ISS PAPER 259 | AUGUST 2014 Cape Town’s protection rackets A study of violence and control Khalil Goga and Charles Goredema

Summary This paper examines protection in Cape Town, primarily in the central business district (CBD) and on the Cape Flats. While significant security initiatives have been undertaken in the city’s CBD since 1999, protection racketeering still flourishes. This suggests that it is more than a mere reflection of deficiencies in state capacity, and that other factors should also be taken into account. This paper explains protection racketeering and contextualises its development in Cape Town.

In a seminal paper entitled War Protection, legitimacy and Therefore, it is argued that the use of making and state-making as organized criminal governance violence in transitional states is often crime, Charles Tilly characterises the As the state advanced and became more shared, and Tilly illustrates that this was 1 state as a form of organised crime. sophisticated, it developed a level of prevalent among early European nations Tilly’s argument is not centred on social control over the population, and (in the process of state-building) in the th th the premise of all politicians being its legitimacy was recognised by other 15 and 16 centuries. Fragile states or murderers or thieves, but rather on states.2 This legitimacy differentiated the countries engaging in state-building have the fact that the initial basis for the state’s use of violence from the use of often been in similar situations with the formation of the European state, (which violence by other actors. Consequently, state sharing the ‘monopoly on violence’ in turn formed the basis of the modern the distinction between state protection with warlords or criminals. nation‑state) was to provide protection through the use of violence and the When one reverses Tilly’s analogy, it is to its inhabitants in return for taxes. protection given by other actors was possible to infer that organised crime Given that the threat to inhabitants based on the state’s legitimacy. While can take on ‘state-like’ characteristics mainly emanated from the acquisitive this Weberian notion of the state having in specific spheres based on the level inclinations of feudal lords needing a legitimate monopoly on the use of of legitimacy and social control the funding for their war-making ventures force has taken precedence in modern criminal (or criminal group) may have. and personal capital accumulation, part political thought, Tilly argues that this This legitimacy is established through of the threat to inhabitants came from line (between legitimate and illegitimate) the use of violence and can develop to the actions of the state itself. As with is ‘uncertain’ and ‘elastic’. He adds that the point of what Andre Standing terms the quintessential protection racket, the ‘early in the state making process, many ‘criminal governance’.4 Standing states initial formation of the state was based parties shared the right to use violence, that organised crime networks can on capital accumulation. its actual employment, or both at once’.3 adopt political or governance functions PAPER

in given territories in order to ensure their contextualises the history of the CBD and long-term sustainability. This is noticeable Cape Flats, as well as the development in several states, including Italy, where of protection rackets. Finally, the paper organised crime groups such as the considers why protection racketeering , Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta provide has developed in Cape Town and who is a number of functions,5 especially most vulnerable. protection.6 Private security and This paper examines contemporary protection protection racketeering in Cape Town, primarily in the Cape Town central The business of private business district (CBD) and on the Cape protection Flats,7 two areas in which protection Traditionally considered the domain racketeering is evident despite their of the state, protection has become markedly different socio-economic increasingly associated with non-state profiles. There are similarities between the institutions, which include regulated two areas, but there are also differences private security companies and various that determine the form protection forms of ‘informal’ protective structures racketeering takes in each of them. (such as criminal groups, neighbourhood While protection rackets on the Cape watches and vigilante groups). The lines Flats can be linked to the failure of the between various forms of protection are 427 174 state to institute social control, major continually being blurred. Internationally, initiatives to provide security have been this growth in the legal private security registered ‘active’ security launched in Cape Town’s CBD since industry has coincided with the advent officers in the country. The 1999. These include a relatively extensive of economic neoliberalism, particularly majority of security officers environment surveillance regime of closed after the end of the Cold War, and the are on ‘guard’ or ‘patrol’ duty and have limited skills States increasingly allow private companies to take on roles associated with the police, and to operate in The current estimated annual spaces associated with the use of violence value of the industry is in excess of circuit television (CCTV) cameras that are growing recognition of private actors and centrally controlled and managed by the companies that provide protection10 for city authorities in collaboration with the and within the state. States increasingly R50 billion South African Police Service (SAPS).8 allow private companies to take on roles shared among However, the state has not been able to traditionally associated with the police put an end to protection racketeering, and military, and to operate in spaces which appears to have existed for at least requiring or associated with the use of 9 364 two decades in the city centre and even violence. This is noticeable through the longer on the Cape Flats. This suggests subcontracting and growth of the private security service providers that protection rackets do not necessarily military industry and private military only reflect deficiencies in state capacity companies (PMCs).11 and policing, and that there are a number In The three years leading up to Private security has become an integral of other factors that must be taken 2012, the SAPS paid up to part of security across the globe. into account. Furthermore, it is evident Private policing now forms part of that state authority is often shared with the South African security apparatus, R350 million ‘informal authority’, which includes civil and its exponential growth is well society and can include organised crime.9 to private companies to guard documented.12 Private security ranges its stations The paper defines and explains from conventional security guards to protection racketeering, after which it highly trained and skilled professionals

2 Cape Town’s protection rackets with a military or policing background. agencies’17 makes them far more in the United States (US).21 However, According to the Private Security Industry dangerous to civilians as well as the recent research in Southern Africa Regulatory Authority’s (PSIRA) annual state, while their employment or use of suggests that many organised criminals report (2011/2012), there are 427 174 ‘violent entrepreneurs’ (discussed below) create a network that is more flexible, registered ‘active’ security officers in makes the slip into organised crime amorphous and fluid.22 the country.13 The majority of security easier. In Cape Town, some of the largest Protection racketeering consists of officers are on ‘guard’ or ‘patrol’ duty and registered security companies were planned and ongoing participation in have limited skills. The current estimated operated and influenced by notorious a number of defined serious criminal annual value of the industry is in excess underworld figures.18 offences by a group, which include of R50 billion shared among 9 364 Protection rackets . RICO, which set the precedent security service providers. So embedded Alongside the legal companies providing for tackling criminal enterprises and has private policing become in South private security, there are many types brought racketeering cases into the Africa that in the three years leading of ‘informal’ protection and security criminal justice system, sought to tackle up to 2012, the SAPS paid up to R350 million to private companies to guard In Cape Town, some of the largest registered security 14 its stations. companies were operated and influenced by notorious Within South Africa, many private security underworld figures companies have been legitimised by the state and are regulated by the PSIRA in occurring across South Africa. The criminal enterprises and has heavily terms of legislation (the Private Security focus here is on enterprises that provide influenced legislation across the world Industry Regulatory Act 56 of 2001 and ‘protection’ by using extortive protection – including South Africa’s Prevention of the Security Officers Act of 1987). Private rackets. These companies may be Organised Crime Act (POCA). Rather security is seen as a viable and important registered as legal enterprises, may be than investigating distinct criminal events, part of the South African security criminal enterprises, or may straddle the racketeering investigations focus on apparatus by both the state and the line between legal and illegal enterprise. prosecuting the criminal enterprise. The public. Although impossible to measure, term ‘criminal enterprise’ can refer to Extortion as a crime is defined by the impact of private security in South a wide variety of criminal associations, common law as ‘taking from another Africa appears to be positive. According including commercial ‘white collar’ crime. some patrimonial or non-patrimonial to the Institute of Race Relations, ‘every Racketeering investigations focus on advantage by intentionally and unlawfully patrol car of a private security firm doing ‘patterns of criminal activity’ as well as subjecting that person to pressure which crime prevention duties has a deterrent predicate offences, and have a more induces him or her to submit to the effect on crime, allowing the SAPS to specific focus on the enterprise. The taking’.19 concentrate its resources elsewhere. criminal enterprise itself need not be Every response to an alarm by a private Extortion can be committed by an a hierarchal, businesslike structure; security company allows the police to individual or a number of individuals. usually it is a network within which a few deal with some other pressing matter.’15 For example, a single kidnapper can individuals ultimately reap most of the However, the private security industry has extort money from a victim. However, in profits from extortion activities. also come under increased scrutiny, with the context of a protection racket, the Extortion activities that are continuous the government proposing amendments extortion often takes place over a period and organised amount to protection to the legislation to limit foreign of time and is predominately undertaken racketeering. The protection racket differs ownership of security companies and by a criminal group, prompting from ‘private protection’ or ‘security’ to increase the regulation of companies Skaperdas to state that extortion as it involves an element of continuing operating in the country.16 This is taking is the defining activity of organised criminality. Volkov describes it as: place in the context of the state’s seeking crime.20 This should be understood in to reassert its authority and regulate the context of the debatable, narrow An institutionalized practice whereby an industry with the potentiality to exist definitions of organised crime based on tribute is collected on behalf of a alongside state authority. Furthermore, the hierarchal ‘mafia-model’ typology criminal group that, in exchange, unlike ordinary citizens, the nature of that informed the Racketeer Influenced claims to offer physical protection from these companies as ‘violence managing and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) other such groups.23

