם הראשון היא כוללת מדה עליונה זו העולה עד למעלה מהאספקלריא המאירה של נבואת משה רבנו is found throughout זיהרא עילאה The concept of Adam’s kabbalistic literature (which also states that Enoch would I had never understood it as .(זיהרא עליאה later receive this also including prophecy, as opposed to simply greatness, but after investigating the matter I do not think that R. Kook is saying anything out of the ordinary by excluding Adam from the Rambam’s Principle. I think that this is also the sense you get from R. Hayyim of Volozhin when he discusses Adam.[17] In Nefesh ha-Hayyim 1:20, he also stresses the greatness of the Messiah, and he cites a rabbinic text that the Messiah will surpass Abraham, Moses, and Adam.[18] R. Hayyim adds that he will only surpass Adam after the Sin, but not before.
Regarding Adam before the Sin, R. Solomon Elyashiv writes:[19]
השגת אדה”ר קודם החטא שהשיג אז את כל האצילות הנה היה במדרגת האצילות של אז שהיה גבוה ונעלה מאד . . . כי מציאת אדה”ר שקודם הטא היה למעלה לגמרי מכל חק סוג אנושי אשר מאחר החטא ולהלאה
R. Isaiah Horowitz discusses Adam from a kabbalistic perspective on a few occasions. In Shenei Luhot ha-Berit[20], sectionToldot Adam: Beit Yisrael (p. 9a in the first printing, Amsterdam 1749; no. 104 in the newer printings), he writes:
והנה אדם עולה במספר קטן ט’ כי אדם לא בא בסוד יחידה מצד כתר המעלה העליונה עשירית, וזהו “אדם אחד מאלף לא מצאתי” א”ל [אל תקרי] אֶלֶף בסגול אלא אַלף שהיה חסר
This is exactly how the text appears in the first printing including the vowels. R. Horowitz cites Ecclesiastes 7:28, Only .אדם אחד מאלף מצאתי :however the verse actually states It .ואשה מכל אלה לא מצאתי :later in the verse does it say seems clear that this is simply a mistake and that R. Horowitz was citing from memory.[21] We find the same verse misquoted later in the Shelah, where the derash seems to be clearly based on the mistake:[22]
חותמו של הקב”ה אמת רומז על אה”יה אשר אהיה כי אהיה פעמי’ אה”יה עולה כמנין אמת. אדם הוא מעשר אמת כי ד”ם מעשר מ”ת ומהאלף לא שייך מעשר וזה רמז אדם אחד מאלף לא מצאתי כלומר אחד מאלף לא נמצא מעשר
This is all quite strange as using Otzar ha-Chochma I found two other places in the Shelah where the verse is cited correctly.[23]
Regarding Moses’ prophetic level, in Limits, p. 89, I cited authorities who understand Midrash Tanhuma’s statement that the Messiah will be “more exalted than Moses” to mean that he would be a greater prophet than Moses. Subsequent to the book’s publication, I found that the Lubavitcher Rebbe also leaves this as a possibility,[24] for in hisSefer Sihot: 5751, vol. 2, p. 789, he writes:
ובתנחומא (ס”פ תולדות) משמע שהוא נביא גדול ממשה – ראה לקו”ש ח”ו עמ’ 254 – ועצ”ע
Here is one additional point which is I think of interest. Although Judah David Eisenstein was not a religious authority, he was an Orthodox Jew and his works became quite popular in Orthodox homes.[25] It is noteworthy, therefore, that in his Otzar Dinim u-Minhagim, p. 325, he writes as follows, completely rejecting the Rambam’s system of dogma:
ואיך יעלה על הדעת לומר כי היהודי שאינו מאמין בלבו באיזה מן הי”ג עקרים חוץ מאמונת ה’ לבדו כי הוא יוצא מכלל ישראל. בפרט כי דת ישראל לא נוסדה על מחשבות ורעיונות רק על המעשה, מצות עשה ומצות לא תעשה, והיהודי המקיים כל המצוות הוא בודאי יהודי כשר אע”פ שאינו מאמין בלבו ברוב העקרים שמנה הרמב”ם He then suggests that the Rambam retracted his understanding of ikkarim.
