Devolution and party organizational strategies: The special relationships between state wide parties (SWP) and non state wide parties (NSWP) in Spain
Tània Verge, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain) ([email protected])
Oscar Barberà, Universitat de València (València, Spain) ([email protected])
ABSTRACT The aim of this article is to develop an analytical framework to examine and, eventually, classify the special relationships between the State-Wide Parties (SWP) and the Non State-Wide Parties (NSWP). Special relationships are established when parties agree to co-operate not only in the electoral arena but also in organisational aspects. This analytical framework, based on the concepts of vertical integration and autonomy, is applied to the Spanish case in order to understand the relationships of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) with the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC); the Partido Popular (PP) with the Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN); and the Izquierda Unida (IU) with Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV).
KEY WORDS POLITICAL PARTIES – DEVOLUTION – VERTICAL INTEGRATION – SWP – NSWP – SPAIN
– Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, 10-12 September 2009, Postdam – Introduction1
The study of political parties has moved in new directions as a result of the political decentralisation experienced in several European states. Sub-state elections have regionalised the tactics and organisation of state-wide parties (SWPs) (Pallarés and Keating, 2003; Brancati, 2008). Multi-level contexts create a complex arena of incentives and interactions in the fight for resources, leadership and autonomy in the relations between parties’ central and regional levels (Deschower, 2003; van Houten, 2009). Wherever political competition is more regionalised, and where SWPs compete with non-state-wide parties (NSWPs)2, incentives to decentralise strategies and programmes increase sharply (Downs, 1998; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004; Hopkin and Bradbury, 2006). The adoption of a regional perspective may also entail looser organic links between the state and sub-state levels3 (Thorlakson, 2005; Biezen and Hopkin, 2006). SWPs occasionally decide to reach agreements with NSWPs that have strong roots in regions where the SWP is weak. Little consideration has been given to the special relations between the SWPs and NSWPs which agree on a stable framework for co-operation at an organisational as well as an electoral level. However, examples can be found in Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain (Carl-Sime, 1979; Thorburn, 1991; Renzsch, 2001; Roller and van Houten, 2003). There is no unanimous position vis-à vis their attributes. First, if the two parties share a stable structure for the purposes of electoral and organisational co-operation, does this make them the same party? And if they are the same party, then what type of party are they? This uncertainty is especially relevant in terms of how the status of the NSWP is affected by its relations with the SWP, and how these relations differ from the SWP’s relations with its other sub-state units. Although some authors have suggested that they are in fact state-wide parties competing in a regional party system (Roller and van Houten, 2003), the NSWP’s legal status, and the fact that it has a number of privileges that the SWP’s other sub-state units do not, means that it is hard to agree that they are the same party unreservedly (Verge, 2009). In many regions, these special relationships have enabled the parties involved to become the government. Although the best-known example is the agreement between the CDU and the CSU in Germany, in Spain these agreements have affected all the
2 state-wide parties and included all ideological families, and unlike in Germany or United Kingdom, they have been reached in more than one region. The Spanish case is therefore the ideal context for studying this type of relationship. The aim of this article is to analyse the form and definition of the special relations between SWPs and NSWPs in Spain today, and improve understanding thereof. The relations discussed are those between the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party/ Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) and the Party of the Catalan Socialists/Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC); the People’s Party/Partido Popular (PP) and the Navarrese People’s Union/Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN); and United Left/Izquierda Unida (IU) with Initiative for Catalonia Greens/Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV). The period analysed herein differs for each group of parties, depending on the period in which the relationships remained ongoing: since 1978 for the PSOE and the PSC, 1987-1997 for IU and ICV and finally, 1991-2008 for the PP and the UPN. The article is organised as follows. The first section establishes an analytical framework defining the characteristics of this type of co-operation. The second section focuses on how the relations in each of the cases under consideration have evolved. The third examines the distinctive features of each relationship. The fourth places the cases within a continuum of vertical integration, based on analysis of the various dimensions and developments in the special relations. The final section concludes.
I. The special relations between SWPs and NSWPs: A framework for analysis
Duverger pioneered the distinction between the various forms adopted by a party organisation: centralisation, articulation and horizontal and vertical linkages (Duverger, 1957: 40 and foll.). These concepts were subsequently refined for empirical measurement by Janda (1980: 95), who added autonomy as a factor defining relations with external organisations. This has three dimensions: (i) organisational policy; (ii) definition of ideology and programme, the design of electoral strategies and the application of public policies; (iii) and finally, alliance policy. Duverger and Janda were mainly concerned with centralised political systems. When considering the complexity of multi-level systems, Smiley (1987) suggested the concept of vertical integration in order to establish the interdependent nature of the links (formal and informal) between the state and sub-state levels of a political party.
3 Thorlakson (2001) subsequently suggested a continuum of vertical integration that defines several types of parties (see Figure 1). When there is no distinction between the state and sub-state level, the party is unitary. The diametrically opposite category is a truncated party, which has no counterpart at either level of government. Several possibilities lie between these two extremes. In integrated parties, there is a very high level of vertical integration, while in federal parties it is much lower. Finally, in split parties, links and co-operation are almost non-existent4.