ISS PAPER 259 • AUGUST 2014 3 PAPER

What is noticeable about Volkov’s repeatedly came up. In the judgement description of protection rackets is it was stated that ‘in a society which is that it focuses on the institutionalised not governed by the rule of law, people and ongoing nature of the extortion. devise alternative structures to govern Furthermore, Volkov argues that the their relations’.27 The judgement further protection often takes on an economic explained krysha as: dimension and the service of protection An alternative system of obligation; or abstention from violence may begin to the classic product of a society resemble a contract. where businessmen cannot count Protection rackets have been extensively on the protection of the law, either researched in Italy.24 Standing uses because the law is itself defective descriptions of the as an or because the administrative and ‘ideal type’ of protection racketeering judicial agencies charged with its whereby the Sicilian Mafia takes enforcement cannot be relied upon over state functions and produces to do so. Where there is no effective a hypothetical ideal type of criminal law, or no effective legal process governance.25 The Sicilian Mafia, for of enforcement, relationships are example, has a history of protection governed instead by power. It was racketeering in areas where the state common ground among the experts had limited control, particularly rural that the situation in Russia in the areas. The Mafia filled in for the state by 1990s and early 2000s was that, providing a type of social control and although there were laws, the legal 28 dispute resolution that was lacking. The processes were defective. fee paid by businesses to local organised However, it should be noted that this crime groups to provide protection kind of krysha payment evolved as the from threats of burglary and robbery state progressed and began asserting is known as the pizzo or ‘wet beak’. A itself more effectively. Krysha then started 2012 report by Italian business leaders being paid to bureaucrats and politicians stated that organised crime was the to protect businesses from ‘enemies and country’s biggest business, making €100 competitors’ and to network with those billion a year (up to seven per cent of in power. The protection that was now the country’s gross domestic product given was not only to protect businesses [GDP]) from various activities, including from physical threats but also from protection racketeering.26 business or state threats and to promote Similarly, within post-Cold War Russia, businesses’ interests. the transitioning state coupled with The Joint Research Centre on ‘shock therapy’ economic reforms Transnational Crime published an created an untenable level of insecurity extensive study on the activities of A 2012 report by Italian business for businesses. It can be argued that organised criminals in European countries leaders stated that organised organised criminal groups became a with a specific focus on extortion and crime was the country’s biggest source of parallel authority of protection, protection rackets. It found that extortion business, making regulation and control for many racketeering could develop from the businesses due to the lack of state protection of businesses against losses, security and high levels of informal and/ but also that extortionists themselves €100 billion or untaxed income. Protection payments may create the conditions under which became known as krysha (Russian protection is needed.29 The study30, a year for ‘roof’). In the 2012 case between drawing on Monzini31, differentiates oligarchs Boris Berezovsky and Roman among the protection rackets according Abrahmovich, krysha was a concept that to their features, namely:

4 Cape Town’s protection rackets • Extortion-protection: taxation on a with the local community.33 In Volkov’s Town CBD was on the decline and regular basis imposed by violent means view, the use of pure terror (in particular, suffered severe deterioration after the the use of violence)34 can only last a end of apartheid. Increased migration • Labour racketeering: violent negotiation certain amount of time before there is a into the urban centre following the for access to the labour market and protest by those affected. Furthermore, loosening of apartheid restrictions employment it may be in the criminal’s interest to coupled with the challenges of • Monopolistic racketeering: a specific seek a level of respect and support for a transition, primarily relating to a lack of market strategy enforced by violent more sustainable relationship. Therefore, capacity on the part of both the state means and aimed at the physical according to Standing, ‘extortion may and the city, led to high levels of ‘grime elimination of the competitor or the steadily shift toward a more tolerated and crime’ and urban decay. This began creation of monopolistic coalitions form of protection where those paying taking its toll as businesses moved feel they are given a genuine service, at This kind of enforcement and extortion out and the city battled to remove least one preferable to that on offer from need not be limited to ‘traditional’ occupants deemed ‘less desirable’ the state’.35 This can eventually lead to criminals. Recent strikes that led to (such as the homeless and street a form of criminal governance that has a 39 mass violence in South Africa’s mining children). As the cityscape changed, level of legitimacy and means to enforce industry highlighted how civil society could and urbanisation and migration took its control over clients. involve itself in labour and monopolistic place, these areas were left with an racketeering. The Association of Minerals Despite the pretence of a consensual uneasy mix of residents and businesses and Construction Union (AMCU) and the contractual relationship, what at both ends of the spectrum. National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) The extortion and criminalisation becomes systemic as were accused of using violence, threats and intimidation against fellow workers the extortionists develop a more symbiotic relationship as well as companies in order to secure with the local community higher wages and increased membership. distinguishes a protection racket is the However, the CBD remained important The Joint Research Centre on fact that the nature of the contract is to the city, particularly as it housed Transnational Crime also states that ‘fundamentally asymmetrical’.36 The Parliament, numerous businesses, traditional criminal protection rackets ‘wielders of force usually have an array high-value real estate and tourist have two identifiable types of extortion of means to remind their clients of the attractions. It was also an important racketeering. These types are systemic asymmetry’37 and therefore ‘violent part of the city’s nightlife. Long Street and casual, which are in turn linked to entrepreneurs’ are distinguished from and its surrounds within the CBD three main variables: ordinary businessmen (even if these form the main entertainment area of • The organisational structure of the businessmen are engaged in illicit the city, which was an apartheid ‘grey crime group practices) through their particular focus area’ where there was a certain level of on violence. As violent entrepreneurs mixing between races. It thus acquired • Its strong presence at local territorial develop they provide ‘necessary a bohemian reputation, which it retained level protection and market conditions needed after the end of apartheid.40 It remains • The victim-offender relationship32 for market relations’, as well as becoming a popular night-time venue for many ‘both enforcers and owners of capital’, people, including students, tourists and To explain these three variables, the collectively a ‘warrior community’ focusing businesspeople, and hosts a variety of study states that when organised criminal on the subordination of others.38 restaurants, bars and nightclubs. Alcohol groups focus their activities on local consumption also remains important to territories, they will often take on more Protection racketeering in the entertainment establishments. monopolistic and hierarchal structures post-apartheid Cape Town’s while engaging more frequently with CBD and surrounds Of particular concern following the end state officials. The criminal group will also of apartheid were the growing levels of begin infiltrating legitimate businesses. A city in decline: criminality in the city centre. Not all the The extortion and criminalisation Cape Town after apartheid crime at the time was organised, and becomes systemic as the extortionists In a situation similar to that in many much could be explained by poverty develop a more symbiotic relationship major cities in South Africa, the Cape within the greater city.

