Bernd J. Fischer. Albania at War, 1939-1945. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1999. xix + 338 pp. $15, paper, ISBN 978-1-55753-141-4.

Reviewed by Tim Kirk

Published on HABSBURG (April, 2000)

Albania is a country that has been relatively Austrians loom largest here. Fischer's study neglected by historians of Europe. There are very brings to an English-speaking readership the in‐ few books in English on any aspect or period of sights of a far more extensive German secondary the country's history; and general histories of literature, supplemented by his own research in south-eastern Europe scarcely dwell on the expe‐ British, German and American archives that in‐ rience of a state that has stood largely aside even cluded the large collection of captured German from the politics and diplomacy of the . and Italian records held on microflm at the US There are some very obvious reasons for this: the National Archives in Washington DC. An Albanian language is difcult, and the country itself has perspective is aforded by the ofcial histories been virtually inaccessible for much of the post- published after the war, which Fischer refers to war period. Moreover, most actors on the Albani‐ collectively as 'Albanian Socialist historiography,' an historical stage are unknown abroad -- with and one with which he takes issue on many two important exceptions, of course: King Zog, the points. It is also a perspective that tells us more rather charismatic pre-war dictator, and Enver about post-war politics than about the war itself; Hoxha, the more-Stalinist-than-thou post-war dic‐ but then that is true to a greater or lesser extent tator. of all our histories of occupation, resistance and Bernd J. Fischer's thoughtful and scholarly collaboration. study of Albania at war is efectively the frst thor‐ At one level Albania's story is a straightfor‐ ough treatment of the occupation of Albania in ward one. It was a weak minor state that was un‐ English. It begins with the demise of King Zog, and able to resist the major powers of the day. Fascist ends with the rise of Enver Hoxha. It deals with a needed a foreign colony -- for reasons of period of Albanian history when the country was prestige as much as pragmatism, and had long occupied by foreign powers, so the deeds -- and had an active interest in the country anyway. Ital‐ especially the words -- of Italians, Germans and ian forces had already occupied Albanian territo‐ H-Net Reviews ry during ; and although they with‐ some economic beneft. In addition, prices were drew at the end of the war, the country was to be‐ fxed and utility charges regulated. Whether Alba‐ come economically dependent on Mussolini's nians were better of or not is a diferent matter, regime during the 1930s. King Zog resisted Italian but it seems unlikely. Fischer's analysis of the Ital‐ political interference, however, and one of the ians' initial economic measures appears inconclu‐ frst tasks of Count Ciano on becoming foreign sive: Albanians apparently paid $3.7 a year per minister in 1936 was to deal with the 'Albanian capita in tax (compared with 107.5 in the United problem.' Ciano advised Mussolini that the annex‐ States and 107.8 in Britain) but presumably they ation of Albania was both possible and desirable earned a correspondingly paltry amount. In any and the Italians invaded in April 1939. The inva‐ case, it is worth wondering how efciently taxes sion itself, Fischer tells us, was a shambles, and were collected at all in Albania during the 1930s. succeeded only because there was virtually no Unsurprisingly, Ciano also sought to win Alba‐ real resistance, apart from the actions of a few in‐ nians over by encouraging and then gratifying na‐ dividuals. Nevertheless most Albanians resented tionalistic chauvinism, and in particular 'claims' the invasion, not least because the belief was to Kosova and other irredenta in , widespread that Albania had ejected the Italians Macedonia and . When the Italians actually after the First World War. Albanians, the author invaded Greece, of course, they were not only re‐ suggests, were rather proud of this supposed vic‐ pulsed but actually lost Albanian territory to the tory, and therefore were bound to consider the enemy as well. It was only after the German inva‐ Italians unworthy masters. sion of the Balkans that a sort of 'greater Albania' As in every country occupied by the Axis, become a possibility. Both fascist regimes sought there were enough collaborators among the rul‐ to woo the Albanians and distract them from the ing class to enable Ciano to establish a provisional woes of foreign occupation by ofering them glory puppet government, and the annexation was ce‐ through aggressive expansion and 'ethnic cleans‐ mented with a personal union of the two coun‐ ing.' But Fischer suggests that the Albanians them‐ tries under Victor Emmanuel III. A new constitu‐ selves had hitherto scarcely been interested in ex‐ tion was promulgated, the Statuto Fondamentale, pansion, and that the country's political leaders which efectively made the government of Alba‐ had recognised the dangers of antagonising their nia the business of a department of the Italian for‐ more powerful neighbours. King Zog, at least, had eign ofce; and an Albanian Fascist Party was foreseen the additional problems irredentism founded, through whose subsidiary organisations would bring to a troubled country. Although the the Italian parent party sought to exercise control acquisition of Kosova after the German invasion over Albanian society. At the same time, the Ital‐ of Yugoslavia was popular both in Kosova itself ians sought to avoid too oppressive a presence in and in old Albania, it did little to increase support Albania, and conciliatory, if ultimately empty, ges‐ for the Italians. tures were made. Support was elicited from the The Italians were increasingly unpopular and country's religious leaders; local political leaders opposition was growing, albeit an opposition be‐ were bribed with honorary titles and, when that devilled by the internecine struggles characteris‐ failed, with hard cash. tic of the European resistance to fascism. Alba‐ The Italians also sought to persuade the Alba‐ nia's ostensible struggle for liberation was also a nians they were materially better of after the in‐ civil war between the nationalist right and a par‐ vasion. It seems that construction projects and tisan movement dominated by Hoxha's Commu‐ grandiose fascist buildings in Tirana brought nists. As in most European countries there was no

