Aish, Huriyya, Karama Insaniyya

RESEARCH aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya: framing and the 2011 egyptian uprising killian clarke New York University, Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies, 50 Washington Square South at 255 Sullivan Street, New York, NY10012, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

doi:10.1057/eps.2012.41; published online 25 January 2013

Abstract One of the principal chants that was raised during the Egyptian uprising of 2011 was aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya, or ‘bread, freedom, human dignity’. This slogan encapsulated the three primary collective action frames that activists employed during the uprising. I argue that these frames were drawn from, and engaged with, three broad themes in Egypt’s political discourse that had been developed over the previous decade: poor economic conditions, lack of democracy, and police abuse.

Keywords Egypt; framing; discourse; mobilisation

n January 25, 2011 the streets of economic grievances (poverty, unem- Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, and many ployment, high food prices) that had O other Egyptian cities erupted in afflicted Egyptian citizens of many classes protest. Egyptians marched through for decades. The second, huriyya, was a alleys and squares chanting slogans that call for the political freedoms that had aired a slew of social, political, and long been denied under the authoritarian economic grievances. Among the most regime of then-President Hosni Mubarak. common of these chants was ‘aish, hur- And finally, karama insaniyya, was a cry iyya, karama insaniyya’ or ‘bread, free- for the kind of basic human dignity that dom, human dignity’.1 These three Mubarak’s police state had always vio- demands, articulated together in a single lated, through torture, police abuse, a phrase, encapsulate the three primary draconian Emergency Law, and, in certain collective action frames that brought cases, outright murder. During the eigh- Egyptian citizens out into the streets in teen-day uprising that pushed Mubarak January and February 2011. The first, out of power, these three frames were aish, simply means ‘bread,’ but served reproduced many times and in many as a metaphor for the array of basic different ways – in slogans chanted on

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(197–214) & 2013 European Consortium for Political Research. 1680-4333/13 www.palgrave-journals.com/eps/ the streets, in public statements made by I trace the development prominent intellectuals, in newspaper articles and posts on blogs, Twitter, and of each of these Facebook, in pamphlets and posters, and discursive themes, as graffiti and street art spray-painted on discussing the contexts walls. Though protesting had become increas- out of which they ingly common in the decade before the emerged and how they uprising, the slogan aish, huriyya, kara- were articulated y ma insaniyya had never been heard in Egypt’s streets before. How did the activists who called for the January 25 protest arrive at this synthesis of collective action frames? And how can we explain these FRAMING PROCESSES, three frames’ power in mobilising people CULTURE, AND DISCOURSE into action? I argue that the activists who produced and disseminated the uprising’s There is a rich literature in the scholarship core frames drew from, and engaged on social movements and mobilisation, with, a rich and multidimensional political dealing with what has been termed ‘col- discourse, whose symbols, meanings, lective action frames’ or ‘framing pro- and vocabularies had evolved since the cesses’ (Snow et al, 1986; Snow and 1990s to include three broad themes – Benford, 1988, 1992, 2000a; Gamson, the need to improve Egypt’s dire eco- 1992a, b; Hunt et al, 1994; Gamson and nomic situation, the need to establish Meyer, 1996). The concept of a ‘frame’ is democratic political structures, and the originally drawn from the work of Erving need to end police abuse. At some point Goffman (1974: 21), who defined frames during the decade before the uprising, as ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable each of these themes had been embraced, people to ‘locate perceive, identify, and elaborated, and propagated by various label’ the events and occurrences in the social movements and political campaigns world around them. Goffman’s largely within Egyptian society. In explaining why psychological understanding of frames Egyptian activists chose the frames they was amended by social movement scho- did and why those frames proved to be lars to describe a more processual phe- so resonant, I trace the development of nomenon, in which individuals and each of these discursive themes, discuss- organisations actively engage in the con- ing the contexts out of which they struction and dissemination of frames for emerged and how they were articulated the purposes of mobilising people to rally by particular groups at particular times. around a common cause. Under this con- In doing so, I draw on a combination of structionist interpretation, frames are de- (a) primary source documents released fined as ‘the conscious, strategic efforts by by social movements, campaigns, political groups of people to fashion shared under- parties, and individuals through a variety standings of the world and of themselves of mediums, (b) my own interviews with that legitimate and motivate collective activists, politicians, and civil society lea- action’ (McAdam et al, 1996: 6). ders conducted during the summers of Activists face a number of challenges 2008 and 2011, and (c) secondary sources in developing frames that can motivate and scholarly analyses that also examine others to join them in collective action. the recent evolution of Egypt’s political For example, they must propose ‘diag- discourse. nostic frames’ that call attention to

198 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya injustices and assign blame by identifying Activists face a number their source. Likewise they must suggest ‘prognostic frames’ that articulate a solu- of challenges in tion to their grievances and ‘motivational developing frames that frames’ that provide a rationale for can motivate others to engaging in collective action (Snow and Benford, 1988, 2000a). In articulating join them in collective these frames, activists must be attentive action. to the kinds of language they use, to the events and experiences that they empha- on, and resources for, activists in their sise, and to the narratives that they framing efforts (Oliver and Johnston, construct, so that their frames will have 2000; Snow and Benford, 2000b). maximal coherence. Additionally, they Whether one speaks of culture, discourse, must endeavor to give their frames or ideology, the point is that social move- resonance by couching them in prevailing ments must engage dialogically and in- meanings, ideologies, myths, values, and teractively with the prevailing meanings beliefs. of their society as they develop their The framing literature has come under collective action frames. criticism for the way in which it deals with As this literature would predict, framing the question of culture and discourse processes were integral to the Egyptian (Swidler, 1995; Hart, 1996; Jasper, uprising. Many of the activists who orga- 1997; Williams and Kubal, 1999; Good- nised the initial days of protest noted the win and Jasper, 1999, 2004; Goodwin time and energy they devoted to devel- et al, 2001). These critics argue that oping effective slogans and calls to action. frame analysis tends to ‘reify culture’ by Moreover, the way they talked about their conceiving it as a distinct social sphere framing efforts reflects the literature’s that social movements must ‘make sense emphasis on the strategic facets of frame of’ through their framing processes. They construction processes. For example, point out that social movements engage Walid Rashed, a leader from the 6 April recursively with prevailing culture, both Youth movement, described how his drawing on existing cultural meanings group tried to ‘market’ their ideas to and producing new meanings through regular Egyptians: ‘They were our custo- the frames they create. Culture provides mers. And we were the salespeople. And a ‘stock’ of beliefs, meaning, values, the idea of change is the product that has narratives, and themes that both con- to be sold. I’m dealing with any idea as a strain movement activists in the frames product’.2 they can produce, but also offer them an Other scholars have called attention to array of discursive resources on which the efforts of Egypt’s activists to construct they might draw in their frame develop- compelling frames during and before ment efforts. One of these scholars, Marc the uprising, and the important role Steinberg (1995, 1998), draws attention those frames played in mobilising broad to the importance of prevailing discourses participation (Alexander, 2011; Alterman, and their relationship to frames. He 2011; Bayat, 2011; Hamzawy, 2011; argues that discourses ‘bound the set of Hirschkind, 2011). Some have noted that meanings through which challengers can the protests were successful, in part, articulate claims’ (1995: 48). A similar because activists for the first time were argument has been made about the able to convert economic grievances relationship between frames and ideol- into political demands (Alterman, 2011; ogy, which are seen as both constraints Hamzawy, 2011). In a slightly different

