Prospects for Democracy in Iran

Politics&Diplomacy

Prospects For Democracy in Iran

Ladan Boroumand

Is Islam compatible with democracy? Can a Muslim society like La dan Boroumand is Director of the Abdor- Ir an ever become a secular democracy? For more than twenty rahman Boroumand years, Western democracies have favored an implicitly negative Foundation, which pro- motes human rights and answer to these questions. Thus, their policy toward Iran was de m o c r acy in Iran. She is made up of a series of hesitant, inconsistent, and ad hoc deci- also Visiting Fellow at the International Forum for sions aimed at countering Iran ’s terrorism in the world, while De m o c r atic Studies and manifesting a total lack of concern about the tyrannical and is res e a r ching the Iran i a n op p r essive nature of the Islamic Republic. Islamic Revolution. Those who profess the incompatibility of Islam and democracy could rightfully refer to some theological and historical tr aits. Much of Islam’s history reveals the continuing influence of a founding prophet who made law, waged war, dispensed justice, and ruled his people. From these observations, one might be tempted to conclude that the secularization and de m o c r atization of Iran cannot proceed without confronting the religious order. This conclusion seems all the more valid, since the leaders of the Islamic Revolution claim to have res t o r ed a “pure Islamic orde r . ” Yet, a closer examination of the history of the Islamic Revolution raises questions about the validity of these argu- ments. First, the theological and historical traits that seem opposed to democracy were similarly incompatible with the rise of the modern nation-state. Yet, these traits did not ham- per its advent in traditional Muslim societies, such as Iran . Second, Iran ’s putative return to Islam’s “original purity” was

Summer/Fall 2003 [9 9] PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN IRAN possible only by means of a modern rev - ditional religious education but rather a olution. Lest this be thought a contro- modern one. They entered politics versial point, it should be noted that the through their involvement in nationalist leaders of the Islamic Revolution them- movements in their respective countries, selves have openly acknowledged the and turned to political Islam as disen- modern nature of their endeavor.1 It is chanted militants. In Iran, Shari’ati is pr ecisely this revolutionary phenomenon one of the main popularizers of rev o l u - that poses a problem, since it finds no tionary Islam founded on the Marxist pr ecedent in the words and deeds of the philosophy of history.3 He combines the prophet. Additionally, Iran ’s rev o l u t i o n - Ko r anic concept of the “Party of God,” ary regime is dismissed by high-ran k i n g or Hezbollah, with the Marxist definition Shi’a scholars as utterly un-Islamic.2 of the Van g u a r d Party. Hence, through- In examining the prospects for democ- out the 20th century, Islamic terminology racy in Iran, 1 shall focus first on the inner has been influenced by modern totalitar- na t u r e of the Islamic regime, which is at ian concepts and know-how. odds both with Shi’a beliefs and Iran’ s The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini own history and traditions. The tran s f o r - was the first eminent religious figure to mation of a traditional society into a abandon traditionalism and opt for this modern nation-state and the collapse of modern Islamist totalitarianism. It would this nation-state due to the Islamic be a mistake to interpret the Islamic Revolution have resulted in the advent of a Revolution as an outcome of Shi’ism, for modern Islamist totalitarian regime. The the revolutionary Ayatollah was an inno- relevant question, then, is not how Iran vator in religious affairs.4 Once in power, can cease being a traditional Islamic poli- the one-time opponent of land ref o r m ty, but rather how it can escape its curren t and women’s suffrage became “progres - subjection to a version of modern totali- sive.” He launched a massive program of tarianism. Iranian public opinion favors nationalization and expropriation. He de m o c r acy, a system that Iranians see not recruited women for campaigns of rev o - as a foreign imposition, but as a common lutionary propaganda and mobilization. heritage of humanity. The overwhelming His policy of terror, revolutionary tri- pr aise for modernity and democrat i c bunals and militias, administra t i v e institutions based on human rights belies purges, cultural revolution, and accom- the fictitious dichotomy between Wes t e r n modating attitude toward the Soviet de m o c r acy and Islamic democrac y . Union alienated the majority of his fellow clerics. But this also gained him the Islamic Revolution, a Variation active support of the Moscow-aligned of Modern Totalitarianism. Th e Ir anian Communist Party, which subor- Ir anian Revolution is the historic imple- dinated itself to the Islamic regime from mentation of Islamist revolutionary ide- 1979 to 1983. ology. The contributions made to the Ac c o r ding to the Iranian philosopher ideology by the Pakistani Mawlana Maw- Dariush Shayegan, “It is not the rev o l u - dudi, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, and the tion that was Islamicized to become Ir anian Shari’ati, among others, to the eschatology; it is Islam that has changed el a b o r ation of this ideology are well into an ideology and has entered the known. These men did not receive a tra- realm of history to fight the infidels. By