ונראה כי גם הרמב”ם חזר מעקריו אלה שכתב בערבית לפירוש המשניות, כי בספרו היד החזקה שכתב בעברית להלכה למשה [למעשה] הורה בגר שבא להתגייר, מודיעין אותו עקרי הדת שהוא ייחוד השם ואיסור ע”ז, ומאריכין בדבר הזה, ומודיעין אותו מקצת מצות קלות ומקצת מצות חמורות ואין מאריכין בדבר זה
Notice how Eisenstein requires belief in God, without which one is not part of Israel. But this takes us back to the question of what actually is belief in God. For the Rambam, someone who believes in a corporeal God is not really believing in God at all, and is thus a heretic, while Rabad disagrees. In Limits and in subsequent writings I have cited a number of authorities who agree with Rabad, which shows that the Rambam’s’ approach in this matter was not universally accepted. While it is true that Rabad and the others I cite believe that God is incorporeal, they do not accept that one who errs in this matter is to be regarded as a heretic, which is a major break with the Rambam as it means that denial of one of the Principles does not equal heresy.[26]
Here is another source that we can add to the list. The Hasidic master R. Meir Horowitz of Zhikov states that one who has a defect in his belief in God – which I assume can also include believing in God’s corporeality – but is part of a Hasidic community and accepts a rebbe, is not to be regarded as wicked. This is because by being devoted to the rebbe he will eventually be brought to a proper belief in God. What he is saying, if I am interpreting him correctly, is that you can have members of the Orthodox community whose beliefs might be incorrect, even heretical, but they should not be regarded as wicked because their very belonging to the community and acceptance of its rabbinic leadership is itself significant. I don’t know how many would agree with R. Meir, but what he says is quite fascinating.[27] וכמו כן יש בנמצא בני אדם אשר יש להם חסרון באמונת הבורא כביכול, ועם כל זה יש להם אמונת צדיקים, ומקבלים עול הצדיק על עצמם . . . וגם אנשים כאלו אינם בכלל רשעים, יען כי על ידי אמונת צדיקים בודאי יבוא אחר כך לאמונת הבורא, כי על ידי התקשרות לצדיק במשך הזמן יזכה גם לאמונה גמורה. וכמו שפירשו בספרים הלואי אותי עזבו ואת תורתי שמרו היינו לשמור מה שהתורה מרבה בתיבת את ד’ א- להיך לרבות תלמידי חכמים
Finally, let me call attention to another unconventional view of R. Michael Abraham. R. Abraham states that since it impossible to force people to believe, the Thirteen Principles of Faith of the Rambam must be understood as only a suggestion which people are free to reject, not an obligation, as only behavior can be legislated, but not thought.[28]
באופן מהותי אי אפשר לצוות על אנשים להאמין דווקא בדבר מסוים. אתה יכול לצוות על אנשים שיתנהגו באופן מסוים, אבל אי אפשר להכתיב להם מה לחשוב, וגם איך תדע שהם חושבים אחרת מכפי שצוו. אז גם 13 עיקרי האמונה של הרמב”ם הם לא הלכה, אלא הצעה של .הרמב”ם, ובהחלט אפשר גם לחשוב אחרת
* * * * * * * *
[1] Regarding Grossman’s review, it is apt to cite the words of R. Yissachar Tamar, Alei Tamar, Shabbat, p. 6 (referred to by R. Neriah Guttel, Or Yekarot [Elkana, 2016], p. 290):
ומכאן אזהרה חמורה למבקרי ספרים שיעיינו הדק היטב עד שחורצים משפטם על ערך הספר וחשיבותו
In a future post I hope to also discuss another critique of my book, that of Seth Kadish. While I have argued that the Thirteen Principles reflect a conservative approach sometimes at odds with Maimonides’ other works, Kadish, in his very interesting and significant article, offers an alternative, I would even say revisionist, perspective. Here is some of what appears in the summary at the beginning of the article.
Such an attitude assumes that Maimonides’ famous list of the “thirteen foundations of the Torah” reflects a conservative stance (regardless of his wider agenda). This paper argues, to the contrary, that his dogma is best read in context as a natural reflection of radical formulations found in his pre- Guide rabbinic writings. It further argues that the great Iberian critics of Maimonidean dogma understood it in exactly this way and rejected it as such, offering meaningful alternatives in its place. They designed their alternative systems to reflect their views about the nature and substance of the Torah, not just to address the semantics of dogma.