killian clarke european political science: 12 2013 199 vein, Jeffrey Alexander (2011) has high- and ideas that appealed to Egyptians of lighted the performative nature of the many ideological currents. Many of the uprising. He argues that activists drew up movements that emerged later in the compelling scripts and projected powerful decade adopted this post-Islamist voca- symbols that imbued the events with bulary in their campaigns, making it an enough meaning and cultural power to important intellectual precursor to the encourage masses of people to partici- three collective action frames that moti- pate in the performance. Finally, Charles vated the uprising. Hirschkind (2011) and Asef Bayat (2011) The first manifestations of post-Isla- have both argued that the demands of the mism emerged in the mid-1990s, as a revolution were drawn from a particular collection of Islamist thinkers in Egypt, kind of political discourse that bridged the and the rest of the Arab world, began to long-standing divide between secular and reexamine the relationship between Isla- Islamist forces in Egyptian politics. All of mist thought and classic ‘liberal’ ideas like these works are noteworthy for calling democracy, rights, and justice. They attention to the framing processes at argued that liberalism and Islamism were work during the Egyptian uprising, but not as fundamentally incompatible as none of them systematically account for both currents claimed, and that Islamic how the different frames were developed, ideas had the potential to be reinter- nor how they related to the prevailing preted to support more liberal causes. cultural symbols and discursive themes in They appropriated concepts like human the Egyptian public sphere. rights, social justice, democratic government, and freedom of expression, and couched them in Islamic terms. Though LAYING THE FOUNDATION: their project was not particularly radical, THE POST-ISLAMIST and the term ‘post-Islamist’ – with its CONSENSUS connotations of rupture and breaking with the past – was only applied by others and Before elaborating on the specific frames after the fact, the innovations of these that shaped the uprising, I first explore thinkers did represent something fresh in some of the changes that occurred in the Egyptian public sphere, which had Egypt’s political discourse in the late traditionally been marked by ideological 1990s and early 2000s that provided an polarisation. By seeking to accommodate intellectual foundation upon which acti- Islamist thought with ideas normally vists later built their particular campaigns. championed by liberals and secularists, During these years, a political current, the post-Islamists created a political lan- later termed ‘post-Islamism’, began to guage that offered new potential for emerge in the Egyptian public sphere cross-partisan collaboration and coali- (Bayat, 2007; Kepel, 2002; Roy, 1994, tional political initiatives. 2004). Though debatably its legacy as There were two primary sources of a political project has been limited, I argue post-Islamist thought in Egypt in the that post-Islamism had an important im- 1990s, one intellectual and the other pact on Egypt’s political discourse, provid- largely political. The former was centered ing new possibilities for cross-ideological on a group of moderate Islamist writers, collaboration and consensus-building that journalists, and scholars, which included were critical for the formulation of future individuals like Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tariq political campaigns. The innovations of al-Bishri, Muhammad ‘Imara, Muhammad post-Islamist thinkers provided Egypt’s Salim al-Awwa, Fahmy Howeidy, and political class with a bedrock of concerns Abdel Wahhab al-Messiri. Though these

200 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya thinkers were not part of any formal between them to begin working together group, they did represent a relatively on joint political initiatives. When the coherent and unified school of thought, second Palestinian Intifada broke out in which Raymond Baker (2003) has descri- 2000, the reformist wings of the Islamist bed as the ‘Wasatiyya’ (or ‘centrist’) and leftist camps formed the Popular school. Their ideological innovations Committee for Solidarity with the Palesti- occurred in parallel to a political project nian Intifada, which organised a variety launched by a collection of moderate of charity events, press conferences, Muslim Brotherhood members who had and political demonstrations designed to grown disillusioned with the Brothers’ show solidarity with the Palestinians ideological inflexibility. These disillu- (el-Hamalawy, 2007; Abdelrahman, 2009). sioned MB leaders decided to split with In 2002 and 2003, when it became the organisation and founded their own increasingly clear that the United States political party, called Al-Wasat (‘The Cen- was preparing to invade Iraq, the same tre’) (Stacher, 2002; Wickham, 2004). committee began organising events to According to Abu el-Ela Madi, the party’s oppose the war. Throughout these activ- founder, the leaders wanted ‘to present a ities, the various political groups nego- new way of moderate Islamic thinking, tiated and debated fiercely over what kinds which would accept cooperation with of demands would be mutually acceptable. others, which would accept full democ- Though foreign issues provided more racy, and which would accept the rotation common ground than domestic ones, of political power’.3 The party articulated a disputes still erupted frequently. As Adel moderate platform that embraced princi- El-Mashad, a leftist and founding member ples based on democracy, Shari’a, and of the Popular Committee for Solidarity human rights, and drew on the ideas of with the Palestinian Intifada said: the Wasatiyya thinkers. Within the Committee itself there are In parallel to these shifts in Islamist [Islamist] sympathies y And so there thinking, Egypt also witnessed some mod- has been conflict on the position to take eration in other political currents during regarding several issues, and at the end the 1990s. Many members of the leftist of the day we chose to disagree and not Tagammu Party had become disillusioned issue a position y Many international by the party’s kowtowing to regime movements – such as the anti- globa- demands and began defecting to leftist lisation movement – face this quand- NGOs, and to an underground Trotskyite ary. Either to limit their ranks to like- movement called the Revolutionary Socia- minded people, or to open up and lists. Likewise, the Nasserist Party lost incorporate all different views and live a number of prominent members to a with that difference. We have chosen splinter party called Karama (‘Dignity’), the second option, and we feel that it is which resembled the Wasat in its calls for more productive, even if on certain moderation and cross-ideological coop- issues we are unable to take a collective eration. These new political groups began stand. Al Ahram Weekly (2002) meeting and discussing questions of reform in a variety of conferences, semi- As El-Mashad points out, the groups nars, and informal meetings, eventually managed their differences by avoiding developing a shared political language divisive issues and focusing on areas based largely on post-Islamist innovations of common ground. Eventually what (el-Ghobashy, 2005). emerged from these debates was a dis- By the early 2000s, these groups had course oriented mostly around human sufficiently bridged the ideological gaps rights, though with heavy condemnation

