Annual Report 2017 HC 1780 Annual Report of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 2017 Including pre-September 2017 oversight by the: Chief Surveillance Commissioner Intelligence Services Commissioner Interception of Communications Commissioner Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 234(6)&(8) of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 31 January 2019 Laid before the Scottish Parliament by the Scottish Ministers 31 January 2019 HC 1780 SG/2019/8 © Crown copyright 2019 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected] ISBN 978-1-5286-0971-5 CCS0119377508 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum Printed in the UK by the APS Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. IPCO Annual Report 2017 3 Contents Letter to the Prime Minister 5 1. Introduction by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner Lord Justice Fulford 6 2. IPA Implementation and the Establishment of IPCO 8 3. Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) 13 4. Surveillance 23 5. Property Interference (including equipment interference) 32 6. Investigation of Protected Information 38 7. Interception 40 8. Targeted Communications Data 49 9. Bulk Communications Data 61 10. Bulk Personal Datasets 69 11. Intelligence Services Act 1994 – Section 7 Authorisations 75 12. Consolidated Guidance 79 13. Prisons 84 14. Errors and Breaches 90 15. Engagement with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and other bodies 106 16. IPCO and predecessors’ budgets 107 17. Annex A: Communications Data acquisition by public authority 109 18. Annex B : Serious Error Investigations 114 19. Glossary for Public Authority Categories 128 IPCO Annual Report 2017 5 Letter to the Prime Minister The Rt Hon. Theresa May MP Prime Minister 10 Downing Street London SW1A 2AA December 2018 Dear Prime Minister, I enclose my first Annual Report covering the work of the three precursor organisations, namely the Office of the Surveillance Commissioners (OSC), the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office (IOCCO) and the Intelligence Service Commissioner (ISComm), from 1 January 2017 until 31 August 2017, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO) from 1 September until 31 December 2017. I have continued the tradition of writing the Report in two parts. The Confidential Annex contains details, including techniques and operational matters, which should not be published for reasons of national security. It is for you to determine, after consultation with me, how much of this open report should be published without releasing any material which would be contrary to the public interest, or prejudicial to national security, to the prevention or detection of serious crime, to the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, or to the discharge of the functions of those public authorities subject to my review. I wish to pay tribute to the fine work undertaken by the three bodies who preceded IPCO and to the last Commissioners who led them: Lord Judge (OSC), Sir Mark Waller, succeeded by Sir John Goldring (ISComm) and Sir Stanley Burnton (IOCCO). They provided the critical foundations for the creation of IPCO and what I hope will be the successful oversight of investigatory powers. Yours sincerely The Rt Hon. Lord Justice Fulford The Investigatory Powers Commissioner 6 IPCO Annual Report 2017 1. Introduction by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner Lord Justice Fulford 1.1 One of my statutory obligations, which I am very pleased to discharge, is to report to the Prime Minister annually about “the carrying out of the functions of the Judicial Commissioners”. My Report must address a range of issues, including: • statistics on the use of the relevant investigatory powers, such as the number of warrants received, how they were used by the individual applicant authorities and the impact of their use; • the operation of the safeguards under the Act in relation to material covered by legal professional privilege and confidential journalistic material and sources; • the ways in which certain targeted warrants were handled; • details of the operational purposes, as set out in the warrants; • the number of errors reported to IPCO, and the number of individuals to whom we provided relevant information as a consequence of the errors; • details of the work of the Technology Advisory Panel (TAP); • an explanation of our resources; and • the public engagements undertaken by the Judicial Commissioners and members of my staff. 1.2 On the surface for 2017 this appears to be a deceptively straightforward task. The reality has been a positive refinement of complication because three quarters of the period (viz. prior to 1 September 2017) relates to the work of our three precursor organisations, the Office of Surveillance Commissioners (Lord Judge), the Intelligence Services Commissioner (Sir John Goldring) and the Interception of Communications Commissioner (Sir Stanley Burnton). In addition, many of the powers contained in the IPA did not come into effect until 2018, and thereby fall outside the ambit of this Report. Otherwise, we have been involved in setting up my new organisation, putting in place the people, infrastructure and systems that have enabled us to function; for instance, with the TAP, although work has been started by that body in 2018, in 2017 we were recruiting its members and beginning the process of applying for their security clearance. 1.3 One of the dominant features of 2017 (extending into 2018) has been the task of unifying these three very different organisations into a single structure. There were marked differences in how they carried out their work, to say nothing of the variety of powers over which they each had oversight. A cursory glance at their annual reports reveals the divergence in style and content as between my predecessor organisations. That is not meant to sound any kind of critical note; to the contrary, the work of each of them was exemplary but fusing their separate, and impressive, legacies into a single, coherent structure has been a formidably challenging task. IPCO Annual Report 2017 7 1.4 In one sense, therefore, this Preface contains an apology and an excuse. This 2017 Report has undoubted limitations, mainly as a consequence of the difficulties I have just described. Most particularly, it is uneven as regards the content on the different investigative powers and there is a lack of balance between the security services, on the one hand, and the law enforcement agencies, on the other. This is particularly evident because we have structured the Report around the different types of investigatory powers, in part to reflect the unified approach to oversight that is to be adopted. Although our inspectors have different areas of expertise, we will ensure the boundaries between the three precursor organisations are not replicated within IPCO. 1.5 In what follows, we have attempted to provide relevant background information and a summary description of each of the powers. 1.6 Although there was some concern as to whether IPCO would be ready to begin operating on 1 September 2017, and whether we would delay the security and law enforcement agencies in their work, I am confident that on our record to date we have dispelled those anxieties. I have received no complaints that the applications for warrants have been handled inefficiently, and we have complied with – indeed, we routinely and significantly exceed – the agreement as to the length of time the Judicial Commissioners will take to resolve the applications. There has been no suggestion that the arrival of IPCO has hampered the law enforcement and security agencies in their work and I am delighted at the arms-length but cooperative relationship that has been developed with all the organisations for which we have oversight responsibility. I am very grateful for the generous approach of all and the considerable assistance that was provided in helping set up this new organisation. The Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Security Services and all the law enforcement agencies have been highly co-operative. The practical and administrative support, along with the many extremely effective briefings that were laid on for the Judicial Commissioners and our staff, have been time consuming for those involved in providing this help and of incalculable benefit to IPCO. 1.7 Although in 2017 I was principally focused on meeting the domestic public authorities who utilise investigatory powers, during October I led a team from IPCO to the ‘Five-Eyes’ Conference in Ottawa in Canada (the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand), which was an extremely useful first step in establishing what I hope will be a lasting and mutually supportive relationship between the Oversight Bodies in our closely-allied countries. I gave a speech in Washington at the Centre for a New American Security. I visited the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and I met with various representatives of the American intelligence Community, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. In November I visited the Dutch Oversight Body (CTIVD), as the first instalment in a series of meetings with the oversight bodies of EU countries. 1.8 It has been during 2018 that my engagement with international bodies, the media and civil society has developed but it is to be noted that we involved key representatives from civil society in the induction and training programme for the Judicial Commissioners in November 2017. 1.9 Overall, I have been extremely pleased at what IPCO achieved in 2017, and I am cautiously optimistic that, with the considerable assistance of others, we laid foundations for the successful oversight of investigatory powers in the years to come.