Figure 1. Vertical integration continuum
State-wide level
Truncated Federal Unitary Bifurcated Integrated Non-state wide level
Source: Thorlakson (2001: 7).
When studying SWP-NSWP relations, we will combine both analytical traditions, taking vertical integration and the autonomy of the NSWP into account (Thorlakson, 2009). Both aspects will be examined in the three main dimensions suggested by Janda (see Figure 2). As regards organisational policy, the areas analysed are: (in)dependence of finances; common or separate membership (recruitment, lists, etc.), the NSWP’s autonomy to select its leader and candidates; organic and institutional co-ordination mechanisms (formal and informal), and the presence of regional representatives on the SWP’s bodies5. In terms of the definition of ideology and programmes, the factors examined are the NSWP’s autonomy when designing platforms, campaigns and public policies, as well as the co-ordination between the two parties. Finally, as regards alliances, we will first consider the autonomy of the NSWP when selecting the parties with which it forms a coalition, and second, congruence in the so-called “multi-level alliances” (Ṩtefuriuc, 2009). Finally, the specific episodes in which the NSWP’s autonomy is at stake
4 provide an excellent opportunity for assessing its real level of autonomy (Houten, 2009: 149). Figure 2. Aspects of special SWP-NSWP relations Interrelations SWP Autonomy
Finances Finances
Membership Membership Organisational Organis. coord. policy Selection of leader
Institutional coord. Candidate selection
Programme coord. Programme def.
Ideology & program- Campaign coord. me definition Campaign def.
Policy coord. Policy def.
Multinivel alliances Alliance Alliances choice choice
II. Changes in SWP-NSWP special relations in Spain
In order to analyse the relations between the IU (United Left) and the ICV (Initiative for Catalonia Greens), it is necessary to take a retrospective look at the relations between another SWP and an NSWP: the PCE (the Spanish Communist Party) and the PSUC (the Unified Socialist Party of Catalonia). These began in 1936, when the PCE ceased to have a regional federation in Catalonia. The PSUC became the PCE’s sister party after the PCE’s Catalan branch merged with other socialist and communist parties. However, during the early post-war years, the PSUC was absorbed by the PCE. It was not until the 1960s that it began to recover its autonomy, which it consolidated in the 1980s (see Figure 3). IU was established in 1986 as a coalition of left-wing parties in the wake of a heavy electoral defeat, with the PCE clearly playing a leading role (Ramiro-Fernández, 2004). In Catalonia, the PSUC also created a political party in 1987 – ICV – but this gradually became a dormant structure within the new organisation (Rius, 2005). As the PCE and the PSUC maintained their historical relations, IU and ICV also established special relations. However, serious disagreements arose in the mid-1990s over the
5 political strategy of the IU and ICV, which led to a breakdown in relations in 1997. At that point, a critical faction broke away from ICV, and with other parties it founded United and Alternative Left/Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (EUiA) as IU’s new sister party in Catalonia. In 2000, changes in the leaderships of IU, EUiA and ICV brought about a new period in relations, which enabled an electoral alliance between ICV and EUiA in Catalonia from 2003 onwards. Since 2004 the ICV and the IU have sat in the same parliamentary group in the national lower house. As it does not involve organisational links, this phase will not be analysed6.
Figure 3. Changes in the relations between IU and ICV Sub-State level State level
1936-1986 PSUC PCE
PSUC PCE 1986-1997
ICV IU
PSUC-viu PCE 1998-2003
EUiA IU
ICV
PSUC-viu PCE 2003-2008
EUiA IU
ICV
Party Main party Elect. coalition Organ. arrangements Elect. pact
The co-operation between the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) and the Catalan socialist parties dates back to the Pact of April (1977), under the terms of which the Catalan Socialist Federation of the PSOE (FSC-PSOE) and the Socialist Party of Catalonia–Congress (PSC-C) agreed on a joint candidature and announced a constituent process which would establish a unified party. Electoral success in 1977 led to the inclusion of the Socialist of Party of Catalonia–Regrouping (PSC-R). In July 1978, the constituent assembly of the Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC-PSOE) approved its first statutes and a Protocol of Unity which defined its relationship with the PSOE (Colomé,
6 1989). Since then, relations between the two parties have not changed significantly in formal terms (see Figure 4). Figure 4. Changes in the relations between the PSOE and the PSC Sub-State level State level
PSC-C PSOE 1977 F.C. PSOE
PSOE 1978-2008 PSC-PSOE
Party Main party Elect. coalition Organ. arrangements Elect. pact
It took some years of conflict and agreements before co-operation between the PP (People’s Party) and the Navarrese regionalists was placed on a formal level. The first electoral agreement between Alianza Popular (PP’s predecessor) and the UPN (Navarrese People’s Union) was reached in 1979. Between 1982 and 1989, the two parties agreed on various coalitions for the general elections, after which the UPN joined the PP’s parliamentary group in both the Congress (lower house) and the Senate (upper house). However, the two parties stood separately in the Navarrese regional elections (Barberà, 2009). This situation changed in 1991, when the PP’s regional branch in Navarre decided to join the UPN in exchange for the latter becoming part of the PP’s parliamentary group in the Congress. Between 1991 and 2008, the UPN stood alone at regional elections, and reached electoral agreements with the PP for every general election. Political disagreements led to a breakdown in relations in 2008, and to the re-establishment of the PP in Navarre (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Changes in the relations between the PP and the UPN
State-level Sub-state level
UPN PP 1982-1990 PPN
1991-2008 UPN PP
UPN 2008- PPN PP
Party Main party Elect. coalition Organ. arrangements Elect. pact
7 III. Integrated or separated entities? Characteristics of special relations
This section analyses special relations in terms of organisational policy, definition of ideology and programme, and alliances policy. Party statutes and resolutions approved in party conferences have been complemented by secondary sources and interviews with key figures in the party concerned7.