ISS PAPER 259 • AUGUST 2014 5 PAPER

Street crime, including that committed ‘Moroccans’. Should establishments ring rose to prominence in Cape Town, by children, made the CBD a particularly refuse ‘protection’ (a mixture of labour allegedly led by businessman Mark Lifman, unsafe place.41 Criminality was centred and extortion racketeering) from the Andre Naude, alleged Belhar ‘Sexy around notorious ‘problem buildings’ ‘white’ security company, the ‘white’ Boys’ leader Jerome Booysen and a such as Senator Park in the CBD. These security company would send the number of former Beeka associates. The problem buildings also saw high levels of ‘Moroccans’ to harass the business. group consisted of a variety of protection property and violent crime, rivalling that Thereafter the same security company and security formations that amalgamated in certain outlying areas with a far worse would again offer protection and more to form Specialised Protection Services reputation. often than not gain the contract. The (SPS). At the beginning of 2012, SPS went about trying to acquire protection contracts The apparent lack of state capacity to security company would benefit from at 200 venues, providing 400 bouncers.48 deal with criminal elements made it easier the protection fees and/or would pay the 45 A number of business owners complained for security companies and individuals ‘Moroccans’ a fee for the harassment. to the police, the media and governmental such as Cyril Beeka42 to make their mark The protection rackets also provided officials over SPS’s use of threats and on the city’s informal security set-up. opportunities for former apartheid security intimidation. The company was shut down, 46 The 1990s therefore saw a number operatives to make a living. Former as it was not registered with PSIRA. Lifman of turf wars between rival protection security police officers, who had allegedly and Naude now face over 300 charges 49 Former security police officers, who had allegedly resulting from their involvement. Despite the arrest of these high-profile figures and established links during the apartheid years with the the closing of SPS, protection racketeering ‘Americans’ gang, now ran security companies. still thrives in the CBD.

merchants as they sought control over established links during the apartheid The upswing In the CBD the lucrative protection and drug markets years with the ‘Americans’ gang, now By the early 2000s, South Africa was of the city. The city could not constrain ran security companies. Protection arguably stable and had avoided the them or provide the service that had racketeering in Cape Town became so potential mass violence that could have followed the transition to a democratic made the presence of these groups notorious that it attracted the attention of state.50 Reforms and changes in public acceptable in the first place. According a presidential task team. The presidential spending, with an increase in social to Kinnes, during this period ‘violence task team linked these rackets with development spending and a strict fiscal was also displaced as the realisation on the Cape Flats and even the Italian policy, had placed the government in a grew that more profit was to be made Mafia in the form of Vito Pallazzalo.47 healthier financial position and allowed from transactions within the city limits’.43 However, the task team was disbanded it to manage the high levels of debt Therefore, there were clashes in the CBD following allegations of corruption. accrued by the apartheid government. between local gangs and groups such as Further solidifying the business venture 44 Crime permeated the country and South the ‘Moroccans’, who were operating was the protection needed by the ‘vice’ Africa recorded high levels of crime over a parking and protection extortion industries that couldn’t approach legitimate the next few years (reaching a peak in scheme for nightclubs. This monopolistic sources of authority. Often escort agencies 2002). At the same time a number of racketeering and violence lasted for a were beholden to protection racketeers reforms began taking place, which had few years, but eventually the violence due to their inability to turn to legitimate a significant effect in reducing the levels was settled after a series of high-profile forms of authority, as their income base of crime. These reforms were focused confrontations and the settlement and was illegal. Within this environment on both policing and social spending. division of protection rackets in the city. protection racketeering was integral to the However, in Cape Town, according to protection of the criminal enterprises with Kinnes elaborates on how criminal Samara,51 criminal victimisation remained which it became entangled. networks expanded beyond racial high in marginalised non-white areas and ethnic identities in protection This status quo was maintained for nearly while more affluent areas (including the racketeering. For example, within the two decades as portions of Cape Town CBD) managed to reduce the levels of CBD there was a noticeable mutually were ‘divided’ among security providers. crime within their ‘borders’. This can be beneficial relationship between a local However, following Beeka’s assassination attributed to apartheid town planning, ‘white’ security company and the in 2011, another protection and extortion which provided far more police resources

6 Cape Town’s protection rackets in white areas; increases in state capacity; violent crime in the city decreased by focused civil society and municipal efforts; 90 per cent from 2005 to 2010. While and an increase in private security. drug-related arrests increased to 955 (2010) from 180 (2005), this can also The Cape Town CBD is one of the more be interpreted as more effective policing remarkable stories of urban renewal. rather than just an increase in drug Policy makers, politicians and civil dealing. The Cape Town CBD is now one society collaborated in creating a safer of the safest city centres in the country.54 and more marketable district. The Cape Town Partnership and the Central City Despite the CBD’s improvement, given Improvement District (CCID) led a number the type of activities hosted (especially of reforms within the city. The ‘broken in terms of bars and clubs) Long Street windows’52 approach was adopted across still has a noticeable seedy underbelly, the city and a harsh approach was taken with numerous drug dealers, prostitutes, toward those who were blamed for ‘grime brothels and exotic dancers. Other and crime’. Public vagrancy was not streets off Long Street within the CBD allowed and street children were removed limits also host bars, clubs and brothels. from the city centre. CCTV cameras were The growth of SPS, described in the installed in the city centre and a number previous section, is an example of of civilian and municipal policing patrols the entrenchment and continuance of were established in 2001. The CCID also protection rackets despite the city’s established associations such as the Club improvement. Protection rackets have and Bar Association (2002) to create a managed to maintain their particular self-regulating authority to suppress drug place in the security establishment. peddling, turf wars, protection rackets and Managers and owners in these areas are ‘sub-standard’ drinking establishments. Within four months of the often unwilling to talk, presumably due to Additionally, the city has taken a number CCID’s implementation, the CBD fear. Furthermore, given the continuing of proactive steps in limiting crime and recorded a drop in crime of street criminality, there is still a belief that vice industries by working with municipal these kinds of protection services are policing and establishing specialised necessary to maintain a level of order. squads. These squads fall under the 46% city directorate and are independent of A history of the criminal The reductions have continued the SAPS, while frequently collaborating economy on the Cape Flats over the last decade and violent crime in the city with it. They include vice, drug and gang Unlike the CBD, which has been the decreased by squads, as well as a ‘problem building’ focus of economic activity, the Cape squad, which has been successful in Flats area has been described as the implementation of bylaws regarding apartheid’s ‘dumping ground’, with the 90% ‘problem buildings’. The accomplishments majority of residents living there due to of these squads and the CCID initiatives from 2005 to 2010. drug‑related the forced removal policies of apartheid are evident, with a number of notable arrests increased to South Africa. It encompasses vast tracts success stories. Of particular importance of land around the city (132 km²) and to the CBD has been the ‘problem houses large, predominately coloured 955 (2010) building’ squad, which in 2012 closed and and black townships with a sizable forced the renovation of the Senator Park from population (rough estimates put the building after it had become a location of figure at over 850 000), although the criminal activity.53 actual number is difficult to determine. 180 (2005) Within four months of the CCID’s This paper concentrates on certain implementation, the CBD recorded a drop parts of the Cape Flats with a high of 46 per cent in crime. The reductions gang presence and a predominately have continued over the last decade and coloured demographic.55 Often those