[1 0 0 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs B O R O U MAND Politics&Diplomacy

willing to oppose the West it has become By abolishing the notion of the free Wes t e r n . ” 5 The Islamic regime could not individual, totalitarianism also abolishes have drawn its dynamism from a distort- God’s transcendence. A totalitarian ed religious dogma. It owes its consisten- regime seeks to rec r eate man in accor- cy to two potent and eminently modern dance with its own truth, whether this myths: the myth of “the People” and the truth is understood to be rep r esented by myth of “the Revolution.” the nation, by history, or by divine prov-

The overwhelming praise for modernity and democratic institutions based on human rights belies the fictitious dichotomy between Western Democracy and Islamic democrac y .

In modern rep r esentative democrac i e s , id e n c e . 8 Their desire to re- c r eate man “the People” is an abstract category made invests these regimes with a terrifying and of free and equal individuals. Once victo- devastating power. Their ideas of orde r rious, the Islamic Revolution promptly and justice reveal the nature of this power. confiscated this concept, emptied it of its The negation of the juridical and de m o g r aphic content, and imposed upon mo r al person of the detainee indicates it an ideological definition. Henceforth, the denial of the concept of the individ- the idea of “the People” did not refer to ua l . 9 Revolutionary Islamic justice is individuals; rather, it alluded to the offi- founded on this denial; thus, the courts cial ideology. Whoever did not adhere to of the Islamic Republic reject due the regime’s ideology became, by defini- process. Due process embodies a differ- tion, an “enemy of the people.” The very ent worldview, in which man is defined as notion of individual rights was abolished an autonomous yet fallible being. The by the victory of the concept of “the denial of due process is the rejection of People” as orthodoxy. this understanding of the human being. Ayatollah Khomeini, the self When the revolutionaries order the rap e described “humble and sinful cleric” who of young girls before execution, because wanted to protect the Shari’a against the virgins might go to heaven, they impose assault of Western values, was tran s - their temporal power and seek to enact formed by this “revolutionary mirac l e ” God’s will by determining His judgment. into an infallible authority that embod- Ultimately, through this act they abolish ied both the Tru t h 6 and the Peo p l e . 7 He God’s transcendence. When these rev o - ended up legislating for and on behalf of lutionaries secretly decide to murder tens God. Khomeini did not hesitate to abro- of thousands of prisoners set to be gate the Shari’a’s injunctions in the name released because these individuals ref u s e of the regime’s overriding interests. A to profess the regime’s ideology, the su p r eme leader whose will expresses the Islamists demonstrate their ambition to Truth in history is the common denom- possess the individual’s soul and mind. inator of totalitarian regimes. By refusing to acknowledge their deaths,