killian clarke european political science: 12 2013 201 of Zionism and US neo-imperialism as opposition to the Mubarak regime. Not well. only was it the first political force in Egypt The campaigns around the Iraq War and to construct such an inclusive rhetoric, the Intifada did not reconcile all, or even but it was also bolder than any opposition most, of the differences between Isla- campaign before it, in directly calling for mists and secularists. Instead, they of- the President to step down (el-Mahdi, fered forums for debate, in which areas of 2009; Clarke, 2011). limited common ground were built upon The Kefaya movement’s genesis can be and entrenched in the political discourse traced to an Iftar dinner in November of the opposition. Though post-Islamist 2003 hosted by the founder of the Wasat movements like the Wasat Party ulti- Party, Abu el-Ela Madi. Several dozen mately went on to have a limited impact prominent Egyptian intellectuals were in on Egypt’s political terrain, their contribu- attendance and the group spent the tions to Egypt’s political culture may have evening discussing the political situation been much greater. By opening the door in Egypt at the time.4 Many of the guests to cross-partisan dialogue and couching had been active leaders in the Popu- concepts in terms that could be accepted lar Committee in Solidarity with the by many currents, they took the first Palestinian Intifada and they were drawn steps toward developing a political dis- primarily from those groups that had course that could be a source of mobilisa- emerged in the 1990s as reformist off- tion for Egyptians of many ideological shoots of the mainstream political cur- orientations. rents. For example, the Karama Party was well represented, as were the Revolution- ary Socialists and a number of prominent HURIYYA: THE KEFAYA leftist members of the human rights MOVEMENT community. The Wasat Party’s founder was the host, and a number of the The dialogue between different political more reformist MB members were also groups that had begun during the 1990s present. The participants were united in and intensified during the activities their anger and disillusionment over the around the Intifada and the Iraq War, Mubarak regime’s perpetual resistance to took a critical turn in 2004 with the democratic reforms or to allowing other foundation of the Egyptian Movement for political groups to have a voice. Moreover, Change, more commonly known by its at the time it was becoming apparent that popular slogan – ‘Kefaya’ (‘Enough’). The Mubarak was trying to position his son, Kefaya movement was led by a coalition Gamal Mubarak, to become his successor. of diverse political forces, whose heated The guests at Madi’s Iftar lamented these debating produced a rhetoric that was developments and, after debating what broad and inclusive enough to unite them course they might take, appointed six toward a common end. The programme individuals from each major political they championed built squarely on the current to draft a document that would post-Islamist discourse of the Wasat express their shared desire for change.5 Party and other moderate Islamists, with These six individuals took seven a heavy emphasis on democracy, free- months to draft a two-page document doms, human rights, and the nebulous that was acceptable to all the political concept of ‘change’. It was deliberately groups that had been represented at the uncontroversial, designed to draw in Iftar. The manifesto was repeatedly as many political forces as possible to amended and tweaked; for example, create a broad, cross-ideological front in some groups insisted on including

202 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya demands against foreign powers like The document then proposed seven Israel and the United States, as well as amendments to the constitution designed demands against the Mubarak regime, to limit the powers of the President, thus rehearsing some of the same themes create a genuine democratic process, that had been prominent in the debates of and enforce freedoms of expression and the preceding three years. According to association. The drafters solicited endor- Amin Iskander, one of the drafters and a sement signatures from 300 prominent leader in the Karama Party, he and his intellectuals and leaders from across colleagues knew that the ideas ‘had to be the political spectrum. They then held a simple and at the same time have a wide conference in September 2004, at which and comprehensive scope’.6 They settled the manifesto was released. After some on ‘democracy’ as the overarching theme, debate and discussion, the conference articulating an array of demands that participants decided to form a move- would all lead to greater political freedom. ment called ‘The Egyptian Movement for ‘Democracy’ had two major advantages: Change’ to pressure the Mubarak regime it avoided the question of economic into implementing their demands. reform, a divisive topic over which the The Kefaya movement held its first different groups disagreed, and it drew on demonstration in December 2004. Acti- the work of post-Islamist thinkers who had vists stood silently on the steps of the already made great strides in connecting Egyptian Supreme Court with yellow the idea of democracy to Islamist thought. stickers bearing the word ‘Kefaya’ embla- As Ahmed Baha’a Shaaban, a communist zoned across their mouths and chests, a and the document’s chief writer put it: metaphor for the regime’s silencing of political opposition. In the months that We refused all points that would lead to followed, its demonstrations came to be a disagreement y The main point was prominent feature of Egypt’s political democracy. And we found that any landscape. During this time, the Kefaya other point would destroy this unity; activists honed their message, develop- because we had Islamists, and com- ing a series of catchy slogans and com- munists, and nationalists. And every- pelling frames designed to demonstrate one had their own main idea. But the regime’s hypocrisy, point out the need we all came together over the idea of for democratic reforms, and denounce democracy.7 the continuation of Mubarak’s presidency. As such, the document stated that the Indeed, although the manifesto itself chief domestic problem plaguing modern did not call for Mubarak to step down, Egypt was: ‘the repressive despotism that ‘yasqut, yasqut, Hosni Mubarak’ (‘down, pervades all aspects of the Egyptian down, with Hosni Mubarak’) became one political system and want for democratic of their most popular chants. ‘La li tamdid, governance’. It went on to articulate four la li tawrith’ (‘no to extension, no to ‘concrete steps on our route to democracy succession’) was another common slo- and progress: gan, which denounced Mubarak’s plan to pass on power to his son, as was the 1. Breaking the hold of the ruling party on ‘kefaya’ chant itself, in which a leader power and all its instruments; would call out a number of grievances 2. Cessation of the Emergency Law now (‘corruption!’ ‘Emergency law!’ ‘Hosni in effect for a full quarter century; Mubarak’) and the crowd would shout 3. Cessation of all laws which constrain back ‘kefaya!’ (‘enough!’). Kefaya also public and individual freedoms; and cultivated relationships with prominent 4. Effecting constitutional reform’8 thinkers and intellectuals who had

