THE SOUTH IN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: THE END OF DEMOCRATIC HEGEMONY APPROVED: sIX-f r MajProfessor C7 Ss j ** IC it, J , *f Minor Professor s • V 4ZZJ — N -cC c / Chaitman of the Department of Political Science Dean bf the Graduate School Buchholz, Michael 0., The South in Presidential Politics: The End of Democratic Hegemony. Master of Arts (Political Science), August, 1973, 193 pp., 9 tables, bibliography, 61 titles. The purpose of this paper is to document and quantify the primary reasons for the gradual erosion of southern Democratic hegemony in presidential elections during the last twenty-four years. The first four chapters comprise an historical study using books, memoirs and periodicals to isolate prime factors in the shift. The final chapter deals with the results of an original survey conducted between September 30, 1971, and April 4, 1972, to assess the feelings of persons actively involved in southern politics. The results confirm and reinforce the findings of the historical study, which indi- cates the primary reason for changing southern allegiance has been the changing philosophy of the Democratic Party in the civil rights field. President Truman's advocacy of civil rights legislation in 1948, for example, was the nucleus around which the Dixie- crats formed. There is evidence the Dixiecrat core helped elect General Eisenhower in 1952 and re-elect him in 1956 instead of the Democratic nominee, Adlai Stevenson. The statements of the candidates during those presidential cam- paigns allowed southerners to identify Eisenhower with the attitude that the states should handle their own affairs in the civil rights field, and Stevenson with the attitude that if the states fail to act, the federal government must. The 1960 election saw a return of southerners to the Democrats, but in that year the draw of an Eisenhower was not present and the Democratic platform plank on civil rights was no stronger than the Republicans'. In 1964 Presi- dent Johnson, the Democratic incumbent, was seen as strongly- favoring civil rights, compared with his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater, whose statements had a states1-rights orientation. In 1968 the Democratic candidate, Vice President Humphrey, had unquestionable civil rights credentials while the Republican contender, Richard Nixon, openly wooed the South with the support of former Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond. The third man in the race, Governor George Wallace of Alabama, had the image of a racist. Humphrey was able to carry only one southern state. President Nixon in office reinforced his go-slow image in the civil rights field and in 1972 had little trouble beating his Democratic challenger, George McGovern, who was considered by many as a left-wing extremist. The southern break from the Democrats was total in 1972. The survey of elected and state party officials of both parties in the eleven southern states indicated the primary reason for the shift in voter allegiance was the policy orientation of the 'Democratic Party. Of those affirming the split, 68.60 per cent believed it had occurred because of national party policies. Of those, 35.11 per cent felt the primary policy question involved was race relations. A majority of the respondents, 79.16 per cent, said the South was through.with bloc voting, and an even greater majority, 87.50 per cent, thought southern experimentation with regional parties also was at an end. A sizeable proportion (35.38 per cent) of those who stated the South no longer would cast its electoral vote in a bloc believed the primary reason was a desire for a two-party system. Some 24.56 per cent, however, listed as the primary reason the belief that southerners think bloc voting now is useless to prevent national involve- ment in local race relations. The evidence indicates that while the South lost its voice in the Democratic Party, it has found another in the Republican Party. The South is expected to continue its new- found allegiance to the Republicans provided the party main- tains its orientation in the civil rights field. The Demo- cratic Party could make a comeback in the South provided it can exchange its liberal image for a more moderate one. THE SOUTH IN PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: THE END OF DEMOCRATIC HEGEMONY THESIS Presented to the Graduate Council of the North Texas State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS By Michael 0. Buch'holz, B. A. Denton, Texas August, 1973 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES "v INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter I. SETTING THE PATTERN AND MAKING THE BREAK, 1876-1948 . 7 Republicans in the South The Revolt of 1928 Truman's Civil Rights Program—1948 Walkout at the Democratic Convention The Dixiecrat Convention The 1948 Campaign II. THE REPUBLICANS MOTE SOUTH, 1952-1955 ... 41 The 1952 Democratic Convention The 1952 Campaign--Equal Rights The 1952 Campaign—Tidelands Oil Tha 1955 Primary Campaign The 1956 Democratic Convention The 1955 Presidential Campaign III. SMALL ADVANCE, SMALL RETREAT, 1960-1964 . 85 The 1960 Democratic Convention The 1960 Republican Convention The 1960 Campaign Racism in Conservative Clothing—1964 The 1964 GOP Convention—Conservative Takeover Johnson and the 1964 Nomination The Campaign of 1964 IV. THE BREAK COMPLETE, 1968-1972 126 The Nixon Comeback and the Southern Strategy The Democratic Crown Passes Wallace in 1968 The Democratic Strategy 1972—Republican Dominance in the South Busing and Race in 1972 iii Chapter Page V. ISSUES AND ANSWERS 157 What Professional Politicians Say Conclusions APPENDIX 184 BIBLIOGRAPHY 189 XV LIST OF TABLES Table Page I. The South in Presidential Politics . 161 II. Why the South Has Broken from the Democratic Party in Presidential Elections 162 III. Why the South No Longer Will Cast Its Presidential Vote in a Bloc ........ 165 IV. Beneficiary of Continued Southern Bloc Voting 166 V. Why Political Parties Would Receive a Southern Bloc Vote 167 VI. Can the South Find a Home in the Two Major Political Parties? . 170 VII. Does the South Need a Regional Party? . , . , 171 VIII. Why the South Has Broken from the Democratic Party in Presidential Elections—Elected and Party Officials . 172 IX. Why the South No Longer Will Cast Its Presidential Vote in a Bloc-- Elected and Party Officials 173 v INTRODUCTION The long love affair, nearly a century in duration, between the Democratic Party and the eleven states of the Old Confederacy is at an end. Victims of a shift in the national mood, southern voters within the past two decades have in increasing numbers sho'vm less willingness to deliver their electoral votes, numbering nearly half of the total needed to elect a president in 1972, on a single platter to a single party or candidate. (See Appendix, Table I, for distribution of southern electoral votes, 1948-1972.) From 1876, when the South agreed to vote for Rutherford B. Hayes as president in exchange for the withdrawal of federal troops from Dixie, through 1944, individual southern states did not vote Republi- can more than twice in national elections—in 1876, 1920, and 1928. But with the exception of 1948, when the Dixiecrats split the South after bolting the Democratic National Con- vention following a fight over the civil rights plank of the platform, the Republicans have garnered southern electoral votes in every election from 1952 through 1972. In fact, the Democratic vote dipped to its lowest point in recent years in the presidential election of 1972, when southerners awarded what used to be their favorite party only 29.42 per cent of the combined two-party vote. (See Appendix, Table II, fcr southern vote totals and percentages in presidential elec- tions, 1948-1972.) For the first time since 1948, a major political party failed to receive any of the South1s electoral votes. Only in 1972, that party was the Democratic Party. The elections these last twenty-four years may be- con- sidered atypical, the results of divisive third-party cam- paigns and the candidacies of a man whom many believed to be above party and of a man whom many thought to be alien to their traditional party. But even in 1960, when none of these factors were brought into play to any significant extent, the Republicans still managed to capture three southern states (Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia) with thirty- three electoral votes. More than 45 per cent of southern voters that year cast ballots for then Vice President Richard M. Nixon, the Republican nominee. A survey conducted among southern state party officials and elected leaders for this thesis appears to bear out the trend exhibited in the voting statistics—that the South no longer is solid Democratic. The primary reason given is, in effect, that the national Democrats have deserted the South, that southern voters in the main no longer approve of national party policies. Of course, the answer is not nearly so simple, Also involved are the increase in southern voting and shifts in southern industry and agriculture that have produced in- and out --migration. But in the minds of these respondents, the 3 party's national policies bear the brunt of the blame. Because they specifically were asked about it, a good propor- tion (24.08 per cent) of those surveyed said the national Democratic Party has lost its southern hegemony because it tends to support federal interference in local race relations. The problem of race always has been an acute one for the South. Involved in the 1876 trade-off was a pledge of non- enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment ensuring the right to vote of all United States citizens regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. As a result, the amend- ment hardly was enforced until the coming of the Rooseveltian New Deal.