Summer/Fall 2003 [1 0 1] PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN IRAN the regime negates the existence of those This crisis has become a matter of public who resist it in the name of free will and debate among the ideologues of the fr eedom of conscience.10 In sum, the Islamic Republic. To analyze it they ref e r Islamic Republic rebels against God’s will neither to Iranian history, nor to the by denying the existence of the very indi- canonical religious and political texts of viduals He created. Revolutionary the Muslim world. Instead, the reg i m e ’ s Islamist justice is alien to the spirit of tra- ideologues try to make sense of their own ditional Muslim jurisprudence. Rather, situation by looking to the Soviet and it is closer to that of the French rev o l u - Chinese experiences.12 tionary tribunal of 1794. Indeed, the regime’s cadres try to The revolutionary character of the understand their own political identity Islamist regime enabled Khamenei, the by referring to the political literat u r e of pr esident of the Islamic Republic, who the modern West. Akbar Ganji, a mid- later became its Supreme Leader, to laud dl e - r anking official of the regime, is the the achievements of the Chinese and emblematic figure of a generation of North Korean atheist re v o l u t i o n a r y young Islamist militants. His intellectual regimes without contradiction. The it i n e r ary is crucial in that it uncovers pr esident said that the elements that the erosion of the regime’s ideology. In bring the Islamic regime close to North his study examining the writings of Ko r ea are their common rev o l u t i o n a r y major Shi’a jurisconsults, Ganji first ch a r acter and anti-Americanism. The shows the discrepancy between their tra- pr esident publicly acknowledged the long ditional worldview and the experience and sincere collaboration and political of the Islamic Republic.13 He eventually relationship between the Islamic refers to a long citation of Benito Republic and North Korea . 11 Mussolini on fascist ideology to explain Ira n ’s political system.14 Satan’s Twofold Figure. The Wes t For Ganji, the story of the Iran i a n that the Iranian regime identifies with Revolution is one of a faction identifying Satan is not, theref o r e, a geograp h i c a l with the modern revolutionary left that and cultural entity, for the Islamists owe allies itself with another faction inspired most of the concepts governing their by European far-right re v o l u t i o n a r y actions to Western thought. The reg i m e ’ s movements. A modern Islamist rev o l u - an t i - W estern rhetoric is rooted in its tion was the outcome of this alliance.15 By rejection of liberal democracy in general , reading Ganji one realizes that, in effect, and human rights in particular. The the revolutionary regime was sustained Islamic Republic’s anti-Americanism is for a decade by the Iranian equivalent of best understood as a reaction against a the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pac t . 16 pr ecise definition of the body politic. Only with the fall of the Soviet bloc did This definition admits no other truth the pact dissolve, revealing the chronic than the existence of an autonomous tension between the ref o r m i s t – l e f t – a n d individual pursuing his happiness. the conservative–right–wings of the rev o - Not surprisingly, the failure of the lutionary oligarch y . revolutionary ideology and the fall of the From this perspective, one can under- Soviet bloc have created a major crisis of stand the title Ganji chose for the article legitimacy within the Islamic reg i m e . that made him famous in Iran, “Satan is

[1 0 2 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs B O R O U MAND Politics&Diplomacy the First Fascist.” This title curiously the past twenty-five years, Iranian intel- echoes the official rhetoric that identifies lectuals and public opinion have been the United States as the Great Satan. pondering the old humanist’s rem a r k , These two depictions of Satan exemplify asking themselves why they rejected the the antagonistic dimensions of modern de m o c r atic option in 1979.18 political culture, liberal democracy, and The intelligentsia has begun to con- to t a l i t a r i a n i s m . sider this issue seriously. The Iran i a n philosopher Dariush Shayegan analyzed Ne ither Western nor Islamic, the reasons for the elite’s failure in 1979. De mocracy is Universal. We should The obsession with Westernization, he now consider the problem of the tran s i - says, completely alienated Iranian intellec- tion to democracy. It is not Islam per se tuals during the sixties and seventies. He that prevents this transition nor is it the shows how anti-Occidentalism found its country’s traditions, which are no more roots in three Western schools of thought than a rhetorical illusion. Neither Islam in s p i r ed respectively by the French anti- nor traditions have been able to curb the modernist thinker Rene Guenon, the profound mutation that Muslim societies German philosopher Martin Heidegger, have experienced for two centuries. It is and the Marxist revolutionary ideology.19 instead the ideological and practical Shayegan argues that independent critical st r u c t u r e of totalitarianism that Iran must thought was not on the agenda of post- abolish to make the transition to democ- 1945 Iranian intellectuals.20 racy. The question is: why did the Iran i a n The same radical questioning can be people favor a totalitarian option instead he a r d among the current Iranian politi- of a liberal democracy in 1979? cal elite. In recent months, two authors The very generation staging the rev o - seemingly rep r esenting opposite ends of lution refused the democratic option the political spectrum published major when it was given the chance by Shapur works in Iran and in the United States. Bakhtiar, the last prime minister under The first, Republican Manifesto, was written the Shah. A long-time social democrat by Akbar Ganji, a product of the Islamic who spent many years in the prisons of Revolution; the second, Covenant with the the Pahlavi monarchy, Bakhtiar used his Peo p l e , by Reza Pahlavi, the pretender to platform as premier to urge his fellow the throne of Iran, who now lives in the citizens to organize political parties and United States. The former is heir to a form trade unions. He asked Khomeini violent totalitarian tradition, the latter to respect democratic principles and to to an autocratic one. Ganji criticizes vie for power not as a religious but a revolutionary thought and pleads for a political leader. Bakhtiar argued that a secular democracy founded on human legitimate leader should come to power dignity and human rights. Pa h l a v i through ballots, not through stre e t de p l o r es, perhaps too implicitly, the lack d e m o n s t rations and riots. When of popular participation during his Bakhtiar left office in February 1979, he father’s reign and calls for a modern and challenged his fellow citizens with a de m o c r atic form of monarchy based on poignant remark, “How strange, we the principles of inalienable individual o f f e red these people freedom and rights and government by the consent of de m o c r acy, they refused to be free . ” 17 For the governed. Human rights and secu-