killian clarke european political science: 12 2013 203 previously articulated moderate or continuing the political conversations that post-Islamist political ideas. For example, the movement had started, further honing its leadership was close to Tariq al-Bishri, its democratic rhetoric (Hirschkind, 2011; a judge and prominent Islamist thinker Lynch, 2007a, b). A wave of judges’ pro- from the ‘Wasatiyya’ stream of thought, tests in 2006 employed some of Kefaya’s who they considered nominating as a most successful frames, while also includ- Kefaya candidate for president. They ing a series of specific demands regarding also selected Abdel Wahhab al-Messiri, judicial and constitutional reform. When another Wasatiyya thinker, as their sec- Mohammed el-Baradei, the former director ond general coordinator. of the International Atomic Energy Agency Another important part of Kefaya’s dis- and Nobel Peace Prize recipient, returned course was its emphasis on individual to Egypt in 2010, he formed an organi citizenship, rather than political parties sation called the National Association for and ideology. Indeed, the manifesto be- Change, which included many former gins by stating that ‘we, the undersigned, Kefaya members and adopted much of are citizens of Egypt’ therefore presenting the movement’s democratic language. For the signatories as individual citizens, example, its first public statement was rather than representatives of political titled ‘A statement of the Egyptian move- currents. Moreover, Kefaya’s leadership ment for free and sound elections based on insisted that its members join ‘as indivi- the comments of Mohammed el-Baradei’. duals’ rather than as representatives of The statement goes on to articulate five particular groups, and they refused to demands targeted at ensuring fair parlia- allow NGOs or political parties to join as mentary elections at the end of 2010: organisations.9 Though in reality many amending the constitution, abolishing the members did come to the movement Emergency Law, preparing new election representing their parties’ or factions’ schedules, and allowing international points of view, the movement’s official monitors and independent judicial moni- position was that it was simply a coalition tors.11 This same kind of inclusive political of concerned Egyptian citizens. This em- discourse was also, of course, a crucial phasis on individualism and citizenship theme in the rhetoric of the Egyptian also granted the necessary space for uprising. ‘Yasqut Mubarak’ was among many younger Kefaya members, who the most popular chants during the pro- were often new to politics, to craft var- tests, and freedom, democracy and citi- iegated political identities.10 By appea- zenship, were widely deployed frames. ling to individuals, Kefaya’s discourse Activists drew heavily on the political made room for ideological hybridity and discourse that Kefaya had developed, not diversity. only because it articulated well the political Kefaya’s activities diminished signifi- demands that they hoped to achieve, cantly after the end of 2005 and, though but also because it had already proven the movement’s leadership continued to successful in drawing together diverse meet, it largely disappeared from the ideological currents. political scene in Egypt. But although the movement withered away, its discourse of democracy, citizenship, and freedom AISH: LABOUR AND THE 6 endured, as myriad successive campaigns, APRIL YOUTH projects, and movements embraced its demands and ideas. For example, the Critics of the Kefaya movement argued Egyptian blogosphere became an impor- that its high political demands were tant arena in the aftermath of Kefaya for not appropriate for mobilising a mass