IU-ICV
Organisational policy The links between the IU and the ICV have been weaker than those between the PCE and PSUC since their outset. The relaunch of the two parties made it easier for the ICV to seek an ex novo definition of the relationship. The ICV increased its autonomy to the extent that it became completely independent. While the PSUC participated (with full voting rights) in PCE conferences on the same footing as the other regional branches of the PCE, and was represented on the PCE executive committee – and therefore bound by the decisions it adopted – ICV members at IU bodies had no voting rights, and their attendance was sporadic. Meanwhile, whereas the PCE’s formal status was that of a guest on the PSUC bodies, the ICV informally accepted the presence of IU members at meetings of its bodies, who in fact practically never attended (Political report, 4th ICV Assembly, 1996, page 29). No formal co-ordination mechanisms for policies and strategies were ever implemented, despite the IU being responsible for defining these (IU Federal Statutes, 1992). Meanwhile, the only mention of IU in the ICV regulations was in the reference to relations with other SWPs, with which co-operation had to be on a federal basis (Protocol of organisation, 1990, section 9). At an informal level, there was a liaison committee containing members of both leaderships and meetings between the two executives were held from time to time. The ICV had full autonomy when selecting its leader and candidates. Furthermore, the federal parliamentary group respected the sovereignty of its members, and distributed the public subsidy between both parties according to their seats.
8 A protocol was agreed upon in early 1991, which despite being approved by the respective executive committees was never ratified because the IU leadership rejected the consolidation of ICV’s autonomy and the two parties’ equal status (Rius, 2005: 44). In the mid-1990s, profound disagreements forced the parties to attempt to redefine their co-ordination. Some measures were proposed, but the differences in platform and alliances policy prevented the consolidation of this co-operation (IU, first temporary provision, Statutes of the IV Assembly, and ICV, Policy report, IV Assembly, 1996, page 31). The only (informal) co-ordination mechanism was established in 1993, when Rafael Ribó, ICV’s president and a deputy in the Spanish Congress, became deputy spokesperson and vice-president of the parliamentary group in order to seek greater agreement in political action. The lack of communication and co-ordination mechanisms outside the lower house hastened the breakdown in relations, as the majorities in both organisations started to see the internal minority groups as an intrusion by the other party (Botella, 2003: 62). The crisis between the IU and the ICV also put an end to the historical relations between the PSUC and the PCE. This breakdown took place in July 1997, when the PCE Federal Committee was attended by representatives of the critical sector within the PSUC, who demanded the reactivation of the PSUC within the ICV. The minority group’s presence led to unease among the PSUC’s dominant coalition (which overlapped with that of the ICV), and it ceased sending representatives to PCE meetings and suspended relations in protest. The PCE then attacked ICV’s ideological inconsistency, and accused it of acting as a “mole” for the PSOE. The PCE also had misgivings about the different positions of the PCE within the IU (the main actor) and that of the PSUC within the ICV (an inactive structure). The inability of the IU to affect the positions of the ICV finally led to the split (Martínez-Simancas and Anguita, 2006: 159).
Programme definition In its first party statutes, the ICV declared its sovereignty as regards the production of its ideology and platform (Protocol of organisation, preamble 1.1, 1990). However, the ICV was able to participate occasionally in the definition of IU’s policy through its presence in its sister party bodies8. The ICV added pacifist, feminist and environmentalist stances to the communist and nationalist profile of the founding parties (Botella, 2003: 62), thus becoming a post-
9 Communist eco-socialist organisation (Rius, 2005: 29). However, the IU continued to advocate policies that were very similar to those of the PCE. In state-wide policies, the ICV was more pragmatic than the IU during the 1990s. This became apparent in issues such as the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), which the three Catalan deputies voted in favour of and IU rejected, and the labour reform agreed between the PSOE and the major trade unions, which the IU also opposed (Dunphy, 2004).