Seth (Avi) Kadish, “Jewish Dogma after Maimonides: Semantics or Substance,” Hebrew Union College Annual 85 (2015), pp. 195-263. [2] Ha-Moreh le-Dorot (Jerusalem, 1956), p. 92 (emphasis added). [3] See R. Isaac Abarbanel, Rosh Amanah, ch. 19; Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought (Oxford, 1986) p. 228 n. 60; R. Dovid Yitzhaki’s essay in R. Jacob Emden, Luah Eresh (Toronto, 2001), p. 466. R. Yehezkel Sarne,Beit Yehezkel: Hiddushim u-Veurim be-Inyanim Shonim (Jerusalem, 1995), p. 242, has an interesting perspective:
יסודי התורה אינו ענין לעיקרי התורה או עיקרי האמונה שהרי לא. כלל הרמב”ם כאן כל העיקרים שאם אינו מאמין בהם נעשה כופר על ידן. אלא יסודי התורה היינו שהתורה עומדת עליהם ומי שאין לו היסודות גם תורה אין לו
This .לוח ארש Earlier in this note, I refer to R. Emden’s work is sometimes written as Luah Eres, yet this is a mistake. The see Ps. 21:3) which) ארשת second word is Eresh, as in the word has the connotation of “speech”. This is explained by R. Dovid Yitzhaki in his edition of Luah Eresh (referred to above), p. 3 n. 1 (second pagination). the ,אדר יקר In Shaharit of Yom Kippur, we recite the piyyut .אחוה בְּאֶרֶשׁ מלולי :first line of which reads R. Aaron Samuel Katz’s commentary on Midrash Rabbah has the title Kore me-Rosh(Berdichev, 1811). It is divided into two This is obviously a .ארש רבה sections, one of which is called also contains letters ארש Ps. 110:6), and) ארץ רבה play on .אהרן שמואל from the names such as in the ,ארש Sephardic melitzah often uses the word Its .(האר’ש sometimes written as) ותשקוט הארש expression meaning is that all speech or utterance should cease, that is, there is no need for any more discussion or argument about the .a play on Deut) באתי אל הארש issue. Another melitzah is 26:3), which means “this is what I have to say”. a play on Gen. 25:6) which) ארש קדם There is also a melitzah means “words of introduction”.
Here is the beginning of R. David Pipano’s Avnei ha-Efod, vol. 1 (Sofia, 1913). On pp. 24a and 171a R. Pipano uses another melitzah that I love, and which you can occasionally find in other Sephardic a play on Deut. 16:3). This means that) ובחפשון יצאתי :works he searched in rabbinic literature.
לוח is a play on ,לוח ארש ,The title of R. Emden’s book is ארז ,that appears in Song of Songs 8:9. In the Bible ארז as it comes at the end of a sentence. Does אׇרֶז vocalized should also be לוח ארז that mean that seforim with the title ,should be Aresh? The answer is no לוח ארש vocalized Arez, and because when we cite the title we are not quoting a biblical אבן verse. Similarly, with R. Isser Zalman Meltzer’s book does האבן הַאׇזֶל just because in I Sam. 20:19 we read ,האזל not mean that when citing the name of the book, where it is not the end of a sentence, that we should write Even ha-Azel. Rather, the title is Even ha-Ezel. (The information in this paragraph has been confirmed with R. Dovid Yitzchaki.) [4] Regarding R. Rosenthal, I think it is noteworthy that he held that at least in certain cases, such as with women who are unable to get married, it is permissible for single women to be artificially inseminated, and he ruled this way in practice. See R. Yehudah Berakhah, Birkat Yehudah, vol. 7, p. 267. R. Aharon Lichtenstein also held this position. See R. Shmuel David, “Teshuvot Ba’al Peh shel ha-Rav Aharon Lichtenstein,” Tzohar 40 (2016), p. 32:
שאלה: רווקה מבוגרת, כבת 41, מבקשת היתר לקבל תרומת זרע מגוי? כדי לזכות להיות אם, האם ניתן להתיר לה
תשובה: אנחנו איננו ששים למצב שילד יגדל בלא אב, אך אי אפשר לראות את דמעתה ולחשות, ולכן כיוון שאין כאן איסור, הרי שמותר לה לקבל תרומת זרע מגוי, ורופא יזריק אותו, כמו שעושים לזוג נשוי
I believe that this is now the accepted position in the Modern Orthodox world, for the simple reason that strictly speaking there is no halakhic prohibition. In the haredi world, rabbis often forbid things for communal reasons, even though there is no real halakhic prohibition. But these types of rulings do not carry as much weight in the Modern Orthodox community.