ISS PAPER 259 • AUGUST 2014 7 PAPER

areas with the largest gang presence government concentrated its resources exacerbated by the ban on mandrax have the highest levels of poverty and on the white areas. Parts of the Cape and the subsequent boom in the illegal unemployment. For example, in Hanover Flats soon became dysfunctional areas market. The large supply of and demand Park, where the majority of residents with high levels of unemployment, for the drug saw criminal gangs grow (90 per cent) live in formal dwellings, substance abuse problems, poor in size and income and become part 63 per cent of households earn incomes educational and medical facilities, and of the political economy of the area. 57 of less than R3 200 a month. Similar broken family units. Gangs established themselves to provide socio-economic profiles predominate in While areas such as District Six did have protection to shebeens and drug dealers, neighbourhoods such as Lavender Hill, a level of gang presence,58 the removal and to provide drug dealers and shebeen Bonteheuwel, Delft and Manenberg.56 of people to the Cape Flats and the owners with protection from the police.60 The Cape Flats, as a residential area, subsequent lack of state services and The Cape Flats after apartheid was developed in the 1950s, when the employment opportunities created a While much of the rest of Cape Town has predominantly coloured population living burgeoning gang problem in these areas in or near the city centre was forcibly by the early 1970s. This gang problem been on an upward swing, controlling removed to the urban periphery. Cape was exacerbated by a more prohibitive levels of crime and growing economically, Town and the Cape Flats had purposely stance towards liquor, based on the parts of the city remain untouched by been designed to limit cross racial apartheid construct of the coloured the general improvement and are devoid mixing, which in turn made it difficult for male being dangerous and lazy.59 of employment opportunities, thereby those living on the urban periphery to These prohibitions saw the rise of illegal becoming increasingly marginalised. Smith access employment in the predominately shebeens and associated criminality, as and Turok,61 in their study of the economy white business centres. These areas in those in the business sought protection of Cape Town, show that the city centre the Cape Flats also had limited social and from gangs or gangs gained income has maintained economic dominance and recreational facilities, as the apartheid from these shebeens. The problem was that Cape Town remains monocentric.

CITYWIDE TRENDS NODAL PROFILE AGGLOMERATION

Performance Potential

INDICATOR OFFICE FLOOR SPACE

YEAR / PERIOD Composition 2012

DEFINITION The total extent of internal building floor space used as offices

Retail WHAT DOES IT TELL US? The scale of economic activity and agglomeration in services sector

Office

SOURCE MIN MAX Industrial City of Cape Town

Figure 1: Office floor space – the total extent of internal building space used as an office. This can be used as an indicator of economic activity and agglomeration in the services sector. Source: http://ctcs.capetown.gov.za/ecamp62

8 Cape Town’s protection rackets Recent growth is more dispersed than Protection rackets Standing’s study found that few formal before, but high-income suburban nodes In many parts of the Cape Flats gangs businesses were victims of extortion. have benefitted, not the Cape Flats where have taken on a peculiar role, vying with Three of the four formal businesses that the poor live. This is illustrated in Figure 1. the state and civil society as a form of faced extortion demands (out of 75 formal businesses) refused to pay, while The lack of control over certain parts of social control. The state is no longer the one paid R250. Standing broadened his the Cape Flats has been of particular primary actor in local power dynamics questioning by asking formal businesses concern to successive provincial and city – instead, the state, civil society and if they paid for security from third-party leaders, highlighted by the occasional organised crime groups often function firms and whether they had a choice in deployment of the army to quell gang in mutually supportive relationships that choosing the firm. In his findings, out of violence. Various studies have shown that are ‘continually being established and the 75 businesses surveyed, 33 paid the state does not have the necessary reshaped’.66 Lambrechts argues that security firms. Out of these, only five were social control on the Cape Flats, and that none of these actors has a monopoly of not happy with the service and 11 were some of these urban spaces are under power and that the actors and positions unable to find adequate replacement the control of gangs. Despite attempts change constantly. security companies in the area. Among by the state to enforce a level of social The conceptualisation and understanding informal traders, 14 out of 53 traders control on the Cape Flats, Robins63 of protection rackets in the Cape Flats reported being extorted by criminal argues that it has been unable to do so. He summarises his views by stating, The state is no longer the primary actor in local Spatial governance in places like power dynamics – instead, the state, civil society and Manenberg will continue to be relatively ineffectual given existing organised crime groups often function in mutually levels of social inequality and racial supportive relationships polarization. Such processes are varies. Standing’s67 study on the criminal gangs, but from Standing’s research it reproduced by massive unemployment economy of the Cape Flats focuses on seemed as though the protection racket and racialised poverty resulting from was more sporadic than formal. Standing socio-spatial legacies of apartheid the levels of extortion faced by both states that informal traders who did and Cape Town’s shift from a formal and informal traders as well as admit to paying extortion did not provide manufacturing to a tourist, IT and illegal shebeen owners. In his research amounts, which may well be because financial services economy.64 he found that shebeen owners often complained of having to pay extortion they did not trust the interview process. Robins further argues that: money to the police. This is similar to However, he adds that only two informal Contestation between the state the findings on police corruption by traders said extortion occurred more and gangs over control of space Liza Grobler, who found that the police than once, which suggests opportunistic in Manenberg is part of a broader officers would often go to a shebeen with rackets. Summarising his findings, process in terms of which current a new police recruit to see whether the Standing states, investment strategies and urban recruit accepted free alcohol. Should the Primary research on the phenomenon development schemes have avoided recruit take the drink, this would confirm of protection rackets on the Cape Flats poor areas of the Cape Flats, that he was ‘one of them’ and he would has produced inconsistent findings. thereby reproducing the socio-spatial be included in corrupt activities.68 If not, There are many people who claim inequalities of the apartheid city.65 the police officers, acting in concert, that protection rackets are common While the state has tried to remedy this would try to remove him from their throughout the region, particularly with interventions and renewed social precinct or shift. Shebeen owners saw involving the shebeen industry. planning, in general business is still criminal gangs and drug operators as However, in two areas studied for located in the city centre and former being less of a problem than the police this research, Mitchells Plain and white areas. The exclusion of certain in demanding protection payments. Atlantis, there is very little evidence populations is also evident beyond these However, Standing adds that shebeen of well-organised protection rackets, forms of employment and investment, as owners are often involved in the drug although there are high crime rates demonstrated by the continuing legacy of trade and thus their relationships with and insecurity alongside ubiquitous illegal shebeens. criminal gangs are complex. criminal groups and street gangs.