204 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya movement. Kefaya was accused of speak- reforms initiated by the government of ing only to a small audience of educated, Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, who was middle-class, urban intellectuals and appointed by Mubarak in 2004. Spurred politicians who alone represented a very on by Gamal Mubarak and a cohort of small fraction of the Egyptian population. business-oriented NDP leaders, the Nazif However, at about the same time as government enacted a wave of neo- Kefaya’s activities, a far more populist liberal reforms, including the privatisation and grass-roots kind of mobilisation was of many state-owned companies and the beginning to generate momentum. From erosion of worker protections, designed 2004 to 2008, 1.7 million Egyptian work- to encourage more foreign-direct-invest- ers engaged in more than 1,900 strikes ment. Workers reacted angrily to these and demonstrations, airing an array of changes. The first major strike occurred demands and grievances related to their in October 2004 at the ESCO Spinning poor working conditions, including low Company in Qalqubiya, north of Cairo, as wages, few collective bargaining rights, workers responded to the sale of the privatisation of government-owned busi- company from the state to a private nesses, and a lack of job security (Beinin, Egyptian investor, demanding that their 2010). Though their activities were jobs remain secure. The biggest strikes not coordinated by any formal social erupted in December 2006, and then movement organisation, workers’ groups, again in September 2007, at the massive based in different factories and cities, Misr Spinning and Weaving Company built on each others’ momentum, sharing in the working class town of Mahalla and exchanging strategies, tactics, deal-Kubra. The strike in Mahalla inspired mands, and slogans. They also had no workers in other sectors to demand their formal ties to the Kefaya movement, economic rights, and the annual number though they appropriated some of of strikes, gatherings, sit-ins, and demon- Kefaya’s frames and repertoires and were strations rose from between 200 and 270 inspired by its example. As Kemal Abu a year during 2004, 2005, and 2006, to Eita, a labour activist, Kefaya member, over 600 in 2008 (Beinin, 2011). Though and Karama Party leader explained: most of these strikes were over local economic grievances that plagued a spe- [Kefaya] helped in terms of the context cific group of workers, sometimes the that it created. People found a power in demands or chants would spill over into society that went down in the street and the realm of national politics; for exam- said: ‘Down, Down, Hosni Mubarak’. ple, at one strike in Mahalla al-Kubra, This destroyed the barrier of fear. workers pulled down and desecrated a It facilitated the idea of demonstrating poster of Hosni Mubarak. or sit-ins or strikes and made it easier. Beginning in 2007, striking began to It broke this image of the government spread from blue-collar industries like as impenetrable and all-powerful.12 textiles, sanitation, and building materi- The workers strikes also effected a als, to white-collar sectors of the econo- shift in the political conversation, away my that were mostly controlled by the from the high demands of democracy state. In the most famous example, the and citizenship and towards the more country’s municipal tax collectors held material issues of food prices, low wages, strikes through 2007 and 2008 until unemployment, and a lack of basic they were granted first a 325 per cent services. increase in their wage (commensurate The context for this wave of worker with their colleagues employed directly mobilisation was a series of economic by the Ministry of Finance) and then

killian clarke european political science: 12 2013 205 their own independent trade union (i.e, using some of the same language about separate from the state-controlled Egyp- rights and freedom: tian Trade Union Federation). The success We planned to use the same kind of of the tax collectors, and their ability to organization [as Youth for Change], but mobilise a broad network of employees, not the same goals. In Youth for prompted some labour leaders to launch Change the goal was ‘change Mubarak’. a national minimum wage campaign, In the 6 April movement the goal is to demanding that the government set change Mubarak and help the people y a minimum wage level of EGd1,200 So we brought together political, eco- a month. In 2010 the government re- nomic, and social demands as one y In sponded by raising the minimum wage 2005, Kefaya talked only about political to EGd400, a wholly inadequate level things: government, and Mubarak, and but still a significant achievement for the constitution. But the people in the the movement. streets don’t care. They just want food The workers’ movement was also and a home to sleep in. Nothing else. inspiring to many young middle-class Now all of the parties and political activists in Cairo and Alexandria who had movements are in agreement that the participated in Kefaya but had become way to change Mubarak is through disillusioned with its elitist orientation economic and social language. We and internal politicking. In 2008, Ahmed must make the link to the people and Maher, a young engineer who had been the street. We must make the link involved in Kefaya’s youth wing, Youth for between economic and political de- Change, established a group on Facebook mands. We must say that ‘freedom is called the 6 April Youth. Maher, and his bread’. You can’t get bread because we co-founders, believed that the workers’ don’t have freedom or democracy.13 movement proved that political demands like freedom and democracy were too Maher points out that, at the time, most abstract to affect normal Egyptians. They of the political opposition agreed that believed that economic frames, related to embracing the demands and language of the difficult conditions in which everyday the workers’ movement was crucial to Egyptians lived, would be superior for effecting real political change. Though generating genuine popular mobilisation. Kefaya had attempted some limited out- In 2007, they tried to link up with the reach to workers in 2005, the 6 April striking workers groups and rally Egypt’s Youth tried to build bridges with workers middle-class youth behind their cause. by organising protests and other poli- Then in 2008 they formed their Facebook tical events in solidarity with actions group and named it after a strike that had already scheduled by labour groups. They been called on April 6, 2008 in Mahalla couched these events in demands that al-Kubra to support the campaign for a echoed those of the workers and called national minimum wage. Maher and his attention to the widespread economic colleagues adopted the date as the name suffering of the Egyptian people. For for their movement in order to demon- example, in the group’s Facebook an- strate their affinity with and support for nouncement for their strike to commem- the workers and their demands. orate the one year anniversary of the In explaining the motivation for forming April 6, 2008 protests in Mahalla, they the 6 April Youth group, Maher said used language addressed directly to var- that he had come to realise the need to ious groups and constituencies whom establish a political movement with a they believed were aggrieved by material more populist bent than Kefaya, though hardships: ‘to the people of Mahalla,

206 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya champions of Egypt y to all the slum abuse were common practices, rarely did dwellers of Egypt y to every unemployed hard evidence ever emerge of it having youth y to every employee who doesn’t taken place, especially not to a young, make a living wage y to every free and middle-class individual like Khaled Said. honorable Egyptian suffering from injus- Many Egyptians were outraged by the tice and corruption’.14 Their announce- Khaled Said incident and they became ment ended: ‘our broad demands affect even more incensed when the Ministry of all the people: minimum wages tied to Interior tried to cover up the officers’ prices, regulation of the market, and the crime by claiming that Said had died from prevention of monopoly’.14 At their con- swallowing a bag of hashish. There was ferences in Cairo, they brought workers an immediate and fierce response from from Mahalla al-Kubra to address their the Egyptian activist community, which members and played videos of the organised a number of protests in the Mahalla sit-in.15 Though it never managed weeks afterwards, calling Khaled Said a to build the kind of durable connections martyr, denouncing Habib al-Adly, the with labour activists that it sought, the then-Interior Minister, and demanding an 6 April Youth embraced the language end to the Emergency Law. About 1,000 of the workers’ movement and tried to people showed up at Khaled Said’s funeral connect it to the political rhetoric of the to demonstrate. Then on June 12 and Kefaya movement. As one protestor and June 13 the 6 April Youth organised leftist activist put it: ‘There was always a protests in front of the Interior Ministry resonance between the workers demands at which demonstrators chanted ‘yasqut, and the activists’ political demands y But yasqut, ya Habib’ (‘down, down, with this resonance had to be built over the Habib [al-Adly]’).18 The biggest event years.’16 Such efforts at bridging these two took place on June 25, when Mohammed discursive themes were crucial in giving el-Baradei, the former IAEA chief, led his these activists the experience to develop first street protest since returning to effective frames when it came time to plan Egypt earlier that year. The event at- the January 25, 2011 protest. tracted over 4,000 people and the chants were mostly aimed at the police and the Interior Ministry, though some did call for KARAMA INSANIYYA:WE an end to Mubarak’s reign as well. ARE ALL KHALED SAID Perhaps the most lasting impact of Khaled Said’s death was the creation of a On June 6, 2010 two police officers page on the social networking site Face- entered an Internet cafe´ in Alexandria book called ‘We Are Khaled Said’, which and dragged a young man called Khaled began posting videos, pictures, articles, Said out the door, hitting him and beating and notes commemorating Khaled Said, him. They smashed his head against a pointing out other instances of police marble table and beat him so badly that abuse, and calling for reform of the Interior they fractured his skull and killed him. Ministry and the police forces. The lan- Their actions were retaliation for a video guage of the Facebook page, which was that Said had uploaded on the Internet of created by Wael Ghoneim, a young mar- the two police officers conducting a drug keting executive working for Google in deal. Later the same day a photo of Said’s Dubai, was not as confrontational or face, broken and distorted from the beat- overtly political as Kefaya’s, or even the ing, began circulating on the Internet and 6 April Youth’s, had been. Ahmed Maher the Egyptian blogosphere.17 Though most remembered noting this moderate tone Egyptians knew that torture and police when he and his colleagues first discovered