It is also of note that before the creation of the State of Israel, R. Rosenthal went on the Temple Mount, as there was a tradition where it is permissible to go. However, he agreed that in contemporary times this should not be allowed. See the interview with his student, R. Shlomo Amar, here. [5] Ha-Emunah ve-Yud Gimmel Ikareha (Jerusalem, 2005), pp. 84, 103-104. [6]Amudei Kesef u-Maskiyot Kesef (Frankfurt, 1848), p. 113. See also ibid., p. 101:
למה לא מנה זה הדעת בהלכות יסודי התורה עם הייחוס בא-ל
[7] See R. Shimshon Dovid Pincus, Nefesh Shimsohn: Be-Inyanei Emunah (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 99:
הרמב”ם היה הראשון שמנה את י”ג העיקרים . . . מה הרמב”ם חיפש כשהוא יסד את אותם “עיקרים”, ובכלל מה הם “עיקרים”? . . . הרמב”ם פסק את י”ג העיקרים להלכה, וכנראה שקבלנו את שיטתו
[8] Hemdat Yisrael (Petrokov, 1927), vol. 1, p. 14a (final numbering; in Limits I referred to this as p. 14b, as it is found on the second column). Interestingly, on the very next page, p. 14b, R. Plotzki writes:
בשיעור שלמדתי בישיבת ר’ יצחק אלחנן ז”ל בפה ניויארק יום ב’ ט”ז תמוז באספת כל גדולי מורי הישיבה והרבה מגדולי הרבנים בנויארק
This shiur at Yeshivat R. Yitzchak Elchonon took place in 1926, during a fundraising visit to the United States. [9] Va-Yavinu be-Mikra: Va-Yikra, p. 175 (emphasis added). [10] Regarding R. Feivelson, see the recent news report here about how two young men from the extremist Peleg group took out a knife and threatened R. Feivelson that he stop giving shiurim or else suffer the consequences. In a future post, I hope to discuss why there has been strong opposition in some quarters to R. Feivelson’s approach. [11] “Yemot ha-Mashiah be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam,” Sinai 41 (1957), p. 17. [12] Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Shilat, vol. 1, p. 106 (Arabic), pp. 154-155 (Hebrew). This is in line with the Rambam’s Seventh Principle which states that other prophets cannot reach Moses’ level of prophecy. In Limits, ch. 6, I discuss those who disagreed with this principle. I subsequently found what seems to be another example of disagreement with the Rambam in this matter. In speaking of the prophets in the Messianic era, R. David Kimhi, commentary to Joel 3:1, writes: וכן יהיו בהם [הנביאים] מעלות זה למעלה מזה כמו שהיו בנביאים שעברו עד שאולי יקים בהם כמשה רבינו ע“ה
In his final words he offers the possibility that future prophets will be as great as Moses. [13] R. Hananel Sari writes as follows with reference to Maimonides’ description of the Messiah in Hilkhot Melakhim:
כאן המלך המשיח נמדד רק במידת הצלחתו להקים מחדש את הממלכה לפי חוקי התורה. כלומר, מבחן התוצאה בעניין זה בלבד, ואינו צריך !להיות נביא, ובוודאי שאינו צריך להיות נביא גדול
“Tekufatenu vi-Yemot ha-Mashiah be-Mishnat ha-Rav Kafih,” Masorah le-Yosef 7 (2012), p. 97. [14] Commentary to Hilkhot Teshuvah, p. 650 n. 21. See also R. Kafih’s note to his edition of Iggerot ha-Rambam, p. 50 n. 26. [15] Regarding Maimonides not correcting the Mishneh Torah to bring all of the halakhot in line, see myStudies in Maimonides and His Interpreters, pp. 6, 68 n. 275. [16] See my Iggerot Malkhei Rabbanan, no. 120. Copies of this work are available here. [17] Nefesh ha-Hayyim 2:17, 4:28. [18] The rabbinic text R. Hayyim refers to is a Midrash, but he was apparently citing from memory, as the Midrash does not mention anything about Adam but instead mentions Abraham, Moses, and the angels. This Midrash is usually quoted from Midrash Tanhuma, ed. Buber, vol. 1, p. 70a, but this edition was not yet published in R. Hayyim’s lifetime, so he would have known the Midrash from Yalkut Shimoni, Zechariah, no. 571. [19] Leshem Shevo ve-Ahlamah: Sefer ha-Deah (Petrokov, 1912), vol. 1, p. 85b. Following this passage, on the same page, R. Elyashiv says something noteworthy (and difficult to accept). He cites the following from Shemot Rabbah 41:6:
Another explanation of And He gave unto Moses (Ex. 31:18). R. Abbahu said: All the forty days that Moses was on high, he kept on forgetting the Torah he learned. He then said: “Lord of the Universe, I have spent forty days, yet I know nothing,” What did God do? At the end of the forty days, He gave him the Torah as a gift, for it says, And He gave unto Moses. Could then Moses have learned the whole Torah? Of the Torah it says: The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea (Job 9:9): could then Moses have learned it all in forty days? No, but it was the principles (kelalim) thereof which God taught Moses.