ISS PAPER 259 • AUGUST 2014 9 PAPER

Where extortion is recorded, our from some Chinese entrepreneurs the underlying causes of violence in the data suggests this is opportunistic, to ensure their shipping container taxi industry in the Western Cape, it was predatory and sporadic.69 businesses remain on public property. found that taxi associations were involved in illegal activities, including murder, and Differing results are evident in research One of Charman and Piper’s most the report stated that ‘taxi association conducted by Lambrechts70 in interesting findings is that there is an mother bodies operate like a modern day Manenberg. She found that businesses important relationship in Delft between mafia with the power to extort monies had to pay gangs in order to operate landlords and shopkeepers. While half of from operators, the ability to kill people in their areas. If payment was not the respondents stated they had nobody who disagree with them and threaten forthcoming, intimidation and threats to turn to for support when facing their interests’.75 The report further stated would follow and the gangs would crime and violence, of those who could that a group of 30 or 40 people were rob the businesses. She quotes a rely on others, coloured shopkeepers behind much of the violence and that rehabilitated Hard Livings gang member, turned to their neighbours or community there was a link with gangs, especially who says, policing forums and black shopkeepers in coloured associations. The gangs turned to street committee leaders, See, sometimes the HLs (Hard Livings extort money from operators and drivers. Gang) can come in and rob you … whereas foreigners sought the landlord’s Furthermore, the report found that there They can take the stuff anytime if they protection. Thus the powerful landlord was a link with organised criminals who want to, but if you want protection can become an important safety net. used the taxis to carry and distribute you’ve got to pay us for the protection In the study they refer to a shopkeeper drugs, and to transport prostitutes so that you don’t get robbed and if who rented from a well-known drug lord on occasion. you don’t want to die, you also have to and paid more than double the rent, Thus protection racketeering takes pay for protection.71 but got protection in return. Similarly, on multiple forms on the Cape Flats. The rampant corruption in the police force and ‘hard The protection of businesses and policing’ strategies have made it more difficult to turn inhabitants is often far more complex than just straightforward coercion. The to legitimate sources of authority lack of state capacity and authority, as well as the importance of the criminal In a study by Charman and Piper,72 other shopkeepers rented from well- economy in the area, has created various particular attention is paid to immigrant, known community leaders as a source arrangements of power that include primarily Somali, businesses in the of protection. criminals. Furthermore, the rampant township of Delft on the Cape Flats. While businesses, both formal and corruption in the police force and ‘hard Unlike many other suburbs on the Cape informal, may suffer from protection policing’ strategies have made it more Flats, Delft is more racially mixed, with racketeering, the taxi industry has been difficult to turn to legitimate sources of a fairly large black population (40 per under considerable strain from gangs. authority. Jensen relates how police cent) in a majority coloured (60 per cent) Protection rackets in this industry were officers referred to entire Cape Flats township. Particular types of protection established in the 1980s in the wake of communities as ‘cockroaches’76 and and extortion exist in Delft. In the wake the government’s massive deregulation Samara states ‘policing in the townships of xenophobic violence, curfews have of the public transport sector.73 In the is in effect reinforcing the wedge that been set for businesses. However, vacuum left by state authority, violent exists between police and residents, shopkeepers tend to violate the curfew conflicts (known as taxi wars) over routes deepening mistrust and cynicism and despite the risks and state that they and fares occurred. eroding the ground in which genuine have more trouble from the police than long term crime prevention, and therefore the community. Yet street gangs and The taxi industry now consists of social development, could potentially criminals target these foreign-run spaza thousands of operators, and the take root’.77 shops for protection payments. Should established associations that represent the shopkeepers fail to pay, they throw taxi drivers can be seen as racketeers Analysis of protection rackets in bricks and stones at the container that who demand payment. However, they the CBD and the Cape Flats houses the spaza shop. Charman and do provide a level of protection in an The various types of protection rackets Piper give the example of the Delft extremely dangerous and cut-throat in Cape Town highlight the multiple Development Forum extracting payments business. In the Ntsebeza report74 on formations these rackets may take.

10 Cape Town’s protection rackets Protection rackets in the CBD and on the early 1990s. The violence of those number of gang bosses and criminal the Cape Flats vary to a large extent years has continued to the current date, businessmen have shares in or own in both sophistication and type. Thus but the level of that violence is now clubs and bars in the CBD, often through protection rackets in the CBD and Cape comparatively limited. proxies. Flats have a number of both noticeable Thus the CBD has seen the Furthermore, it is evident that tolerance characteristics and reasons for their entrenchment of criminal networks for these protection rackets is based continued existence. established at a time of weakened state on the belief that they often provide a In the CBD authority. These protection rackets service. The relationship between these What is noticeable in the Cape Town have almost become an accepted groups and those in business is difficult CBD is that those providing security often part of the Cape nightlife, similar to the to fully ascertain. While there is a distinct blur the line between private security and entrenchment of pizzo taxes in Italy. element of resentment over payments, criminal groups. Before being shut down, Businesses are willing to deal with the there is also the perception of protection SPS operated like a legitimate security body, going as far as trying to legitimise While there is a distinct element of resentment over its activities with the PSIRA by aligning payments, there is also the perception of protection 78 itself with a legitimate company. The rackets being a ‘necessary evil’ given the nightlife and complications within the CBD regarding private protection highlight the failure to the number of threats on the street regulate the private security industry. The payments in order to avoid the flare- rackets being a ‘necessary evil’ given PSIRA as a regulatory body is out of its ups in violence witnessed in the 1990s. the nightlife and the number of threats depth, undermanned and understaffed. Even with the improvement in the on the street, including drug dealing and Currently, there is only one PSIRA state’s imposition of its authority, it is theft. Police cannot be everywhere all the inspector to 9 000 security officers.79 difficult to remove the criminal element. time and protection rackets’ potentiality Many of the protection rackets in the The network itself is highly organised of violence – much more so than that of CBD have ties to legitimate companies. and sophisticated, and is capable of ‘ordinary’ security companies – makes Beeka’s companies were registered adapting to changing conditions. The with the PSIRA and therefore these them suitable and necessary candidates. modus operandi of these criminals companies have a level of legitimacy. Thus despite the increases in the state’s means that payments have been made capacity and authority in the CBD, the The action of protection rackets in the to networked criminal enterprises for provision of security in South Africa often CBD is focused on labour racketeering decades. The criminals involved in the has to be shared by a variety of actors, and forcing businesses to use their trade have remained fairly constant including private security companies. labour in the form of bouncers and despite the recent arrests of some security consultants. Furthermore, there members, and those involved seem to Drug dealing in the CBD remains big is a level of extortion by these security have a focused connection to the area. business, and the nature of many nightlife companies due to the increased charges This gives credence to the theory that businesses creates two scenarios. they force on business owners in the protection crime in the CBD is primarily Firstly, there is substantial profit to be CBD. Reports suggest that about 200 networked and monopolised, despite made through drug dealing in a club and venues were paying SPS anything occasional outbreaks of violence. These therefore there is a need for organised between R250 a week and R25 000 a outbreaks seem to occur after a central criminals to control that element. The month in protection fees for bouncers, figure in the network is killed or arrested, drug trade falls in the realm of anti- while smaller venues were forced into although payments are still made. In sovereignty for the state and these illegal taking on additional security at an the SPS case, the large number of markets thus need criminal structures to 80 inflated price. Despite the closing of arrests that were made as a result of the provide this type of criminal governance. SPS, many of the same individuals are media hype around SPS’s activities was Secondly, in order to control and limit still believed to be involved in protection followed by the release of the majority criminality, protection rackets become rackets in the CBD. The continued of those arrested. Therefore there was a necessary evil. According to Leggett, power of these individuals, despite continuity in the protection racket. Gang the security trade is important for the occasional disruptions, is based on the bosses’ presence also extends beyond drug trade as those who control the monopolistic rackets that occurred in the provision of protection services. A security at the club control the club,