Alliance policy Incongruent multi-level alliances arose early in the relationship. According to Botella (2003: 62), the ICV encouraged the growth of left-wing parties in all the Spanish regions during the 1980s in order to subsequently form a federation. For example, in 1988, instead of supporting the Basque IU regional branch, the ICV backed the campaign by a left-wing nationalist party (Euzkadiko Eskerra). Meanwhile, it established alliances with green parties in order to occupy a new electoral niche. However, the alliance which led to the most serious disagreement was that with the PSOE. IU’s strategy in the 1980s and 1990s was based on refusing all co-operation with the PSOE (Ramiro-Fernández, 2004: 15). Ribó sought a rapprochement with other left-wing parties, which was already under way in other European countries (Ribó, 1999: 84). Agreements with the PSC, PSOE’s special partner in Catalonia, at local level increased, and included a pre-electoral agreement for the regional elections of 1999, and an agreement with the PSC and a left-wing nationalist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya/Republican Lef of Catalonia (ERC) for the Senate in 2000. In 1997, when the Galician regional branch of IU reached an electoral agreement with the Socialists and Greens, the IU leadership created a new federation in the region. It also dissolved the leaderships of two other regional branches and purged the critical sectors throughout the region (Paniagua and Ramiro-Fernández, 2003). The ICV strongly opposed this decision, and helped the Galician federation in its electoral campaign. The IU then expelled the two ICV MPs from the joint parliamentary group.
PSOE–PSC
Organisational policy The relationship between the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) and the PSC (Party of the Catalan Socialists) has been notable for its ambiguity. In legal terms,
10 the PSC is completely independent of the PSOE. It is registered in the Political Parties Register as an autonomous party, and organises its conferences on a sovereign basis. The Spanish Central Electoral Board has ruled that the two parties have an independent legal status in terms of public financing and assignment of party political broadcasts on several occasions (1986, 2006 and 2008). This independence and special status compared to the other PSOE regional parties is also recognised by the PSOE statutes. The financing of the two parties is completely separate too, and acknowledged as such by the Court of Audit, which has been officially inspecting their accounts separately since 1986. As an independent party, the PSC does not have to make any contribution to the federal bodies of the PSOE, and the PSC has its own membership list. The separate nature of the parties does not mean that they have no connections. First, under the terms of the Protocol of Unity, PSC members who move outside Catalonia must seek admission to the corresponding PSOE regional party, and vice versa. Second, the number of PSC’s representatives at PSOE conferences is proportional to the membership of the NSWP. As regards participation by members of the PSC on the PSOE executive boards, the PSC National Council selects its delegates to the PSOE Federal Committee and its candidates for the PSOE Federal Executive Committee are presented or endorsed by the PSC delegates at the PSOE conference (art. 4, 1978 Protocol of Unity; art. 24, PSC Statutes 2008). The PSC general secretary (like the other regional PSOE general secretaries) is an ex officio member of the Federal Committee (art. 34, PSOE Statutes 2008). Furthermore, the PSC members on the PSOE Federal Executive Committee and Federal Committee are ex officio members of the PSC Executive Committee (art. 11.1, PSC Statutes, 2008). However, the PSOE is not formally represented on the PSC executive bodies – not even as a guest. Institutional co-ordination has been one of the main sources of tension. A particularly important issue was the suppression of the PSC parliamentary group which had existed since 1977 in the national lower house, as a result of a change in the lower house regulations passed in 1982. Nonetheless, despite the existence of separate groups, the Protocol of Unity imposed a common voting discipline. Since then, there have been sporadic demands by the PSC for its own parliamentary group, although voting discipline has never broken down (Colomé, 2003). The PSC representatives among the leadership of the Socialist parliamentary group usually have significant influence in
11 each legislature. The PSC currently holds 40 percent of the posts on this body. This body discusses the proposals presented by both groups, and comes to a joint position showing the group’s unity during floor voting. The PSC has almost always had a representative on the Mesa del Congreso (the Congressional Committee). In the Senate, the electoral agreement with ERC and the ICV since 2000 has enabled the creation of a parliamentary group which operates independently of the Socialist group. Despite the fact that meetings of the respective executive committees are infrequent, there are several informal co-ordination mechanisms between the two parties. These include frequent telephone calls (especially during election campaigns), joint activities, etc. Furthermore, when the PSOE is the governing party, the offices held by the PSC, and the ministries in particular, are an excellent channel for inter-party relations. The role played by ministers in this mediation process depends on their influence within the national government and within the PSC9. These ministers have included Narcís Serra (a member of the government between 1982 and 1995), former Mayor of Barcelona, and José Montilla, who combined his duties as Ministry of Industry (2004-2006) with his work as PSC First Secretary. Some PSC leaders have also had considerable influence within the PSOE. The most important case was that of Josep Borrell, who was the PSOE candidate for