What Is Motivating China to Adopt Soft Power Strategies and How Effective Have These Strategies Been?

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

China and the evolution of power: What is motivating China to adopt soft power strategies and how effective have these strategies been?

By William Kennedy

Master Thesis, Political Science: International Relations

June 2016

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Candidate Number: 11126019

Supervisor: Dr Julia Bader

Programme: Power Transition in the 21st Century: The Rise of China in International Relations

Department: Graduate School of Social Sciences William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Abstract III

Abbreviations IV

List of Graphs V

Contents

1. Introduction 1 2. Chapter 1: Conceptualizing soft power 5 2.1 Origins of soft power theory 5 2.2 China’s adoption of soft power 8 2.3 Research on Chinese soft power throughout the world 13 3. Chapter 2: Theory - Foundation of empirical analysis 17 3.1 China Threat theory 17 3.2 Regime Security theory 20 3.3 Migration theory 24 4. Chapter 3: Methodology and analysis 28 4.1 Method and Data 28 4.2 Disadvantages of methodology 29 5. Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis Case Study - Central Asia 31 5.1 Chinese soft power policies in Central Asia 5.1.1 Culture 32 5.1.2 Aid and investment 33 5.1.3 Institutions 36 5.2 Survey results and analysis 5.2.1 China threat 37 5.2.2 Regime legitimacy – Xinjiang 41 5.2.3 Regime legitimacy – Cultural Superpower 43 5.2.4 Economic interests 49 6. Conclusion 52 7. Bibliography 57

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Abstract

This thesis aims to explore the rise of soft power in Chinese foreign policy, detailing how soft power forms have been reinterpreted from its classical understanding under Nye to a broader definition of the topic which has come to form one of China’s most important foreign policy tools. The thesis investigates issues surrounding the different motivations China has in developing and implementing its soft power strategies. By contextualizing soft power, we can examine how various theories receive and understand the benefits of soft power. Four different motivations have been put forward, each derived from a different theoretical perspective.

The research undertaken is framed against China’s broader rise in International Relations, and the consequence of this rise is taken into account when studying the findings against the different motivations. Firstly a literature review will be done, which focuses on previous work carried out when looking at Chinese Soft power, both generally and to specific regions in Africa and Asia. By using a case study of Chinese-Central Asian relations, a topic which has been neglected and understudied by previous scholars. The thesis will then allow me to show whether the theory holds up and can be put forward to other specific regions in the world.

The research is based on survey results supplied by Central Asian Barometer, primary sources such as aid statistics, government statements and secondary literature, including newspaper articles and peer reviewed journals.

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Abbreviations

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ART ASEAN Plus Three

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

EAS East Asia Summit

FAGIA Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment

FTA Free Trade Agreement

IMF International Monetary Fund

OBOR One Belt One Road

PRC Peoples Republic of China

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

UN United Nations

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List of Tables, Figures and Pictures

Table 1: Types of Power 5

Figure 1: Which countries pose the biggest threat for Kazakhstan? 39

Picture 1: Map of Central Asia 41

Figure 2: In your opinion what role do the following countries play in Central Asia? (Tajikistan) 45

Figure 3: What language would you want your children to learn and why?

(Tajikistan) 46

Figure 4: What role does the U.S, Russia, China and the European Union play in Central Asia? (Kazakhstan) 47

Figure 5: What role does the U.S, Russia and China play in Central Asia? (Kyrgyzstan) 48

Figure 6: In your opinion which of the following countries might be a model for development of Kyrgyzstan? 49

Figure 7: Where should Tajikistan get its investment from? 51

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Introduction

Water is fluid, soft, and yielding. But water will wear away rock, which is rigid and cannot yield. As a rule, whatever is fluid, soft, and yielding will overcome whatever is rigid and hard. This is another paradox: what is soft is strong.

- Lao Tzu

This thesis, using various theories from International Relations, will look at the reasons motivating the Peoples Republic of China (hereafter known as China) to pursue soft power. To answer the question: what is motivating China to adopt soft power policies and how successful has it been?, the first part of this thesis conceptualizes the different definitions of soft power in the current academic literature, and will look at other explanations from scholars about why China is embracing soft power and how this is already having an effect in places such as Southeast Asia. The second part will look at the four motivations, derived from different IR theories, to see how they are compatible with soft power theory and how each theory uses soft power to explain why a state will adopt soft power policies. The thesis will then use Central Asia as a case study to discuss Chinese soft power, examining Chinese-Central Asian relations from 2012 to the present day to infer what the reasons are behind the growth of soft power in the region, and whether these polices can be deemed a success. This will help shed new light onto Chinese soft power strategies, and better understand China’s soft power approaches to other regions of the world.

Soft Power is the ability of a political body, such as a state, to indirectly attract other countries to wanting and behaving in a way that it deems acceptable. Few Western international relations phrases have penetrated as deeply or broadly into Chinese vocabulary in recent years as soft power (Berkofsky, 2007). Since 2006, when Hu Jintao first publicly mentioned the role of soft power in Chinese foreign policy, academic journals and policymakers have increasingly paid homage to Chinese soft power and soft power strategies. This new focus on Chinese power (seen through hard, smart and soft power) is in conjunction with China’s rise, and how China views itself in regards to its great power status and territorial issues towards regions such as Taiwan, Xinjiang and the South China Sea.

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China’s rise has been predicted by scholars and academics since the 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping first announced the opening up of China’s economy to outside markets and foreign investment. Today, China is currently the world’s second largest economy, the world’s largest exporter, second largest importer, second in annual military spending and attracts the greatest share of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the world (World Bank, 2014). Whilst this transformation is impressive, it has also created concerns amongst both China’s neighbours and western powers, such as the U.S, who have come to view a resurgent China with suspicion.

When looking at the context of China and its growing soft power, it is important to turn to current debates within International Relations that have focused on what the implications and consequences are for the existing governance system, discussing whether China will be able to fit into this system, or whether it will challenge the status quo.

Some ‘power transition’ theories argue that war is an inevitable outcome of power transition, because the rising power seeks to alter the existing governance system or the current power will launch a pre-emptive strike to preserve its hegemonic position while it still maintains greater capabilities vis-à-vis the rising power. John Mearsheimer has argued to this affect, saying that a power transition between China and the U.S will not be peaceful because China’s designs are to ultimately become the regional hegemon in Asia. Mearsheimer points out that states are not capable of knowing what each other’s intentions are and cannot know with a high degree of certainty whether they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo power. This means that ‘China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on the warpath and conquer other countries in the region, although that is always a possibility (Mearsheimer, 2010). Aaron Friedberg, also arguing from a realist position, warns that there is ‘a struggle for mastery in Asia’ (Friedberg, 2000). Under the anarchic system that realists adhere to, one need only look at Imperial Japan or Germany at the turn of the 20th century to see that rising states are prone to conflict, with China seen as no exception.

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On the other hand, scholars such as John Ikenberry have countered the possibility of China’s zero sum rise, and have argued that even as power and authority move away from the West ‘it doesn’t have to be a struggle where at the end point we see an overturning of liberal international order… in the recent decade at least China and other rising states, are rising up inside rather than working around the rules and institutions, such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank’ (Ikenberry, 2014).

Constructivists, who argue that International Relations assumptions and objective variables have meaning because they are ‘constructed from a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs’ (Slaughter, 2011), argue that China will be viewed as a threat depending on the shared interests and norms (or lack of) that China develops with other counties. Whilst China’s domestic norms are illiberal compared to the more liberal international system, if China’s external identity is pacifistic and cooperative, then greater mutual trust and shared norms can flourish.

China’s transition to new forms of diplomacy, such as being more vocal on the international stage, providing genuine aid to developing regions and soft power forms, has meant that regional Asian powers and the United States have been cautiously optimistic about China’s rise. In fact China has shown growing commitment to strengthening multilateral and bilateral ties in the region through the establishment of numerous Free Trade Agreements (FTA), hosting the Six Party nuclear proliferation talks and becoming a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and East Asian Summit (EAS) bodies. China’s need for a favourable international environment is designed to aid its domestic economic stability, with an interest in its overseas markets, the growing demand for natural resources and the opening of new export markets meaning a stable regional environment is imperative for a ‘harmonious Chinese society’ (Shiping & Acharya, 1998). China’s attempt to grow peacefully, different from other past rising powers, has meant greater emphasis has been placed on soft power as a means of transforming China’s image from that of a threat to a benign regional power. China has shown great flexibility in modifying its strategies to maximize its national interests and improve its international image (Zhu, 2010). By using soft power globally and in a smart way, China will be able to frame its rise as a status quo power, and better present its rise as a ‘win-win’ to other countries who engage with China. The growing appreciation within China towards different forms of power can

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 be seen with the establishment of ‘Comprehensive National Power’, which was designed by China to quantify hard and soft power.

The greater emphasis placed on research into Chinese soft power has meant that Chinese initiatives abroad to present a positive image of itself, using culture and public diplomacy, in places such as Africa and Southeast Asia, have been widely studied. However, China’s soft power in Central Asia, a region that has grown in strategic importance to China since the turn of the century, has been largely ignored. When Central Asia gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, China identified the region as important both economically (importing natural gas from the Caspian Sea, establishing the Silk Road Economic Belt) and from a security perspective (using the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a vehicle to combat the ‘three evils’ of separatism, extremism and terrorism in the region). I will thus use the Central Asia region as a case study to better understand how different geopolitical challenges have forced China to adopt soft power.

The thesis will examine four motivations, arguing China is pursuing soft power for different reasons, ranging from mitigating the security dilemma posed by China’s rise, helping the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gain legitimacy at home by improving China’s international image and using soft power as a component of ‘national rejuvenation’ to help China become a cultural superpower. Each motivation will be grounded in a particular theory, which will then discuss how soft power is used to aid China’s foreign policy.

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Soft Power

In the following section I will look at soft power and its rise in academic literature. The term soft power will be contextualized to better understand what is meant by soft power when talking from both Western and Chinese perspectives. This review will frame the analysis of soft power in the wider academic debate, which will then be used when discussing soft power in relation to International Relations theories in the next chapter.

1. Origins of Soft Power Theory:

The first person to explicitly place soft power in academic thinking was Joseph Nye, whose seminal work on soft power, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics was published in 2004. Nye groups power into three categories as a way of showing how power can be wielded. According to Nye, power can be ‘threats of coercion (“sticks”), inducements and payments (“carrots”), and attraction that makes others want what you want’ (Nye, 2008). It’s this last form of power which Nye uses to define soft power – as a means not of coercion or forcing a state to act in a certain way, but making a state aspire to ones level of prosperity and openness. The three pillars which Nye holds up as the structure of a state’s soft power are culture, public diplomacy and foreign policy. Nye says that ‘In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in a large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others’ (Nye, 2008). As shown in Table 1, command power (hard power) is replaced with co-optive power (soft power), with military threats re placed with agenda setting as the most important tool a state can wield when engaging with various other states (Nye, 2004).

Table 1: Nye - Types of Power (Liu & Tsai, 2014)

Primary Behaviours Government Policies Currencies

Coercion Coercive Diplomacy Threats Military Power Deterrence War Force Protection Alliance

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Primary Behaviours Government Policies Currencies

Economic Inducement Payments Aid, Bribes, Sanctions Power Coercion Sanctions

Attraction Public Diplomacy Values, Culture Soft Power Agenda Bilateral and Multilateral Policies, Institutions Setting Diplomacy

The relationship between hard and soft power is not mutually exclusive, with the two being able to work in tandem. Nye claims that ‘Hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other... soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power... Both are aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behaviour of others’ (Nye, 2004). In order to have soft power, you have to have means to be able to communicate and promote its use. Hard power can be a way of doing this, with theorists such as Samuel Huntingdon pointing out that soft power is in some respects merely a manifestation of hard power, being nothing more than the soft ‘face’ of hard power. This is rejected ultimately by Nye, who points out that whilst there is some relationship between the two, soft and hard power can work in isolation to each other. Nye’s definition, based on the behavioural perspective, is descriptive and normative.