ISS PAPER 259 • AUGUST 2014 11 PAPER

and thus the drugs moving in and out entrepreneurs (including in bouncing and Corruption in the police force and among of the establishment.81 This is reiterated ‘protection’) had devoted part of their other political figures is a major issue and by Kinnes, who argues that the rackets early life to violent sports such as boxing is highlighted by Beeka’s association with not only provide bouncers with designer and kickboxing. It was these skills that such high-ranking individuals. However, drugs but that these bouncers in made them ideal candidates to begin while Beeka’s notoriety placed him in turn also distribute drugs. Similarly, in enforcing protection services.85 the spotlight, other organised criminals also have significant influence over the Johannesburg the Elite security group In Cape Town, a large number of those police. For example, Dan Plato, the had links with criminal groups such as involved in the protection racket also Western Cape MEC for Community the Hells Angels and, according to the appear to have a background in violent Safety, related a story of how a decision Mail and Guardian, ‘whoever controls sports. For example, Yuri ‘the Russian’ 82 to raid nightclubs was made at a the door controls the drugs’. However, and Houssain Ait Taleb (the leader of MANCOM meeting at 9am. By 9.30am, while these links are often made, it the Moroccans) were both well-known should also be noted that the nature of kickboxing champions, and Cyril Beeka Plato received calls from his sources the market has changed and often more had a black belt in karate. Volkov argues notifying him that the information had 88 sophisticated buyers will get their drugs that it was in many of these sporting been leaked. Thus protection racketeering, in particular Corruption remains a major problem in both the labour racketeering, in the CBD is SAPS and municipal policing. The failure to eradicate systemic, sophisticated and entrenched, corruption and the decline in trust in the police allow especially within the nightlife industry. Failure by regulatory bodies to ensure non-state actors to gain legitimacy compliance with legislative mandates blurs the distinctions between legal and before going to a club, as they are more clubs that this warrior community began illegal private security companies, and assured of levels of quality and have organising into criminal groups. In Russia, rampant corruption at a high level makes fewer problems with law enforcement. the community of violent entrepreneurs it difficult to remove these entrenched developed and bonded in these sports’ Many of these protection rackets thrive networks of criminality. The violent clubhouses. According to media reports, due to the threat of force. Protection reputations of these criminals have also Ait Taleb’s kickboxing club in Cape Town rackets are managed by dangerous made it difficult for business owners was primarily used by members of the people. The names associated with to turn to the authorities, despite the now defunct SPS. This environment protection rackets are also often at the gains made by the city in increasing and resultant criminality ties in with upper echelons of crime in Cape Town. state capacity. Sutherland’s differential association An increased payment is less trouble theory.86 Similarly, the protection On the Cape Flats than the threat posed by protection business also provided a number of Residents of the Cape Flats tend to rackets. Volkov describes these former soldiers or police officers with a rely on informal means of security individuals as violent entrepreneurs.83 supplemental or new source of income. and protection as the state battles to A sociological study of the bouncer Many of the bouncers in Leggett’s establish its authority. A weak state may trade in England asked why men would study of drugs and organised crime in lack the political legitimacy required for choose a profession in bouncing, given South Africa were known to be former society to accept its right to enforce the the dangerous environment, levels of rules it imposes, which organised crime police or army members.87 Similarly, the organised crime and relatively poor groups or organised criminals may have. links established by former police and pay. What the study found was that Thus the growth of protection rackets security officers with criminals and their ‘the real benefits of the occupation can be symptomatic of a ‘disconnect’ knowledge of operations made the slip are grounded deep within masculine between state and society, with the state into criminality far easier. working-class culture and self identity being unwilling or unable to provide with its powerful appreciation of bodily Corruption remains a major problem in protection and/or enforce its authority power, personal and group respect and both the SAPS and municipal policing. on errant members of the community.89 violent engagement’.84 Yet, this is not the The failure to eradicate corruption and Additionally, if a state has a limited only explanation for choosing a violent the decline in trust in the police allow capacity to deal with corruption, society career. In Russia, a number of violent non-state actors to gain legitimacy. will be less likely to turn to legitimate

12 Cape Town’s protection rackets sources of authority and instead resort Similarly, businesses in vulnerable Notes to the services of organised criminals positions (often illegal and illicit) are also 1 To quote Charles Tilly, ‘If protection and protection racketeers. On the Cape at the mercy of extortion rackets, but rackets represent organised crime at its smoothest, then war risking and state Flats, the lack of state authority and the these relationships tend to be more making – quintessential protection rackets importance of criminal gangs create symbiotic. Shebeens, businesses with the advantage of legitimacy – qualify as additional complications for protection operating illegally and drug dealers all our largest examples of organised crime.’ See Charles Tilly, War making and state rackets. Gangs are arguably as important benefit from having a relationship with making as organised crime, in P Evans, D as the state in providing protection, albeit protection rackets. Thus the protection Rueschemeyer and T Skocpol (eds), Bringing informal, in these areas and have gained racket moves from one of extortion the state back in, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. a significant level of legitimacy, as have to one with similarities to the krysha 2 Joel Migdal, Strong societies and weak private protection companies in many system. Many shebeens are unable to states, Princeton: Princeton University Press, former non-white areas. enter the legitimate business sector and 1988. 3 Charles Tilly, War making and state making as While the CBD has a more noticeable therefore depend on alternative forms of , 173. protection, extortive or not. group of protection racketeers with 4 Andre Standing, The social contradictions of a particular modus operandi, the Similarly, those in the taxi business, organised crime on the Cape Flats, ISS Paper 74, 2003. Cape Flats has more diverse types which has been ravaged by violence, of protection rackets. These rackets 5 Paoli goes on to state: ‘Southern Italian Mafia are also known to pay protection fees coalitions are multifunctional organisations. may be systemic or opportunistic and to bodies that blur the line between In the past hundred years, their members can range from a required or desired the criminal and the legitimate. These have exploited the strength of mafia bonds to presence to coercive extortion. Due pursue various endeavours and to accomplish fees are arguably necessary, given the the most disparate tasks.’ This goes to the rampant crime problem on the violence and the inability of the state to beyond purely economic motivations. See Cape Flats, a variety of actors extract regulate and govern the taxi industry. Letizia Paoli, Italian organised crime: mafia extortion. As a purely extractive coercion, associations and criminal enterprises, Global Furthermore, gangs often practise Crime 6(1) (2004), 22. street gangs can demand payment from coercive extortion on taxis. What is 6 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: the business owners in an unsophisticated noticeable in the taxi industry is that business of private protection, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993; and Letizia manner. Standing’s study showed that there is a nexus between gangs, mother formal businesses were often capable Paoli, Mafia brotherhoods: organized crime bodies and taxi businesses. Italian style, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 90 of limiting this threat. However, there 2003. Importantly, legitimate forms of authority are exceptions and extortion can still 7 While generalisations are often made about occur. Furthermore, this form of extortion such as the police also run protection the Cape Flats, it should be noted that the Cape Flats has a number of suburbs within can become more formalised as the rackets against vulnerable businesses it with different socio-economic and racial group establishes its territory in the area. such as shebeens and can actively profiles. While certain townships, including What is noticeable is that those who seek protection money. The corruption the majority of black townships, are mired in poverty, there are several lower-middle and cannot turn to authorities are the most of the Cape Flats police force is far middle class areas in the Cape Flats. The at risk. From the first section it is evident more serious than that of the CBD, majority of protection rackets have occurred that those in informal businesses are with police providing protection to as in poor coloured areas with a high gang well as potentially becoming part of the presence, such as Manenberg and Lavender more likely to suffer from extortion than Hill. Thus references to the Cape Flats will those with a formal business, and that drug business. Grobler’s study found denote these areas. foreigners and vulnerable populations that aspects of police culture (such as 8 The CCTV regime in Cape Town, which was seem highly likely to fall victim to some the code of silence) made it harder to subsequently emulated in other metropoles, is discussed in detail by Anthony Minnaar, limit this corruption. Furthermore, as kind of extortion, both opportunistic The Implementation and impact of crime and systemic.91 Additionally, it has been criminality is entrenched and political prevention/crime control of open street shown that the state’s failure to establish patronage becomes the norm, there is a closed circuit television surveillance in South African central business districts, Surveillance its authority make protection rackets an possibility that those seeking protection & Society, 2007, 174–207, http://www. important source of informal protection may turn to members of the community, surveillance-and-society.org/articles4(3)/ and vulnerable businessmen can actively including officials, without going through southafrica.pdf (Accessed 17 May 2014). seek these forms of protection.92 the correct channels. 9 See C Goredema and K Goga, unpublished occasional paper on crime networks and governance in Cape Town, 2013. 10 S Gumedze (ed), From market for force to market for peace: private military and security