Summer/Fall 2003 [1 0 3] PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN IRAN larism are the common denominator of the sole legitimacy of the government.23 both works. H a e r i - Yazdi draws a dividing line For more than twenty years, Iran i a n s between Mohammad’s function as a have experienced the absolute negation prophet designated by God and that of a of the individual. Perhaps it is this very te m p o r al ruler elected by his people and negation that has made them understand approved by God. God’s approbation of the existential relevance of modern indi- Mohammad as an elected ruler is inter- vidualism and human rights. For that pr eted as God’s endorsement of the sov- reason, human rights are at the heart of er eignty of the people.24 In the same vein, today’s public debate in Iran. Lawyers, Mohammad Motjtahed Shabestari, a students, and university professors ref e r w e l l - respected theologian, argues in to human rights as a universal heritage, favor of a “state founded on the Universal and the homo islamicus is a rar e phenome- De c l a r ation of Human Rights.”25 non. This is precisely what distinguishes the pre- r evolutionary era from contem- In the Eyes of the West. Tot a l i - po r ary Iran . tarian regimes create and propagate ficti- Students are eager to learn about tious versions of reality in order to hide de m o c r acy and to understand its prem i s - their moral and political failures. If such es. The following statement by the stu- propaganda remains unchallenged, dents of the University of Zanjan is one totalitarian rulers can all too easily atom- example among many: ize their societies and isolate their citizens. Communism greatly benefited The Students’ movement should from the Western democracies’ ideologi- abandon sterile political strife cal naiveté. The Islamic Republic, for its (between reformists and conserva- part, has been able to survive for a quar- tives). It should concentrate on the- ter of a century by relying on the same or etical questions to remedy its own st r atagem. The West could help by chal- weaknesses. It must focus on the lenging the official propaganda and study of key concepts such as democ- acknowledging the demands of the Iran - racy, republicanism, and human ian people. This would be simple to do rights. This theoretical work must and would carry little or no risk. Yet it enable the student movement to take would probably give a huge moral and up the challenge of substituting a psychological boost to pro-democrac y man defined by his duties by a man fo r ces within Iran . defined by his rights.21 For almost two decades, Western de m o c r acies viewed Iranians as believers For their part, the dissident Shi’a mystically united by a supreme political scholars advocate secular democracy in and spiritual leader. The West refused to the name of Islam. The late Haeri-Yaz d i acknowledge that this false united front rejected the legitimacy of the Islamic was made possible by and endured Republic, establishing the body politic because of an exclusionary dynamic that on an agreement between citizens, who pitted “insiders” against “outsiders.” The collectively own the public space and insiders were a small minority.26 The out- their rulers.22 The citizens give mandate siders were the majority of the Iran i a n to their rulers. The popular mandate is people who were kept at bay by a ruling

[1 0 4 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs B O R O U MAND Politics&Diplomacy elite using terror. Today, the regime pro- worship; the separation of religious motes the idea of Islamic democracy and authority from political power; and free - claims that this system embodies the will dom from arbitrary arrest and detention. of the Iranian people. According to this These demands correspond to the model regime, Islamic democracy–unlike of a secular democracy, for which the Western democrac y –is founded not on Ir anian people yearn. human rights but on virtue.27 To truly identify the will of the Iranians, however, Author ’s Note : I would like to thank Marc Plat- tner and Philip Costopoulos for their comments. one need only look at the demands that This article is drawn from a conference on S é c u l a r- ar e most often put forward in the public isation, démocratisation et monde musulman, organized by the Association française pour l’étude de la debate: freedom of speech, assembly, and M é d i t e r ranée orientale et du monde turc o - i ra n i e n association; freedom of conscience and hosted by UNESCO in Paris in November 2002.