Soft power can have both negative and positive connotations depending on how the soft power is received by foreign states. For example, if a country cannot avoid the association between its cooperation in development and the discourse of manipulative colonial practices of interference, that country cannot present its cooperation regarding development in a good light (Kivimaki, 2014). Therefore a country’s soft power strategy can fail to make aid policies attractive, and thus fail to influence other countries’ attitudes towards its aid.

Another example of soft power shortcomings is the barrier placed around civilization. A country’s soft power attraction will likely be more successful when directed to allies and countries which share common world views. American postmodern culture for example has a stronger chance of being accepted by countries which share America’s view on democracy, human rights and religion, than say conservative

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Muslim countries which have a fundamental opposition to U.S culture and unilateralism. Popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar (Nye, 2004).

Although soft power sometimes has a direct effect on specific goals, it is more likely to have an impact on the general goals that a country seeks (Nye, 2004). This means we can place soft power in a relational power structure, which can be understood in terms of agent-structure relations. Katharina Kronenberg says that ‘in order to understand this relationship it is important to not only understand the structural location and positioning of these states in relation to each other but also in the context of regional or other power configurations as well as in the internal power dynamics within the state that is at the receiving end of the soft power’ (Kronenberg, 2012). An example of this is the United States and its continued support for Israel. This support has negatively affected its relationships with other states in the region who do not recognise Israel’s existence. Therefore, US soft power in the Middle East is constrained by its support for Israel, and has been tied to its diplomatic relationship in the region.

Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed in another country rather than concentrated. The way soft power can impact and be received differently by various sections of society has not yet been fully understood. Nye and others discuss to some extent the way that soft power can have different outcomes depending on whether it is being received by the elites or masses. The internal relations between the elites and masses, and the disjuncture between the state and society can have a real impact on the effectiveness of soft power (Kronenberg, 2012). For example, western culture in the Cold War seems to have been much more appealing to the general Soviet population at the time, whereas in comparison, the effects on the Soviet leaders were not as pronounced. Whilst soft power strategies such as Radio Free Europe and Hollywood films were extremely popular with the general public, the Soviet government continued to refuse greater economic and political contact with the West.

In essence Nye’s theory of soft power is ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opting people rather than coercing them’ (Nye, 2008). The strategies Nye describes with which a country can pursue to obtain soft power are through

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 culture and public diplomacy. These resources are used as tools to communicate deeper understandings about a state, or what its foreign policy objectives are. An example of this type of public diplomacy is the United States promoting Hollywood films abroad or China’s attempts at slogan diplomacy, such as framing its growing power under the spectre of ‘peaceful development’.

2. China’s adoption of Soft Power:

Soft power has been discussed and articulated by senior Chinese governmental ministers on a regular basis over the past two decades. Party chief and President Hu Jintao made it clear at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting in 2006: “The increase in our nation’s international status and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defence, as well as in soft power such as culture (Ma, 2006).” Others, such as Jia Qinglin, CPPCC Chairman and a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee, urged the CCP to further strengthen its commitment to Soft power strategies and to “deeply understand the importance of national soft power with cultural construction as the main task in order to both meet domestic demands and enhance China’s competitiveness in the international arena” (Yue, 2007).

Chinese academics who write about soft power have focused a great deal on images such as pandas, Peking opera, martial arts and heritage sites such as the Forbidden Palace. As well as these cultural associations, Chinese scholars have focused on traditional Chinese culture, which boasts an unrivalled history in Asia, spanning different centuries and developing new traditions, symbols and texts. Li Mingjiang argues that Chinese soft power has focused on cultural soft power due to its core value of ‘harmony’, which is the basis for China’s appeal in a globalized, individualistic world. According to Li, ‘cultural glory was a prominent feature (of the Chinese Nation)… The socio-economic success of East Asian “dragons” and, now, the success story of China’s own economy are evidence of Chinese cultural merits. While China and East Asia are in ascendancy, the West has started a cultural reflection and readjustment, which provides China with a good opportunity to expand its cultural influence’ (Li, 2008).

However Nye has been critical about Chinese attempts at pursuing soft power policies that have aimed to bridge the gap between itself and western countries. Nye

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 claims that although spending billions on cultural institutes around the world, attracting sporting and business events to China, China has fallen short of gaining any long lasting impact from these ventures because of its domestic problems involving limiting free speech and human rights, environmental degradation and the suppression of minority cultures. Events such as the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and the 2008 protests in Tibet are good examples of how the Chinese state faces a continued struggle surrounding its perceived image within the international media. Many have attributed the deficiencies in China’s soft power to its domestic weaknesses (Nye, 2012). The 2015 report by soft power 30 Index points out that the lack of democracy, free press, and access to information that many people around the world take for granted weighs heavily on perceptions of China around the world (Yun, 2015).

According to Nye ‘Great powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their national interests, but it's not an easy sell when the message is inconsistent with their domestic realities’ (Nye, 2012). Nye argues that the states who are more likely to be successful projecting soft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms which now emphasize liberalism, pluralism and autonomy (Nye, 2000). Soft power has been controlled and directed by the CCP since its introduction in 2007. This has meant that soft power which is traditionally defined by Nye has struggled to fully resonate beyond the Chinese state. According to Nye, the overreaching guidance the state places on soft power strategies has meant that has been little room for manoeuvre when implementing or creating co-optive methods of power between China and foreign states. This top-down strategy has, in Nye’s view, propagandized Soft Power, to the extent that civil society and human to human soft power interaction have been taken over by "the party which does not buy into the view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global appeal"(Nye, 2013).

However the danger for Nye’s version of soft power is that it is seen as merely an extension of cultural power. Although culture can play a large role in the formation and deliverance of soft power, it is not the only mechanism that is useful for its application. Politics, economic development, the creation and participation in

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 international institutions and aid have all fallen under the rubric of soft power diplomacy. Nye’s soft power is also problematic in this example of Chinese soft power because it tends to be seen as a western notion of power. Nye’s emphasis on soft power elements such as democracy and human rights, are seen as western constructs by authoritarian governments in Asia and Africa, and so are not widely used or assimilated into soft power strategies.

Nye has been challenged on his more limited reading, and pro-western view of soft power, with scholars such as Joshua Kurlantzick calling for soft power definitions to be widened in scope when looking at non-western foreign policy. More traditional hard power forms, such as aid and investment, along with traditional soft power forms are becoming increasingly dominated at the state level and have been identified as new forms of soft power by countries such as China. If a state is attracted and swayed by another’s stature in the world and economic might, rather than its domestic political reality, is that not soft power too? What a state may or may not be attracted to is completely objective in a globalized world, where a tapestry of different cultures, political regimes and foreign policies can be disseminated from each other. The debate about the sources of or deficits in Chinese soft power— particularly in the realms of policy and political values—thus implicates deeper disagreements regarding the normative standards that determine what deserves acknowledgement, recognition, status, and admiration within international relations (Hall, 2016).

Kurlantzick argues that ‘In the context of Asia today, both China and its neighbours enunciate a broader idea of soft power, the idea that soft power implies all elements outside of the security realm, including investment and aid’ (Kurlantzick, 2006). An example of this is the greater importance placed on economic power as a competent of soft power. This is a significant modification of Nye’s more narrow focus on soft power, where economic ‘carrots, such as aid’ are seen as more closely tied with hard power strategies. This argument has been supported by other scholars, who argue that in order to study Chinese soft power, we first have to de-westernize its meaning, and critically look at soft power from a neutral angle to better understand what a state wants to achieve from soft power, and the insecurities that drives these policies (Rawnsley, 2012). Liu also adds to this new narrative surrounding Chinese soft power, arguing that, far from the rigidity of Nye’s three pillar approach towards soft

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 power, it is a more malleable term, which is ‘… that aspect of diplomacy that involves a government’s efforts to transmit its national culture to foreign publics with the goal of bringing about an understanding of national ideals and institutions as part of a larger attempt to build support for political and economic goals’ (Liu 2008).

This broader definition of soft power has been exhaustively discussed in China as an element of a nation’s “comprehensive national power”. Huang describes comprehensive national power as comprising hard power (economic power, national defence power, and natural resource power); soft power (political power, diplomatic power, and cultural and educational power); and coordinating power (political structures, government leadership, organizational decision-making power, management capabilities, and reform coordination capabilities) (Cho, 2008). Men Honghua notes that, "Whether or not China can truly rise depends not only on hard power, but also requires an emphasis on soft power. A true rise is one in which both types of power complement each other” (Wuthnow, 2008). Men notes that the rise of prior great powers, including ancient Rome, imperial Britain and France, and the two Cold War-era superpowers (i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union), relied not simply on coercive power, but also on attractive values, cultural influence, institutional innovation, and economic persuasion (Wuthnow, 2008).

Some Chinese commentators argue that this is an area where China may enjoy some advantages vis-à-vis the United States (Huang, 2013), for instance in its increasing aid donations to African countries, which has meant China is now the largest donor to the continent. By spreading the availability of learning about Chinese language and culture, drawing on the attractiveness of Chinese developmental model and economic successes and focusing on nations whose bilateral relationships with the United States are faltering, China has been able to effectively challenge U.S supremacy in soft power in areas where it has strong historic ties, such as Southeast Asia or Africa (Kurlantzick, 2006). China has also gone beyond historic regions to spread its influence, using a diverse range of tactics to better articulate its wider message about its peaceful rise, and China as a global cultural superpower.

The increasing interest paid towards how China articulates and defines its soft power means terms such as ‘Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics’ have been increasingly mentioned and developed as a way of separating different Chinese and

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Western conceptualizations of soft power. For China, soft power penetration serves its diplomatic objectives. China’s diplomacy can be divided into three levels: great power diplomacy, border diplomacy, and resource diplomacy. Based on different diplomatic requirements, China’s “soft power” penetration falls into three different categories: economic aid, economic cooperation, and cultural penetration (He, 2012). Take for example China’s diplomacy toward the Central Asian countries on its borders. First, China established political and economic relations with Central Asian nations through increased foreign aid; it then developed comprehensive cooperation frameworks through plans such the Silk Road Economic Belt, and greater cooperation on economic and security issues through the SCO; and, finally, through semi-official projects, which have enhanced China’s cultural appeal as well as advanced a pro-China stance (He, 2012).

Whilst Nye’s soft power framework has been met with some scepticism, especially from neo-realists in the West, soft power has been readily accepted by the Chinese academic community. An explanation for this is that Chinese culture is the most important component of soft power, and due to China’s history of exporting Confucianism to other East Asian regions, China can use culture to gain influence. One possible explanation is that soft power theory can is compatible with traditional Chinese concepts; for example, Confucianism extols a king who relies on moral force not physical force, believing that the ‘kingly’ will triumph over the hegemon’s way (Glaser, 2012). For the leading proponent of the culture school, Yu Xintian, soft power includes thoughts, ideas, and principles as well as institutions and policies, all of which operate within the context of, and cannot be separated from, a nation’s culture (Glaser, 2012). Yu argues that Confucianism is an attractive option because of the shared ideals it has with other East Asian societies and that “the more fashionable the ideology, the more people will accept it and the greater the possibility to build the country’s soft power” (Glaser, 2012). China’s ancient history and traditional culture are viewed by most scholars as a valuable source of soft power for attracting not only East Asian neighbours with whom China shares a Confucian heritage but also the wider international community.

