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Through the Web, Darkly Through the Web, Darkly Through the Web, Darkly Through the Web, Darkly © Copyright 2020 William von Hagen. All Rights Reserved. All opinions expressed in this document are the opinions of the author, except where explicitly attributed to someone else. They are just that - opinions. Free thought and speech are still legal, aren't they? Released on Amazon and as donation-ware. If you didn't get this on Amazon and liked any part(s) of this document or found it to be useful, please make a small donation via PayPal to <[email protected]> or in Bitcoin to 35DnXM3Fg9zvirbraGmUGecLy7EPZiBWsT. Thanks! Comments welcome. Updates will be ongoing. Any errors are accidental. Please report them to [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] to ensure that this document is corrected. Heads up! The cover illustration is a public domain photograph of the skull of St. Wenceslaus [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/ File:St_Wenceslas_skull.jpg]. Merry Xmas, reader! ISBN-13: 978-0-578-56194-3 Version 20200526-002 This legend may not be removed from this document by any party. That would be just plain wrong. Through the Web, Darkly Table of Contents Table of Contents About this book .............................................................................................................. xi 1. Overview ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Cast of hackers ................................................................................................... 2 1.2. Differentiating between privacy and anonymity ......................................................... 4 1.3. Ways of exploring ............................................................................................... 4 1.4. Non-reader's checklists ......................................................................................... 5 1.5. More reasons to worry abut privacy and anonymity ................................................... 6 2. Selecting hardware and an operating system ....................................................................... 7 2.1. Selecting your hardware ....................................................................................... 8 2.2. What OS to use when exploring ............................................................................. 8 2.2.1. How Linux is distributed ............................................................................ 9 2.2.2. To VM or not to VM? ............................................................................... 9 2.3. Putting together a secure system ........................................................................... 10 2.3.1. Dat Mofo' Linux ..................................................................................... 11 2.3.2. Just Browsing, honest! ............................................................................. 12 2.3.3. Kodachi! Gesundheit! ............................................................................... 13 2.3.4. Parrot Linux - Argv, matey! ...................................................................... 14 2.3.5. Qubes OS .............................................................................................. 16 2.3.6. TAILS, I win .......................................................................................... 17 2.3.7. Whonix do you love? ............................................................................... 18 2.4. Recommendation: Which Linux? .......................................................................... 20 3. Installing Linux on a USB stick ...................................................................................... 21 3.1. Partitioning and formatting USB storage ................................................................ 21 3.2. Formatting the partitions on your USB storage ........................................................ 24 3.3. Writing a Linux distribution to USB storage ........................................................... 25 3.4. Now I have a bootable secure OS - Why read more? ................................................ 29 4. How Free Can You Go - Hardware/Pre-OS Security ........................................................... 31 4.1. The Hardware to Software Hand-Off: The Boot Process and GNU .............................. 31 4.1.1. How Modern Booting Works ..................................................................... 33 4.1.2. Boot Process and Other Low-Level Snooping ............................................... 34 4.1.2.1. The Intel Mis-Management Engine (IME) ......................................... 34 4.1.2.2. Itel vPro ...................................................................................... 34 4.1.2.3. AMD In-Secure Technology (AST) .................................................. 36 4.1.3. Finding Freedom with CoreBoot and LibreBoot ............................................ 36 4.1.4. Other Low-Level Scheiss .......................................................................... 36 5. Making a Windows 10 system secure .............................................................................. 37 5.1. Overview of securing a Windows 10 system ........................................................... 37 5.2. Things to think about for a clean install ................................................................. 38 5.2.1. Which version of Windows to start with? .................................................... 38 5.2.2. Storage encryption is job one .................................................................... 39 5.2.2.1. Using Microsoft's Device Encyption ................................................. 39 5.2.2.2. Using Microsoft's BitLocker disk encryption ...................................... 39 5.2.2.3. Using third-party disk encryption ..................................................... 40 5.2.3. Installation requirements ........................................................................... 42 5.2.3.1. Creating a new account .................................................................. 43 5.2.3.2. An island is better than a peninsula .................................................. 43 5.3. Locking down a Windows 10 system .................................................................... 44 5.3.1. Creating a save point ............................................................................... 44 5.3.2. Creating a new user for "experimentation" ................................................... 47 5.3.3. Stopping personal data donation ................................................................. 49 5.3.3.1. Disabling general eavesdropping and data collection ............................ 50 © 2019, William von Hagen iii Table of Contents Through the Web, Darkly 5.3.3.2. Eliminating data collection details .................................................... 52 5.3.3.3. Customizing application and personal security .................................... 56 5.3.4. Locking down and expediting Windows Updates ........................................... 64 5.4. Selecting and running anti-virus software ............................................................... 64 5.5. Selecting a browser and maximizing browser security ............................................... 65 5.5.1. Chrome .................................................................................................. 65 5.5.2. Edge ..................................................................................................... 65 5.5.3. Firefox .................................................................................................. 65 5.5.4. Exensions for any browser ........................................................................ 65 5.6. Random security and usability optimizations ........................................................... 65 6. Dress for success, er, privacy ......................................................................................... 67 6.1. Protecting your data and the box it comes in ........................................................... 67 6.1.1. Physical protection: Faraday cages and you .................................................. 67 6.1.2. Counter-Surveillance Devices .................................................................... 68 6.1.2.1. Counter-Surveillance Hardware Devices ............................................ 68 6.1.2.2. Counter-Surveillance Software ........................................................ 68 6.1.3. Data protection: passwords and encryption ................................................... 68 6.1.3.1. Passwords and the boot sequence ..................................................... 69 6.1.3.2. Setting a Win/Lintel BIOS or UEFI password .................................... 69 6.1.4. Encryption is still job one ......................................................................... 71 6.2. Wiping your electronics quickly ........................................................................... 71 7. My kingdom, or 0.005 bitcoin, for a VPN ........................................................................ 73 7.1. Why a VPN? .................................................................................................... 73 7.2. What is 5 EYES and why do they suck? ................................................................ 74 7.3. How does the Patriot Act bite you in the ass? ......................................................... 75 7.4. Censorship is to knowledge as lynching is to justice ................................................
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