R. Elyashiv believes that the entire text just cited was stated by R. Abbahu, but it appears to me that the words beginning “Could then Moses have learned” were not said by R. Abbahu. Be that as it may, R. Elyashiv has a difficulty with the midrashic statement, which he attributes to R. Abbahu, that Moses was only taught the principles of the Torah, as this contradicts other aggadic statements that Moses was taught all the details as well. He therefore concludes that R. Abbahu did not really believe what he said, but his statement was only directed towards the heretics, whom he would sometimes dispute (see Avodah Zarah4a).
I find this quite difficult, since if his statement was directed towards the heretics, why does it appear in the Midrash without any such indication. This is quite apart from what many will regard as a more fundamental difficulty, namely, the assertion that a sage’s words in a classic rabbinic text are to be understood as a false statement designed to merely “shut up” the heretics. Here is what R. Elyashiv writes:
אך העיקר נראה לי כי ר’ אבהו לא אמר זה אלא כנגד המינין כי הוא היה רגיל להתווכח עם המינין. וכמ”ש בעבו”ז דף ד’ ע”א. וכדי שלא ליתן פתחון פה למינים להעיז נגד קבלת חז”ל אמר כמה דברים גם מה שהוא נגד דעתו, ע”ד שאמרו חולין כ”ז ב’ לאויבי דחיתי בקש. וע”ד ששינוי [!] הע”ב זקנים כמה דברים בתורה בהעתקתם לתלמי המלך כמ”ש במגילה ט’ ע”א . . . וכן הוא בענינינו כי מה שאמר ר’ אבהו בשמו”ר פ’ מ”א סי’ ו’ הנז’ שלא למדה משה רק כללים לא אמר זה אלא כנגד המינים וכדי לסכור את פיהם אבל הוא עצמו ודאי סובר ככל המאמרים הנז’ שלמד הקב”ה למשה כל דקדוקי תורה ודקדוקי סופרים
In Changing the Immutable, ch. 8, I discuss some who make the same claim as R. Elyashiv regarding other texts. Recently, I found that R. Judah Leib Landesberg also makes this point. In his Hikrei Lev (Satmar, 1905), vol. 1, p. 57, he discusses R. Judah’s statement in Sanhedrin 92b that Ezekiel’s vision of the Dry Bones coming to life was not something that happened in reality, but was only a parable (mashal). R. Landesberg cannot accept that R. Judah really meant this. He assumes that the point of his statement was polemical, and directed against the early Christians who spoke about the resurrection of Jesus and were strengthened in their false belief by the story of the resurrection of the Dry Bones.
מפני הוראת שעה ופריצת הדור החדש אשר על יסוד זה חפץ לבנות בנין שקר וכזב, מותר לומר שכל התחיה בימי יחזקאל היה “רק משל”, למען לא תתגבר ותתחזק האמונה הבדויה, שחנוך והתלוי קמו חיים ועלו השמים
On p. 66, he adopts the same approach regarding R. Hillel’s statement in Sanhedrin 99a: “There shall be no Messiah for Israel, because they have already enjoyed him in the days of Hezekiah.” As R. Landesberg sees it, R. Hillel did not believe what he said, but his statement was directed against those Jews who were being influenced by the followers of Jesus who claimed that the Messiah had arrived. R. Hillel was telling these people that Jesus could not be the Messiah, as there will be no Messiah since the prophecies were already fulfilled in the days of Hezekiah. According to R. Landesberg, R. Hillel’s false statement was justified as a “hora’at sha’ah”, an emergency measure to save Jewish souls from going astray. He also identifies R. Hillel with the Nasi Hillel II, and suggests that the Roman government required him to make the statement that there would be no Messiah.