Another explanation is favourable timing. Nye’s theory was introduced into China as the country was undertaking an in-depth investigation into the rise and fall of great nations, seeking not only to escape the fate of the Soviet Union but to transform

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China into a great power (Glaser, 2012). China’s increasing fascination with rising powers in history, and their demise, has heightened policymakers consciousness surrounding how a state is perceived vis-à-vis its neighbours and the positions it holds in terms of military force and economic weight. Scholars such as Shen Jiru have studied the collapse of the Soviet Union, in an attempt to learn how great powers can use soft power in an attempt to secure national interests. According to Shen Jiru, the Soviet Union could not compete with the U.S because it had “lost the whole game due to a flaw in its soft power” (Jiru, 1999).

3. Research on Chinese Soft Power throughout the world:

Further academic research has been taken to examine Chinese soft power towards specific regions. Most of the literature has focused on Chinese soft power attempts in Southeast Asia and Africa. Chin-Hao Huang argues that soft power is notoriously hard to measure, but using surveys and opinion polls, finds that Chinese soft power has been more effective in Southeast Asia than areas such as East Asia, where historical issues and domestic political circumstances still play a large role in creating anti-Chinese sentiment. China’s massive push to project soft power in East Asia has not directly translated into more supportive views of its quest for status and legitimacy. This is because of two reasons deriving from (1) Beijing’s decision to demonstrate its resolve on regional territorial disputes with military coercion and (2) the lack of serious political reform in China (Huang, 2013).

Others have focused on China’s policies towards the ASEAN countries, with Lum, Morrison and Vaughn writing from a U.S policy position, arguing that before the pivot to Asia, the U.S had left a vacuum in Southeast Asia which China is attempting to exploit using soft power. This analysis points to a growing ‘concern over China’s rising influence in Southeast Asia, and beyond, is leading some in the United States to be increasingly wary of China and its motives out of a fear that if China’s power and influence continue to increase, Beijing will eventually seek to constrain and/or undermine America’s ability to promote and protect its interests in the region’ (Lum 2008). This view is shared by other academics, who view Chinese attempts through agenda setting and encouraging greater following of its developmental model as a way to exert greater influence in Southeast Asia. Through the use of soft power,

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 particularly in terms of rule-making and agenda setting, China has the chance to gradually push out US influence from Southeast Asia while reducing the security concern of neighbouring states. For ASEAN, not only could China's rise be beneficial for its economic development, the participation of China in regional affairs could also increase the status of Southeast Asia (Liu, 2014).

In other regions, such as Africa, further study has placed Chinese soft power as having a direct correlation with the increase in Chinese dependence on natural resources and migrant labour. Adams Bodomo argues that the introduction of Confucius Institutes has offered ‘a chance of helping Africa-China relations to move away from the skewed economic focus’ and that this reversal away from a rigid focus on trade has meant ‘Cultural diplomacy, especially the soft power version of it with Chinese characteristics, is giving China a more human face in its relations with Africa’ (Bodomo, 2009).

Much of the literature surrounding China and Central Asia have focused on geopolitics, and placed the increasing presence of China in Central Asia in narratives such as the ‘War on Terror’ or the ‘New Great Game’. When looking at prior academic text concerning Chinese soft power in Central Asia, there has been a few notable scholars who have examined particular policies or strategies towards Central Asia, such as using Confucius Institutes or China’s vast population as soft power resources. Most of the literature is in agreement that China is increasingly seeking to export Chinese soft power to Central Asia through cultural and educational exchanges. However, whilst Chinese soft power policies have produced some results, the region’s resentments against China-mainly due to Chinese occupation and colonizing policies of the past and increasing tensions over China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority-will continue to endure (Berkofsky, 2012)1.

In his detailed article towards Sinophobia and Sinophilia in Central Asia, Sebastian Peyrouse argues that by using Soft Power in Central Asia, China is fast becoming the most important actor in the region and is challenging Russia’s influence, both culturally and politically (Peyrouse, 2016). The use of the term “China’s soft hegemonism” has also grown when describing China’s relationship with Central

1 The Uighur Diaspora probably totals some 11 million, approximately 10 million of whom live in China—the vast majority of these in Xinjiang. Between 300,000 and 1 million Uyghurs also live in the five Central Asian states.

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Asia, whereby China has managed to become a regional hegemon merely through aid, investment and public diplomacy, rather than coercion or conquest. Nicholas Swanstrom also points out that Chinese soft power in Central Asia is challenging Russian supremacy in the region, but that more needs to be done by the CCP to better integrate Central Asia into Chinese trade networks. According to Swanstrom ‘shuttle trade, growing people-to-people contacts, and historical ties have served to reinforce the natural synergy that exists in the region, even though China’s burgeoning influence has caused some unease there’(Swanstrom, 2007).

From a Chinese academic perspective, new focus has been placed on Chinese development and soft power in Central Asia after a highly influential piece published by Peking University professor Wang Jisi. Wang argues that China should not confine itself to engaging with its traditional partners and rivals in the East, but should balance this policy by ‘moving westwards’ and ‘establish a new international geostrategic pillar for its (China) Western Development strategy’(Wang, 2014). Wang argues that due to the Chinese-US relationship becoming increasingly zero-sum over issues such as the South China Sea, the westward strategy will help build mutual confidence between the two nations as China faces favourable opportunities being involved in multilateral coordination and contributing to its international image. There is also a soft power dynamic behind this strategy, as Wang argues that greater attention can be placed on ‘the environment, people’s livelihood and employment in the invested countries’ (Wang, 2014). Yun Sun has also expanded what is defined by Wang’s ‘March West’ strategy, and claimed that it can be a vital part of Chinese soft power because ‘to turn China’s economic muscles into political strength and soft power, China will allocate more resources into forging closer ties with countries in the region through diplomatic engagements, human exchanges, foreign assistance, and academic research projects. Furthermore… China will also design comprehensive social, religious and foreign policies to reinforce its national security and improve relations with the ethnic minorities’ (Yun, 2013).

4. Conclusion:

There are two sources of tension in the academic literature towards China and soft power. One argument is that soft power use by China is incompatible because of China’s lack of democracy and human rights, with Nye and others presenting soft power as an extension of western liberal values. This argument has been criticized

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 by both Chinese and Western scholars, who read soft power as a larger body encompassing attributes which goes far beyond the foundations set out by Nye. The second argument is the level of success China has found in its strategies of building up soft power. Whilst certain areas have been documented to have been more receptive to Chinese soft power, such as Southeast Asia, others are still wary of China because of historical grievances and present day realties. More work needs to be done to address and validate these arguments in the future.

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Chapter 2: Theory – Why China is motivated to develop its Soft Power

This chapter will focus on the motivations China has for developing its soft power. By using different theories as analytical tools, we can better understand what might be motivating China to develop its soft power. These different theories will then be used to look at the case of Chinese soft power in Central Asia in chapter four. By examining how each theory incorporates soft power, we can better ascertain why China is acting in the way it is, and to better understand and predict what its future policies in this area will be.

1. Motivation 1: China Threat Theory:

Western realist scholars, such as Iain Johnston (Chinese Realism) and Yuan-kang Wang (Offensive Realism and the rise of China) have increasingly discussed the ‘threat’ posed by China’s rise over the course of the past two decades, with many offensive realist scholars arguing that because of China’s hard power capabilities, it is only a matter of time before conflict breaks out due to China attempting to overturn the international political status quo. The China Threat Theory can be placed inside the framework of Realism, whereby China, seen as the rising power, is challenging the hegemon, in areas such as Southeast and Central Asia, where the U.S and Russia have historically been the most influential states. Realism holds that states are concerned with their relative power in the international system. The absence of a superordinate authority (i.e. a world government) in the international system has forced great powers to pursue their national interests by increasing their power. Indeed, when national interests can only be pursued by power, the pursuit of power itself becomes a national interest, or in Morgenthau’s terms, statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power (Yee, 2002).

Realists argue that when one state gains greater economic and military power, other states are not capable of knowing how this state intends to act with the new material power it has gained because of the anarchic state system, and the state’s primary resolve to survive. The rise of the ‘China Threat’, and the unease felt towards a rising China has created a security dilemma for its neighbours and the United States. A security dilemma is rooted in a state’s uncertainty as to its neighbour’s intentions. In its basic form such a predicament stems from the anarchical international order that causes countries to be anxious about other states harming their sovereignty and

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 national interests. The result is a penchant for self-help, which can take the form of mercantilist economic strategies, power politics, etc.

A first variable that determines the outcome of a security dilemma is the evolution of material capabilities. It is the relative change of economic or military means, shifts in the balance of power, which intensifies the security dilemma. Mutual perceptions form a second factor of importance. A security dilemma is aggravated when an increase in capabilities of another state is identified with hostile intentions or negative historical precedents (Holslag, 2009). However some realists maintain that China’s power is not increasing as rapidly as is often claimed and that its ambitions are, and are likely to remain, modest, even conservative. As to the security dilemma, optimistic realists argue that there may be a variety of other factors at work that will mitigate its effects and help keep relations between Washington and Beijing from spiralling out of control (Friedberg, 2005).

"China threat" arguments should then apply when China is in a position to challenge the U.S, or becomes increasingly hostile over territorial issues. An increase in China's aggregate power could be relative, brought about by the decline of other powers such as the Soviet Union (Russia) and Japan, or it could be absolute, brought about by China's economic growth and military build-up. Although China has settled various border dispute since the 1980s, it is still seen by some as a revisionist power hoping to create a ‘Greater China’. Realists argue that China hasn’t given up the possibility of using force to retake Taiwan, has suppressed political rights in Hong Kong and Macao and has acted indifferently to border disputes in its western regions.

The ‘China threat’ perspective has taken several forms and can be categorized as ideological, economic, and military. The anti-China hands point to rising nationalism and anti-America propaganda as evidence of the ideological threat that the last remaining powerful communist nation presents to the rest of the world (Broomfield, 2003). Scholars such as Friedberg and Mearsheimer also dismiss the idea that comprehensive engagement of China, largely through economic partnership, will, over time, liberalize its political system and incorporate it in the global order as a legitimate, stable, and peaceful force. Instead, the China threat theory argues that China’s emerging economic strength will give it a position that allows it to do the absolute opposite: threaten peace and security and challenge the status quo on

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 issues like Taiwan. The ‘China threat’ school of thought seems to equate a state of preparedness with a state of war and China’s perception of a threat as antagonistic (Broomfield, 2003). Li Jie claims that China, as the only country having developed outside of the Western system in modern history, has structural contradictions with the West, and is therefore regarded as “alien” to Western norms. With a misunderstanding and misinterpretation surrounding the ascent of China, and its aims and ideological convictions in Asia, China has been placed under a “soft containment” policy from the Western countries, who perceive China with a ‘cold war mentality’ (Li, 2006). Academics and officials recognise that the increase in international hostility to China’s rise has the potential to limit development and progress. This has increased the need to develop a theoretical understanding to effectively wield soft power.