presidency of the government for a short time after the Socialist primaries of 1998 (see Hopkin, 2001). The PSOE initially had some control over the PSC’s candidate lists, but this has declined over time. Despite the fact that the PSC statutes have always recognised that its National Council is the highest decision-making body for approving both candidate lists and party platforms (PSC Statutes, 2008, art. 7), in the 1980s the general secretary and the secretary of organisation presented the lists for the general elections to the PSOE Federal Committee. Although the lists were never amended, the PSOE expected to express its opinion on them, and to approve them informally. Since the 1990s, the candidates’ names have been passed on personally by the PSC general secretary. Today, written notification is sent purely for informative purposes. The PSOE therefore has no influence on the selection of PSC candidates, although the PSC participates in the selection of the PSOE’s general secretary and the candidate for president. There is no record of the PSOE interfering in the PSC’s selection of candidates for regional elections, as the PSC has complete sovereignty in Catalan politics. For European elections, the PSC agrees with the PSOE on the number of candidates it will field and
12 the position on the joint list its members will occupy. The PSOE cannot nominate the PSC’s candidates or change the order in which candidates are listed. International policy was not defined in the Protocol of Unity. Unlike other regional Socialist federations, the PSC has a secretaryship for international relations that establishes relations with socialist parties in Europe, North Africa and Latin America. The PSC is part of the European Socialist Party, although Spain is represented by the PSOE. The SWP is the exclusive representative at the Socialist International, and the PSC is part of the PSOE delegation. Finally, the name of the PSC must be accompanied by that of the PSOE. In 1984, after the suppression of the parliamentary group and the disagreement over the Constitutional Law for Standardisation of the Autonomous Regional Process, the PSC considered removing the PSOE’s initials, but in the end the proposal was rejected (Colomé, 1989: 60-1). However, the PSC statutes stipulate that the organisation’s acronym is PSC, and this has enabled it to exclude the PSOE acronym in much of its electoral advertising since the late 1990s in both regional and general elections.
Programme definition The degree of independence of the NSWPs in defining electoral programmes and campaigns varies according to the type of elections. The PSC has had complete autonomy in regional elections. This autonomy has been retained because the Catalan regional elections are held separately from the other sixteen regional elections in Spain. Throughout much of the 1980s, the PSC and PSOE general election programmes and the design of campaigns were basically the same, with slight differences such as the inclusion of a PSC candidate and the translation of the electoral slogan into Catalan. The PSC has produced its own slogans and advertising since the mid-1990s, although they are complementary to those of the PSOE (Roller and van Houten, 2003: 15). The organisational secretaries of the two parties work closely together during electoral periods. The PSC produces its own electoral programme for general elections, with different priorities in some areas, although there is broad agreement with the PSOE platform, and the PSC participates in the production. In this area, therefore, the PSC has increased its autonomy and scope for independent action. There has been considerable consistency in terms of public policies. The main disagreements arose over the different conceptions of political decentralisation which emerged in 1982, during the debates on the Constitutional Law for Standardisation of
13 the Autonomous Regional Process (or LOAPA). However, these issues failed to create major dissent due to disagreements within the PSC10. Twenty years later, the tension between the more federalist stance of the PSC and the more centralist position of some key PSOE regional parties has led to problems for the PSOE in terms of presenting a consistent position across Spain (Verge, 2010). Disagreements between the two parties once again came to the fore due to the preparation and implementation of the new Catalan statute of autonomy, which was passed in 2006.
Alliance policy The Protocol of Unity and the PSC Statutes recognise the PSC’s independence when establishing alliances (art.7, PSC Statutes, 2008). The reality has been more complex. The large majorities held by the PSOE in Spain and by the nationalist bipartisan federation Convergence and Union (CiU) in Catalonia during the 1980s created no major problems. However, between 1993 and 1996, PSOE’s dependence on CiU to guarantee its majorities in Congress led to a change in the PSC’s policy of opposition in Catalonia. For example, in 1995 the PSC enabled the investiture of the CiU candidate by abstaining in the vote. The situation changed in 2003, when the first PSC-ERC-ICV alliance led to the formation of a tripartite coalition in the regional government, a pact contested but some PSOE leaders but backed by the party Secretary-general and since 2004 Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. After the 2004 general elections, the PSOE governed with parliamentary support from the same parties as the PSC, which led to congruent multi-level alliances (Ṩtefuriuc, 2009). Congruence did not prevent several episodes of tension between the two governments, which finally brought about a change in the PSC candidature. Despite the PSC being completely free to re-establish the Catalan tripartite coalition in 2006, prominent leaders within PSOE demanded a change in the PSC’s alliance policy. There has been no congruence in multi-level alliances since 2007, as the Prime Minister has dispensed with the support of ERC and ICV.