ולא לבד העכו”ם גם רבים מהיהודים מתנצרים וטענותם והתנצלותם הי’ “כי משיח כבר בא” ע”כ היה הנשיא הילל מוכרח במעשה מטעם הממשלה, ומפני “הוראת שעה” לפרסם בישראל שלא יאמינו ברע ולא יבטחו בו ובשלוחיו, וחלילה להאמין כי הוא המשיח המקוה לישראל ע”כ גזר ואמר “אין משיח לישראל”! ונבואת ישעי’ כבר נתמלאה בימי חזקיה
[20] See R. Herschel Schachter, Divrei ha-Rav, p. 184, in the name of R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik, that the practice developed of calling this work the Shelah ha-Kadosh rather than its actual title, Shenei Luhot ha-Berit, because people thought that Shenei Luhot ha-Berit as a title was a bit “over the top”. [21] See Eliezer Zweifel in Ha-Karmel, March 13, 1866, p. 249. [22] P. 178b in the first printing. In more recent printings see section Masekhet Pesahim, no. 524. [23] First printing, p. 348b, in more recent printings see section Bamidbar, no. 27; first printing, p. 409b, in more recent printings see section Torah she-Be’al Peh, no. 384. [24] See the discussion of the Rebbe’s words by Aharon Meir Felder in Tamim be-Hukekha (Brooklyn, 2008), pp. 26ff. [25] Regarding Eisenstein, see Robert L. Samuels, “The Life and Work of Judah David Eisenstein as Reflected Primarily in His Memoirs” (unpublished masters dissertation, Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, 1960), available here.
R. Binyamin Lau, Mi-Maran ad Maran (Tel Aviv, 2005), pp. 137ff., discusses R. Ovadiah Yosef’s attitude towards Eisenstein’s Hebrew encyclopedia, Otzar Yisrael. He first notes that in a responsum about the permissibility of using the secular calendar, R. Ovadiah citesOtzar Yisraelas a source that the secular year is not to be traced to Jesus’ birth, since he was actually born before the beginning of the Common Era. See Yabia Omer, vol. 3, Yoreh Deah, no. 9. R. Lau notes that R. Ovadiah is not consistent in how he relates to this encyclopedia. In R. Ovadiah’s responsum dealing with the halakhic status of the Ethiopian Jews, he refers to R. Eliezer Waldenberg’s reliance on Otzar Yisrael to demonstrate that they are not descended from Jews, and harshly attacks R. Waldenberg for relying on this work “which contains some matters of heresy.” Yabia Omer, vol. 8, Even ha-Ezer, no. 11:3.
R. Lau is content to note the inconsistency without probing further if perhaps this can be explained as R. Ovadiah delegitimizingOtzar Yisraelbecause it stood in opposition to his halakhic conclusion that the Ethiopians are Jewish. It appears likely that the delegitimization was ad hoc polemical rather than substantive, and thus able to be used when R. Ovadiah felt warranted. For another negative comment about Otzar Yisrael, see Yalkut Yosef, Orah Hayyim 131, p. 415.
In 1993, R. Hayyim Kanievsky’s notes to Eisenstein’sOtzar Midrashim were published. I received a copy of the pamphlet from David Farkas, who informs me that it was included with the recent reprint of Otzar Midrashim, obviously in order to make the book more “kosher”. It is interesting to examine what R. Kanievsky states should be deleted from Otzar Midrashim, as it is not merely references to academic scholars but also phrases that most will see as quite innocuous. Even Eisenstein’s comment that some scholars regard Eldad ha-Dani as a charlatan is to be deleted (R. Kanievsky’s note to p. 19), perhaps because this would reflect poorly on the rabbis who were taken in by him. (Shimon Steinmetz suggests that the reason is actually the reverse, that including this information would reflect poorly on those who were skeptical of Eldad.)