According to this motivation, it can be argued that China is increasing its soft power so as to make its hard power look less threatening. China Threat Theory has emerged in the past decade because of China’s hard power capabilities and intentions. The inclusion and promotion of soft power in this time, especially using slogan diplomacy, such as focusing on China’s ‘peaceful rise’, has been used to counterbalance China’s perceived threat against the existing international order. According to Li soft power ‘is primarily utilized to refute the “China Threat” thesis, facilitate a better understanding of China’s domestic socio-economic reality, and persuade the outside world to accept and support China’s rise’ (Li, 2011). Nye also supports this view, suggesting soft power is a way of mitigating the risk of regional coalitions balancing against China (Nye, 2011). By attempting to increase its soft power, China is presenting itself as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in Asia, seeking to diffuse the security dilemma in the region, and persuading states not to increase their security ties with other regional powers such as India, Russia and the U.S. Soft Power is seen as a way of blunting China’s military threat by presenting China as a benign hegemon, that seeks to work with the U.S and its regional powers, rather than having any territorial or economic aspirations that would negatively impact any state. William Callahan argues that Chinese culture is a positive ‘treasure box’ of soft power resource (Callahan 2014). China’s domestic policy of ‘harmonious society’ and its foreign policy of ‘peacefully rising’ in a ‘harmonious world’ are all based on the idealised view of Chinese civilisation. ‘Peaceful rise’ can be viewed as not only a

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 strategy that refers to China’s immediate future, but also its imperial history when China was an imperial power and had strong relations with smaller, neighbouring tributary states. Chinese soft power discourse, in the context of China’s growing power, thus looks to traditional Chinese civilisation as a resource for the country’s values in the twenty-first century, such as the values of peace and harmony, but also as the cultural hegemon in the region (Callahan, 2014).

2. Motivation 2 & 3: Regime Security Theory

Regime Security Theory can also be used as a foundation for showing the reasons behind why the CCP has become more concerned with Soft Power. While Nye sees soft power as a positive force that is useful for a state’s foreign policy, using Regime Security to interpret Chinese discussions of soft power is interesting because it does the opposite: soft power is negative rather than positive, and is employed as a tool in domestic policy more than in foreign policy (Callahan, 2015). Regime Security Theory can be understood within the neoclassical realism paradigm. According to neoclassical realists, ‘systemic pressures are filtered through intervening domestic variables to produce foreign policy behaviours’ (Schweller 2006).

Regime Security focuses on the ruling government or coalition, rather than the state, as the key unit of analysis and identifies internal security threats as a key motivator for foreign policy strategies. This theory is also useful to examine soft power diplomacy because a country will form partnerships with external states that may help deal with threats that are directed towards the ruling regime. Contrary to balance of power or balance of threat theories, which stress the role of external threats in influencing alliance choices, regime security theory predicts that rulers facing intense internal threats will choose allies who are best able or most willing to provide assistance in countering these domestic challenges (Koblentz, 2003).

The ‘Regime’ refers to the small number of elites that have control over the machinery and decision making processes of government. According to this theory, governments that retain power through non-democratic means frequently face a high level of regime insecurity due to a combination of lack of legitimacy, political fragmentation, inadequate social cohesion, and lack of consensus on fundamental political, social, and economic issues, institutional deficits, and domestic sources of

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 instability. While these states might be well equipped with military hardware, their security ‘software’, in the form of political legitimacy, social and political integration, and policy capacity, is usually deficient (Koblentz, 2003). For instance, national regimes, especially authoritarian, non-democratic regimes, are most often overthrown internally, rather than from a foreign force. These regimes are usually toppled by popular movements, ideological rivals or through military coup d’état. Leaders facing this insecurity dilemma place more emphasis on regime security and legitimacy, as an unplanned transfer of power would place severe consequences on them. Thus the interests of the regime lie in its self-preservation, which means that the interests of the ruling regime may not extend beyond its own self-preservation and enrichment.

When discussing Regime Security with soft power analysis in relation to China, I will use Kingsley Edney’s article, which attempts to link China’s soft power motives with the CCPs insecurity over its perceived illegitimacy and regional tensions amongst minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. According to Edney, ‘soft power is primarily relevant to the enhancement of regime legitimacy where a significant component of the moral justification for maintaining the current system is based on regimes ability to improve the international status of the national unit. The international increase in positive attraction that is associated with a rise in soft power make it easier for the regime to convince its citizens of the truth of its claims that the country’s international status is improving under its leadership, where “status” is defined not only in terms of material capabilities, but also in terms of social recognition’ (Edney, 2015). The Chinese government has long claimed that foreign policy must be an extension of domestic policy and that diplomacy should serve domestic politics.

A second motivation argues that the regime is increasingly concerned about national cohesion. For the CCP to remain legitimate, it must show that it is a uniting force, and will uphold China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Interestingly, analysts who explore these two components of soft power—national cohesion and regime legitimacy—do not describe them as sources of American soft power but simply offer them as prescriptions for China’s development of soft power (Wang, 2008).

One of the main challenges to national cohesion, and thus the legitimacy of the CCP, is the challenged posed by separatism, which is predominant in regions such as Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Edney argues that a strategy of soft power is to be

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 counter-insurgent, so as to enhance regime security by making it less likely that domestic adversaries who pose a threat to national cohesion will be able to obtain material support from both local and foreign (e.g. ethnic Uyghur diaspora, Dalai Lama supporters) populations (Wang, 2008). By exporting soft power abroad, China is creating an indigenous ideology that can be seen as superior to foreign influences and ideas which may prove harmful to China’s sovereignty. Jia and Zhao claim that ‘illegal religious activities’ in Xinjiang, under the influence of external hostile forces such as Islamic extremists, can pose a threat to cultural security because they can undermine the identification of ethnic minorities with the national polity, reduce their trust in the CCP and encourage separatism (Wang, 2008).

When deriving a motivation from Regime Security, we can see two possible motivating strategies explaining why China is focusing its Soft Power resources towards Central Asia. By seeking cooperation from external states, through both ‘hard’ security cooperation and ‘soft’ public diplomacy, China is hoping to handle the growing calls for greater freedoms and separatism from its minorities in the West, which form a large diaspora in Central Asia. China sees soft power as a strategy to help increase its economic partnerships with Central Asian countries, which in turn will create better economic opportunities for Uyghurs in Xinjiang, mitigating their desire to separate from China. Regime Security theory, which is best applied to authoritarian governments, finds that the CCP is worried about its standing domestically, and thus aims ‘to improve the international status of the national unit’ (Edney, 2010). China also seeks cooperation from the outside to a) handle domestic minorities and b) push for regional economic integration so as to mitigate economic incentives for minorities to seek separation from China. Increasing anti-Han demonstrations by minorities has put pressure on the CCP to show that it is fighting against separatism and terrorism, and so have adapted soft power strategies to tackle this problem when partnering with other states.

Regime security theory is also useful when explaining another motivation for soft power. Unlike the previous motivation which focused on inward forces which could disrupt the power base of the CCP, the third motivation focuses on external factors and the cultural aspect of soft power. This motivation states that China is increasing its soft power as part of its wider aims of national ‘rejuvenation’. The motivation also argues that the CCP is using soft power to assert its legitimacy to its domestic

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 audience, with the wielding of soft power becoming part of a wider attempt to make China a global cultural superpower, which is in tandem with its rise in other military and economic spheres.

After the ‘century of humiliation’, China sees its rise as a way of regaining the lost status it endured during the 19th century at the hands of western imperialism. The psychology behind this fall from grace, from a Chinese perspective, means that China will not be satisfied until it resumes its superpower status. Some in China see this restoration of power not as a means to exert its influence unfairly, but rather as a degree of fairness in restoring China’s relative power in international affairs. By seeking to use present China’s tradition, language and heritage as one of the world’s preeminent cultures, the CCP is both challenging the dominant position of Western culture and securing its own position in China as it is seen as improving China’s standing within the international community.

The CCP has identified and defined Chinese civilization as something anti-Western. Official pronouncements from Chinese leaders have long played up the notion that Western culture is an aggressive threat to China’s own cultural sovereignty. By playing to this fear, the CCP is able to strengthen its own place within Chinese society, as it positions itself as the defender of traditional culture and soft power. It has thus taken a myriad of internal measures to ensure the country’s post-Mao reforms remain an exercise in modernization without “westernization.” Since the 1990s, for example, ideological doctrine has been increasingly infused with a new cultural nationalism, and the Party’s previously archaic propaganda system has been massively overhauled. Hu Jintao highlighted similar themes in early 2012 when he warned that ‘international hostile forces are intensifying the strategic plot of Westernising and dividing China … Ideological and cultural fields are the focal areas of their long-term infiltration” (Dynon, 2013).

Due to China’s position as a regional power, and its history as a regional hegemon until the mid-19th century, the CCP hopes to use soft power as a way of increasing China’s influence abroad, which will help maintain its legitimacy domestically. A communiqué released after the Central Committee meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in 2011 announced that “it is a pressing task to increase the state’s cultural soft power” and to “build our country into a socialist cultural superpower” (The Economist, 2013).

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3. Motivation 4: Soft Power and Migration

A fourth motivation focuses on the link between soft power and economic activity and migration, and whether there is a link between the volume of investment and migration to a state and the soft power directed towards said state. With a population totalling over 1.3 billion, China has promoted migration across the world with its ‘Go Outward’ campaign, to help deal with over crowdedness, unemployment and providing labour for Chinese companies. This has created internal problems in these states, especially ones with weaker, less centralized governments. The increase in Chinese migration has depressed wages for indigenous labours, increased unemployment in the host state and created ‘parallel communities’ between local populations and Chinese workers. China has also been accused of neo-imperialism in its trade and investment strategy in developing countries, where natural resources are increasingly been diverted out of the country to feed China’s growing energy demand.

China’s economic interests have been adversely affected by the backlash in certain countries around the world, where China’s economic dominance and high migration have led to troubles implementing projects. Examples of this have been the Zambian presidential elections in 2011, where President Sata was elected on the platform of protecting workers from malpractice and discrimination under Chinese owned mining companies. Sata warned that Chinese mining companies “needed to adhere to the labour laws” and would chuck out investors if they did not pay adequate wages to local staff. In 2010, Chinese manager opened fire on protesters at a coal mine, and though the Zambian government initially indicated that the Chinese mangers would be punished, the charges were later dropped (The New York Times, 2011). This further emboldened Sata’s campaign, and allowed for increasingly the hostile rhetoric towards China. Another prominent example of Chinese economic interests and migration hampering bilateral ties and China’s economic investments is the proposed Myitsone Dam in Myanmar. The dam has seen a growing domestic opposition to Chinese involvement in the project, with many arguing that Beijing is exploiting the international sanctions surrounding Myanmar’s economy to harvest Myanmar’s natural resources. According to Thant Myint-U, author of Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, "Burma can benefit

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 enormously from Chinese trade and investment, but there is almost bound to be a backlash if Chinese projects are undertaken with zero transparency and little concern for their impact on local communities" (BBC, 2011). The proposed plan was later cancelled by the Myanmar government due to large scale protests surrounding Chinese economic and environmental standards.

This division between indigenous labourers and Chinese migrants has the potential to create a negative image of China, and hamper closer economic cooperation between China and other states. This motivation argues that China is worried about the perceived negative effects its economic interests may have on host states, and aim to create a better understanding so as to aid Chinese companies and workers in securing investment and a hospitable atmosphere to work within.