killian clarke european political science: 12 2013 207 the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ page: ‘he had membership of both Khaled and the a different kind of language from us. We writer (who at that point was anonymous) were more aggressive, against Mubarak in the Egyptian nation. This shared mem- and the regime. But on the ‘We Are bership provided the basis for a particular All Khaled Said’ page it was more kind of individual human dignity, which about human rights’.19 Muhammed Adel, was another common theme on the ‘We Maher’s 6 April colleague, added that, Are All Khaled Said’ page. Take, for ‘Wael Ghoneim and the Khaled Said group example, this statement, released on June didn’t want to criticise Mubarak directly’.20 16, calling for participation in an upcoming The page focused on police abuse, tor- demonstration: ‘[we] express solidarity ture, and the unchecked power of the with the family of the martyr and our Mubarak state’s security apparatus; it desire to oppose these inhuman practices didn’t talk about high political issues or carried out by some members of the police call for democracy. Moreover, as Ahmed y who forgot that their role was to protect Maher correctly pointed out, though the dignity and freedom of the Egyptian many of the grievances aired by the citizens’.23 Here dignity is derived not so Khaled Said page could be labeled human much from humanist notions of intrinsic rights abuses, the page generally avoided rights, as it is in the traditional discourse of the discourse of human rights. Instead it liberal humanism, but from a civic national couched its grievances in the more visc- identity that is shared by all Egyptian eral language of state violence, as man- citizens. This idea of individual dignity tied ifested in its various security institutions. to Egyptians’ national identity was also a For example, here is the group’s English widely deployed frame during the Egyptian translation of what they stand for: uprising. The rhetoric of the ‘We Are All Khaled Khaled Said, 28 years old, was tortured Said’ page was particularly appealing to to death by 2 Egyptian Policemen in the middle- class young people who had street. The incident has woken up never been involved or interested in Egyptians to work against the systema- politics. Though other activists through- tic torture in Egypt and the 30 years out the decade had pointed to the pro- running Emergency Law. We need in- blems of police abuse and torture, their ternational supporters to help us stand language, which was conspicuously against Police brutality in Egypt.21 political in tone, had failed to generate This deliberate rejection of the more the same level of outrage as did the elite language of rights and humanitar- Khaled Said page. Wael Abbas, whose ianism was an important source of the blog, al-Wa’iy al-Masry, was one of the Facebook’s page’s popularity among reg- first to take up this kind of activist ular Egyptians. blogging, described how both the class Another noteworthy facet of the page’s position of Khaled Said himself, and the discourse was that it spoke the same language used on the Facebook page, language of individual citizenship that contributed to its success in generating had been prominent during the days of sympathy from a new demographic group Kefaya. The first post, introducing the of Egyptians: page, began as follows: ‘I am Egyptian, and will never accept the killing of Khaled [The Khaled Said page] had good by torture y I am Egyptian and will not marketing because they had Wael let the blood of this youth be in vain. Ghoneim and they had the sympathy I am Egyptian; like me, like Khaled’.22 of the people. Because I was covering The emphasis is on the shared civic violations of thieves and microbus