ISS PAPER 259 • AUGUST 2014 13 PAPER

companies in peacekeeping operations, ISS 22 Annette Hubschle, Organised crime in 35 Andre Standing, Organised crime: a study Monograph 183, 2011. Southern Africa: first annual review, ISS from the Cape Flats, Pretoria: ISS, 2006, 85. 11 The US Department of Defense sanctioned Special Report, 2010. 36 Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs. contracts with PMCs to the value of $161 23 Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs. 37 Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs, 725. billion in 2010: see David Isenberg, Showing 24 Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia. the private military contracting section the 38 Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs money, Huffington Post, 24 May 2011, http:// 25 It should be noted that Standing does not 39 Tony Roshan Samara, Cape Town after www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/ agree fully with these studies, but instead apartheid: crime and governance in the uses these common descriptions to explain showing-the-pmsc-sector-t_b_864372.html, divided city, Minneapolis: University of a hypothetical ideal type form of protection (Accessed 13 May 2013). Minnesota Press, 2011. rackets. 12 Despite the private nature of these 40 See C Tredoux and J Dixon, Mapping the 26 Nick Pisa, Organised crime ‘Italy’s biggest companies, their actions are sanctioned by multiple contexts of racial isolation: the case industry’, Sky News, 11 January 2012, http:// states, and are either regulated or self- of Long Street, Cape Town, Urban Studies news.sky.com/story/916774/organised- regulating. See S Gumedze (ed), Private 46(4) (April 2009). security in Africa: manifestation, challenges crime-italys-biggest-industry, (Accessed 17 41 The ISS observed that ‘While a significant and regulation, ISS Monograph 139, 2007. May 2014). proportion of white people (18%) said the It should also be noted that there is a 13 Also note that there are almost 1,8 million suburbs they live in are most unsafe, more difference between the Sicilian Mafia and registered security officers who are (27%) perceive themselves as particularly organised crime in Italy, which consists of registered but not active. See Ministry of vulnerable in the city centre. Fear of crime a number of criminal networks. The figure Police, South Africa has world’s largest in the inner city for these people probably quoted here is all criminal networks and not private security industry; needs regulation relates to actual crime levels: suburbs are just the Sicilian Mafia. – Mthethwa, DefenceWeb, 30 October comparatively safer than other parts of the 2012, http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index. 27 Executive summary of the full judgement of city where serious crimes are concerned. php?option=com_content&task=view&id= J Gloster, Berezovsky v Abrahmovich, 2007, Impressions of the inner city formed through 28306&Itemid=116, (Accessed 30 October http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/ the media and general perceptions (often 2012). JCO/Documents/Judgments/berezovsky- misplaced) of ‘disorder’ as a result of 14 No more private security for cops, City Press, abramovich-summary.pdf, (11 September overcrowding and street hawking also play 30 May 2012, http://www.citypress.co.za/ 2012). an important role, however. Fear of crime SouthAfrica/News/No-more-private-security- 28 Executive summary of the full judgement of in the city centre, based on this package of for-cops-20120530, (Accessed 30 May J Gloster, Berezovsky v Abrahmovich, 2007, issues, is nevertheless far less of a problem 2012). http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/ here than in Durban and Johannesburg.’ See Perception and reality: surveying crime in 15 Martin Schonteich, Unshackling the crime JCO/Documents/Judgments/berezovsky- fighters: increasing private sector involvement abramovich-summary.pdf, (11 September Cape Town, Nedbank Crime Index, Volume 2, in South Africa’s criminal justice system, 2012). number 2, 1998. (http://www.issafrica.org/ South African Institute for Race Relations, 29 Transcrime, Study on extortion racketeering: pubs/CrimeIndex/98Vol2No2/PERSEPTION. 1999, 27. the need for an instrument to combat HTML) (Accessed 17 May 2014) 16 See the Draft Green Paper on policing, activities of organised crime, http://ec.europa. 42 Cyril Beeka was a well-known underworld which calls for increased regulation of private eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/ and security figure in both Cape Town and th security due to the belief that private security study_on_extortion_racketeering_en.pdf Johannesburg. A 6 Dan karate expert, he is undertaking functions of the state. Civilian (Accessed 11 May 2014). was known for his violent temper and links Secretariat for Police–Draft Green Paper on 30 Ibid to organised criminals (including Cape Flats gangster Rashied Staggie, alleged mafia boss Policing, 2013 (http://www.policesecretariat. 31 P Monzini. L’estorsione nei mercati leciti e Vito Palazzolo and notorious Czech fugitive gov.za/downloads/green_paper_policing.pdf) illeciti. Liuc Papers n. 1–Serie (Accessed 17 May 2014). Radovan Krejcir) and important government Storia, impresa e società. 1993 figures (such as former intelligence head Mo 17 Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs: the use 32 Transcrime, Study on extortion racketeering: Shaik and former metro police chief Robert of force in the making of Russian capitalism, the need for an instrument to combat McBride). Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. activities of organised crime, http://ec.europa. 43 Irvin Kinnes, From urban street gangs to 18 For example, Red Security and its previous eu/dgs/home-affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/ criminal empires: The changing face of gangs incarnation, Pro Security, which provided study_on_extortion_racketeering_en.pdf in the Western Cape, ISS Monograph 48, much of the security for Cape Town’s nightlife, (Accessed 11 May 2014) June 2000 had links to underworld figure Cyril Beeka. 33 Ibid. Red Security is now wholly owned by Edward 44 Some of the bouncers were Moroccan and Beeka, Cyril Beeka’s brother. 34 According to Volkov, ‘violent entrepreneurs’, for some reason this term was soon applied a term used to describe people who ‘sell’ to all bouncers and their associates. A recent 19 See SAPS, Crime Stop, http://www.saps.gov. violence, use both violence and coercion Cape Times interview with Housain Ait Taleb, za/crimestop/common_offence_definitions. to achieve their ends. While violence is an a major role player, on the Moroccans, shed htm, (Accessed: 8 August 2013). immediate and visible use of force, coercion light on long-held assumptions about the 20 Stergios Skaperdas, The political economy can be ‘saved’. Yet coercion requires group. He stated, ‘At that time, everyone of organized crime: providing protection violence as a ‘memory or potentiality’ and was called Moroccan. Even Cyril was called when the state does not, Economics of for coercion to be effective, violence needs Moroccan.’ He added, ‘We are not mafia. Governance, 1998, 461. to be employed at least once. Each use We are a brotherhood … We protect each 21 For further information on the development of force (violence and coercion) is equally other.’ At the time of writing, seven members and influences over the concept of organized important for the violent entrepreneur and of the Moroccan group were involved in crime see Andre Standing, Rival views of the costs and effects of these two modes the bouncer scene in Cape Town. What his organized crime, ISS Monograph 77, 2003. are different. account does show is that law enforcement