2 H-Net Reviews coherent 'national' resistance, so much as a strug‐ was characterised by demoralization, panic and gle between right and left to prevail within the re‐ treachery (pp. 162-3). The Germans' behaviour in sistance movement, in the hope of imposing one's Albania was 'generally good' and they made fewer own political system after the war. And in Alba‐ mistakes than other foreigners (pp. 166-7), while nia, as elsewhere in the Balkans, the Communists they were even 'quite thorough and sensitive' in had the edge, not least because when the Ger‐ constructing a four-man regency with a represen‐ mans occupied Albania in 1943 some of the na‐ tative from each of Albania's major religious com‐ tionalist 'resistance' groups collaborated readily munities. As a result, Fischer argues, the Germans with the Nazis both politically and militarily. and their puppet government were 'received Germany was not particularly interested in favourably by 25 to 30 percent of the population, Albania, and had been content to see the country leaving 30 to 45 percent neutral' and 35 to 45 per‐ occupied by Italy. The aim of the 1943 invasion cent in opposition' (p.188). The estimates are tak‐ was primarily defensive: they wanted to prevent en from one of the author's secondary sources, the landing of Allied troops in the region, and and it would be interesting to know how such an took advantage of the vacuum left by the fall of assessment was made of political attitudes in a Mussolini. Moreover, the Germans themselves pre-democratic society in the throes of war. knew little about Albania, and it was Austrian Yet it does not seem unlikely that a quarter of Nazis, rather than their comrades from the Altre‐ Albanians were well disposed to the Germans. ich (Germany within the boundaries of 1937), who The form of occupation established in Albania were prominent during the occupation -- as in‐ was less brutal than in other parts of eastern Eu‐ deed they were elsewhere in the Balkans. For ex‐ rope and certainly, Fischer argues, less harsh than ample, Ribbentrop's special representative in in neighbouring Greece and Serbia. Moreover, the south-eastern Europe, and one of the most impor‐ Germans had pulled of a propaganda coup by tant political fgures in the German occupation of persuading men to join their puppet government Albania, was Hermann Neubacher, formerly the who were known not to be Axis stooges. Unsur‐ Nazi puppet mayor of . Similarly, many of prisingly, though, enthusiasm was greatest in the the Albanian collaborators had Austrian connec‐ newly acquired territories of Kosova and Came‐ tions, and several ministers in the Albanian pup‐ ria. Kosova was apparently staunchly pro-Axis to pet government set up by the Nazis had been edu‐ the bitter end. The were driven out by Alba‐ cated in . The objectives of the German oc‐ nian nationalists (thereby undermining the use‐ cupation were not only defensive and strategic, fulness of the local economy to the German occu‐ but also short-term. Where Italy had invested in a pation authorities); an indigenous SS division was colony for the future, Germany plundered the formed in the province; and Kosovars provided country's resources for the war efort. Although hundreds of volunteers for militia units in a 'na‐ Albania seems to have escaped the genocidal poli‐ tional mobilisation against the Communists.' But cies of the Nazis more than other parts of eastern in Albania, as in Yugoslavia, the resistance to the Europe, the famine conditions the Germans had Nazis was now in the hands of Communist parti‐ brought to Greece were very quickly felt in Alba‐ sans, who were encouraged by the advance of the nia as well. Red Army into and Bulgaria. Fischer's assessment of the German occupa‐ Albania's unique experience of occupation by tion is punctuated by strikingly positive observa‐ both Fascist Italy and makes it a tions. The country was occupied 'with consider‐ particularly interesting case study of the Nazi able efciency' (p. 161), while the Italian retreat 'new order' in Europe. There was perhaps less of

3 H-Net Reviews the sheer brutality here that was typical of the viewer and to HABSBURG. For other permission, German occupation of other parts of Europe. But please contact . apart from the rather diferent case of Greece, Al‐ bania was the only country to experience occupa‐ tion by both fascist powers. For all the discussion of 'generic' fascism that has taken place over the decades, there have been very few studies where Italian and German policies in the same feld have been compared directly. Thus this book is also a rare and useful comparative study of fascist poli‐ cy, although the author rarely interprets the occu‐ pation regimes explicitly as acts undertaken by fascist regimes qua fascist regimes. Indeed, he fnds continuities between Mussolini's (or Ciano's) policies in Albania and those of their Liberal pre‐ decessors, between the presence of Austrians in Albania (and Albanians in Austria) before 1918 and their return after 1943. The 'new order,' after all, was not a project hatched only by fanatical ideologues and implemented by SS men alone. The attempt to impose or re-impose an authoritar‐ ian order on Europe is one that preceded the com‐ ing to power of Mussolini and Hitler, was shared by many nominal 'non-Fascists' and 'non-Nazis,' and indeed has survived in many parts of Europe, albeit as the aspiration of a marginalised minori‐ ty. Bernd Fischer's achievement is to bring us a thorough and detailed narrative of Albania's polit‐ ical history between 1939 and 1945. It is clearly structured, very readable, and based on as wide a range of sources as is reasonably possible or use‐ ful. The fow is spoiled occasionally by frequent, sometimes crass, spelling and typographical er‐ rors, which should have been eliminated by copy editors and proof readers. But they are a minor ir‐ ritation. This is a good book, which flls a yawning gap in the history of wartime Europe. It deserves a very wide readership. Copyright (c) 2000 by H-Net, all rights re‐ served. This work may be copied for non-proft educational use if proper credit is given to the re‐

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Citation: Tim Kirk. Review of Fischer, Bernd J. Albania at War, 1939-1945. HABSBURG, H-Net Reviews. April, 2000.

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