208 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya drivers and people from the lower vendor called Muhammad Bouazizi from classes, but Khaled Said was a symbol a small town in Tunisia lit himself on fire of the middle class. And for the first in frustration with Tunisia’s rampant cor- time the middle class has woken up ruption and poverty. The uprising that because one of them was subject to Bouazizi set off culminated with the police brutality y The Khaled Said departure of Tunisia’s president, Zine group didn’t appear as though it was el-Abidine Ben Ali, for Saudi Arabia on an activist group, or people with a 14 January 2011. Maher and his collea- political purpose or an ideology or an gues were energised by the example; he agenda behind them. They were de- recalled his exchanges at the time with fending a young guy who was killed by Wael Ghoneim, who was helping him to the police. So a lot of people identified plan and publicise the Police Day protest: with them because they found that they ‘I received an email from Khaled Said [Wael did not have anything behind it.24 Ghoneim]andhesaidtomethathehad another idea. We needed to make the Wael Ghoneim’s unique innovation was protest not for Police Day only, but make his ability to talk about the visceral it an anger day against corruption, and grievance of police brutality without get- torture, and bad salaries’.25 The plan had ting bogged down in political ideologies or originally been to make the protest only elite human rights rhetoric; his focus was about the police and to connect it to the narrow and pure, and this was a crucial momentum that the Khaled Said incident source of his appeal. Through his Face- had created. But with Tunisia’s revolt now book page he introduced a new kind of standing as an example, the organisers discourse to the Egyptian public sphere, decided to enlarge the scope of the event which ultimately formed the basis for the and include a number of additional frames. third collective action frame that was In crafting these frames, the planners employed during the uprising. of the 25 January 2011 protest drew from what was, by that point, a rich stock of available images, chants, narratives, and JANUARY 25, 2011 ideas from the three discursive themes that had been developed over the pre- At the end of December 2010, Ahmed vious years. They adopted elements Maher created a Facebook event for a day of Kefaya’s language and emphasised of protest on 25 January 2011 to pro- freedom, democracy, and citizenship. test against the brutality of the Egyptian They reformulated the demands of the police and call for the resignation of the workers’ movement, which had already Interior Minister and the end to Emer- inspired much of the 6 April Youth’s gency Law.25 January 25 was an annual rhetoric, and denounced poverty, unem- national holiday to celebrate the Egyptian ployment, high prices, and corruption. police, and for the past two years the 6 And they built on the momentum that April Youth had called for similar protests had been generated by the ‘We Are All on that day to point out the irony of Khaled Said’ Facebook page, condemning celebrating a police force that system- torture, police abuse, and the Emergency atically abused its citizens. These past Law. The Facebook page that provided protest attempts had been failures; few details for the January 25 protest included people had shown up and the security four core demands: (1) to address the forces had handily shut them down. problem of poverty, institute a minimum However, in the days following the crea- wage, and help university graduates find tion of the event page, a young fruit jobs, (2) to abolish the Emergency Law

killian clarke european political science: 12 2013 209 and end the practice of torture by the It was the power and police, (3) to dismiss Habib el-Adly, the Interior Minister, and (4) to limit the familiarity of these President to two terms in office and to themes that gave the give the people the right to choose him.26 activists’ frames such The activists synthesised these demands into a single slogan – ‘aish, huriyya, resonance, and that karama insaniyya,’ – which they displayed allowed them to motivate on their Facebook page at the top of their such unprecedented list of agreed-upon chants. Similar de- y mands were written on paper and virtual waves of Egyptians leaflets, which were then disseminated through email and physical pamphleteer- largely national in its genealogy and ing campaigns in the days preceding the scope, there were also important symbols uprising.27 The leaders gave interviews on and slogans used during the uprising regional news channels like Al-Jazeera that had a more transnational dimension. and Al-Arabiyya explaining why they Indeed, it is noteworthy that the slogan planned to protest and they utilised an that came to later define not just the array of social media and Internet tools to Egyptian uprising but the Arab Spring disseminate their messages. On 25 Jan- in general, was one that originated in uary, one activist tried to capture these Tunisia: ‘al-sha’ab yurid isqat al-nitham’ demands in a single Twitter post: ‘pro- (‘the people want the fall of the regime’). tester’s demands: increase in minimum This slogan’s power in Egypt, I would wage, dismissal of interior ministry, re- argue, was drawn from its central role in moval of emergency law, shorten presi- the success of the Tunisian revolution, dential term’.28 On January 18, a Youtube which served as a critical catalyst and video went viral of a 6 April Youth activist, source of inspiration for the protests that Asmaa Mahfouz, explaining why she emerged on 25 January. However, it was would be going out into the streets on conspicuously absent from the messages 25 January. Her video began: ‘four Egyp- and slogans deployed by activists in the tians have lit themselves on fire to protest days before the protesting – a deliberate the humiliation, hunger, poverty and decision by these activists to keep their degradation that they had endured for demands one step shy of revolutionary. 30 years. Four Egyptians have lit them- The chant was later adopted somewhat selves, thinking that we can have a spontaneously, as people marching on revolution like Tunisia, that we can have 25 January and 28 January began to gain freedom, justice, honor, and human awareness of their collective power and dignity’.29 extend their demands to include a full Besides the same collection of demands overthrow of the regime. But to explain around freedom, justice, and dignity, the success of the frames deployed before Mahfouz also references four Egyptian the uprising we must look not so much to men who lit themselves on fire in the transnational symbols and slogans, but to days before the uprising, mimicking the the rich stock of ideas, phrases, images, desperate action of Muhammad Bouazizi, and narratives that had been inserted by the fruit-vendor who ignited the Tunisian activists over the last decade into the protests. Her statement is a reminder national political discourse in Egypt. It that, though the frames developed and was the power and familiarity of these deployed by activists before the uprising themes that gave the activists’ frames were drawn from a discourse that was such resonance, and that allowed them to

210 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya motivate such unprecedented waves This continuity in the of Egyptians to take to the streets on y 25 January. political discourse affirms the notion that collective action frames CONCLUSION and political discourses Hosni Mubarak stepped down from power are, in fact, recursive in on February 11, eighteen days after the their relationships. Police Day protest, and ushered in a period of post-revolutionary uncertainty. Many of the activists who contributed to themes of social justice that had the planning and the framing of the emerged with the Mahalla al-Kubra uprising’s protests quickly grew disillu- strikes. Demands for democratic elec- sioned with the so-called transition as tions and political freedoms were raised they came to realise how little had truly on countless occasions, as the military changed. Many of those grievances that council overseeing the transition again had formed the content of their chants and again backslid on promises to liberal- remained just as dire as they had been ise the political system. And when under Mubarak – the security apparatuses members of the military massacred 28 went largely unreformed, unemployment Egyptians at the Maspero media building and poverty remained rampant, and an in October 2011, activists raised the same increasingly authoritarian-minded mili- slogans denouncing state violence that tary council seemed unlikely to usher in had first been heard during the Khaled anything resembling genuine democracy. Said protests. However, just as the grievances that This continuity in the political discourse had motivated the uprising did not fall before, during, and after the uprising, away with Mubarak’s resignation, so too, affirms the notion that collective action the frames denouncing them remained in frames and political discourses are, active use. The months following the in fact, recursive in their relationships. uprising were full of protests, oriented Through their hard work in defining and around a dizzying array of political, social, honing resonant frames, activists, la- and economic issues. Egyptians made bourers, and political leaders before the clear that they would not accept a partial uprising contributed a rich array of sym- revolution, and as they continued to press bols and meanings to Egypt’s cultural for their demands to be met, they drew on sphere, which later served as resources the same discourses and ideas that had for those activists who came to plan the formed the basis for the uprising’s power- 25 January uprising. Likewise, the upris- ful combination of frames. Though there ing was itself a tremendously creative was never again the same convergence of affair; its participants innovated with the demands that came to a head in the cultural resources at their disposal and, slogan ‘aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya’, in turn, generated a vast new array of the various themes in Egypt’s political powerful symbols and frames (‘al sha’ab discourse continued to be rehearsed and yurid y’ being the best example). reformed. Workers continued to press for These new meanings quickly became greater labour rights, including a mini- entrenched in the public discourse, in mum wage in line with the cost of living turn offering resources to those and the right to organise independent Egyptians who continued their activism unions, and they drew on the same in the months following the uprising.

killian clarke european political science: 12 2013 211 Though the aftermath of the uprising has months may, in turn, come to reshape disappointed many, there is still no telling Egyptian political discourse and offer how the frames, symbols, and slogans themselves as resources for future waves developed during the protests over these of activism.

Notes

1 Another common variation of this chant was ‘aish, huriyya, adl igtimaiyya’ or ‘bread, freedom, social justice’. I focus on the first version because it is a more comprehensive expression of the three primary collective action frames that shaped the uprising. As I explain in a later section of the essay, the phrase ‘karama insaniyya’ was drawn squarely from the discourse that emerged in 2010 around the death of Khaled Said, which drew attention to the abuses of the Mubarak police state. It is, therefore, useful as a specific representation of this particular collective action frame. ‘Adl Igtimaiyya’ was also an important slogan, but it was drawn largely from the discourse of the Left and the labour movement, and therefore represents the same collective action frame as does the phrase ‘Aish’. Therefore, though this second slogan was certainly important, I believe that it is less useful as a conceptual representation of the full spectrum of collective action frames that were important in the Egyptian uprising. 2 Interview with Walid Rashed, leader of 6 April Youth, 22 August 2011, tape recorded. 3 Interview with Abu el-Ela Madi, founder and leader of the Wasat Party, 13 August 2008, tape recorded. 4 Interview with Abu el-Ela Madi; interview with George Ishak, former Kefaya General Coordinator, 11 August 2008, tape recorded. 5 Those six figures were: George Ishak, a liberal Christian, Ahmed Baha’a Shaaban, a communist, Abu el-Ela Madi, the Wasat Party founder, Sayyed Abdel Sattar from the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Sai’d Idris, an Arab Nationalist, and Amin Iskaner from the Nasserist Karama Party. 6 Interview with Amin Iskander, founder and leader in the Karama Party, 12 August 2008, tape recorded. 7 Interview with Ahmed Baha’a Shaaban, independent communist and Kefaya leader, 14 August 2008, tape recorded. 8 ‘Declaration to the Nation,’ The Egyptian Movement for Change, available at: http://www. harakamasria.org/node/2944. 9 Interview with George Ishak. 10 This was evident during many of my interviews, when young activists would often define their political identities in complicated and hyphenated ways. ‘I am a leftist with a nationalist orientation, but I am also devout so I agree with some Islamist ideas too’, for example. 11 ‘A statement of the Egyptian movement for free and sound elections based on the comments of Mohammed el-Baradei,’ The National Association for Change, http://taghyeer.net/official-statements/ 2009/12/11/. 12 Interview with Kemal Abu Eita, head of the Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers and Karama Party leader, 25 August 2008, tape recorded. 13 Interview with Ahmed Maher, founder and leader of 6 April Youth, 20 August 2008, tape recorded. 14 Post is available at: http://www.facebook.com/events/48462721323/. 15 Author’s participant observation, 6 April Youth conference, Journalists’ Syndicate, Cairo, 17 August 2008. 16 Interview with Amr Abdelrahman, leftist activist, 1 August 2011, tape recorded. 17 The most comprehensive summary of the Khaled Said incident can be found at: Shalaby and el-Marsfawy (2010). 18 A video of these protests can be found here: http://egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com/2010/06/ follow-up-why-khalid-was-murdered.html. 19 Interview with Ahmed Maher, founder and leader of 6 April Youth, 6 August 2011, tape recorded. 20 Interview with Muhammed Adel, leader of 6 April Youth, 17 August 2011, tape recorded. 21 Post is available at: http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id ¼ 146499585362420&id ¼ 1336 34216675571&ref ¼ mf. 22 Post is available at: http://www.facebook.com/ElShaheeed?sk ¼ notes&s ¼ 80#!/note.php?note_id ¼ 135080079839154. 23 Post is available at: http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id ¼ 136567599690402. 24 Interview with Wael Abbas, blogger and activist, 24 August 2011, tape recorded. 25 Ahmed Maher interview.

212 european political science: 12 2013 aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya 26 These can be found at: http://www.facebook.com/notes/%D9%83%D9%84%D9%86%D8% A7-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF/25-january-%D8%AA% D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-25-%D9%8A%D9%86% D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1/197190613628100. 27 The pamphleteering campaign was documented here: Al-Masry Al-Youm, ‘6 April tawaz3 20 alf manshur li’du3a al-muwatinin ila muthahara 25 January y wa dakhiliya: sanat3amal bi’huzm’, 23 January 2011. Examples of a pamphlet distributed by the protest organisers can be found at: http:// www.tahrirdocuments.org/2011/03/how-to-revolt/. 28 Quoted in: Tweets from Tahrir, in N. Idle and A. Nunns (eds.) (2011), Doha: Bloomsbury Qatar Foundation Publishing, p. 33. 29 The video is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ SgjIgMdsEuk.

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About the Author

Killian Clarke holds an MA in Middle Eastern Studies from the Hagop Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York University. He has conducted research on mobilisation and the Arab Spring, focusing particularly on Egypt. His most recent publication is: ‘Saying “Enough”: authoritarianism and Egypt’s Kefaya movement’, Mobilization 16 (4).

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