PP–UPN
Organisational policy
14 Relations between the PP and the UPN were governed by the agreement signed in 1991, by the fourth additional provision of the PP Statutes, and by the electoral agreements which were signed for general elections every four years. The 1991 Pact was based on four general principles: the merger of the Navarrese PP within the UPN; the incorporation of the UPN in the PP’s parliamentary group in the national lower house; the complete financial and organisational autonomy11 of the two parties; autonomy of decision-making at the respective territorial levels; and the presence of one candidate from UPN among the first ten names on the PP’s list in European elections (PP-UPN 1991 Pact). Between the 1991 Pact and the UPN conference in 1993 (which ratified it), provisional mechanisms were established to incorporate the Navarrese PP leaders in UPN’s governing bodies. The size of the UPN Executive Committee thus increased by a third, in order to accommodate the leading figures in the Navarrese PP. The same procedure was used in local party sections. The Pact also included the preparation of the lists for the 1991 regional and local elections. Party quotas were also applied when the first UPN government of Navarre was designated (in 1991), with a third of the ministries reserved for former PP members. This initial allocation eventually disappeared, as ex-leaders of the Navarrese PP joined one of two factions fighting for control of the UPN. Since 1993, no reference has been made to the partisan background of UPN members. According to the reports by the Court of Audit, the UPN accounts were totally independent of those of the PP. The PP did not receive any contribution from the UPN and the two parties’ membership lists have always been completely separate. Formal organic co-ordination between the two parties was based on the presence (with no voting rights) of one UPN member on the PP’s National Executive Committee. Furthermore, since 2004 the party has designated a representative to attend the PP's Autonomous Regional Council (Additional 4th Provision, PP Statutes, 2004). The designation of a UPN representative to the PP National Executive Committee was the direct responsibility of its Executive Committee (art. 44.20 of the UPN Statutes, 2005 and art. 4 of the PP-UPN Agreement, 1991). Significantly, the person holding the post between 1991 and 2008 was the UPN deputy and ex-PP leader in Navarre Jaime Ignacio del Burgo. Formal institutional co-ordination basically involved the presence of UPN MPs in the PP parliamentary groups in the Congress and Senate. Parliamentary co-operation
15 between the PP and UPN dated back to some years before the 1991 Pact. Between the 1982 general elections and 1991, both parties’ candidates formed a single list12 (Barberà, 2009). When the Navarrese nationalist coalition Nafarroa Bai (NaBai) (Navarre Yes) obtained representation in the national lower house in 2004, the UPN asked the PP for more autonomy to prevent this party from monopolising the defence of Navarre’s regional interests and started to demand its own parliamentary group, albeit discreetly13. After the 2007 Navarre regional elections, the UPN made the same request, this time publicly, but it met substantial opposition from both the PP and one sector within the very same UPN. Apart from these mechanisms, many of the relationships between the PP and the UPN were based on intense informal co-ordination between the leaders of the two parties, especially the presidents, and took various forms over time, due to the governing roles of the UPN and the PP.
Programme definition The UPN's autonomy in the production of its platform and the design of its campaigns has varied according to the type of elections. In regional elections, the UPN statutes (art. 7 and art. 29.12, UPN Statutes, 2005) and the PP-UPN Pact guaranteed the NSWP’s full independence. However, the fact that regional elections in Navarre are held simultaneously with most other Spanish regions has led to greater co-ordination with the PP. This was particularly apparent in the 2007 regional elections, in which Navarre was the cornerstone of PP’s campaign14. Regarding general elections, the PP-UPN Pact specified that UPN’s campaigns should comply with the guidelines of the PP's national campaign, although some autonomy regarding specific Navarrese aspects was permitted.
Alliance choices The complex nature of Navarre’s multi-party system, the lack of UPN majorities in the regional parliament and the PP’s support for nationalist regional governments in Catalonia and the Canary Islands (1993-96) made congruence in multi-level alliances impossible. The strong popular support for the Basque nationalist parties in Navarre also granted the UPN considerable autonomy when selecting its parliamentary support and partners in government. This support has often come from the Socialist Party of
16 Navarre, PSN, the PSOE’s regional federation, which currently supports the UPN-led government (Barberà, 2009). As said, after the 2007 regional elections, the UPN once again asked the PP for its own parliamentary group. The refusal led to the resurgence of old disagreements after the 2008 general elections, in which the NaBai representative was re-elected. The situation deteriorated considerably in autumn 2008, when the UPN stated its willingness to negotiate the annual state budget with the PSOE government. Either because of the UPN leadership coming to the conclusion that its lack of autonomy vis-à-vis the PP was the cause of its results in the 2007 regional elections, or because of its commitment to the Socialist party branch in Navarre (the Socialist Party of Navarre/Partido Socialista de Navarra, PSN) arising from the investiture vote, the UPN decided to abstain from voting on the budget. The UPN leadership claimed their party was guaranteed its own voice in the national lower house on issues affecting Navarre, so this did not contradict the UPN-PP Pact. The imposition of sanctions against the UPN deputies who disagreed with the party leadership and voted against the budget presented by the PSOE government precipitated the crisis and the break with the PP. Three out of the five UPN representatives in the Congress and the Senate along with other ex-leaders left the party and joined the new party federation the PP created in Navarre.