Chinese migration towards Central Asia is predominantly split between three different groups; entrepreneurs who have set up companies after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, migrant workers who are employed by Chinese companies in the energy and infrastructure sector and local traders who inhabit numerous bazaars throughout the region. It is this third group which poses the biggest problem for Central Asia. Because of the large border separating China and Central Asia, and China’s transformation into the ‘factory of the world’, cheaply assembled products from China are increasingly finding their way into local markets, and are competing with locally made products. The introduction of the Eurasian Customs Union, which includes Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus has ‘weakened the competitiveness of China's export goods in Kazakhstan. The unification of import tariffs between these three countries has led to an increase in tariffs on goods imported by Kazakhstan from China’ (Belt and Road, 2016). Kyrgyzstan, with Chinese border trade being responsible for 1/3 GDP, also joined the Custom Union in 2015. As trade from China has continued to grow extensively over the past decade, states who are becomingly increasingly dependent on China have enacted balancing strategies by increasing economic integration and trade deals with Russia. Rafael Pantucci, an expert in Central Asia-China relations at Open Democracy, says that ‘the erection of a Russia controlled tariff barrier between China and Kyrgyzstan is likely to have a chilling effect on trade coming out of Kashgar, at a time when the Chinese government has invested a great deal into trying to develop the southern city’ (Pantucci, 2013). This is especially problematic for the CCP, as much of the trade which flows to Central

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Asia is directed through the part of Xinjiang that has faced heightened ethnic tensions for decades with large tranches of money going towards re-developing and establishing a Special Economic Zone with the aim of turning it into a hub for Central Asian trade.

Although it is hard to precisely quantify the number of Chinese migrants in Central Asia, estimates have put the numbers of migrants at 75,000 in Kazakhstan, 60,000 in Tajikistan, 40,000 in Uzbekistan and 100,000 in Kyrgyzstan, where the Chinese diaspora have recently become the fourth largest ethnic group. Chinese workers have been increasingly employed to work on strategic economic projects, such as gas pipelines from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang, and other infrastructure projects which make up the Silk Road Economic Belt, a key trade initiative for China in the 21st Century.

The negative view of the Chinese population in Central Asia is nothing new, with anti-Chinese sentiment stretching back as far as the 13th Century, with the creation of the Silk Road. In the 20th century, anti-Chinese propaganda was regularly issued in the region by the government of the Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet split. This cultural wariness and suspicion, which has fed into the narrative of anti-Chinese sentiment is still relevant today. The vacuum of Chinese understanding in the region has caused greater consternation given the increase in migrant Chinese labour. A recent study of attitudes towards China in Kazakhstan showed that the respondents demonstrated weak knowledge of Chinese culture (literature, art, traditions), as well as insufficient knowledge of its current affairs. Though the knowledge of China’s current economic, social, and political life increased from 39 percent to 49 percent between 2007 and 2012, their familiarity with Chinese culture and history remained at the same low level: 9 percent in 2012 and 10.2 percent in 2007 (Sadovskaya, 2015). It is then no wonder that this vacuum is being filled with subjective images, not based on fact and often brought in from outside. A particular concern for Central Asian states is the lack of reliable information and difficult access to migration statistics on China and analytical data on its economic presence in the region, as well as the social practice of Chinese migrants’ “parallel existence” in receiving communities accompanied by an absence of communication with local people (Sadovskaya, 2015).

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Conclusion:

The main source of tension between the different motivations is the distinction between whether soft power is a resource that is used to aid the state to strengthen its relationships with external states or the regime to maintain power. China threat theory and China’s economic dominance of certain foreign regions and sectors, both support the former, arguing that soft power is a tool to better articulate a country’s message and intentions, and is primarily used to mitigate the security dilemma posed by China’s rise. This view has been supported by a wide range of academics, such as Joseph Nye and Bonnie Glaser, who argue for the need to divert away from traditional power politics and zero-sum conflicts by diversifying how power is both realised and implemented. For Rawnsley and others, this shows that soft power is a ‘reactive, defensive’ tool which has become increasingly popular in China in tandem with the ‘threat’ discourse that has emanated from the West (Rawnsley, 2012).

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Chapter 3: Methodology and Analysis

The following chapter will outline the methodology used and how the empirical analysis will be structured and presented. My analysis will focus on a case study involving Chinese soft power towards Central Asia, examining what policies China has initiated and the wider reasons about why these policies may have been introduced. The reason I have decided to focus on Central Asia is because of the lack of research that have focused on Chinese-Central Asian relations. Central Asia is likely to become more important to China in the coming years, with natural resources, terrorism and the growing power competition in the area all having a real impact on China, and it’s soft power strategy in the region. The empirical analysis will question and examine the motivations of China head on when looking at the range of different sources, before examining whether these have been effective in creating Chinese soft power.

1. Data Analysis:

I will examine my motivations by using a range of different methods and sources. These methods will involve using survey and opinion poll data, content analysis and data analysis.

Firstly, I have found a large amount of secondary sources, such as newspaper articles, academic journals, books and radio sources that will allow me to analyse examples and outcomes of soft power. Primary sources such as government sources, such as white papers, multilateral and bilateral meetings, minutes taken at these meetings, interviews with senior policy makers and press statements have also been used to help give greater context on the situation regarding soft power and its different cases. These sources are mostly in English, with some sources being translated from Mandarin to English.

This will allow me to see if the Chinese government is taking action on soft power to target specific issues, such as greater cooperation towards Xinjiang and Muslim extremism, or more generally towards the wider population. If necessary, contradicting views are both included in the analysis to reduce the risk of interpretative bias by the author.

I will use qualitative data when looking at things such as the change in levels of aid and loans from China to Central Asian countries. I also have some questionnaire

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 results that look at public opinion towards China. I have been in contact with the Central Asian Barometer, a non-profit organization that specializes in looking at Central Asian attitudes and public opinion in the region towards a variety of different issues. They have sent me data surrounding China/Central Asian relations, and public opinion polls towards things such as Chinese economic development projects and whether China is seen as a threat to sovereignty. These surveys were carried out from 2012-2014 in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The surveys in each country have a sample size of 1000 people, have a gender split of 50:50, includes participants from different regions of these countries, and a range of different age groups. The use of opinion polls and surveys will help me explore the first motivation, as the surveys will determine whether there is anxiety towards China’s rise, and thus aid the argument that Chinese soft power is designed to help mitigated its hard power. The surveys will also be used to look at general attitudes of Central Asians towards China in relation to other foreign powers. Whilst soft power is hard to empirically study, surveys and opinion polls are regularly used by academics because they give a good indicator about how a country is perceived by a population from another state, and whether a country’s culture and public diplomacy is seen in a positive or negative light. A more advanced statistical analysis using SPSS will also be used to analyse some answers, and to see if there is any correlation between factors such as whether China is seen as a threat and the willingness to learn Mandarin.

2. Disadvantages of methodology:

It is difficult to properly quantify soft power behaviours, and its effects, because soft power is sometimes based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Whilst Hard Power is usually direct and visible, soft power is indirect, and can take years for the desired affects to appear.

The opinion polls used however do have some disadvantages to them. For example some results show that the option of ‘Don’t Know/no answer’ can sometimes be as high as 40%, leading to skewed or imbalanced results. This may be that some of the questions posed were either too difficult to understand or were not relevant to the respondent. This means that the opinion polls that I am using may lack validity. Some scholars also argue that opinion polls and surveys provide an immediacy that

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 does not reflect reality. Nye argues that researchers must be careful when using opinion polls and surveys, saying they are ‘an essential but imperfect measure of soft power resources because answers vary depending on the way that questions are formulated, and unless the same questions are asked consistently over some period, they represent snapshots rather than a continuous picture’ (Yu, 2015).

The surveys do not cover Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where it is much harder to gather information due to the political climate in each of these countries. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have a long history of central authoritarian control from the government, which means gaining access to each country to study sensitive data is virtually impossible. This means that my analysis will be limited when generalizing to all of Central Asia, because there is no way of knowing for sure how these countries populations may view Chinese hard and soft power.

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Chapter 4: Chinese soft power in Central Asia – What are Chinese soft power polices in Central Asia and why has China been motivated to use soft power in the region?

Central Asia comprises of the countries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As well as bordering China to the east, the region is sandwiched between Russia to the north, Afghanistan in the south and Iran and the Caspian Sea to its west.

Relations between Central Asia and China over the past two decades have evolved in light of two parallel processes of fundamental significance for the global order. One being the disintegration of the Russian/Soviet empire in Asia and the other – the sudden rise in China’s position (in Asia and worldwide) (Jarosiewicz, 2013). Diplomatic relations were established quickly thus adding credibility to the newly established states in the region, enabling economic development and easing the consequences of the crisis the collapse of the USSR had brought about (especially at the social level, owing to the ‘suitcase trade’ typical of the 1990s) (Jarosiewicz, 2013). However mistrust over China’s rise and its lack of cultural cohesion with the region has caused historic, ethnic and economic tensions to remain between the two regions. The issue of land, with China’s perceived want to redraw its western borders through negotiation or force, and economic dominance in terms of trade and energy, has caused widespread protests throughout the Central Asian region. Protests erupted in Kazakhstan in 2011, when the President, Nazarbayev seemed to suggest that Kazakhstan was willing to lease up to one million hectares of tis unused agricultural land to Chinese farmers. The government in Almaty was forced to backtrack two days later and issue a statement of ‘clarification’ (Aitken, 2011).

The role of Soft Power in Central Asia is multi-faceted, with China taking a wide range of policy options, spending billions of dollars to put forward a benign image of itself, creating shared norms, cultural exchanges and increased trade opportunities.

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Soft power policies in Central Asia:

1. Culture:

The prevalence of soft power strategies in China points to the government making a concerted effort in Central Asia to better communicate China’s aims and economic priorities in the region. One of the cornerstones of China’s soft power approach, not only in Central Asia but around the world, is the establishment of Confucius Institutes. Modelled on Western language and cultural centres such as the British Council and the Goethe Institutes, the aim of the institutes are designed to promote the learning of Chinese language and various cultural aspects of China. A common practice of the institutes are sponsoring student exchange programs and supporting the development of educational programs about China. To date, eight Confucius institutes have been established in the Central Asian region; four in Kazakhstan, three in Kyrgyzstan and two each in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The institutes are located in regional universities and large towns that are strategically located on the Silk Road transit route. In 2013, the number of registered Confucius Institute students in Central Asia stood at 24,000, a 33.3 percent year on year growth. The Confucius Institutes also organized 480 cultural activities in 2013, attracting 180,000 participants, double the number in 2012 (Xinhua, 2014).

Other cultural exchanges, such as increased travel and tourism and student study abroad and scholarship programmes have been set up by China to run parallel with the language courses run by the Confucius Institutes. People to people exchange has grown enormously alongside the growing economic investments made by China in the region. Chinese tourists now count for 12% of the total number of tourists visiting Kazakhstan every year. China is also the second most popular destination for Kazakhstan tourists (Russia being the first), with over 85,000 Kazakhs visiting China every year (Zhu, 2010). Bates Gill argues that tourism is an important component of Chinese soft power, as the new generation of Chinese tourists tend to cast a more positive image of a wealthier, more confident Chinese elite (Gill, 2006).

At the political level, there have been numerous parliamentary exchanges between China and the Central Asian states. Representatives from the Xinjiang branch of the Chinese Communist Party travel frequently to Central Asia, and Chinese delegations have visited the parliaments of Central Asia to learn about their procedural practices.

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Other cultural forums include the Silk Road International Cultural Forum, which was established in 2011, with the aim to ‘exchange ideas to better promote cooperation and coordination in culture’ (Kaihao, 2011). Nicholas Swanstrom argues that it is difficult to assess the impact of this on China’s soft power in the region, but it seems evident that Beijing’s unrelenting support of the Central Asian governments has created a larger degree of political trust than any other measure (Swanstrom, 2007).

Many Central Asian students who cannot afford to study in the U.S or Europe decide to enrol in Chinese universities, with the Chinese authorities creating favourable conditions for students to enrol in schools in Xinjiang and the rest of China. The number of Kazakh students enrolled at Chinese universities reached 7,500 in 2014. A further 2,000 students from Kyrgyzstan and 3,000 students each from Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also enrolled at Chinese higher education institutes2. In 2013, President Xi made a diplomatic visit to the region, visiting each country. When in Kazakhstan, he gave a major speech focusing on PRC policy toward Central Asia at Nazarbayev University. Xi promoted the idea of a “Silk Road economic belt” and announced a number of new Chinese initiatives, including a ten- year program to fund scholarships for 30,000 students from SCO countries and another to pay for 10,000 teachers and students from SCO member state Confucius Institutes to visit China (Scobell, 2014).

2. Aid and investment:

Chinese aid and investment into the region has also increased dramatically. Trade between the Central Asian states and China amounted to some $1 billion in 2000 and by 2013 it had risen to $50 billion. Since then China has signed new deals with the Central Asian states, notably agreements inked with Kazakhstan in 2016 that are worth some $23 billion (Ovozi, 2016).

Much of the investment in Central Asia are designed as ‘Soft Loans’, which carry little or no interest on them over a long period of time. These types of loans and aid are pushed by China, which sees them as ‘win-win’ scenarios between China and Central Asia. China’s foreign aid and government-sponsored investment activities (FAGIA) in Central Asia accounted to only two to five percent of China’s worldwide

2 URL: http://radiotochka.kz/1592-.html

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 aid and investment assistance in 2014 (Wolf Jnr, 2014). The RAND Corporation found that Chinese FAGIA pledges to Central Asia increased from $27 million in 2001 to $7.8 billion in 2011. This was an annual growth of 47%, led by a sharp increase from $1.4 billion in 2008 to $6.3 billion in 2009 (Wolf Jnr, 2014). The key drivers for this increase were several large projects for constructing oil and gas pipelines and exploration of copper mines. Along with the astonishing growth rate, programs also exhibited an uneven growth distribution among various categories. In particular, energy and natural resource projects were much more common than any other programmes. Some noteworthy deliveries included the two copper-exploration loans provided to Kazakhstan in 2009 and 2011, which gave Kazakhstan the largest delivered share of pledged aid over the past ten years. By the end of the decade, more than 40 percent of its cumulative pledged assistance from China had become fulfilled (Wolf Jnr, 2014).

China’s significant, yet largely unconditional, financial transfers—be it through infrastructure investments or concessional loans—have largely obliterated the acute necessity to reform and diversify the region’s economies (Huaff, 2013). This has caused Central Asian countries to essentially be bound economically by China, creating a dependency on natural resource exports to sustain economic growth and development. An example of this is Turkmenistan, which remains China’s single largest source of imported gas, while Turkmenistan is only second to Myanmar in terms of its dependence on China as an export market. China also concluded $13bn worth of loans-for energy deals with Kazakhstan, including most recently another $3 billion loan that was extended in 2013 after CNPC acquired a stake in the Kashagan international oil consortium (Cooley, 2015).

The increase in aid and investment has culminated in the One Belt One Road project, which links China to European markets through Eurasia. China in using the strong appeal and confidence-inspiring symbolism of the Silk Road as its main strategy for developing its soft power. The term “Silk Road” has positive historical connotations, and is a symbol of continued Chinese cooperation on issues such as trade and migration, which China hopes will not be lost on the native populous. Nonetheless, China will need to clarify its priorities further in this context.

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China’s development model is well suited to Central Asia, with the ‘Beijing Consensus3’, likely to be an appealing factor to many of the Central Asian countries, whose economies are still heavily state dependant since the dissolution of the USSR. Popularized by Joshua Ramo, the Beijing Consensus is described as the reversal of the Washington Consensus, whereby ideas such as the free market and privatization are turned on its head, with a more pragmatic role for the state is supported. Instead of a one size fits all approach, and economic shock therapy, China’s development model has been widely admired for its steady approach, following Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic ‘groping for stones while crossing the river’ approach. Ramo argues that China is ‘marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity’ (Ramo, 2004). If Soft Power is all about attraction, then China’s economic development strategies have not only influenced other countries to attempt similar modernization programmes, but many have actively followed China’s lead in developing their own economics.

For Central Asia, China’s strong authoritarian focus, coupled with strong economic growth is a positive attraction. Regional autocrats, who have held power for over two decades, see China’s development model as one where continuing rule need not be sacrificed for greater economic progress. There have been no official statements to confirm the adherence to the Beijing Consensus, however the ‘unconscious’ appeal can be studied by using survey results, where we can see that Chinese economic and developmental models have proven very popular to people in the region. Bates Gill suggests that Chinese mix of market oriented authoritarianism and ‘Beijing’s ability to present an alternative political and economic model could be a telling indicator of a growing Chinese ideological influence that is countering the Western perspectives of democratic practice as a prerequisite for economic prosperity’ (Gill, 2006).

3 The Beijing Consensus is more of a rhetorical device used by scholars to discuss China’s economic and political models. Whilst China has not explicitly discussed this new model, it is important nonetheless because inspiration may be taken from it to show that development strategies can succeed when there is a divergence from Western ideas.

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

3. Institutions:

Chen Dongxiao argues that ‘multilateral diplomacy has been a broad arena for improving our diplomatic capabilities and national image’ (Lu, 2012).China has sought to use multilateralism in Central Asia, increasing its Soft Power through the SCO. The SCO was set up as the Shanghai Five for the purpose to tackle terrorism and extremism in the region, the organization added Uzbekistan in 20014, and has grown into an important multilateral summit addressing security and economic issues. China has been at the forefront of this push for greater integration between member states, with proposals for a SCO Development Bank and a SCO Free Trade Agreement.

The SCO is presented by China as a convergence of norms and interests in the region, often referred to in the context of common norms and defined as “Shanghai spirit” which includes “‟mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multi-civilizations, and striving for common development5.” However, this convergence of values is not beholden to any political, religious or ethical likenesses. According to Zhao Huasheng, “the Shanghai spirit is designed to allow states and people with different ideologies, political systems and states of mind to cooperate, rather than attempting to create a common ideology” (Huasheng, 2015). The SCO has been seen as China’s attempt to create a ‘new regionalism’ in Central Asia. China’s 'New regionalism', defined as 'open, functional, interest-based cooperation among contiguous states' based on mutual respect for state sovereignty. For China the SCO is of huge symbolic importance as, for the first time, it showcases China's capability to promote its norms and values through its soft power diplomacy, in a multilateral setting which it co-leads with Russia (Greiger, 2015). The SCO also enhances regime security in China by helping to legitimize its rulers. Since none of the political leaders were selected through free and fair elections, the SCO functions as an autocrats’ club, providing rulers with a tangible means to demonstrate their status and offer real economic benefits to their citizens through international trade and investment. Membership to the SCO is also beneficial for the Central Asian states because of China’s position in the world. By using the SCO as a vehicle to

4 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization consists of China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. India and Pakistan were granted full status as full members in 2015, and are expected to join in 2016. 5 http://en.sco-russia.ru/about_sco/20140905/1013180761.html

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 become more integrated politically and economically with China, Central Asian states stand to gain from China’s economic standing and UN Security Council seat (Crisis Group Report, 2013).

Moreover, the SCO is a forum for all the member states to cooperate in keeping one another in power: As secular authoritarian regimes, they all share a common interest in blocking Islamic fundamentalism and democratization (Scobell, 2012). China’s ‘affirmative’ approach towards the countries of Central Asia has been manifested through the high level of bilateral visits, China’s interest in signing strategic cooperation agreements, and its support for Central Asian countries on the international scene, especially in two sensitive areas: the legitimisation and the stability of the regimes, and their independence from other regional powers (Jarosiewicz, 2013).

Indeed the SCO has provided China with an avenue to tackling the three evils ‘separatism, extremism and terrorism’. By virtue of bilateral security arrangements with key Central Asian states through the SCO, China has successfully extradited a significant number of alleged Uyghur ‘separatists and terrorists’ from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Jarosiewicz, 2013).

4. Survey results and analysis

To examine if Chinese soft power has been effective, and the perception of China as a rising power which is seen as a threat, this next section will use survey results to synthesize regional perceptions and reactions to China’s soft power, measuring affinity for China’s cultural attractiveness through poll data and cross-national surveys.

4.1 Motivation 1 – China seen as a threat towards Central Asia:

The Central Asian Barometer surveys reveal interesting trends about how China is perceived, and the extent to which Chinese culture has been accepted by Central Asian populations. When asked about which country should be seen as the most important partner, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan all named Russia as the most important partner. China was ranked between second and fourth in the options given, placing second with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, with 17.2% and 24.4% respectively. This was comfortably ahead of third placed Iran and the EU, but lagged

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 far behind Russia, which claimed over double the amount of responses China received.

In Kyrgyzstan, China was even further behind, placing fourth, behind Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey with only 22.2% of responders seeing China as a key diplomatic priority for Kyrgyzstan. Given that China is now the largest trading partner in the region, and a key security backer of many of the regimes in Central Asia, it is surprising that it is not regarded as the top priority nation, or at least on a similar level with Russia, which has seen its power wane in the region over the past two decades. The reason for such a low score vis-à-vis other nations may be the underlying fear of a growing China, and the China threat, which may manifest itself to a greater extent in the future. By loosening ties with China, and balancing towards Russia, Central Asia may mitigate the threat posed by China, and thus are less likely to be dependent on China for exports, or suffer land reclamation or occupation. China may also suffer because of its lack of cultural affiliation. Along with Russia, states such as Turkey and Iran (and Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan), who all share common ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, also post high scores, despite not having the economic pull of China.

Whether China is viewed as a specific threat is more complicated still. China Threat Theory states that China uses its soft power to help counterbalance its hard power capabilities. Therefore, China should be seen as a threat to the stability of the countries in question. The results show a mixed feelings towards China’s power and the threat this poses. In Kazakhstan, which is most agitated about conspiracies of land takeover, China places first in the question of which country poses the biggest threat to Kazakhstan? 30.5 % of the respondents to the survey placed China as the biggest threat to the nation’s sovereignty and interests. This was much larger than second place United States which scored only 12%. The reason for the large gap between China and other states may lie in China becoming increasingly dominant over Kazakhstan’s energy sector. The rise in the number of pipeline deals, extraction of other natural resources and the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, which has displaced thousands to Kazakhstan, means that China is increasingly seen as threat to sovereignty.

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Figure 1: Which countries pose the biggest threat for Kazakhstan? 6

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the threat posed by China is more ambiguous. For both countries, Afghanistan is seen as the most likely country to pose a threat. This may be because of the geographical distance between the two countries and Afghanistan, with Tajikistan bordering the state to the north. Afghanistan has also been a training ground and safe haven for Islamic groups linked with terrorism and extremism in Central Asia, many of which have operated in the Ferghana Valley between Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan China is seen as the fifth largest threat posed, with 20% choosing China, behind Afghanistan, United States, Uzbekistan and Iran. This is surprising, and possibly a sign that Chinese soft power has been effective in the region, due to China’s land border and increasing cross border migration. The fact that China ranks below smaller powers such as Iran and Uzbekistan shows that China’s soft power and increasing investment strategies have been having an effect on its image. In Tajikistan, China is placed fourth, but with only 2.5% of respondents seeing China as a threat to their state. This is another sign that China’s soft power is having the desired effect and that China is successfully portraying itself as a benign power.

6 Table made with survey results from Central Asian Barometer

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When arguing that China is motivated to increase its public diplomacy and soft power to offset its perceived threat to Central Asia, we can see that extra effort has been placed at developing its bilateral framework with Kazakhstan, which China sees as its most important partner in the region. In 2002, the two countries signed the ‘Good Neighbour Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’, and further developed inter-governmental development plans on areas such as culture and education. Kazakhstan was also the first Central Asian State to form a strategic partnership with China, which has served to strengthen mutual trust and deepen cooperation (Rumer, 2007). The use of surveys have largely supported the China threat thesis to be correct in terms of China needing to use soft power to challenge the perceived threat it poses to the region. This motivation holds especially for Kazakhstan, which has developed closer bilateral and public diplomacy ties with China, but is also most at threat over its dependence of trade in natural resources, influx of political refugees and migrant workers.

China posing a direct threat is most likely to be true for countries that share a border with China. Chinese attempts to use soft power in countries such as Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan seem to be less of a priority for China, with bilateral relations usually only focusing on economic investments. As can be seen from Picture 1, lack of a common border diminishes the potential for disputes, and thus giving China an image of a revisionist state. Also, the lack of a common boundary reduces the opportunity for direct contact, transportation links, border trade and nongovernmental interaction (Rumer, 2007).

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Picture 1: Map of Central Asia

The surveys seem to present an ambiguous picture of how China is seen in the region. Whilst its rise is framed as being a threat to its bordering states, it also seen as a partner with which economic development, trade and security relations are seen in a positive light. The problem China faces, and a reason for the increase in soft power in recent years, is that its culture has not gained sufficient traction within the region. No survey points to China having a positive impact with its language or cultural morals. If China is to better present itself as a benign power, and that it is firmly committed to a ‘peaceful rise’, it needs to further clarify its position, using its culture and history to show its peaceful history and lack of territorial ambition. Religion and ethnicity also seem to be a limitation in China’s approach to Central Asia.

4.2 Motivation 2 – China seeking regime legitimacy

The next motivation for Chinese soft, which is supported by Regime Security, puts forward that soft power of other actors, both state and non-state, can constitute a threat to cohesion and CCP legitimacy. Non-state actors, such as the Uyghurs in

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Xinjiang, Uyghur exile community in Central Asia and other groups sympathetic to their cause can have negative effects on party-state efforts to generate national cohesions (Edney, 2015). China’s soft power towards Central Asia is part of a broader effort by China to gain the benefits of being open to international cultural influence and exchange without undermining national cohesion. This is carried out through China’s public diplomacy, leading roles in regional institutions and nongovernmental programmes. Regime Security argues that soft power in Central Asia is enhancing the ability of China to use vehicles such as the SCO, and joint terrorism drills so in order for Central Asian neighbours to remain sympathetic to Beijing’s cause. Prominent cases include the deportation of Uyghur activist Ershidin Israil from Kazakhstan to China. Although granted refugee status by the UN, Israil was removed from Kazakhstan by Chinese police under the framework of the SCO. Kazakhstan is obliged to extradite individuals accused by another member state government of “terrorism,” “separatism,” or “extremism,” and to “prevent the granting of refugee status and corresponding documents” to persons alleged to be involved in offenses related to terrorism (Radio Free Asia, 2011). NGO’s such as Freedom House have repeatedly highlighted Israil’s deportation, pointing to a ‘disturbing trend of China’s influence in the region to pressure neighbouring governments to repatriate members of persecuted ethnic and religious minorities, despite international legal norms prohibiting the return of an individual to a country where he or she may be torture’ (Radio Free Asia, 2011).

China’s relation with Central Asia reflects the importance placed on the Xinjiang province, where both soft and hard power are being used by China abroad and at home to better integrate the province into the regional economy. Michael E. Clarke, in his book Xinjiang and China’s Rise in Central Asia – A History, reflects this view. Clarke argues that the acquisition of natural resources and growing cultural and economic links are increasing Beijing’s ‘gravitational pull’, which has resulted in ‘Central Asian acquiescence to China’s dominant role in the SCO but also in Central Asia assurances and cooperation with Beijing on the issue of Uyghur ‘separatism’ in Xinjiang’ (Clarke, 2011). Konstantin Syroyezhkin, a Kazakh sinologist, also suggests that China’s soft power towards Central Asia is motivated by domestic concerns. He argues that ‘Xinjiang, like Taiwan and neighbouring Tibet, is a neuralgic issue for China, which desperately needs internal stability in that predominantly Muslim,

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 resource-rich and strategically important region. Beijing’s strategic and energy objectives are based on stability in Xinjiang, and its Central Asian policies grow out of its preoccupation with stability there’ (Tukmadiyeva, 2013). The strong link between domestic and foreign policies plays out over Xinjiang and China’s greater ambitions in Central Asia. The notion of ‘opening up’ is still relatively novel in China, and has not dramatically altered Beijing’s priorities in the region, which is still heavily focused on domestic issues. Tukmadieyva argues that this dual strategy ‘explains the strategy of “double-opening” employed towards Xinjiang in relation to Central Asia – an effort to tie Xinjiang into “China Proper” through simultaneous integration into Central Asian economies while establishing security and economic cooperation with the Central Asian states’ (Tukmadieyva, 2015).

4.3 Motivation 3 – China is suing soft power to become a ‘Cultural Superpower’

Due to the lack of transparency in terms of policy making within the Chinese government system, it is very difficult to ascertain whether this motivation is correct. Whilst growing Chinese power would present China with an opportunity to increase its soft power alongside its hard power, and many see China as being able to challenge western dominated cultural forms with its own mix of Chinese and socialist cultural exports, Central Asia is unlikely testing ground for implanting Chinese culture and challenging western and to a lesser extent Russian cultural supremacy. The mix of Muslim culture, Russian language dominance and local folk traditions means Chinese language will more than likely be ignored and squeezed out of mainstream practice and thought. Chinese culture has slowly crept in importance and influence in the past two decades, but the growth has been negligible, especially when comparing the numbers of students learning Mandarin to those learning English or Russian. Whilst there has been some limited success in China’s cultural diplomacy, the effectiveness and popularity is linked to Chinese investments, which has made states like Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan open to China's 'cultural diplomacy'. In the course of recent years, China has gradually come to be accepted as a natural partner by the Central Asian states, despite a centuries-old local distrust of Chinese ambitions. This means that soft power is motivated by investments and greater economic opportunities, rather than China seeing itself as a greater cultural power in the region. The idea that China sees itself as a cultural power would be more suited to looking at the motivations surrounding Chinese Soft Power in South and East

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Asia, where in terms of shared Confucius heritage, language and history, China shares a much deeper role and influence.

However, although China is not seen as such a strong threat as many had predicted, the results show that Chinese culture is still intrinsically rejected by the Central Asian states. In Tajikistan, China, along with the EU, was widely rejected as having a strong or meaningful cultural influence over Central Asia. In fact China was seen as having a much more negative impact on culture in Central Asia than other areas such as security and development, with 5.8% of respondents, against 1.3%, saying the implantation of Chinese culture and morals into society was having an adverse effect on the region. Chinese culture was highlighted the most when looking at the negative aspects of Chinese involvement in Central Asia, ahead of more direct interventions such as creating instability or interfering with internal policies. This may be because of the lack of cultural crossover, with Confucianism and other traditional Chinese religions such as Daoism and Buddhism unlikely to appeal to Central Asia’s largely Sunni Muslim population. China’s cultural morals, which are based around the patriarchal family, rather than religious belief, may not sit as well with the more conservative elements of Central Asian society.

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Figure 2: Survey Question (Tajikistan) – In your opinion what role do the following countries play in Central Asia?7

USA Russia China Iran European Union (EU) Turkey Positive - security and stability 11.4 30.5 11.4 10.2 9.1 10.3

Positive – economic development 8.9 25.3 35.1 14.5 9.3 21.2 1.0 Positive - cultural development 1.5 1.3 15.9 4.3 6.3

Neutral – no significant impact on … 10.7 4.1 4.6 7.4 11.3 6.8

Negative - leading to instability 7.5 1.3 2.7 1.6 1.3 2.7

Negative – intervention with the regional … 4.8 1.4 2.1 0.3 1.8 1.1

Negative – implanting its culture and morals 8.7 4.9 5.8 5.2 4.3 5.3

Don’t know/no answer 47.1 31.0 37.2 44.9 58.6 46.3

Further questions in the survey also present China with a problem with its culture in Central Asia. The issue of language is also seen as a problem, due to the lack of speakers in the region, and also the lack of desire for people wanting to learn the language. In the survey respondents were asked about what language, other than Tajik, that they wanted to learn. Chinese language scored very poorly, with a score of only 2.7%. The Chinese language and its increasing study in Central Asian countries is a vital tool in China’s soft power strategy, so the results are obviously a blow to longer term Chinese integration in the country. The lack of aspiration to learn Mandarin may lie in the fact that Russian is still more useful in these countries, with many migrating to Russia, not China, to find work. In a further follow up question, which language would you want your children to learn and know? The Chinese language again scores poorly, with only 1% selecting mandarin. This shows that China still has a long way to go in increasing its cultural influence in Central Asia. It is telling that in the future, Central Asian still see Russian, English and Arabic as far

7 Table received via Central Asia Barometer PowerPoint presentation

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 more useful languages to acquire than Chinese, pointing to the fact that Chinese culture is still misunderstood or neglected in the region.

Figure 3: Survey question (Tajikistan) – What language would you want your children to learn and why?8

English 52.6

Russian 39.3

Arabic 4.5

Chinese 1.0

Turkish 0.8

Other 1.7

There are similar results to Tajikistan’s from the other Central Asian countries regarding Chinese culture and language. In Kazakhstan for instance, negativity surrounding Chinese culture is slightly higher, encompassing 18.6% of the share of attitudes. The Kazakh respondents also highlighted culture and its role in Kazakh society as the main negative aspect of China’s interaction within Central Asia. This is again surprising, as the negativity that surrounds Chinese culture is only matched by the United States, and dwarfs that of the EU and Russia. The positive aspects of China’s role in the country are also seen as similar to the Unites States, and again falls well below that of Russia. In comparison to other countries in the region, Kazakhstan, which also sees China as its greatest potential threat to sovereignty, also has the least positive outlook on cooperation with China and Chia’s role within the region. This may pose a problem for China in the future, as Kazakhstan is both its largest supplier of natural resources and biggest trading partner in the region. Kazakhstan is also seen as the de facto leader of the Central Asian states. This points to China needing to step up and increase its cultural understanding and

8 Table received from Central Asia Barometer Excel spreadsheet

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 learning in Kazakhstan, increasing its scholarship exchange programmes, setting up Confucius institutes and developing its public diplomacy tools.

Figure 4: What role does the U.S, Russia, China and the European Union play in Central Asia? (Kazakhstan) 9

When analysing the responses to the same set of questions in Kyrgyzstan, we see that China’s culture and morals are still seen in a largely negative light, with 24.2% of the respondents pointing to Chinese culture as having a negative impact on the region. However the positive image of China is also higher, with China being slightly better off in terms of positive views towards economic and security development.

9 Table received from Central Asia Barometer PowerPoint presentation

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Figure 5: What role does the U.S, Russia, and Chia play in Central Asia? (Kyrgyzstan) 10

China’s developmental model, which was mentioned earlier in the thesis as a key soft power strategy for Beijing, was also shown to be largely ineffective when placed against competing states in the region. Although Beijing’s economic development model has proven to be a strong success over the past 20 years, Central Asian states have still preferred to follow Russia and Kazakhstan when developing their own economies. For example, as can be seen in figure 1, in Kyrgyzstan, China’s developmental model is ranked behind both Russia and Kazakhstan, with less than 20% of respondents preferring the adoption of Beijing Consensus type reforms and policies.

10 Table received from Central Asia Barometer PowerPoint presentation

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Figure 6: In your opinion which of the following countries might be a model for development of Kyrgyzstan? 11

Sebastian Peyrouse argues that whilst the elites may be more pro-China, there remains a large disconnect between the elites and the general population, who view China with a deep mistrust and scepticism over its governmental model and the continuing adherence to communist principles. Peyrouse says that China is merely a counterweight to ‘Islamism or “democratic chaos” and that Chinese-style references to Beijing’s communism hold little sway in domestic debate surrounding the future of the region. Those who ‘consider themselves to be part of the “Soviet” or “Eurasianist” tradition… give their clear preference to the Russian model. Those with a Western, pan-Turkic, or Islamic orientation view China negatively, believing that it hinders the evolution of their societies in the desired direction. While there are pro-Western, nationalist, pan-Turkic, or Russophile ideological traditions, very few scholars in Central Asia call for a closer alignment in regards to culture with China’ (Peyrouse, 2016).

11 Data received from Central Asia Barometer SPSS spreadsheet

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4.4 Motivation 4: Soft Power is motivated because of China’s economic interests abroad

Whilst China’s economic and security arrangements are generally welcomed in the region, due to Central Asian countries using China as a balance against Russia, the Russian language (Russian language remains the de facto lingua franca of the region’s political, economic and cultural elite, as well as of urban, well-educated upper middle classes12), shared Soviet history and migration undertaken by workers to Russia means that Russian culture is still dominant today. This appears to have led to a general misperception surrounding Chinese involvement in the region, with many seeing China as challenging and replacing Russia as the main regional power. In order to present itself as a responsible power, China must better make the case for the study of its language and culture and work with Russia in the SCO to improve regional infrastructure and trade in a sustainable way.

We can argue, using the information available on Chinese soft power, that Chinese economic interests are likely to be a motivating factor is likely to be accurate. Chinese labourers have increasingly been used in large infrastructure projects within Central Asia. Whilst we cannot ascertain the exact number of migrants working in Central Asia, estimates range from 100,000 to well over 500,000. Many Central Asians have been impacted by the slow Russian economy and reduction in oil prices over the past year. This has seen the levels of unemployment rise, and more people migrating overseas to find home, whilst many local labouring jobs are increasingly going to Chinese workers, who work for less pay. In the surveys, we can see a strong preference in Central Asia for the extraction of natural resources to be controlled by the state, and have little or nothing to do with foreign companies or migrant workers. Respondents in Tajikistan were asked who should be allowed to develop mineral resources in Tajikistan? and the results showed strong support for state controlled companies. Overall, over half (50.5%) opted for resources to be extracted by the state, and a further 15.1% opted for private Tajik businesses to be able to extract resources, with only 4.3% choosing foreign companies. The anti- foreign attitudes towards investment and labourers can be further seen in the sources of investment, and where people think this should derive from. The results

12 Rossi, Marco, Old Game, New Player: Russia, China and the struggle for mastery in Central Asia, Policy Briefing, EU Parliament, August 2012, p.14

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 again paint a picture of local resentment towards foreign populations and investors, with 21.4% choosing foreign investors as main sources of investment against 23% who favour local investors. However the most popular answer was for investment to come from the state, even if that meant cutting expenditure elsewhere (34%). This shows that foreign companies and investors are seen as negative influences on a state’s economy and sources of resentment.

Figure 7: Where should Tajikistan get its investment from? 13

The increase in dependence on natural resource imports form the region and the likely infrastructure projects that will be commissioned in the coming decades because of the Silk Road Economic belt, means that soft power is being used to better articulate China’s investment strategy in the region, and create a more positive image of the country. China hopes that by increasing its soft power in the region there will be a greater degree of Chinese investment, and more acceptance of Chinese labour.

13 Table taken from Central Asia Barometer Excel spreadsheet

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper asks what factors are motivating China to increase its soft power, using a case study of China’s soft power relationship with Central Asia. The paper put forward four different motivations as tools to better understand the aims of China’s soft power strategy, before examining if they were compatible, or were rejected, when used with the case study.

Fist, the thesis examined the role of Soft Power more generally, and looked at how soft power is formed, the implications for its use and how it differs from other types of power. The thesis then went on to contextualize Soft Power from a Chinese perspective, and argued that Chinese perceptions of Soft Power had evolved from previous western notions and ideas surrounding the term. The thesis explored how China has created a broader remit for activities and attractions that come under Soft Power, and how China is beginning to expand its use of soft power into regions such as Latin America, Africa and Central Asia, where it has large investments in natural resources. The next section dealt with the differing motivations behind this extension of Chinese Soft Power throughout the world, where four different explanations were given to help predict why its rise had come about.

The thesis has used different observable data, from qualitative resources such as trade statistics and statistics regarding tourism, cultural exchanges and the opening of Confucius Institutes to survey results and quantitative data reports into attitudes towards China’s threat perception and cultural influence. Whilst soft power is very hard to measure, and the reasons for its use vary, the method of using a case study is the most practical way of analysing soft power. The thesis used research to show that China’s position in a certain region of the world was ambiguous, with China being seen as both a threat and potential economic and security partner. However although this research process worked well with two motivaitons, which could be empirically mapped by looking at how China is perceived as a threat/the attitude towards the role of Chinese workers in Central Asia, motivations that focused largely on the regime are largely theoretical, and with no information on the internal workings of Chinese policy making, much of the research was done using Regime Security theory as a way of assessing the role of the CCP in introducing soft power resources. The various motivations put forward also fail to take into account other variables that are external to the regime which may motivate soft power, such as

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 encouraging the study of Mandarin to allow for its greater use in business, or wanting other states to learn more about China so as to better understand its history and cultural norms.

Whilst national security is touted as the foremost motivation for pursuing soft power, other motivations focus on the internal mechanisms of the CCP, which point to domestic concerns driving China’s Soft Power project. The second motivation is touted by Kingsley Edney who argues that the ‘cultural security’ that is provided by soft power affords the ruling regime in China greater legitimacy and lessens the likelihood of a revolution, coup or popular uprising. According to Edney, ‘the leadership attempts to appease domestic nationalist audiences by gaining ‘face’ for China abroad and the party-state has often publicized of support or admiration of foreign allies to demonstrate China’s international status and thereby bolster its moral claim to rule’ (Edney, 2015). Both the second and third motivations adhere to Regime Security as a way of understanding the domestic concerns the ruling party has, and the need for soft power to be deployed as a strategy to shore up support for the regime. However they differ in regards to how the CCP sees its legitimacy in terms of the domestic populous. The internal security motivation, argues that territorial integrity and sovereignty are the most important factors for regime legitimacy, with areas such as Taiwan, Xinjiang and Tibet increasingly becoming more restive, the CCP needs to show that it has the full support of the international community. The role of soft power allows China to increase its ability to set the agenda on international issues such as the issue of Taiwanese independence aspirations where China hopes that the more people know about China, the more they will accept why it acts in the way it does (Breslin, 2010).

On the other hand, the external security motivation argues that in terms of building legitimacy and national cohesion, the CCP aims to develop and rebrand China as a cultural superpower, rejuvenating the ancient culture. The motivation states that China sees itself wronged after the century of humiliation and the rise of postmodern western popular culture. In order to achieve its rise as a great nation, Chinese soft power is being rolled out alongside its hard power to increase its comprehensive nitinol power and to reassert itself globally as a truly important cultural power. By doing this, the CCP hopes that it will further generate national cohesion, with the

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Chinese populous rallying around a more culturally important and assertive China, which will in turn strengthen its own legitimacy at home.

Overall my research found that Chinese soft power in Central Asia is largely motivated due to China wanting to be seen as a more benign neighbour, with China wary about how it is represented in the region because of strong anti-Chinese sentiment. There is also a need to cultivate strong relationships with the ruling regimes and populations so as to afford China better access to oil and gas reserves and to co-opt the region into helping China focus its attempts to tackle religious and ethnic separatism and extremism.

The differing of China’s interests with individual countries, such as the role of natural resources plays in bilateral relations, the length, or lack of, land borders between China and Central Asian countries and the domestic political climate means that there are corresponding differences between China and each country. The ethnic, historical, linguistic and cultural relationship that the Central Asian states have with Xinjiang, especially in the case of Kazakhstan, can go a long way to explaining the reasons behind why there are differences in the perceived threat presented by China, and the positive aspects that China brings to Central Asia, in terms of broader security cooperation and economic opportunities.

Mitigating China’s perceived threat is still the best place to start when examining the reasons motivating soft power, with China still being seen in Central Asia as a source of potential conflict, and the threat of territorial loss and economic dominance registering as real and possible threats in the region. Although high level diplomatic talks have become more recurring, and China and Central Asia have been active partners in the SCO, the research points to an underlying mistrust of China within the general population.

A Kyrgyz saying goes: “When the dark haired Chinese arrives, even a red-bearded Russian will be dearer than your own father” (Krasnopolsky, 2016). The belief that China has ulterior motives in Central Asia, and seeks expansion to alleviate overcrowding with its growing population, or that China will use its energy pipelines in Central Asia as an excuse to deploy troops on ‘peacekeeping’ operations, is a common theme in Central Asian thought. This view not only comes from Central Asian populations who border China, but also from the elites. Murat Auezov,

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to China between 1992 and 1995 has been one of the most outspoken critics of Chinese foreign policy designs. Auezov has said ‘China of the 19th Century, China of the 20th Century and China of the 21st Century are three different countries. What is common among them is the desire to expand their land’ (Nogayeva, 2015).

This anti-Chinese psychology is not something that can be diminished by simply engaging in economic trade and security relationships, hence why Chinese soft power is attempting to broaden its cooperation within the region, from cultural and public diplomacy, to promoting its developmental model. Only then can China be seen as a reliable partner, and start to replace Russia as the most important power in the region. The findings also point to strong nationalistic tendencies in the region, which is not surprising given the long occupation of the region by the Soviet Union and the recent independence that each state received. This again poses another reason for soft power from China, where its perceived economic domination and growing migrant population have caused a strong reaction from the indigenous populations. The anger directed towards foreign nationals and companies in extracting natural resources in the region, which manifests itself in protests and strikes, means China needs to ensure its soft power is directed towards political elites to ensure access to resources are not blocked and also the populations that are directly affected by Chinese migration.

My research has attempted to answer the broad question of what is motivating Chines power, and uses different theories put forward and applied them to a case study. Further study is needed to examine if the results from Central Asia are compatible when applied to other regions of Asia. A greater focus on the types of sources are also needed to help present a more vivid picture of Chinese policy making strategies. This would require interviews and insider knowledge from policy makers. Further work on Chinese soft power in Central Asia can look at whether Chinese culture and soft power is compatible with the regions various folk religions and traditions, whether Chinese soft power is in competition with other normative powers soft power strategies and whether soft power can be seen as compatible with China’s increasingly stringent rule over Xinjiang.

With the findings, and the ambiguous position presented by the Chinese threat theory and the role of migration into Central Asia, further interviews in Central Asia

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016 with both elites and people living on the border regions with China would create a clearer position of people’s opinions towards the Chinese soft and hard power, and will allow for a better understanding of how China is reacting to these views.

William Kennedy Universiteit van Amsterdam 2016

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