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For Reference LAS L-79-84 Current concern regarding nuclear-weapon proliferation has re-emphasized the interest in ~ November 1979 detecting nuclear tests conducted anywhere in the world. Such tests could be conducted un- derground or in the atmosphere. One means of detecting atmospheric nuclear explosions utilizes a “bhangmeter,” an optical sensor developed dur- ing the years of US atmospheric nuclear tests. It detects and records the extremely bright and characteristic flash of light from an atmospheric explosion. The high intensity of the light flash makes this a sensitive technique, and the dis- tinctive signature of the light signal reduces the likelihood of errors in identifying the detected signal as a nuclear event. In addition, timing infor- Light Flash Produced mation in the light signature can be used to infer the energy released by the nuclear explosion, i.e., by an the yield. This review describes the light flash that would Atmospheric be detected by a bhangmeter from an atmospheric nuclear explosion and the method by which the Nuclear Explosion yield of the explosion is obtained. It presents the physical processes that produce the light flash and determine its characteristics, and incorporates an analysis showing that naturally occurring signals would not be mistaken for that of a nuclear explosion. Guy E. Barasch CHARACTERISTIC SIGNATURE Figure 1 shows the light-flash signature of a 19- kiloton atmospheric nuclear test conducted in — - — For Reference . Nevada on May 1, 1952. The two distinct light peaks, with a dimmer but still luminous minimum between them, are characteristic of the optical signature of all atmospheric nuclear explosions below about 30 km altitude. A nonlinear (logarithmic) time scale is used to display this curve so that details can be shown of the very fast first-peak and minimum-signal regions. LOS ALAMOS SCIENTIFIC LABORATORY Post Office Box 1663 Los Alamos, New Mex!co 87545 505/667.5061 A. A!fwmat,w, A.t,on/Ewal OCW,W.,W EmDIwer UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACT W.74Q5.ENG, 36 p ,d’,~ Is Permission to reproduce this article is granted. I TIME Fig. 1 The total pulse length exceeded one second. pressure are reached. A firebaii is created that The time of the first peak in this signature occurred grows very rapidiy. H soon becomes so iarge, with at about 300 IJS(this is called first-maximum time); so much air enguifed in it, that subsequent growth the minimum signal occurred at 12 ms (minimum and light emissions do not depend significantly on time); and the second peak occurred at about 130 any source characteristic except yield. Because of ms (second-maximum time). Note that although this, the characteristic shape of the light signai is the two peaks appear to be very similar, this ap- very simiiar for aii nuciear events. This similarity parent similarity is due to the distortion caused by has ailowed the discussion of a generic nuciear- the logarithmic time scale. Actually, the second explosion signature without regard to detaiis of the peak lasted about 100 times longer than the first source, and aiiows the foliowing source- peak and contained about 99V0 of the total radiated independent discussion of the physical processes energy, which was about one-fourth of the yield. that produce the characteristic double-peaked For yields different from 19 kilotons, the light light pulse. curve shape is very similar to that in Fig. 1, but the times at which first maximum, minimum, and second maximum occur are different. The FIREBALL PHYSICS minimum and second-maximum times are directiy reiated to yieid; therefore, measurements of these Within the first microsecond after detonation, times can be used to infer yieid. Approximate scal- the entire nuciear yieid is deposited in the bomb ing iaws that reiate yieid to time-to-minimum and, materials, heating them to extremely high tem- iess accurately, time-to-second-maximum, are peratures in the range of 107 K (degrees Kelvin). given in Fig. 2. Some of this energy is immediately radiated away in the form of x rays and extreme ultraviolet radia- tion, but this radiation is immediately reabsorbed ‘os~ in the air within the first few meters surrounding the device. The air is thereby heated to a very high temperature, in the range of 106 K, with a corresponding increase in pressure to severai thousand atmospheres. This heated air and the hot bomb vapors (debris) in the interior constitute the initial fireball. The firebaii subsequently expands through a combination of radiative and hydrodynamic processes. An intense shock wave (thin region of highiy compressed air) is formed at the surface, which expands outward at a high veiocity. inside the shock, the energy is rapidiy redistributed through emission and reabsorption ,.s,, lMt 1( of ultraviolet radiation. YIELD, Y The time variation of iight emission during the first puise in Fig. 1 is controlled by the radial Fig. 