14 Cape Town’s protection rackets may have favoured alien conspiracy models. 53 Interview with Nathan Ladegourdie, Assistant South Africa, South African Review of See Caryn Dolley, Band of brothers who Chief, Vice Squad, Cape Town. Sociology 43(3) (2012). patrol club scene, Cape Times, 30 January 54 The State of Cape Town Central City Report 73 Makubetse Sekhonyane and Jackie Dugard, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/news/south- 2012, http://ct-city-report.digitalmag.co.za/ The taxi industry and government at africa/western-cape/band-of-brothers-who- issue.php?name=ct-city-report/2012, loggerheads, SA Crime Quarterly 10 (2004). patrol-club-scene-1.1223533?ot=inmsa. (Accessed 17 May 2014). 74 Dumisa Ntsebeza, Report to the Premier: ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot, (Accessed 30 Committee of Inquiry into the underlying January 2012). 55 See endnote 7. causes of instability and conflict in the minibus 56 Statistics regarding the various wards in Cape 45 Irvin Kinnes, From urban street gangs to taxi industry in the Cape Town metropolitan Town are obtained from the census results criminal empires: The changing face of gangs area. Ntsebeza Report, 2005. on the city website: see City of Cape Town, in the Western Cape, ISS Monograph 48, City statistics and population census, https:// 75 Ibid, 110. June 2000. www.capetown.gov.za/en/stats, (Accessed 8 76 Steffen Jensen, The security and 46 Irvin Kinnes, From urban street gangs to January 2014). development nexus in Cape Town: war on criminal empires: The changing face of gangs See Andre Standing, The social gangs, counterinsurgency and citizenship, in the Western Cape, ISS Monograph 48, 57 contradictions of organised crime on the Security Dialogue 41(1) (2010). June 2000. Cape Flats and Organised crime, for an in- 77 Tony Roshan Samara, Cape Town after 47 Vito Palazzolo has long been accused of depth contextualisation of the history of the apartheid. being a top mafia ‘banker’ in the ‘pizza Cape Flats. connection’, which was a channel used by 78 Henriette Geldenhuys and Warda Meyer, 58 Don Pinnock, The brotherhoods: street gangs the Italian Mafia to send drugs to the US Thugs move on Cape Town clubs. and state control in Cape Town, Cape Town: in the 1970s and 1980s through pizzerias. 79 Henriette Geldenhuys, Fifty security firms face David Philip, 1984. His move to South Africa was shrouded in charges, iol news, 20 May 2012, http://www. mystery and through high-level corruption 59 See Steffen Jensen, Gangs, politics and iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/fifty-security- means he managed to secure residency in the dignity in Cape Town, Oxford: James Currey, firms-face-charges-1.1300260, (Accessed 22 country. He is currently awaiting extradition 2008; and Andre Standing, Organised crime. May 2012). in Thailand to Italy, where he faces a number 60 Andre Standing, Organised crime. 80 Sibusiso Nkomo, Bouncers to appear of charges and a conviction in absentia. He 61 Ken Sinclair-Smith and Ivan Turok, The over licences, Cape Argus, 6 February denies these links and his rebuttals can be changing spatial economy of cities: 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/news/ found on his personal website, http://www. an exploratory analysis of Cape Town, crime-courts/bouncers-to-appear-over- vrpalazzolo.com/. Development Southern Africa, 29(3) 2012. licences-1.1228163. 48 Henriette Geldenhuys and Warda Meyer, 62 The Economic Areas Management 81 Ted Leggett, Rainbow vice: the drugs and sex Thugs move on Cape Town clubs, Weekend Programme (‘ECAMP’) is a research and industries in the New South Africa, New Africa Argus, 11 March 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/ policy support initiative that tracks and Books, 2001. news/south-africa/western-cape/thugs-move- assesses the market performance and long- on-cape-town-clubs-1.1253533?ot=inmsa. 82 Craig McKune, Battle for control of the term growth potential of business precincts doors and the ‘drugs’, M&G Centre for ArticlePrintPageLayout.ot, (Accessed 11 across the metropolitan region. Investigative Journalism, 3 February 2012, March 2012). 63 Steven Robins, At the limits of spatial http://amabhungane.co.za/article/2012-02- 49 The majority of cases against SPS employees governmentality: a message from the tip of 03-battle-for-control-of-the-doors-and-drugs, have been dropped. Africa, Third World Quarterly 23(4) (2002). (Accessed 5 February 2012). 50 According to Andre Standing in Organised 64 Steven Robins, At the limits of spatial 83 Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs. crime, this is one of the major differences governmentality: a message from the tip of 84 S Winlow, D Hobbs, S Lister et al, Get between the transition state of Russia and Africa, Third World Quarterly 23(4) (2002), 665 ready to duck: bouncers and the realities of South Africa. Whereas Russians suffered a ethnographic research on violent groups, severe decline in living standards and massive 65 Ibid, 684 British Journal of Criminology, Special Issue: corruption, in South Africa this was far more 66 Derica Lambrechts, The Impact of organised Methodological Dilemmas of Research, 41(3) limited. crime on state social control: organised (2001), 536–48. 51 Tony Roshan Samara, Cape Town after criminal groups and local governance 85 Vadim Volkov, Violent entrepreneurs. apartheid. on the Cape Flats, Cape Town, South Africa, Journal of Southern Africa Studies 86 Edwin Sutherland, Principles of criminology, 52 The ‘broken-windows theory’ is the belief that 38(4) (2012). Philadelphia: JB Lippincott, 1947. well-kept urban environments are less likely to suffer from the same urban disorders that 67 Andre Standing, Organised crime. 87 Ted Leggett, Rainbow vice. plague badly maintained environments. Most 68 Interview with Dr Liza Grobler. 88 Interview with Dan Plato, MEC for Community famously it was implemented in New York, by 69 Andre Standing, Organised crime: a study Safety in the Western Cape. then mayor Rudy Giuliani adopting a ‘zero- from the Cape Flats, Pretoria: ISS, 2006, 230 89 See Federico Varense, The russian mafia, tolerance’ and aggressive police strategy. For private protection in a new market economy, more information see, 70 Derica Lambrechts, The Impact of organised crime on state social control. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. James Q Wilson and George Kelling, “Broken 90 Andre Standing, Organised crime. Windows: The police and neighborhood 71 Ibid. safety”, The Atlantic, 1982, Accessible 72 Andrew Charman and Laurence Piper, 91 Andrew Charman and Laurence Piper, online http://www.manhattan-institute.org/ Xenophobia, criminality and violent Xenophobia, criminality and violent pdf/_atlantic_monthly-broken_windows.pdf entrepreneurship: violence against Somali entrepreneurship. (accessed 17 May 2014) shopkeepers in Delft South, Cape Town, 92 Ibid.

ISS PAPER 259 • AUGUST 2014 15 PAPER

About the authors ISS Pretoria Khalil Goga is a researcher at the ISS Transnational Threats and International Block C, Brooklyn Court, 361 Veale Street Crime Division. He has been researching organised crime in Africa since New Muckleneuk, 2009 and has been affiliated with the ISS since 2012. He previously lectured Pretoria, South Africa at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, and received both his undergraduate and Tel: +27 12 346 9500 master’s degrees from this university. Fax: +27 12 460 0998 Charles Goredema is a senior research consultant working on various [email protected] projects managed by the ISS and the African Development Bank. His focal ISS Addis Ababa areas are transnational economic crime, governance and illicit financial flows. 5th Floor, Get House A lawyer by training, Charles’ career includes the prosecution of economic Building, Africa Avenue, crime (Zimbabwe), lecturing courses in Criminal Justice (Zimbabwe and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia South Africa) and managing research projects focusing on organised crime Tel: +251 11 515 6320 (South Africa). Fax: +251 11 515 6449 [email protected]

ISS Dakar About the ISS 4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum Route de Ouakam, The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation that aims Dakar, Senegal to enhance human security on the continent. It does independent and Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42 authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and Fax: +221 33 860 3343 delivers practical training and technical assistance. [email protected]

ISS Nairobi Braeside Gardens, Acknowledgements off Muthangari Road Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya IDRC CRDI Tel: +254 20 266 7208 International Development Research Centre Fax: +254 20 266 7198 Centre de recherches pour le développement international [email protected] This paper was made possible with support from the International Development Research Centre. The ISS is grateful for support from the following members of the ISS Partnership Forum: the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden www.issafrica.org and the USA.

© 2014, Institute for Security Studies ISS Paper No 259 Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the ISS, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity.