Vol. 2, No. 1, January-July 2009
North Ryde, New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
ISSN : 0974-0600
Journal of Global Communication VOL.2, NO.1, JAN. - JULY 2009
North Ryde, New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia CONTENTS
Sl. No Details Page 20 Information Control and Imperiled Public Discourse : A General Process Model of Gatekeeping, Agenda Setting, and News Content Homogenization, Gregg A. Payne 199-208 21 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet: Challenges to 209-224 Democratic Communication, Lauren B. Movius 22 The transformation of political communication in Mexico (1994-2006) 225-247 German Espino 23 No More Bowling Alone: When social capital goes digital 248-263 Anders Svensson 24 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism 264-278 Reggy Capacio Figer 25 Manipulation, Informative Control and Iraq War, Aurora Labio Bernal 279-288 26 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair 289-312 Claudia Bucciferro 27 The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse, Ming Kuok LIM 313-326
l The International Team of GCRA Congratulates
Professor Naren Chitty, Founder President of GCRA For winning the award of “Order of Australia” for “Services to education, particularly in the field of international communication as a researcher and academic, and to a range of professional associations”.
Professor Naren Chitty AM, with Her Excellency Professor Marie Bashir, Governor of New South Wales, after the investiture ceremony for the Order of Australia at Government House, Sydney, on May 6, 2009 Journal of Global Communication Vol. 2 No. 1 (January to June 2009)
Special issue on Media and Democratization
This issue has the privilege of guest editor Mohammad Sahid Ullah Associate Professor Department of Communication and Journalism, Chittagong University Chittagong-4331, Bangladesh Phone: 88-01554-352573, Mobile:88-01819-333539, Fax: 88-031-726310 Email: [email protected] Journal of Global Communication, Vol2., No.1, Jan.-July 2009 pp. 199-208 Information Control and Imperiled Public Discourse: A General Process Model of Gatekeeping, Agenda Setting, and News Content Homogenization Gregg A. Payne, Ph.D. Department of Communication Studies, Chapman University 1 University Drive Orange, CA 92866, USA 01.714.997.6815, [email protected]
Abstract This paper is, in part, a response to Gandy’s (1982) recognition of a need to go beyond conventional borders of agenda setting theory, to examine who sets the media agenda, for what purposes, and with what consequences. Conventional conceptual explications of gatekeeping and agenda setting are revisited, and substantive modifications proposed. Theoretical linkages between the two are examined, together with the consequences for homogenization of mass media news content. A general content homogenization model is proposed that provides an explanatory and predictive framework for news analysis; irrespective of dominate social, political, and economic ideology. It is argued that that gatekeeping controls over the agenda setting process produce a homogenized news product that curtails opportunities for robust public discourse. McCombs contention that agenda setting is an inadvertent by product of the mass communication process is problematized (2006). Key words : gatekeeping, agenda setting, media, news, homogenization, information Introduction This paper makes the argument that mass media news content is a product of a gatekeeping hierarchy whose dictates determines news frames (Ghanem, 1997, Takeshita, 1997), specify exemplars associated with priming, and imbue media and public agendas with the issues and attributes that generate first and second-level agenda-setting effects. The architecture of the gatekeeping process and its agenda-setting outcomes, it is argued, result in homogenization of mass media content, the marginalization of minorities, curtailment of expression of dissident viewpoints, naturalization of a distorted reality, and restricted dialectical possibilities available for public discourse. The discussion here is, in part, a response to Gandy’s recognition of the need to look beyond agenda setting to reveal the forces that set the media agenda, the purposes for which it is set, and the resulting influence on the distribution of social power and values (Gandy, 1982, p. 7). In general, discussions of the media agenda treat the phenomenon as a spontaneous event, lacking any antecedent generative force. In fact, the antecedents are several, a number of which are identified here. It is also suggested that there is little evidence to support McCombs contention (2004, pp. 11, 19) that agenda setting is an inadvertent by product of mass 202 Information Control and Imperiled Public Discourse: A General Process.... communication. Instead, it is argued, the agenda is the purposeful construction of elite interests dedicated to maintenance of the status quo. A General Process Model of Content Homogenization (figure 1) is advanced. The model reflects a theoretical synthesis of gatekeeping and agenda setting processes in the production of largely undifferentiated, conservatively-biased mass communication content. It is argued that the model is subject to validation through hypothesis testing examining relationships postulated by the model. In addition to authenticating the proposed model, the expectation is that empirically- based research will have substantive implications for advancement of agenda setting theory, and its relation to news content homogenization. For those whose primary interests lay elsewhere, a brief lexicon of relevant terms may be helpful. Framing is the ideological lens through which environmental phenomena are viewed in the construction of news. Priming is psychological construct suggesting media content makes salient for news consumer’s issues and their attributes that are subsequently reflexively consulted as typifications (Zillmann, 2002; Willnat, 1997). Issues are events or activities featured in news coverage, attributes specific qualities of the issues. The notion of first-level agenda setting asserts that news content determines what people think about; second-level effects are located in how people think about what they think about. While the theoretical work and derivative research by US scholars has produced a voluminous literature related to largely to US news production, the global application to a variety of social, political, and economic circumstances has gone largely unexamined. The present paper demonstrates their relevance to news generation under a variety of ideological conditions, and addresses the oppressive consequences of what Schiller (1996, p. 87) has called the tyranny of gatekeepers. The global relevance of extant theoretical and empirical work is suggested by the influence of mass media in cultivating values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and behaviors already present in a society, stabilizing and reinforcing conventional beliefs and behaviors, and, in the process, homogenizing public opinion, irrespective of the cultural context (Gerbner, Gross, and Signorielli,1986). While the analysis presented here argues for the global applicability of a content homogenization model, the illustrative exemplar employed involves the news product of US media. The contention is that mass media embedded in capitalist economic systems are profit- driven enterprises that subordinate the political welfare of nations to revenue generation (Bagdikian, 2004, 2000; Shiller, 1996; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Jencks,1987). More broadly, it is asserted that dominate ideology under any set of political, social, and economic conditions will dictate news content advantaging elites, without reference to the needs of the citizenry. Gatekeeping Ruminations on gatekeeping typically conjure mental images of White’s (1950) wire service editor, a conscientious employee located somewhere in lower strata of a management hierarchy, diligently engaged in vetting wire service copy, selecting some for publication and rejecting the rest, based upon a subjective, idiosyncratic assessment of news value. Like White’s Mr. Gates, gatekeepers historically, have been cast as relatively low-level, well-intentioned functionaries in
Gregg A. Payne 204
news production operations, hirelings who determine more or less unilaterally what gets broadcast or published and what doesn’t. Such a perspective, however, tends to both sanitize and trivialize a set of relationships that are considerably more complex and insidious. Unaccounted for is a multi-layered process driven by elite priorities that produces a homogenized, information-deficient public agenda hospitable to dominate ideology, and delimiting topics and perspectives available for debate. Primary-level Gatekeeping Gatekeeping is a tripartite process. Primary-level gatekeeping involves an external locus of control residing with social, political, and economic power centers and their individual and institutional spokespersons, who control information available to the media. Among the consequences is establishment of a media agenda and a macro-level frame stipulating an acceptable ideological context for news presentation. The governing aristocracy includes what McChesney has referred to as homogenized ownership (2004, p. 47). There is a vested interest in making available to the media and, ultimately, the public only information supportive of the status quo, and, in both topical and ideological content, not inimical to corporate well being. Secondary-level Gatekeeping Secondary-level gatekeeping is an internal function involving publishers and senior editors, whose content decisions reflect the priorities of primary-level gatekeepers, and the dominate cultural viewpoint (Paul and Elder, 2006, p. 10; Gans, 2003, pp. 24, 198; Gitlin, 2003, pp. 5,40, 80, 95, 274; Bagdikian, 2000, pp. 17-18). Decisions made at this level translate into events and activities selected for coverage, and treatments that constitute micro-level framing, achieved, in part, by careful selection of sources expounding elite perspectives (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). The priming process prioritizing for audiences the content of the media-produced public agenda is initiated here. Involved is a two dimensional decision-making process. In the first step, choices are made that produce selective coverage of environmental phenomena extracted from a universe of possibilities. (Kim and McCombs, 2007; Sie-Hill, Dietram, Shanahan, 2002; Nelson and Kinder, 2001; Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). The second step involves decisions about how the news is played. The choices made dictate the prominence of issues within the larger context of the news product, and are central to establishing salience in the public agenda. For both print and electronic media, the consequences of the decisions are observable in the placement of stories, coupled with space or time afforded them. Tertiary-level Gatekeeping Priming and framing find their final, micro-level configuration in the product of tertiary- level gatekeepers, whose function is to generate content. Their contribution to homogenization is a consequence of top-down pressure, and their social and economic location among the middle and upper-middle classes (McChesney, 2004, pp. 98-137). News room socialization (Breed, 1955), personal predilections and a survival instinct compel compliance with dictates of superiors. The framing and priming effects of primary and secondary-level gatekeeping influences are realized in the rendering of news. The homogenizing consequences of the top down coercive 205 Information Control and Imperiled Public Discourse: A General Process....
influences are, in some cases, exacerbated by pool reporting (McClellan, 2008), and consensus or pack journalism (Biagi, 2007, p. 246: Gans, 1980, p. 86; Crouse, 1972). The former phenomenon, in which a small group of reporters acts as intermediaries between news makers and other news workers, inevitably contributes to homogenization of the news product (McClellan, 2008). The latter reduces complexity to banality, also contributing to production of largely undifferentiated content. In all cases, divergent perspectives that would provide useful grist for a dialectical mill are lost. Agenda Setting Content admitted by gatekeepers for publication or broadcast is taken to have multiple agenda-setting impacts. It sets the public agenda that establishes both issue and attribute salience, the first a generalized account of some event or activity, the second specifying selected qualities of the issue (Takeshita, 1997). It also has first-level agenda setting effects, dictating at some level, what people think about as a consequence of mass media engagement, and second-level influences affecting how people think as a product of news framing by the gatekeeping establishment (McCombs, 2004; McCombs, M., Llamas, P., Lopez-Escobar, E., and Rey, F., 1997; McLeod, J., Becker, L., and Byrnes, J., 1974; McCombs, and Shaw, 1972; Rosenberry, and Vicker, 2009, pp. 150-153; McCombs, 2004, pp. 86-97; Nelson, T, and Kinder, D. 1996; Pan, Z, and Kosicki, 1993; Scheufele, D, 1999, 2007). From this perspective agenda setting is a product of gatekeeping, and an intervening variable between gatekeeping and content homogenization. The seminal theoretical and empirical work in agenda setting originated with the Chapel Hill study executed by McCombs and Shaw (1972). The study, executed during the 1968 US presidential elections, investigated links between news content and voter perceptions of the most compellingly important issues of the time. It revealed significant correlations between media and public agendas, and produced evidence, contrary to that then prevailing (Klapper, 1960; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948), that media content had profound effects. In the intervening decades, there has been considerable theoretical extension and intension growing out of research examining relationships between media and public agendas in a variety of social and other contexts. Effects in relation to differing audience characteristics have been studied, as have conditions, events, and people influencing the agenda (McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver, 1997). While the media agenda is defined here in terms of information made available by elites to media practitioners, operationalization of the public agenda has been preoccupied traditionally with counting the frequency with which certain matters are reported, the ways in which they are framed or contextualized, and the presumptive influence on priming, or the salience of those matters in the public mind (McCombs, 2004, p. 87). Moreover, the conventional focus has been on first-level agenda setting, which is assumed to make salient an attitude object (Griffin, 2006, p. 401). The relatively recent conceptual extension of agenda setting to accommodate second-level effects has not adequately accounted for a multidimensional gatekeeping hierarchy. Second- level agenda setting suggests a covert transmission of ideology, conceding the long-denied possibility that media content may not only determine what is thought about, but also how salient issues are thought about (McCombs, Llamas, Lopez-Escobar, and Rey, 1997). The concession, coupled Gregg A. Payne 206 with implications of first-level agenda setting, raises critical concerns. Where both the salience of environmental phenomena and the ideological evaluation of those phenomena are consequences of encounters with homogenized media news, the potential for rational public discourse and decision making grounded in a free marketplace of ideas becomes increasingly remote. Here again largely uncritical discussions have ignored the inherent homogenizing effects of gatekeeping and agenda setting, the resulting exclusion of alternative viewpoints, and the lost potential for news to serve as a democratizing influence. Content Homogenization Content homogenization is a product of the relationships between gatekeeping and agenda setting. Conceptually, content homogenization, as the term is used here, suggests that events and topics selected for news coverage and the ideological perspectives with which they are infused, provide little in the way of diversity, contribute little to a free marketplace of ideas, and are inherently hegemonic (Gitlin, 2003, p. 211, 271). They reflect the priorities of the relative few who dominate news production operations, including the very rich, chief executives, the corporate rich, senior members of the military, and the political directorate, all representing a relatively monolithic presence in their acceptance of a common set of values, beliefs, attitudes, perspectives, norms, rules, and behaviors (Mills, 1956; Gans, 1980, p. 206-213). While the structural relationships and relative power vested in those social categories may vary from country to country and culture to culture, occupants of the categories inhabit the same castes that comprise media and other elites everywhere. Their machinations as superordinate gatekeepers dictate first the media agenda and, ultimately, the public agenda, with their ideological sensibilities reflected in the news product (Schudson, 2005; Gitlin 2003). Among the consequences is control over the construction of social reality, and the capacity to eliminate conflicting perspectives (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 123, 128). Homogenization of news themes, topics, and treatments, neither in the US nor globally, can be explained exclusively by reference to either media time or space constraints, or predispositions of news workers occupying subordinate roles in a hierarchal gatekeeping structure. Theoretical Links The conceptual explications proffered here show gatekeeping to consist of three interrelated tiers, and agenda setting to be a multi-tiered process derivative of gatekeeping structures and processes. Additionally, framing is shown to be a hierarchal, dichotomous phenomenon consisting of macro and micro-level framing predictive of cognitive structures associated with priming. All contribute to a calculus of power and control. Macro framing is conceptualized as the editorial process of accommodating news to elite ideology (Gitlin, 1980). Micro framing, circumscribed by the ideological parameters of the macro frame, accommodates transient exigencies in the evolution of news. Priming suggests a heuristic psychological process in which media references prompt recall of previously acquired information (Ghanem, 1997; Wilnat, 1997; Zillmann, 2002; Roskos-Ewoldsen, D., Roskos-Ewoldsen, B., and Carpentier, F. (2002). Zillmann (p. 27) advances the notion of a representativeness heuristic, arguing that media exposure results in an inductive process that generalizes from samples of events to populations of events. The relationship between content homogenization and priming is located in issue and attribute agendas. The first, 207 Information Control and Imperiled Public Discourse: A General Process....
as has been pointed out, foregrounds topics, the latter attributes of topics. Both are products of gatekeeping influences that produce a largely undifferentiated supply of information similarly framed. Where such conditions exist, accessible heuristics are severely restricted. Information and its effects, including assignment of meaning, become myopically accretive, hindering discriminating, dialectical discourse, and ensuring narratives consistent with the status quo. Clarifying relationships involving the various levels of gatekeepers, levels of agenda setting, and agenda types is critical to an improved understanding of homogenizing influences both on and of media content. It is clear that primary-level gatekeepers have a vested interest in framing a media agenda that produces secondary-level effects consistent with the dominate ideology. The news production process involves micro-level framing at the secondary gatekeeping level, and priming at all levels. The public agenda is realized in content choices of secondary-level gatekeepers and treatments of tertiary-level gatekeepers, resulting in first-level and second-level effects consistent with objectives of primary-level gatekeepers and the media agenda. Ultimately, both public and media agendas reflect a hegemonic confluence of external and internal interests, driven by the prerogatives of power and perquisites of the powerful. The consequences are typified by the conservative positions of those occupying senior status in the gatekeeping hierarchy and subscribed to as a matter of both organizational efficacy and self preservation by subordinates. The resulting insular and parochial news product, characterized by a mendacious topical, thematic, and ideological sterility, imposes on consumers a restricted set of perceptual and cognitive filters. The outcome of the consequent information deprivation suggests media-imposed social control (Noelle-Neumann,1984). Consequences The empirical implications of the reconceputalizations suggested here are several. They provide space required to move away from the assumptions associated with traditional constructions of gatekeeping and agenda setting. Operationalization of the various levels of gatekeeping makes it possible to assess their relative impacts on news gathering and presentation, and relationships with priming and framing. In particular, it becomes possible to examine influences on agenda setting of gatekeeping structures under a variety of social, economic, and political conditions, to examine the relative influences of a hierarchally constituted gatekeeping establishment on subordinate gatekeeping roles, and how the consequences comport with a range of normative mass media theories From the relationships modeled, several theoretically useful propositions emerge: 1) Media content is a product of economic, social, and political power exerted through primary-level gatekeeping. 2) Primary-level gatekeeping is committed to maintenance of the status quo. 3) Protecting the status quo is linked to news content reflecting the dominate ideology. 4) The application of power produces among secondary and tertiary-level gatekeepers a consensual definition of news consistent with that of primary-level gatekeepers. 5) The influence of the dominant ideological perspective is primarily attributable to second- Gregg A. Payne 208
level effects of the media agenda, and secondarily attributable to a first-level effect of the media agenda. 6) Secondary and tertiary-level gatekeepers produce a public agenda supportive of the media agenda. 7) The public agenda is formulated as a homogenized news product consistent with dominate political, economic, and social ideologies. Conclusion The model and these propositions suggest a range of empirically testable hypotheses germane to examination of news production structures, and their impacts on news content under a global assortment of political, economic, and social conditions. The General Content Homogenization Model provides a foundation for empirical analysis of media as cultural artifacts in relation to structure, function and bias arising out of dominate ideological commitments. Additionally, it enables examination of relative influences of multiple, sometime conflicting, and ideological positions. An example can be located in US media attempts to reconcile the schizoid tension between satisfying expectations of a social contract in which a free press is expected to contribute to development, maintenance, and repair of democracy, and the competing, and more compelling, profit production mandates of a capitalist economy. One of the consequences is that the variegated subtleties and complexities inherent in a free marketplace of ideas, and indispensable to robust public discourse, are collapsed into a pedestrian, monochromatic narrative where democracy and capitalism become isomorphic, with democratic ends attainable only through capitalistic means. Potential alternative realities are left unexamined, and consequently absent from civil discourse. What emerge are narrowly circumscribed media and public agendas that, at both primary and secondary levels, are antithetical to democratic process, but may produce precisely the outcomes coveted in authoritarian political circumstances. References Bagdikian, B. (2000). The media monopoly. (6th Ed). Beacon Press: Boston. Bagdikian, B. (2004). The new media monopoly. Beacon Press: Boston. Berger, P., and Luckmann, T. (1966). The construction of social reality: A treatise in the Sociology of knowledge. New York: Anchor Books. Berelson, B.,Lazarsfeld, P. and McPhee, W. (1954): Voting. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Biagi, S. (2007). Media/Impact: An introduction to mass media. Belmont, CA: Thomson/ Wadsworth. Breed, W. (1955). Social control in the newsroom: A functional analysis. Social Forces, (33), 326-335. Crouse, T. (1972). The boys on the bus: Riding with the campaign press corps. New York: Random House. 209 Information Control and Imperiled Public Discourse: A General Process....
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l Journal of Global Communication, Vol2., No.1, Jan.-July 2009 pp. 209-224 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication Lauren B. Movius Annenberg School of Communication, USC 3502 Watt Way, Los Angeles 90089 Cell: 714.362.1328, Email: [email protected]
Abstract The Internet represents a medium for both liberty and control and the Internet is assumed to have an inherent democratic nature and be a force for democracy. However, undemocratic uses of the Internet exist as well, even by democratic regimes of the West. The Internet can be used as a tool of control and dominance; it can increase government power, enhancing government ability to monitor its citizens and potentially control individuals. This article examines national security and individual’s privacy from U.S. government surveillance, in the context of the Internet post September 11, 2001. However, government control of the Internet is not simply a response to or a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11; the U.S. government has always tried to increase its control over information and technology. The article documents several examples of attempts to control the Internet and communications prior to 9/11 and argues that the events of 9/11 provided the justification necessary to enact legislation to broaden surveillance powers. The article then discusses how surveillance technologies work and examines the key actors involved in surveillance Key words: Internet, privacy, communication, democracy, dominance, surveillance, democracy Introduction The Internet represents a medium for both liberty and control. When the Internet first emerged, many celebrated its potential for autonomy and freedom, since governments could seemingly do little to control the borderless network (Barlow: 1996). The Internet is seen by many as a means of freedom of expression and a “kind of democratization of access for all” (Mathiason: 2009: xiv). The Internet is assumed to have an inherent democratic nature and be a force for democracy. Indeed, a link between technological advance and democratization remains a strong assumption in popular thinking (Kalathil & Boas: 2003). However, undemocratic uses of the Internet exist as well, even by democratic regimes of the West (Vegh: 2006). The Internet can be used as a tool of control and dominance; it can increase government power, enhancing governments’ ability to monitor its citizens and potentially control individuals. Therefore, loss of privacy and anonymity on the Internet is an area of concern in need of investigation and analysis. The development of the Internet as a networked global communications medium and the extent to which people use it have produced a qualitative change in the nature of communications, and in the nature and amount of information which is exposed to interception and surveillance. 213 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication As a result of the digital revolution, many aspects of life are now captured and stored in digital form. Indeed, it is rare for a person in the modern world to avoid being listed in numerous databases (Diffie & Landau: 1998). Much of this translates into individual’s privacy from companies in the context of privacy and economic efficiency (Movius & Krup: 2009; Varian: 1996). However, focusing on the U.S. context, this article examines national security and individuals’ privacy from government surveillance, in the context of the Internet post September 11, 2001 (9/11). Surveillance is not new, and by focusing on post 9/11, it is not to suggest that this period represent a new type of surveillance. As will be discussed below, there is a long history of government surveillance. New technology, however, has led to new forms of surveillance, and has also attributed to the rise of surveillance studies over the last two decades (Lyon: 2006). The period since 9/11 is of particular concern, since this legitimated the expansion of surveillance (Ball & Webster: 2003). Indeed, 9/11 “encouraged an alignment of actors, organizations, debates and viewpoints, from different policy and academic spheres, all of which featured surveillance as a germane issue. Accordingly, national security was constructed as relevant to public and private sector positions on… Internet security…with privacy issues temporarily taking a back seat” (Ball & Webster: 2003:9). In order to understand the significance of 9/11 to Internet surveillance, we must consider the situation prior to 9/11. Thus, the article first discuses U.S. government attempts to conduct surveillance or to control the Internet prior to 9/11, in order to support the argument that surveillance post 9/11 was not expanded simply to increase security, but to increase government control. Second, I will discuss why the Internet has been historically difficult to control due to technological and institutional factors. Third, I will analyze how the U.S. government sought to overcome these technological and institutional challenges by enacting new legislation, notably the Patriot Act, and through the use of new technology. I argue that 9/11 provided a window of opportunity to enact these changes, and the U.S. government used social alarm to pass legislation. Fourth, I discuss some limits of technology. Fifth, I consider the effects of increased surveillance and question whether it helps in reducing terrorism and increasing security. Attempts to Control Communication Prior to 9/11 Governments have always sought to control communication and information. Indeed, “control of information has been the essence of state power throughout history, and the U.S. is no exception” (Castells: 2001:169). The U.S. government, as all governments, seeks to maximize their control of communications under limits of institutional constraints. Government control of the Internet is not simply a response to or a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11; and there are several examples of government surveillance programs that have existed well before 9/11. U.S. government surveillance has been well documented through the release of documents under Freedom of Information Act requests. Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Walls (1990) document the scope of the FBI Counter Intelligence Program acts of surveillance on various domestic social movements between 1957 and 1974, and Sasha Costanza-Chock (2004) provides an historical overview of state surveillance of social movements in the US. The Senate investigation Lauren B. Movius 214 known as the Church Committee investigated the FBI Counter Intelligence program and other programs of surveillance during the 1970’s. This investigation revealed details of “domestic intelligence activities [that] threaten to undermine our democratic society” (Church Committee: 1976:1). The Committee recommended that the “CIA, NSA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the armed services be precluded, with narrow and specific exceptions, from conducting intelligence activities within the United States, and that their activities abroad be so controlled as to minimize the impact on the rights of Americans” (Diffie & Landau: 1998:121). Since these recommendations, limits on surveillance have been eroded, and this process began well before 9/ 11. Turning to electronic communication, federal agencies had legal powers to monitor e-mail and computers well before the Patriot Act. Two sources of authority for wiretapping exist in the US and set the framework for U.S. electronic-surveillance laws: the Federal Wiretap Act, also referred to as Title III, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. The Federal Wiretap Act was adopted in 1968 and expanded in 1986. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 updated Title III and the FISA to apply to electronic communications, and allowed for “roving wiretaps” - wiretaps with unspecified locations, where the government can tap any phone or Internet account that a suspect uses. Under the Electronic Privacy Act, law enforcement needs a search warrant, and not a more stringent wiretap warrant, to access stored communication. This authority to use a roving wiretap was granted in 1986 and broadened in 1999. The Patriot Act added roving tap authority to the FISA and made a number of significant changes that have led to an increase in FISA investigations (Jaeger, Bertot, & McClure : 2003). In 2007, wiretap applications under Title III increased 20 percent from 2006. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts publishes annual Wiretap Reports on wiretap activity of federal, state, and local police, and there has been a nearly steady increase in the use of wiretaps from 1994 - 2007, with applications rarely being denied. It is important to note that Wiretap Reports only include data for Title III electronic surveillance and do not include intercepts regulated by FISA. Since the early 2000s, FISA wiretap orders constitute a majority of federal wiretaps (Rule: 2007). In addition to the above examples of government surveillance, the U.S. Congress and U.S. Justice Department attempted to gain legal control of the Internet through the 1996 Communications Decency Act. The rationale for the Act was that it was necessary to protect children from sexual indecency on the Internet. Here, we see how social alarm - the need to protect our children from sexual predators and indecent material on the Internet - was used in proposing legislation. Many people saw this as the “first great attack on cyberspace” (Goldsmith & Wu: 2006: 19). This law was seen as an attack because it threatened the fact that the Internet was open to both children and adults without any discrimination, and this openness was seen as the Internet’s strength. The Act was ruled unconstitutional in 1997 by the Supreme Court in a vote of 7 to 2, since it was overly broad and could result in the chilling of speech unrelated to protecting minors. 215 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication
Table 1. Number of Wiretap Applications, Authorized Intercepts, and Denied Intercepts as Reported in Wiretap Reports for Calendar Years 1994 - 2007 (Source: Administrative Office of the United States Courts) Year Wiretap Applications Authorized Denied 1994 1154 1154 0 1995 1058 1058 0 1996 1150 1149 1 1997 1186 1186 0 1998 1329 1327 2 1999 1350 1350 0 2000 1190 1190 0 2001 1491 1491 0 2002 1359 1358 1 2003 1443 1442 0 2004 1710 1710 0 2005 1774 1773 1 2006 1839 1,839 0 2007 2208 2208 0 Thus, it is not correct to view 9/11 as generating surveillance measures and a completely new surveillance landscape. Instead, there is a history of surveillance, with surveillance systems being broadened after 9/11. Lyon contends that surveillance societies already existed in many “democratic” countries, and that 9/11 produced “socially negative consequences that hitherto were the stuff of repressive regimes and dystopian novels or movies” (2003: 15). The events of 9/11 and the “war on terror” justified these measures. Before examining attempts by the U.S. government to control the Internet after 9/11, an understanding of the characteristics and obstacles of controlling the Internet may be useful. Control of the Internet When the Internet first appeared, it was widely believed that the Internet could challenge the authority of the nation state, and that because of its borderless nature, it lay beyond government control (Barlow: 1996; Johnson & Post: 1996). The co-founder of MIT’s Media lab Nicholas Negroponte argued, “The Internet cannot be regulated. It’s not that laws aren’t relevant, it’s that the nation-state is not relevant” (Higgins & Azhar: 1996). Unlike other networks, such as a telephone network, the Internet is not dependent on a central server. Instead, the Internet is a network of networks. There is no single central authority on the Internet. There is a decentralized routing system that was designed to carry messages from point to point, even if intermediate exchanges are blocked. As John Gilmore famously stated, “The net interprets censorship as damage, and routes around it.” The lack of centralized control on the Internet is due to historical factors (Abbate: 1999), as well as the Internet’s technical architecture. Let us now consider why network architecture matters and how it made the Internet initially difficult to control. Design features do not necessarily Lauren B. Movius 216
come about because they represent the best technical option. Instead, the architectural design of an information system is a choice, and political and economic forces shape these choices. The founders of the Internet self-consciously built a network with open architecture through the “end-to-end” principle (Abbate: 1999). Thus, the Internet founders “embraced a design that distrusted centralized control. In effect, they built strains of American libertarianism…into the universal language of the Internet” (Goldsmith & Wu: 2006: 23). The end-to-end principle has evolved from the original notion of where to put and not to put functions in a communication system (Saltzer, Reed, & Clark: 1984), and it has come to address issues such as maintaining openness, maintaining user choice, and increasing reliability (Kempf & Austein: 2004). The end-to-end principle “grew over time to become a (if not the) foundation principle of the Internet architecture” (Kempf & Austein: 2004). Because of the end-to-end nature of the Internet, intelligence, as well as control, is decentralized. Messages on the Internet are broken up into packets of data, and the network routes them via the most efficient path, regardless of the packets’ content or origin. Thus, the network is said to be “dumb”, and intelligence lies on the edges of the network. In addition to the technological architecture, the Internet developed in the United States, and is thus under the constitutional protection of the First Amendment. The First Amendment limits governmental ability to regulate speech, and everything is potentially “speech” on the Internet. As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court Case ACLU v. Reno found the Communications Decency Act to be a violation of the First Amendment. This case afforded Internet related matters the strongest First Amendment protection. While the Internet represented a site of freedom and liberty based on the aforementioned technological and institutional grounds, new technologies and regulations challenged these obstacles to control of the Internet. The U.S. government attempted to circumvent such limits with: first, changes in legislation using social alarm, and second, developments in new technologies. New Legislation: U.S. Patriot Act After 9/11, the U.S. government called for increased surveillance in order to protect against future terrorist attacks. The key initiative that emerged to augment government access to information was the U.S. Patriot Act. The Patriot Act was introduced less than a week after 9/ 11 and signed by President Bush and passed into law on October 26, 2001. The Patriot Act qualitatively extended the government’s electronic-surveillance capabilities. The Act allows the U.S. government to investigate both citizens and non-citizens and to engage in surveillance, with many elements effecting communication on the Internet, leading to increasing surveillance and control of the Internet. The Act threatens civil liberties and potentially provides government power to suppress free exchange of knowledge. With civil rights and communication rights in the digital environment being eroded, dissemination of electronic material may be inhibited through censorship, and interaction in the public sphere may be limited (Ó Siochrú: 2005). There are considerable implications for online privacy. For example, the Patriot Act increases the ability of law enforcement to authorize installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices, and to authorize 217 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication
that these devices record all computing information. Whereas prior law concerning these devices related only to the telephone industry, the Act redefined a pen register and trap and trace device and expanded the nature of information that can be captured to include electronic mail, Web surfing, and all forms of electronic communications. Furthermore, the prior statutory requirement that the government prove the surveillance target is an agent of a foreign power before obtaining a pen register or trap and trace order under the FISA was removed. Use of Social Alarm Increased surveillance and the use of high-technology surveillance have increased in the context of the new global politics of terrorism. Events such as 9/11 are referred to as “trigger crimes” by scholars (Innes: 2001), who argue that such events allow for the introduction of new technologies with less public debate than usual, since such technologies are perceived to be a necessary response. Thus, the events of 9/11 led to a “surveillance surge” (Ball & Webster: 2003), and they legitimated existing trends. For example, many of the provisions of the Patriot Act relating to electronic surveillance were not new, and were proposed before 9/11, when they were subject to much criticism and debate (EPIC, 2005a). The Justice Department has been lobbying for the power to conduct “secret searches” long before the 9/11 attacks took place and terrorism became a justification for enacting such legislation. Furthermore, the Act was proposed only a week after 9/11, and it has been argued that “details of this complex and far-reaching expansion of investigative powers were prepared and ready to be put forward before the events of September 11 — as surveillance interests awaited an auspicious moment” (Rule: 2007: 55). With the events of 9/11, this social alarm factor allows government to do things that they would otherwise not be allowed to do, as the enactment of legislation and introduction of new technology is met with less public debate. In 2000 when the FBI’s Carnivore program, which scanned and recorded network traffic and “wiretapped” the Internet (King & Bridis: 2000), became public, there were criticisms that the system could get more information than the government was entitled to under a limited subpoena used for pen registers and trap-and-trace devices. Carnivore was extremely controversial, and there was a great deal of concern expressed by members of Congress, who stated their intent to examine the issues and draft appropriate legislation (EPIC: 2005b). Former Attorney General Reno announced that issues surrounding Carnivore would be considered by a Justice Department review panel and that its recommendations would be made public. That review, however, was not completed prior to 9/11. As a result, Congress did not have any findings and recommendations when it enacted the Patriot Act. Thus, the 9/11 terrorist attacks provided social alarm and a way for government to thwart concerns of Carnivore that were predominant prior to 9/11. The use of social alarm is exemplified by the administration’s argument for the necessity of the Patriot Act. Without appropriate policy responses to the terrorist attack, the argument goes, there would be serious consequences for national security and public safety. Attorney General Ashcroft warned that further terrorist acts were imminent, and that Congress could be blamed for such attacks if it failed to pass the bill immediately. Congressional leaders warned that the legislation was the only way to protect against terrorism and that the Act had to be passed within days, which it was. Lauren B. Movius 218
Within this context of social alarm, we must note that immediately after the terrorist attacks, the public seemed to be willing to sacrifice some privacy, as evidenced by an October 2001 Harris Poll which founds that 63% of Americans wanted monitoring of Internet chats, and 54% favored monitoring e-mail (Schwartz: 2001). However, as time passed, feelings towards the Patriot Act changed, and from 2003 to 2004, nearly a quarter of all Americans felt that the Act went too far (USA Today: 2005). When polled about specific provisions of the Patriot Act, the public expressed widespread disapproval. For example, a poll found that 71% disapproved of sneak and peak provisions of the Act, and 51% disapproved of sections granting access to records using FISA (USA Today: 2005). Technologies of Surveillance The above discussion of the end-to-end principle of the Internet focused on how this design feature made it difficult to exert control over the network. The end-to-end principle is one of the reasons why the Internet has been so successful (Auerbach: 2004). However, the end-to-end principle also enables harmful activities. There is a constant tension between the need to control or limit harmful activities, while not compromising the Internet’s core architecture. As the Internet grew in scale and importance, several factors challenged the end-to-end principle (Clark & Blumenthal: 2000). The Internet was developed by a community of users. Trust between end users, and authentication of end nodes, was not a concern, and it was assumed that end nodes would cooperate in order to achieve mutually beneficial action, per the end-to-end principle implies. However, with the growth in users of the Internet and its turn to a commercial nature, motivations of some end users are not ethical, and may include attacks on the network or on individual end points. Another challenge to the end-to-end principle may come if governments or corporate network administrators seek to interpose between two parties in an end-to-end conversation. For example, a government may claim the right to wiretap, thereby inserting itself in a communication between two end nodes. Censorship or surveillance on the Internet violates the end-to-end principle, since the principle states that intelligence should be at end-points, and not in the middle of the network. Control in the middle of a network, such as China’s “Great Firewall”, instead of control at the user level, is argued to limit growth of the network, since the end-to-end principle has been attributed with rapid growth of the Internet throughout the world (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski & Zittrain: 2008). Thus, as the Internet developed, some of its original design features that had made control difficult began to be challenged. Additionally, surveillance devices and systems were introduced after 9/11. Four main ways to improve technological surveillance were proposed since 9/11: biometrics, such as iris scans or fingerprints; identification cards with embedded programmable chips; closed circuit television (CCTV), enhanced with facial recognition software; and communication measures such as wiretaps and Web-based surveillance (Lyon: 2003). Most of these technologies were not new. For example, retinal scans had been tested for years in the context of bank machines, and were deployed at airports for security after 9/11 (Lyon: 2003). Some of the other measures, such as increased wiretaps, had to wait for legal change, which was provided by the Patriot Act, in order to be implemented. 219 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication
Typology of Intelligence Gathering In order to differentiate between types of electronic surveillance, it is useful to categorize the spectrum of intelligence gathering activity. While distinctions are not always clear, I will briefly outline the major categories so that we may better understand the vast landscape of surveillance technologies. The Director of National Intelligence lists six main categories of intelligence: human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). Human intelligence is the most common form of intelligence gathering; information is collected by tracking or interviewing a subject of investigation. The organization primarily responsible for the collection of human intelligence in the US is the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency. Signals intelligence is intelligence gathered by intercepting electronic signals, such as signals sent over radio and broadcast, and forms of telecommunication, such as emails or encrypted messages. Echelon is an example of signals intelligence, and the National Security Agency is the authority corresponding to this category. Because information may be encrypted, signals intelligence often involves use of cryptanalysis. Imagery intelligence includes representations of objects reproduced electronically or optically on film. Open source intelligence is publicly available information; the Director of National Intelligence and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center are the main collectors of open source intelligence. Geospatial intelligence is the analysis of security related activities on the earth. Major Actors I will now discuss who are the major actors involved in surveillance and how surveillance processes work. U.S. government agencies involved in surveillance include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Also involved is the Homeland Security Act, which was signed by President Bush on November 25, 2002 and consolidates 22 agencies into one department. One of the department’s main roles is to access, receive, and analyze information collected from intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the private sector to assess terrorist threats. The Homeland Security Act included the Cyber Security Enhancement Act, which expands ISPs’ ability to disclose information to the government, such as the content of e-mail or instant messages, which can be given to a government official. The FBI is one of the major players in surveillance. As of June 2002, the FBI’s official top priority is counterterrorism. In the fiscal year 2003, the FBI received a total of $4.298 billion, including $540.281 million in net program increases to enhance Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber crime, Information Technology, Security, Forensics, Training, and Criminal Programs. The Patriot Act granted the FBI increased powers, especially in wiretapping and monitoring of Internet activity. Carnivore is a system implemented by the FBI that is analogous to wiretapping, except in this case it is e-mail that is being tapped. The technology uses a standard packet sniffer and filtering. When an e-mail passes through that matches the filtering criteria mandated by the Lauren B. Movius 220 warrant, the message is logged along with information on the date, time, origin and destination of the message and then relayed in real time to the FBI. It has been reported, as of January 2005, that the FBI has abandoned the use of Carnivore in favor of commercially available software (Associated Press: 2005). The NSA is another U.S. government agency responsible for both the collection and analysis of communication messages. For years, not much has been know about the NSA, despite having been described as the world’s largest single employer of Ph.D. mathematicians, the owner of the single largest group of supercomputers, and having a budget much larger than that of the CIA (Bamford: 2001). The NSA has been heavily involved in cryptanalytic research, continuing the work of its predecessor agencies, which had been responsible for breaking many World War II codes and ciphers. The NSA, in combination with the equivalent agencies in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, is believed to be responsible for, among other things, the operation of the Echelon system. Echelon is thought to be the largest signals intelligence and analysis network for intercepting electronic communications in history, with estimations of intercepting up to 3 billion communications every day. The signals are then processed through a series of supercomputers that are programmed to search each communication for targeted addresses, words, phrases, or individual voices. However, the limits of a large system such as Echelon are defined by its very size, as discussed below. The proposed “Total Information Awareness” (TIA) program relied on technology similar to Echelon, and it would integrate the extensive sources it is legally permitted to survey domestically, with the “taps” already compiled by Echelon. TIA is part of the Information Awareness Office, a mass surveillance development branch of the United States Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The TIA project would develop data mining tools that would be capable of sorting through huge amounts of information to find patterns. The system would use information search and retrieval tools or programs, which automatically translate recoded messages in order to sift out patterns and associations from the massive amounts of information, which is mostly held in private sector databases. The TIA initiative could combine individuals’ bank records, tax filings, medical data, e-mail records, and other information into one centralized database, which could be used for evidence of any suspicious activity. The assumption behind these technologies is that terrorists exhibit patterns of behavior that can be identified by data mining many pieces of data and activities that are subject to surveillance. By data mining a range of databases, it is presumed that officials can identify terrorists before they strike, thus preempting any terrorist activity. The underlying premise is that if everything can be seen, then all threats can be stopped. Perhaps more importantly, there is the conviction that if everything can be seen, then everything can be controlled; this is a motivation that drives TIA, but this is not unprecedented, and is a familiar goal of government. DARPA did acknowledge concerns of accessing information that is not normally accessible to government. The Information Awareness Office amended the Total Information Awareness name in May 2003 to Terrorist Information Awareness (still TIA) and emphasized in its report to Congress that the program is not designed to compile dossiers on U.S. citizens, but rather to 221 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication
gather information on terrorist networks. Despite this name change, the description of the program’s activities remained essentially the same in the report. Congress passed legislation in February of 2003 halting activities of the Information Awareness program, since it could greatly infringe on individuals’ privacy rights. While Congress passed a provision shutting down the Pentagon’s TIA, some of the same ideas appeared in a new program called Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (Matrix). The Matrix is operated by a private company on behalf of a cooperative network of state governments, and represents an example of a recent “data surveillance” program. It ties together government and commercial databases, and according to Congressional testimony and news reports, it then makes those dossiers available for search by government officials. For example, in Congressional testimony by Paula Dockery, she described how the Matrix works as a process that involves combining government records with information from public search businesses into a data-warehouse, where these dossiers are combed by specialized software to identify anomalies using mathematical analysis (Dockery: 2003). If the details of one’s life should happen to contain “anomalies”, they will then be scrutinized by analytical personnel and investigators looking for evidence of terrorism or other crimes. Company officials have refused to disclose details of the program, but according to news sources, the kind of information to be searched includes credit histories, driver’s license photographs, marriage and divorce records, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and the names and addresses of family members, neighbors and business associates (Stanford & Ledford: 2003). The Matrix program was terminated in April 2005, although components continued to be made available to police in individual states, according to the ACLU, which filed Freedom of Information Act requests concerning Matrix. Limits of Technology A main goal of surveillance practices appears to be the development of superior technologies. The paradox is that the 9/11 terrorists relied primarily on older technologies, such as jet aircraft and sharp knives, but the solution to combat terrorism is assumed to be found in high-technological solutions. Technology is seen as a savior, and “technological fixes are the common currency of crisis in late modern societies” (Lyon: 2003: 65). However, there are limits to technology, which will now be explored. Can using technology predict terrorist activity? Commenting whether this is feasible, Steven Aftergood, the head of the Federation of American Scientists’ projects on government secrecy and intelligence, doubts that “technology can be precise enough to distinguish a few suspicious transactions in a sea of activity” (Harris: 2002). Furthermore, a policy analyst said, “it’s statistically unlikely that the system could predict and pre-empt attacks and also avoid targeting innocent people as suspected terrorists” (Harris: 2002). Most of the surveillance devices and systems introduced after 9/11 relied on researchable databases. Technologies such as face recognition, iris scans, and biometrics all rely on searchable databases, which are used to anticipate and preempt terrorist activity (Lyon: 2003). Data is sorted by an automated system according to certain categories in order to isolate an abnormality, which may be a risk. An algorithm is used to code for indicators of characteristics or behavior Lauren B. Movius 222
patterns that are related to the occurrence of certain behavior. Structural elements of the surveillance technologies raise a host of complex questions; the Electronic Privacy Information Center (2008) asks the following: “What is the basis for developing the algorithm? What are acceptable false positive and false negative rates? What indicators are relevant? Who will collect and store the relevant indicators? How are the indicators related to particular kinds of behavior? Is that relationship reliable? Who determines what behavior should be targeted? What types of specific behavior will the system try to catch?” Additionally, there are technical issues, such as the reliability of the data used to make decisions, and questions of who will have access to the data and for what purposes. Finally, there are policy issues that need to be addressed, including a determination of individuals’ rights to control their personally identifiable information, and recourses available for someone wrongly identified or denied a service. A key aspect of contemporary surveillance is “social sorting”. Lyon (2003) argues that this type of automated discriminatory mechanism for social categorizing reproduces social and economic divisions in societies. Information is stored in large databases, and data mining is used as a tool to discover patterns in the data. Data mining facilitates the classification of individuals into segments or groups. However, the means by which these groups are created is problematic. While the technologies employed are very high-tech, the categories with which they are coded are much more simple. Lyon (2003) notes how database marketers in the US use crude behavioral categories to describe neighborhoods, such as “pools and patios” or “bohemian mix”, and CCTV operators in the UK target the “young, black, male” group. The social implications of data mining are discrimination and exclusion. Gandy (2003) cites a commentator who referred to data mining as “Weblining”, in order to draw a parallel between “redlining”, which uses spatial or geo- demographic discrimination, to data mining, which uses conceptual categories instead of spatial in order to potentially discriminate against groups. Social sorting raises a critical question about how we understand and theorize surveillance developments: does surveillance entail intrusion or exclusion? (Lyon: 2003). This paper has discussed how increased surveillance post 9/11 has led to the infringement of individual’s privacy; therefore, surveillance in these terms is viewed in individualist terms as an intrusion on privacy. This individualistic view of intrusion contrasts with how “social sorting” excludes people by categorizing them into cultural or social divisions. Thus, we can question whether intrusion or exclusion is a better conceptualizing or motif of surveillance post 9/11. Arab and Muslim minorities have been disproportionately targeted by surveillance measures in several countries (Lyon: 2003), suggestion that categorical exclusion is just as important to consider as intrusion of individual privacy. Analysis of Intelligence The actual ability to survey leads to information, but the key problem is that sufficient resources do not exist to properly analyze this information. The ultimate goal of intelligence is accurate analysis. The Congressional Research Service report states that “analysis is not an exact science and there have been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, failures by analysts to prepare accurate and timely assessments and estimates” (Best: 2006). The overall quality of 223 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication analysis has not been high, looking to the failure to provide advance warning of the 9/11 attacks and a flawed estimate of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction as evidence of systemic problems (Best: 2006). Returning to Echelon, the limits of a large system such as Echelon are defined by its very size. Though the system intercepts 3 billion communications daily, analysts must know which intercepted communications to monitor before they can realize an intelligence advantage. For example, in the months prior to the 9/11 attacks, there were snippets of dialogue found that suggested some sort of attack was imminent. However, analysts were unable to pin down the details of the attack because operatives planning the attack relied largely on non-electronic communications (Bamford: 2001). The strategic analysis of information, not just the accumulation of information, is the key to success of increased surveillance. Some efforts have been made to resolve this problem of analytical shortcomings since 9/11. For example, Congress has increased funding for analytical offices, and the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 contains a number of provisions designed to improve analysis, including the designation of an entity to ensure that intelligence products are timely, objective, and independent of political considerations, and the designation of an official to whom analysts can turn for problems of analytical politicization or lack of objectivity. However, there remain several impediments to a much-needed comprehensive analysis. First, there are long lead-times to prepare and train analysts, especially in fields of counterterrorism and counter proliferation (Best: 2006). Secondly, there has been a shortage of trained linguists, especially in languages of current interest. While the National Security Education Program is designed to meet this need, most observers believe the need for linguists will remain a pressing concern for some years (Best: 2006). A report by the Information and Privacy Commissioner/Ontario (IPC), which reviewed national security measures introduced since the 9/11 attacks, found that security experts do not think a huge electronic infrastructure is needed to solve national security problems (Cavoukian: 2003). In fact, a lack of information was not what prevented the FBI from discovering the terrorists’ plans for 9/11. On the contrary, it was “an excess of badly organized and poorly shared data” (Cavoukian: 2003: 26). A 2001 Congressional report on NSA states the agency is ‘faced with profound “needle-in-the-haystack” challenges’ because of the volume of information collected (Bamford: 2002). This finding was echoed by a congressional investigation into the 2001 terrorist attacks, which found that the failure by government to prevent the attacks was not caused by a lack of surveillance technology; instead, it was the result of fundamental organizational breakdowns in the intelligence community. Instead of assisting in the war on terror, more realistically, perhaps, surveillance results in a chilling effect. The Information and Privacy Commissioner states that programs of surveillance may ‘impact the behavior of both terrorists and law-abiding individuals alike. Terrorists are likely to go to great lengths to make certain that their behavior is statistically “normal,” while ordinary people are likely to avoid unusual but lawful behavior out of fear of being labeled “un-American.”’ (Cavoukian: 2003: 16). Lauren B. Movius 224 Conclusion This article has focused on the U.S., but a major shift has taken place in the political and legal landscape of many counties around the world that introduced legislation to aid their ability to fight terrorism following 9/11. For example, France passed 13 anti-terrorism measures on October 31, 2001, the United Kingdom passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act on December 15, 2001, Canada passed the Anti-Terrorism Act on December 18, 2001, and Australia introduced five anti-terrorism bills in 2002. Moreover, many countries have adapted their political discourse and broadened definitions of “terrorism” and “terrorists,” in order to pass laws which had previously failed - illustrating the pattern of using social alarm of terrorism to enact legislation that would otherwise likely encounter resistance. National security is often used as the rationale to enact legislation and heighten surveillance powers, and the debate is centered on security versus privacy. Indeed, following 9/11, the debate between security and privacy gained new momentum (Neocleous: 2007). However, the dichotomy between security and privacy is a false one (Cavoukian: 2008). Security and privacy is not a zero sum game; giving up privacy does not necessarily lead to greater security, and increased security need not result in a loss of privacy. There are two logics operating in the context of the Internet. First, there is the logic of security vis-à-vis the Internet that creates conditions for surveillance. Second, there is the logic of control. I suggest that the real debate is about liberty versus control, and the U.S. government has operated under the logic of control. Liberty means having both privacy and security. As Benjamin Franklin famously observed, people willing to trade their freedom and liberty for temporary security deserve neither and will lose both. Surely there is a better way to balance our civil liberties and the nation’s security without abandoning either. Indeed, in response to the erosion of civil liberties, social movements have formed to advocate for increased privacy protection and more checks and balances on government surveillance. Further research may investigate this crucial area of the impact of social movements on Internet policy and privacy protection. Surveillance initiatives analyzed in this article are only symptoms of deeper shifts in political culture, governance, and social control (Lyon: 2003). Diffie and Landau (2007: 313) remark, “Control of society is, in large part, control of communication.” As society and technology evolve, the government’s power to control communication changes. If increased surveillance continues, it does not bode well for democracy and personal liberties. The struggle over control of communication and individual’s rights will surely continue for years to come. Research on these battles for power and control will help us understand the role of technology in society, as well as how to better balance the needs of both the government and the public. References Abbate, J. (1999) “Inventing the Internet” London, MIT Press. Administrative Office of the United States Courts. (2007): “Wiretap report” http:// www.uscourts.gov/wiretap04/contents.html Associated Press. (2005): “FBI ditches Carnivore surveillance system” on January 18, 2005. 225 Surveillance, Control, and Privacy on the Internet : Challenges to Democratic Communication
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l Journal of Global Communication, Vol2., No.1, Jan.-July 2009 pp. 225-247 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006) German Espino Professor, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences Autonomous University of Queretaro, Mexico.C.P. 76000. E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract With the downfall of the authoritarian regime ruling Mexico for more than seven decades, the relationship between politicians, the mass media and public opinion transformed dramatically. This paper addresses such a transformation of political communication by looking at the 1994, 2000 and 2006 presidential campaigns in comparative perspective. The analysis observes specific changes in the area, such as the displacement of the traditional centers of power that determined the political relations during the authoritarian regime as well as the breakdown of the corporatist compliances that characterized the media-government relations. Further traits that illustrate contemporary changes in political communication in Mexico is the establishment plural spectrum of powerful media whose barons act as powerful pressure groups; and the instability of Mexican electorate, which in turn fuels the prevalence of both independent and ‘soft vote’ over the ‘hard vote’. Finally, the paper concludes that candidate’s media and communication strategies during the 2006 presidential campaigns were the most influential factors of the election. Key words: Elections/campaigns, agenda setting, media effects, Quantitative/survey, Quantitative/content analysis. Introduction This paper presents the results of a study aiming to analyze the 2006 presidential election in Mexico. The central hypothesis sustains that the overthrow of the authoritarian regime which ruled the country for over seventy years, has sparked an ongoing transformation of the roles being played by three key political communication actors –politicians, mass media and the public opinion. Wolton (1998) defines political communication as a space where there is an exchange of contradictory speeches from among politicians, mass media, and public opinion, as three actors that have the legitimate right to express their views. In order to explain the new process of political communication, this article describes the new roles of these three players. A new political communication scenario has been established in the Mexican presidential elections with the mentioned change in regimen and the principal transformations lie in: 1) the non-existence of an authoritarian regime that ordered the rotation of power in Mexico due to a new plurality of actors and game rules, taking the president out of a central power position and putting into place a variety of different sectors that formed groups embattled in the process of 229 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
influencing the political system; 2) the media has broken corporate ties that used to sustain the government, now placing them as powerful independent pressure groups; 3) the passive role of the constituency that was typical of during the authoritarian regime, takes on a more participative role that sometimes contributes to changes in the political system. Given all of these changes, a secondary hypothesis suggests that the candidates’ media campaigns turned out to be the most influential factors in the election. This study basically analyzes the communication strategy areas of the different campaigns, not on the direct campaigning of the parties or candidates but rather on the media campaigning. Basic concepts to situate the political communication in Mexico Some authors have argued for the medias’ attested ability to influence voters, giving us such theories as the Spiral of Silence and Agenda Setting. The latter is a key concept in this study as one of the theories that have taken up the concept of the powerful role of the media in modern life. It helps us understand how political actors such as the media and the different sectors of civil society participate in influencing political campaigns. According to this theory, the media are not consigned to telling people what to think but they can guide them in a space where the media has the capacity to direct public attention towards particular issues. The fact that the media can chose these issues corresponds to a fixation on agenda setting, suggesting that we all have the need to know what is happening around us and that it is the medias job to satisfy this need. As such, the media no longer persuade, instead they choose issues and guide the public towards them. There are two recent contemporary political communication tendencies that are crucial to a critical approach towards political campaigns: 1) the media as newly arrived public space protagonists, a trend commonly denominated as “video-politics”; and 2) the Americanization of the political campaigns. The first one is called video-politics because of the hegemonic nature of television and the tendency of journalists and communicators to place themselves as the protagonists of public space which results in displacing politicians’ influence towards that of media personalities. The second phenomenon of the Americanization of political campaigns refers to the way politicians, the media and diverse political systems adopt political electoral technology designed in the United States. These trends are often intermingled and this analysis sometimes makes a distinction between the two tendencies while staying close to showing how they work together in the new scenario of political communication. Furthermore, the analytical lenses of Americanization and Video-politics help us approach other political processes such as voter volatility that gets translated into polls results in which independent voters constitute a decisive majority. They also help us to look at political party configurations such as the “catch-all parties” and how these displace the candidates’ parties. As a result, these lenses identify how the political campaigns have become more personalized, where a candidate gets turned into a media personality. In the same manner, they help us to see the processes taking place in the current landscape of political communication as key campaign strategies are centered on the political marketing, and where the three main political parties institute primaries to select their candidates. German Espino 230
In terms of the video-politics, we are able to see political spectacle and media scandals. From within this tendency of the media, programs, cultural events, political functions, and social situations get transformed into shows for many reasons, to include the immanent importance of television ratings. Paradoxically, television competition to attract a large audience sparks innovation while also reproducing the successful formats of talk shows, reality shows, sports, etc. For example, most all of the newscasts reproduce the same tendencies to create a show: brevity, confrontation, negativism, interpretation, prediction, personalization, etc. (Rospir in Muñoz-Alonso and Rospir 1999). Politics as a media event reaches its culmination with negative and scandalous journalism programs that often become the heart of campaign information. However relevant, Americanization and video-politics theories fall short in terms of being able to describe the totality of these processes. ‘Reception studies’ are one of the more comprehensive means through which to tackle the macro-processes of the new configuration of political communication that is taking place in Mexico (Morley 1996, 37; Orozco 2004, Jensen 1995). This theoretical corpus offers the following Mexican political communication assumptions: I. Within the plural spectrum of media outlets in a democracy, the bulk of the media develop an “internal plurality” that consists of a diversity of ideological voices and affiliations. There also are media networks that represent the principal existing ideologies that pertain to the “external plurality” of the public space. These two aspects of the spectrum compensate each other in a process that tends to reduce the potential bias inherent in the media. II. News media is a product of different voices and cultural traditions that often results in the polysemic character of their messages. III. The theory highlights the importance of active receptors who are constantly reinterpreting messages. The meaning the audience gives to the messages is not inextricably linked to the source or to the means of communication. Reception is a complex process of influences that interact with the agents and with the circumstances of the communicative process. Within this complexity, it is the receptors who establish the final meaning given to any message. IV. This process can be thought of in terms of a complex contextual resignification of media events. It is not the only factor that determines the meaning process since meaning is a result of a permanent battle between different agents and circumstances of the communicative process. There are a number of factors that come into play such as the diversity of media outlets, group influences, political ideologies, etc. V. The process of message resignification is like a power struggle. Texts are not a blank page which succumb to the whims of the receptor. Instead, the cultural studies tradition insists that there are sense enclosures inscribed in texts despite their polysemic character. Given the range of possible meanings, a receptor’s reading could be: dominated (reproducing the outlets intended meaning); negotiated (partially reinterpreting the intended meaning); or critical (deconstructing the inscribed power mechanisms in the text which allows the receptor to develop a personal interpretation of the text). 231 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
The following paragraphs describe the methodological approaches informing the paper, and the range of official, independent and researcher-conducted studies, documents, surveys and copy which, examined comparatively, yields some light about the understanding of political processes in Mexico. Methodology Electoral-campaigns literature typically focuses on research methods which aid to evaluate the main variables affecting electoral processes, their impact or degree of variance. However, this paper aim is not to assess such variables separately, but rather, goes beyond to further examine the configuration of a new political communication landscape by focusing on the interplay and roles of the three key actors, as the following diagram shows (Graph I). Graphic I: Relationships between the political communications agents
Politicians (Mass media’s campaign) *Political marketing strategy *Public relations to influence mass media: media coverage of the campaign, political spectacle, negative issues…
Mass media *Journalist coverage of the campaigns *Agenda setting (emphasized the negative issues)
Electing public *Hard vote, soft vote… *Independent voters * Social-political context
Consequently, media campaigns are the chosen strategy that allows candidates to intervene in media outlets. The principal elements of their campaigns consist of hiring political publicity and public relations consultants that utilize the media to promote a positive spin and a proper management of the national public agenda (which uses political spectacle and the management of negative issues). Politicians, political parties and candidates This research is based on a case study that looks at the three most important campaigns in the 2006 presidential race. The candidates reviewed are as follows: Felipe Calderon of the German Espino 232
National Action Party (PAN); Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO), candidate of the CBT (Coalition for the People’s Welfare) integrated by three parties: PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution); PT (Workers Party) as well as Convergence Party; and finally Roberto Madrazo of the Alliance for Mexico comprised by PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the PVEM (Ecologist Green Party of Mexico). The candidates were analyzed mainly through their media strategies, since this research sustains that it media strategies during the 2006’s campaigns were the factors that more strongly influenced the election. This is clear in a country like Mexico, which possesses a large number of registered voters (71.3 millions) in a very extensive geographical domain (2 millions km2). As for the elements of media strategies, we analyze, they are referred as: 1) The political marketing strategies; 2) The development of tactics for public relations and spin, in order to intervene and impact on the media –this includes the management of the public agenda, especially the negative issues and the activities of political spectacle. Besides their campaigns, candidates were also analyzed through their media strategies, particularly media interviews, phone-ins, as well as their public speeches, declarations and statements along to those of their campaign officers. To supplement this particular area of the research, the author carried out several interviews with campaign officers from both the PAN and the CBT. To analyze the political advertisement we gathered monitoring results from the Federal Election Institute (IFE 2006a) –the institution in charge of all the federal elections, outlining their results of previous public monitoring as well as those compiled by a Verifying and Monitoring Company (Verificacion y Monitoreo 2006). Mass media One of the central points of this research consists of explaining the function of the media in relation to other political communication agents, namely the politicians and the citizens. In order to examine the impact of political campaigns in the media, some published reports from the Electoral Institute who monitors media coverage of political campaigns were utilized (IFE 2006b). Besides, we carried out, our very own content analysis study to look at the agenda management and issue salience during the campaigns coverage. The media outlets analyzed for these purpose are as follows: 1) The television newscast held highest rating called “El Noticiero” and: 2) The three most important newspapers of the country: “Reforma”, “El Universal” and “La Jornada”. Furthermore, the study also examines the way in which politicians and media introduce key issues (particularly negative ones) into the electoral political agenda, and their attaining impact on polls. Also this paper attempts to demonstrate that the media and political campaigns contrive to convert politics into a spectacle, again using methodological tools such as content analysis of issue salience and agenda management. To summarize, the methods supporting our claims in relation to media’s role s during elections are: a) Journalistic coverage of the campaigns within the news programs, comparing our own content analysis with those conducted by IFE (2006b) as well as the Civic Alliance. 233 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
b) Analysis of political advertisement using IFE monitoring reports and the aforementioned content analysis. c) In the same manner, the study examines the impact of distinctive media events such as debates and scandals using a number of poll surveys and reports in comparative perspective d) Negative issue salience and prevalence of scandals is also assessed through the content analysis of media coverage of the events in question. e) Finally, in order to evaluate the true penetration of the media, we monitored major television news programs assisted by reports from the Brazilian Institute of Statistics and Public Opinion (IBOPE). This is the company in charge of undertaking rating measurement for the major media companies of Mexico. Public electorate Within the new scenario of political communication, the electing public constitutes the most difficult aspect to study and comprehend because very few quality studies tackle these issues systematically, and the few ones that do are rarely published or made available. Almost all the studies which are published about this particular aspect are surveys. For that reason the trustworthiest polls to analyze the opinion climate were consulted. Those carried out by “Mitofsky Consulting” for the Televisa Corporation and the others done by Grupo Reforma, which is one of the most important journalistic groups in the country. Similarly, the election’s final results were systematically compared to further examine the voters’ behavior, as well as their wider interplay with the two other main actors of political communication, such as the media and candidates. The new scenario of political communication in Mexico In this section, the paper reviews the role, practices, patterns and trends informing our first political –communication agent: the presidential candidates and their campaigns. It reviews the sociopolitical conditions that might have impacted presidential elections; as well as the evolution of political campaigns; their officers; media strategies; political marketing, trends and devices; and the major decisions they made in relation to the overall process of political communication. The sociopolitical context The relationships between politicians, media and public can only be understood through the sociopolitical context that influences the whole decision process such as the state of economy, the political culture, international relations, government’s legitimacy and social discontent. Among the sociopolitical conditions, three appear to be relevant matters with important impact on the results of the Mexican presidential elections, namely: 1) The evaluation that the citizens make about the current government, and the extent to which the State is made accountable; 2) The social conditions of the country which are subject to the influence of the media and the political campaigns; 3) Certain extraordinary sociopolitical circumstances such as economic or political crisis that may affect the electoral process. Furthermore, there are a number of sociopolitical conditions that allow greater influence and level of maneuver on the part of candidates and their campaigns. Such conditions are: A) The conditions of the population, poverty, minimal education levels and insufficient political German Espino 234
formation; B) The monopolistic concentration of the main communication media (the companies Televisa and TV Azteca almost had the whole national television) and; C) A presidential regime that concentrates the executive power and increases its influence capacity upon the population. Many Mexican voters have historically lacked enough formation or political information, therefore they tend to use the information generated during the election campaign in order to make their voting decisions; this clearly enables these influences to take hold. Some authors mention that on certain occasions societies live within extraordinary circumstances that definitely influence the vote of the population. This would include circumstances such as sociopolitical and economic crisis, or a regime change process. These authors believe that the later was, indeed, very important during the so-called Mexican transition because during this process some extraordinary circumstances unfolded. For example, since 1988 an important citizen movement consolidated, one which successfully engrained with the opposition parties, even though the elections were strictly controlled with an iron fist by the authoritarian regime. In the following elections, this social movement makes itself clearly present with the triumph of the opposition in different states and regional governments up until 1994. Years later the opposition triumph is manifested at the Union’s Congress election in 1997, and culminated with the political alternation of the presidential election in 2000. The opposition was able to succeed and articulate itself with the expectation of change for the majority of the population. The 1988, 1994 and 2000 campaigns were clearly marked by extraordinary circumstances. The 1998 campaign is noteworthy because of a convulsive economic crisis at the time, but also antagonistic factions and further split within PRI’s party. The 1994 campaigns were shaped by a year colored by acute sociopolitical crisis, such as the EZLN irruption and the assassination of the official presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio. Last, the 2000 campaign stands out due to the change in process of the “democratic transition”. The 1994 presidential campaigns The last memory of the authoritarian regime being able to determine the fate of the presidential election goes back to 1994. During that election, the regime successfully took advantage of and capitalized the fear and schism provoked by one extraordinary circumstance, the 1994 sociopolitical crisis. In such a convulsive year, the Mexican political system went through a serious institutional crisis and the presidential elections were placed under testing conditions, which also further tested the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. After the massive fraud accusation that spawned in 1988, the presidential elections did not possess very much credibility either within or outside the country. As self-proclaimed winner candidate, President Carlos Salinas did all he could to reconstruct the legitimacy of the political system after the rough allegations and lack of credibility yielded by a highly questioned election 1988. President Salinas did have a certain amount of success at spreading the idea that Mexico was entering the economies of the First World because he joined Mexico to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and also signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada. 235 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
Nonetheless, in January of 1994 the Zapatista guerilla (EZLN) modified the optimistic expectations of society and the government. But the hardest peril for the country was presented in March 1994 when the PRI’s candidate for the presidency, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated. Within this context president Salinas decided to start promoting an electoral reform that would reinforce the legitimacy of the political system. The electoral reform concluded successfully, allowing the organization of credible elections, with better certitude guarantees and equality for the opposition. Still, within this context, the decisive element was the strength of the authoritarian regime. The accusations of election fraud during the 1988 elections possessed high cost in terms of the legitimacy of political system. Such was the case that it was impossible to repeat a fraud in the 1994 presidential election. For all these reasons, instead of election fraud, President Salinas implemented a massive clientelistic system through a great number of social assistance programs for poor people. With the sale of large state owned companies, the president was able to obtain a lucrative budget for the Secretary of Social Development (Sedesol), which administered the majority of the social assistance programs. It was not exactly a casual move when President Salinas assigned Luis Donaldo Colosio as head of these programs. This is the man who would later be named presidential candidate of the PRI. However, this link between the presidential campaign of the PRI and the benefits of Sedesol was shortened by Colosios’s assassination. Nonetheless, there were many other links. At least the giant clientelistic apparatus functioned efficiently to support Ernesto Zedillo, the new PRI’s candidate. In this manner the main strategy of the PRI to succeed in the presidential elections of 1994 was the organization of clientelistic structure through federal social programs. In addition, within the “media campaign” the social panic was efficiently used which may well have been caused by the assassination of Colosio and the irruption of the Zapatista guerrillas. At that time, the mass media had a corporate deal with the regime which meant that they functioned according to the PRI’s campaign strategy. The deal meant during the authoritarian regime, the Mexican mass media received huge economic privileges making it the biggest Spanish media network of world. However, during the 1994 electoral process, the media gave more equitable campaign coverage when compared to the coverage given to the opposition. In quantitative terms, the following chart shows how all the studies reveal an evolution in the coverage of the 1988 election. Table 1. Presence of the parties in two main TV news during the 1988 and 1994 presidential campaigns Party Coverage in 1988 Coverage in 1994 PRI 91.71% 32.01% PAN 3.48% 16.69% FDN-PRD 3.94% 19.3% Others 0.87% 31.95% Source : Arredondo Ramírez y Alianza Cívica, en Trejo (2001, 297) However, in qualitative terms the PRI party candidate was privileged while the opposition candidates were constantly disqualified. Alianza Civica (Acosta y Parra 1995) produced an German Espino 236
important content analysis of this election that incorporated qualitative indicators to evaluate the media. As an example, the organization reviewed the way journalist used adjectives to qualify or to disqualify candidates. The Alianza Cívica report reveals that the PRI candidate had a privileged position in the news. Reports about the PRI party tended to include their own campaign images together with the candidates own voice while the opposition candidates had neither an image nor a voice that was their own (Acosta 1995, 214). Moreover, the news anchors offered positive comments when it came to the PRI and negative ones in the case of the PAN and PRD candidates (Acosta 1995). At the same time, the PRI presidential candidate was included in the introductory program segments while any information related to the other two major parties was squeezed into the segment that covered all of the eight opposition parties (Acosta 1995). Additionally, radio developed coverage that was more biased in favor of the PRI than television, in both quantitative and qualitative terms: The radio coverage in the campaign was actually more slanted towards Zedillo than on television according to the Institute for Federal Elections. The study said that Zedillo received 50.1% of the airtime compared to the 49.9% that covered all of the eight remaining parties... (Oppenheimer 2003, 168) But the worst scandal with respect to the disparity in coverage was the series of spots and threatening messages of radio broadcasts intended to scare the public. The objective was to associate the opposition with violence and the PRI with peace. Finally, the Proceso magazine condemned the Zedillo campaign for returning to the custom of paying the excessive costs of the reporters in charge of covering the tour. Worse yet, the team of the PRI campaign was giving the reporters money to compensate them for their meager salaries (Chávez 1994). The combination of these factors permitted the PRI to triumph with a majority of votes (48.7%) for the presidential candidate and also with an absolute majority in congress (48.58%), not to mention the highest level of voter participation in the last two decades (77.16%). It is noteworthy that during this era the power of the authoritarian regime still had strong influence against the institutional weakness of the opposition parties. Neither the PRD, nor the PAN had territorial structure throughout the country, nor were they able to carry out an efficient media campaign. Furthermore, the economic resources of these parties were far less than those of the official party. Despite the control held by the authoritarian regime in the 1994, a new scenario of political communication begins to take hold in the campaigns. It was the first time the opposition parties had a significant impact in the media (even though they were not on parity with the ruling party). It was also the first time that the candidates of the three strongest electoral forces faced each other in a televised debate. Additionally, it was the first time the investments in political marketing, media publicity, and polling were a so high. New territory was also charted in the sense that the election was organized by the citizens and not by the government. In conclusion, it was a scenario of political communication in transition and although it was dominated by authoritarian government it also offered some opportunities for new democratic, pluralistic political tendencies to take hold. 237 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006) The 2000 Presidential campaigns By the year 2000, the authoritarian regime could not longer control the election process because conditions had changed radically. The economic crisis of 1994 and 1995 accelerated the discredit of the authoritarian regime. More provincial governments, councils and the same Chamber of Deputies fell to the hands of the opposition. The Ernesto Zedillo’s presidency had promoted an electoral reform had strengthened the citizen-handled, autonomous nature of the Electoral Institution, and hence strongly contributed to guaranty credible and a somewhat middle level equitable election. With these advances, the regime could no longer determine the course of the elections. The civil society had gained more institutional power which allowed it to move according to its own interest even against the authoritarian regime. On their part, mass media had broken the corporative deal for the first time in history and consequently enjoyed an independence never before experienced. Perhaps the main reason the media established their independence from the government was because communities from around the whole country were beginning to vote for opposition parties in greater numbers. At the same time, Televisa newscasts had succumbed to the lowest national ratings and credibility levels, a network that had been the bulwark of the authoritarian regime. Due to these pressures, Televisa substituted the old news directors and newscasts to recover lost terrain in the ratings war. Leopoldo Gómez, the vice president of Noticias de Televisa describes the 1996-1997 crisis of his corporation: Our viability as a business was in jeopardy, ratings were low and so were the sales. Our newscasts had reached the point of null credibility. It was then that a effort was made to restructure all of the newscasts, and to force, put pressure to the extreme margins of free expression. Television Azteca, our competition, earned ratings that were twice as high as ours for the nightly newscasts (Villamil 2001, 102-103). The opposition at the time governed in a good number of states and soon developed greater institutional capacity which translated into a national electing base, as well as a capacity to utilize the latest advances of media campaign technology. In order to design their campaign strategies, both candidates Fox (PAN) and Labastida (PRI) hired the most famous U.S. consultants of the time. James Carville acted as a Labastida’s consultant after having worked for Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin while Vicente Fox took on Dick Morris who had worked for both George Bush and Bill Clinton (Bucio y Gutiérrez 2005). Due to all of these new conditions, this 2000 context verified the founding election process. The campaigns and the elections developed, for the first time, according to democratic rules. From another point of view it could be said that even though in 2000 the official party had a great institutional weakness and had been deeply discredited, it continued to reserve sufficient resources to dispute a presidential election. In this sense, during this particular year the campaigns were carried out with equivalent forces, but using different support mechanisms. While the PRI’s candidate had the giant clientelistic support which had been achieved with social governmental programs, the main opposition candidate had the majority’s support from society that aspired for political change. There were a great number of civil organizations and groups of all ideological affiliations that worked for change and a social movement was obvious. German Espino 238
The PAN successfully associated the citizen’s movement to their ethos to capitalize the expectations for political change of the population; this association eventually became a strong deciding factor in the electoral results. This expectation for political change of the people was obvious for the three major campaigns, even the official party took as a strategic center of their communication campaign the idea of political change. Furthermore, the Vicente Fox’s campaign strategy was able to convince society that it was the only political change constituting a real alternative, and that the official party represented the continuity of the ancient regime. In order to succeed, the PAN candidate received the support of not only the reduced PAN’s electing base, but mainly of the majority of the independent electors, including a leftist sector which made a “strategic vote” to defeat the state’s party. The triumph of this party in 2000 presidential election was the first alternation after 70 years of the PRI government. The way the media acted in the 2000 campaign battle marked the historical break with the authoritarian regime. It was the year when television and radio election coverage reached equitable levels for the first time in history. There are multiple reasons for the break and the principal one was that for the first time the polling data was favoring a candidate from an opposition party. Similarly, many institutions such as the IFE and the Alianza Cívica had been established to monitor the tendencies of the media. Combined with these factors, there was also the credibility crisis of the regimen and the implications for all of the networks of the strong public criticism of the Televisa newscasts. Table 2. Coverage of the Radio and TV during 2000 presidential election Party Percentage of Radio airtime Percentage of TV airtime PAN 30.2 30.4 PRI 31.1 27.4 PRD 21.1 22.3 Source : IFE in Trejo 2001 The qualitative study done by the Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos (2000) also reached a similar conclusion, that for the first time there was equitable coverage among the principal parties in the campaign. Table 3. Presence of the parties in the two main TV news and at the voting during the 1988, 1994, 2000 presidential campaigns ANO PRI PRD PAN TV Voting TV Voting TV Voting 1988 91,71% 50% 3,94% 31% 3,48% 17% 1994 32,01% 48,7% 19,3% 16,6% 16,69% 25,9% 2000 28,12% 36,11% 27,4% 16,64% 30,4% 42,52% Source : Electoral results and Content Analysis IFE 1994 and 2000. Television was principal scenario in the 2000 presidential campaign in the sense that it 239 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
garnered the most investment from the parties’ advertising spots. The outlay was significant in comparison to the money spent during the 1994 campaign where the parties only spent 25% of its budget on the media. In 2000 the parties spent 54% of their budgets on getting campaign media space. This is equal to more than 120 million USD. Television spots took up 30% of the campaign budgets which comes out to 67 million USD. The outlay for radio was 43 million USD while the press earned 9 million USD (IFE en Trejo 2001, 394-395). Moreover, it was the first time that highly rating television comical shows interviewed the candidates. The large audiences that were registered as viewing the televised political events were superior to the other media outlet ratings. The second debate that took place between the presidential candidates garnered 7.3 million viewers but the highest numbers were registered on Election Day. All of the existing ratings records were beat as people tuned in to watch the election returns. On that day, when the IFE president appeared at 23:00 on all of the major network channels to announce the winner, the national rating for the event was 64.4 meaning that there were a total of 30 million viewers. (IBOPE in Trejo 2001, 439) The presidential campaigns of 2006 In the 2006 the social conditions were completely different from those of six years earlier. While during the 2000 a citizen movement was verified which fought to defeat the authoritarian regime, in 2006 the citizen movement supported the two great political powers that were in opposition to the authoritarian regime, namely the PAN and PRD. This support placed both forces at virtually even levels in regards to electoral preferences. First stage The Mexican presidential campaigns lasted a little more than five months. For convenience of this study, such a period was divided into three stages. The first stage begins on the 19th of January. This is the formal starting day of the election campaigns and it lasts until the first few days into March. In this stage it was clear that the election domain belonged to Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). During this period his campaign was nearly ten points ahead in the surveys, and was the campaign which had the initiative momentum. During this period the preferences of his competitors were stagnant and at times actually moved backwards. Also during this first period of the campaign, Madrazo’s campaign was undermined due to a series of media’s scandals (Author 2007). Graph II. Evolution of election preferences during the first stage
50
40
30 López 20 Obrador Felipe 10 Calderón 0 Roberto Madrazo ry y h a ar rc u ru a an b M J Fe Source : Reforma Group (2006a) German Espino 240
At the end of one and a half months of campaign surveys, there was a marked paradox, a consolidation process of Lopez Obrador, even though his presence within the media was insignificant. At the same time the Calderon and Madrazo campaigns were suffering a backward movement in spite the fact that they were investing more time and effort, not to mention money on the media. Before this failed campaign, however, the PAN candidate made a crucial decision which was to change the entire strategy resulting in the second stage campaigning Table 4. Expenditure on radio and TV, from the 19th of January to the 3rd of March Candidate Total Expenditure* Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador $4,168,156 Felipe Calderon $17,564,628 Roberto Madrazo $7,018,727 Source : Verification y Monitoreo (2006) * Expenditure estimated in American dollars. Second stage At the end of the first stage, the institutional campaign of President Fox began to be outstanding. It was at this point that the president openly solicited the electors to endorse his party within the government, something his critics viewed as an unlawful intromission in the process. Yet despite not being permitted, President Fox and the whole federal government managed to intervene in the campaign in a very diverse way in order to support the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderon, as well he was instrumental in trying to humiliate the principal opponent candidate: Lopez Obrador. The federal government also purchased airtime for a intense publicity campaign consisting of spots in key media outlets, in order to broadcast his accomplishments and to openly call for continuity. Furthermore, there are many reports that several federal government agencies, especially Sedesol, utilized resources in a clientelistic way to promote voting in favor of the PAN (Reveles 2006) Table 5. Investment per month of the Presidency in spots (January 19 until May 19th) January February March April May Total Number 8,484 77,803 51,657 156,117 162,314 456,375 of spots Cost in $8,684,992 $44,216,594 $24,848,335 $50,508,580 $42,740,370 $170,998,873 dollars Source : Verification y Monitoreo, at Reveles 2006 Nonetheless, the main support of Fox to the PAN campaign was to address a negative campaign to provoke his political rival, Lopez Obrador, who ended up falling into the trap and involving himself in a personal battle against the president. By the end of February, the discussions between president Fox and Lopez Obrador had risen to their highest levels of stridency. At the coldest moment, in the beginning of March, AMLO recriminated the president with a shameful tune: “Shut up Mister President! Shut up jungle parrot!” The PAN exploited these errors with a clever negative campaign and compared the abruptness of Lopez Obrador with the authoritarian 241 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
personality of the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez. Eventually such comparisons became the most important issue of the agenda’s media during March and April. On their part, Felipe Calderon’s team argued that it was a “contrast campaign”: on the one side the PAN developed an aggressive negative campaign which essentially disqualified Lopez Obrador’s personality, and the other PAN’s campaign strategy proposes a positive angle in which “the virtues” of Calderon were highlighted. It is almost unnecessary to remember this is the traditional way to use political negative advertising (Morris 2002). Utilizing this contrast strategy, Lopez Obrador’s campaign errors also helped, such as his sour discussion with President Fox and then his absence during the first presidential debate. With all these negative events being noted and the careful administration of negative issues in the electoral political agenda, the skillful PAN’s media campaign provoked the fall of Lopez Obrador’s electoral preferences. The PAN also managed to light a growth within Calderon’s candidacy; both tendencies conjugated to reverse the electoral preferences. To their disadvantage, AMLO’s campaign team did not implement efficient damage control against such an impacting negative campaign. Lopez Obrador did not react to the attacks for almost two months. It was not until the first week of May that he initiated a counter-attack, but it appeared to be too late: by then he had lost his advantage of ten points, and for the first time in two years he was behind in the preference surveys. During this period Calderon’s campaign had the dominating public initiative agenda while Lopez Obrador’s assumed a reactive position. Graph III. Turn of the electoral preferences in the second stage:
50 40 30 López 20 Obrador 10 Felipe Calderón 0 Roberto l ry ry h ri y a a rc p a u ru a A M an b M J Fe Source : Reforma Group (2006b). Third stage The third stage of the campaign begins on the June 6th, the day of the second debate, when the CBT campaign manages to introduce a scandal involving Felipe Calderon in the political electing agenda. This was the most negative issue within the PAN campaign and it was presented only a few weeks before the election. Nonetheless Felipe Calderon’s campaign team managed an efficient damage control strategy, which consequently stopped the preferential elections from falling. This circumstance again demonstrated the great strategy capacity and reaction on the German Espino 242
part of the PAN media campaign. At the end of this third stage, right before the elections, none of the main campaigners managed to clearly dominate the agenda. Both fought fiercely to overturn the impact of negative themes. Only days prior to the election, some of the major corporate and influential groups of the country such as the Coordinating Businessmen Council (CCE, for its Spanish acronym) developed yet another intense negative publicity campaign against Lopez Obrador which proved to be largely successful. The previous surveys prior to the elections demonstrated that there was virtually an even match between the two leading candidates, yet Lopez Obrador, could never recover the leading spot. Graph IV. Electoral preferences oscillations 40
30 López 20 Obrador Felipe 10 Calderón Roberto Madrazo 0 l ry ry h ri y st d a a rc p a 1 2n nu ru a A M e e a b M un n J Fe J Ju
Source : Mitofsky Consulting, 2006 Election results In what is deemed to be the most competitive election ever, the triumph of Calderon was very tight. He obtained only 233,831 votes more than Lopez Obrador, which means that he won by merely 0.56 percent. Almost 60% (58.22%) of the registered population participated. Although it was the lowest level of participation in presidential election in the last two decades this, however, is quite acceptable if one considers that the intermediate legislative election often only reports 40% participation. This high participation appears to contradict the general interpretation that highly negative campaigns tend to discourage voter incentive because there is no doubt that this was the most negative presidential campaign to date. The tendencies of the mass media on 2006 This investigation claims that it was not the oblique twisting of the media, but rather the media strategy of the campaigns, what decisively determined the 2006 elections. The deficient media campaign of Lopez Obrador, combined with a clever media strategy of Felipe Calderon, appears to have impacted the election results meaningfully. Therefore, the objective of our content analysis of agenda management is not to emphasize that media tend to prioritize negative issues and scandals, bur rather, the aim is to evaluate which campaign received greater injury due to the impact of such negative issues. The study interest 243 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
focuses on observing the relationships that were established between the negative themes of the campaigns, the agenda management on behalf of the media and the electoral preferences. The findings confirm that the media played an active role in promoting negative issues that affected the campaigns and that ran counter to their interest. Nonetheless, the influence of these negative themes within the electing public was not as direct as one might have thought, but rather it was mediated by myriad factors, namely the complexity of the media subsystem. First of all, the media spectrum is plural. The majority of the media companies do not overtly decide to or publicize their support for one candidate with demerit in regards to others, but instead develop what we might call an “internal plurality”. They proclaim their neutrality by contracting a plurality of different political affiliation personalities, commentators and panelists. Even the journalistic outlets that are the most criticized by the left-winger organizations such as El Noticiero news which is aired by Televisa, as well as Reforma newspaper, have among their columnists a number of renowned intellectuals of all the ideological spectrum, including some with noticeable left-wing credentials. For example, in 2006 “El Noticiero” had well known left- wing intellectuals and writers who also participated as advisors to Lopez Obrador’s campaign such as: Carlos Monsivais, Elena Poniatowska and Rene Druker. Consequently one could support the argument of media plurality on the grounds of their internal composition, but also because the media landscape also offers a varying offer of ideological positions. This “external plurality” of the media generates cross currents that might help to prevent such tendencies –whether they be left or right, to become hegemonic within the public space. This means that even when there were media players that openly opted to support the PAN’s candidacy, there were also others that overtly leaned towards the candidacy of the CBT in such a way that the three main candidates seemed to be compensated with the sympathy and support of a number of media outlets. A paradox should be mentioned here, as it were the newspapers —which normally do not boast large readership when compared to broadcast audiences, the ones that introduced the main negative issues to the public agenda. In fact, the most salient media in this matter was La Jornada, the most notable left-wing paper, due to their revealing of some of the most widely discussed scandals of the campaign targeting both PRI and PAN candidates (Author 2007). It is also true that all the media propagated the great negative issues and these themes set the agenda. Nonetheless, all of the data gathered suggests that this does not necessarily translate into a direct influence for the electorate. These influences are mediated by a lot of different factors such as: the plurality of the media, the polysemy of the messages, and the reinterpretation of the meaning that the receptor makes (Orozco 1999). For that reason, it is possible to assert that the amount of negative issues are not the most significant factor influencing the electing public, rather the whole planning and devising of a comprehensive media strategy is. Certainly, the effectiveness of a strategy consists in the assertive management of the negative issues; the actions of political spectacle that the candidates carry out, as well as political advertisement and airtime. The results of these studies have leaded this author to think that the media strategy of the German Espino 244
campaigns was the most significant factor of the elections 2000 and 2006. In order to arrive at this conclusion all other factors that are considered to have had some form of influence in the decisions of the election were effectively eliminated, these include: media bias in favor of a particular candidate; the effectiveness of the “dirt-land” campaign; and the party’s identity of the electors (Author 2007). In this sense, the politicians appear to be the central actors of the campaign and the electoral process, consolidating a trend that was already visible six years earlier, in 2000. Likewise, the lack of extraordinary circumstances, such as crisis, recession, political transitions or social mobilizations, also means that no external factors can be attributed as having impacted the results during 2006. For the past three presidential campaigns, the politicians have placed themselves as the key players of the elections, and the most innovative strategies and efficient campaigns prompted electoral triumphs. In 1994, the authoritarian regime managed to orient the course of the election for the last time. By 2000, opposition politicians developed a strategy to catalyze the widely popular expectations for change, and in turn, citizens’ demands and weariness constituted strongly influenced the result through PAN’s Vicente Fox candidacy. In contrast, six years later the electoral victory was decided in the political struggle between PAN and CBT through the media campaigns. Politicians, personalizing the campaigns During the presidential campaigns, personalization of politics has augmented while diminished parties influence. This trend is what normally occurs as result of Americanization of elections and the “video-political” tendencies; nonetheless, the Mexican case offers a variety of local conditions that might shape such a scenario differently. In 2000 Fox as in 2006 Lopez Obrador and Felipe Calderon all openly asked the rightwing, leftwing and independent electorate to vote for them. Fox as much as Calderon and Lopez Obrador all succeeded in forming a “catch-all party” by augmenting their voters long above their traditional areas of support. In order to achieve this, the key factor were the independent voters, to the point that the three runners grew in popularity at the expense of the underdog; in 2000 this was the PRD and in 2006 it was the PRI. Reviewing these results, a further phenomenon is noticeable. A large sector –possibly the majority of the electors, no longer identify themselves with or are loyal to a particular political party. Instead they associate their preferences to motives which are largely unrelated to parties’ identity. This could well be the main reason why these political organizations need to re-assess their strategies; instead of trying to keep loyal voters, they must readdress their efforts in chasing the indecisive electors or the ones with no political affinity. Another important fact is that the winning candidates of the last presidential elections acted more like media leaders than traditional politicians. During their campaigns, they skillfully learned the ‘media blows’, namely to strike others with blows sent through the media; therewith attracting, 245 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
through these, highly visible symbolic gestures, a lot of publicity due to their innovative nature. They could also be seen frolicking with famous personalities during non-traditional activities; in short, they ensured to enjoy the limelight while investing in political ads at a larger scale that their rivals. Hence such trends in contemporary political communication in Mexico, confirm the Americanized and “Video-political” campaigns. In such scenario, media have positioned themselves not as observers, but as the protagonist actors within the public space. In turn, the citizens, by detaching themselves of any party affiliation, have become the public of the political spectacle. The mass media, from the corporative pact to the plurality regime The downfall of authoritarianism sparked a deeply reform of the communication media subsystem. The media abandoned the corporatist agreement that they had with the regime and they became independent pressure groups. In spite of the hegemony of Televisa and TV Azteca on terrestrial television, the national media spectrum is plural and even most media show a diverse internal composition. Furthermore, just as occurs in other realms of cultural production, a good deal of the national media spectrum can be seen as having a great influence from leftwing intellectuals. But one the salient aspects to observe, is the fact that the media coverage of political campaigns mirrors the electoral strength and power that political parties hold at a particular moment. Based on the analysis of official and independent monitoring, as well as on our very own content analysis, it is possible to argue that the inequity within the electoral process does not appear to stem from media coverage of the campaign. The analysis of monitoring copy shows quite a different reality: in both 2000 and 2006 elections the news outlets distributed their support amidst all different campaigners, besides the most important media arguably allotted similar airtime and resources to all candidacies. The following chart shows the evolution of Televisa and TV Azteca —from campaign coverage that previously leaned towards favoring PRI’s candidate in 1988, to a more balanced, equitable coverage that represent the power and strength of parties at key points during the 2000 and 2006 elections… Table 6. Presence of the parties in the two main TV news and at the voting during the 1988, 1994, 2000 and 2006* presidential campaigns Year PRI PRD PAN TV Voting TV Voting TV Voting 1988 91,71% 50% 3,94% 31% 3,48% 17% 1994 32,01% 48,7% 19,3% 16,6% 16,69% 25,9% 2000 28,12% 36,11% 27,4% 16,64% 30,4% 42,52% 2006 22% 22.23% 21% 35.33% 19% 35.89% Source : Created by the author herein based upon the electoral results by IFE (1998, 2006b) and the content analysis of the Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos 1994 and 2000, as well as Trejo 2000, and Content Analysis IFE 2006b. Monitored news items constrained to news programs aired on prime time television (Televisa and TV Azteca). German Espino 246
*In 1988 the PRD did not exist, it was rather, a leftwing coalition called National Democratic Front (FDN), after the elections the PRD was formalized. In 2000 the PRD contended in coalition with other parties under the Alliance for Mexico formula. Finally, during 2006 the PRD contended also with the coalition under the formula: “Coalition for the Good of All”. Furthermore during that same year the PRI contended in coalition under the platform “The Alliance for Mexico”. While in 2000 the PAN contended under the coalition: “The Alliance for Change”. Evidently, the process was not equitable, as proved by excessive campaign expenses and a Machiavellian management of the agenda with negative themes, as well as the intervention of Fox and of the corporate executives in the electoral campaigns. The Tribunal for Elections condemned almost all of this when attempting to determine the winner of the election (TEPJF 2006). Inspite of this lack of equity and some of the illegal agreements between the government and the television’s corporate management,( The Government of president Fox offered many gifts to the media, for example: he cut the taxes for TV and radio corporations, he also resigned the legal concessions for the possession of Televisa and TV Azteca stations, further he also gave casino’s concessions to Televisa and TV Azteca, to name but a few.) inequity seems to stem from the campaigns themselves than solely from the media coverage. As noted earlier, the media’ landscape is apparently a plural one. In the current circumstances, it will be rather difficult for a party and for a government to establish total control again that would politically homogenize the media in the same manner as the authoritarian regime did. The prevalence of television appears to be the inheritance of a long tradition of authoritarism, since, as the Government recalls, the majority of population who could not afford the consumption of books, newspapers and magazines, were the greater consumers of television. (Secretaria de Gobernacion 2003) But within the current circumstances, the political communication scenario is qualitatively different. During the authoritarian regime, the media only gave coverage to the regime candidate as part of a well-rehearsed ritual, yet nowadays the scene within the media appears to be a real battle to convince the electors. Due to the fact that the political communication scenario is built within the media, strategies are designed to suit electronic spaces. In spite of the media’s protagonism and its tendency to videopolitics, the relationship between the media and the politicians are more complex than it may appear. For instance, on the one hand President Fox’s administration granted too many privileges to media moguls, sometimes beyond what is legal: TV and radio corporations received reductions of taxes; anticipated renewal of broadcasting concessions and; Televisa and TV Azteca received concession for casinos. On the other hand, the handling of negative issues in the media proved to be highly influential in the preferences, what might be interpreted as a great influence of media over the electorate. However, this study concludes quite differently: it asserts that the negative themes did not have a direct impact, but rather an intermediate one. But also it was the candidates and the politicians who introduced the negative issues, rather than the media, who in the end turn out to merely have an instrumental role. 247 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
Therefore, even when officials from both PRI and PAN administrations relied substantially on mass media, this did not automatically translated into a greater electoral cost effectiveness. Rather, the outlining of integral media campaigns proved to hold the greater impact on the voters, hence going far as to argue that the candidates ‘used’ the media. However the case, just as occurred before, both players end up winning: politicians continue to award all sorts of concessions and privileges to media, yet in exchange they receive privileged coverage, as well as extremely cheap advertisement contracts (Montes and Cordova 2006). In spite of agreement renewal between the media with the political class, and even due to the fact that the campaigns of 2006 the public appeared profoundly influenced by the agenda of negative themes, it is worthwhile to remember that these conditions continue to be extraordinary. During 2006, for the first time there were campaigns centered on negative themes. In the 2000 elections, the citizen’s movement was capitalized upon by the “candidate for change”, Vicente Fox. Here, it must be pointed out that it was Dick Morris, the American PAN’s strategist, who created the ideas of “ad hoc” under totally different circumstances. (Bucio and Gutiérrez 2005; Olmos 2007) The electing public The citizen’s movement Another great theoretical framework that inspires this investigation is “the reception theories” (Orozco 1999). Beginning with these theories, it is the goal of the paper to evaluate the existence of an active public that re-interprets the messages from the media. It should be recognized that during the 2006 election there was substantial scarcity of quality studies tackling the way in which the public processed the campaign information. But there are two fundamental facts which appear to be proof of an active public: 1) the unstable elector’s growth and 2) during the democratic transition many NGO’s and civic associations emerged, all of them pushing decisively for political change. The instability of the electors First of all there was the instability of the electors. On the one side the huge electoral base of the PRI had been disintegrated; on the other hand, the electoral bases of the PAN and PRD had grown substantially. Still in a correlative manner, there have been a segment of independent electors without a party which constitutes the key to winning the election. Today this segment is the top priority of all election campaigns. Before 2000, the triumph of the PRI was dependent on the hard vote. Today the hard vote of the PRI has been significantly reduced. So much so that it no longer permits them to triumph in federal elections. What’s more, the electoral bases of the PAN and PRD have grown with a new hard vote and one soft vote. The soft vote and the independent votes are the ones that decided the election. That is, it is not longer the hard vote – the stable one– but rather the unstable ones, that are the most important at election times. As was aforementioned, this change in voting habits was clearly manifested since PAN surpassed 9 million 146,841 votes in 1994 to 15 million 989,636 votes in 2000. This is almost a doubling of votes. This large oscillation in such a short period can only be explained by the extraordinary circumstance of a growing independent electorate as well as by the growing citizen German Espino 248
movement that demanded political transition. During the 2006 elections a citizen movement was manifested with a high electing participation, this was obvious from the high number of votes obtained by the PAN and the CBT. Nevertheless, during the 2006 elections, citizen mobilization was less clear than in 2000 because it developed within two contradictory, opposite directions that would eventually lead to virtually even match during the elections for the PAN and the CBT. The great growth of the independent vote is one central issue used to prove the instability of the electors. During the 2006 elections the independent vote was divided among the main disputing parties, Lopez Obrador with 43% and Felipe Calderon 34% (Reforma Group, 2006c). This apparent advantage for Lopez Obrador was compensated for by the electoral bases of both candidates which is why Calderon won the election by a tight 0.56 per cent difference. Likewise, in order to support the hypothesis of active citizens, we might trace the emergence of the associative tissue of some organizations that strove for political change. Therefore, since 1988, until 2000, a great number of social organizations appeared and mobilized. This associated web had multiple functions in the change process, from the channeling of dissatisfaction with certain system policies as was done by the movement “El Barzon”, to procuring elections that would be carried out in an equitable way as the association Civic Alliance did it. But like these organizations, thousands of supporters emerged throughout the country, the majority of them promoting the political change by diverse forms. This transformation of the electing public demonstrates that within the new regime the citizens have a decisive role in the political system; nowadays, electing public can influence politicians through the use of their vote and even within the media through the rating and the credibility indexes. Conclusion In conclusion, the identification with the party is no longer the decisive factor of the elections as the model from the University of Michigan suggests. The electoral base of one party no longer guarantees its electoral triumph. Nowadays it is the instability, uncertain voters of the electorate what possesses the capacity to decide election results. Due to this increasing electoral instability, the parties needed to adopt the “catch all” strategy in order to win the election and the candidates seek to become media leaders to win the elections, as had occurred in 2000 and 2006. The most successful example of the instability electorate management was the PAN 2000 and 2006 campaigns. In both campaigns the PAN candidates began with the surveys results not in their favor. They were loosing by almost ten points, however thanks to effective mediatized campaign strategies (focused on independent voters), they ended up victorious (Scherer 1999, Reforma Group 2006c). In conclusion, the voter is becoming increasingly independent and unpredictable. There appears to be more soft vote and less hard votes. Each election depends less on the axle of ideology-parties and more on the axle of the candidates-campaigns. All of this strongly contrasts with the typical view that disdains electorate for their political ignorance, ends up assuming an active role, re-interpreting the political messages from both media and candidates. Arguably, such a reading of electorate’s behavior is clearly distinct from the days in which the electorate 249 The Transformation of Political Communication in Mexico (1994-2006)
appeared to be a passive public due to its low political participation, fuelling concerns within scholars that it was precisely what the regime wanted (Linz 2000). Yet, during the period of the so-called transition, when the authoritarians were loosing the elections, a majority of voters constituted themselves as an influential active public. For that reason today the most important sector for the campaigns is the independent vote and the “soft vote”; it is these votes that decide the triumph or burial of a candidate. They vote not according to party sympathy or ideology, but rather according to the circumstance at the time, most probably the candidate and the campaign. In that sense, if we are to highlight any progress in the state of democracy in contemporary Mexico, that is the electing-public that during the authoritarian regime assumed a passive role, and that currently has evolved and transformed in a more engaged participation. Their task arguably pressurize politicians (through vote) and to media (through the ratings). Yet in such a reality, media and politicians still happen to hold the power in such a way that their complicity, as showed by the paper, still manages to directly influence the electorate. References Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos (1994) “Las elecciones federales en México según seis noticiarios de Televisión”, México. — (2000) “Las elecciones federales de 2000 en México. Análisis cualitativo de la cobertura y gastos de campaña en TV”, México. Acosta Valverde, Miguel y Luz Paula Parra Rosales (1995) Los procesos electorales en los medios de comunicación. Guía para el análisis de contenido electoral en México. Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos A.C. y Universidad Iberoamericana. México. Bucio, Marco y Jaime Gutiérrez (2005) Dos visiones para el triunfo, Editorial Miguel Ángel Porrúa, México. Chávez, Elías (1994) “Reaparecen vicios rechazados por Colosio”, en Proceso 0918-11, 6 de junio, México. Hernández, Érika (2006) “Multiplica Fox spots en 2005”, Reforma, México. IFE (2006a) Reporte de monitoreo de publicidad, junio, IFE, www.ife.org.mx, México — (2006b) “Análisis general de los resultados del monitoreo de noticias periodo del 19 de enero al 30 de junio de 2006”, Instituto Federal Electoral, www.ife.org.mx, México. Linz Juan J. (2000) Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Colorado, United States of America. Mitofsky Consulting (2006) “Así van... la contienda por la presidencia de México, 22 de junio 2006 “ El Noticiero, www.consulta.com.mx, México. Montes, Rodolfo y Édgar Córdova (2006), “Gangas y regalos para los aspirantes”, El Universal, 19 de junio de 2006, México. Morales, Alberto (2006) “Cada voto por Calderón costó en ‘spots’ $45.46", El Universal, 7 de julio, México. German Espino 250
Morris, Dick (2002) Juegos de poder, Editorial El Ateneo, Buenos Aires. Olmos, José Gil, (2007) “Dick Morris: injerencia impune”, Proceso 1585, 18 de marzo, México. Oppenheimer, Andrés (2003) México en la frontera del caos, la crisis mexicana de los noventa y la esperanza del nuevo milenio, Ediciones B, México. Orozco Gómez, Guillermo (1999) “Reception analysis seen from the multiple mediation model: some issues for the debate”, Intertexto, núm.5, http://www.intexto.ufrgs.br/v5n5/a v5n5a4.html Reforma Group (2006a) “Reporte de la encuesta nacional sobre preferencias electorales publicada el 16 de marzo de 2006” Reforma, México. — (2006b) “Reporte de la encuesta nacional sobre preferencias electorales publicada el 3 de mayo 2006” Reforma, México. — (2006c) “Elecciones 2006, encuesta de salida”, Reforma, Mimeo, en: www.ife.org Reforma (2006), “Multiplica presidencia gasto en propaganda” Reforma, México. Reveles, José (2006) Las manos sucias del PAN. Historia de un atraco multimillonario a los más pobres. Planeta. México. Scherer Ibarra, María (1999) “En el “maratón” electoral, el PRD luce rezagado Cárdenas no repunta” En Proceso No. 1206- 07, 13 de diciembre, México. Secretaría de Gobernación (2001) “Encuesta Nacional de Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas 2001” Secretaría de Gobernación Dirección General de Desarrollo Político. México. Trejo Delarbre, Raúl (2000) Mediocracia sin mediaciones, prensa, televisión y elecciones, Editorial Cal y Arena, México. TEPJF (2006) “Dictamen relativo al cómputo final de la elección de presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, declaración de validez de la elección y de presidente electo”. Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación, México. En www.ife.org Verificación y Monitoreo (2006) en Morales, Alberto “Calderón gasta más”, El Universal, 6 de marzo 2006, México. Wolton, Dominique (1998), “La comunicación política, construcción de un modelo”, en: Jean Marc Ferry, Dominique Wolton et al, El nuevo espacio público, Gedisa, Barcelona.
l Journal of Global Communication, Vol2., No.1, Jan.-July 2009 pp. 248-263 No More Bowling Alone: When Social Capital Goes Digital Anders Svensson Assistant Professor Media and Communication Studies, School of Education and Communication Jönköping University, P. O. Box 1026, SE-551 11 Jönköping, Sweden [email protected], Phone: +46 (0)36 10 14 63, Mobile: +46 (0)705 88 93 48 www.hlk.hj.se
Abstract It has been acknowledged the importance of associations, political as well as non- political, for the foundation of democracy. In the last three-four decades the number of associations in Western countries have decreased rapidly and there is a fear of negative implications for the future of democracy. Putnam suggests the importance of associations to be their production of social capital, that is, reciprocal trust between people involved in such networks. This article argues for a shift from this focus of social capital to the communicative, relational and cognitive aspects suggested by Nahapiet & Ghoshal. This makes conversation and achieving common goals playing a significant role in associations’ positive effects on democracy. Today people increasingly build their relations and perform communicative action on the Internet, to achieve the same common goals they used to strive for in real life associations. Taking off from Schudsons model, distinguishing social and democratic talk, the communicative and democratic implications of participating in an online discussion performed by a fan culture, is investigated. The conclusion is, something Putnam hints at in his broad investigation into the decreasing activity in American associations, that the production of social capital might today also be digital. Key words: Democracy, associations, social capital, participation, culture, conversation. Introduction When Alexis de Tocqueville (1969) in the 1830’s traveled in the young American nation, it was his impression that Americans of whatever age, class or line of thought, constantly formed associations: “The Americans make associations to give entertainments, to found seminars, to build inns, to construct churches, to diffuse books, to send missionaries to the antipodes… If it is proposed to inculcate some truth or to foster some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form a society.” (1969: 149) He underlined the importance of taking into consideration not only the political and industrial associations but even more the intellectual and moral. Furthermore, he included any associations, be they serious or futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive. He noticed that it was easy to elude this kind of associations, or understand them imperfectly, “because we have hardly ever seen anything of the kind.” (1969: 151). Anders Svensoon 252
Tocqueville divined a connection between associations and equality. In equal nations, he wrote, all people are independent and at the same time weak. To achieve something they must assist each other and associate. In democratic countries, he wrote, the knowledge of forming associations is the primary condition to all other knowledge. The custom to associate and the knowledge how to do this, are parts of a civic spirit. 150 years later, Putnam (1993) did similar observations in Italy. He came to the conclusion that the flourishing life of associations explained the democratic capacity in north in contrast to the southern regions of the country. He also elaborated Tocquevilles analysis of the outcomes for democracy in general. Putnams concept, social capital, involved trust as the significant element. People venture cooperating because they trust other people to cooperate in return. This develops the explanation of the custom, namely that it generates strong social norms of trust and reciprocity that facilitate the kind of cooperation that is the foundation of democracy. When Putnam (2000) put America under the pocket lens much was different from that nation so enthusiastically described by Tocqueville. The lonesome bowler became the metaphor of the decreasing associate life of America and, consequently, the vanishing of social capital in the contemporary American society. The lonesome bowler even functions as metaphor of a similar decrease of organizational activities in many Western countries. The resulting lack of social capital is perceived a threat for the maintenance of democracy. Social capital The concept of social capital was not invented by Putnam. It is, with Putnams own words, “to some extent merely new language for a very old debate in American intellectual circles” (2000: 24), about the strong or weak society versus individualism. Nevertheless, social capital was highlighted and put at the agenda by Putnam and his research team when reporting the findings from their extensive investigations of Italian democracy (1993). In his early definition, Putnam puts trust and participation as the core elements of social capital. Participation creates social capital involving that the citizens’ accounts can be based in confidence in other people in the society. One of the criticisms against this definition is that social capital can be conceived to be both formal and informal networks on one hand, and psychological factors as trust and inter human reliance on the other. The Swedish political scientists Petersson & Rothstein (2000) find this two-fold definition problematic in a Swedish context. In Sweden participation in parties and popular movements is decreasing and so is confidence in politics and politicians. But survey data displays no weakening of social networks and no decrease in inter human reliance in the society (Petersson et al.: 1998; Rothstein: 2001). Another objection towards the early Putnams conceptualization is delivered by Stolle (1998), Uslaner (2001) and Whiteley (1999). They argue for the idea that participation in associations do not produce increased trust in other people. Instead it is people who in their families have been socialized to trust other people, who actively join associations. Furthermore, Rothstein & Kumlien (2001) question the positive effects of participation on social capital at all. They suggest as a more likely positive cause, the absence of corruption and abuse of power within a society’s political institutions and public administration. 253 No More Bowling Alone : When Social Capital Goes Digital
The late Putnam (2000) acknowledges not only trust and the ability of people to work together, but also communication and positive collective action as core elements of social capital. Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) goes further by dividing social capital into three clusters: the structural, relational and cognitive dimensions of social capital. In the structural dimension the network is in focus. The relational dimension holds trust, norms and identity as some of the most central factors. Finally, the cognitive dimension focuses on shared meaning and common values, as well as collective goals and shared vision among community members. Departing from the late Putnam and Nahapiet & Ghoshal, we can now move the focus from principally networking and trust, to communication of shared meaning and vision, and collective action for achieving common goals, and regard these qualities important elements manifesting the concept of social capital. By investigating to what extent and how these elements are dealt with within associations of different kinds we can establish the occurrence of social capital in contemporary democracy. In the following we will examine the two core elements of social capital, communication and collective action, in a community on the Internet. By investigating a web community we can comment on if such digital associations can complement or even succeed physical associations as possible reproductive spaces of social capital. We will use an analytical model based on Schudson (1997) that distinguishes social conversation from democratic problem- solving conversation. Social conversation belongs to the private sphere and democratic problem- solving conversation to the public sphere. When people form associations they enter the public sphere with the purpose to communicate and act to achieve common goals. Consequently, we should expect conversation within associations, analogue as well as digital, to be of a predominantly problem-solving character. Social conversation versus democratic problem-solving conversation When Schudson (1997) differs between social and democratic conversation, he points at the different functions. Social conversation, first and foremost, belongs to peoples every-day lives as an informal tool for creating relations, gaining local information and for accomplishing the ordinary practices for living. Democratic conversation, first and foremost, belongs to peoples public life as a formal tool for solving problems. A more explicit comparison gives at hand that problem-solving conversation is characterized: “not by egalitarianism but by norm-governedness and public-ness, not by spontaneity but by civility, and not by its priority or superiority to print and broadcast media but by its necessary dependence on them.” (1997: 297). From statement this we can discern three antitheses one of each poles defines the characteristics of social conversation and democratic problem-solving conversation respectively. We now can order Schudson’s antitheses in the following way (Svensson: 2008): Social conversation Problem-solving conversation Egalitarian Norm-governed Spontaneous Civilized Media independent Media dependent Anders Svensoon 254
Why does not Schudson simply oppose egalitarian to non-egalitarian? Most likely Schudson does not mean egalitarian in general, but in relation to different qualifications people participating in problem-solving conversations ought to possess. This kind of conversation demands knowledge of specific norms, a knowledge that might be differently distributed among the participants. This is not presumed in social companies where no, or less and informal, norms of conversation might be expected. The next antithesis could be related to the structure and aim of the conversation. In social conversation addressing and replying are spontaneous. The partners simply try to understand each other but else the interaction is quite unbiased. The function is to create and maintain social relations. In problem-solving conversation addressing and replying are governed by specific rules of etiquette and order. Schudson might even have had in mind the political union meeting with its agenda and order of speaking. The aim of problem-solving conversation accordingly is to promote action and produce results. Social conversation, according to Schudson, is not dependent on media since it spontaneously and unbiased takes place in the everyday life world. Of course it might be transmitted by means of media like telephone or by e-mail. It might even give rise to texts in print and electronic media. But it is not per definition public but private and exists independently of the media. Social conversation therefore could be conceived superior to media. Problem-solving conversation on the contrary is dependent on media. It builds on documents and is being documented since it concerns many people and is of public interest. Because of this it often takes place in the media and is also dependent on being transmitted afterwards by different media. When so is the case, it might give rise to new public conversations. Material and method The materials examined are, first and foremost, messages posted to the online discussion at the website hvfantasten.com. (The web site hvfantasten.com is a central meeting place for supporters of the Swedish top ice hockey club HV71 (Swedish Champions in 1995, 2004 and 2008) and people interested in the sport. The site, independent from both HV71 and the supporters association North Bank Supporters, was opened in April 1997 and contains today a well informed blog with news about the club and the sport, and a well frequented discussion forum, both regarded a high standard within the Swedish ice hockey public.) The data collection comprises three seasons of the Swedish National Hockey League. The final selection contains three strategically chosen samples per season, at the start of the league and during times when the team is on a winning strike as well as times when the team has lost many games. In total, the selection comprises 3993 contributions, published during 149 days. Besides the content analysis of the web site, official Internet statistics have been analyzed and complementary facts have been collected by more or less structured interviews with the web master (Svensson, 2007). In the following we will discuss possible indicators in the data of the three antitheses derived from the distinction made by Schudson (1997) to separate social conversation from democratic problem-solving conversation. Whether the discussion tends to be egalitarian or norm-governed, and consequently 255 No More Bowling Alone : When Social Capital Goes Digital
requires knowledge of specific norms of conversation, will be analyzed from two aspects. Firstly, by establishing if any norms are published on the web site and, if so, what these norms might signify. Secondly, by establishing to what extent the participants comment on others handling of norms that eventually might put demands on the participation in the discussion. The participants might not just comment on others violation of norms but their own violation as well. The general netiquette prescribes namely that participants in online discussions should correct their own mistakes if possible, instead of wasting other peoples time by being corrected of them (McLaughlin, et al, 1995). Whether the discussion tends to be spontaneous or civilized, and aimed at producing effects, will also be analyzed from two aspects. Firstly, by establishing if any agenda, explicitly pronounced or implicitly imposed, topically structures the discussion, and to what extent the participants make comments that might indicate the existence of an agenda and eventual digression from such an agenda. Secondly, by establishing to what extent the participants make propositions or demand action to solve problems they experience important in making the team successful or could be improving for the sport in general. Whether the discussion is media independent or media dependent, will finally be analyzed from two aspects. The dependency of the Internet for the existence of the discussion goes, so to say, without saying. At the same time the discussion would be possible without the Internet, but not with the same scope of participation and range in space. The first aspect, consequently, involves examining the scope, the proportion between those participating in and those just visiting the discussion, and the range, from what servers participants and visitors log in to hvfantasten.com. The second aspect, involves establishing to what extent the mass media might explicitly be used as sources referred to and in this respect be the foundation for the discussion. Egalitarian versus norm-governed The introductory analyses have examined whether participation in the discussion is egalitarian or if participation requires knowledge of any specific norms and consequently is conditioned by unequal qualifications. Two aspects have been examined: the first aims at establishing if there are any guidelines for the discussion published on the web site and, if so, what these mean. The second aims at establishing if any conversation norms are at issue in the contributions to the discussion. Explicitly expressed conversation norms When entering the discussion at the web site hvfantasten.com visitors are met with the appeal, “Try to keep a serious tune.” To find out what is accepted as a “serious tune” demands some experience of taking part of online discussions. An interpretation on a general level suggests that “serious” is related to the content of the message, and “tune” to the form. The participants are expected to have something to say and to say it in a decent way. What more, visitors are also met with the more demanding notification that “mischievous contributions violating the unwritten rules of the net will be deleted”. Most people should agree on that messages of this kind intend to sabotage the discussion. On the contrary, many people would be unsure of what is meant with “the unwritten rules of the net”. Once again, experience Anders Svensoon 256
of taking part in and of online discussions obviously is an important requirement for participating in the discussion at hvfantasten.com. “The unwritten rules of the net”, experienced net surfers probably conceive as similar to “the etiquette of the net”, that is, the netiquette. The less experienced a net surfer, the less familiar with the netiquette and other normative requirements on the net. Several explicitly expressed norms at hvfantasten.com imply previous knowledge of what exactly these mean and, consequently, create non-egalitarian conditions for participating in the discussion. Comments and self-corrections According to MacLaughlin et al (1995) there are seven types of errors that violate the standard of online discussions. The first half are less severe errors, like technical mistakes, waste of other participants time or boosting for products. The second half are more severe errors, like violation of ethics, language and facts. This type of errors challenge the mutual understanding between participants (Svensson: 2009). Comments More than ten percent of the messages at hvfantasten.com in different respects concern subjects that are related to netiquette and norms. Two thirds are commenting other participants handling of these matters. Just a few of these comments concern the less severe types of errors. The very majority of the comments instead concern the severe types of errors: Table 1. Messages commenting other participants violation of the norms Quantity Percentage Ethical violation 59 19 Violation of language 86 27 Violation of facts 170 54 Total 315 100 A little more than half of the comments concern violation of facts. If we relate factual errors to Habermas (1996) universal pragmatics and the validity claims of conversations, the claim of truth, that is, the foundation of the discussion in a factual reality, is the most engaging claim in the discussion at hvfantasten.com. Thereafter follows the claim of comprehensibility, and finally the claim of veracity. Keeping to facts, in a tolerably proper language, and mean what one says, simply spoken, are the most important general and overarching norms in the just mentioned order. Rarely claims occur of throwing some violator out from the forum. The web master neither erase many messages. When asked he confirms that he erase “just a few messages in a year”, either on his own initiative or as a result of urgings from participants. One reason to the low frequency of repressive actions might be that the participants sometimes just ignore violators by meeting them with silence. This is perhaps a more efficient way to cope with violators, at least consciously violating people. 257 No More Bowling Alone : When Social Capital Goes Digital
Self-corrections The participants not only comment each other but also correct own mistakes and violation of the norms. From this we can draw the conclusion that several participants, firstly, are familiar with the etiquette of the net and, secondly, are urgent to avoid being publicly criticized and rebuked of such things an experienced net debater should know about how to behave in an online discussion. Table 2. Self-corrections of own mistakes and violation of the norms Quantity Share Language 25 22 Facts 53 46 Double postings 37 32 Total 115 100 Language errors seem not to be considered the most serious violation. Wrong spelling not least is mostly accepted. When the discussion is intensive it is easy to miss a letter or two on the keyboard. This explains to some degree the linguistic level of the discussion. After all the content is the most important and this is reflected in the great share of corrections of wrong facts. The norms do not make the prerequisites for participation egalitarian but, on the other hand, do not call too much attention. The reason for this might be that the mere existence of norms makes those not understanding them to seldom post any messages to the discussion. If so, it further underlines that the conversation at hvfantasten.com is not egalitarian but norm-governed. Spontaneous versus civilized The next step in the analysis concerns whether the discussion is ordered and aimed at effects or spontaneous and unconditional. This is undertaken by establishing if there is any agenda guiding the discussion and to what extent the participants stick to any agenda, along with the existence of initiatives aiming at action in view to solve problems with the team and things related to hockey. Agenda When entering the discussion forum, we find the text: “Participate in the discussion about HV71 and hockey in general.”. At a first glance the limitation of this explicit and open agenda seem rather narrow. What else could such a discussion concern than figures and results? Of course supporters of different kinds love to ponder before the games and perform analyses afterwards, but it does far from stop with this. The team and the hockey in general can be discussed from several points of view. Obviously there are several subject matters beyond HV71 and hockey in general. A great deal of the discussion concerns the supporter culture, from behavior, loyalty and engagement to activities performed by the supporter’s association. A second area of concern is the reporting, analyses and inquiry of the team and the sport in general undertaken by the media. A third area of concern, that goes beyond the open agenda, deals with the standard of the discussion itself. Anders Svensoon 258
Apart from these three implicit subject areas, under certain circumstances, it might be possible even to write about subject matters ranging from betting on the net to 9/11. The topical limitations of the open agenda thus become transcended by means of this complementing hidden agenda. Table 3. Discussed areas of topics at hvfantasten.com (percent) Area of topic Share Quantity HV71 and hockey 62 3082 The media 8 394 The supporter culture 19 939 Netiquette and norms 7 318 Other topics 4 223 Total 100 4956* *The quantity exceeds the number of examined messages, 3993, because each message may contain more than one topical area. Thus the discussion at hvfantasten.com both have an open agenda, decided by the web master, and a hidden one, decided and accepted by the participants. Yet, newcomers can only relate to the open agenda before entering the debate. The hidden agenda is only possible to relate to by taking part of the discussion and learn what topics that goes or not. So, the guidelines that were not exactly precise concerning the norms governing the discussion are not more precise concerning what topics that are accepted to bring up on the agenda. Discussing the relevance of subject matters The relevance of subject matters sometimes is at issue. One fundamental principal is that there are better suited discussions online for topics not related to ice hockey. This does not mean that the participants find other topics less important than hockey. When 9/11 in 2001 caused several messages during a couple of hours some participants after a while argued that such a tremendously important subject matter should not be at issue in a discussion on such a comparatively less important subject like hockey. It is considered relevant discussing general facts and feature related to the team, but when i.e. the discussion concerning the match dress becomes too train spotting, it is considered irrelevant. The supporter culture is relevant, but when i.e. the discussion becomes too internal, it is considered irrelevant. Discussing the impartiality of the media is relevant, but i.e. initiating a discussion concerning the Stockholm focus of the national television repeatedly in a short time, is considered irrelevant. The same goes for debates turning into personal vendettas. Personal messages yet, are seldom criticized, although they are irrelevant with regard to the netiquette. In relation to how often they show up the number of objections towards them still are negligible. When, in some rare moments, they cause objections the reason seems to be that someone has gone too far in being irrelevant. Perhaps remarks become extra obvious if they occur rarely. They become reminders also for the rest of the participants to stick to the agenda and be careful with regard to the norms. In that way the order and civility of the discussion primarily are founded on the self- discipline of the participants. 259 No More Bowling Alone : When Social Capital Goes Digital
Proposals and claims for change The civility of the discussion has also to do with its aim at reaching obvious effects by the solution of problems. The supporters might experience problems as obstacles for the team to be successful. They might also be obstacles for a good supporter culture. Another problem area is the media reporting. Finally, as we just have dealt with, there might be obstacles for a good debating atmosphere and a pertinent and constructive discussion. Let us first find out to what extent the participants experience problems on each of the topical areas in the discussion. This is founded on the assumption that negatively formed messages indicate a critical attitude which in turn indicates experienced problems of some kind: Table 4. Negative messages on each topical area (percent) Positive Negative Other Sum of percent Quantity HV71 and hockey 46 36 18 100 2807 The media 40 38 22 100 340 The supporter culture 51 33 16 100 878 Netiquette and norms 32 57 11 100 305 Other topics 46 27 27 100 170 The supporters have good reasons to be more positive than negative to the team. The positive opinions, in the first room, concern the players with whom the supporters experience a kind of us-relation. The negative opinions concern the administration and management of the club. Here are problems to be solved. Regarding the supporter culture the supporters have predominantly positive experiences of their own community, even when the team has backdrops. Still as many as a third of the messages, concern problems to be solved. When it comes to the media the participants are less positive and experience more problems than with the earlier two cases. The positive reactions predominantly regard other supporter media on the net, and web media independent of the traditional mass media. Consequently, these latter media are subjected most of the negative opinions. In the fourth topical area, netiquette and norms, we find predominantly negative opinions. The reason for this might be that this area becomes subjected to discussion when participants tend to violate the norms and consequently are critically treated. Otherwise there is no need to comment the netiquette and norms. The critical messages not only express dissatisfaction but also suggest how to come to terms with the problems. Indications of this are initiatives for action, such as proposals or demands for measures creating some kind of positive change. It is important to underline that we here deal with explicitly pronounced demands or undoubted proposals for measures. Table 5. Explicitly pronounced demands and proposals (percent) Demands Proposals Implicit/none Sum of percent Quantity HV71 and hockey 2 21 77 100 2158 The media 1 20 79 100 268 The supporter culture 2 46 52 100 454 Netiquette and norms 2 36 62 100 189 Other topics 1 26 73 100 124 Anders Svensoon 260
The share of demands or proposals are most numerous in areas of topics where persons that can be addressed are most likely to be present online. For instance, there are other supporters present online to address with initiatives of action regarding the supporter culture. There are other participants present to address with demands to improve their net culture. This is far from the case regarding the initiatives of action addressed to HV71 or the media. The participants do not know to what extent representatives of these actors visit the discussion to read the messages. Of course there are less explicitly pronounced messages that could be interpreted as demands and proposals. However, these are to be found in the category ‘implicit/none’ with messages not aiming at solving problems at all. Media independency versus media dependency The relation to media can be two-folded. Firstly, the discussion is mediated by means of ICT-media. Secondly, the participants read, watch and listen to other media and may use this information for founding the discussion upon. The mediation of the discussion Long before Internet was introduced HV71 was, and still is, subjected to discussions among the supporters at working places, schools, pubs and other public meeting places. However, in these physical spaces the discussion is public only for those being present. If more people should be able to take part of the discussion it must be mediated. The initial question then is, what scope the discussion at the Internet web site hvfantasten.com has in the respect if more people than those posting messages can take part of the discussion? 1250 unique pen names have written the almost 4000 examined messages. These are the active participants. There are also plenty of passive participants in online discussions, just reading messages. These are called lurkers in Internet terminology. In order to establish the number of lurkers a comparison has been made between the average number of daily messages, with the average number of daily visits at two different points of time. The first point consists of the 16 days just before the opening of the season, the second point consists of one week after the League has started. The statistics is gained from a script measuring the visits on the web site. Table 6. Average number of daily messages and daily visits Messages Visits Point 1 25 1099 Point 2 39 1304 The table shows the relation between how many visits that result in a message to the discussion. The reason why there are more visits and messages at the second point is that the League has started at this time. These circumstances influence on the proportional relation between active and passive visits to some degree. Two percent of the visits result in messages during the first point in time and three percent during the second. In other words, in 97–98 percent of the cases the visitors just read and do not post any messages. In these cases the discussion functions as a traditional mass medium where few people speak to many. 261 No More Bowling Alone : When Social Capital Goes Digital
The script measuring the visits also shows from what host servers visitors log in to hvfantasten.com. If we rank the 50 most frequent host servers we get a picture of the range of the discussion: 1. On top we find servers at telecom companies providing private Internet subscriptions. Most of the participants consequently log in from their homes. 2. Next are servers at almost all Swedish universities. We also find universities in Finland and Norway. 3. The next category includes host servers at Jönköpings municipality, along with several of the most important employees in the south lake Vättern district. They are followed by most of the municipalities and administrations in southern Sweden. 4. Finally there are servers at all the local and plenty national media companies and the municipality of Stockholm. On a similar visiting frequency we even find host servers at the Swedish government and parliament. It is obvious that politicians from Jönköping, engaged in the governing center of Sweden, are interested in the discussions concerning the team representing their local region in the Swedish Premier League of ice hockey. If the discussion had been performed only in the physical world, most of the people visiting and posting today via Internet had not been able to participate. The Internet medium is a requirement for the discussion to be conceived a public conversation. The local mass media do not offer the same possibilities for immediate interaction and are limited in time and space. Nevertheless the mass media play an important role as the foundation for the public debate. The discussion at hvfantasten.com should not constitute an exception from this fact. The use of media as sources By way of introduction references to media in general are examined depending on what topical area that is discussed. Table 7. References to media sources on each area of topics (percent) Area of topics Share n N HV71 and hockey 8 259 3082 The media 9 36 394 The supporter culture 4 39 939 Netiquette and norms 4 14 318 Other topics 4 8 223 Total 9 356 3993 The share of explicitly pronounced references to media as sources reaches the highest level when the discussion concern HV71 and hockey in general along with the media. HV71 and hockey must be considered of a high public interest and is covered regularly in the media. Regarding media it is logical that the participants refer to these when discussing them. When it comes to the supporter culture along with the netiquette and norms, references to media occur to a much lower degree. These areas of topics are covered in the media far from to the same degree as the hockey sport. They are neither of the same public interest as the hockey. Rather Anders Svensoon 262
they are special interests for the supporters and participants in the discussion. As long as supporters behave well and online discussions are properly performed, media do not pay them any attention. On the other hand, as soon as supporters show too much passion and online debaters become verbally violent, they become of public interest and media find them important to cover. The use of media as sources can be differed into three categories depending on who is the sender. The media have somewhat different functions and motives for covering certain issues and topics. Three different sender categories occur; traditional mass media, hockey institutional media and supporter media. The latter category includes organized as well as non-organized supporters and private persons, in other words, the public. Table 8. References to mass media, hockey institutional media or supporter media on each area of topics (percent) Mass Institutional Supporter Sum of percent Quantity media media HV71 and hockey 60 27 13 100 259 The media 61 14 25 100 36 The supporter culture 28 15 57 100 39 Netiquette and norms 7 21 72 100 14 Other topics 63 12 25 100 8 It is the mass media that is the source for the discussion regarding HV71 and hockey along with the media itself. The mass media are less useful for information about the supporter culture along with the netiquette and norms. In this respect the institutional media seem more useful, not least regarding the netiquette and norms. It might be so that institutional media are found useful as sources when participants correct errors related to facts. The only media paying much attention to issues that the supporters have very much at heart, is the supporter administrated media. In this respect the supporter media must be regarded an alternative public sphere. Barely ten percent of the messages contain explicitly pronounced references to media as sources. Could the discussion consequently be regarded as independent of media to a figure of 90 percent? This should presuppose that none of the messages founded on information from media give rise to any comments at all. This does not seem reasonable. It is also likely that a big part of the messages not referring to media still are based on information from media. The media might be the source for most of the supporters to take part of HV71. Only 7000 can see the team in the arena at the home games. If we furthermore consider that most likely some hundreds of thousand people are supporters of HV71, this does strengthen the assumption that the media must be the basis for the discussion, least to a higher degree than ten percent. Conclusion The conversation at hvfantasten.com tend to be norm-governed rather than egalitarian. There are some explicit norms published, but not very clearly defined. Consequently, participants are presumed to understand the norms and know the netiquette well. Experience of participation in online discussions is demanded. The norms are dealt with by commenting other participants 263 No More Bowling Alone : When Social Capital Goes Digital
errors, along with self-corrections of own mistakes. About ten percent of the postings regard mistakes, errors or violation of the netiquette and norms. The standard is maintained by this self- regulation and repressive measures are consequently rare. The very existence of norms might have a selecting function and keep less experienced people from participating. The fact that there are norms and, furthermore, these are subjected to interpretation, creates unequal conditions for participating in the discussion. The conversation is based on a highly limited pronounced topical agenda. The participants, however, interpret the meaning in a broader sense than what is explicitly noticed. This does not mean that the conversation is spontaneous, rather it is structured by both an open and a hidden agenda. When someone diverges too far or repeatedly from the accepted topical areas, the topical relevance is subjected to comments. This establishes order and structure of the performance of the discussion. The participants are not only supporting the favorite team but are rather critical as well. This suggests that problems are at issue in the discussion, both regarding the team as well as the discussion as such. The critical ambitions mostly aims at coming to terms with and solve the problems. A great part of these postings present proposals or demands for change by constructive solutions. Finally, the conversation is dependent on different media. Firstly, ICT-media for its mediation to more people than those just participating. Hardly three percent of all visits to the web site, end up with a message being posted to the discussion. Since the discussion comprises both other topics and point of views than the mass media, different opinions reach out to a wide audience around the clock. In this respect the discussion might be considered an alternative public sphere. Secondly, the conversation to a great part is dependent on other media as sources for the foundation of the discussion. Such media are explicitly referred to in ten percent of the postings to the discussion and they quite likely give rise to comments. Most likely even messages not containing explicit references could be founded on media information. Quite few people are able to see HV71 live, but far more people support the team and are dependent on media for this relation. Without the existence of the Internet and the mass media, there had not been any discussion involving more than those visiting the arena. In summary, the findings derived from our data, by means of the analytical concepts based on Schudsons (1997) qualities distinguishing social from democratic conversation, quite obviously show that the online discussion within the examined community of interest, rather than a social chat, tends to be a democratic problem-solving conversation. If we now re-introduce the two qualities derived from Putnam (2000) and Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998), communication and collective action, what are the implications of our findings for hvfantasten.com as a space for reproduction and reinforcement of social capital? To start with communication, the conversation is governed by specific conditional factors. The participants join the discussion in their every-day contexts, such as the home, the school or the working-place. When entering the digital conversation they enter a certain discourse demanding a certain discursive knowledge. These are qualities not always necessary or even negotiable in every-day life, except from occasions when the same discourse is performed in physical Anders Svensoon 264
conversational situations. To master the discourse can be regarded a social capital, useful in all kinds of team sport communities. When entering the conversation at hvfantasten.com the participants also must be familiar with a general behavior on the Internet. This is governed by a global regulation of behavior, the so called netiquette (McLaughlin, et al: 1995). These qualities can be acquired theoretically. Quite likely most participants learn them by first ‘watching’ and later by ‘doing’. To master the netiquette can be regarded a social capital, useful in all kinds of online communities providing space for participation and interaction. Closely related to the netiquette is the standard of the conversation. The standard is partly covered in the netiquette but is also dependent on local discussion cultures and supervision from individual participants observant of the discursive level of the discussion. The standard takes on the communicative and deliberative aspects and consequently the democratic outcomes for the participants, such as a communicative conversation style and more general civic cultural qualities (Svensson: 2009). To master the standard can be regarded a social capital, useful in all kind of civic conversation, online as well in real life. If we move on to the second quality of social capital, collective action, the very fact that we could designate the examined discussion a democratic problem-solving conversation, points at the discussion at hvfantasten.com being a space for collective action. This action ranges from efficient information gathering on the Internet, able to pick up and publish news hours and days before several mass media; via mobilization of nationwide supporter actions to influence the televisions covering and representation of the sport; to analyses and following demands affecting the club to take measures to improve their capabilities within the management of the club, composition of the team and strategies in the rink. To participate in and gain experience from such collective actions can be regarded a social capital, useful in all kinds of associations. All the mentioned examples of social capital – discursive, behavioral, communicative and collective – are derived from an associate space for people interested in and finding important the sport of ice hockey. Some would disagree on that ice hockey has something to do with social capital or democratic problem-solving conversation. Ice hockey as such has nothing to do with these qualities, but associations and discussions have. The subject matter is secondary to the fact that people unite as a cause of their interest in or dependence of different subjects, be they political or not. Tocqueville (1969) put attention to the fact that intellectual and moral associations, no matter how “serious or futile”, were perhaps more crucial for early American democracy than political and industrial associations. Putnam (1993) stated that most important for the efficiency of democracy in northern Italy was people’s engagement in voluntary associations like choral societies, literary guilds, hunting parties, service groups or sports clubs. What these communities are organized for are all different, how they are organized are all the same: they are associations voluntary formed by people in their everyday civic lives. They all together compose a grassroots democracy that functions as the hotbed for democracy in entire nations and states. The final question is that of whether digital communities can complement and even succeed physical associations as possible productive spaces of social capital. Part of the participants at hvfantasten.com, are active in the supporters association in the physical world. This is an ordinary 265 No More Bowling Alone : When Social Capital Goes Digital
democratic association and as such it may be expected to produce social capital, quite likely of the mentioned qualities. In comparison to hvfantasten.com, however, the supporters association have much less participants and also less variety regarding age, education and location. The online HV-community seems to reach out with more social capital than the analogue community; to more people, to more different people, to more geographical places and, finally, the social capital can be distributed anytime around the clock. The case with our examined association clearly is that the digital community do not produce less social capital than the physical community. It is an illustrative example of how the vanishing social capital in the physical world as a matter of fact might be revived in the digital world. In that way we could say that social capital in part has gone digital. References Habermas, Jürgen (1996) “Between Facts and Norms” Cambridge, MIT Press. McLaughlin, Margaret L., Osborne, Kerry K. and Smith, Christine B. (1995): “Standard of Conduct on Usenet” in Jones, Steven (Eds) “Cyber-Society: Computer-Mediated Communication and Community”, Thousand Oaks, Sage. Nahapiet, Janine & Ghoshal, Sumantra (1998): “Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage”; Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242–266. Petersson, Olof, Hermansson, Jörgen, Micheletti, Michele, Teorell, Jan and Westholm, Anders (1998) “Demokrati och medborgarskap” (“Democracy and citizenship”), Stockholm, SNS Förlag. Putnam, Robert D. (1993) “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy” (with Leonardi, Robert and Nanetti, Rafaella Y.) Princeton, N.Y., Princeton University Press. Putnam, Robert D. (2000) “Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community” New York, Simon and Shuster. Rothstein, Bo (2001): “Social Capital in the Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and Civil Society”; Politics and Society 29. Rothstein, Bo and Kumlien, Staffan (2001): “Demokrati, socialt kapital och förtroende” (“Democracy, social capital and trust”), in Holmberg, Sören and Weibull, Lennart (Eds) “Land du välsignade: SOM-rapport nr 29” (“Blessed Country: SOM-report nr 29”), Göteborg, SOM-institutet, Göteborgs universitet Räftegård, Curt (1998) “Pratet som demokratins verktyg: om möjligheten till en kommunikativ demokrati” (“Talk as Means of Democracy: About the Possibilities for a Communicative Democracy”), Diss., Gothenburg studies in politics, nr 49, Hedemora, Gidlund. Schudson, Michael (1997): “Why Conversation is Not the Soul of Democracy”; Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 14, 297–309. Stolle, Dietlind (1998): “Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust in Voluntary Associations”; Political Psychology 19 (3), 497–526. Anders Svensoon 266
Svensson, Anders (2007) “Från norra ståplats till cyberspace” (“From North Bank to Cyberspace”), Diss., Gothenburg, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication. Svensson, Anders (2008): “Solving problems and then socializing: the character of conversation within a non-political online discussion” paper presented at Participatory Communication Section of IAMCR, Stockholm. Svensson, Anders (2009): “Young men, sports and ICT’s: fan cultures and civic cultures” in Dahlgren, Peter and Olsson, Tobias (Eds) “Young People, ICT’s and Democracy”, Gothenburg, Nordicom (forthcoming). Tocqueville, Alexis de (1969) “Democracy in America”, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday. Uslaner, Eric M. (2001) “The Moral Foundation of Trust”, New York, Cambridge University Press. Whiteley, Paul F. (1999): “The Origins of Social Capital” in van Deth, J, W., Maraffi, M., Newton, K. & Whiteley, P., F. (Eds) “Social Capital and European Democracy”, London, Routledge.
l Journal of Global Communication, Vol2., No.1, Jan.-July 2009 pp. 264-278 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism Reggy Capacio Figer Department of International and Advanced Japanese Studies San Copo 110, Amakubo 1-11-12 Graduate School in Humanities and Social Sciences University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-0005, Japan [email protected], s0830
Abstract The Filipino tendency of ingenuity has permeated almost all facets of culture and psyche – from feasts to disasters, both local and global. This showcase of ability to establish connections between materials at hand and experiences at front is symptomatic to a nation whose geography is forever divided by seas, language, religion, and consciousness. Desperate in approaching the diversities, its heroes found refuge in technology – from novels of print capitalism to websites of globalization. On these acts of national imagination, citizenship goes through periods of resiliency producing nationalist icons and anonymous heroes. This essay is a survey of national experiences when Filipinos, conscious of the need of a “one nation,” capitalize on technology to forge citizenship and nationalism. With their created record of information and communication technology use, “network nationalism” comes close to this nation’s patriotic declarations in an era of wired and electronic connections. Key words : Technology, network, diaspora, culture, nationalism, patriotism, capitalism, globalization The Filipino tendency of ingenuity has permeated almost all facets of culture and psyche – from feasts to disasters, both local and global. This showcase of ability to establish connections between materials at hand and experiences at front is symptomatic to a nation whose geography is forever divided by seas, language, religion, and consciousness. Desperate in approaching the diversities, its heroes found refuge in technology – from novels of print capitalism to websites of globalization. On these acts of national imagination, citizenship goes through periods of resiliency producing nationalist icons and anonymous heroes. This essay is a survey of national experiences when Filipinos, conscious of the need of a “one nation,” capitalize on technology to forge citizenship and nationalism. With their created record of information and communication technology use, “network nationalism” comes close to this nation’s patriotic declarations in an era of wired and electronic connections. Introduction As A Structure of Transnational Mobility, an international airport, cultural scholar Rolando Tolentino writes, imposes a “no-emotion policy.” Alluding from “blood compact,” the Filipino- Reggy Capacio Figer 268
Hispanic ceremony toward peaceful co-existence consecrated by literal meeting of blood, he cites “tear compact” as an imaginary compromise between the families engaging in diaspora and the constructed space of departure (Tolentino, Rolando. “Nunal sa Talampakan: Paglalakbay sa Epiko,” Sipat Kultura: Tungo sa Mapagpalayang Pagbabasa, Pag-aaral at Pagtuturo ng Panitikan. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2007, 65). The liquid metaphor of affinity puts every performed sacrifice at an altar of one’s mater dolorosa – for familial financial stability in the personal ground and for national economic development in the political level. On these affective connections are thoughts of paradox. For example, while the structure lingers inanimately, its walls are crowded with peoples consumed by reasons; that while it remains stationary, its aerial view is characterized by traffic of ideas, goods, and peoples. These contradictions are very like the nation and the heroes that it has been producing – caught in the exchanges of resources and ideologies – of wars and migration – historical yet unfinished. The airport that Tolentino is referring to is nonetheless that of a country that supports dispersion of its peoples, a country, by chance and destiny, fragmented by time. Philippine history can explicate the phenomenon. When the Spaniards arrived in the islands, they brought with them, not just the material representations of Catholicism but, their very distinguishing features of a community from far away, giving the native Filipinos a face-to-face experience with citizens of the other side of the world (thereafter, assigned as the West by colonial hegemony). Despite their being itinerant, the balangay travels of pre-Hispanic Filipinos were confined within neighboring islands. Limitations of boat size and human agility could be constraints of the speed and distance of trades and visits. What the Spanish occupation implies is that it was the idea of “far away” that crafted the Filipinos to desire to go farther. The colonization agitated the consciousness of the locals which gradually molded them to lust foreignness. Spain’s power which owns the 333-year of Philippine history witnessed the rise of powerful churches, from which distance signified familial economic value, capital indulgence, and proneness to reduccion, of religious orders, from which the privileged offspring of the wealthy clans learned the cultures of the foreign, of galleon trades, from which commercialization of human resources was provoked. It was the images of magnificence from the gaze of the colonized that made even the ilustrados think that the Philippines was nationally incapacitated, and that its existence was dependent to Spain. Linking Nationalism and Media The foremost ilustrado, Jose Rizal, illustrated dispersion from patria as a salient feature of heroism. His attendance to European countries was not only a proof of economic abundance in the Alonzo-Rizal household; it was also a paradigm where exile was equal to diaspora and revolt. Rizal and his comrades, or the Los Indios Bravos, showed that there has been a profusion of availability of greener pastures in the West, and that it was the goods and ideologies of “far away” that they instrumentalized and filipinized that led to the realization of their version of revolution. Thus, the land of the foreign, the far away, based on the perspective of the Los Indios Bravos, has been a hospitable refuge for the excess and the abject, a conducive location for the learned, and a tranquil land for the poetic-results of these are assimilationist propaganda, medical degree, and underground novel. 269 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism
It was of most irony that Rizal felt “unhomeliness” in the very land that he wanted to save, cure and write. Judged as subversive to Spanish authority and as stimulator of Philippine revolution of 1896, he was shot by firing squad – fulfilling the last function of heroism: dying for the nation. For morphological sake, the 33-year-old “first Filipino” was an elite rhetorician who left for exile and a Europe-educated critic of church domination who fell for freedom. Through technology of photography, the image of his death, the fall of an indio in the hands of frailes, was published in church-controlled publications warning denouncers of their probable fates and reiterating the power of Spain. His pictures, then on, took an iconic value among Filipinos. Particularly, his last studio portrait shot in 1890 Madrid, where he wore a black European suit, became widely reproduced and circulated at the spate of revolution. Such photograph carried the following words on the reverse: Doctor Jose Rizal! Shot in Manila, 30 December 1896. Tyranny snatched you away from us!... But what she will never do is to erase you from the hearts of your countrymen. When the Philippines is able to decide its own destiny, she will know how to erect an altar to your memory in the temple of immortality and to put your name in letters of gold in the eternal pages of history. For now, you must satisfy yourself with the ardent worship that each Filipino devotes to you from the depths of their souls. (Condensed from direct quote of Vicente Rafael from W. E. Retana’s Vida y escritos del Dr. Jose Rizal. “Nationalism, Imagery, and the Filipino Intelligentsia in the Nineteenth Century.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 16, no. 3 (Spring 1990), 591-611. Accessed through stable URL account: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343641, 5 May 2008). For many Filipinos, esteemed scholar Vicente Rafael writes, Rizal’s portrait “memorialized loss” and converted it into “a potent basis for visualizing a new history for the country.” It could cross boundaries – marked “boundaries of an imagined community but do so without the labor of mourning.” (Rafael, Nationalism, Imagery, and the Filipino Intelligentsia, 608-610.) It is on this occasion that Tolentino’s sentiment on the analogy of airport and tear could be considered as a revolutionary capsule toward the metaphysics of diaspora. For anyone who had left had lost parcels of their lives during their departure from and arrival to the nation that they have been cognitively haunted and intimately affiliated. Fast track to the Philippines under Marcos rule, the country’s ownership of the first airport and airline in Asia presents the dialectic of technological advancement and movable citizenship. On this very airport, in August 21, 1983, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, who aboard the China Airlines Flight 811, was gunned down. He was on self-exile for three years and decided to come back upon feeling to need due to the worsening political situation in the Philippines. His intention was to sincerely discuss with Ferdinand Marcos and persuade him to reinstate democracy, though he knew it would be an exercise of futility. There was an order of non-issue of passport for him, but a friend obtained a legitimate one for him under the name Marcial Bonifacio. There were threats of denial of airline landing, imprisonment, and even death, but he persisted saying that “if it’s my fate to die by an assassin’s bullet, so be it,” and that, what must be the most heroic statement, “the Filipino is worth dying for.” Reggy Capacio Figer 270
“Why can’t I come home,” this “Wonder Boy of Philippine Politics” was often quoted. His photo, his fall from the claws of dictatorship, in white American suit, dominated the front page of world press. Odd as it seems, the photo at tarmac is an indelible image in Philippine history for the last 25 years. Though it may signify a nation reborn, its metaphorics of loss bring concrete proof to the myth of death as a requirement for heroism. To subvert the grammar, and to forever commemorate sacrifice, the technological site became Ninoy Aquino International Airport. OCWs and their Imagination of the Homeland Through Media The naming of the airport after Ninoy signaled an alternative dimension to bayani (“hero”). More than just perfecting Isagani Cruz’s structuralist genetics where heroes in Philippine epics leave their communities in search for passion and freedom, the airport signifies weaves of departures, displacements and homecomings (Cruz, Isagani. “Si Lam-ang, si Fernando Poe Jr., at si Aquino: Ilang Kuro-kuro tungkol sa Epikong Filipino.” Bukod na Bukod: Mga Piling Sanaysay. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2003, 241-256.). Thus, anyone who leaves the nation, folkloric or economic may be, gets an opportunity to heroic iconology – from being a renowned kin for a hoping family to an unknown addition for a national collective of overseas workers. The contents of the balikbayan boxes that they send – ranging from jumbo size toiletries to second hand appliances – quantify the long-distance relationship that they endure with the facilitation of e-mails, overseas calls and internet chats that bridge opposite directions and time zones. Like Rizal and Aquino, their photographs foregrounding colossal structures and venerated sceneries hang on the walls of their homes and their small businesses are named after them – a familial version of commemorating heroism. Like all artifacts, the airport is signified by different contexts – what was a consequential site of the hero’s death became a spatial image of patriotism embellished by the government’s project of citizen dispersal, from which the OCW phenomenon began. It is in the tear compact performed by the well-wishing kin that the departure is synonymous to exile, and that the arrival is a completion of the entire course, after which the conferment of the “hero” title. It was Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, Ninoy’s widow, who first called the overseas contract workers as the “the new heroes” – acknowledging that the nation is, in fact, new that it needs to update its culture of valor and martyrdom. While the worth of Ninoy’s death is equal to the overthrowing of Marcos and the eventual installation of his widow to presidency, his declaration has been engrained to the national consciousness. It has earned the honor of national slogan from blackboards of educational institution to five hundred peso bill. The money, where Aquino appears, suffers a low exchange rate which puts heroism as equal to domestic servanthood in the monetary affairs of world order. Forced to leave by economic conditions confronting their families, OCWs imagine their nation limitedly. Foreign print and broadcast journalisms seldom project reportage that is Philippine. To be continually updated to one’s land, the OCW has to find wi-fi location or install postpaid internet connection. Logging in to cyberspace fills the melancholy as dialogue boxes, key clicks and hyperlinks deliver the news. This act defines the dimension of one’s attachment to the nation – online – limited by network connection and by individual knowledge of technology. In being offline, what is left to him/her is, what Benedict Anderson regards as a modernism’s given, 271 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism
nationality (Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2003 [1983], 5.). But even that supplies him/her an inescapable ambiguity of belongingness. Thus, longing for communion with fellow members, one desires for a foundation of a version of one’s nation. For Ernest Gellner, nationalism invents nations where they do not exist (uoted from Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.). This maybe true to Filipinos in diaspora, who, yearning for just a parcel of national community, create ethnic cliques and compromised settlements, and induce these with their distinguishing style of imagination. The example of the ilustrados could very well showcase the formation which led to a network they named Los Indios Bravos. Their longing for patria brought them to alternatives that included technology, novels and newspapers which were transported to the Philippines and found a desired reader in Andres Bonifacio who, ignited by Rizal’s literary imagination, formed a network of nationalist comrades who eventually initiated the official revolution against Spain. Rizal and Bonifacio never exchanged emails nor left offline messages to each other’s Yahoo messenger account nor talked over long distance telephone calls nor belonged to the same imagination of nation. There were obvious limits to their connection – as they occupied opposite time zones and foreign opportunities, thus confusing platforms for democratic design. Bonifacio, however, who never left Philippines, believed that the nation owes its freedom from Rizal – the man who departed to far away, left verbal artifacts, and showed what dying is all about. Belonging to a nation charts on the domino of filiations where one comes to define oneself in connection to ancestors long gone and generation yet to be born. Experiencing the new form of heroism, from the long stretch of Rizal-Aquino continuum, come the projects of births and mortalities when one understands the arbitrariness of his existence. This is what the recent “I am Ninoy” campaign has verified as Filipinos celebrate their long-distance nationalism, 120 years after Rizal’s first novel, 110 years after independence from Spain, 60 years after Manila airport’s establishment, and 25 years after Aquino’s death. The project is a “celebration of hope and idealism, a freedom movement, a community of heroes… who give out of sheer selflessness and serve the country the best way they can.”( Definition of the project comes from www.iamninoy.com, 16 September 2008. Emphasis added.) Defining Nationalism through Media Technologies What is a Filipino nationalism, and what are its constant and enduring goals? What are its manifestations and distinctive characteristics? Abueva defines Filipino nationalism as “love of the Filipino nation and its people: a selfless, inclusive love beyond our selfish individual, parochial or partisan interests.” It is, he narrates, the “citizens’ secular identification with and commitment to the Filipino nation and national community” – transcending family, clan, tribe, village, town, city, province, region, local culture, and religion. Further, it (nationalism) is a shared national identity based on indigenous values of pagsasarili (self-reliance), pakikisama (equitable sharing and partnership), pagkabayani (patriotism), pagkakaisa (national unity, national consensus and discipline), pakikitungo (consideration), pakikipagkapwa-tao (human solidarity based on developing the nation), and pagkakapantay-pantay (equality and equity).( Abueva, Jose. Filipino Reggy Capacio Figer 272
Nationalism: Various Meanings, Constant and Changing Goals, Continuing Relevance. Quezon City, University of the Philippines Press, 1999, xx.) Five of the shared indigenous values – self-reliance, partnership, unity, patriotism, solidarity - as listed by Abueva were mentioned by respected Filipino historian, Honoracio de la Costa, SJ (1971), as principles that have governed the Filipino national tradition which accounts in the formulation of the Filipino nationalist ideology based on his critical survey of the series of anti- colonial movements. Through these ethnic performativity of liberation, he defines nationalism as both an ideology and a commitment – an ideology which is “a concept of what a nation is,” and a commitment which is “a recognized and accepted duty to help develop and help defend one’s nation.” Nationalism presumes the existence of a nation, he says, so our definition of it still lies on how we perceive and conceive the nation which he defines as “a people with a common political allegiance” which is based on “a tradition, a consensus, and a compact” – tradition which is “a shared experience from which the nation drives the principles and values by which it lives; consensus which is a “shared understanding of what the nation is”; and compact which is “a shared agreement among the citizens based on the national tradition and the national consensus.”( As cited by Abueva, xxiii-xxxii. Excerpts from Filipino nationalism and the national tradition.) Arcilla (1992), after surveying the histo-political birth of Latin natio and European patria, enumerated the implications of nationalism: (1) consciousness of national unity and the disappearance of other unities due to privilege or province; (2) the opinion that the propertied, if not all, were members of the ‘nation’ and should enjoy a greater voice in government, be considered ‘citizens’ with voting rights on matters of common interest… (3) a belief that the national government of the citizens, and not just the monarch, was obliged to provide benefits to all through ‘national’ action; (4) an increased desire for a common language, literature, culture, etc.; and (5) the conviction that all were members responsible for and totally devoted to the nation (In Abueva, 24.). In Philippine history, the young Filipino intelligentsias led by Rizal are credited for the birth of Filipino nationalism. They lived during the period strongly influenced by Enlightenment, narrates Arcilla; but “how orthodox was their doctrine?” Arcilla concluded that history shows that the Filipino people have seldom finished what they started. Barely had the Spaniards established a colony than it was endangered by the Chinese wars, the Dutch attacks, and the chronic Moro aids. During the late 18th century, the British came and devastated the colonial economy. The next century saw unprecedented development in the Philippines, but everything was again stymied by the Bonifacio uprising of 1896 while Rizal and other intelligentsias disappeared. The American occupation came in few years later making Filipinos grew in political sophistication – “for scholarship had no chance in that period of stress and fighting.” Under the Americans, the Philippines grew even more and was preparing for independence when Japanese bombs destroyed everything (Ibid., 23-25.). Oscar Alfonso (1967) explains how Filipino national consciousness, whose lack Rizal had lamented, finally crystallized in the 19th century. He points to the circumstances that stimulated the awakening and intensification of Filipino national consciousness and nationalism. He cites 273 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism
the revolts provoked by personal grievances, opposition to harsh practices, religious motives, and agrarian complaints; and discusses their outcomes. He defines nationalism as “a product of political, economic, social and intellectual factors at a certain age of history.” Further, he says that it “is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area” that speaks a common language, possesses a literature, attached to common traditions, venerates its own heroes, and is some case, has a common religion(Ibid., 7-23. Excerpts from Beginnings and development of Filipino nationalism: From local revolts to the Philippine revolution of 1896-1898.). Before the 19th century, the Filipinos already seized basic ingredients of nationalism, but did not yet think of themselves as a nation. They had a common territory. Most of them professed the same religion and shared basic cultural characteristics. Certain factors made the development of nationalism among Filipinos a longer process. Alfonso cites the insular conditions, geographical barriers and, linguistic diversity as reasons. This geographical situation led to conspicuous failure of the Spanish friars to spread the use of their language and the ability of the Spaniards to subject Filipinos to reduccion. The combined sources of dissatisfaction of Spanish rule in the Philippines and in Europe contributed to the Filipino nationalism in the 19th century, placing the Filipinos in larger communication among themselves and with the outside world, giving them opportunities to share and formulate liberal ideas. After four centuries of Spanish, American and Japanese colonialism, the Filipino nationalism may be seen as loosely concerted and continuing movement to define and advance the national interest. As such, in a world time of profound and brisk change under the impact of globalization and modern technology, Abueva cites that its aim is the fullest realization by “ethnic Filipinos of their political and economic independence, the rediscovery and assertion of their national and Asian roots and identity, and the realization and satisfaction of their collective welfare and individual well-being as a democratic nation.”( Abueva, xxi.) We can conclude that Filipino nationalism is seen as a sentiment that wants to liberate from colonialism, an emotion that is love of country, a consciousness that is represented through symbols of nationhood, an inspiration, an ideology geared toward national purposiveness devoted to the tasks of achieving national unity and national progress, a philosophy that promotes a government and politics and cultural growth to make Filipinos supreme in their own land, a social movement that has an objective to survive physically as a nation and as distinct national identity. Common to the defining of the term is the hope and assertion to enhance independence, sovereignty, and self-reliance, and rejection and opposition against colonialism, and all forms of oppression and exploitation. It is a move to shape and to imagine the national destiny, to control and to preserve natural resources, to enhance and enlighten the people. Revolt of the texters: Critical Role of Texting and SMS In 1956, historian Teodoro Agoncillo published his book, The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan (Published by the University of the Philippines Press. A second edition came out, fifty years later, in 1996.). Allegedly the founding text of a nationalist revision of Philippine history, Agoncillo vowed of his book’s partisanship to the Filipino people – the masa (“mass”). Logically, The Revolt of the Masses jumpstarts with Reggy Capacio Figer 274
“the emotive cry of freedom, followed with the instinctive resort to physical force to realize the primitive urge to be free, the Katipunan had adopted first, the political philosophy of the French Revolution – Liberty, Equality and Fraternity – then, the American system of free elections and, finally, the principles of universal freedom of thought, of conscience and education.”( Revolt of the Masses, 292. Emphasis added.) Agoncillo’s narrative underscores the Filipino instinct to be free. But one must be cautioned by the book’s qualifier – that the revolt is by the mass which, in the Philippines, signify the lower portion of the social stratum, opposite of which is the class where the ilustrados belonged. In this uprising, the cast is led by Bonifacio whose lowly origin might have been one of the factors that affected the paucity of reliable documents about him. Thus, unlike Rizalian artifacts that were instrumental in the monumenting of the foremost national hero, Bonifacio’s life and death remains controversial that even his corpse remains unfound. This locating of the body is metaphorical to the imagination of the figure long lost and yet to be found, resembling the absence of primordial autonomy that is yet to be experienced. Agoncillo’s revisionist approach to historicizing gave back the power of destiny-creation to the very mass majority whose lives, though not nationally commemorated, write the history of the nation. As argued, Philippines’ signification of “the new hero” marked “the new nation” and “the new generation” of valor. The linear plot of history has passed on the power of citizenship from the elite to the common tao. This shift of supremacy has been intimately connected to technological arms that are available to the masses. A year after the country’s centennial of independence, cellular phones were introduced; and since then, Philippines has been heralded the texting capital of the world with one hundred million texts being sent daily around the archipelago(Pertierra, Raul and E. Ugarte. Cultures and Texts: Representations of Philippine Society. Quezon City: University of Philippines Press, 1994, 88.). With “texting” as the national pastime, Filipinos are commonly referred to as “generation texters.”( Ellwood-Clayton defines a texter as “a regular participant in text exchange with other cell phone owners.” Becoming a texter, she says, “involves the development of texter-textee relationships, or general reliance on mobile communication in the fulfillment of one’s communication desires.”) Indispensable to contemporary popular culture, texting has infiltrated both the primitive and the postmodern Filipino living. Bella Ellwood-Clayton’s investigation, for example, which focused on the relation of “texting” and religion in the Philippines, proved that it is the ingenious in the Filipino that sees the possibility of connection between the new technological specie and Christianity. According to her, Filipinos send two types of text messages to one another: “hallmark” (forwarded) and personal (self- composed) texts. Personal text messages “range from trivial social detailing to more intimate dialogue, and often include the ubiquitous “God bless” at the end of messages” and [h]allmark religious texts are “passed across the archipelago like chain letters… generally syrupy and corny.” This meeting of folk Catholicism and technology in texting provides users “a financially solvent, endearing and particularly rewarding form of adhesion in maintaining social relationships. The text exchange “keeps people feeling socially connected and acts to abate loneliness and social alienation.” (Ellwood-Clayton, Bella. “Texting and God: The Lord is My Textmate – Folk Catholicism in Cyber Philippines.”) 275 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism
The God-is-my-textmate phenomenon is a sequel to Mary-is-my-comrade in 1986 People Power Revolution. The statues of Virgin Mary was used in the carnivalesque drama of “peaceful” massive revolt and fallen dictatorship. While the interpretation of “people power” is a transcendental force, the incredible unison of Filipinos in creating myriad versions of Edsa around the archipelago has strengthened Agoncillo’s “instinctive resort” and “primitive urge.” The revolt was a networking of social demands that arose from politically habitual and nationally sporadic permeations of trauma. There was no texting then but the Filipinos, discovering the power of words, put their bodies together and produced heat. The people found technology in themselves – and realized that such is relentless weapon. In 2001, the act of texting showed its capacity to penetrate in the political affairs of the common tao (people). It has been said that the overthrow of Philippine President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in 2001 is credited to the massive exchange of text messages, mostly jokes known as “Eraption” which generally depicts the President’s malapropism and lack of fluency in English language. The messages, occupying the role of a national comedy, had disturbing subtexts of graft and corruption, gradually converting even the apolitical of citizens to a conscious sovereign. The cellular phone, as a communication device, became a political instrument in driving the Filipinos to the streets, throngs of which eventually unseated Estrada. Estrada’s rise to political stardom had been theorized elsewhere as a concrete proof of media’s power toward their audience. From a second-rate actor glorified in pro-poor movies, he dominated local politics and, since then, as the Philippine economy was regressing, gradually ran for presidency. For the majority who has been confronting poverty in the eye, he is the hero the cinema of the oppressed promised. For the elite, he is a result of late 19th-century concept of mass society – where Filipinos, stricken by politically-induced economic turmoil, created pseudo- environments and submitted to the myths of a formulated grammar of projected valor. It was ironic that the unbeatable Erap, as how his comrades and fanatics have nicknamed him, had been a subject of public scrutiny through an impeachment trial whose proceedings were beamed live in national television. The prosecution was first of its kind, both entertaining and informative in its legalities and proofs. What was used to be confined in the esteemed halls of congressmen and senators was opened to public – supplying the common viewer an illusion of participatory judgment. Divided toward opinions on presidential vindication, the people found a handy weapon in a cellular phone that was yet to celebrate its second year in Philippine market. It may be acceptable, therefore, to relegate the People Power 2 as an elite-based revolution, given the context of national economics and individual capacity of phone purchase. Nevertheless, journalism and scholarship citations heralded texting as the unique ingredient in the launching of the second edition of the Edsa phenomenon. Witnessing the rise of web-linked mobile phones and Internet mass mailings, Ilene R. Prusher called the Edsa variant a “spam democracy.” Similar to spam email, “spam democracy” means “unwanted messages that exercise free speech.”( “Filipino activists find mobile phones, text messaging, ‘perfect for insurrection’,” Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 2000. http://archives.nandotimes.com. ) Sheila Coronel described the uprising a “multimedia revolt,” referring to the joint forces of traditional media and information communication technologies. Reggy Capacio Figer 276
Text messaging circulated “to coordinate the protests, keep protesters abreast of events as they unfolded, and to mobilize citizens to march, bring food, and keep vigil.”( “The Media, the Market, and Democracy: The Case of the Philippines.” Javnost=The Public 8.2, 109-124. Apart from SMS, Coronel cited email and Web as weapons of protests. “As many as 200 anti-Estrada websites and about 100 e-mail groups were set up during the period. Organized groups used email to discuss position papers, reach a consensus on issues and mobilize numbers of rallies. The Internet was a bridge that linked protesters in the provinces, Metro Manila and even overseas. The web played the host to the entire, polemical tracts and even virtual rallies (110).) Katz and Aakhus pointed at the SMS power as “society-altering technology,” saying that the protesters used “phone trees” to organize demonstrations. They recognized the mobile phone as the “quintessential instrument of two-way interpersonal communication [which] can also work as a tool to spur and coordinate the action of masses for political change.”(Kats, J. and M. Aakhus, eds. Perpetual Contact: Mobile Communication, Private Talk, Public Performance. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.) Witnessing the “mobile many,” Howard Rheingold capitalized on Edsa 2 to illustrate “smart mob.” Despite the impossibility to meet together, Rheingold said that smart mobs can act together using mobile devices, which can serve as a social control instrument and as a tool for political resistance (Rheingold, Howard. Smart Mob: The Next Social Revolution. 2002.). To explore the “telecommunicative fantasies” among middle class Filipinos, esteemed scholar Vicente Rafael used the Edsa 2 as a backdrop. According to him, the middle class, whom he collectively called “the crowd,” believed in the power of themselves and of their cellular phones – in the capacity of communication technology to transmit messages at a distance and in their ability to master relationship with the mass with which they shared a context. The “cellphone,” despite its being transgressive in categories in the popular culture of the Filipinos, has seemingly projected handy and obstacle-free weaponry. It allows users “to reach beyond traffic-clogged streets and serve as a quicker alternative to slow, unreliable and expensive postal services.” Evading the multifarious of broadcasting media, Rafael says, cellphone users “became broadcasters, receiving and transmitting both news and gossip and often confounding the two. Indeed, one could imagine each user becoming a broadcasting station unto him or herself, a node in a wider network of communication that the state could not possibly even begin to monitor much less control.” Here, cellphones bring a new variety of crowd, “one that was thoroughly conscious of itself as a movement headed towards a common goal…; cell phone users define themselves against a mass of anonymous others (and)... they become those others, assuming anonymity as a condition of possibility for sociality.” At its most utopian, Rafael said that “the fetish of communication suggested the possibility of dissolving, however provisionally, existing class divisions.” With the messianic assurance of repackaging the crowd into a citizenry dealing with justice, the telecommunicative practice was still haunted by the voiceless and muted mass.( Rafael, Vicente. “The Cellphone and the Crowd: Messianic Politics in the Contemporary Philippines.” Public Culture 15 (2003), 399-425.) Blogging and Alternative Publishing Randolf S. David, one of the Philippines’s foremost sociologists, called the presidential 277 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism
ascendancy of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) a “rescue from pits of demoralization,” describing the country as a “nation that is just beginning to wake up to the magic of its gifts.”(From “Letter to a Granddaughter,” first published as an article for column “Public Lives” in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 21, 2001. The essay appears in David’s Nation, Self and Citizenship: An Invitation to Philippine Sociology. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2002, 343.) Three years later, when GMA sought office through a “legal” mandate, David laments, “we did not elect a president, what we have is a president who cheated.”(Quote is explicit translation of statement in Filipino: “Wala tayong nahalal na pangulo nitong nakaraang eleksyon. Mayroon tayong presidenteng nailusot sa mga butas ng magaspang na canvas(s).” From “Canvass,” in Sawikaan 2004: Mga Salita ng Taon. Quezon City University of the Philippines Press, 2005, 13.) GMA’s administration remains haunted by issues of election fraud, proof of which are alleged wiretapped recordings of phone calls between she and elections commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. “Hello, Garci,” GMA greets the officer in the recording that was made public in early June 2005. Not long after, “Hello, Garci” jokes and ringtones buzzed from phone to phone and found downloadable MP3 formats in a number of blogs and websites. Only in the Philippines that ringtone has been used as weapon of resistance of anonymous composers who were unmindful of the government’s threat toward illegal propagation of the conversation. Anthropologically, such ingenuity has a tradition that roots from pre-Hispanic Bagobo peoples who were converting the act of rice pounding into the act of music making. Given the aforementioned text, a scholar called the Philippines a “land of musicians.”( Read Rosario Cruz- Lucero’s “The Music of Pestle-on-Mortar” in The Nation beyond Manila. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2007, 1-10.) For what seemed to be a purely transaction became a lyrics for tempos of protests. In response, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) gathered all the jokes and published them in a collection(Hello, Garci? Hello, Ma’am. Political Humor in the Cellphone Age. Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (2005).). PCIJ Director Sheila Coronel writes about the capacity of texting, in disseminating the sense of humor, as a characteristic of Filipino network of consciousness: There are over 30 million cellphone users in the country today. The potential audience, therefore, for a single joke is easily in millions, surpassing the audience of newspapers and all but the best-rating television and radio programs… Phone company executives say that jokes are a staple of SMS messaging, surpassing most other types of messages sent. This, plus the amazing speed in which jokes can travel in the mobile-phone age can only encourage amateur humorists of every stripe. (“Joke Only.” Preface to Hello, Garci?, ix.) On June 27, 2005, the President asked for a national apology through national television. Loi Reyes Landicho made a parody out of that “I am sorry” speech in www.professionalheckler.blog-city.com, making blogging an alternative online space for protest and personalized journalism. (The blog entry appears in pages 26-28 of Hello, Garci?) The collection, too, included Alan C. Robles’s hilarious graphics and pictures mocking the circus of events, images and dialogues. A graphic art of an anonymous artist also found publication with his “poop-to-graphs,” actual photographs with balloons containing made-up quotes, particularly Reggy Capacio Figer 278
that of President Arroyo. There is also a series of comic strips with GMA as Darna, the local popular culture heroine, which was passed on as attachment to one email to the other; the creator however remains untraceable. While some graphic works can claim authorship, majority of the messages, including the artistry that they bear with them, seem to have been communally owned. The subtexts and puns that they ingrained are likely arbitrary in affection to free the nation. This is the magic of revolt of mass that is impossible to be individually named and monumented. Toward “network nationalism” One returns to Benedict Anderson for the cultural roots of Philippine nationalism. Taking the Rizalian texts as the main foundation of his theorizing of nation that he defines as “imagined communities,” Anderson fell in love with the diaspora of Filipinos and pushed on “long-distance nationalism” as a “menacing portent for the future.” This variant of patriotism is a disturbing omen because First of all, it is the product of capitalism’s remorseless, accelerating transformation of all human societies. Second, it creates a serious politics that is at the same time radically unaccountable. The participant rarely pays taxes in the country in which he does his politics; he is not answerable to its judicial system; he probably does not cast even an absentee ballot in its elections because he is a citizen in a different place; he not need fear prison, torture, or death, nor need his immediate family. But, well and safely positioned in the First World, he can send money and guns, circulate propaganda, and build intercontinental consequences in the zones of their ultimate destinations. Third, his politics, unlike those of activists for global human rights or environmental causes, are neither intermittent nor serendipitous. They are deeply rooted in a consciousness that his exile is self-chosen and that the nationalism he claims on email is also the ground on which an embattled ethnic identity is to be fashioned in the ethnicized nation-state that he remains determined to inhabit. That same metropole that marginalizes and stigmatizes him simultaneously enables him to play, in a flash, on other side of the planet, national hero. (Anderson, Benedict. “Long-Distance Nationalism,” Specter of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2004 [1998], 58.) Here, one acknowledges the distance between he/she and his/her patria. Theatrical as it may seem, the world becomes the stage where one assumes heroism based on the very definitions and qualifications of one’s origin. It is greatly understandable, therefore, when one perfects the role every time an opportunity arises to practice the love of country. In the recent Miss Universe (2008), for example, beauty connoisseurs and pageant fanatics missed the conferment of Miss Photogenic award. Allegedly, the officials of the Organization were preventing a predictable result since the recipient of the citation is identified through online votes. The voting scheme was introduced in 1996, and since then, two countries have dominated – Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The latter’s texts were instrumental for five wins for its delegation since the aforementioned year, giving Puerto Ricans an equal fight for numbers. The recent three consecutive years, however, showed that Filipinos could make the result traditional 279 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism
– a trend the Organization and some participating nations may have found alarming (Zafra, Jessica, ed. Manila Envelope: Dispatches from the End of the World. Manila: Sanserif, Inc., 2005.). Whether the Filipina queens deserved the award or not should find an opportunity for discourse in photography and pageantry. For now, it is notable that this country of carnivalesque and fiesta colors is not just a pageant-crazy public but a nation anxious of hearing its name in the celebration of beauty. Like any spectacle, pageants create nationalist claims. In the international stage televised to billions worldwide, the Filipino diaspora focuses on the woman in sash. The gendered image becomes asexual as the spectator, rooting for the representative, experiences nationalism in international context. The spectator looks at the pageant as a selection process for a hero, thus, despite the dwindling economy, one participates whatever the cost is. Allegedly, the votes were results of massive networking among Filipinos across the globe. Conclusion In 1993, Howard Rheingold introduced the term “virtual communities” and two years later Nicholas Negroponte spoke in Being digital about “digital neighborhoods” which was a pace auxiliary than Marshall McLuhan’s “global village.” These terms and the e-loads they brought with them put the discourse of citizenship in the online affairs of the nation. This ability to participate in society online is what Mossberger, et. al. call as “digital citizenship.”( Mossberger, Karen, et. al. Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society and Participation. London: The MIT Press, Cambridg, 2008.) To explicate this in Philippine context, necessary to cite are surveys that present facts about cyber connectivities. Synovate market research found out that Filipinos from across income groups are increasingly embracing the Internet. Eight to 10 percent of the research’s respondents have started to do online purchase with the upscale and older ones accessing the internet from home and with the younger lower-income and younger users mostly logging on in a café. The study also noted that Filipino users access the Internet mainly for communication and searching for information(Oliva, Erwin. “Research shows Filipinos increasingly embracing the Internet,” Philippine Daily Inquirer. http://globalnation.inquirer.net/mindfeeds/view/2008-0814-154612, 31 August 2008.). In the most recent study of Universal McCann, the Philippines has the highest number of Internet users in the 16-24 age group who joins social networking groups, and that it is among the top five countries that found blogging as alternative publishing. The study also indicated that blogs and social networks are becoming “mainstream” media and are a valid platform for spreading information. The survey also noted that more importantly, consumers are no longer passive – that “they have more control on how they consume content.”( Olcohondra, Riza. “RP: From texting capital to leader in social networking,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, vol. 23. No. 287, 20 September 2008, A1&A15. The Social Media Wave 3 report showed that RP had the highest penetration of social networking among Internet users at 83.1 percent, compared with the global average of 57.5 percent. It also that RP has the second highest incident of blog-reading at 90.3 percent against South Korea with 92.1 percent of blog readership. About 65.8 percent of Filipino internet users write blogs, compared to China which topped the survey at 70.3 percent. The study had 17,000 respondents from 29 countries who are internet daily users. The study was conducted in March 2008.) These results offer a more specific situation toward understanding Reggy Capacio Figer 280
the digital and social divisions. While there are inequalities in access to the Internet and knowledge of search strategies and technical connections, the imagined wire that connects each one from the other opens networks of personal as political consumptions of relative issues. Nationalism is thriving on the Internet. But one must be reminded that Internet did not invent nationalism. Philippine history has showed that it has a long history of patriotism long before the World Wide Web. But what must be put into great consideration is the very act of expanding the web of nationalist influence. The Filipinos’ virtual communions made everyone’s connection to the imagined community practicable though not easily locatable. Probing Rizal’s offering of Noli Me Tangere to mi Patria (the motherland), Vicente Rafael declared that mi Patria is not easily locatable in the world. “Its geographical uncertainty,” he says, “makes it seem as though Rizal were conjuring an image rather than positing a settled and clearly demarcated entity. (Rafael, Vicente. The Promise of the Foreign: Nationalism and the Techniques of Translation in the Spanish Philippines. Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 68.) This may be true to all who went to far away and plays a Ninoy, or a Pinoy, in cyberspace. Bibliography Abueva, Jose V. (1999) “Filipino nationalism: Various meanings, constant and changing goals, continuing relevance” Quezon City, University of the Philippines Press. Agoncillo, Teodoro A. (1956) “The revolt of the masses: The story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan” Quezon City, University of the Philippines Press. Anderson, Benedict (2004) “Specter of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World” Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Anderson, Benedict. (2003) “Imagined communities” Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil Publishing, Inc. Coronel, Sheila S (2005) “ Hello, Garci? Political Humor in the Cellphone Age” Quezon City, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Coronel, Sheila S. (2001) “The media, the market and democracy: The case of the Philippines”; Javnost: The Public 8.2, 109-124. Cruz, Isagani R. (2003) “Bukod na bukod: Mga piling sanaysay” Quezon City, University of the Philippines Press. David, Randy S. (2002) “Nation, self and citizenship: An introduction to Philippine sociology” Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. Ellwood-Clayton, Bella (2005): “Texting and God: The Lord is my textmate –folk Catholicism in cyber Philippines” in Nyiri, Kristof (Ed) “A sense of place: The global and the local in mobile communication”, Passagen Verlag, Vienna, 2005 at www.socialscience.t mobile.hu/ dok/8.Ellwood.pdf (Accessed on 23 December 2008.) “Filipino activists find mobile phones, text messaging, ‘perfect for insurrection” Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 2000 at http://archives.nandotimes.com (Accessed on 23 December 2008.) 281 I am P/Ninoy: Filipino Diaspora, Technology and Network Nationalism
Katz, James E. and Aakhus, Mark A. (Eds) (2002) “Perpetual Contact: Mobile communication, private talk, public performance” UK, Cambridge University Press. Lucero-Cruz, Rosario (2007) “The Nation beyond Manila” Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press. Mossberger, Karen, et. Al (2008) “Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society and Participation” London, The MIT Press, Cambridge. Olcohondra, Riza (2008) “RP: From texting capital to leader in social networking,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 20 September 2008, Philippines. Oliva, Erwin. “Research shows Filipinos increasingly embracing the Internet,” Phlippine Daily Inquirer on 31 August 2008 at http://globalnation.inquirer.net/mindfeeds/view/2008, 0814- 154612. (Accessed on 31 August 2008.) Pertierra, Raul and Eduardo F. Ugarte (1994) “Culture and texts: Representations of Philippine society” Queszon City, University of the Philippines Press. Rafael, Vicente L. (2003) “The Cellphone and the Crowd: Messianic Politics in the Contemporary Philippines”; Public Culture (15) 399-425 at http://faculty.washington.edu/ vrafael/cell_phone_and_crowd.pdf. (Accessed on 11 January 2009.) Rafael, Vicente L. (2005) “The Promise of the Foreign: Nationalism and the Techniques of Translation in the Spanish Philippines” Durham, Duke UP. — (Spring 1990): “Nationalism, imagery, and the Filipino intelligentsia in the nineteenth century”; Critical Inquiry, 16 (3) 591-611 at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343641 (Accessed on 05 May 2008.) Rheingold, Howard L. (2002) “Smart Mob: The next social revolution” Cambridge MA, Basic Books. Tolentino, Rolando B. (2007) “Sipat kultura: Tungo sa mapagpalayang pagbabasa, pag-aaral at pagtuturo ng panitikan” Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press. www.iamninoy.com Zafra, Galileo S. and Romulo P. Baquiran Jr. (2005) “Sawikaan 2004: Mga salita ng taon” Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press. Zafra, Jessica (Ed) (2005) “Manila Envelope: Dispatches from the End of the World” Manila, Sanserif, Inc.
l Journal of Global Communication, Vol2., No.1, Jan.-July 2009 pp. 279-288 Manipulation, Informative Control and Iraq War Aurora Labio Bernal Communication Faculty (University of Seville-Spain)., Avenida Américo Vespucio s/n, Isla de la Cartuja, 41092 Seville. SPAIN [email protected]
Abstract Taking the studies of Herbert Schiller as a basis, we shall carry out a reinterpretation of the myths that uphold the Market Economy, within which the media shall act as instruments that have control over public opinion. The multinationals of the sector, with multiple interests, thus forget their role of public function and instead join together with the political/economic elite which aims at the survival of inalterability. In order to do so, the doses of manipulation are to be administered on a daily basis by means of multiple mechanisms and shall reach their highest levels at moments of crisis. This is what was to happen at the different phases of the invasion in Iraq in 1991, 1998 and 2003, just as can be seen in the case of American journalism. Key Words: manipulation, economic elite, journalism, groups, power. Introduction In the mid-seventies, Herbert Schiller wrote The Mind Managers (1974), a book that was ahead of its time due to its analysis of the mechanisms used by the media for manipulating public opinion. The analysis of the American writer cannot be of more importance at this very moment. Thirty years after its first publication, the processes of concentration and multinationalization have turned communication and information into thriving businesses, due to their profits and their capacity to have an influence on world population. A globalised society in economic terms is a standardised society in cultural and informative terms. What we’re saying is by no means anything new. In fact, in the eighties when there was an attempt to re-establish a New International Economic Order, it was to be unavoidably associated with the additional creation of an New World Order of Information and Communication. In this way, it was revealed that the hegemony of an elite of nations above the rest was not only an economic matter, but at the same time it was also creating inequalities in the access and distribution of content matter. From then on, these conditions have not improved. Instead, they have become more acute due to the willingness of a system which establishes its own identity by means of the media. It is not the only mechanism that is used. In reality, the very same rules of capitalist dynamics help the media to be, at times, the shelter where they can take refuge. At other times, they facilitate the comprehension of a unique way of seeing the world, the only way possible, which turns alternative thinking into something strange. In both cases, the definition of the messages is perfectly 283 Manipulation, Informative Control and Iraq War structured so that few doubts can be raised about the system, so that its survival is encouraged by means of consumption and so that people can relax their minds, as they sit back on their comfortable couches and enjoy the entertainment provided. In doing so, it is especially interesting to analyse the superficial layer of content, which is determined to show values such as freedom, pluralism and independence. In other studies, we have already pointed out that the media themselves praise the goodness of the system. They refer to the press as the fourth power, they deny that there may be any other possibility of censorship in the current democracies and they sell the mirage of free societies. In the aforementioned book, Schiller, by analysing this in the case of the United States, drew attention to the existence of up to five myths in the structure of content. Although we coincide with the American author, we miss in his analysis the establishment of relations between these myths, whose ultimate intention can only be understood by using their interdependency as a starting point. A reinterpretation of Schiller’s myths Schiller begins by referring to the exaltation of individualism, under the precepts of which private property is encouraged as a culmination of human well-being. However, this will require a suitable imperturbable context which will allow this reality to be assumed without doubts appearing. This is how the second myth appears, that of neutrality, to which we referred before when we spoke about the appearance of an ideal system which denies manipulation as a form of social control. Thus, the individual can live in peace, accumulating wealth just like the rest of his fellow men and with the assurance of being protected by a model of a neutral state in all its ramifications. It is precisely in this context that another of the myths begins to make sense, that of the pluralism of the media, guarantors of the structure of a well-formed public opinion. The belief in the fact that a quantity of channels and the abundance of information ensure diversity and alternative thinking is shaped as one of the most determinant axes in manipulation. People trust the media, which have theoretically and traditionally been granted the values upon which current democracies have settled. Discrepancy also grants the definitive value of plurality, even if it’s only a case of being the disguise of a truly heretical element. If the latter were to appear, the system would really end up expelling or devouring it. Two other myths are joined to these, both contrary and complementary at the same time: the one that refers to the absence of the analysis of social conflicts and the one which calls out to human emotions which justify the demand for a specific type of message. In this way, it won’t be necessary to emphasize the in depth study of existing inequalities. In exchange, these contents are to be substituted by banal informative channels which, at the end of the day, only respond to the demands and the requests of the audience. The interrelation of these mechanisms in the structure of the message ensures order and the incapacity to react. It is the victory of the system over the individual, relegated to its role as Aurora Labio Bernal 284 producer and consumer of goods, submitted to the interests of owing and owning rather than those of loving and being. Armand Mattelart has written about this matter: In the name of categorical imperatives of the techno-political planet, archetype of the emancipated networks of historic boundaries and those of different cultures, the neo-liberal utopia has created an unsurmountable horizon for the evolution of the globe, in which the ideal of equality and justice has been prohibited, in which the utopian matrix has been inspired for quite some time. No great topics, no great conflicts, but instead technical solutions, a ‘managerial action free from worries of political hegemony’, according to the vocabulary issued by the great world agencies of intermediaries. No great tales of freedom, but instead short-sighted technoutopian fragments. With the disappearance of the Cold War and the equilibrium of terror, human societies would have reached the ‘final point in man’s ideological evolution’. Consequently, no need for those promoted to sovereign consumers/audiences to resist the established order, but the neo-Darwinian obligation to adapt to the new competitive environment of world free trading. Now, it’s not just survival of the fittest, but also the survival of the fastest (...) Only the ‘universal commercial republic’ is legitimised in its rejuvenated version: the global democratic marketplace. (Mattelart, 2000: 431-432) There does not seem to be much innocence in the emanation of informative messages by means of media which have lost (if in fact they ever had had it) their independent character, in order to form part of corporations directly connected with economic and political interests. In this way, globalization, in informative terms, makes us talk about the power of the media, this being understood as another ramification of the economic-political power in the world. According to Ramón Reig, ‘every Power structure requires a discourse, it needs messages for its consolidation’ (Reig, 2004: 125). Clearly, these contents shall encourage the legitimacy of the System, not only by means of publicity which incites consumption, but also by means of homogeneous information to which it is impossible to respond. In this sense, the receiver should not confuse the different ideological lines in media – often marked by the need to cover market quotas – with the unanimous message that praises the goodness of Market Economy. The commercialisation of the media is such that the contents are poisoned in order to achieve the sale of the informative product. In nearly all television channels all over the world, we can find that showiness is an essential characteristic. Even the so-called serious press has been unable to escape the tabloidazation of its contents, which gradually give priority to lighter- hearted subjects and which fundamentally fulfil the function of entertaining. Furthermore, even some news reports include undercover publicity based on commercial interests of the company to which the media group belongs. It is the case of promoting certain writers, which publish their work in the Group editorial, or certain cinema directors who receive support from their affiliated audio-visual company. It is the definitive death of the Fourth Power and the discovery of a new way of creating journalism, subject to market laws and their ways of manipulating. 285 Manipulation, Informative Control and Iraq War
Groups, power and manipulation At present, the media panorama shows us a tangle of communication companies at the service of one single interest: the system of market economy This is why, although we can discover political tendencies in many media groups, we uphold the thesis that the true dominant ideology in this media falls in with the bases on which capitalism is settled. If we wish to understand all of this in a practical manner, we only need to pause to study what the journalistic reality itself shows us on a daily basis. We are specifically referring to the amount of news reports which the media themselves echo over and over again and which constitute the best evidence of the complex relations that are established within the informative structure. We thereby discover the impossibility of acknowledging the media as isolated companies which assume their public function as a priority task. Beyond all of this, the interests and relations between the great corporations of this sector and of other industries, are revealed to us as key elements in understanding the informative submission to the neo-liberal ideology. We can confirm this by means of an example in which we shall apply considerations of a structuralist methodology. In June 2002, we heard the news that Robert Murdoch, communication tycoon behind whom we find the News Corporation group, was buying the Italian digital platform Stream from the Vivendi group. Months before, in another news report, we heard that Fox News, also belonging to News Corporation, had a larger audience than the American channel CNN, belonging to the America On Line-Time Warner conglomerate. The analysis of this information leads us to establishing a series of bonds from which we can reach other sectors, corporations, media groups and countries. For example, Vivendi, as well as being a communications group, is also a company dedicated to water supply. Furthermore, according to this information, it reaches Spain thanks to Canal Plus, where we curiously find the CNN Plus channel, a Spanish derivation of the American channel which, as we have seen, is in the hands of AOL-Time Warner. And from CNN Plus we get to the Prisa group, a Spanish group which, for example, also has interests in Mexico, which it reaches with Santillana, El País Internacional and Radiópolis. By reading this data we open the way to the understanding of how it’s only a few corporations which dominate the market of world media. This has some direct consequences starting when these companies are the catalysts of predetermined messages and configured with propagandist aims for the upholding of this power structure, from which they emanate and to which they owe their survival. In reference to this matter, Chomsky and Herman have written: The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfil this role requires systematic propaganda. (Chomsky and Herman, 1990: 21) Aurora Labio Bernal 286
These are the authors who also tell us about a series of filters applied to the information by the media which work as implicit censors in the messages so that they can maintain a certain state of things. From the management of information by the power structure to the advertising subjection and the company configuration which dominates the media. The media power in the world can therefore be found in the hands of corporations with interests inside and outside of communication which, furthermore, is not recognised as a public service but as a profit making business. This contemporary social reality is the product of a capitalist advance, accelerated after the Second World War, which has supposed a worldwide informative distribution which corresponds to the political and economic distribution. It is the case of a second wave in the process of globalization, in which a unique way of thinking has been imposed: Groups which are more powerful than States carry out an attack on the most precious possession of democracies: information. Are they trying to impose their law on the whole world or, on the contrary, do they wish to open a new area of freedom for citizens? Neither Ted Turner, from CNN; nor Rupert Murdoch, from News Corporation Limited; nor Bill Gates, from Microsoft; nor tens of other new masters of the world have ever submitted their projects to universal suffrage. Democracy wasn’t made for them. (...) They have no time to lose. Their products and ideas freely cross the borders of a globalised market. (...) Proceeding (once again) from the United States, but happily taken up by Europeans, this new preaching serves the interests of world capitalism. (Ramonet, 2002: 165-166) In the same way, on informative grounds, there are also some companies which rule the world and that can be found in the developed area of the planet. This is how we can verify that the six largest communications groups in the world are American and European, and that they extend their area of influence beyond their frontiers thus contributing to spreading an informative flow which connects with its western interests. Established as another part of economic power, these groups depend on the approval and the tolerance of a political elite which protects them and gives them shelter. In appearance, we speak of pluralism, but in practice, control is removed from the market in order to proceed with concentrations and a rhythm which is increasingly wilder in the sector. Good relations between the political, economic and media elements also allow the exchange of favours. The executive allows the growth and expansion within the limits of property, while corporations maintain the singular dimension of the message in order to avoid ‘social disorder’. This practice can reach levels of propaganda at moments of crisis as could be seen in the War in Iraq through the American media. It was a case of keeping public opinion favourable, which is why the media of that country took unanimous turns when patriotic journalism was to be carried out. The machinery must keep going, although truth can be somewhat injured along the way. The manipulated message: an example through of the War in Iraq As we have just seen, nowadays information suffers the consequences of a commercialised 287 Manipulation, Informative Control and Iraq War system which puts economic results before public function. This is not strange since, in the attainment of this interest, the message undergoes a process of manipulation that can prove to be more than obvious, but that can also be diluted through mechanisms that are not recognised by the receiver. If this occurs with daily information, then that which is produced at moments of crisis is even more contaminated due to the confluence of commercial interest with propagandist purposes. Under these circumstances, we are going to make a special mention of the techniques used during the different phases of the Gulf War, starting with the first American attack at the start of the eighties up until the last real invasion in 2003. In effect, the first Gulf War, in 1991, revealed the different tactics used to manipulate information on behalf of western media, especially the Americans. In fact, when the bombing occurred over Baghdad, the only television station to broadcast the images was CNN, from which the rest of the channels in the world would get their data. Indeed, we can assert that it was a conflict in which information was censored, manipulated and even invented. In this sense, the complicity between large media groups and the political-military leadership made it possible to broadcast impaired contents: (...) Indeed, to understand how television became ‘Pentavision’, it is necessary to consider not just how negative dimensions of the management system prevented news media from reporting certain aspects of the war but how readily reporters succumbed to the positive side of news management, relaying event through the eyes, and in the terminology, of the military. (...) Euphemisms were the order of the day. Emitting a stream of ‘bovine scatology’ (one of Schwarzkopf´s more colourful coinages, though applied by him to journalists’ stupid questions rather than to the briefings) the briefer used opaque jargon to obscure reality, so that civilian casualties became ‘collateral damage’ while ‘degrading capabilities’ was the preferred substitution for bombing. (Carruthers, 2000: 142-143) Thus, during the months that the war lasted, it was revealed that journalists obeyed orders from their companies, which didn’t hesitate to adopt instructions dictated by the government as their own. It was a case of creating patriotic journalism, in which the distinction between who were the good guys and who were the bad guys ought to be made perfectly clear. Not only information was censored, but also at times lies were told and false news reports were invented with a more than obvious propagandist intention: In 1990, the organisation Citizens for a Free Kuwait managed to convince a reluctant America that there was a need for the Gulf War to break out. Supported by George Bush senior, this group led the world press to believe that Iraqi soldiers had killed Kuwaiti children, by removing them from their incubators; a cynical operation of intoxication, brilliantly carried out thanks to the savoir faire of a rival member of the Rendon Group(The author refers to the Rendon Group, dedicated to carrying out clandestine propagandist campaigns requested by the Pentagon.), Hill and Knowlton, whose former head of the Washington Office, ‘Torie’ Clark, is now spokesperson Aurora Labio Bernal 288
for the Pentagon. (El Semanal Supplement, 2003: 20) Seven years later, when the Clinton administration once again bombed the Iraqi city, history repeated itself. It was the CNN, surprisingly isolated there as the only international station, which once again was to broadcast for the rest of the planet. From thousands of homes, viewers watched a shower of bombs, at the same time as they received the message from the American president which justified the act. Rising up as the saviour of his country and the whole world, Clinton lashed out at Saddam Hussein, accusing him of not collaborating with the UN inspectors who were in Iraq to check whether or not he owned weapons of mass destruction. And the whole world believed the message, even though it was made in the midst of a process that questioned whether Clinton would remain in office, due to the Lewinsky matter. However, certain variations between one event and another could be noticed when it was time for the western media to report, with the exception of the Americans. After the fighting in 1991, many voices were raised against informative manipulation which had been performed with an outright contempt for the truth. Criticism made way for the awareness of the journalistic profession, especially in Europe. For this reason, when the bombings occurred in 1998, we can observe a variation in the manner of reporting of many professionals, who, in spite of American recommendations, tried to show an alternative version. We insist that these reflections are not going to affect the American media which once again in 2003 fell in with the propagandist directives from the American government. In February 2004, Colin Powell presented the UN with some photographs as irrefutable evidence that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction in his territory. Rather more than questionable, the images became the necessary justification to start the second Gulf War which would eventually lead to the dismantling of the Iraqi regime. During the invasion, the country’s media took unanimous turns to support the Bush administration. The mechanisms used show that manipulation can be carried out in many ways. Among the roughest, we can find the explicit censorship carried out by the American government on the report sent by the Iraqi government to the UN relating to the weapons of mass destruction. Just as was published in the German newspaper Die Tageszeitung in December 2002, and as was revealed by Project Censored 2004, the American executive literally removed 8,000 of the 11,800 pages from the original report. In these pages there were, according to an article published by Michael I. Niman in The Humanist and in ArtVoice in spring 2003, references to the involvement of different American governments in supplying forbidden weapons to Iraq: The missing pages implicated 24 U.S.-based corporations ante the successive Ronald Reagan and George Bush Sr. Administrations in connection with the illegal supplying of Saddam Hussein’s government with myriad weapons of mass destruction and the training to use them. (Niman, 2003, cited in Censored 2004, Media Democracy in Action, 2003: 42) But not only was information concealed. There was an attempt to censor it, thus affecting the informative task itself. In another article, we have already mentioned how, shortly before the 289 Manipulation, Informative Control and Iraq War
American troops entered Baghdad, the Pentagon had asked journalists to leave the Iraqi capital. Aware of the power on public opinion, the American troops preferred to not have any direct witnesses on their entrance to the city, a definitive symbol of the fall of the Saddam regime. Furthermore Colin Powell warned the journalists of the danger they were in ‘not only because of the threat of a potential military action, but because of the risk of Saddam taking hostages’ (Sistiaga, 2004: 133). One day before the capture of Baghdad, the threat was fulfilled when an American tank fired at the Palestina Hotel, where the international press was lodged. Two news professionals, including Spanish cameraman José Couso, died during the attack, justified before public opinion as an action in an area of intense fighting. Although the version offered was more than questioned by journalists present in Baghdad, the then president of the Government publicly declared that informers ‘knew the high risk that they ran by being there, a risk that unfortunately had been materialised’ (El Mundo, 10 April 2003). The statement was made by José María Aznar at a meeting with George Bush, whose policy in the war was perfectly assimilated by the Spanish executive, also in informative matters: Powell wasn’t the only one to publicly ask journalists to flee and stop doing their work. The Spanish government devoted itself to calling the heads of media who had reporters in the area so that they could get them out of there. From Moncloa, from the vice-presidency of the Government, from the Ministry of Defence, from the headquarters of the Partido Popular in Génova Street, directors and heads of television, radio and press were urged to remove their people from Baghdad, The calls were made directly by ministers and State secretaries. There was an authentic psychosis of forced evacuation among those of us reporters who were in Baghdad because the Spanish government adopted the American communicative policy. It was a case of waging an illegal war which was not supported by the United Nations, and against which we could find the majority of public opinion, therefore the less witnesses the better. (Sistiaga, 2004: 133-134) This control strategy also had another ramification by means of the embedded journalists. That is to say, not only were orders sent to the media in a general manner, but furthermore, the Pentagon made sure that there were informers within the military units. The initiative was considered a ‘clear success’ by the Pentagon, but we should ask ourselves why it was so praised in view of the requirements that were imposed. For example, among the rules that had to be obeyed by that type of journalist, there was one which forbade the broadcasting of information about operations that were underway unless they were authorised by the commander in charge. In the same way, they were only allowed to broadcast public data relevant to the date, time or location of the military missions and action if they were described in general terms. In this respect, informative work surrendered itself to military control, with the journalists becoming ‘captives, prisoners’ (Ferreira and Sarmiento, 2004: 63-64) of the units that accompanied them. If this method of control is performed effectively, there is another manner of informative manipulation, this being that of omission. We are referring to the concealment of elements that can provoke a negative attitude of public opinion regarding the War in Iraq. The photos of the coffins draped with American flags and which transported the lifeless bodies of soldiers who had Aurora Labio Bernal 290 fallen in Iraq became famous but the media said nothing about those who were wounded during the war. The instructions were to not show the consequences that the conflict was having on the American army, mainly that young men under the age of thirty were being mutilated for life, much to the ignorance of the population in general. According to information published in El Mundo in January 2004: At least 10 American soldiers were wounded every day in Iraq. The proportion is seven to each of the 496 deaths, but the Pentagon is increasingly more imprecise. The last official report speaks of 2,809 wounded, although three weeks ago news leaked out that another 8,581 ‘medical evacuations’ had occurred since the war began, many of which were caused by the mysterious pneumonia that some attribute to the anthrax vaccinations and others to impoverished uranium. Moreover, all these techniques are to try and achieve patriotic passion, with tarnished examples, like that of the rescue of soldier Lynch, which seemed more like a Hollywood motion picture rather than reality. It was a way of calling on the emotions of the population, which enthusiastically welcomes heroic attitudes that safeguard the myth of the homeland as a collective sentiment (Labio, 2003: 189-202). So, the combination of these simplifying elements, censorship and the control of information were determinant when it came to launching a manipulated message and at the service of the dominating elite in the United States. One year after the invasion of Iraq, the American executive admitted that weapons of mass destruction had not been found in Iraq and that it was improbable that connections between Al Quaeda and the Saddam Hussein regime would be found. That wasn’t of much importance. The Americans had adopted the manipulated message: the War in Iraq already formed part of their country’s foreign policy. References Baker Edwin (2002) Media, Markets, and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bardoel, Jo and d’Haenens, Leen (2004) ‘Media Meet the Citizen. Beyond Market Mechanisms and Government Regulations’, European Journal of Communication 19 (2): 165-194. Carruthers, Susan L. (2000) The Media at War. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. Chomsky, Noam (2002) La Propaganda y la Opinión Pública. Barcelona: Crítica. Chomsky, Noam and Herman, Edward (1990) Los guardianes de la libertad. Barcelona: Grijalbo Mondadori. Davis, Aeron (2003) ‘Whither mass media and power? Evidence for a critical elite theory alternative’, Media, Culture & Society, 25: 669-690. El Mundo: ‘Aznar dice que los periodistas muertos ‘asumieron el riesgo”, 10 April 2003 : 14. El Mundo: ‘Los lisiados ocultos de Bush’, 11 January 2004: 6-7. El Semanal Supplement : ‘Los dos frentes de la noticia’, 30 March 2003: 20. Ferreira, Leonardo y Sarmiento, Miguel (2004) ‘Prensa en Estados Unidos ¿un siglo de ética perdida?’, Chasqui, 85: 63-64. 291 Manipulation, Informative Control and Iraq War
Goodman, Amy (2004) En la cama con el enemigo. Madrid: Temas de Hoy. Labio, Aurora (2003) ‘Medios de comunicación y propaganda. El caso de Elián González’, Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico, 9: 189-202. Mansell, Robin (2004) ‘Political economy, power and new media’, New Media & Society 6(1): 96-105. Mattelart, Armand (2000)Historia de la utopía planetaria. De la ciudad profética a la sociedad global. Barcelona: Paidós. Ramonet, Ignacio (2002) La tiranía de la comunicación. Barcelona: Debate. Reig, Ramón (2004) Dioses y Diablos mediáticos. Barcelona: Urano. Schiller, Herbert I. (1987) Los manipuladores de cerebros. Barcelona: Gedisa. Sierra, Francisco (2000) ‘Guerra informativa y sociedad televigilada’, Voces y Culturas 15: 89- 105. Sistiaga, Jon (2004) Ninguna guerra se parece a otra. Barcelona: Plaza y Janés. Van Dijk, Jan (1999) The network Society. London: Sage Publications. Various authors (2003) Censored 2004, Media Democracy in Action. New Cork: Seven Stories Press.
l Journal of Global Communication, Vol2., No.1, Jan.-July 2009 pp. 289-312
President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media: A Complicated Affair Claudia Bucciferro School of Journalism and Mass Communication 1511 University Ave. 478 UCB, University of Colorado, Boulder Boulder, CO 80309, USA Phone : (303) 786-0891, Fax :( 303) 492-0969, E-mail:[email protected]
Abstract As the first female President of Chile and a non-traditional political figure, Michelle Bachelet has received worldwide media attention since she was elected in 2006. This study examines discourses referencing her government published by two major Chilean newspapers, El Mercurio and La Tercera, particularly during times of social unrest. It focuses on three controversial issues: a national student mobilization nicknamed Movimiento Pingüino, a failed metropolitan transportation plan called Transantiago, and the debate surrounding the morning-after pill’s free distribution in public hospitals. From a Cultural Studies perspective, the analysis presupposes that media discourses relate to larger forces within society, in terms of the ideas they validate and the social processes they support. Thus, this study explores the nature of the media coverage, the related themes that are brought up by each issue, and the way the representations of the President changed over time as the stories developed. This is contextualized by considering Chile’s recent history and some of the social, political, and economic powers that currently have a bearing on media. Finally, this paper reviews how several Media Studies theoretical frameworks could be used to understand this coverage, discussing its implications for issues of democracy and participation. Keywords: Media, politics, power, Chile, President Michelle Bachelet, democracy, civic participation, Cultural Studies, public sphere. Introduction When Michelle Bachelet, President of Chile, was elected in January, 2006, with 53.5 % of the popular vote, what seemed to be the beginning of a new era was announced in the press. Editors and columnists wrote of the new winds that were blowing through a country that was no more a traditional Latin American colony, but a modern republic (Peña: 03/12/2006). The image of a “new Chile” seemed to be somehow embodied in the persona of the newly elected President: Acknowledgments: I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Michael Tracey for the excellent discussions that helped to shape a first draft of this paper. This paper will be presented at the National Communication Association’s 95th Annual Convention, which will take place in Chicago, USA, in November 2009. 293 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair A very unorthodox character within the political milieu, she is a pediatrician who also holds a Master’s degree in military science, is agnostic, is a separated mother of three, and a former political detainee and exile (Presidencyofchile.cl: 12/09/2007). Her father died in one of Pinochet’s detention camps, and she has traced her political career without the help of an influential husband. By electing her to office, the nation seemed to embrace a liberated, egalitarian, modern notion of itself. Michelle Bachelet ran a warm, friendly campaign that capitalized on her unique characteristics, which set her apart from a political establishment that was beginning to be resented by the people of all political tendencies (Walder: 11/25/2005). On the one hand, the Right’s legitimacy as a political force had been undermined since the military dictatorship that ruled the country for 17 years ended. On the other hand, the shiny promises put forth by the Center-Left coalition that has been in government since 1990 had not delivered as expected (Fisher: 04/02/ 2006; Silva: 2004). Right-wing media such as El Mercurio newspaper were caught in-between these conflicting forces, afraid to strongly criticize such an appealing candidate, but also unable of participating in the celebration that she brought forth. Furthermore, they could not call upon the spirit of objectivity, a value long ago overridden in the Chilean press by rather clear editorial lines that represent the interests of certain social groups. Therefore, how did the most prominent national newspapers handle the information? Bachelet’s approval ratings were very high by the time she took office in March, 2006, reaching 65.3% (Adnmundo.com: 03/04/2007). This made it difficult even for media traditionally aligned with rightist political forces and critical of the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (the governing coalition), to present an upfront attack on the new President. Nonetheless, as time went by and controversial issues arose, there were opportunities for a more critical engagement, and this had implications for how the President’s image was constructed in the public imaginary. It is precisely the nature of the press coverage during times of tension and unrest that this paper focuses on: How do media cover Michelle Bachelet’s government during times of conflict? Do they maintain the tone and style that they used at the time she took office? What are the main themes that arise? What are the main political and social actors identified? What does the coverage tell us about the meta-narratives that lie behind, such as those involving the character of the Chilean nation? The answers to these questions provide insights about the relationship between media, politics, power, and social processes in Chile today. They also tell us what are the dominant and resistant discourses that circulate in the public sphere, and who are the actors currently engaged in active participation. Methodology This study examines discourses referencing Michelle Bachelet’s government published by two major Chilean newspapers, El Mercurio and La Tercera, particularly during times of social Claudia Bucciferrol 294
and political unrest. It focuses on three controversial issues that have attracted significant media attention: a national student mobilization nicknamed Movimiento Pingüino, a failed metropolitan transportation plan called Transantiago, and the debate surrounding the morning-after pill’s free distribution in public hospitals. These three issues were selected because they had national relevance and they were covered by the media for a period of time that extended over years. In this sense, they became core issues that transcended the day-to-day news cycle, constituting topics for debate and organized social action among the Chilean people. They also brought into the public sphere factions of society that are not always directly involved in political affairs – the youth, the bureaucrats, women, and religious groups, among others. The newspapers El Mercurio and La Tercera were selected because both media outlets represent different editorial lines (rightist vs. moderate), are aimed at different audiences (upper class vs. middle class), have national circulation and a wide readership, and are published both on-line and in hard copy. The topics that this study focuses on were covered in hundreds of articles, so the ones selected for analysis constitute a purposeful sample – they were published primarily in the editorial, national, and political pages of the online papers, and were chosen because they provided information pertinent to the questions posed. Their publication dates spans a period that goes from March 2006 to February 2009, and I personally collected them as they were published on the webpages of both newspapers. Some articles published in different media outlets were included in the discussion because they provide additional insights, but they are few in comparison (for a complete list of articles, see the References to Articles published by El Mercurio and La Tercera). The analysis was undertaken using Qualitative Text Analysis as a methodology (Denzin & Lincoln: 2000; Lindloff: 1995). After reading Chilean newspapers on a daily basis for several months, I identified the three main issues around which conflictive actions and discourses seemed to revolve at the time: the Movimiento Pingüino, the Transantiago, and the morning-after pill. Then I began collecting all the newspaper articles that dealt with these topics, as I was reviewing relevant literature for undertaking the analysis. Since the coverage was ongoing, the analysis often involved a back-and-forth process of collecting and reviewing material, considering it in light of theory, and identifying emerging trends. I focused on observing the general discourses that were articulated in the media, the actors thus identified, and the representations of the government that were put forth, and analyzed these in relationship to historical and situational factors. It must be made clear that this study does not analyze media material from the specific perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis (Van Dijk: 2001). More in line with a Cultural Studies approach (Turner: 1990, Gunster: 2004), it is broader in its scope and more general in its theorizations. Instead of paying particular attention to the details of language use, it focuses on understanding the media coverage, exploring the themes that emerge and the actors that are 295 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
represented. Because the content of media is articulated through collaborative practices of signification that are situated and historically defined, the analysis is contextualized by considering Chile’s recent history and the factual powers that currently have a bearing on media. In the following pages, the term “media discourse” refers in general to the material published or broadcasted by media; it is understood as being part of processes of signification and representation that transcend the strict domain of language and whose meaning should the considered in relationship to historical, social, economic, cultural, and political factors (Schiller: 1996). In Media Studies, the concepts of “media text” and “media discourse” are often used interchangeably, because their meaning is understood to be actualized when the audience engages with them. Thus, even though “preferred” or “dominant” readings may be distinguishable and may relate more directly to the writer’s intentions, audience members bring their own preconceptions and experiences into the process of interpreting media messages (Hall: 1980). This is worth clarifying because if we were to assume a linguistic approach, “text” and “discourse” would be considered as distinct (Talbot: 2007). The analysis is underlined by the concept that media discourses relate to larger forces within society, both in terms of the lines of thought they validate and the social and political processes they support (Hall: 1982). As John Westergaard (1977) explains, “contemporary debate about the media – about their social role and character – mirrors contemporary debate about the condition of society.” Media discourses are intrinsically tied to social forces, and “all diagnoses of the nature and impact of media production carry with them at least hints of some conception of the general drift of social existence” (p. 95). Therefore, by looking at the way two major national newspapers have covered polemical issues concerning President Michelle Bachelet, I arrive at some insights regarding the discourses that circulate in Chilean society today and the major social, political, and economic forces that are related to them. The first part of this paper contains a brief historical introduction that explains the media system in Chile and offers details about the two newspapers whose articles have been analyzed. Then, I narrate the stories of the three controversial issues that occupy us, drawing from the selected media material. Finally, I review several frameworks that could alternatively be used to analyze the nature of the media coverage of President Bachelet’s government, discussing the resulting implications for issues of democracy and activism. These models – which could be termed propaganda, mass communication, marketplace approach, and civic participation – are not discussed exhaustively, but they are introduced in order to advance a theoretically informed discussion that is not aimed at settling on a single explanatory approach, but at exploring different perspectives and opening the venue for an expanded discussion. Historical Background: Power and Media in Chile The discourses currently being published in the Chilean press can not be adequately understood without considering the country’s recent history. The media were actively involved in the heated debates that existed during President Salvador Allende’s government (1970-1973), Claudia Bucciferrol 296
either as defendants of his socialist project or as voices that heightened the threat that communism represented for the interests of property-owning groups. El Mercurio, in particular, acted as the voice of the opposition to the Unidad Popular government (“Popular Union”) and after the coup d’etat that overthrew it, represented the interests of the rightist groups that supported the military regime headed by Gen. Pinochet (Kornbluh: 2003). The current state of affairs in the media system is a result of multiple measures implemented during the seventeen years of military dictatorship (1973 – 1990). After the coup d’etat, radio stations and newspapers deemed “leftist” were forcibly closed, and the people who worked for them were detained, usually tortured, and sometimes forcibly “disappeared.” The regime imposed strict limitations on freedom of speech, and the brutal persecution of dissidents forced media personnel to self-censor in order to survive, which affected both the content and form of media texts (Aliski: 1981). Furthermore, the neoliberal economic reforms introduced launched an accelerated process of modernization that contributed to creating a consumer society that didn’t exist before, resulting in the dislocation of traditional modes of life (Ford: 2006; Silva: 2004; Hojman: 2006). The withdrawal of government support pushed all media towards commercialism, so the broadcasting stations and newspapers that had formerly been public-service oriented either disappeared or were forced to compete in a free marketplace (Hite: 2006). This benefited media outlets that had been traditionally supported by the economic elites, such as El Mercurio. It is apparent that power and socioeconomic position are deeply related in Chile, and that an analysis of media and their discourses should also take them into account. Even though modernization has resulted in a wider access to goods and services for the general population, class continues to mark a person’s place in Chilean society, unlike in other countries where this may be blurred or denied, at least to some extent (Milner: 1999; Miliband: 1969). Wealth and power are highly concentrated in the hands of the upper class, to the point that the top ten percent of the population controls almost half of the national income, and the level of social inequality has actually increased in recent decades (Reygadas: 2006). Founded in 1900, El Mercurio is considered one of the most important papers in the country, and until today it is caters to the privileged segments of society (the upper classes termed “ABC1” in marketing) (Nef: 1999). The other newspaper used in this study, La Tercera, was founded in 1950, and seems to be tailored towards the educated segments of the middle class, which tend to hold more liberal views. It is owned by COPESA, Consorcio Periodístico de Chile, S. A., which also owns several magazines, radio stations, and tabloids. Media ownership is highly concentrated in Chile, and is mostly in the hands of El Mercurio conglomerate (dominated by the Edwards family) and COPESA. El Mercurio conglomerate also owns several newspapers, including some tailored towards other social groups throughout the country (Kornbluh: 2003). Coverage of President Michelle Bachelet After President Bachelet was elected, most of the articles published in the Chilean press 297 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
were auspicious. A review I undertook of 26 editorials and commentaries published in El Mercurio and La Tercera during the month after she took office, in March of 2006, revealed that there were high expectations, as if Bachelet’s election represented a historical step in the crystallization of a new, modern, Chile (Bucciferro: 2006). For example, Squella (03/24/2006) begins his column by saying that “just as I thought fair to bid farewell to Lagos’s government with the word ‘pride,’ I now see fit to welcome Michelle Bachelet’s with the word ‘hope,’” meaning “trust in good things that can happen to us as a country, the first of which has to do with bigger progress to diminish the inequalities in the living conditions of the Chilean people.” This was published in El Mercurio, and shows that even in a paper that has traditionally supported the political Right and thus represents interests opposed to a Socialist President such as Michelle Bachelet, few voices dared to present an open criticism. Among the few who self-consciously voiced more skeptical ideas was Max Riesenberg (03/26/2006), a sociologist from the University of Chile who questions whether the change in government actually means a larger change in society, saying that “it is a commonplace to affirm that the election of the first woman President in history implies a great cultural change,” because it “seems to open horizons and announce new suns, an odyssey were the Chilean woman will begin to leave behind her baggage of insecurities and historical discriminations to finally locate herself also by the right of the Father,” a development that he doubts will follow immediately. In spite of a few voices such as his, there was a “honeymoon” phase in the relationship between the press and President Michelle Bachelet at the beginning of her government. Things changed as time passed, and the development of a more critical stance on the part of the media was related, in my view, to three major issues that caused much debate: the Movimiento Pingüino, or the mobilization of students within the public education system, which occurred in mid-2006; the Transantiago, a transportation plan that was implemented in February of 2007 in Santiago, with rather disastrous results; and the governmental initiative of making the morning-after pill available at no cost in public hospitals throughout the country, an issue that dated back to when Michelle Bachelet was Secretary of Health during Ricardo Lagos’s presidency. In the following pages, I will review each one of these issues, the way they were covered by the media, and the underlying issues at hand. Movimiento Pingüino Nicknamed after the white, gray, and dark blue uniform that the students in the public education system are required to wear, the Movimiento Pingüino represented a powerful critical force to the status quo of a country that had grown accustomed to depoliticization (Silva: 2004). It began in Santiago on April 26, 2006, and by May 29 it had paralyzed most of the country’s public schools, resulting in daily marches in the downtown streets of major cities, and in struggles with the police that yielded more than 600 people arrested overall (Aravena & Plattillo: 03/17/ 2007). Claudia Bucciferrol 298
In their public declarations, the students said that they were protesting the general idea that “everything was alright” in Chile, bringing attention to the inadequacies of the school system and the unresolved social issues that it contributed to. In particular, they demanded the reformation of the Ley LOCE, Ley Orgánica Constitucional de Educación, a law that was promulgated by Pinochet shortly before he left office but had remained unchanged, and that basically subjected the national educational system to free market regulation (Julio: 07/17/2006). In this sense, the movement represented a voice that forced its way into the national arena and that criticized both the rightist opposition that supported the law and the Concertación governments that had failed to modify it. The press coverage of the movement’s actions was characterized by two different aspects: First, the strikes and blockades the students put together in dozens of schools, as well as the public demonstrations and fights with the police, were considered juicy news material by the dailies, which presented pictures and accounts of the events and gave them plenty of attention. Second, the movement’s potential for enabling the articulation of political ideas was not amiss, so the papers gave room for interpretation – should students be allowed to behave like this? Is the movement being manipulated by the Communist Party and the extra-parliamentary Left? How do the students’ demands relate to a larger social discomfort in the country? How should a woman President act in order to preserve her authority without losing her popular appeal when challenges such as these arise? (Aravena: 09/02/2007). In the end, after 40 days of negotiations that resulted in the Secretary of Education’s dismissal and the government’s agreement to draw a law initiative that would replace Ley LOCE, the students returned to classes, not without promising that they would mobilize again if the agreements were not respected or if new issues came up. In fact, mobilizations continued throughout the following years, and even expanded to include college students and school teachers, many of whom refused to enter the classrooms and took to the streets when a new educational law was being debated in Congress, in June of 2008. A major consequence of the movement was that it ended the journalistic complacency with the government, and enabled the development of new critical discourses within the national public sphere. This was not unintended, as some of the movement’s leaders pointed out: Germán Westhoff, for example, said that “we built a social movement like one that had not been seen in our country in a long time. It was very important. It was a lesson for a society that had fallen asleep, that has stopped being a citizenship” (Aravena & Plattillo: 03/17/2007). Thus, the movement articulated a critique to the capitalist system, which can function smoothly under a formally democratic structure (although the latter is not a condition for the first, as the expansion of capitalism under the protection of authoritarian regimes demonstrates), but creates dynamics that in the practice prevent the type of engagement and participation that a real democracy would require. During recent decades, the Chilean economy has miraculously expanded and the country 299 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
has been incorporated into the global world, but the changes have also entailed some less desirable consequences – one of them being that people have stopped being citizens; they have become mere consumers (Moulian: 2002). Just as people have become mainly concerned with working more in order to acquire more, they have lost the time and the interest necessary to pursue active participation in the political and social life of the nation. This constitutes one of the oppressive aspects of capitalism, something that Marxist theorists had pointed out years ago, out but that is often overlooked by concerns over class relations (Lichtheim: 1965). That said, in a country where class continues to be very important, the expansion of the commodity form during the last decades has met with significant criticism, not only among the social groups identified with the Left (Tironi: 1999). Transantiago Transantiago is the name given to a public transportation plan that was implemented by the government in the capital city, Santiago, and which significantly changed the existing system of suburban buses. The fleet of buses was replaced, the itineraries were changed, the stops were re-determined, a new payment system was established, and different companies were subcontracted to manage the system. Its launching in February of 2007 was accompanied by a big propaganda campaign that hailed it as part of a “cultural change,” initiated by the government. The campaign made use of all types of media and featured Iván Zamorano, the Chilean football player who rose from a humble family background to international stardom, as its emblematic “face.” So, it was framed in terms of a radical effort to “modernize” Santiago and facilitate the daily commute of thousands of people (Cociña: 11/08/2006). However, things didn’t go as planned, and the system’s implementation was marked by various deficiencies that resulted in a perceptible worsening of the conditions that commuters faced in the city: the number of buses was actually smaller than before, the payment machines didn’t work, the itineraries were confusing, drivers often didn’t stop were they were supposed to, etc. All of this resulted in chaotic traffic, overcrowded buses, people waiting at the bus stops for hours on end, businesses decrying their losses, increased street crime, and general social discomfort and unrest, to the point that public demonstrations spontaneously erupted and took over the streets. Some avenues in Santiago were even barricaded at night by gangs of people wearing face masks who engaged in a shootout with the police, publicly protesting the plan (Sepúlveda: 03/10/2007). All of this was prominently featured in the media, so the positive views promoted by the state-sponsored campaign were quickly replaced by images unfavorable to the government. Within weeks of the Transantiago’s implementation, Zamorano publicly stated that he had been fooled and withdrew his support, in the midst of public quarrels over the allocation of blame for the plan’s deficiencies. Government officials said that the contractors were not doing their jobs properly, while opposition parties kept pointing out the executive office’s responsibility in failing to carry out a proper evaluation before the plan’s implementation. The issue was brought to Claudia Bucciferrol 300
court, and even Representatives from the governing Socialist Party supported initiatives to investigate it (Emol.com: 03/23/2007). President Bachelet was made personally responsible for everything, although some political figures argued that she had been misled by reports coming from the committee that evaluated the plan prior to its beginning. The debate over how much she knew at the time continued for years (Israel: 02/10/2009). She publicly issued a statement apologizing in the name of the government for the many troubles that the Transantiago was causing to citizens, a move that she said was inspired by the desire to be honest but which backfired when her detractors used it to question her authority and ratify her blame. She allocated additional funds in order to make the plan operable, but many of the problems continued. Finally, a committee was formed to investigate the case, one private contract was cancelled, and some functionaries were fired (Trivelli: 02/10/ 2009; Castañeda & Cisternas: 12/09/2007). The system never became self-financing, and by its second anniversary the governmental subsidies amounted to US$1 billion dollars (Cerda & Cabello: 02/10/2009). The issue was used to discredit the governing coalition as a whole: since it became known that the plan dated back to Ricardo Lagos’s government, the reputation of Bachelet’s predecessor – who left office with a very high approval rate and was considered a potential candidate for the next presidential elections – was forever tarnished (Sierra: 12/21/2007). In all this, the media have played a prominent role, covering the story from different fronts. In addition to presenting the problems that people who use the system face everyday (the human aspect of the story), they covered the statements and responses of both government officials and opposition figures (the political aspect of it), and featured articles on the street protests that took place. Media outlets such as La Tercera also published comprehensive articles that tried to make sense of it and position it within a larger picture, proposing that the original plans for the Transantiago were an example of a type of projects developed by experts that look great on paper, but fail soundly in “real life.” The project aimed at solving Santiago’s transportation problems, which are varied: as a colonial city, its streets were not originally designed to accommodate the thousands of cars and buses that transport over 4 million people every day. Because the terrain is prone to earthquakes, the city has spread in all directions, making for lengthy commutes. Santiago’s geographical location in the Mapocho river basin, surrounded by mountains, prevents winds from blowing in and circulating the air, so the high number of vehicles and manufacturing plants produces significant air pollution. However, despite the well-meaning goal, the plan failed. From my point of view, there is almost a Weberian quality to this. Even though the classical theorist’s ideas were written on the other side of the globe and just about a century ago, the issues they raise concerning the way industrialization, modernity, and bureaucratization affect the lives of everyday people are very much applicable to the state of affairs in many developing 301 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
nations today (Callinicos: 1999). Nature over-ridden by the affairs of modern life; cities sprawling along thousands of miles and accommodating millions of people, with the problems that ensue; the rise of a cast of experts and bureaucrats that must define and oversee the implementation of large-scale plans; the existence of a power elite locked in internal quarrels; the dull daily existence of the average person, who is affected by all this but is unable to influence it; and finally, the media as witnesses, but also as instruments of the powers that lie behind (Reinhard: 1962). I know from experience that life in some developed nations may today involve virtual commuting, clean and safe suburbs, and timely buses that run on biodiesel, but the situation is very different in most places in Chile. If we consider Weber’s views (1958), all these processes could be related to the rise and development of a particular type of society – one in which the forces of capital and the powers of the administrative machine create the conditions for projects such as Transantiago to be conceived, but also the conditions for the failures that they are likely to become. Bernarnino Bravo (03/28/2007), a Chilean historian, pointed in that direction when he said that the system’s shortcomings relate to larger structural problems that prevail in the country, such as the increased separation between “the experts and functionaries that live off the budget and off regulating and controlling everybody else, and the great majority of people who work and produce.” Notably, functionaries usually travel in their own cars, so the people most affected by the disruption in the public transportation system have been the workers and students who depend on it (Trivelli: 02/10/2009). This may be the most relevant aspect brought up by the media coverage of the Transantiago: that heightened people’s awareness of the tribulations that the average citizen faces everyday, and pointed out the problems that come along with the creation of large urban centers. The Morning-After Pill The issue of the State-sponsored distribution of the morning-after pill in public hospitals has been controversial from the start. It is important for various reasons: It potentially affects every Chilean, not only the people who live and work in the capital city. It has brought another actor into the debate, the Catholic Church, which opposes it. It affects two historically disenfranchised groups – women and the poor – who have been traditionally excluded from the political establishment but whose votes are always courted by the power elites. It constitutes a topic over which the political Right and the Left differ significantly and passionately, and has introduced tensions within the governing coalition (because it includes the Christian Democratic Party). Finally, it was the first issue over which Bachelet’s government had to face significant criticism, as the debates began less than a month after she took office and could be even traced back to the previous government. The story of the morning-after pill in Chile has been filled with detours and controversies. It wasn’t commercially available until recently, even though in other countries it has been used Claudia Bucciferrol 302
since the 1970s. The initiative to make it available was promoted while Bachelet was Secretary of Health under Ricardo Lagos’s government, in 2001, but anti-abortion groups pressed legal charges as soon as the use of one commercial brand (Postinal) had been authorized, and this ended in a court-issued prohibition to further distribute it. However, a similar medication, but with a different commercial name, was approved later on, so in 2004 it became available at pharmacies and was given at public hospitals, but only to rape victims. A large legal controversy ensued, ending in a Supreme Court rule that supported the pill’s commercialization. Nonetheless, its price and the requirement of a doctor’s prescription made it prohibitive for the lowest socio-economic segments of the population, so the initiative to distribute it universally was reinstated by President Bachelet in 2006 (Sierra & Hola: 03/26/2006). The President said that it is not fair that only people of means can buy the pill, and she promoted the idea of making it available to everybody at public hospitals, so people of low socio-economic strata can see a doctor or nurse-midwife and then obtain it for free. In this sense, she sees the issue in terms of dealing with inequality of access to advancements in medicine (Estrada: 09/04/2006). For people in the opposition parties, however, the topic is not about equality, but the value of life, which is seen by them as beginning at the moment of conception. Along a perspective congruent with conservative Roman Catholic views, they say that the morning-after pill is an abortion method, and abortion is illegal in Chile, even though regular birth control pills, condoms, and IUDs have been used for decades. Moreover, they argue that its availability would allow people to be promiscuous and irresponsible in their choices, and would undermine the institution of the family (see the letters to the editor by Baraoma: 03/26/2006, and by Jovel & Pinedo: 03/30/ 2006). Because Michelle Bachelet personally promoted the initiative, the opposition’s attacks have been directed towards her person, as is apparent in the comments posted on El Mercurio’s blogs. Incidentally, the group Opus Dei has many followers among the wealthy elites, and generally opposes Michelle Bachelet’s government because besides being a Socialist she has ties to the Freemasonry (PINR: 12/20/2005; Aravena: 02/17/2007). So, the debates surrounding the morning- after pill are clearly related to larger political, religious, and social issues. The controversy over the pill’s distribution ended legally when a group of rightist politicians finally appealed to the Tribunal Constitucional (an entity that reviews claims regarding constitutional jurisprudence). In 2008, with 5 votes against 4, the Tribunal forbade the pill’s free distribution, although it allowed its commercial sale at pharmacies (Morales, Rodrigo & Fernández: 04/08/2008). The debate about the topic, however, still continues, and one of the most significant aspects of it is that issues of socioeconomic status and religious affiliation have been brought to the table in public debates. This is so because in Chile, the people more likely to be conservative and religious are found in the upper classes, not among the poor. Couples who have many children usually belong to the traditional elites, are Roman Catholic and wealthy enough to have a big house and several 303 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
domestic servants who take care of the children and do all household chores, so it is easy for them to oppose birth control. People (especially women) from the middle and lower classes, however, are very aware of the demands that come along with having children, both in terms of the attention and effort that must be put into caring for them and the resources that are needed to ensure their success in life. It is probably because of this that Chile has a fertility rate of 1,95 children per woman, which is lower than that of developed countries such as France and the United States (CIA World Factbook: 12/18/2008). In this sense, the coverage of the debates around the pill was quite different between El Mercurio and La Tercera. For example, being sympathetic to progressive views, the latter even published an article where Horacio Croxatto, a physician who has done research on the pill’s effects, said the final ruling showed that “once more, pressure from the Church prevailed over science and human rights, and a moral dictatorship was established in Chile” (Morales, Rodrigo & Fernández: 04/08/2008). El Mercurio, on the other hand, clearly held an editorial stance that pleased conservative readers, published numerous letters to the editor opposing the pill, and stressed the official views of the Catholic Church. Theorizing the Press Coverage Within the framework of Media Studies, the way media has covered the three issues presented above could be analyzed from various theoretical perspectives, which in turn emphasize different aspects. In the following pages, I advance a discussion that is by no means exhaustive, but that brings to attention some of these approaches and their implications for concepts of democracy and participation. Media, Elites, and Propaganda The Right-wing backlash that followed the original enchantment with President Bachelet’s progressive ideas could be explained in terms of the way media operates and the interests they serve. Thus, a possible explanation would be that the privileged factions of society, which also constitute the media-owning economic groups and the traditional elites, see the political advancement of an unorthodox, agnostic, single mom as a threat that needs to be controlled. Barsamian (1991) says that “the actual purpose which the media serve very effectively is to inculcate and defend the economic, social and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate domestic society and state” (p.1). Although this is considered obvious by people who are familiar with the Political Economy approach to media analysis, it is by no means a predominant perception among the general public, who oftentimes expects that media coverage would be fair, objective, and balanced. Barsamian says that because media are corporations whose main purpose is to make money, they serve the interests of their owners and their major advertisers, who in turn try to influence political affairs. Along the same line, Ben Bagdikian points out that people have an Claudia Bucciferrol 304
interest in controlling media in order to get economic profit, or social and political influence, so these factors have an effect on the type of discourses featured in the media (in Barsamian: 1991). In the Chilean case, for example, El Mercurio’s rather elitist connections are quite evident throughout the editorials and commentaries reviewed, and they even express some disdain for public protestors, especially when they are women (see Orrego: 09/14/2008). This is important because the voices featured in the press acquire validity and dominance in the public sphere, and thus serve to either empower or undermine other social actors. Chomsky and Herman (2002) propose a “propaganda model” that explains how media functions in a capitalist society and the type of content that is made possible within such dynamics. They say that media serve the interests of the economic and political elites, and are usually a tool for “manufacturing consent” among the rest of the population; consent, that is, with the current status quo and the existing policies. By choosing to leave some topics completely outside the public debate, misinforming about others, and predominantly relying on official discourses when covering issues that are posed in the public sphere, the media obstructs change and social activism. In this sense, considering that El Mercurio is a newspaper owned by a powerful economic conglomerate related to the rightist and Catholic upper-class, we would expect the coverage of a Socialist, agnostic President to be unfavorable. The paper’s articles don’t seem to be oriented towards creating complacency, however, but towards stirring up things and generating debate, perhaps because the current political status quo is not entirely beneficial for the traditional elites. An alternative explanation would be to consider generating apathy as a result of too much controversial information a path to creating political deactivation, which has certainly been a reality in Chile for a number of years (Silva: 2004). Nonetheless, Chilean newspapers tend to present their editorial line in such an evident manner that their content is not necessarily destined to deceive, but more to persuade – still, that confers them a degree of power in shaping the nature of the discussions that take place within the dynamics of a formal democracy. Mass Communication Within a conceptual framework that emphasizes the “mass” aspect of media, Lazarsfeld & Merton (1964) say, regarding media and public activism, that “public issues must be defined in simple alternatives, in terms of black and white, to permit organized public action” (p. 104). This statement rings true when considering how the debates surrounding the validity of the students’ movement, the political responsibilities for the Transantiago’s deficiencies, and the consequences of universally distributing the morning-after pill have been presented through the media. This could be the underside of a well-meaning attempt: in the name of balance, the media often cover two sides of an issue, but in doing so they tend to oversimplify the complexity of the topic at hand. This is also done, more purposefully and bluntly, by public figures and public relations representatives, who usually present issues in terms of uncompromising dichotomies in order to 305 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
sway the public’s opinion in one direction or another. This has immediate implications for the topic that is the focus of this paper, since the three issues discussed are very complex, yet they have often become watered down during the long- winded debates revealed by media coverage. The Movimiento Pingüino, for example, attempted a more general critique of the way public education functions within a capitalist State dominated by marketplace dynamics, but a main point of struggle ended up being whether the Secretary of Education should be fired or not (and he finally was, perhaps even as a scapegoat, which would let the students “win” in specific terms, but would leave the more profound aspects unaddressed). Likewise, the controversies these issues have generated have tended to polarize the public opinion, aligning it around dichotomous views, to the detriment of a more productive engagement. This is quite obvious in the case of the morning-after pill, which touched on complex matters such as women’s issues, equality of access to healthcare, and the need for a social support network for parents and kids. Yet most of this ended up being overlooked by a concern over whether the pill was abortive or not, with a high degree of mutual stereotyping on the part of the contending parties. Another effect of the “massification” of the public debate in the contemporary world is the blurring of the boundaries between politics and show business, something that could also be detrimental to the quality of democratic discussions. Silva (2004) says that the difference between the tradition that existed before 1973 in Chile and the way politics function today is that politicians have to market themselves through the media in a manner that is attractive to the audience. So, the public sphere has become a kind of “media happening” that people can watch as a source of entertainment, and the issue of projecting “the right image” has acquired particular relevance (also in Tironi: 1999). This was evident in the case of Transantiago, for example, whose accompanying publicity stunt was designed to imprint a favorable image on the government, and whose failure resulted in day-to-day updates that put the politicians on the spot and showed journalists on the streets as if they were covering a natural disaster. Within this framework, political ideologies are also watered down to bits and pieces apt for mass consumption, and the media capitalizes on the polemics caused by the actions and reactions of political figures, which is detrimental for the development of a more complex discussion and for widening the possibilities for participation. This happened in the case of the morning-after pill, especially concerning the fact that the President’s supporting its distribution led to her persona being attacked and her political views being stereotypically represented (also to illustrate this, see Carrillo: 11/25/2007). A Marketplace of Ideas From the point of view of a marketplace approach to media, the fact that newspapers would serve the economic interests of the people that support them seems to be perfectly natural (Fowler & Brenner: 1982). Newspapers are businesses that run for profit, so the existence of Claudia Bucciferrol 306
different papers with different interests and serving different publics is what creates a marketplace of ideas from which the public can pick and choose. According to this, it would be alright for El Mercurio to take a critical stance and to play up issues that undermine the President’s figure, as it did regarding her responsibility for the Transantiago’s deficiencies. This would correspond to the political agenda that the people who own the paper, and probably also a good percentage of its readership, have. Nonetheless, what this approach fails to account for is the fact that not everybody gets to own a newspaper (or any other media outlet on a national or transnational scale, for that matter). In the vast majority of cases, only the economic elites command the resources to own newspapers and broadcasting stations not managed by the State, and where free market predominates, much of media ownership is concentrated in very few hands. Thus, the range of voices and political views that are featured in these media are rather limited, and they should not be assumed to represent the interests of all factions of the population. In Chile, El Mercurio may be the most powerful newspaper in the country – it is the biggest, oldest, and probably the one that has the most resources and attracts the wealthiest readership. But, as the debate surrounding the morning- after pill demonstrates, we should not assume that the ideas featured in its pages are objective or unbiased. On a related approach, it has been argued that media reflect the state of affairs of society, and thus whatever they are airing or publishing is “what the audience wants” (Hirschberg: 09/04/ 2005, p. 1). This moves the focus of attention away from the political and economic powers that may underlie editorial decisions of what stories to publish and how to cover a particular newspaper story. Yet how a story is told, the amount of space devoted to it in the paper, the position it is assigned within the paper and within the page, the amount of resources and time invested in pursuing it, are all important factors that should be examined and that usually don’t obey the audience’s interests. According to this, the newspaper coverage of the first female President of Chile would just reflect what the public wanted to hear: even though a laudatory approach worked well for all media during the first few weeks, a more critical and polemic coverage came into being as controversial issues arose. In the case of newspapers that draw a wide readership among the wealthy elites, such as El Mercurio, the development of these issues naturally offered opportunities for criticizing a Socialist government and positioning potential Right-wing candidates for future elections. Conflict and Participation On a journalistic level it is said that conflict sells, so the tensions between different political factions, as well as the challenges to the status quo that have taken place in relationship to the three issues that occupy out attention, provide reporters plenty of material to use in their stories. Nevertheless, if this approach was correct, we would expect the public’s engagement with 307 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
political issues to go up as polemics develop, and the opposite seems to be true: some polls show that the Chilean people are tired of the controversies and have little interest in political affairs, which they see as distant fights among entrenched factions (Herrera: 12/02/2007). In my opinion, it could be that the expansion of a “consumer society” into all spheres of life, as Tironi (1999) says that has occurred in the last decades, goes along with a concern for efficiency and service, and so people want politicians who “deliver,” who manage the State smoothly and rather invisibly provide for their needs, over those who get entangled in ideological debates. This is a trend that is already becoming evident as things get geared up for the next presidential elections, and it is likely to influence its results. Yet some authors see conflict as intrinsic to a democratic society, and the media’s role as being a forum for an expanded debate. Laclau & Mouffe (2001), in particular, say that conflict and division are not “empirical impediments that render impossible the full realization of a harmony that we cannot attain because we will never be able to leave our particularities completely aside in order to act in accordance with our rational self” (p. vii). Moreover, the authors say that antagonism is important for the existence of pluralist democracy because “any form of consensus is the result of a hegemonic articulation” (p. viii). This is an interesting proposition given that the years following the end of the military dictatorship in Chile were marked by what was called a “politics of consensus,” a negotiated agreement between all political actors to move on without stirring up the passions and delving into the divisive issues of the past. While that certainly helped to smooth the transition to democracy, it also led to an environment where complacency and oblivion predominated, and the social discontent grew as the years went by (Orellana: 1999). President Bachelet’s election, from my point of view, acted as a catalyst for a reactivation of the public sphere, something that was evident in media discourses shortly after she took office (Bucciferro: 2006). However, the newly empowered citizens – who where even invited to walk through the Presidential Palace and e-mail the President – where also willing to take to the streets when things such as the failed Transantiago took place. Strikes, public demonstrations, and clashes with the police have taken place one after the other in the last few years, and have involved all kinds of social groups, including high school and college students, doctors and other health professionals, teachers from public schools, miners from State-owned industries, truck and bus drivers, etc. Besides causing general disruption and significant economic losses, all of this has been featured in the media, contributing very little to fostering the image that Chile wants to project to the world – that of a stable, democratic, modern Western country. Therefore, as other authors argue, it could be that too much participation and debate can produce a climate of unrest in which the people’s demands can’t be negotiated effectively with the government. Fitzsimmons (2000) cites Huntington’s view, saying that “participation can be de-stabilizing for democracy because it may exert too much pressure on the state and raise unrealistic expectations among the citizenry” (p. 7), which it is likely to have happened in Chile. Claudia Bucciferrol 308
For example, although the first weeks of the student movement seemed to signal a positive re- awakening of political interest and activism among the youth, the numerous strikes and protests that have taken place since have actually had the effect of distancing the government from the citizens (Peña: 11/25/2007). The Meta-narrative: The National Image and President Bachelet Throughout the public debates surrounding these issues, there is an underlying concern for the relationship between President Michelle Bachelet and the country’s image. As most of the countries in the developing South, Chile has been largely marginalized from the industrialized world’s attention. In recent decades, the country has gained notoriety because of Salvador Allende’s “democratic path to socialism,” Pinochet’s dictatorship, and the “economic miracle” brought along by neoliberalism during the 1990s. The nation is still troubled by the memories and the experience of these first two historical events, but has fully embraced the third (Moulian: 2002). The market, capital and consumption have become guiding forces for Chileans today, just as it is the case for people in much of the developed world. As a whole, the country is very invested in the achievement of standards associated with modernity. The government’s Projecto Bicentenario (the “Bicentennial Project”), which has been very publicized, is part of a larger effort to turn Chile into a “developed nation,” something that not long ago was thought to be achievable by the year 2010, when the 200th anniversary of independence will be celebrated (Gobierno de Chile: 04/17/2009; Moris: 01/27/2009). In times dominated by the power of appearances, the notion of a country’s image as something that should be carefully crafted has become ubiquitous in Chile, and media discourses play a role in helping to shape it. Michelle Bachelet’s candidacy attracted much international attention and her election conveyed the idea that voting into office a well educated, nontraditional woman spoke of a sophisticated, modern nation. However, the focus on how the President’s image reflects the nation’s own became problematic when challenges arose, as it is clear from the media material revised for this study. The idea that Chile can’t afford to look bad in the eyes of its European commercial partners due to scandals such as Transantiago, or that polemical social movements such as the Movimiento Pinguino really hurt the country’s public image, have been presented in the press in various ways, often making the President directly responsible for any undesirable effects. Michelle Bachelet has seen her image undermined due to these affairs, so her ability to govern the people and her aptitude as a decision-maker have been questioned (Estrada, 12/04/2007). From the cultural icon she was held as in 2006, she was later on accused of having little authority, being incompetent, and even being a murderer of unborn babies. As Michelle Bachelet looses the status of a positive icon, her ability to relate to the national image is considered to be in peril (Aravena: 09/02/2007), and this is perhaps the most significant 309 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
and over-arching result of the media coverage that her government has received during times of social unrest. The debates surrounding the Movimiento Pingüino, the Transantiago, and the morning-after pill ostensibly went beyond the particular issues raised by the initial protesters, and even beyond issues of internal politics – they became entangled with concerns over national identity, values, cultural characteristics, and future goals. Conclusion It is clear throughout this analysis that the media coverage of President Michelle Bachelet has changed since she was elected in 2006. During her first weeks in office, El Mercurio and La Tercera featured articles that were generally positive, but conflict developed over time and the media coverage acquired a more critical stance. The three issues analyzed in this study – the Movimiento Pingüino, the Transantiago, and the morning-after pill – were relevant on social, economic, and political levels, and were surrounded by a debate that transcended their particularities to include the questioning of the government, the President, and the larger concepts associated with the Chilean nation. As they were presented in the newspaper articles analyzed, the Movimiento Pingüino constituted a student-run challenge to the complacency created by capitalism and formal democracy, and brought into the public sphere the demands and interests of a social group (the youth) that until then had been thought to be utterly individualistic and indifferent to politics. The Transantiago epitomized the constitutive failures of a bureaucratic system in which design and implementation are separated by a huge breach, and forced the political and economic elites to acknowledge the difficulties that average people face everyday as they travel for hours through an unfriendly city to work and study. Finally, the morning-after pill raised issues of socioeconomic inequality and women’s rights, as well as bringing to the fore the tension between the legislative and executive powers, and the irreconcilable worldviews of ultra-conservative groups versus liberal factions of the population. Overall, more articles published by El Mercurio than by La Tercera were considered for this analysis. This was not done deliberately; rather, it reflects the number of articles published by each paper covering the three issues at hand. This could be the result of each paper’s characteristics: El Mercurio is bigger and has more pages; La Tercera, on the other hand, is a smaller tabloid. However, it could also be that for El Mercurio a more extensive coverage of controversial issues allows for a stronger articulation of criticisms to the government; while La Tercera is publishing fewer and smaller articles to temper its initial support for Michelle Bachelet. Despite the critical stance that El Mercurio has taken in relationship to the President, however, it is interesting that she has given it special access to cover her activities and even has written articles for it (Escobar: 11/25/2007; Bachelet: 04/22/2007). During a trip to Chile I took in 2008, it seemed to me that the move evident in media discourses from a supportive to a critical stance in relationship to the government reflects a Claudia Bucciferrol 310
feeling among the general people. The grassroots demonstrations that the issues at hand have sparked indicate that social discontent is not just being prodded by rightist media outlets, and it could be that the unrealistic expectations that developed during Bachelet’s campaign (which were supposedly not initiated by the President herself), set up the stage for a disappointment (Correa, Muñoz & Sepúlveda: 07/09/2006). The media echoed the initial high spirits, and then contributed to their decline. For example, in a column published in March, 2006, Edwards says that the public’s expectations were so high that “in all segments of our society there is palpable feeling of something important that is about to happen. The new President and her government have the huge responsibility of not letting the people down” (03/12/2006). Nevertheless, even though she followed through with her program, her years in office could not achieve the far-reaching social change that many people hoped to see (such as the one involving women’s rights). It is unlikely that a change of this scale would have happened in such a short period of time anyways, and from my point of view, it would be rather impossible to bring it about through governmental policies alone. An opposition-run paper such as El Mercurio has capitalized in the current critical trends, helping to air discordant views and to position wealthy male candidates as alternatives for future elections. In 2007, it published a survey showing that “the 54.6 of the people polled preferred a man” as the next President of the country, “while 32% says the gender doesn’t matter and only 9.2% voted for a woman,” which would arguably be a result of the decline in popular support for Michelle Bachelet (Ebner: 11/23/2007). As she approaches the end of her term, in March of 2010, it is likely that the next President of Chile will be a much more traditional political figure. The two most important candidates currently running for office are businessman Sebastián Piñera (backed by the rightist coalition Alianza por Chile) and former President Eduardo Frei (supported by three of the parties that make up the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia). Both of them are male, wealthy, from a traditional family, and related to the economic elites. They are also quite religious – Piñera has ties to the Opus Dei, while Frei is a Christian Democrat – so issues such as birth control are unlikely to continue in the government’s agenda. It is generally expected that the next administration will “crack-down” on the social movements that have been linked to public protests and strikes during the last years (and that have received so much media attention). Establishing a more “orderly” and “efficient” state of affairs would go well with the nation’s aspirations to modernity, but would represent a conservative turn after years of social effervescence. An overarching theme throughout this analysis is the relationship between power, politics, media discourses, and social processes, which are quite strong. The dominant discourses featured in the press relate to economic and political interests, but also reflect the social tensions brought up by the dynamics of capital and modernization. The type of stories covered, how they are covered, what actors are featured, and what voices are privileged are all issues that contribute to construct a certain worldview. This, in turn, either supports or undermines the interests of particular groups – which are defined mostly according to economic and political factors. Therefore, an analysis of media within the context of democratization should critically consider what their discourses convey and how they relate to other forces in society, instead of 311 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
assuming that journalistic practices abide by the principles of fairness, objectivity, and balance. Half a century ago, C. Wright Mills (1956) called for the analysis of media in relationship to power, class, and the dynamics of capital, a sociologically informed analytic framework that goes beyond the particularities of the text. In addition to an understanding of how the legitimization of certain worldviews and the creation of meaning among audience members take place, his perspective brings into focus the myriad of processes that play a role in terms of social dynamics and media discourses. He also keeps as a bottom line a concern for common people, who are not necessarily aware of all the forces that shape their everyday world. If it were true that Chilean people are losing interest in politics, then the heated debates featured in the media would be removed from the national public sphere and would speak of other interests and powers. However, the grassroots movements that developed around the three issues discussed in this paper indicate that this is not so, and that at least among historically disenfranchised groups such as women, workers, and the youth, there is interest and desire for organized action. Furthermore, the privileged discourses that circulate in a society have implications even for people who are otherwise uninterested in engaging with them. In this sense, what Miliband stated in 1969 regarding issues of power and people’s everyday lives, was as relevant then as it is today, despite a myriad of other changes that have taken place since. He wrote: It is for the state’s attention, or for its control, that men compete; and it is against the state that beat the waves of social conflict. It is to an ever greater degree the state which men encounter as they confront other men. This is why, as social beings, they are also political beings, whether they know it or not. It is possible not to be interested in what the state does; but it is not possible to be unaffected by it (p. 3). References to Articles Published by El Mercurio and La Tercera* Aravena, P. (09/02/2007). “Bachelet lidera ranking de protestas en los gobiernos de la Concertación.” El Mercurio.com. Aravena, H. (02/17/2007). “Sebastián Dávalos: Hijo de Michelle Bachelet.” El Mercurio.com. Aravena, F. & Plattillo, M. (03/17/2007). “De pingüinos a mechones: cómo han cambiado sus vidas un año después.” El Mercurio.com. Bachelet, M. (04/22/2007). “Los sueños que inspiran mi mandato.” Article written by the President for El Mercurio.com. Baraona, J. (03/26/2006). “Píldora y valores.” El Mercurio.com. Bravo, B. (03/28/2007). “Transantiago, atochamiento institucional.” El Mercurio.com. Carrillo, M. A. (11/25/2007). “Califican como ‘falta de interés’ suspensión de visita de Bachelet a la Araucanía.” La Tercera.cl. Castañeda, L. & Cisternas, H. (12/09/2007). “José Manuel Mena tras su remoción : ‘Hemos sido parte del problema, no el problema’.” El Mercurio.com. Cerda, R. & Cabello, N. (02/10/2009). “Expertos y usuarios reconocen mejoras en Transantiago a dos años del inicio.” El Mercurio.com Claudia Bucciferrol 312
Correa, R., Muñoz, J. A. & Sepúlveda, E. (07/09/2006). “A fondo con la Presidenta Michelle Bachelet: ‘La frase ‘gobierno ciudadano’ no es mía’.” El Mercurio.com. Ebner, B. (11/23/2007). “Encuesta de la UDP reveló que el 54,6% quiere que el próximo Presidente sea hombre.” El Mercurio.com. Edwards, S. (03/12/2006). “Igualdad de género.” La Tercera.cl. Blogs El Mercurio. (22/05/2006). “El primer mensaje presidencial.” El Mercurio.com Eichholz, J. C. (03/14/2006). “El encantamiento.” El Mercurio.com. Estrada, A. (12/04/2007). “Presidente de la CPC critica duramente al gobierno y expone incertidumbres del sector privado.” La Tercera.cl. Escobar, P. (11/25/2007). “Un día con la Presidenta.” El Mercurio.com. Fernández, M. (02/06/2006). “Paridad: Gesto y consecuencia.” La Tercera.cl. Fischer, A. (04/02/2006). “Las carencias de la derecha.” El Mercurio.com. Herrera Muzio, M. (12/02.2007). “Preocupante desencanto de los Chilenos con la política.” El Mercurio.com. Israel, R. (02/10/2009). “Transantiago: Dos años después.” La Tercera.cl Jovel, L. F. & Pinedo, P. (03/30/2006). “Humanismo?” El Mercurio.com. Morales, A.; Rodrigo, G. & Fernández, O. (04/08/2008). “Fallo del Tribunal Constitucional prohíbe ‘píldora del día después’.” La Tercera.cl Orrego, C. (09/14/2008). “Este incómodo Tribunal Constitucional.” El Mercurio.com. Peña, C. (03/12/2006). “Conservadores?” El Mercurio.com. Peña, J. P. (10/31/2007). “Jaime Gazmuri: ‘Existe una crisis muy profunda al interior del Partido Socialista’.” El Mercurio.com. Peña, J. P. (25/11/2007). “Gobierno destaca ‘política de los acuerdos’ con la Alianza en Seguridad y Educación.” La Tercera.cl. Riesenberg, M. C. (03/26/2006). “Cambio de gobierno y cambio cultural?” El Mercurio.com. Salinas, J. L. (05/02/2006). “Alejandro Jodorowski: ‘Hay que entender que la vida es igualdad y pareja.” El Mercurio.com. Sepúlveda, A. (03/10/2007). “Welcome to Transantiago de Chile.” El Mercurio.com. Sierra, A. & Hola, C. (03/26/2006). “Entrega masiva de la píldora del día después y reposición de la ley de muerte digna: El desquite de la doctora Bachelet.” El Mercurio.com. Sierra, A. (12/21/2007). “Duro informe revela que en el Transantiago no hubo errores, sino que ‘premeditación’.” El Mercurio.com. Squella, A. (03/24/2006). “Esperanza.” El Mercurio.com Trivelli, M. (02/10/2009). “Transantiago: Aprendimos la lección?” La Tercera.cl Yáñez, N. (11/25/2007). “Boeninger lanza tesis de ‘alternancia no traumática’ en el poder.” El 313 President Michelle Bachelet and the Chilean Media : A Complicated Affair
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The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse Ming Kuok LIM College of Communications, Pennsylvania State University 115, Carnegie Building, University Park PA 16802, United States [email protected], phone: 1.814.876.0776
Abstract This paper examines how socio-political blogs contribute to the development of democracy. Data in this paper are collected from field work conducted in Malaysia between June-August 2008. This paper suggests that blogs perform three main functions which help makes a democracy more meaningful. First, blogs function as the fifth estate or a check-and-balance of the government. This function deals with the dissemination of information, providing an alternative perspective to challenge the dominant frame, and the setting of news agenda. The second function considers blogs as networks. This is linked to the social-networking aspect of the blogosphere both online and offline. Blogs also have the potential to act as mobilizing agents which facilitated the mass street protests. Thirdly, blogs function as platform where users could express themselves. The significance of this function becomes more apparent in countries with strict media control such as Malaysia. Blogs also act as training ground for self-expression not just for the bloggers but for readers of the blogs as well. The three functions above are not mutually exclusive but are merely viewed as having enough unique qualities to be differentiated from one another. The three functions are best conceptualized as a Venn diagram of three interlocking spheres each influencing and being influenced by the other. Keywords : blogging, deliberative democracy, fifth-estate, networks, platforms for expression, agenda-setters, mobilizing agents, Malaysia Introduction Blogging around the World: In different parts of the globe, we see examples of people getting into trouble with authority over what they have posted on the Internet, whether through a standard webpage, an online video clip or a blog. According to the World Information Access (WIA) Report(The WIA Report derives its data from reported arrests of bloggers from various sources including Global Voices Online, Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters sans Frontieres, various news websites and individual bloggers.) from the University of Washington and other sources, at least 67 bloggers have been arrested for various reasons between 2003 and 2008. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)( According to CPJ, it does not apply a rigid definition of online journalism, but it carefully evaluates the work of bloggers and online writers to determine whether the content is journalistic in nature. In general, CPJ looks to see whether the content is reportorial or fact-based commentary. In a repressive society 317 The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse
where the traditional media is restricted, CPJ takes an inclusive approach to work that is produced online.) reports that at least 56 online journalists worldwide, including bloggers, are jailed in 2008 surpassing the number of jailed print journalists for the first time in history ("CPJ's 2008 prison census", 2008).