N OT E S

1 M. Motahari, “Islam and revolution,” Pir a m o u n - e 16 For the admiration and ideological sympathy Jomhouri-e Eslami (1999): 139–14 1 . between Nazis and Communists, see Francois Fur et “ 2 S. Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The the Past of an illusion” the chapter on Nazism and Islamic Revolution in Iran (O x f o r d: Oxford University co m m u n i s m . Press, 1988), 156. 17 “The comments of Shapour Bakhtiar - The sto- 3 H. Dabashi, “Ali Shari’ati: The Islamic Ideo- ry of the Iranian Revolution” BBC World Service Per s i a n . logue Par Excellence,” Theology of Discontent: The Ideological 18 See the monthly Payam-e Emrouz, Feb r u a r y - Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1993): 102–14 6 . Ma r ch 2000, 14; D. Shayegan, Le regard mutile, Schizo- 4 S. Amir Arjomand, “Traditionnalism in Iran , ” phrenie culturelle : pays traditionnels face a la modernite (Pa r i s : From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam (1984): 222–3. Albin Michel, 1988); M.R. Nikfar, Khoshunat, Hoquq-e 5 D. Shayegan, Qu’est-ce qu’une révolution religieuse Bashar , Jame’eh Madani (Te h r an: Tarh-e No, 1999); A. (Pa r i s : Les presses d’aujourd’hui, 1982) 202. Ganji, Majma’ol Jaze’r Zendan Gu n e h , (Teh r an: Tarh-e No, 6 H. Dabashi, 463. 2002); S.J. Tabataba’i, Zaval Andisheh Siassi dar Iran 7 A. Khomenei, “Second Sermon during the Fri - (Te h r an: Kavir, 1996). The most brilliant form of day Prayer April 21st 1989 (1/2/1368),” Jomhouri-e Esla- this introspection could be found in A. Nafisi, Re a d i n g mi , 21 April 1989 (2/2/1368), 11. Lolita in Tehran, a memoir in books (New York: Random 8 R. Khomeini, Etela’at, 22 January 1982. House, 2003). 9 H. Arendt, Tot a l i t a r i a n s m (New York: A Harvest 19 D. Shayegan, 1982, 129–13 8 . Book, 1976), 153. 20 Ibid., 139–15 0 . 10 During the summer of 1988, the reg i m e 21 ISNA (Iran Students News Agency) (10 October engaged in mass executions of prisoners who were 20 0 2 ) . pr eviously sentenced to various prison terms. Thou- 22 M. Haeri Yazdi, Hekmat va Hokumat (Shadi Pub- sands of prisoners were executed in few months; how- lishing, 1995), 216. ever the regime did not make these executions public. 23 Ibid., 120–12 1 . H. A. Montazeri, 355–6. 24 Ibid., 151–4. 11 A. Khamenei, “Second sermon at the Fri d a y 25 M. Mojtahed Shabestari, “Human Rights, the pr ayer May 20, 1989 (29/2/1368),” Jomhouri-e Eslami, True Foundation of the Social Order,” Ne s h a t (22 May 21 May 1989(30/2/1368): 9. 1999, 1/3/1378). 12 See “The Chinese model (olgouy-e Tch i n i ) , ” 26 M. Rayshahri, “Discourse at Teh r an University No r o o z , 27 April 2002 (27/2/1381): 2. (F riday sermon), February 4, 2000,” Fat t h (5 Feb r u - 13 A. Ganji, Talaqi-e fasciti az din va hokoo m a t ary 2000, 16/11/1378). For the point of view of the (The fascist interpretation of religion and govern- outsiders see A. Khamei, “The Iranian Insiders and ment) (Teh r an: Tarh-e No, 1999): 7–8. the Iranian Outsiders,” Go z a r e s h 97-98 (March – A p r i l 14 B. Mussolini, “fascismo”, in Enciclopedia italiana 1999, farvardin 1378): 67–70 . 14, 847–51 (1932). 27 M. Khatami, Fear of Wave (Te h r an: Simaye Javan, 15 A. Ganji, “Satan is the first fascist” (1999): 1997): 154–5. 18 9 –20 4 .

Summer/Fall 2003 [1 0 5 ] AD: Seton Hill Journal on Diplomacy and IR