R. Kanievsky also says to delete any references to non-Jewish influence on these so-called Midrashim. To give one example, Eisenstein, p. 251, writes as follows about the medieval Midrash known as Sefer ha-Yashar:
כנראה נתחבר ספר הישר במאה התשיעית או העשירית בזמן הגאונים.. המקורים שמהם שאב המחבר הם מדרשות חז”ל ספר יוסיפון, והגדות הערביים I don’t .והגדות הערביים R. Kanievsky says to delete the words understand why R. Kanievsky feels this way. I could just as easily imagine a great Torah scholar going through Eisenstein’s book and showing the problems with many of these Midrashim, precisely because of the questionable material in them, which would explain why they were never “accepted”. Even with regard to Sefer Zerubavel (Otzar Midrashim, pp. 158ff.), which is a seventh-century apocalypse that has no religious authority in traditional Judaism and is full of strange passages, R. Kanievsky objects to Eisenstein’s historical comments. Again, I don’t see why R. Kanievsky sees this as a religious imperative when dealing with such a work as Sefer Zerubavel, and am frankly surprised that he did not recommend deleting this entire “Midrash,” as he did with other “Midrashim” included by Eisenstein that he did not regard as authentic (see his notes to pp. 371, 372, and see also his notes to pp. 35, 400, where he expresses doubt that these “Midrashim” are from the Sages). Regarding Sefer Zerubavel, see David Berger,Cultures in Collision and Conversation(Boston, 2011), pp. 268ff.
Also of interest is the following passage fromOtzar Midrashim, p. 583, about Midrash Tanhuma. I have underlined the word that R. Kanievsky said to remove:
אמנם הוא [ר’ תנחומא] לא מחבר המדרש הזה ולא מסדרו, רק הבאים. אחריו קבצו רוב דרשותיו וספחו אליהם דרשות מבעלי אגדה זולתו, וקראוהו על שמו מפני שהיה דרשן מצוין בזמנו
I do not know why R. Kanievsky was bothered by Eisenstein declaring that R. Tanhuma was a great darshan. Is it because this might imply that other sages were not such great darshanim? But how is this any different than saying, for example, that R. Akiva was a great Torah scholar, a statement that no one would object to?
Finally, R. Kanievsky (notes to p. 214) appears to be defending the so-called letter of R. Yohanan Ben Zakai. This is an obvious forgery, and according to Moshe Hillel was written in Poland in the eighteenth century. See Hillel, Megilot Cochin (Jerusalem, 2018), pp. 259ff. See also pp. 190ff., where Hillel discusses other scholars’ views about the matter [26] Regarding the Rambam and Rabad, there is a very strange passage in R. Isaac of Komarno, Shulhan ha-Tahor, 167:3. I shudder to think what a Lithuanian rosh yeshiva would say if you mentioned to him the explanation offered for Rabad’s words.
אבל המצוה שיהיה מלח על השולחן ובפרט מי שהוא משורש קין יזהר מאד, מרן האר”י, ובזה תבין דברי הרמב”ם [הל’ חמץ ומצה ח, לח] שפסק לאכול מצה בחרוסת, הוא הטעם כיון שיש לפניו דבר שהוא משובח מן המלח מחוייב לאכול פרוסת הבציעה בדבר שמשובח כיון שעומד לפניו הכרח שיטבול בו את הבציעה המצה כי חרוסת שלהם הי’ מפירות יקרים הרבה מוטעם ביותר וכתב עליו הראב”ד זה הבל ותמהו עליו למה לו לההביל את הדבר שהוא מוזכר אצל הגאונים הראשונים עיין שם, אבל באמת כוונת רבינו רוח הקודש שלו הי’ זה הבל מי ששורשו הבל א”צ למלח ודי בלפתן אבל מי שהוא משורש קין בהכרח שיטבל במלח ולא בחרוסת והוא ענין נפלא
R. Nahum Abraham writes that it is forbidden to print this explanation, as it is so bizarre. See Darkhei ha-Ma’amarim, p. 13 (first pagination). [27] Imrei Noam (Brooklyn, 2003), vol. 1, p. 225 (to Ex. 4:8-9). See Mendel Piekarz, Ha-Hanhagah ha-Hasidit (Jerusalem, 1999), p. 37. [28] See here.