Figure 1. Number of Arrested Bloggers by Countries (2003-2008) (Data presented in Table 1 is adapted and expanded from the original WIA Report up to early 2008.) Iran was the first country in the world to arrest a person based on something which was published on a blog in 2003 ("Bloggers unite to fight", 2003). Sina Motallebi, the Iranian political science graduate and social-political columnist for a local newspaper was arrested by the Iranian government and put into solitary confinement for twenty three days (Alavi, 2006:3). Sina Motallebi was eventually released (Glasner, 2004) and moved to the Netherlands soon after that with his wife and son. Motallebi's case was one of the first to highlight the potential of blogs as a tool to give a voice to the voiceless. Motallebi himself credits the blogosphere for his “quick” release from prison. During an interview he retold the moments when he was being arrested by the authorities: “…at the interrogation when they arrested me, they said 'nobody knows about your case.' And I said, 'No, I wrote something about that on my Web site.' It was the first time somebody had seen the reactions to his arrest, before he actually was arrested…” (Glasner, 2004) Unfortunately, Motallebi's case also foreshadowed how bloggers especially political bloggers would be treated not only by the Iranian government but repressive regimes around the world. According the OpenArab.net(According to their official website at http://www.openarab.net/ en/node/528, Open Arab Internet is an initiative by the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (Anhri) to advocate the free use of the Internet without censorship, blocking or Ming Kuok LIM 318 spying. In this context, the initiative seeks to provide international and Arab information and Internet related documents. The initiative also defends Internet users, web-designers, and writers by organizing legal and media campaigns and highlighting practices restricting Internet freedom.), “bloggers are always kidnapped by non-uniformed security forces during [sic] covering or participating in certain activities or political demonstrations or during covering some tribunals” in Egypt ("Electronic press and blogs", 2007). There has been an increase in the arrests of various bloggers without a legal cause in Egypt. OpenArab.net estimates that “the number of bloggers who faced kidnapping or arresting was bigger” even than that of political activists and journalists and “they are targeted just for being bloggers”. For example, a 24-year man Abdel Kareem Nabil Suleiman, better known as blogger Kareem Amer, was sentenced to four years in prison for criticizing President Hosni Mubarak and the Islamist control of the country's universities on his blog ("Two years for a blog", 2008). Usually, Egyptians have been able to “voice out” their dissatisfactions against the Government as long as they are not acted out. Fahmy Howeidy, an Egyptian writer who has often criticized the government, calls it the “freedom to scream” because “you can say what you want but you cannot act”(Slackman, 2009). The authorities appear to be interpreting the publication of one's thoughts on a blog as an actual act against the Government which would explain the increasingly frequent arrests of bloggers. In Southeast Asia, Burmese dissidents and its exiles used the power of blogs and video- sharing websites to let the world know what was happening in the country during the mass protests led by Buddhist monks in September of 2007. The protest that became known as the Saffron Revolution was the first mass protest by the people in nearly twenty years. Since the Saffron Revolution, the Burmese military junta had become ever more vigilant in its control of information and sentencing vocal dissidents to absurdly long sentences as in the case of blogger, Nay Phone Latt. The blogger was arrested 29 January 2008 and sentenced to 20 years and six months in prison for possession of “subversive film” ("Petition launched", 2009). The Burmese case offers two lessons: firstly, while the democratizing power of the Internet does exist, it would cease to exist if the powers-that-be decides to literally shut down the Internet as in the case of Burma. Secondly, it also taught us that except in the extreme case of being literally cut off from the World Wide Web, the Internet provides a very real and powerful tool to disseminate information even circumventing a powerful military government. The island-state of Singapore provides yet another layer to the story of the use of blogging (or rather the lack of) in political communications. Singapore could easily be identified as one of the most technologically advanced country in the world with a high Internet penetration rate, computer ownership, and education level. Yet, it also has one of the least vibrant online political scenes. The restrictive legal environment in Singapore certainly does not encourage vocal criticism of the government even in cyberspace. Several high profile cases have been widely reported in the local media to showcase local bloggers who have been fined, jailed or given warnings over what was published on their blogs. In 2005, two men were jailed and fined for posting inflammatory racist remarks on their blogs. In handing out the sentences, the judge reminded the two that “it is every Singaporean's duty to respect other races and religions” (Chong, 2005). Elsewhere, Reporters sans Frontieres (RSF) annual report stated China has at least 50 319 The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse
cyber-dissidents in its prison in 2007 ("Repression continues in China", 2008). The Paris-based RSF also reported six Vietnamese cyber-dissidents were arrested in the space of one week in May 2007 and were charged with dissemination of anti-government propaganda. The Saudi Arabia government arrested outspoken Saudi blogger Fouad al-Farhan for “specific violations of non-security laws” in early 2008, making him the first Saudi Arabian blogger to be arrested. Even in fairly liberal Western countries such as the United States and United Kingdom, bloggers have been arrested for what they have posted in their blogs. American blogger, Josh Wolf was sent to prison for nearly eight months by the federal prosecutors for “refusing to hand over unpublished video he shot during an anti-G8 Summit protest in San Francisco in July 2005, where one police officer was struck in the head with a pipe” (Locke, 2007). Studying Malaysian Blogosphere Blogging is certainly making waves in the political undercurrents of the world. One of the countries where blogging has created some waves is Malaysia. Immediate impact of blogs could be felt from the changes in the socio-political landscape especially during the recent 12th General Election on 8 March 2008. The 2008 General Election was considered historic, both local and foreign media from Al Jazeera to the Economist called it a “political tsunami”. The results were so unexpected that it left many wondering about the country's political future. To be sure, the incumbent ruling party, Barisan Nasional (BN) still managed hold to power by a simple majority, enough to form the next Government. The significance of the election results lies in the fact that in the past 50 years, the BN had never held less than a filibuster-proof two-thirds supermajority in the Parliament (With the exception of 1969 but the ensuing racial riots on 13 May 1969 forced the Prime Minister to declare a state of emergency and nullified the election results.) which would allow it to easily amend the Constitution and create new laws without a real debate. To add salt to BN's wound, it also lost control of five states to the Opposition party. Many observers felt that the Internet and especially blogs played an important part in the election. The de facto leader of the BN who is also the Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, admits the “serious misjudgment' in ignoring the Internet and blogs which in contrast were fully utilized by the Opposition to disseminate their messages ("Malaysian leader admits mistake", 2008). Malaysian politic is highly divided along the racial lines. Malaysia is a plural society of Malays, Chinese, Indians, and various indigenous groups. This is a direct consequence of the colonial British policy of importing laborers from China and India to work in the highly lucrative tin mines and rubber plantations According to the Population and Housing Census in 2000, the Malays constitute the majority of the population (53.4 percent), the Chinese is the next largest group (26 percent) followed by the Indians (7.7 percent) and the indigenous group (11.7 percent). The country's political framework is modeled after the British Westminster system. The dominant political party in the country is the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) which is a Malay-based political party. The second largest party is the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) which represents the interest of the Chinese community; this is followed by the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). These three major parties and eleven other smaller parties (They are the Malaysian People's Movement Party, People's Progressive Party, United Traditional Bumiputera Party, Sarawak United People's Party, Sabah United Party, Liberal Democratic Ming Kuok LIM 320
Party, United Sabah People's Party, United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation, Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party, Sarawak People's Party, Sabah Progressive Party (withdrew from BN after the 12th General Election), again most of which are ethnic-based parties, make up the Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition. The BN has essentially been ruling the country since its independence in 1957 (Up to 1973, the Barisan Nasional was called the Alliance Party which consisted only of UMNO, MCA, and MIC.). There are Opposition parties in the country, namely the religious party, Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the relatively multiracial Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People's Justice Party)(PKR). PKR was formed during the Reformasi movement in 1998/99 when then popular Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was sacked and jailed on corruption and sodomy charges which were believed to be trumped up. In the latest General Election on 8 March 2008, the three Opposition parties formed a loose coalition called Pakatan Rakyat (People's Alliance) which managed to drastically reduce the number of BN's seats in the Parliament from a high 91.3 percent in 2004 to 63.1 percent in 2008. Functions of Blogs in Democratic Discourse In order to better understand how blogs played a part in the 2008 Election, this paper attempts to categorize the various functions of socio-political blogs. Based on the analysis of in- depth interviews with the bloggers in Malaysia, three main categories or functions emerged as possible classification on how blogging serves the democracy building purpose. The first function sees blogs as the fifth estate, the second function sees blogs serving as networks and in the third function, blogs are platforms for expression. These three functions are not mutually exclusive but are merely viewed as having enough unique qualities to be differentiated from one another. Some features do overlap, for example, the mobilization of people to participate in mass rallies could not have happened without the dissemination of the news about the rallies, or that the readers would have very little to comment on (or express about) if the information of the rallies are not posted by the bloggers after they had taken place. The three functions are best conceptualized as a Venn diagram of three interlocking spheres each influencing and being influenced by the other. Blogs as the Fifth Estate: Providing Information and Setting the Agenda Blog as a web-based application built on user-generated content bypasses conventional gatekeepers such as editors, advertisers, and official authorities. Kahn and Kellner argues that this feature enables blogs, and the Internet in general, to form part of a revolution which “promotes and disseminates the capitalist consumer society, individualism and competition, and that has involved new modes of fetishism, enslavement, and domination yet to be clearly perceived and theorized” (2004: 93). Broadly speaking, every person using a user-generated platform such as a blog has the potential to have his or her voice heard directly and without being filtered. This in turn enables blogging to perform a function commonly refer to as the fifth estatea play on the words fourth estate which refers to the mainstream mass media. Perlmutter argues that “if big media are not giving us the complete story or are getting the 321 The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse facts wrong too often” (Perlmutter, 2008: 134), then blogs can serve an important function in the political-media system: watchdogs of all the vertical powers, including the government and the press itself and horizontal powers including other blogs. They can “raise a hue and dry over questionable actions and utterances by government or big media or any powers that might otherwise seem immune to constructive criticism.” (Perlmutter, 2008). This is arguably one of the most prominent functions being performed by the Malaysian political bloggers. Malaysian political bloggers actively seek out discrepancies or deliberate omissions in mainstream media's reporting and highlight them on their own blog which in turn gets picked up by other bloggers who disseminate it in the blogosphere. Hewitt argues that “old information monopoly had an enormous ability to decide where and when news would be news” but that “gatekeeping function is gone, and blogs have rushed in to decide for themselves what matters” (Hewitt, 2005: 103). The mainstream media in Malaysia have highly complex relationship with the ruling government and it is not always regulatory in nature. All major newspapers and private television stations in the nation are linked directly or indirectly to the government in terms of ownership. The concentration of ownership brings in the question conflict of interests between the news desk and the interest of the owners. The relationship could also be purely based on the fear of being shut down especially considering all major media format including print and broadcasting require an annual renewal of license that is subject to the sole discretion of the minister in charge(The Printing Presses and Publication Act 1987 gives the Home Minister the power to amend or revoke a printing license at his discretion.). This is in addition to the various other laws designed to keep the media on a tight leash. Taking these factors into consideration, trusting the mainstream media to report on the ruling government may not be the most commonsensical thing to do. This situation creates a need for another point of view, an alternative media, and in the case of Malaysia, this alternative media arrived in the form of blogs. There are several ways bloggers serves as the fifth estate. Bloggers could break news, providing new information or firsthand accounts to the readers. They could also set the news agenda by highlighting news neglected by the mainstream media or framing them in a different angle. Most of the social political bloggers in Malaysian write “opinion pieces” on the issues which affect them. Much of what is written on these social-political blogs is a reflection of the information found in other sources, usually from the mainstream media and government sources such as annual budget report, crime statistics, or new federal projects. But a good number of them provide new information to the public or “break the news”. Most notable is Ahirudin Attan who is a former newspaper editor of the Malay Mail. Ahirudin who blogs everyday frequently tries to break news and relishes the fact that he could do so: …I blog everyday and very rarely I miss a day, so that is a challenge to get fresh stories because I like to break stories and I like to get scoops and things like that , so that is the big challenge. But it pays off every time the newspapers call you and say “thanks for the story and get I get more of this?” and you know that sometimes when Straits Times has to do it (break a story), but not through me and would get around me but still have the same story, and that's even Ming Kuok LIM 322 more fun. (Interview with Ahirudin Attan). Far fewer though are bloggers who provide “expertise”, similar to what Laura McKenna calls “policy bloggers'. Policy bloggers provides expert knowledge or well-researched information on narrowly defined issues. Some policy bloggers provide in-depth analysis on alternative fuel sources, endangered wildlife protection, etc. Such expertise is still considered as a minority in the blogosphere. The same goes for the Malaysian blogosphere and most bloggers identified for this study are opinion-based bloggers. However, some bloggers in the country do provide expert opinion on their blogs. These expert opinions usually came about because of the expertise the bloggers have in the professional life or after having done extensive research on the topic. Blogger Malik Imtiaz who is a successful lawyer by training and profession frequently provides expert analysis on matters pertaining to the law. For example, in the case of the arrest of blogger Nathaniel Tan under the Official Secret Act 1972 (The OSA was enacted after the 1969 racial riots, it prohibits a person from getting information that is deemed an official secret by the government for the fear that it may fall into the hands of the enemy.), Malik Imtiaz wrote a lengthy analysis detailing the origin of drafting the Act and articulated the reasons why it would be unconstitutional to use the Act in the way the police have to justify the arrest (Sarwar, 2007). To the extent that bloggers are contributing what they could, they are serving a complementary role in the flow of information. Bloggers fill the gaps in the flow of information between the producer and users. As Ahirudin Attan argues: “…blogs provide the channel not just for the common people, the laymen but for professional like me to take up serious issues which are of concern to the population, the voting population, and in a way we are complementing the mainstream media…” (Ahirudin Attan) (Asian bloggers: Part 1. (2007). 101 East Retrieved May 4, 2007, from http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECFKcP_lXFo) The “gaps” in the flow of information will always exist because of imperfections in the system. First of all, it is simply logistically and financially impossible for a news agency to cover every event and there are bound to be news-worthy stories that slip through. Secondly, these gaps may be deliberate and exist because of the various control mechanism in the media system including legal control as laid out in the previous chapters. Due to these imperfections in the system, gaps will always exist and for now bloggers are particularly efficient in finding these gaps. In a sense journalists are writing the “first rough draft of history” (The phrase “first rough draft of history” is usually credited to former publisher of Washington Post, Phillip Graham), providing the first reporting of the events which are happening now and usually done on short deadlines. And in a way, blogs could be the bullet-points of that first rough draft of history. One of the strength of blogs lies in their ability to provide information that big media could not or at least not as quickly. Bloggers excel in providing these bullet-points of history, from which the journalists could use to complement their own reporting. Firsthand accounts of events are is a good example of information that bloggers could disseminate more quickly than traditional media. 323 The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse
Bloggers as Blogs as the Fifth Networks Estate
Blogs as Platforms for Expr- ession
Figure 2. Visual representation of the functions of blogs in a democracy Blogs as Networks: Emergence of Networks of Deliberations and Mobilizing Agents The second function of blogs is related to the inherent networking nature of the technology. Blogs have enormous participatory and deliberative potential. The blogosphere is organized as a distributed network, “there is no central hub but instead blogs link to a number of other individual blogs” (Rettberg, 2008). Readers can engage and participate in any given discussion through feedbacks and comments. Readers leave comments and opinions on a certain blog post and this could be joined by other readers. There is an almost instantaneous feedback which allows for a near real time deliberation similar to live chat rooms. Yet at the same time it is also an asynchronous communication as blogs contains archival capability which allows users to search for previous discussions or to participate in discussions at different times. It is this participatory and deliberative nature of blogs that had intrigued democracy scholars the most. David Klein and his colleagues, speaking specifically of the American context, argues that “it would be extremely shortsighted to disregard the enormous influence that bloggers are beginning to have upon the …political scene” (Kline, Burstein, De Keijzer, & Berger, 2005: 5). The near-instantaneous and asynchronous communication may be better suited for the purpose of deliberative democracy. Live chat without archival capabilities erase all discussions once the session ends, precious little information will be available for reference once the chat is over except perhaps the memory of it. And in fact certain amount of asynchrony may provoke deeper, more deliberate response. That is not to say the responses are “better or worse” than from the immediate responses that one would expect in a real-time chat or conversation but simply “a different” kind of deliberation which should have its own merits. Among the active bloggers, a community of deliberation has emerged. Some of these networks are less formal and less structured while some are more organized with specific objectives in mind. Some exist purely in cyberspace and some cross-over to the physical world. For example, in the wake of the defamation suits and arrests of bloggers in the country, several bloggers came together to form an association, National Alliance of Bloggers (All-Blogs). All-Blogs which aims to assist bloggers in trouble, provides a certain level of security to the bloggers in the country who writes on more controversial topics. The annual Bloggers United Malaysia (B.U.M) an event created by blogger Desiderata, provides opportunities for the bloggers to gather and meet each Ming Kuok LIM 324 other in person. There is also the informal Mee Rebus(Mee Rebus is a traditional Malay dish of noodles with spicy sauces.) Tuesday social meeting, where bloggers would gather at the residence of one of the blogger's residence in a very informal setting. All these real-world activities are in addition to all the activities and deliberation already being carried out in the blogosphere. Sometimes these deliberations manifest in very bold manners such as a street demonstration in which blogs act as mobilizing agents. As mobilizing agents, blogs provide the readers with information on upcoming events including protest rallies, political speeches, midnight vigils, gatherings of a more peaceful or social nature. Several major events took place between 2006 -2008 which benefited from the help of the blogosphere. At the time of writing, at least three major rallies and several smaller scale protests took place in the country including the Lawyers March at PutraJaya, the BERSIH Rally around Kuala Lumpur, HINDRAF Rally, PROTES Rally at Kelana Jaya Stadium, the handing over of a memorandum at the Parliament, and the Press Freedom Walk organized by a group called BENAR, a group promoting media freedom in the country. Table Street Demonstrations in Malaysia in 2007 Date The Protest Location Number of Participants *(Detained) Sept 26, 2007 Lawyers March Putrajaya 200 (0) Nov 10, 2007 BERSIH Rally Kuala Lumpur City 40000 (245) (Yellow March) Nov 25, 2007 HINDRAF Rally Kuala Lumpur City 10000 (230) Dec 9, 2007 Human Rights Day Kuala Lumpur City 50 (8) March July 8, 2007 Protes Rally Kelana Jaya Stadium 8000 (0) *estimates One of the biggest and earliest of these public protests was the BERSIH Rally organized by the Coalition for Fair and Clean Election or BERSIH on 10 November 2007. Information concerning the BERSIH Rally was circulated on the blogosphere for several days prior to the actual event which took place at several strategic locations around the country's capital, Kuala Lumpur. Demonstrations of this scale are rare in Malaysia. The last mass street protest was in 1998. The event was considered illegal by the police and the government had issued warnings to the public against participating in the event. Khairy Jamaluddin, the son-in-law of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Chief of the UMNO Youth called the rally a hypocritical move by the Opposition that is illegal and that the police should arrest the BERSIH organizers. He characterized people who participate in the rally as “monkeys on the streets” (Ong & Zahiid, 2007) The BERSIH Rally went on as scheduled disregarding the warnings issued by the authorities. According to reports from local media and to eye-witness accounts on the blogosphere, roughly 40,000 people took part in the demonstration. The street demonstration was also known as the Yellow March because of the canary-yellow colored T-shirts that were worn by the majority of 325 The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse the participants. One blogger, Polytikus, even gave a list of things to be conscious of on the day of the rally itself including the wearing of a yellow T-shirt, be aware of “plants” from the government and not the least some practical advice including wearing comfortable shoes and bringing an umbrella in case of rain: For first timers: Wear comfortable shoes. Don't worry about arrests because police only target 'rioters'. If you clear the area when you hear the police warning (remember, they must do it clearly 3 times), no harm shall fall upon you. Please refrain from bringing sharp objects so no keris even if we're going to see the King. Bring cameras and video cameras - the whole event needs documentation, the more the merrier (especially so if you see flag burners or suspicious individuals setting a dustbins on fire). Umbrellas may come in handy, be prepared for rain or shine! Bring your friends. Share the momentous event of your first rally with others. When you hear cheers and chants, join in! And wear yellow! :) See you there! :) (Polytikus, 2007) Despite the scale of the BERSIH rally, it was almost all but ignored by the mainstream media. On the day of the rally, the only local news agency seriously reporting on the event was Malaysiakini.com, the paperless newspaper often seen as critical to the ruling government. Al- Jazeera which has a regional office in the heart of Kuala Lumpur also reported the event. The front page of the Malaysiakini.com was filled with live reports on the event complete with video clips. By the second day of the BERSIH rally, the Malaysiakini.com website had put together a Special Report webpage of the November 10th rally with 68 hyperlinks of individual reports and articles that were sub-divided into different categories including general news reports, photo gallery, videos, news from the day before the rally, news after the rally called the “aftermath” and a category for letters to the editors (Beh & Zahiid, 2007). Bloggers linked up to the reports by the new portal and helped to disseminate the news further in the blogosphere. The local English daily, The Star, was bare in its coverage of the rally in the following days although it did report the use of water cannons and tear gas on the demonstrators as well as a short video clip of the event which it put up on its website. The front page of The Star, the day after the BERSIH Rally was about rising fuel prices, a worthy news item in a normal news day but certainly not when the country had just witnessed the largest mass protest since 1998. Hints that the BERSIH Rally actually took place could finally be found in page eight in an article title “Massive traffic congestion caused by the rally” and another piece with the deputy Prime Minister explaining the reason that a permit was not issued to the protest. Both newspapers used the term “illegal” when describing the rally. Based on the selection of news by The Star and the New Straits Times the focus was clearly to emphasize the economic burden and the legal persecution of such a large scale demonstration evident by news reports on the traffic congestion, the woes of small traders in the capital, and the number of people arrested. It also gave a lot of column space for the administration to explain its position. The success of the BERSIH protest despite all the police warnings and road-blocks on the day itself to prevent more participants from entering the city limits, could be attributed to the blogs and other alternative news portals such as Malaysiakini.com. As one blogger eagerly notes: “the Yellow March, all those marches, they were all inspired by blogs, they were all promoted by blogs and they got the attention and response because of the play-up in the blogs” Ming Kuok LIM 326
(Interview with blogger Nuraina S. Samad). The BERSIH Rally is an illustrative example of how alternative information could be spread through the networks of bloggers, by-passing traditional media, to mobilize the grassroots to take part in such an event and to report on (the success of) the event, even though the mainstream media avoided the issue. Blogs as Platforms for Expression Thirdly, blogs also serve another important function in a healthy democracy. They provide ordinary people with an avenue for expression. The bloggers interviewed for this study, regardless of their background, appreciated the control they have over their own writings. Essentially, as a technology that allows self-expression in a manner that personal diaries do, they could write and publish what they want to say without having to deal with editors, company policies, shareholder's interests or many of the laws that governs the other mass media. Blogs empower the marginalized by providing them with tools to express themselves. Even when if the blogger happens to be a well-known personality such as the former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad who has the means of getting his words out through more traditional form of publications, the ability to have your words completely reproduced in their entirety is highly rewarding for them: …it is to me very satisfying, that I am able at last to voice my opinion, my real opinion, not the abbreviated one that gets published in the papers, even those papers which are friendly towards me they cannot very well put down everything that I said, and a lot of time they would miss out on the important points but with a blog I can put down anything…(Interview with Mahathir Mohamad) Blogger Marina Mahathir is a HIV/AIDS activist and a newspaper columnist in the highest circulating English language newspaper in the country. She also feels that there is a difference between writing on her blog than writing for a newspaper: …it is an interesting outlet; it is very different from writing my newspaper column. You do feel a sense of freedom then do like the idea that I could write a little bit or write a lot depending on what, you know and I think that is the beauty of the blog that you could just put the little comment on something you don't have to write a whole thesis, which is what something you have to do sometimes for another kind of forum…(Interview with Marina Mahathir) Mahathir Mohamad and Marina Mahathir are well known figures in the country with an established audience who would actively seek out their columns, speeches, and other writings. Yet, they still feel the need to have a medium where they could express themselves unedited and unabridged. Others, such as blogger Elviza Michelle, who is a corporate lawyer by profession, expressed her frustration over the fact that the mainstream newspaper, in this case, the New Straits Times (NST), did not publish her commentary on the defamation suit the NST had filed against fellow bloggers Ahirudin Attan and Jeff Ooi. Elviza, who was encouraged by Ahirudin Attan himself to start a blog, began blogging on her blog, WriteAway.blogspot.com to express her frustrations on the matter. Another interesting finding in the study, which ties into the freedom of expression, is the observation by bloggers of the rise of quality of discussion in their blogs as reflected by the 327 The Function of Blogs in Democratic Discourse
comments left by the readers. The bloggers noted that in the early stages of their blogging, readers would leave comments using less than cordial languages but over time, with some action by the bloggers themselves including telling the readers to respect other people's comments and to refrain from using expletives, the civility of the comments improved. This is a significant observation especially considering the running argument against freedom of expression by the ruling government and even mainstream media is the fear that by letting people have the freedom to say whatever they want on the Internet, chaos and possibly racial riots and civil unrest, will ultimately be the result. Editor-in-chief for the English language daily The Star, Wong Chun Wai commented during a panel discussion with leading bloggers and politicians argues that “Malaysians are still grappling with the idea of speaking up because on one hand, there is this call for greater democratic space but if you look at the cyberspace people are still shouting” and because they are unable to articulate their opinions properly they would use “inflammatory remarks” and “allegations” ("Bloggers, politics and the elections", 2007). Blogger Malik Imtiaz, who is also a human rights lawyer, looks at the argument from a different perspective: …In Malaysian society, because you have been muzzled for a long time you lose your sense of voice, you don't know when to speak softly, so people are shouting when there is no need to shout. It is a process that needs to be moderated and by itself over time would conform to a level which is acceptable. For people who didn't have the right to speak and now are having the right to speak, they want to say everything and they want to vent everything. And that is a process that we need to give space for and will inasmuch as we need to teach them through the blogs and so on… (Interview with blogger Malik Imtiaz) If civil society is the goal to be achieved, then the need for a training ground for expression should be a logical one. Blogs appear to be an excellent platform as the training ground for self- expression and free speech. It is a moot point by the authorities that the discussion on sensitive issue should be avoided. Instead of sweeping it under the carpet, the process of deliberation should begin in earnest on some kind of platform, if the discussion is not yet ready to be part of the mainstream discourse, the blogs could very well be the training ground or bridge between a nascent public sphere and a full-fledged deliberative democracy. Conclusion There are indications that that blogs will continue to have a presence in the political deliberation in the country, the blogs written by A-list bloggers such as Ahirudin Attan, the president of the National Alliance of Bloggers, Mahathir Mohamad, the former Prime Minister of the country, and Raja Petra Kamarudin who was arrested for allegedly posting seditious articles insulting Islam and the King continue to be hugely popular, drawing thousands of readers on a normal day and more if they are breaking news. These bloggers are functioning as the fifth estate, performing the check and balance function of the establishment, both the government and the mainstream media. As this paper has implied, the uniqueness of blogs comes not entirely from their content. Indeed, what has been written or posted on blogs may well have been said or printed elsewhere decades or even centuries ago. The blog is also not entirely revolutionary as because “they Ming Kuok LIM 328 represent an ancient impulse in anatomically modern human, the yearning for public political expression”, and “they are not forcing all the old means and techniques of politics, policymaking, and campaigns and election to grind to a halt, to retool or to be abandoned” (Perlmutter, 2008, p. 9). However, blogs do indeed offer something revolutionary in the form of hyperlinks. The hyper-linking structure creates the kind of “nonlinear, endless jumping around, and instant feedback that previous technology from cave paintings to television, simply could not” (Perlmutter, 2008: 10). Hyperlinking also facilitates the function of blogs as networks. However the networks of blogs are not equally distributed, aggregator sites such as Technorati or Digg would have more links to blogs and individual blogs also differ in their “power” (Shirky, 2003). More established blogs have more power simply due to the long tail of continuous exposure, a famous personality's popularity is likely to spill over to his or her blog and in the process increasing the power the blog. An excellent example is the case of former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed who only started his blog on May 1, 2008 but has garnered an impressive 5 million hits in matter of months. The former prime minister brings with him his prestige and fame to his blog (www.chedet.com) which created the initial buzz to attract readers. The provocative ideas that he continues to post on his blog both sustain and provide the fodder to keep the public interest and coverage by the mainstream media in a feedback loop. This “unequal distribution of power” is something that researchers need to keep in mind when researching on bloggers and in selecting blogs for studies. 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