IV. Discussion: Classification of the especial relations SWP-NSWP
The previous two sections show that inter-party special relations can adopt various forms, and are subject to change over time. The differences found in the interrelations and links analysed in terms of organisational policy, programme definition and alliance choices, and the NSWP’s autonomy enable us to place these special relations within the continuum presented in the analytical framework. The majority of SWP-NSWP special relations in Spain resemble the federal party model, regardless of the ideological family to which the three pairs of parties belong (see Figure 6). The three NSWPs analysed have had total autonomy in terms of selecting their leaders and candidates, finances, and membership. The SWP cannot impose sanctions on the NSWP or overrule the NSWP’s decisions. Furthermore, the influence of the NSWP is extensive due to the direct representation of regional interests on the SWP bodies (see Figure 7).
17 Figure 6. Continuum of the special relations by vertical integration and autonomy
ICV PSOE-PSC (1997-2009) (1990s-2000s) UPN IU-ICV PP-UPN PSOE-PSC (since 2008) (1987-1997) (1991-2008) (1978-1980s) - Truncated Bifurcated Confederal Integrated Unitary + However, several differences across parties and between the same parties over time are apparent. The first difference is between ICV-IU relations and those between the PSC-PSOE and the UPN-PP. The second is between the parties between which relations have ended, ICV-IU (since 1997) and UPN-PP (since 2008) and the less drastic changes experienced by the PSC-PSOE special relations.
Figure 7. Summary of the special relations SWP-NSWP in Spain
IU-ICV (1987-1997) PSOE-PSC (1977-2008) PP-UPN (1991-2008) Organisational policy Shared finances No No No Common membership No No No Formal institucional Confederal group in Separate groups in Same group in coordination Congress Congress & Senate Congress and Senate (1977-82); Separate groups in Senate (2000-08) Informal institutional Yes PSC ministries in all No ministries coordination PSOE governments and in the direction of the parliamentary group Candidate selection Yes Yes Yes Formal organisational ICV with no voting PSC in PSOE bodies; UPN in PP bodies (but coordination rights in IU PSC delegates in PSOE no reciprocity) members are ex officio members at PSC bodies Informal organisational Barely (since 1997) Intense Intense coordination Programme definition Autonomy in programme Yes in both elections Yes regional Yes regional definition Weaker in national Not in national Autonomy in campaign Yes in both elections Yes regional Yes regional definition Large in nacional Weaker in national (especially since 1996) Coordination in No Not in regional Not in regional programme definition High in national High in national Coordination in No Not in regional Not in regional campaign definition High in national High in national Autonomy in public Yes Yes Yes policy definition Coordination in public No Not always Not always policy definition Alliance choice Congruent multilevel No Not always No alliances Autonomy in alliances Yes Yes Yes
18 choice Source: Own elaboration.
The ICV-IU special relations during the period 1987-1997 were very similar to those of separate parties. Figure 7 shows the NSWP’s absolute autonomy in organisational policy, definition of ideology and platforms, and choice of alliances, and the almost total lack of organic co-ordination, which was often complemented by substantial disagreements as regards policies and by a complete incongruence in alliance choice. The special relations between the PSC-PSOE and UPN-PP (1991-2008) are to a large extent similar to the federal model. There are separate finances, membership and selection of candidates. The NSWP is represented on the SWP executive board. However, both parties are part of the same parliamentary group in the lower house. Platforms and campaigns are coordinated for state-wide elections, although PSC’s autonomy is greater. As NSWP-SWP special relations have evolved, the NSWPs have increased their autonomy, and in the cases of ICV-IU and UPN-PP this has even led to a breakdown in relations. There has been no formal change in PSOE-PSC relations in the last thirty years, although they have undoubtedly moved towards a consolidation of the model defined in 1978. This contained some grey areas that were subject to interpretation. Initially, the PSOE tended to see the PSC as a mere regional federation, and the special status of the PSC created misgivings in some of its regional federations. The leadership of the two parties and the changes in the parties’ competitive position have had a strong impact on the changes in their relationship. The charismatic leadership and landslide majorities of the PSOE under Felipe González and the weakness of the Catalan socialists during the 1980s led to a high level of dependence by the PSC on the PSOE. Since José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s election as the PSOE’s general secretary (in 2000) the relationship has been more balanced. This is also due to the weakness of the PSOE between the mid-1990s and 2004. The fact that both parties have been in government since 2004 has made their relations more complex and has heightened tensions, because the leaders of the parties and the presidents of the governments concerned are the same person. Institutional disagreements have thus also had an impact on inter-party relations.
19 The different stances of Julio Anguita and Rafael Ribó, the general secretaries of IU and ICV respectively, as regards the country’s political decentralisation and its impact on party organisation was also decisive in the distance between them gradually increasing, as the former rejected any type of asymmetrical agreement both between Catalonia and Spain and between the IU and the ICV.