2 growth of the shock. Although the shock surface is The independence of the light-signature puise intenseiy luminous, the shock is opaque to visibie shape from yieid is due to the fact that the iight, thus concealing the air and bomb debris in its processes producing the iight do not depend on interior. As the shock expands, it engulfs cold air, the construction of the, nuclear device. in an at- causing its temperature to decrease, with a mospheric nuciear expiosion, a huge quantity of corresponding decrease in brightness. The optical energy is reieased into the atmosphere sur- energy emission rate (power) is proportional to the rounding the device. The energy is reieased so firebaii brightness times the area of its surface. Af- nearly instantaneousiy, and into such a smaii ter detonation, the opticai power first increases, voiume, that extremes of temperature and because the increase in surface area outweighs the decrease in brightness. Later, it decreases, loss of energy by radiation. This cooling eventually because the decrease in brightness is dominant. results in the decrease in luminosity following the During the early expansion and cooling of the second maximum in Fig. 1. After the second max- fireball, the ultraviolet radiation in the interior imum, the inner fireball gradually becomes decreases rapid Iy until it cannot effectively transparent, revealing the bomb debris inside, redistribute the energy. Thereafter the shock tem- whose brightness also decreases with time. perature falls more rapidly than the temperature in The majority of the total energy radiated by the I the interior. As the expansion proceeds, the shock fireball comes from the second peak, which is not continues to cool, and as it does so, it becomes very different in its instantaneous brightness, less and less opaque to visible light, while also relative to the first peak, but it lasts about 100 times becoming less luminous. A point is reached, longer. By the time this “thermal pulse” is over, the I corresponding to the minimum optical power available energy has either been radiated away, region in Fig. 1, where the shock becomes suf- trapped in the debris and entrained air of the ficiently transparent to allow light from the hotter fireball, or it is propagating in the shock wave, interior to begin to escape, causing the optical out- which is now well outside the visible fireball. put to begin increasing. Further growth of the To illustrate the physical processes described shock results in increasing transparency and a above, Fig. 3 shows three fireball photographs further increase of the luminosity of the inner from the 19-kiloton nuclear test of Fig. 1. All three region. photographs are reproduced at about the same As the expansion continues further, the tem- linear scale, showing graphically the growth of the perature of the inner fireball decreases, due to the fireball from first maximum (a) through minimum I combined effects of hydrodynamic expansion and (b) to second maximum (c). .— .. ... ... ... : —.-. — ~.-.-.—— ..-. I -- . —. -.—— -.-——. i _:,... I 1 , 1 . ..— — Fig. 3 Figure 3(a) corresponds to a time of 405 PSafter bolts,” which emit 109 joules of visible-light energy detonation and shows the highly radiant shock in a single short-lived intense stroke. The closest front at about its maximum intensity. The fireball lightning simulation to the timing and intensity diameter at this time was 50 m. characteristics would require an ordinary stroke Figure 3(b) shows the dim 200-m fireball at followed by a long-lived “super-bolt” stroke, minimum time. The radiation from the shock sur- producing 10’ joules of visible light in -100 ms. face was weak, and the shock was beginning to This assumption is conservative because although transmit light from the hot inner region. The bright long-lived ordinary strokes have been observed, spots, known historically as “measles,” are long-lived super strokes have not. The postulated speculated to be small, hot vortices of air or bomb lightning signal would have a peak radiated power debris just behind the shock front. of approximately 10’0 watts, which is about 400 Figure 3(c) shows the fireball just prior to times smaller than that of a one-kiloton explosion. second maximum, at which time the shock was To achieve the pulse shape and peak-radiated transparent and the inner fireball was radiating power simulating a one-kiloton nuclear explosion, strongly. The diameter was 355 m. The smoke lightning would have to be both 400 times more trails visible alongside the fireball were from energetic and 100 times longer in duration than rockets launched to probe the fireball and the sur- ever observed for the super bolts. rounding air. Thus, because the nuclear signature is orders of magnitude more energetic than any other terrestrial phenomenon that might simulate it, the UNIQUENESS light signature of an atmospheric nuclear event is unmistakable.
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