Concluding remarks
The main objective of this article has been to create an analytical framework for understanding and subsequently classifying the various types of special relations between NSWP and SWP. An examination of the Spanish case considers the various types of relationship between the PSOE-PSC, PP-UPN IU-ICV and finally enables them to be situated in a continuum. In general, during the period in which these relations were ongoing, they tended to be quite similar to each other, regardless of the ideological family (social democratic, communist or conservative) the parties belonged to. In all three cases, the NSWP had a great deal of autonomy in the three areas analysed (organisational, programme and alliance policies). An analysis of the developments in the three cases shows a trend towards increasing autonomy among the NSWPs. In two cases, the ICV- IU and UPN-PP partnerships, the tensions caused by this trend led to a breakdown in relations. In PSOE-PSC relations, tensions have also arisen without leading to major changes in the formal mechanisms. Due to the moderate or low levels of vertical integration and the high level of autonomy of the NSWPs, we have rejected the hypothesis that they are state-wide parties competing in a regional party system. The operationalisation of two key concepts in special relations, the level of vertical integration and the SWP's autonomy with regard to the NSWP in the various areas presented here means that this analysis could be used for studying other countries where this type of relationship occurs. Finally, the description and classification of these special relationships is essential in being able to move on to a second phase in the analysis, which would lead to examine with greater detail the reasons why these relations are established and why they differ in their evolution over time.
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23 Appendix: list of acronyms AP: Alianza Popular CDN: Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra CDU: Unión Demócrata Cristiana (Alemania) CiU: Convergència i Unió CSU: Unión Social Cristiana (Baviera) ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya EUiA: Esquerra Unida i Alternativa FSC-PSOE: Federación Socialista de Cataluña- PSOE ICV: Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds IU: Izquierda Unida NA-BAI: Nafarroa Bai PCE: Partido Comunista de España PP: Partido Popular PSC: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya PSC-C: Partit Socialista de Catalunya - Congrés PSC-R: Partit Socialista de Catalunya-Reagrupament PSN: Partido Socialista de Navarra PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español PSUC: Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya UPN: Unión del Pueblo Navarro USC: Unió Socialista de Cataluña
24 1 The authors are grateful to Montserrat Baras, Gabriel Colomé, Astrid Barrio, and Juan Rodríguez for their comments to a previous version of this paper. 2 NSWP present candidatures and obtain representation in a single region (occasionally in more than one), be it in the national or regional elections (Molas, 1977; De Winter and Türsan, 1998; De Winter et al., 2006). 3 For the analysis of decentralization in the organization of the Spanish SWPs, see Méndez and Orte (2005), Ramiro- Fernández and Pérez-Nievas (2010), and Astudillo (2010). 4 Some of these categories had been previously defined by Carty (1991) and Dick (1991). 5 Thorlakson (2009) has recently characterized this representation as a new dimension, as the NSWP’s influence over the SWP 6 For an indepth analysis of the relationships IU-EUiA and PCE-PSUC viu, as well as for the rapprochement between ICV and EUiA, see Verge (2009). 7 We wish to thank the interviewees for their kind collaboration: Josep Maria Sala, José Zaragoza, Joan Marcet (PSC), Rafael Ribó (ICV) and Javier Gómara (UPN). 8 Report presented to the II Federal Assembly, 1990, page 22. 9 The PSC has always counted with an average of two ministers in PSOE’s governments. The election of the ministries and the departments that are assigned to the NSWP is discretion of the Prime Minister, albeit the NSWP might well make a proposal. In fact, once the PSOE even nominated a minister (Ernest Lluch) who was opposed to the PSC executive board. 10 The speaker of PSC parliamentary group (Ernest Lluch) failed to present the amendments the party Executive Committee had approved as he considered that voting unity had to be always respected. The Executive Committee sanctioned him and some members of this body resigned after this. 11 See the articles 17.2 y 29.11 of UPN 2005 Statutes. Nonetheless, it should be noted that UPN head of list for national elections between 1993 and 2008 was Jaime Ignacio del Burgo, a relevant leader of PP’s branch in Navarre before its merger into UPN. 12 In 1982: UPN-AP-PDP; in 1986: AP-PL-UPN; in 1989: UPN-PP. Traditionally UPN obtained the head of the electoral list for national elections and AP-PP obtained representation in the Senate. 13 Between 1996 and 2000 UPN representatives in Congress sat in the parliamentary group of Canary Coalition/Coalición Canaria (CC) as part of the agreement reached by CC and the PP in order to grant the latter’s investiture and the conservative government’s stability. 14 By that time the Spanish government and ETA were involved in an official dialogue process. In March 2006 ETA had declared a permanent cease-fire and the Parliament had authorised the government to start the dialogue. The PP totally opposed it and tried to discredit it by arguing that the government was not only talking but negotiating with ETA, including the annexation of Navarre to the Basque Country.